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Further Correspondence

respecting

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 64

January to March 1946

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CONFIDENTIAL

**FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING
EASTERN AFFAIRS**

PART 64.—JANUARY TO MARCH 1946

CHAPTER I.—PERSIA

[E 511/5/34]

No. 1

Mr. Bevin to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).

(No. 17.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, 16th January, 1946.

THE Persian Ambassador asked to see me most urgently this afternoon. He told me that the Persian delegation had decided to submit their case to the General Assembly, but asked whether His Majesty's Government would support it being put on the agenda of the Assembly. I made it clear that it was for the Persians alone to decide whether to go to the General Assembly or the Security Council. I could make no recommendation on this, but I assured the Ambassador that I would support it being put on the agenda of either the Assembly or the Security Council, whichever way they decided. Furthermore, I advised the Ambassador to see the International Secretariat immediately for advice about the technicalities of procedure and to inform Mr. Byrnes. The Ambassador said that he had seen Mr. Byrnes last night, who was most sympathetic.

2. The Ambassador further said that the latest information from Persia indicated that, instead of withdrawing their troops, the Russians were reinforcing and, indeed, interfering with normal sailings on the Caspian Sea.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

[E 904/5/34]

No. 2

Consul-General Wall to Sir R. W. Bullard (Tehran).—(Communicated by Tabriz Despatch No. 9, 17th January; Received in Foreign Office 30th January.)

(No. 2. Secret.)
Sir,

Tabriz, 12th January, 1946.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith an appreciation of conditions in this consular district between the 13th August and the 31st December, 1945.

Persian Administration.

2. The pessimism of the Persian officials and merchants which I mentioned in the conclusion of my despatch No. 12 of the 23rd August, 1945, has been justified by the events of the last four months and the long-standing question: "What will happen to Azerbaijan after the war," has been answered in fairly plain terms. That some people were sure about the answer long ago can be seen now from the efficient planning and timing of the assault on the Persian Administration in this province. The aim of the Tudeh party was to reduce to a minimum the authority of the Tehran Government in Azerbaijan, the practice of the Russian authorities, adjusted to this aim, was to prevent any strengthening of

the local administration by the appointment of more competent and patriotic officials.

3. Even in Persia it is possible that a weak local administration might in certain circumstances be bolstered up by patriotic and public-spirited local citizens. Thus, in Azerbaijan, the Persian Government might have found strength, first, in an organisation of merchants and manufacturers in some anti-Tudeh party and, second, in the combination of wealthy landlords whose interests were threatened by the Tudeh-Democratic movement. The Democrats were well aware of these dangers and took the initiative. By a little terrorism and a lot of threats and bluff they frightened the townspeople out of any attempt to combine in a "reactionary Seyyid Zia party." When necessary they could always count on Russian support to secure the expulsion of persons likely to be active in such combinations, because such persons could always be "proved" to be inimical to Russian interests. By August 1945, there had been enough of such expulsions to convince everyone that there was no hope whatever of forming an anti-Tudeh party. At the same time a campaign of terrorism was being carried on against the landowners and had reached its height at harvest time, when the Tudeh weapon of withholding rents in kind could most effectively be brought to bear. This campaign also was a complete success and served a double purpose: it robbed the Persian Administration of the potential support of the landowners, and it freed and emboldened the peasants on whom the Tudeh-Democrat party counted as forces in the next stage.

4. The Administration thus isolated was powerless: it could make no regulations and undertake no activity which had not the approval of the Tudeh-Democrats. It was headed, not by a substantive Governor-General, but by an acting official whose avowed purpose was simply to keep the wheels on the cart as long as he could and to get out when he couldn't. An attempt to substitute a substantive Governor-General, Mehdi Farrukh, for the acting official, Abu'l Fath Nikjou, was frustrated by a violent Democrat press campaign and by a plain statement of the Russians that they would consider his appointment "provocative."

5. By December the work of undermining the Persian Administration had left only two main props still to knock out: the gendarmerie and the army. Of these, the former was the stouter. Its rôle in Azerbaijan, besides keeping order in the country places, had been quite openly to assist the landowners in collecting rents and disciplining their peasants, whose condition approximated more nearly to that of serfs than tenants. The peasants could therefore be counted on to give their support against the gendarmerie as they had in general given it against the landowners. The army, like the civil administration, had been efficiently neutralised by the Russians, who, by the restrictions they placed on its movements, practically confined it to barracks in its garrisons of Tabriz, Rezaieh, Miandub, Marageh, Sarab and Ardebil. It was certain that they would not allow it to interfere with the Democrats' plans.

6. Hence the Persian Administration's only hope of resisting an attack lay in receiving reinforcements from outside the province, just as the Democrats' only hope of carrying out their plan quickly and easily lay in preventing such reinforcements. This was the crucial act of the campaign, and one in which the Russians could no longer act through the Democrat party: they were forced themselves to come out and stop the reinforcements sent by the Tehran Government at Kazvin. Thus, while ensuring the success of their policy, they were obliged to admit, in spite of all the camouflage with which the act was daubed, that the destruction of the Persian Administration in Azerbaijan was in fact *their* policy.

7. By successive stages between the 16th November and the 18th December the props were knocked out from under the Persian Administration: its ruins were quickly swept away or incorporated in the new edifice and a "National Government of Azerbaijan" assumed control from the 12th December, the day when the National Parliament of Azerbaijan met in Tabriz and all Government offices were taken over. The new Government, while claiming not to act to the detriment of Persian integrity and sovereignty, exercises in practice an authority wider than is usually understood by the term "local autonomy," and is at present, while no settlement with Tehran has yet been reached, for all practical purposes, an independent State.

Formation of the National Government.

8. The leaders of autonomous Azerbaijan are in the main "Old Liberals," that is to say, men who held and expressed Communist or Socialist principles

in the time of Reza Shah, were imprisoned for them, or fled to Russia, and emerged into public life again when Reza Shah was overthrown at the time of the Allied occupation in 1941. The leaders themselves are not "muhajirs" (immigrants from the Soviet Union), but several of them have spent periods in Russia. They are all ex-members of the Tudeh party, and, with possibly two exceptions, they are all men who in a free election, if such a thing were possible in Azerbaijan, would receive few if any votes from their fellow townspeople.

9. There are possibly two reasons for the reorganisation of the pro-Russian party which took place in August. One is that the Tudeh party had gained a reputation for violence and corruption and subservience to the Russians; the other is that it was led by men whom the Russians probably did not trust to carry out the final stages of the campaign. In the reorganisation these men (notably Ali Amir Khizi) were dropped. The first reason carries little weight in Azerbaijan, but the reorganisation, and especially the use of the name "Democrat party," possibly seemed to the Russians to have a good propaganda value abroad: though it has never seemed to people in this province that the Russians cared much for world opinion. The new Democrat party made an appeal to all classes, and tried to show that it was moderate, non-violent and patriotic. It was never, however, a political party in the Western sense: it assumed from the first the right to be the only party in the country, and to express alone the will of the people of Azerbaijan. It was a party in the Communist sense—an instrument for putting into effect a plan decided by a minority in the name of the people, for what the minority conceived to be the good of the people.

10. The Democrat party immediately absorbed all the old Tudeh party except, as it claimed, opportunist and irresponsible elements. The Tudeh party of Azerbaijan abolished itself by a self-sacrificing act on the 17th September. The Democrats published a declaration of policy like any other political party, but their main efforts were directed to organising themselves for the coming overthrow of Persian authority. During September and October committees of the party were organised in all the provincial towns and larger villages and in the first half of November arms, procured and distributed with Russian aid, were served out to party members in the zone chosen for the first attack.

11. In two days, the 16th and 17th November, the gendarmerie was overpowered and control assumed by the Democrats in a zone stretching from Sarab, through Mianeh to Miandub, cutting across all the lines of communication between Tabriz and the rest of Persia. The telegraph to Tehran (and the rest of the world) was cut, and all traffic on the roads strictly controlled. The Persian army garrisons in Ardebil, Sarab, Marageh and Miandub were isolated and outnumbered, and the Russian military authorities, while not absolutely forbidding the Persian general in plain terms to send reinforcements, made it quite clear that he could look for trouble from them if he did. The forces used in this insurrection were peasants armed with rifles and stiffened by "muhajirs"—immigrants from the Caucasus, many of whom have seen service in the Red army, and all of whom are completely under Russian influence. During the next week the region north-west of Tabriz, including the towns of Marand, Khoi and Maku, was similarly brought under Democrat control. These first conquests were made without much resistance by Persian troops or gendarmes, who, as soon as they surrendered, were disarmed and disbanded; but there were a number of isolated murders of gendarmes, civilian officials and landlords.

12. The party's political plan was geared to the insurrection. As soon as the gendarmerie were cleared from eastern Azerbaijan a National Congress met in Tabriz (the 19th November), composed of 650 delegates from all parts of Azerbaijan. This congress adopted a declaration which appealed to the five great democratic Powers to support Azerbaijan's claim to local autonomy "within the Iranian State." It also elected a provisional local government in the form of a "National Committee" of thirty-nine, which was charged with arranging the elections for a "National Parliament." This was the first open announcement that the Persian local government had been definitely superseded. The elections began on the 28th November and ended on the 1st December. The day they began Tehran's last choice for a governor-general for Azerbaijan, Murtaza Bayat, arrived in Tabriz. He had instructions to offer wide reforms and a programme of public works, but, of course, matters had gone far beyond the point where any palliative measures might have had an effect. There was never, indeed, any question that the Democrats—or more accurately, the Russians

—would allow their plans to be altered by anything Tehran could do, and it was at least six months too late for any official from Tehran to entertain hopes of raising local opposition to the Democrats. Bayat did not encounter the same violent opposition which had kept Farrukh away: the Democrats were strong enough to carry on as though unaware of his existence, and to leave him and his aged lieutenant, Mubassir Roshani, to make themselves faintly ridiculous with a proclamation offering to negotiate "with all parties." Bayat did have one or two interviews with members of the National Committee, but they refused to discuss any modification of their plans. Towards the end of his brief stay here, too, the Democrat press took notice of him in an article couched in the firm but not unkindly tone in which a child might be told to run away and play.

13. The elections were staged in the Russian manner: there was no opposition to the Democrat candidates, but to each list was added a number of "non-party" names, for which, of course, no one was expected to vote. There was universal suffrage over the age of 20, but as there was little pretence of secrecy in the ballot, and as, in any case, the polling booths were run and the votes counted entirely by party members, the number of votes announced as cast did not necessarily bear any definite relation to the number of persons who actually entered the booths. The total number of votes which the party announced as being cast in Tabriz corresponded to a tenth of the population. Twelve Deputies were elected for Tabriz, and every useful member of the party was assured of a seat somewhere.

14. The Parliament of 100 members thus elected met in Tabriz on the 12th December. In the week that had elapsed since the end of the elections the party's military movement had kept pace with the political development: party members in Tabriz had been armed with rifles and pistols, and the volunteer riflemen (*fida'is*) from the province were concentrated in the immediate suburbs of the town to the number of several thousand. Simultaneously with the opening of the Parliament, the armed forces closed in and took over all the police stations, the gendarmerie headquarters and the local government departments. There was some firing but no casualties, for the surrender had been most probably pre-arranged. The Persian military garrison in Tabriz surrendered two days later without resistance. Immediately the party, or the National Government as it had now become, proceeded to reduce the last remaining centre of Persian authority—that in western Azerbaijan. Here, the Persian Commandant and Acting Governor-General at Rezaieh unexpectedly took the initiative, and in a three days' attempt to forestall the Democrat attack permitted his gendarmerie to shoot at sight any known or suspected Democrats they encountered. The Democrats, actively aided by the Russian military authorities, assembled all available transport and brought in such reinforcements that, on the 18th December, the Rezaieh garrison capitulated, to be followed a few days later by those still remaining in eastern Azerbaijan, and the whole province was then completely in the hands of the National Government.

Composition and Policy of the National Government.

15. The Azerbaijan Cabinet, headed by Jaafar Pishavari as Prime Minister, is composed of ten Ministers: the Interior, the People's Army, Agriculture, Education, Health, Finance, Justice, Roads, Posts and Telegraphs, Trade, Labour. Four of these posts—Education, Finance, Justice and Roads—are filled by men who have played a prominent part in Tudeh-Democrat activities ever since the occupation. The other Ministers, though all party men, are not such well-known public figures. Of the whole Cabinet the only two of any noticeable ability are the Prime Minister and the Minister of Education, Mohamed Biriya, who is also chairman of the Azerbaijan Trade Union and has shown some organising ability and force of character in that capacity for several years. His, principally, is the task of carrying through the change from Persian to Turki as the official language. The Minister of Finance is the one time Mayor of Tabriz, Ghulam Reza Ilhami, a hypocritical, untrustworthy character whose ability is as doubtful as his honesty. He is at present showing a great deal of boastful and bullying energy in collecting taxes.

16. The Government's policy as announced by Pishavari on the 12th December is naturally first to establish securely Azerbaijan's autonomous status. It proposes to do this by broadening the basis of administration by electing regional and town councils to carry on local government, by making the Turki language the one official language of Azerbaijan, by raising and equipping a modern army and by seeking recognition of Azerbaijan's status among the Great Powers. In domestic policy it promises a reform of land tenure equitable

to both landlords and peasants, the extension and improvement of public health services, the development of industry and trade and the modernisation of communications. It guarantees respect for private property and for the rights of racial and religious minorities.

Relations with the Central Persian Government.

17. These at present do not exist. The Persian Government has so far shown no sign of recognising the Azerbaijan "rebels" and the National Government for its part abuses the "reactionary" Government in Tehran, accuses it of trying to strangle Azerbaijan financially and threatens to make a complete break with Persia. Telegraphic communication with Tehran was restored on the 17th December, but all messages are censored and the use of code is prohibited to private persons and commercial firms. The post is operating between Tabriz and Tehran, but is liable to censorship as are correspondence and papers carried by travellers. While still protesting that they do not want to break with Persia, the National Government are on the verge of it, and if the Russians desire it, the attitude of the Central Government provides them with all the excuse they need. Azerbaijan, however, cannot exist as an independent State. If it parts from Persia, it must inevitably be absorbed by Russia. Its future relations with Tehran, therefore, depend entirely on what Stalin wants and on how far he thinks he can go in the face of British and American opinion. It is worth noting, however, that from the first the Democrat party have tried to remove the Azerbaijan question from the purely domestic Persian sphere and make it an international question.

Internal Administration.

18. While the final form of local government within the province by means of "democratically" elected councils remains yet to be settled, numerous appointments of provincial officials have been made. In general, the old structure of administration is being kept, with *farmandars* (governors) and *bakhshdars* (mayors) appointed by the Minister of the Interior. These officials will, however, function by the advice of and subject to the supervision of the popularly-elected councils. In Tabriz a head of municipality has been appointed and arrangements are being made to elect a municipal council. The head of the municipality is Bayat Maku, a son of the old Sardar of Maku, who fell foul of Reza Shah and one of whose relicts—Anali Khanum—still owns the remains of the Sardar's property at Maku, but is not particularly *bien vue* either by Russians or Democrats.

19. The heads of the local government departments in Tabriz were, of course, removed by the National Government, but most of the minor civil servants appear to have stayed on in obedience to Pishavari's appeal. The salaries and ranks of all who will work loyally for the new Government have been guaranteed, but there has, of course, been a good deal of reshuffling to the advantage of tried party-members among the civil service. Turki has become the official language and all business is to be performed in that language. The Minister of Education has been instructed to arrange classes for those civil servants who are not proficient in Turki. The change-over is causing some slight temporary confusion as there is not yet a standard Turki spelling. But nearly all the minor civil servants are born Azerbaijanis, who speak Turki as their mother tongue and the change will not be by any means so difficult to bring about as for example, the adoption of Erse as an official language in the Irish Free State. The language of instruction in the schools is to be Turki and commissions are at work translating the existing Persian text-books. The popular idiom in Azerbaijan differs a good deal from the Osmanli Turkish, and there is no question of adopting modified Latin characters; the language of Azerbaijan, therefore, is being rapidly influenced by the nearest written Turki idiom on which it can model itself—the dialect of Baku.

Security.

20. The gendarmerie has been abolished throughout the province, but there is a promise in the Government's programme that it will be reconstituted on a "democratic basis." At present, however, its functions, among others, are being exercised by companies of volunteer riflemen (*fida'is*). In Tabriz and the other towns, the police, purged of "reactionary" members, are working normally, but are augmented by *fida'is*. A period of martial law (or something which approximates to it) has been proclaimed for three months from the 12th December. Judgment is by court martial (*mahkama sahrat*) and has so far been swift and

exemplary. Four criminals have been publicly executed for rape and robbery. The courts and judicial offices are, of course, being staffed with Democrat officials.

21. In pursuance of their policy of creating a strong army, the National Government offered all officers and men of the Persian garrison after surrender the choice of re-enlisting in the "People's Army" on advantageous terms. A private soldier is offered 150 rials per month in pay besides his keep and clothing. So far the response has not been good, and the regular forces of Azerbaijan (as distinct from the unpaid fida'is) probably do not number more than 2,000. It is proposed to obtain the best modern equipment and instructors for the army, and these, naturally, can come from only one source. The People's Army Minister, Gavian, is an old Liberal, whose father also was a fida'i in Tabriz at the time of the agitation for the Persian Constitution forty years ago. The Deputy Minister, Ghulam Yahia Daneshian, is probably a stronger character than Gavian—he looks like a professional gun-man—but was unknown before the "revolution." The army is ill-equipped as yet; the troops wear their own clothes with, at most, a rolled blanket or a Persian army overcoat by way of uniform. It has, however, acquired all the small arms of the disbanded Tabriz garrison.

Finance.

22. The first act of the new Ministry of Finance was to get possession of the Persian Government balances in the National Bank of Iran. The manager of the bank failed to make any arrangement to transfer his cash reserve to safer custody, and it is possible that the National Government therefore found about 40 million rials. But the Minister of Finance complains that the bank's cash is 15 million short, so that it is possible that the manager did, after all, succeed in getting some of it away. Drawings on the bank were at first limited and then stopped altogether. A little later the Bank Taavoni Sepah and Boudagian Brothers, were likewise brought under Government control. Tehran retaliated by cancelling the validity of the signatures of the National Bank officials here, and the head office of the Bank Taavoni Sepah did the same as regards its Tabriz branch. The Central Government Treasury has naturally not remitted the usual sums allocated for local government expenditure in the budget, and the National Government is now faced with the problem of raising sufficient funds to pay its way. Long before the "revolution" capital was being transferred from Tabriz to Tehran, and during October and November there was a desperate scramble by merchants to get as much of their wealth as possible out of the Russian zone. The National Government put a stop to that. No funds may be transferred now, and merchandise may only be sent out of Azerbaijan on an undertaking that the proceeds of sale will be returned here. At the same time the National Government is applying the Millsaugh income-tax law with some modifications, and the methods used in collection are so much more ruthless than under the old régime that most of the tax due from certain enterprises for the last year has in fact been paid to the local treasury.

Trade and Industry.

23. Trade has been declining during all the period under review. Uncertainty about the future caused wholesale dealing in the bazaar to dry up, and although the export trade, particularly in carpets, began to look up in August and September, the difficulties placed in its way by the Democrat party, even before they seized power, killed it later in the year. At present a few commodities, but no food-stuffs, are being sent for sale in Tehran on the condition mentioned in the previous paragraph. As a result of the embargo on the export of food-stuffs the prices of some locally-produced articles have come down; geese and turkeys, for instance, which were prepared for the Tehran market towards the end of December had to be sold off in Tabriz for 50 or 60 rials each, less than half the normal price. But, in general, retail prices show little change from what they were six months ago. The cessation of payment by the National Bank has added to the difficulties of trade within the province; the only source of money now is the Imperial Bank of Iran, and merchants are reluctant to flaunt their wealth before the Ministry of Finance by making large purchases. The National Government itself is in the market as a seller, having acquired a large stock of sugar, tea and cotton piece-goods from the Persian Supply Department which it wants to turn into cash. Immediately after seizing power it advertised the sale of 100 tons of sugar, but found no buyers. The Russians, nevertheless, have been able to dispose of a certain amount of sugar and cotton cloth. They have been able to sell the latter by promising to arrange for permission to export it to Tehran. The same political and financial difficulties have, of course, had an adverse effect

on the import trade, and the promise of a big increase in purchases from the United Kingdom has unfortunately not been fulfilled.

24. The factories of Tabriz have shown no signs of recovering from their depression. One match factory and one leather factory are the only two which have continued to work at a profit. The policy of the National Government aims both at making the factories profitable again and at mulcting the owners of some of the fat profits they made in former years. They have already taken over one leather factory, acquiring all its one-toman shares at the price of 2.50 rials—though it is doubtful whether they have paid for them. The match factory has paid 11 million rials arrears of income tax. The Khosrovi Leather Factory is under distraint for the payment of 6.6 million. Most of the managers and directors of the textile factories are absent in Tehran, and, as these concerns also will most probably be required to pay their taxes, it is likely that they, too, will be taken over by the Government. The practice of selling a factory's product on the local market to collect taxes due is wasteful and short-sighted, since the Tabriz market can only absorb a small part of the output, and that at a very low price. Unless, therefore, some trade settlement is made with Tehran, the only outlet for the goods of local factories will be Soviet Russia. But the diversion of the province's entire export trade to Russia will mean a drastic cut in the exaggerated profits which it is the custom of Tabriz manufacturers to demand and make, with consequent reductions in wages. That the reorganisation of industry means harder work, stricter conditions and lower profits seems already to have dawned on some of the National Government and on the leader of the workers' union. New and stricter rules of work in the factories have been drawn up and approved by the union, and the workers are beginning to find that factory life is not the fun it was in the slack old "reactionary" times. The union has a short way with slackers: on the foreman or manager's complaint a couple of riflemen are likely to appear at the factory and march the defaulter off to the union headquarters, whence he returns in a more serious and chastened mood.

Kurdish Affairs.

25. The last four months have seen a development in Kurdish Nationalist plans similar to that of the Azerbaijan Nationalists. Contact between Kurdish Nationalists and Russian political officers has been constant, and about September it began to be apparent that the Russians were taking the Nationalist Komalla Kurd Society seriously in hand. In that month five Kurdish chiefs, including Gazi Mohamed, Nuri Beg and a chief of the Dehboukris were taken on a visit to Baku, where it seems clear they were advised by the President of the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic and other influential Russians to combine with the Turki-speaking Azerbaijani separatists and were, no doubt, given an approved plan of action. Shortly after their return the formation of a "Democrat party of Kurdistan" was announced with Gazi Mohamed as president and headquarters at Mahabad. A printing press and a quantity of newsprint were supplied to the society by the Russians. The society's manifesto called for the establishment of an autonomous Kurdistan "within the Persian State," and pledged full support to the Democrat party of Azerbaijan. Kurdish observers were present at the National Congress (paragraph 12 above), and at the opening of the Azerbaijan National Parliament. About the middle of December Kurdish spokesmen declared that a National Assembly of Kurdistan would be opened in Mahabad within a few days, but by the end of the year there was no firm news that this had been done.

26. Towards the end of October Mullah Mustafa Barzani and his brother with about 2,000 families of his tribe, fleeing from the Iraqi Government forces, crossed the Persian frontier and settled in the Sulduz area. He has been welcomed, if not too warmly, by the chieftains who support the Kurdish Democrat party, and is likely to play a part in the formation of an autonomous Kurdistan in this part of Persia. While Democratic principles do not appeal to the feudal chiefs of the Kurds, the majority of them support the party as a means of securing their independence. Those who fear both Russian domination and the ambition of upstarts like Gazi Mohamed, nevertheless support the most powerful party out of prudence. Co-operation with the Azerbaijan National Government has been so far slight: Nuri Beg and Rashid Beg Herki came in to help with the reduction of the Rezaieh garrison, but were sent away again by the Russians. There are some indications, too, that the Russians may not intend autonomous Kurdistan to be on an equal footing with autonomous Azerbaijan, but may design to keep the Kurdistan administration subordinate to the National Government at Tabriz.

Soviet Policy.

27. All the foregoing paragraphs are, of course, a description of Soviet policy; the Russian aim was and is the establishment of an autonomous Azerbaijan. But, as previously, the question was what sort of a régime they intended for Azerbaijan; now it is, what do they intend to do with the autonomous Azerbaijan they have created? It is clear that Azerbaijan cannot continue in its present indeterminate position, owing allegiance to Persia but disowned by Tehran; guided, supported and protected by the Soviet Union, but theoretically part of a foreign sovereign State. Had it been the Russians' desire to detach Azerbaijan completely from Persia, nothing could have been easier when the Democrats seized power; a plebiscite as efficiently run as the elections would have given a unanimous vote in favour of union with the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic. Many people in Azerbaijan think that this will yet be done, and that the instrument to be used has already been prepared, in the shape of the "Friends of Soviet Azerbaijan" Society, which has recently been formed. There are, perhaps, two reasons why it has not been done: first, even the Russians may well be puzzled how to camouflage convincingly so flagrant a breach of their treaty undertakings; second, Azerbaijan may be much more useful to Soviet policy as part of Persia than as part of the Soviet Union, since, as one of the most populous and richest provinces (the equally rich province of Mazandaran being also in the Russian zone), it can be used to put great pressure on the Central Government, to influence the composition of the Government and Majlis and to serve as an open door through which Soviet influence can enter and spread to all parts of Persia. The Russians, in short, may view Azerbaijan as an instrument by means of which the whole of Persia can be turned into an Outer Mongolia. If that is a possible guess at the long-term policy of Russia, certain effects of her short-term policy are no longer guesswork; Russian engineers are already drilling for oil in the province, others are surveying for copper, gold and possibly other minerals, and the whole trade of the province is being carefully shepherded to the Soviet fold.

British Interests.

28. Where things have gone so much according to the Russian plan British interests have inevitably suffered. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in this province has to compete with the Russian Iransovnaft Company, and the Russians naturally view with equanimity difficulties which tend to restrict the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's trade and extend that of Iransovnaft. The company's depots have suffered no violence in the troubles of the last month or so, and there has been only a negligible loss of money through the Democrats shirking payment for some of the petrol, &c., consumed. But the supply of products to the agencies up and down the province has been delayed and obstructed by the Democrats commandeering lorries of the company, and, with the interruption of banking business, the agents are unable to remit the proceeds of their sales to Tabriz. The Imperial Bank of Iran, which has suffered so far only a loss of business through the drying up of trade and the closing of the National Bank, is accused by the National Government of withholding credit from the bazaar, of transferring funds out of Azerbaijan and of taking up a hostile attitude to the new Government by refusing to honour the signatures of the officials of the National Bank and one of the private banks whose balances with the Imperial Bank the National Government naturally want to obtain. At the end of December there were signs that the National Government would put pressure on the Imperial Bank in Tabriz by threatening to withdraw their protection and by refusing to grant legal facilities.

29. The sales of British propaganda material, which remained at their usual level through August, September and October, declined sharply when the troubles began in November. The agents in the provincial towns may well be afraid of incurring odium (or inviting violence) as agents of a "reactionary Power" if they display British literature. The agent at Marand was killed during the seizure of that town by the Democrats at the end of November—though probably more because he was a wealthy landowner than as the distributor of reactionary propaganda. It is very probable, too, that parcels of publicity material sent from Tabriz would be seized in the local post offices. However, the change in methods of distribution of the more popular periodicals instituted by the Public Relations Bureau at Tehran during the period under review has relieved this consulate-general of most of the task of despatching to agents, and hence it is not possible to ascertain how far sales have fallen in many lines. On the other hand, the closing of the National Bank has made it impossible for the provincial newsagents

to buy British publications from the wholesale dealer in Tehran. Throughout the crisis in Tabriz, the Public Relations Bureau shop radio attracted a large audience to listen to the news of Azerbaijan—some of it unfortunately very inaccurate—given in Persian by the B.B.C. and Tehran radio. Democrat criticism of the B.B.C. was sharp at one period and it was feared that we might be asked not to broadcast, but no such request has so far been made, and the only hostile demonstration against the shop was a half-hearted one by a few mischievous youths who broke the window.

Conclusion.

30. The last four months have seen the logical result of the policy of interference in Persia's internal affairs which the Soviet authorities have pursued in this province ever since the occupation. The Persians have never been masters in their own house in Azerbaijan, and hence, as far as the day-to-day life of the common people is concerned, nothing much is altered by the transference of power to the National Government. Before the events of the 12th December, however, the Persians could always look forward to the blessed 2nd March, when, they piously hoped, the last Russian soldier would take the road to the north and they could do as they liked again. That hope, if not dead, is now *in extremis*. Even those fatalistic old Conservatives who have seen both Tsarist and Ottoman invaders come and go before are beginning to admit reluctantly that this time it is different. It seems hardly likely that the Russians will bluntly break their promise to withdraw on the 2nd March, but the present situation offers well-nigh endless possibilities of legal quibbling and chicanery; Azerbaijan may argue that it is no longer part of Persia within the meaning of the treaty; or Stalin may graciously grant the petition of the Azerbaijan people to allow their Soviet guests to stay a little longer; or, if the Soviet troops do depart, they will be no further away than Julfa, and can cover the 90 miles from there to Tabriz rapidly enough in response to an appeal for protection against the blood-drinking hordes of the Tehran reactionaries.

31. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Foreign Office; His Majesty's Embassies at Angora and Moscow; His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah; the Government of India; General Headquarters, Delhi; and C.I.C.I., Baghdad.

I have, &c.

J. W. WALL.

[E 1990/5/34]

No. 3

Mr. Bevin to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).

(No. 65.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, 4th March, 1946.

THE Persian Ambassador came to see me to-day. He expressed grave concern at the non-withdrawal of Russian troops from Persia and asked me whether I had received any further information. I replied that we had sent a note enquiring what was the attitude of the Soviet Government and were awaiting a reply. Pending its arrival I was unable to make any statement. The Ambassador told me that many suggestions had been made that the Prime Minister of Persia had entered into some agreement in Moscow. He had taken the precaution of telegraphing his Prime Minister last week and had been assured that the Prime Minister had presented a note of protest to the Soviet Government. The Prime Minister was returning to Tehran to-day and would probably make a statement on his return. To the Ambassador's question whether I thought the Russian troops would withdraw, I replied that Stalin had always asserted that Soviet Russia kept her treaties and that this was the first time that a case of this kind had occurred. I added that we had better be patient for a day or two before any further statement was made and await the report of his Prime Minister's negotiations, which we would then study.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

[E 2370/5/34]

No. 4

Speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs during the Debate in the House of Commons, 14th March, 1946.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Ernest Bevin): As the House is aware, His Majesty's Government have addressed to the Soviet Government an enquiry as to their intentions in respect of the withdrawal of their troops from Persia. I have received enquiries as to whether it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to replace British troops in Persia. No decision to that effect has been taken by His Majesty's Government, nor have they taken any steps to open negotiations with the Persian Government for the return of British troops.

I ought to say that we received the most categorical assurances from Generalissimo Stalin and the Soviet Government that the integrity of Persia would be respected, and that there was no intention to taking aggressive action against her. The Soviet Foreign Ministry, in their reply to the representations which we made to them in November last on the subject of reported Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Persia, stated:—

"In so far as reference is made in your letter to the Tripartite Treaty of 1942 and the declaration of the three Powers on Iran, I have to state that, in accordance with this treaty and declaration, the Soviet Government invariably carries out a policy of respect for the territorial integrity, suzerainty and independence of Iran."

Moreover, at the time of the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, when the question of the withdrawal of British and Soviet troops from Persia was discussed, I clearly understood from M. Molotov that there was no difference of view as to the date by which Allied troops should be withdrawn under the treaty, that is to say, by the 2nd March, 1946, six months after the signing of the Japanese instrument of surrender. In his letter which concluded the correspondence on this subject, which I communicated to the House, M. Molotov asked me to bear in mind the exceptional importance which the Soviet Government attached to the strict fulfilment of their obligations.

It is difficult for His Majesty's Government to understand the present policy of Soviet Russia in this matter, and more difficult for us to believe that all these assurances are not going to be fulfilled. We are now awaiting the reply of the Soviet Government to the enquiries which we have addressed to them.

When His Majesty's Government became a party to the resolution of the Security Council on the 30th January, that direct negotiations should be undertaken between the Soviet and Persian Governments, they did so on the clear assumption that the existing treaty obligations to withdraw Allied troops from Persia on the 2nd March would be fulfilled, and His Majesty's Government would regret any settlement which appeared to be extracted from the Persian Government under duress while the Soviet army was still in occupation of part of Persia.

[E 2318/5/34]

No. 5

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 15th March).

(No. 65.)
Sir,

Tehran, 3rd March, 1946.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith a note on the question of North Persia; the development of Soviet policy during the period since the occupation in August 1941; how His Majesty's Government treated the problem: first by trying to hasten the withdrawal of the foreign troops, then by the scheme put forward at the Moscow Conference; and finally, how the matter was dealt with by the Security Council. The note lacks an ending because we do not yet know what will be the result of the negotiations which the Persian Prime Minister is conducting in Moscow; but I am expecting to leave this post very soon and may not be here when the result is known, and the 3rd March is a convenient moment to report, now that we know for certain that the Soviet Government intend to keep troops in most of the places they already occupy, "until the situation is clarified."

2. It is my firm belief that from the moment when the Soviet Government sent their troops into North Persia they intended to take what we should call

a mean advantage of the opportunity, and to renew—this time for good, though in a more discreet way—the grip on North Persia which they relaxed after the last war. To the military and civil agents of Soviet policy the accusation that they have taken a mean advantage would appear outrageous: they would justify their action by the plausible argument that in such parts of Persia as came under Soviet influence or inspiration the poorer classes would speedily attain release from the economic oppression from which they now suffer and a much higher standard of living, and would probably add that this release would be accompanied by an increase in political freedom. The advantage taken is nevertheless mean, for the Soviet troops were supposed to be in Persia solely in order to secure goods and war material for the war against the Axis, and under a treaty obligation to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of the country, and the use of a temporary hold in order to bring about permanent economic or political changes cannot be considered legitimate. As to the claim that greater political freedom would follow: that is a fundamental question where I part company with the Soviet apologist.

3. The present despatch deals with the past. I hope to treat in another despatch the question of Anglo-Soviet relations in the future, as seen from Tehran.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 5

Russia and North Persia.

IT seems reasonable to conclude, from the actions of the Russians in Persia since August 1941 and from what we have seen of their policy elsewhere, that they intended from the beginning to utilise the presence of their troops to establish their influence in North Persia for good; but it is probable that they would have preferred to attain that end in a much more discreet manner than that which they have used during the last two years. From the moment when Soviet troops entered Northern Persia in August 1941 the Soviet authorities used every means to weaken the influence of the Persian Government in Azerbaijan by interference both in the civil administration and in the application of security measures, but the recalcitrance of a Persian Prime Minister, Mr. Saed, and the unexpectedly early end of the war with Japan, gave Russia a choice between losing the chance to turn the occasion to profit or taking more overt action. In the end she chose overt action.

2. In the more discreet armoury of Soviet policy the blandishments of Stalin in person were the first weapon. During the Tehran Conference in November 1943 Stalin paid the Shah a compliment which President Roosevelt had withheld, of going to call on him. In the course of the visit he captivated the young Shah and induced him to accept a gift of Soviet tanks and aeroplanes. The aircraft—bombers and fast fighters—were not such as Persia needed, and the tanks would have been too heavy for any of the bridges in Persia, but the gift-horse was not examined with indecent curiosity. When, however, the material was ready to be handed over, the Soviet Ambassador produced a list of stringent conditions which gave the Persian Government and the Shah good reason to think that the main object was to secure influence in the Persian army and caused them to decline the gift by asking to be allowed to accept it without conditions. The displeasure of the Soviet Government was shown by the immediate removal of the ambassador and by the omission of Kalinin to send the customary telegram to the Shah at the Persian New Year, and comments by members of the Soviet Embassy show that they considered the refusal of a present offered by Stalin in person as impiety, not merely ingratitude.

3. The refusal of the war material, however, was a slight set-back to Russian aims, compared with the rejection in October 1944 of the Soviet demand for an oil concession. The word "demand" is used correctly, for the Soviet negotiator, M. Kavtoradze, did not submit terms for examination, but demanded the grant of a concession over a huge area in principle, the minor details such as payments to be worked out afterwards. The arrogance of this request was the more striking, in that the British and American companies which were bidding for a concession in the south at that moment were offering keenly competitive terms which were being checked for the Persian Government by one

of the best firms of consultants (American) in the world. The area envisaged in the Soviet demand was large: for prospecting purposes the Soviet Government wanted rights over 216,000 square kilom. in Northern Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Semnan and Northern Khorassan; after five years 150,000 square kilom. would be selected for exploitation; and, of course, the exploiters would be, not a company, but the Soviet Government—a circumstance which M. Kavtoradze seemed to think should make a special appeal to the Persian Government. There is reason to believe that the Soviet Government had in mind something more than an oil concession—perhaps something which in practice would have resembled the old chartered companies. To arouse hostility against the Persian Government, Soviet spokesmen talked of the roads which would have been built and the agricultural and irrigation projects which would have been undertaken if the concession had been granted; and one of the Persian delegates at the San Francisco Conference had to listen to a long harangue by a man attached to the Soviet delegation, who assured him that, unlike the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company who did nothing to improve the area where they worked but merely exploited it, the Soviet oil concern would turn the concession area into a smiling tree-covered landscape. This could, in fact, be easily done without net loss to the Soviet Government if the Persian Government had to grant, as it was evidently expected to do, the blank concession dictated by M. Kavtoradze. On all financial and economic transactions between Russia and Persia, such as the munitions agreement and various barter agreements, Persia is always a heavy loser, and it can be certain that in concluding an oil concession the Russians would have left themselves such a margin that they could carry out specious public works and give their Persian employees conditions better than elsewhere (except perhaps in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) in Persia and so set up a strain which would serve Russia's political ends. Besides, with a huge economic concern spread over 150,000 square kilom. of territory, the Russians could influence the administration, the courts, and the elections in and near that area, and make themselves not only all-powerful there, but indirectly a power in the rest of the country too. But the Soviet proposals were rejected early in October 1944, and, moreover, the Majlis, in a mood of patriotic excitement, accepted a Bill tabled by the demagogue, Dr. Musaddiq, on the 2nd December, 1944, prohibiting the grant of any oil concession and passed it into law forthwith.

4. There still remained one means by which Russia could expect to gain influence more or less unobtrusively: the elections to the XV Majlis. The law on the subject is rigid: the elections should have been announced on the 12th September, 1945, and been begun about the 12th December, and even if, as is permissible and customary, they had run on for three months, they would have taken place almost entirely before the 2nd March—the last date, under the tripartite treaty of January 1942, for the evacuation of the Allied troops from Persia. The Persian Government, however, had had experience enough with the small band of Tudeh Deputies which Soviet influence had placed in the Majlis, although only seven in number, with their discipline and the support of several other Deputies, also indebted to Soviet pressure for their seats, and of a number of rich men with lands in the north whose material interests drove them to vote against their admitted convictions, they were able to constitute an influential opposition. It was quite certain that this time the Russians would neglect no chance to put their friends into the Majlis, and with the administration in North Persia in a state of paralysis, they could have secured from thirty to forty seats in the north, and even if they secured none outside their zone (and they might well have obtained a few), they would have been able to dominate the Majlis. When September came, however, the proclamation by the Shah which should have announced the elections for three months later was never issued, and the Russians must have realised that their influence was at this entrance quite shut out. To bolt the door the Majlis, on the 11th December, passed a law postponing the elections until the foreign troops should have left Persia.

5. After each check, though particularly after the second, one detects an increase in Soviet pressure in the north, and especially in Azerbaijan. The administration of Azerbaijan had been weakened, but by small pinpricks rather than by a great wound; the Kurds had at first been encouraged, but seemed to have been told to calm down again. Examination of the time-table of events shows, however, that events now speeded, or were speeded, up. The proffered war material is refused in March 1944: not only does the Soviet Union snub Persia that same month by omitting to send the customary telegram of congratulation on the 21st March, the Persian New Year, but the following month obvious signs of a great Soviet drive, including talk of a greater Azerbaijan, are noticed in Tabriz. The Soviet demand for an oil concession is rejected in October 1944:

before the end of the month the Soviet authorities in Tabriz profit by a demonstration to disarm Persian police and military patrols, prevent Persian officers from leaving their barracks carrying arms, and order the Persian general-officer-commanding to leave for Tehran at twenty-four hours' notice; and by the 1st December a Tudeh demonstration is already talking about provincial councils. Perhaps after that the course of events was inevitable, but it is a reasonable supposition that if on the 12th September the elections had been announced to begin three months later, the next few weeks would not necessarily have seen a visit of the Kurdish leaders to Baku, or meetings at Tabriz of the new "Democratic" party, with the formation of a standing committee and the issue of orders to public departments and schools to change over from the Persian language to Turki within a year.

6. Apart from the evidence suggesting that a check to Soviet policy in Tehran was followed on three occasions by the intensification of agitation against the Persian Government in the north, and especially in Azerbaijan, there is plenty of evidence of direct Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Persia. A blatant example is the boring for oil, near Tabriz and south of Shahi, without the consent of the Persian Government. Another is the open interference of the Soviet authorities with the security measures adopted by the Persian Government to deal with the officers who mutinied at Meshed. The most striking instance of interference is admitted by the Soviet Government, though it is given a Pickwickian interpretation which makes it non-intervention in Soviet eyes. This was the action of the Soviet Government in stopping at Sharifabad, a few miles east of Qazvin, a small force of Persian troops and gendarmes which, on the 20th November, 1945, was on its way to Azerbaijan to strengthen the Persian forces there, and in particular to deal with the situation created by the seizure of Mianeh by the Azerbaijan "Democrats." In reply to the remonstrances of the Persian Government the Soviet Government replied that the Persian forces were free to proceed, only the Soviet Government advised against it, since the arrival of more Persian troops in Azerbaijan might lead to bloodshed, which would compel the Soviet Government to bring in reinforcements to ensure the security of their existing troops—and the Soviet Government did not wish to have to send in reinforcements. Later the Soviet Government argued that the Persian forces already in Azerbaijan were sufficient for legitimate duties, though they were, in fact, perhaps one-fifth the number of the Soviet forces. This was in conformity with the policy which had been followed from the beginning—to keep the forces of the Persian Government down to a figure with which the Soviet protégés would be able to deal when the time should come. The Mahabad affair, in March 1945, afforded a striking illustration of this policy. Some gendarmes having been killed by Kurds, the Persian Government ordered some troops from Southern Kurdistan to go to Mahabad, but the troops were stopped by Soviet authorities and not allowed to proceed. The Soviet Embassy first said that troops for Mahabad might be sent from Rezaieh, and later actually urged the Persian Government to send troops to occupy Mahabad—but from Tabriz. It would appear that the aim was not only to prevent the introduction of reinforcements in Azerbaijan, but to split up the larger of the existing garrisons so that the scattered forces might be the more easily overcome. The political developments in Azerbaijan have conformed so closely to the invariable Soviet pattern that this alone affords strong presumptive evidence of Soviet inspiration, but there is plenty of more direct evidence of Soviet interference: the acting British Consul-General at Tabriz has himself seen Soviet lorries full of armed "Democrats" driven by Red army soldiers in uniform, and any serious enquiry on the spot would undoubtedly be able to confirm his conviction that the Soviet military authorities distributed arms to the dissidents and interfered in other ways, and that among the "Democrats" are many helpers from over the border. The evidence for the distribution of arms by the Russians is good. Arms have been given both to the "Democrats" and the Kurds, and always Persian arms. The Soviet Government acquired large stocks of Persian Brno rifles from three sources: (1) by capture when the Persian army disintegrated in August 1941: the Persian Government admit that they lost about 80,000 rifles, and a considerable proportion of these must have fallen into the hands of the Russians; (2) by purchase of 100,000, with cartridges, from the Persian Government (with British money) in 1941; (3) under the contract by which an unwilling Persian Government was compelled to make rifles and machine pistols and small arms ammunition for the Soviet Government at prices below cost; about 40,000 rifles were delivered under this contract. Two rifles seen in "Democrat" hands by the acting British Consul-General at Tabriz are stated by the Persian General

Staff, on the strength of their serial numbers, to belong to the 100,000 which we bought for the Russians from the Persian Government.

7. Soviet intervention can be studied profitably in connexion with Kurdistan. Here, again, the Soviet Government have denied the charge, officially and in writing, but the record convicts them. Perhaps we need not judge too seriously the much-advertised cultural visit of the Kurdish chiefs to Baku early in 1942. On the face of it, this was an encouragement to a notoriously recalcitrant minority and hardly in accordance with the terms of the treaty with Persia and Great Britain which the Soviet Government had just signed; but let us admit that the Red army was so weak in Kurdistan that the visit was a device to keep the Kurds quiet without force or threat of force. Let us admit, too, that after what seemed to be a period of encouragement the Soviet authorities seemed to be keeping the Kurds at arm's length. Later, however, we find them preventing the Persian authorities from repelling an attack on Rezaieh by local Kurds and from punishing those responsible for the raid, and protecting the Kurdish murderer of a Persian registrar who had tried to prevent the rigging of the Mahabad elections in favour of the Kurdish leader, Qazi Muhammad. Open and unashamed support of Kurdish intransigence came in March 1945, when there occurred the Mahabad affair described in the preceding paragraph. The climax came in September 1945, when a group of Kurdish chiefs, headed by the leaders of the autonomy movement, Qazi Muhammad, were hurried off by the Soviet military authorities to Baku, where they had an interview with the President of Soviet Azerbaijan, Baqirov, who promised them Soviet help in securing their independence if they would assist the new Democratic party of Azerbaijan. Assistance was speedily provided in the form of a printing press and a large quantity of paper. There was no concealment about this: assistance in the form of arms was provided with greater discretion.

8. The Kurdish question, though it has been run by the Russians in connexion with the Azerbaijan question in general, is not an integral part of it. It is now clear that the Kurds do not accept orders from the Azerbaijan National Government in Tabriz, and there is no doubt that in asserting their independence of Tabriz they are relying on promises of Soviet help. Russian influence in Tabriz may leaven the whole of Persia; but Russian influence in the northern part of Persian Kurdistan may leaven not only the southern part of Persian Kurdistan, but the Kurdish territories of Iraq and Turkey, too. A policy that united all the Kurds would appeal to the Kurds, and it would suit Russia because it would weaken three States, bring Soviet influence close to Bagdad and Mosul, and eventually provide an excuse for demanding the Kirkuk oil to provide a revenue for an autonomous republic or province of Kurdistan.

9. The very nature of the Azerbaijan movement would have declared its Soviet origin, even if the Soviet Government had not proclaimed its support when it held back the Persian reinforcements at Sharifabad. Nevertheless the Persians, who state that there would have been no Azerbaijan movement at all but for the Russians, are hardly more correct than the Russians, who ascribe it to a spontaneous outburst of democratic feeling. The fact is that the Russians found a greater disposition to chafe against control from the capital than they would have found in any other province of Persia.

10. In the days of the wars between Persia and Turkey the Azerbaijanis formed the spearhead of the Persian army, and that not merely because they were the nearest province to Turkey. Although speaking a Turki dialect, the Azerbaijani is separated from the Turk by his Shiah faith. The connexion with Persia was strengthened in Qajar times by the custom under which the heir-apparent was always Governor-General of Azerbaijan. This connexion was severed when Reza Shah came to the throne, and Azerbaijan was perhaps neglected more than most other provinces during his reign precisely because of its pro-Qajar past. Then Tabriz showed a keener attachment to the constitutional movement of 1905-09 than any other part of Persia, and greater courage in defending it. This disinclination to accept autocratic rule at the centre took another step towards "autonomy" in 1921, when a certain Khiabani turned out all the military and civil personnel that were not of local origin, and although he was overthrown, the desire that the pickings of office should remain in the province will not have disappeared with him. Nor did the Persian Government make any effort to conciliate local feeling on this point, and to the average corruption of the Persian officials in Azerbaijan was added, when Soviet forces entered the country in August 1941, the cowardice and lack of public spirit which led most of the higher officials to take to their heels, regardless of the interests of their charges. Even after the occupation the Persian Government

seems to have made no effort to select officials who would do them credit and tend to keep the population of Azerbaijan attached to the Persian Government and throne. The first Governor-General appointed, General Muqaddam, was well known to be an incorrigible thief, the second was a nonentity, who openly sided with the Soviet Government against his own. It is suggestive that the Soviet authorities approved heartily of them both and parted with them with regret and indeed under protest.

11. There is no need to describe in detail the process by which Azerbaijan became "autonomous." That has been well done by Mr. Wall in his despatches and telegrams from Tabriz, and, in particular, in the admirable summary, in his despatch, No. 2 dated the 12th January, 1946, of the events of the last five months of 1945. As a result of elections of the type which Russia has made familiar, Azerbaijan has secured a Government purely "democrat" in character, the title "democrat" having been adopted, it may be assumed, to recall the democrats of 1905 and to take in the foreign reader, and also to break away, in appearance at least, from the Tudeh party, which had become discredited throughout Persia by its open subservience to Russia and suspect to the Kurds by its agrarian policy. The Azerbaijan Government has repeatedly declared its desire to operate its autonomy within the framework of the Persian Constitution, but unless the negotiations in Moscow pare down the autonomy very considerably, or unless, with Soviet help, a stronger Government is set up in Tehran than Persians usually produce, Azerbaijan is not likely to be amenable to control from Tehran, and the tendency to gravitate more and more towards union with Soviet Azerbaijan will be very great. North Persian Kurdistan will undoubtedly be protected by Soviet influence from too close control even from Tabriz, because of its utility as a corridor to the heart of the Middle and Near East.

How the Problem has been Dealt with.

(a) Withdrawal of Foreign Troops.

12. The effect of the presence of Soviet troops in Persia was obvious and caused His Majesty's Government to wish to hasten their departure and the Soviet Government to resolve to keep them there as long as possible. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945 the Soviet representatives refused to discuss Mr. Eden's proposal that the period of withdrawal might begin when the Persian supply route had been closed, though they confirmed that they had no intention of putting pressure on Persia and that they stood entirely by the Tripartite Treaty and the Tehran Declaration. It would have been a weapon against the Soviet Government if we had been able to accept in principle the thesis put forward by the Persian Government on the 19th May, that, the war with Germany being over, there was no longer any need for the retention of Allied troops in Persia. Unfortunately circumstances were against this; not being at war with Japan the Russians could reasonably be expected to withdraw forthwith; but we needed for the purpose of the war in the Far East to protect the oil area and the American air-base in the south. The most His Majesty's Government could do was to assure the Persian Government that they were prepared to consider sympathetically the Persian Government's request that the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia should begin before the final date fixed by the treaty and were discussing the question with the Soviet and American Governments. At that time His Majesty's Government were not prepared to withdraw their troops except *pari passu* with the Russians. It was significant that at this moment two Persian newspapers which had always followed the Soviet line—one of them the known mouthpiece of the Soviet Embassy, *Rahbar*—published articles maintaining that the evacuation of Persia by foreign troops would simply put the country back where it was in the days of Reza Shah. This theory had been voiced in pro-Russian papers before, its basis being the absurd theory that Reza Shah was under "imperialist" influence; but this time *Rahbar* was more explicit, and declared that evacuation ought not to be effected until satisfactory military and political conditions should have been set up. This was probably the first hint that the Russians were keeping the treaty of 1921 as a weapon of reserve.

13. Early in July, before the Potsdam Conference, His Majesty's Government stated that their object was to relax the Russian grip on North Persia, and if possible to get all the Russian troops out of Persia before the treaty date. Their proposal to the Russians that there should be *pari passu* withdrawal by stages and that the military representatives should work out the details had received no reply. It seemed clear that the Russians did not favour withdrawal of their forces in the near future; they probably hoped by remaining to obtain such a firm

hold on North Persia that they would be able to establish and perpetuate their domination of the Persian Government. It was clear that if they were successful the consequences for His Majesty's Government and for their imperial interests in South Persia might be most serious, but the most that could be obtained from the Soviet Government at the Potsdam Conference was an agreement to evacuate Tehran—an agreement which was carried out with typical Soviet disingenuousness; although loudly announced as having been completed on the 20th September, it was not in fact completed until December—if an evacuation can be considered completed which leaves behind large numbers of Russians, out of uniform but billeted together and with undefined duties. During the London Conference in September the Secretary of State made another effort to secure an early, partial withdrawal of the Allied forces. It was proposed that by the middle of December 1945 there should be no British troops in Persia except in the southern oil area to the south of and including Andimishk and no Soviet forces except in Azerbaijan; all British and Russian troops would, of course, be withdrawn from Persia by the 2nd March. M. Molotov would go no further than admitting that the withdrawal of troops should be effected within the period laid down in the Tripartite Treaty and suggesting that the final plan of withdrawal might be discussed towards the end of the said period. He carefully avoided admitting that the period would end on the 2nd March, 1946. In spite of M. Molotov's negative attitude the evacuation of British troops proceeded rather faster than if he had agreed to our plan, and by the 21st November, the Hamadan, Kermanshah-Bisitun and Khorumabad areas had been evacuated and no British troops under Paiforce remained in Persia, except those from Andimishk southwards, while a long-range squadron operating in East Persia under the orders of the Government of India had been removed by the 28th November. Meanwhile, Russia had thrown off the mask, and on the 20th November had used Soviet troops to prevent a small force of Persian troops and gendarmes at Sharifabad, near Qazvin, from proceeding to Azerbaijan, where the "Democrats" had just seized Mianeh. The Russians also re-occupied Kerej—20 miles from Tehran—in force, and even established a post less than 10 miles from Tehran, and, in general, they intensified their military "occupation" of the north. The United States Government, on the 24th November, made representations to the Soviet Government, proposing that all Soviet, British and American troops should be withdrawn from Persia by the 1st January, 1946, referring to the Tehran Declaration regarding Persian territorial integrity, &c., and setting forth the American view that the Persian Government ought to have full liberty to move its armed forces throughout Persia as it saw fit. The Soviet Government, in their reply, declared that the Tehran Declaration did not affect either the number of Soviet troops in Persia or the period during which they might stay, and declared their intention to abide by the treaty of 1942 in spite of the fact that the right of introduction of Soviet troops into Persia was envisaged by the Soviet-Persian Treaty of 1921. This treaty has been quoted more than once by pro-Russian newspapers in Tehran and both Stalin and Molotov quoted it to the Americans during the Moscow Conference. Neither Stalin nor Molotov mentioned the 1921 treaty to the British delegation; this may have been out of politeness, because the 1921 treaty obviously has one eye on His Majesty's Government, or it may have been because they have a greater respect for our knowledge of public documents than that of the Americans. The British delegation might have reminded M. Stalin or M. Molotov that the relevant provisions of the 1921 treaty, narrow as they are, are still further restricted by a subsequent exchange of letters which was made between Russia and Persia. On the 12th December, 1921, the Russian diplomatic representative in Tehran wrote to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs assuring him that articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 treaty which provided for the entry of Soviet troops into Persia in certain circumstances, were "intended to apply only to cases in which preparations have been made for a considerable armed attack on Russia or the Soviet Republics allied to her."

(b) *Treatment of the Azerbaijan problem as one of Persian Local Government in general.*

14. The plan put forward by the British Embassy at the Moscow Conference, in December 1945, whereby Great Britain, Russia and America would assist Persia to solve the Azerbaijan question as a part of the problem of local government throughout Persia, was not invented on the spur of the moment. While we have regarded with scepticism the support given by the Soviet Embassy and the Tudeh party to the candidature of Qawam-es-Saltana to the

premiership, in view of the fact that he is everything that the Tudeh profess to hate, and while we have not joined the Soviet Government every time it began, for reasons of its own, to call the current Prime Minister a Fascist, we have always tried, however ineffectively, to induce successive prime ministers to accept measures within the capacity even of Persia, whereby the Administration might be improved. The chief measures suggested during the last three years or more have been (1) the establishment of a civil service commission to deal with at least the upper posts, in order to avoid the nepotism and confusion of the present system; (2) treatment of the tribes as an integral part of the population instead of as pariahs; (3) application of a system of local government for the whole country; (4) recognition of minority languages at least in the primary schools. The first proposal appeals to every Persian statesman when he is out of office, but only then. The second was acted upon to the extent that M. Soheily, early in 1943, made a statement in the Majlis about the tribes which, though sadly watered down from the suggestions made to him, might have been of value if he or his successors had made serious attempts to put it into execution. Recognition of such languages as Kurdish and Turki is not a policy that appeals to the Persian, who, to begin with, cannot believe that anyone does not appreciate the Persian language at the value put upon it by the Persians themselves. As to local government, all the Persians that were consulted were agreed that it would make use of local patriotism and talent then running to waste, relieve the over-centralisation which is one of the main causes of administrative stagnation, and act as a check on the abuses committed by officials sent—often for short periods—from Tehran. In June 1943 His Majesty's Ambassador was able to report to the Foreign Office, when sending a copy of the relevant articles of the Constitution and a summary of the Provincial Councils Law, that he had discussed the question with the Shah and the Prime Minister (M. Soheily) and that "both appeared to be sympathetic, and to favour some degree of decentralisation; and both seemed to realise that a spontaneous grant of local councils to all the provinces might perhaps forestall a demand from Tabriz or the Kurdish areas for still wider concessions." No action was, however, taken by the Persian authorities at the time, though His Majesty's Ambassador spoke of the scheme to every Prime Minister in turn and one of them went so far as to decide to take it up. By November 1945 "Tabriz and the Kurdish areas" in Azerbaijan had put in their demands for "wider concessions," backed by the force of Soviet Russia, and it was already late in the day when an appeal from the Persian Government to the Governments of Great Britain, Russia and the United States made it possible for His Majesty's Ambassador, with the authorisation of the Foreign Office, to put the provincial council proposal to the Prime Minister as his personal suggestion. M. Hakimi was vaguely sympathetic and authorised His Majesty's Ambassador to speak to the new Minister of the Interior, M. Saleh. It was found that the idea had by now reached M. Saleh, who was already studying the question; and a few days later he suddenly issued orders that the Provincial Councils Law of 1907 was to be put into execution and elections held at once. He had decided that it was politically desirable to take action at once rather than to wait to remedy the defects in the law. He spoke of amendments being made, but it is understood that these were all directed towards reducing the councils to the status of advisory bodies to the Governor-General—a fantastic suggestion at this time of day. Closer examination of the law showed that it was what might have been expected from the first Persian Parliament (1907), when the enthusiasm was in inverse proportion to the experience: it is a mass of ill-selected, unco-ordinated provisions which would defeat a council with far more experience, energy and goodwill than any Persian council is likely to have. It refers vaguely to responsibility in regard to roads, bridges and education, but fails to define the powers or the kind of schools, &c.; it has nothing about public health, except for references to hospitals, orphanages and asylums; its financial provisions are completely unintelligible; and, in some ways, it increases centralisation instead of diminishing it.

15. Mr. Byrnes, United States Secretary of State, had Persia placed on the agenda of the Moscow Conference, but at the first meeting agreed to M. Molotov's suggestions that it should be removed from the agenda and reserved for informal discussion. The Persian Government, supposing that the Persian question might be discussed, had reminded Great Britain and Russia of their right to be consulted in virtue of article 5 of the 1942 Treaty, but had not quite asked for an invitation to be represented at the conference. The Russians naturally wanted no action to be taken about Persia; the American delegation

had no policy except an appeal to the United Nations Organisation. The British delegation felt that it would be a pity to go to the United Nations without first trying to find a solution through the three Allies during the presence of whose troops in Persia difficulties had arisen with which she seemed unable to cope alone, and proposed that the three Powers should suggest to the Persian Government that they should appoint a tripartite commission to advise the Persian Government on the establishment of a system of local government and on the possible use of minority languages for educational or other purposes. The full story has been told in the Foreign Office print, but for convenience the Anglo-American proposals, as modified by the insertion of the amendments put forward by Stalin, are given in the annex to this despatch. The British delegation put forward the nucleus of the scheme, the American delegation turned that into complete terms of reference, embroidering the language and, in particular, adding the provision in paragraph 2 which included in the duties of the proposed commission the submission of recommendations to the Three Powers on the acceleration of the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia. It seemed to the British delegation that this provision might perhaps serve as a pretext to the Russians to delay withdrawal beyond the 2nd March, but the Americans clung to it as the only clause that did not appear to be casting reflections on the Persians, so it was retained.

16. During the course of the negotiations both Stalin and Molotov declared that they did not care whether the Persian question were brought up before the United Nations Organisation or not; they had nothing to blush for. Nevertheless, the Anglo-American proposals at first had a quite good reception from Stalin, and it was a disappointment when, after his amendments had been incorporated, Molotov rejected the scheme, the ostensible ground of rejection being that though he realised that the proposals could not be adopted without the Persian Government's consent, the Soviet Government found it equally impossible to consult the Persian Government. The British delegation had added to the preamble the words "and are submitting this agreement to the Iranian Government for their concurrence" as a matter of form, since, under article 5 of the Tripartite Treaty of 1942, Great Britain and Russia undertook "to consult the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah in all matters affecting the direct interests of Iran." It is quite possible that Molotov's excuse for rejection was a pretext. After consideration the Politburo may have decided that with a little more pressure from Russia the Persian Government would give in and consent to leave such matters as Azerbaijan, the evacuation of Soviet troops, &c., for direct discussion with the Soviet Government.

17. His Majesty's Government determined, nevertheless, to make an attempt to get the Anglo-American scheme through by securing the approval of the Persian Government hoping that if three parties were agreed, the consent of the fourth, the Soviet Government, might then be secured. His Majesty's Ambassador returned to Tehran with instructions to do his best to induce the Persian Government to approve the draft proposals, and similar instructions were sent to the American Ambassador in Tehran. The reception was, at first, favourable. The Shah, who was given a copy privately, approved, and so did two or three influential Persians who were also shown copies; and the Government said that they accepted "in principle" and "with a few amendments." The Persian Government were so well disposed that when Mr. Bevin deprecated their half-formed plan to appeal to the United Nations Organisation as likely to wreck any chance there was that the Soviet Government would accept the Anglo-American proposal, they deferred to his opinion. This was in spite of their belief that unless the matter was submitted to the Assembly, then meeting in London, before the 6th January, there would be no further chance to raise it until the next meeting—a belief which was shown to be unfounded by the subsequent proceedings in the Security Council. Unfortunately, the Anglo-American proposal suffered from the great drawback that it could not be published since the Russians would never accept a scheme which had been hawked about in the press, while, on the other hand, some publicity was inevitable since the Persian Government has not the powers of a British Cabinet and could not approve the scheme without consultation. This consultation had, therefore, to be effected in a hole-and-corner fashion which gave the proposal the worst advertisement. As a whole it might have received fair consideration by the public, but certain points leaked out in garbled form, and the public and the Deputies were easily stampeded into the fear, if not the belief, that the object of the proposals was to place the country under mandate, to restore the conditions of 1907, and so on. This fear was exploited by the pro-Soviet newspapers,

which expressed the most lively horror at the alleged interference in the internal affairs of Persia. Meanwhile, the Persian Government had produced two impossible amendments, viz., that the clause about the use of the minority languages should be omitted, and that two Persian members should be added to the Tripartite Commission. The Anglo-American proposal was, therefore, dropped.

18. The Persian Government then returned to the plan to invoke the assistance of the United Nations Organisation, and on the 19th January the Persian delegation notified the Executive Committee of the decision of the Persian Government to bring the situation in North-West Persia before the Security Council in accordance with article 35 (1) of the Charter as a "situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute." The communication mentioned the Soviet Government by name. The course of the proceedings in the Security Council is well known. They ended with the adoption of the following resolution:—

The Council "having heard the statements by the representatives of the Soviet Union and of Iran in the course of its meetings of the 28th and the 30th January, 1946, and having taken cognisance of the documents presented by Soviet and Iranian delegations and those referred to in the course of the oral debates.

"Considering that both parties have affirmed their readiness to seek a solution of the matter at issue by negotiation, and that such negotiations will be resumed in the near future, requests the parties to inform the Council of any result achieved in such negotiations.

"The Council in the meanwhile retains the right at any time to request information as to the progress of the negotiations."

19. The great efforts made by Mr. Bevin, well supported by Mr. Stettinius, to assist Persia were largely nullified during the course of the proceedings by the fall of the Persian Government which had invoked the help of the United Nations Organisation—that of M. Hakimi. It must not be thought that the overthrow of the Government indicated dissatisfaction on the part of the Deputies with the appeal to United Nations Organisation. It merely illustrated the frivolity and irresponsibility of the Persian character, as exemplified in most of the Deputies, and also in the Shah, who finally ordered Hakimi to resign—only to regret his action when it was too late. The vote in the Majlis a few days later, whereby Qawam-es-Saltana became Prime Minister was, perhaps, as absurd an operation as ever decided so momentous an event. The tortuous Deputies, being still engaged in an ecstasy of intrigue as to Hakimi's successor, and unable to agree, thought to gain time by voting for Mutamin al Mulk (Pirnia) who, although he would probably not accept the nomination, might rally a majority of votes against the Qawam. Mutamin al Mulk received fifty-one votes, the Qawam fifty-one. Dr. Musaddiq cast a vote against the Qawam, not by voting for Pirnia, but by casting a solitary vote for Hakimi, for whose resignation he had been mainly responsible. To complete the sad comedy, the Speaker, sodden with opium, descended from the chair and cast his vote for the Qawam. The Qawam thus had a majority of one over Pirnia, though as many votes had been cast against him as for him. The Shah might have been justified in asking for a more decisive vote before entrusting the Government to Qawam, but he did not do so.

Annex.

(The words in italics represent amendments of substance, as opposed to mere verbal changes, proposed by the Soviet Delegation.)

The Governments of Great Britain, U.S.S.R. and the United States have agreed on the formation of a Tripartite Commission for Iranian questions and are submitting this agreement to the Iranian Government for their concurrence.

The terms of reference are as follows:—

1. The commission shall take as its point of departure the fact that during the presence in Persia of Allied troops the Persian economy and governmental

organisation have been disturbed and difficulties have arisen between the central Government and the inhabitants of certain provinces. The Three Powers recognise that they may have some responsibility for this and should therefore endeavour to assist the Persian State in re-establishing normal conditions to the satisfaction of all elements of the population and maintaining friendly relations with other countries.

2. With a view to removing the apprehensions of the Iranian Government and causes of international friction, the commission shall deal with the question of the acceleration *as far as possible* of the withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran, and shall make appropriate recommendations to the Governments of the Three Powers.

3. The commission shall keep in mind (a) the undertaking given by Great Britain and Soviet Russia in the treaty of January 1942, to respect the political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Persia; and (b) the declaration about Persia issued during the Tehran Conference by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Stalin and Mr. Churchill.

4. With a view to reconciling the existing differences between the central Persian Government and certain *provinces* of the country, the commission shall advise and assist the Persian Government in the establishment of provincial councils in accordance with the provisions of the Persian Constitution.

5. The recommendations of the commission (which must receive the approval of the three Governments before being submitted to the Persian Government) shall cover the whole of Persia, including Azerbaijan.

6. Existing laws amplifying the relevant provisions of the Constitution (with respect to provincial councils) shall be taken as the point of departure, but the commission shall recommend any amendments which seem to be required, especially in regard to the elections to the local councils, the powers and duties of the councils and the manner in which they are to be furnished with funds.

7. The commission shall also make recommendations as to the *free* use of the minority languages, such as Arabic, Turki and Kurdish, for educational and other purposes.

8. The commission shall consult closely with the Persian Government and with representatives of all important elements of the population in the process of formulating its recommendations.

9. The Three Powers shall use their best endeavours to persuade the Persian Government to pass into law and to put into execution the recommendations made by the commission.

10. The commission shall make no recommendation which would weaken the fundamental unity of the Persian State.

11. The first provincial elections shall be carried out under the supervision of the commission.

[E 2535/5/34]

No. 6

(1)

The Earl of Halifax to Mr. Bevin. (Received 21st March)

(No. 1811)

(Telegraphic)

Washington, 20th March, 1946

ADDRESSED to New York, No. 10.

Following for Sir A. Cadogan:—

"My immediately following telegram contains text of note to Security Council presented by Persian Ambassador to Secretary-General of United Nations Organisation, 18th March.

"2. Mr. Lie has asked me to convey this to you.

"3. Foreign Office please pass to Tehran and Moscow as my telegrams Nos. 31 and 128."

[E 2551/5/34]

(2)

The Earl of Halifax to Mr. Bevin. (Received 21st March)

(No. 1812)

(Telegraphic)

Washington, 20th March, 1946

ADDRESSED New York, No. 11.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text:—

"Pursuant to article 35, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations, Persia brings to the attention of the Security Council a dispute between Persia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

"This dispute has arisen by reason of new developments since the adoption by the Security Council of the Resolution of 30th January, 1946, relating to the earlier dispute between Persia and the U.S.S.R.

"The U.S.S.R. is maintaining Soviet troops in Persian territory after 2nd March, 1946, contrary to the express provisions of article 5 of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of 29th January, 1942.

"Furthermore, the U.S.S.R. is continuing to interfere in the internal affairs of Persia through the medium of Soviet agents, officials and armed forces.

"These acts are in violation of the aforesaid treaty and also in violation of the declaration of Tehran and the Charter of the United Nations.

"The immediate and just solution of this dispute by the Security Council is of the greatest importance to the preservation of the good relations with the U.S.S.R. which Persia wishes to maintain as an independent and sovereign State and to the survival of the purposes and principles which the members of the United Nations have solemnly undertaken to respect."

2. Foreign Office please pass to Tehran and Moscow as my telegrams Nos. 32 and 129.

[E 2568/5/34]

No. 7

Mr. Roberts to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 22nd March.)

(No. 158. Confidential.)

Sir,

Moscow, 9th March, 1946.

IT may be useful to supplement the telegrams which I have addressed to you during the recent visit to Moscow of the Persian Prime Minister with the following review of his activities here:—

2. Qawam-es-Saltana arrived in Moscow on the 19th February and was met at the airport by M. Molotov and representatives of the People's Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade: an indication that the Soviet Government intended to discuss economic as well as political questions. Before he arrived, the Persian Embassy here shared the views expressed in Sir Reader Bullard's telegram No. 217 to you of the 17th February that the mission could be relied on to sign almost anything the Russians put before them, and the prospect filled them with gloom. Diplomatic representatives and journalists here were equally gloomy, and I must confess that I and my United States colleague viewed the prospect with considerable anxiety.

3. The talks began at once, broken, however, by the concurrent Soviet conversations with the Mongolian delegation in Moscow, who were clearly more amenable, as, indeed, was shown by results, and who therefore received greater and more favourable publicity in the Soviet press. M. Molotov received the Prime Minister alone on the 20th February, and saw him again with Generalissimo Stalin on the 21st. No other Persian was present at these interviews. Preliminary conversations also began between commercial experts. Lest there should be any doubt that the memory of M. Kavtaradze's failure to obtain a share of Persian oil still rankled, the Soviet press published simultaneously accusations of discrimination against Persian employees and other unsatisfactory practices by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

4. I talked to Qawam-es-Saltana for the first time at a reception given by M. Molotov on the 22nd for him and Marshal Choibalsan, the Prime Minister of Mongolia, who was also in Moscow. At this public meeting he was unwilling to

discuss political questions, and merely said that he was anxious to get back as soon as possible to the many tasks that awaited him in Tehran. Even at this early meeting I had the impression that his Soviet hosts were treating him with some coolness.

5. On the 24th February the Prime Minister agreed to receive me. He told me that his conversations had not yet reached a stage at which he could give me a message for you. He was in a despondent mood, and had clearly received a hint of Soviet intentions, for he no longer expected the Red army to be withdrawn by the 2nd March. This attitude he contrasted with the correct behaviour of His Majesty's Government. The Prime Minister mentioned the difficulties he was having over Azerbaijan; but did not speak of oil, even indirectly. He remarked more than once that he counted on our support.

6. The tenor of his conversations with the Soviet Government was kept a close secret and there was little or no evidence to guide the speculation which was rife in Moscow; but it was evident that considerable pressure was being brought to bear on Qawam-es-Saltana. I learnt on the 28th from a reliable source in the Persian Embassy that the Prime Minister had seen Generalissimo Stalin again, this time without even M. Molotov. According to this informant Qawam-es-Saltana had been extremely dissatisfied with his first three talks (two with Molotov and one with Stalin), when the Russians had put forward three demands: the recognition of complete autonomy for Persian Azerbaijan; oil concessions for the Soviet Union; and the right to maintain Soviet troops in North Persia after the 2nd March. These demands went considerably further than he had expected or was prepared to go; and he had replied that he did not have the authority to negotiate on this basis; and even explained that any Persian representative negotiating about oil was liable to impeachment. The Prime Minister was more encouraged by his second talk with Generalissimo Stalin, who had discussed the withdrawal of Soviet troops from North Persia provided that the Soviet Government got their way over oil. The Prime Minister, while pleased that the Russians should be willing to bargain instead of merely issuing demands, was nevertheless well aware that the Soviet Government could send troops and equipment back into Persia under the pretext of operating and guarding their oil concessions. The Prime Minister observed that in spite of Soviet assurances to the Anglo-Saxon Powers that they regarded the 1942 treaty as governing the stay of foreign troops in Persia, both Generalissimo Stalin and M. Molotov had on each occasion made great play with the rights accorded to the Soviet Government under the 1921 treaty, and insisted that they must maintain troops in North Persia for their own safety, even though British and American troops were withdrawn.

7. Meanwhile, the United States Chargé d'Affaires, who was ill, had sent a message to Qawam-es-Saltana stating that the fact that he was not asking for detailed information about the negotiations should not be interpreted as showing a lack of interest on the part of the American Government, they would, on the contrary, be most interested in the result. The Prime Minister was visibly relieved and cheered by this sign of American interest. The Americans were given the impression that the talks which the Prime Minister had so far had with Generalissimo Stalin and M. Molotov were preliminary, and that the detailed negotiations were still to come.

8. Two days later the time limit set by the 1942 treaty for the removal of foreign troops from Persia expired. Just before midnight on the 1st March an official Tass communiqué, which appeared in the press next day, was broadcast announcing that the Persian Prime Minister had been informed on the 25th February that the withdrawal of Soviet troops would begin in certain districts of North-East Persia but that elsewhere they would remain until the situation had been clarified. The text of this announcement forms the first enclosure to this despatch. This bald statement made no attempt to provide any legal justification for the failure to withdraw their troops, and the Soviet Government had clearly decided to brazen out their policy, which was now unmistakable. No claim was made that the Persian Prime Minister had agreed or even that the matter had been discussed with him; there was no reference either to the treaty of 1942 or even to that of 1921; nor was any explanation given of why evacuation of troops, at least from the "relatively quieter districts," had not been completed by the 2nd March instead of merely beginning then.

9. On the evening of the 3rd March I sent to M. Molotov the note of protest which you had telegraphed earlier in the day, the text of which forms the second enclosure to this despatch. The following morning I took a copy round to Qawam-es-Saltana. He read it carefully and seemed distinctly relieved by it. It now became possible to coax from him a little more information. He told me that he would return empty-handed to Tehran next day, without even an agreement

on commercial matters. He explained that in the absence of any adequate excuse provided by the Russians for maintaining their troops in Persia, he could not agree to this flagrant violation of a treaty agreement. All that the Russians had produced was the ridiculous argument that at the Peace Conference after the last war the Persian delegation had put forward a demand for Baku, Turkestan and Armenia, and the fact that a member of that delegation, Hakimi, had recently been Prime Minister proved that these demands were still supported by Persian official circles. After explaining his failure to reach common ground about Azerbaijan in the face of the Russian demand that its autonomy must be recognised before anything else, the Prime Minister admitted to me that the Russians had pressed him again for oil concessions. When he had argued that he was prevented by law from even discussing the matter, the Russians had suggested that a new Majlis should be convoked and the law changed; to which the Prime Minister had answered that elections for a Majlis could not take place unless the Soviet Government withdrew their troops. The Prime Minister seemed very despondent. He said that in the circumstances he could only decide on the next step after returning to Tehran. He asked me whether he could count on British and American help and what our advice would be. I told him that I was not in a position to offer him advice from His Majesty's Government, and still less from the United States Government. But I pointed out that the note of which I had given him a copy showed clearly what our attitude was towards the failure of the Soviet Government to move their troops. I also explained that the Security Council was still closely concerned with the question, and (since the Prime Minister seemed to think that it would not meet again for some time) that it was a standing body. Qawam-es-Saltana also questioned me about the United States Government's attitude, and said he hoped to see the American Chargé d'Affaires before he left.

10. Mr. Kennan, to whom I had described my conversation with the Prime Minister, saw him later in the day. He has told me that after giving him the same account of the position, Qawam-es-Saltana had asked whether the United States would protest categorically against the Soviet Government's failure to withdraw troops, or couch their protest in the form of an enquiry as we had done. Mr. Kennan, who was aware that the United States Government, having no treaty rights comparable with ours, would find it difficult to protest unless the Persian Government had done so first, asked whether the Persian Government had, in fact, lodged a formal protest. The Prime Minister thereupon showed him a copy of a note of protest which was being delivered that night to M. Molotov, and which was in unexpectedly firm language. A translation of this note forms the third enclosure to this despatch. The Prime Minister said that he had first seen the Soviet communiqué in the press. Mr. Kennan then impressed on the Prime Minister the importance of the U.N.O. machinery, and gave him a copy of Mr. Byrnes's recent speech, several passages of which had a close bearing on the position in Persia. The Prime Minister finally said that he was seeing Generalissimo Stalin again that night before leaving; and added that so far the generalissimo had been very hard with him.

11. Later that evening the Persian Embassy informed me that the Prime Minister had decided to postpone his departure for forty-eight hours, ostensibly because Generalissimo Stalin was giving a Kremlin dinner for him on the 5th. This change of plan at first seemed a little disturbing. But it soon became clear that the Prime Minister, who had shown unexpected resistance to Soviet pressure, and was remaining somewhat against his will, had made up his mind not to sign any agreements in Moscow. In fact, in written answers to newspaper correspondents he agreed that he wished for firm and lasting friendship with the Soviet Union and would do his best to achieve it, but crossed out an addition that he was hopeful of doing so.

12. Stories had, however, been circulating in the Persian Embassy and delegation, which reached foreign diplomatic and journalistic circles in Moscow, to the effect that the Soviet Government might be dangling before the Prime Minister the prospect of heading a new régime in Persia at the expense of the Shah after the imminent dissolution of the Majlis. This may have accounted for the delay in the Prime Minister's departure, but there was nothing in his conduct here to support such stories and His Majesty's Ambassador at Tehran is clearly better placed to estimate their reliability.

13. On the 6th March Mr. Kennan received instructions to deliver a note of protest to the Soviet Government on the retention of their troops in Persia. The text of his letter to M. Molotov forms the fourth enclosure to this despatch. The protest has since been published in Washington.

14. In accordance with your instructions, I saw Qawam-es-Saltana again that evening and obtained from him the Russian text of his Government's protest

dated the 3rd March. The Prime Minister begged me to treat as strictly confidential the fact that he had given it to me. He confirmed that he would definitely leave on the morning of the 7th March. No agreement whatever had been reached, and he did not disguise his disappointment over the results of his visit. He repeated to me an earlier remark that he had been astonished to find the Generalissimo looking so old. The Prime Minister then told me that he was having some difficulty over the joint communiqué to be issued on his departure. M. Molotov's original draft had been to the effect that conversations had taken place in an atmosphere of friendship and understanding and would be continued through diplomatic channels when the new Soviet Ambassador took up his post shortly at Tehran. The Prime Minister had sent back an alternative draft saying that the conversations had taken place only in an atmosphere of friendship, omitting the word "understanding" and making no reference to the continuation of talks in Tehran. The Prime Minister was clearly reluctant to bind himself to continuing conversations in Tehran; he realised, he said, that these would no doubt take place, but concurrently, he intimated, with a renewed appeal to U.N.O. He asked me what we and the Americans could do to help Persia if the U.N.O. procedure, in which he apparently placed little faith, failed to restrain the Soviet Government. I told him I could make no prophecies, but reminded him of our close interest in the problem and informed him of the American protest, of which he had not heard and the news of which encouraged him.

15. In the course of this conversation Qawam-es-Saltana made the following points: The Russians had never given any reason for their refusal to withdraw troops other than the grotesque one of the Persian claim to Baku in 1919; they had constantly referred to the 1921 treaty, and apparently sincerely believed in a British threat to the security of the Soviet Union through Persia. The Prime Minister said that he had told the Russians that he thought this was nonsense. The Soviet press had, incidentally, published the day before some accusations by Mr. Shahshahani, the former head of the Persian Section of the American O.W.I., to the fact that we were arming tribes in the south and preparing a reactionary "Putsch"; which the Prime Minister also dismissed as absurd. The Russians had apparently complained of discrimination against them over oil concessions and of the privileges granted to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Other commercial questions were still in abeyance; and he was sending to M. Molotov a long note setting out the Persian point of view on various issues. The Prime Minister was, in general, surprisingly critical of the Soviet press and the Soviet conception of democracy.

16. Shortly afterwards the Prime Minister received the United States Chargé d'Affaires, who had been instructed to inform him officially of the American protest to the Soviet Government. Mr. Kennan told me that he had been given a similar picture. The Prime Minister had added in confidence that Stalin had taken him aside at the Kremlin dinner and warned him not to repeat the mistake of the English, who had lost America because they did not make the "necessary democratic reforms" in time and were now about to lose India for the same reason.

17. Qawam-es-Saltana left for Tehran by air on the 7th March. He was seen off at the airport with the usual honours by M. Molotov and other officials, including the new Soviet Ambassador to Persia. The joint communiqué as finally agreed was published in the Soviet press of the 8th March, and forms the fifth enclosure to this despatch. It shows signs of compromise in drafting.

18. My main impression of Qawam-es-Saltana's visit to Moscow is that we were fortunate that his hands were tied in advance by Persian laws which no doubt contributed to his unwillingness to yield in the face of the considerable pressure which was brought to bear on him. As far as their object of penetrating Persia is concerned, the Soviet Government must count this visit a failure on every count, unless they have obtained from the Prime Minister some private assurance of concession of which we do not yet know. The Prime Minister made it clear that the attitude of His Majesty's Government, and even more that of the United States Government, were material factors in the shaping of his policy. My United States colleague was, as always, most co-operative and exerted himself throughout to strengthen the Prime Minister's resolution. We both heaved a sigh of relief when we saw his aircraft leave the Moscow airfield without, so far as we could ascertain, any one-sided agreement having been reached between him and the Soviet Government and without his having acquiesced in the retention of Soviet troops in North Persia in defiance of Soviet treaty obligations.

19. The immediate future, however, is more obscure. The Soviet Government have hitherto shown some care, at least in their international dealings over

the past few years, to avoid flagrant violations of international treaties, and it is disturbing that on this occasion they have not made the slightest attempt to excuse their action. Reasons, however inadequate, may be given when the Soviet Government see fit to reply to the notes addressed to them by His Majesty's Government, the United States Government and the Persian Government. But it is certain that the Soviet authorities will not remain inactive, and it seems only too likely that they will continue their efforts to produce a Persian Government amenable enough to meet their various demands and to cover up under a façade of apparent Soviet-Persian unity recent high-handed Soviet actions. This they will no doubt endeavour to accomplish before the next meeting of the Security Council and during the uneasy period which will follow on the dissolution of the present Persian Majlis. I fear also that these efforts may be accompanied by an intensification of the Soviet campaign to discredit British motives and undermine British influence throughout the whole of Persia. This campaign might be halted if the United States Government continue to maintain the firm front somewhat belatedly taken up in their protest of the 6th March. But the Soviet Government are already endeavouring to divert American attention from Persia by the now familiar device of drawing a red herring across the trail, in this case the protest published in the Soviet press on the 9th March about American intervention in Bulgaria, allegedly in contravention of the Moscow tripartite agreement of last December.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to Tehran, Washington and Government of India.

I have, &c.

FRANK K. ROBERTS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7

Tass Communiqué (Izvestiya, 2nd March, 1946).

ON the 25th February, during conversation with the Prime Minister of Persia, Qawam-es-Saltana, he was informed of the decision of the Soviet Government that from the 2nd March withdrawal of part of the Soviet troops from districts of Persia where it is relatively quieter, namely, from districts of Meshed, Shahrud and Samnan, which are situated in the eastern part of Persia, is to be begun. As regards Soviet troops in other districts of Persia, they will remain in Persia until the situation has been examined.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7

Mr. Roberts to M. Molotov.

Dear M. Molotov,

Moscow, 3rd March, 1946.

I HAVE been instructed by my Government to make the following communication to the Soviet Government:—

2. It is reported by a Moscow wireless announcement on the 1st March that Soviet troops would begin their evacuation of the areas of Meshed, Shahrud and Semnan, in Eastern Persia. The Soviet troops in other areas of Persia would remain there for clarification of the situation.

3. On the assumption that this announcement is correct, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom feel bound to draw the attention of the Soviet Government to article 5 of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of Alliance, which provides as follows:—

"The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Persian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of armistice or armistices or on the conclusion of peace between them, whichever date is the earlier. The expression 'associates' of Germany means all other Powers which have engaged or may in future engage in hostilities against either of the Allied Powers."

4. In view of the fact that an instrument of surrender with Japan, the last of Germany's associates during the late hostilities, was signed on the 2nd September, 1945, His Majesty's Government considered, and have on several

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occasions so notified the Soviet Government, that the date for withdrawal of all Allied forces from Persian territory under this article should be the 2nd March, 1946. Accordingly, all British forces were withdrawn by that date.

5. In view of the announcement referred to above, His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn whether the Soviet Government have now withdrawn their troops from Persian territory and, if not, to be urgently informed what are their intentions in this respect.

6. His Majesty's Government would regard any failure of the Soviet Government to withdraw their troops at the end of the period provided for in article 5 as constituting a breach of their obligations to His Majesty's Government under the tripartite treaty.

Yours, &c.
F. K. ROBERTS.

Enclosure 3 in No. 7

M. Qawam-es-Saltana to M. Molotov.

(No. 36)

To: The People's Commissar,

Moscow, 3rd March, 1946.

IN No. 53 (8969) of *Izvestiya* of March 1946, an official communiqué of Tass was published regarding the decision of the Soviet Government to withdraw its forces from the districts of Meshed, Shahrud and Samnan. At the same time it was stated that the Soviet forces in other districts of Persia would remain until a clarification of the situation.

In connexion with the aforesaid communiqué, I consider it imperative to communicate the following to you:—

According to the tripartite treaty concluded in Tehran on the 29th January, 1942, between Persia, the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain, the withdrawal of forces from Persia before the 2nd March, 1946, is obligatory and indisputable. In compliance with this, the British forces have been completely withdrawn from Persia by the stated date.

Therefore the detention of part of the Soviet forces in some districts of Persia does not in any case agree with the aforesaid treaty and conflicts with the repeated statements of the Soviet Government concerning the unconditional agreement of the Soviet Government with the terms of the aforesaid treaty on this question. Moreover, the decision of the Soviet Government is in contradiction to the basic laws of Persia, as well as to the existing contractual relations between the two States.

Taking the aforesaid into consideration, I am obliged, to my regret, on behalf of my Government, to express a protest with regard to the above-mentioned decision of the Soviet Government and I request you to issue appropriate instructions for the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet forces from all districts of Persia.

Please accept, &c.,

QAWAM-ES-SALTANA,

Prime Minister of Persia.

Enclosure 4 in No. 7

Mr. Kennan to M. Molotov.

(No. 89.)

Excellency,

United States Embassy,

Moscow, 6th March, 1946.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I have been instructed by my Government to communicate to the Government of the Soviet Union the following:—

"The Government of the United States has been informed that the Government of the Soviet Union has decided to retain Soviet troops in Persia after the 2nd March, 1946, that this decision was taken without the consent of the Persian Government, and that Soviet troops continue to remain on Persian territory, in spite of the protests of the Persian Government.

"It will be recalled that in reply to a note addressed on the 24th November, 1945, by the Government of the United States to the Government of the Soviet Union suggesting the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Persia, the Soviet Government, on the 29th November, stated that the period of the stationing of Soviet troops in Persia was governed by the Anglo-Soviet-Persian

Treaty of the 29th January, 1942. The Government of the United States understood from this statement that it was the intention of the Government of the Soviet Union that all Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Persia not later than the 2nd March, 1946, six months after the date of the signing of the instrument of surrender with Japan on the 2nd September, 1945. This understanding was based upon article 5 of the tripartite treaty referred to above, which states:—

"The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Persian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices, or on the conclusion of peace between them, whichever date is the earlier."

"So far as the Government of the United States is aware, this commitment was not questioned at the recent meeting of the Security Council in London which agreed that the Soviet Union and Persia should seek a solution of their differences by direct negotiation.

"The decision of the Soviet Government to retain Soviet troops in Persia beyond the period stipulated by the tripartite treaty has created a situation with regard to which the Government of the United States, as a member of the United Nations and as a party to the declaration regarding Persia dated the 1st December, 1943, cannot remain indifferent. That declaration announced to the world that the Governments of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom were 'at one with the Government of Persia in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Persia.' In the opinion of the Government of the United States, the maintenance of troops in Persian territory by any one of the three signatories to that declaration, without the consent and against the wishes of the Government of Persia, is contrary to the assurances contained in that declaration. Furthermore, it was generally accepted during the various discussions which took place at the meeting of the Security Council in London that the retention by a member of the United Nations of its troops in the territory of a country which is also a member of the United Nations, without the consent of the Government of that country, is not in accordance with the principles of the United Nations and that the withdrawal of such troops should not be made contingent upon other issues.

"The Government of the United States, in the spirit of the friendly association which developed between the United States and the Soviet Union in the successful effort against the common enemy and as a fellow member of the United Nations, expresses the earnest hope that the Government of the Soviet Union will do its part, by withdrawing immediately all Soviet forces from the territory of Persia, to promote the international confidence which is necessary for peaceful progress among the peoples of all nations.

"The Government of the United States trusts that the Government of the Soviet Union, no less than itself, appreciates the heavy responsibility resting upon the Great Powers under the Charter to observe their obligations and to respect the sovereign rights of other States.

"The Government of the United States requests that it be promptly advised of the decision of the Government of the Soviet Union which it hopes will be in accord with the views herein expressed."

Please accept, &c.

GEORGE F. KENNAN,

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosure 5 in No. 7

Translation of Soviet-Persian Communiqué on Persian Prime Minister Qawam-es-Saltana's Stay in Moscow published in Soviet Press, 7th March, 1946.

DURING his stay in Moscow, from the 19th February to the 6th March, the Prime Minister of Persia, Qawam-es-Saltana, had a number of conversations with J. V. Stalin, President of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., and V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.

During the negotiations, which took place in the course of these conversations in an atmosphere of friendship, questions of interest to both parties were discussed. Both Governments will exert all their efforts to create, with the appointment of the new Soviet Ambassador to Persia, favourable conditions for strengthening still further the friendly relations between the two countries.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 29th March.)

(No. 76. Secret.)

Sir,

Tehran, 15th March, 1946.

IN my despatch No. 65, dated the 3rd March, I transmitted a note on the question of North Persia. The note stopped at the point where it had become clear that the Russians did not intend to withdraw their troops from Persia by the date fixed by the tripartite treaty. I now have the honour to submit some speculations as to the effect that Soviet policy is likely to have in this part of the world. It is an easier task than it used to be, as the Russians have begun to show their hand almost as openly as Hitler used to do, though they have never provided us with a succinct "Mein Kampf" so that we might study the action in comparison with the programme. Eight years in close contact with Soviet Russia—nearly half from inside Russia, the rest at a sensitive spot in the Soviet "security belt"—have convinced me that the attitude of the rulers of Russia, whoever they may be, towards the rest of the world resembles that of the early Moslem lawyers, who named it the Dar al Harb, or Region of War, as opposed to their own Region of Islam. The Region of War comprised all lands where Islam was not dominant, and it was legitimate to make war on any of them, the only criterion being the prospects of success. The Soviet Government seem to have decided that this is a favourable moment to effect the virtual inclusion of part of Persia in the Dar al Soviet and to establish indirect control over the rest of the country.

2. It would seem to be a simple and straightforward matter to convict Russia of aggression for her behaviour in provoking the Azerbaijan movement and in retaining troops in Persia after the treaty date, but behind the defence that the troops have a right to be in Persia under the 1921 treaty there is the moral claim of the Soviet Government to represent the policy which used to be called Liberal. This policy is well set forth by E. G. Browne in his book "The Persian Revolution of 1905-09." In his introduction he states that his book is based on the following assumptions:—

- "(1) That in this world diversity, not uniformity, is the higher law and the more desirable state.
- "(2) That everything in this world has its own generic perfection, or as the Bábis quaintly phrase it, its own Paradise, which is only attainable by the realisation of its own highest potentialities, not by the adoption of the attributes of something else.
- "(3) That, whether it be a question of individuals or nations, the destruction of a distinctive type is a loss to the universe and therefore an evil."

If any of those ministers of the Czar who were responsible for Russian policy from 1905-17 ever read Professor Browne's principles, they probably thought him at best an impracticable idealist, and they would have considered any British statesman who professed to believe in them as a humbug concealing behind a sanctimonious façade the cynical imperialism of the British Government. The Soviet Government, however, would probably claim the principles as their own. It is reactionary Persian Governments, they would say, that have tried to iron out the diversity which should be the spice of life, making no allowance for differences of race and language; and that by neglecting education and failing to control the power of wealth and landownership, have prevented the Persians from even beginning to attain the realisation of their own potentialities. How different, the Soviet Government would say, is the situation in Russia, where every minority is encouraged to use its own language and to develop its own culture, and opportunities for education and self-development are open to all individuals without discrimination.

3. Here lies the great difficulty that clogs our action in the present conflict of words with Russia: that in many instances Russia can state a case against us which has a certain plausibility. It is not only that, whatever the historical or treaty justification, we have troops in India, Greece, Egypt and elsewhere in other oriental countries, but that even in Persia, where we interfered as little as possible, helped that country to feed itself, and withdrew our troops with complete respect for our treaty obligations, we are held, probably by a large majority of those Persians who know anything about the matter, to have followed a reactionary policy. Those young Persian intellectuals of the more honest sort, such as those who become members of the Anglo-Persian institutes established

by the British Council, realise that we are no less interested than the Russians in culture and its wide dissemination—and much more interested in freedom; but the Tudeh never cease to label us as reactionaries trying to keep the masses in ignorance, and the claim of the Right to be our friends unfortunately gives some support to the thesis. In its simplest form the thesis is this: The Governments which have been supported by His Majesty's Government since the occupation have been composed of members of the ruling class, which is impervious to new ideas and too selfish and slothful ever to take action for the benefit of the people in general; while, on the other hand, the Soviet Government, in giving its (of course, only moral) support to the Tudeh party, has favoured the "freedom-lovers," the "democrats," and so on. This persuasive antithesis will not bear examination in the light of the facts. The Soviet Government became critical of the Persian Government only when the Government of Mr. Saed resisted certain unreasonable Russian demands. They were even particularly friendly towards Mr. Saed, who had passed many years of his life in consular and diplomatic posts in Russia and knew how to treat them in ordinary circumstances; but his past went for nothing when the Government of which he was the head refused to accept the conditions attached to the gift of Russian war material and then rejected the Soviet demand for a blank concession for oil. It was then that the Moscow press and radio heaped abuse on him—that he became a "Fascist" and was accused of planning to use Persia as a base for an attack on the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Russians tried for months to get into power either one of two former Prime Ministers of the old type, Qawam-es-Saltana and, as a second choice, Suhaili. This policy intensified the suspicion aroused by the complete unanimity with which the Tudeh party supported the Russians in their oil demands, in their indignation against the rejection of the war material, and indeed in everything. The Russians appeared to be trying to secure in Persia a Government that would be subservient, whereas His Majesty's Government ask no more than that any Persian Government that comes into power shall not be hostile to British interests. We conceived it to be our duty not to upset the régime in Persia when we were in the country for the specific and limited purpose of conveying aid to Russia through the country as rapidly as possible. Precisely, say the Russians, because the régime recognises the British oil concession but refuses one to Russia; because the reactionary, feudal and capitalist régime offers no danger to British imperialist interests in India, Iraq and other eastern countries. In point of fact, the historian—quite apart from the retention of troops after the 2nd March—will be able to convict Russia of imperialism in Persia unless arbitrary interference, the imposition of grossly unfavourable agreements on a weaker neighbour, and ruthless economic and financial exploitation have ceased to be marks of imperialism; and, if points could be awarded for conduct in Persia from 1941 to 1946 by some all-knowing arbiter, Great Britain could not fail to be adjudged the more honest and considerate and observant of treaty obligations and of having acted in accordance with the principles on which the United Nations Organisation has been constructed. What, however, vitiates our policy in the eyes of some of the young intellectuals is that it leaves Persia as it was; and they don't want that. They are absurdly wrong in alleging that we do this out of malice, that we take a cruel pleasure in causing suffering, as for example, when we were alleged, falsely, to have burned wheat, and to have done this to annoy. But the charge that our liberal policy of non-intervention is ruinous to a country like Persia is not vitiated by that childish exaggeration. It might suit Switzerland, say the critics, but as applied to the Persians, who have none of the civic virtues, it leaves the mass of the people at the mercy of a selfish, ineducable ruling class. Democratic institutions, the criticism goes on, ask too much of the Persians, and indeed of most orientals. The British ask them to be reasonable, fair-minded, incorruptible, ready to compromise, with the hope of getting into power some time, and of spending some years ruling by exercise of the same difficult qualities, and probably at least as many years in opposition. In competition with Soviet propaganda we are at the disadvantage (to use a comparison which I may have used before) which is felt by the Christian missionary in pagan Africa in competing with the offers of Islam. A religion which demands above all self-sacrifice of its followers would be difficult enough to accept even if it were not presented differently by different exponents, and a primitive mind finds it easier to embrace Islam with its five simple duties, one of which offers the fun and excitement and community feeling of the pilgrimage.

4. It is regrettable, but a fact, that the Persians are ideal Stalin-fodder. They are untruthful, backbiters, undisciplined, incapable of unity, without a plan. The Soviet system is equipped with a complete theoretical scheme for

everything from God to goloshes, and power to impose discipline and unity; and the Soviet authorities do not require from their followers the impossible feat of refraining from lying and backbiting, but only that these qualities shall be canalised according to the orders of the day. And to their supporters the Soviet Government offer quick results and office for life. To quote from a despatch which I wrote nearly three years ago (circular despatch No. 34 of the 3rd May, 1943—No. 170 to Foreign Office):—

"In India we hope that the problem of the Hindu widow will be solved by the gradual extension of liberal and humane ideas; a Soviet commissar would appoint one of the less merry widows to the local Soviet and leave it to her to ensure the escape of the other widows from domestic slavery as well as the observation of the Child Marriage Law, the abolition of temple prostitution, and other reforms which at present seem far away."

The apparently unconquerable problem of the too-rapid growth of the population of India could be easily dealt with by the Soviet Government, which for years exhibited abortion as a triumph of Soviet culture and then, in face of public opinion expressed on that occasion only, turned it into a crime overnight because, it seems, they decided that they needed a larger population to fill up the great open spaces.

5. Is the conclusion then that the Soviet system is better for Persia than ours? It depends on one's ultimate aim. Mr. Wallace, when he was Vice-President of the United States, stated in a speech about the Soviet Union that America could learn much from Russia in the matter of the treatment of minorities. Now the lesson that America could learn is that, if she exchanged her present system of government for government by a self-elected, irresponsible and all-powerful committee in complete control of all armed forces and of all forms of education and propaganda, equality between the white and coloured populations could be established by the reduction of the two elements to a common level of subservience. The Americans have not yet discovered a solution of the problem of the coloured population, but it is clear that the Soviet solution would not suit them, because it presupposes a form of arbitrary government which the Americans grew out of long ago. But it does not follow that more primitive people, especially those whose elementary economic interests have been neglected, would not find Soviet methods attractive. There is a great deal of humbug about the Soviet treatment of minorities. It may be too strong to say that it consists of folk-songs tempered by executions, but it is true that the uniformity of opinion imposed by the Soviet system is a high price to pay for social reforms and the permission to use one's mother tongue. Nevertheless, the Kurd would not see the objections that are patent to us. It is true that the feudal chiefs who are being used by the Soviet Government as their instruments would soon be liquidated, but the rank and file of Kurds might well be better off materially, they would have wide educational opportunities, and their nationalist feelings, hostile alike to Turk and Arab and Persian, would be flattered by the union of the three territories in which they live, and by the encouragement of their language, even if it was used in the main to fill them with the chaffy propaganda of the Soviet Government.

6. The moral of this is not that we should acquiesce without resistance or protest in the absorption of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in the Soviet State, whether directly or under the guise of a specious autonomy "within the framework of the Persian Constitution." Such a solution would be contrary to our interests, to the engagements we gave in the 1942 treaty, and to the principles of the United Nations Organisation. The moral is that we must realise that the policy of the Soviet Government, however evil it may appear *sub specie aeternitatis* as tending to produce a sort of performing dog rather than a nobler human being, is exceedingly effective in the East because it goes the way of the grain in offering immediate economic rewards without discouraging the darling sins of envy and hatred, and because it has a solution for the communal or minorities problem which baffle supporters of more democratic methods. In so far as success attends what seems to be the Soviet aim, to replace Great Britain in the Middle and Near East and in India, we may suffer severe losses in prestige and in economic influence, and Russia will make corresponding gains; but, on the other hand, our moral position will become less invidious and vulnerable, and we shall find fewer points of difference between us and the United States.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 571/315/34]

No. 9

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 1. Secret, for the period 31st December, 1945, to 6th January, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 8 of 7th January; Received 18th January.)

(1)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

CONFIRMATION of the news that the Moscow Conference failed to come to an agreement concerning Persia has caused despair bordering upon panic, and it is impossible to predict which way the Persian cat, in its present state of terror, will jump. Hakimi's Government may decide, after all, to adhere to the draft Anglo-American proposal and put it up to the Russians. It may prefer its own version and court a rebuff by proposing it. It may prefer to use the machinery of the United Nations Organisation. It may decide to do nothing till the 2nd March and hope that the Russians will abide by their treaty obligations and remove their forces by that date. It may decide to negotiate direct with the Soviet Government, in which case it is not unlikely that the Russians will reply that they will only negotiate with a Government not known to be hostile to themselves, by which, of course, they mean a Government which will be prepared to grant them their two main objects, viz., the holding of the new Majlis elections on the due date and the granting of an oil concession in north-west Persia. Again, the Hakimi Government may fall and be replaced by another more inclined to resist Russian pressure. In regard to the above, one bet seems as good as another.

2. Meanwhile, impatience over Hakimi's inertia is growing and much lobbying is being done on behalf of various possible successors. Hidayet has left the Cabinet on appointment as ambassador to Kabul. Muhammad Husain Firuz, foreseeing the fall of the Cabinet, has resigned. Allahyar Saleh is making many changes among the higher officials of the Ministry of the Interior, apparently in the hope of placating the Russians. The Prime Minister has informed the Minister for War that, in the face of the increasing attacks on the army from the Tudeh press, he does not feel that he can retain for much longer either General Riazi or General Arfa, the Chief of General Staff.

3. On the 1st January the American Ambassador, acting on instructions from the State Department, gave to the Persian Prime Minister an outline of the Anglo-American scheme for a tripartite commission to advise the Persian Government as to the election of provincial councils. On the same day the British Ambassador, on his return from Moscow and London, saw the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and gave them a sketch of the course of the negotiations in Moscow, and also a Persian translation of the final draft of the scheme which is reproduced as an appendix to this summary. The Prime Minister agreed to call a special meeting of the Cabinet to discuss it. If agreement to accept the proposals in principle were reached the Prime Minister was to inform the two embassies so that the two Secretaries of State could make statements and thus ensure discussion of the proposals in the press of the two countries. Fortified by this support, the Prime Minister would then report to the Majlis. Unfortunately, the proposal was not laid before the Cabinet till the 4th January. Much opposition to the proposal was encountered, it is believed, from Nariman, the appeasement monger, since Salih, the other pro-Russian, who would certainly have opposed it, was absent. The Cabinet proceeded to maul and mangle the draft so as to make it almost unrecognisable. The clause about the Turki language was cut out and a nonsensical proposal to add two Persian members to the commission was added. The British Ambassador assured the Minister for Foreign Affairs at a subsequent meeting that the draft, as amended by the Cabinet, had no chance of success, that His Majesty's Government could not support it, and that such an attitude on the part of the Persian Government would give their opponents a powerful instrument to use against them, whereas the Anglo-American draft had more chance of success, as it had at one time even been agreed to by Stalin. The Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the Prime Minister on these points and the Cabinet is now reconsidering the draft.

The Majlis.

4. At the session of the 30th December Deputy Tehrani interpellated the Government stating that Hakimi's Cabinet had failed to solve the problem of

Azerbaijan, to reform the Administration or to clarify their foreign policy. According to the Constitution a month's delay in answering an interpellation is allowed, but it is expected that Hakimi will reply within a few days. The Minister of Justice tabled a Bill to provide for more severe penalties for infringement of traffic laws. The Minister for War tabled a Bill to provide relief for the dependents of officers killed in the recent Azerbaijan disturbances. At the session of the 1st January Dr. Musaddiq made one of his frequent attacks on the Government, the charge, on this occasion, being that their economic policy was to the detriment of the country. The Minister of Finance replied. At the same session it was decided to send the papers of the Tadayyun case to the Supreme Court of Appeal. (It will be recalled that Tadayyun was impeached about two years ago on the charge of having taken bribes while Minister of the Interior to ensure the election of certain Deputies.) At the session of the 3rd January a Bill was passed to provide a loan of 5 million rials at cheap rates for shopkeepers who lost their property in the recent fire at Qazvin. Further discussion took place on the Bill to raise the status of "contract" (i.e., non-covenanted) Government employees to that of "official" (i.e., covenanted) employees. The debate on the 3/12ths Budget Bill was resumed but was not completed.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

5. A report from consular sources states that an affray has occurred between Democrat forces and Afshar tribesmen at Shahin Dazh, about 50 miles south-east of Miandoab and the same distance north-east of Saqqiz. Two lorry-loads of reinforcements from the Azerbaijan Peoples army are said to have been sent from Tabriz. The Chief of General Staff confirms this news and states that similar clashes are reported from near Zenjan, from a village named Chahar Oinak, south of Zenjan, and from a village called Uriad between Maragheh and Mianeh. The Chief of General Staff also stated that in all these four skirmishes the Democrat troops had been repulsed with loss of life and arms.

6. According to a press report Ghulam Yahya, Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Defence in the Azerbaijan National Government, has been killed on the Tabriz-Mianeh road by three unknown assailants disguised as Democrat soldiers. Revenge for several political murders contrived by Ghulam Yahya is given as the motive for the crime.

Kurdistan.

7. Reference Intelligence Summary No. 48, paragraph 15, the Iraqi Government have now admitted that Hama Rashid fled from Kirkuk, where he was living under surveillance, on the 23rd December, 1945. They state that a search is being made for him by police and military in the Penjwin area. Meanwhile, according to information received by the Persian General Staff, Hama Rashid has arrived at Mahabad, where he is concocting further plans of revolt with Ghazi Muhammad.

Gilan.

8. Some days ago Muzaffarzadeh, a Deputy for Resht, read out in the Majlis a telegram addressed to the Prime Minister by his constituents. They demanded reforms, a purge of the Administration in general and of the General Staff in particular, the banishment of Seyyid Zia-ud-Din and that 50 per cent. of the taxes collected from Gilan be spent on Gilan. The Prime Minister has replied by saying that he sympathises with their desire for reforms and promises that the forthcoming elections for provincial councils will be entirely free.

9. The manager of the National Bank at Resht, on instructions from Tehran, has deposited 10 million rials in the local branch of the Imperial Bank of Iran.

Appointments.

- 10.—(i) Hasan Ali Kemal-Hidayet (Nasr-ul-Mulk), Minister without Portfolio, to be Persian Ambassador at Kabul *vice* Abul Qasim Najm, who vacated that post recently to become Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- (ii) Ismail Bahadur to be Governor of Yezd *vice* Haidari.
- (iii) Dr. Husain Marzeban (Said-ul-Mulk) to be Governor of Khurramabad.
- (iv) Abdul Husain Shabdiz to be Governor of Arak (Sultanabad).
- (v) Mubasir Roshan to be Governor of Malayir.
- (vi) Ibrahim Shahin to be Governor of Qazvin.
- (vii) Abdullah Ashrafi to be Governor of Shahabad.

- (viii) Ali Mansur, the former Governor-General of Khorasan, has been appointed a member of the High Council of the National Bank in place of Husain Ala, now Persian Ambassador in Washington.

Obituary.

11. The Imam Jume'eh of Tehran died on the 5th January, aged about 75. He was a brother of Seyyid Muhammad Jawad, Zahir-ul-Islam (M.A. 131). Though keeping in the background, he was not without influence in political as well as religious circles. He and his brother had always been friendly to the British.

Economic.

12. The Cabinet have now approved a proposal by the Ministry of Finance that merchants should now be free to import motor vehicles and tyres without Government control, provided that full import dues are paid. (The import duty on motor vehicles is about 22 per cent. *ad valorem*.) This follows logically on other recent steps taken by the Persian Government to free trade from Government monopolies and controls.

Persian Army.

13. The Officer Commanding Ardebil garrison and some more officers of the Tabriz garrison have arrived in Tehran. Colonel Zanganeh, the commandant of the Rezaiyeh brigade, is also expected in a few days. This completes the evacuation of the officers of the Azerbaijan garrisons, less those killed, the one renegade and three forcibly detained by the rebel army as instructors in the mortar, of which a number have fallen into rebel hands and in the use of which the People's army apparently requires further instruction.

British Interests.

14. His Excellency the British Ambassador returned to Tehran from the Moscow Conference on the 1st January.

15. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has been approached for permission to open an Indian Trade Exhibition in Persia. The tentative date is 1947.

American Interests.

16. The personnel of the American mission with the Persian gendarmerie as on the 29th December, 1945, were as follows:—

- Colonel H. N. Schwarzkopf, head of the mission.
- Colonel R. Goode.
- Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Molter.
- Lieutenant-Colonel A. N. Papa.
- Lieutenant-Colonel W. Preston (due to be replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel A. N. Wood in two weeks).
- Major J. Diefendorf.
- Major G. H. Biggs.
- Major R. Waters (due to arrive in about two months).

17. The American Government has obtained the consent of the Persian Government for the temporary operation by T.W.A. of air-line facilities previously provided by the A.T.C. at Abadan. This, they state, is necessary in view of the accelerated evacuation of American troops from Iran and to bring home American troops from India (see Intelligence Summary No. 41, paragraph 8).

Appendix.

Anglo-American Draft of Tripartite Commission for Iranian Affairs, 25th December, 1945.

THE Governments of Great Britain, U.S.S.R. and the United States have agreed on the formation of a Tripartite Commission for Iranian questions and are submitting this agreement to the Iranian Government for their concurrence. The terms of reference are as follows:—

1. The commission shall take as its point of departure the fact that, during the presence in Persia of Allied troops, the Persian economy and governmental organisation have been disturbed and difficulties have arisen between the Central

Government and the inhabitants of certain provinces. The Three Powers recognise that they may have some responsibility for this and should therefore endeavour to assist the Persian State in re-establishing normal conditions to the satisfaction of all elements of the population and maintaining friendly relations with other countries.

2. With a view to removing the apprehensions of the Iranian Government and causes of international friction, the commission shall deal with the question of the acceleration as far as possible of the withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran and make appropriate recommendations to the Governments of the Three Powers.

3. The commission shall keep in mind (a) the undertaking given by Great Britain and Soviet Russia in the treaty of January 1942 to respect the political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Persia; and (b) the declaration about Persia issued during the Tehran Conference by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Stalin and Mr. Churchill.

4. With a view to reconciling the existing differences between the central Persian Government and certain provinces of the country, the commission shall advise and assist the Persian Government in the establishment of provincial councils, in accordance with the provisions of the Persian Constitution.

5. The recommendations of the commission (which must receive the approval of the Three Governments before being submitted to the Persian Government) shall cover the whole of Persia, including Azerbaijan.

6. Existing laws amplifying the relevant provisions of the Constitution (with respect to provincial councils) shall be taken as the point of departure, but the commission shall recommend any amendments which seem to be required, especially in regard to the elections to the local councils, the powers and duties of the councils and the manner in which they are to be furnished with funds.

7. The commission shall also make recommendations as to the free use of the minority languages, such as Arabic, Turki and Kurdish, for educational and other purposes.

8. The commission shall consult closely with the Persian Government and with representatives of all important elements of the population in the process of formulating its recommendations.

9. The Three Powers shall use their best endeavours to persuade the Persian Government to pass into law and to put into execution the recommendations made by the commission.

10. The commission shall make no recommendation which would weaken the fundamental unity of the Persian State.

11. The first provincial elections shall be carried out under the supervision of the commission.

Tehran, 6th January, 1946.

[E 781/315/34]

(2)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 2, Secret, for the period 7th January to 13th January, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 17 of the 15th January; Received 25th January.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

OPPOSITION to the Anglo-American proposal for the tripartite commission has increased during the past week. The Tudeh and others under Russian influence, as was to be expected, showed their hostility, but attacks from the so-called "Right" were no less bitter. The one constant factor in the Persians unstable make-up, his vanity, was offended at the thought that others could see anything needing reform in his administration. "Unwarranted interference," "a repetition of the 1907 agreement" were phrases bandied about by Dr. Musaddiq and others. The Cabinet has as yet come to no decision and if it does not do so very soon it will certainly fall. A feeling (more in evidence among the Deputies than among the Cabinet) that they have been abandoned by the British and American Governments (whereas, in fact, it is they who have abandoned the Anglo-American scheme without proposing any alternative) may

lead the Persians in their despair to incline more and more to appeasement of the Russians and to the introduction as Prime Minister of Qawam-us-Saltaneh, the Russian candidate. The Cabinet, it is believed, is now thinking less of direct negotiations with the Azerbaijan National Government or with the Soviet Government and more about an appeal to the Security Council of the United Nations Organisation.

Azerbaijan.

2. His Majesty's Acting Consul-General in Tabriz reports that the new autonomous Government has revised the income tax law of 1943 and now demands that the tax be paid in a lump sum instead of in instalments. The tax free portion of income is said to have been fixed at 25 per cent.

3. Merchants' goods, other than food-stuffs, may now be despatched to Tehran on an undertaking by the owner that the proceeds of the sale will be returned to Azerbaijan. The despatch of parcels and money to Tehran by post is prohibited. All passengers to Tehran must obtain journey permits from the "Ministry of the Interior." All baggage and correspondence is liable to examination by the police.

4. A "Friends of Soviet Azerbaijan" Society has been formed, ostensibly for strengthening cultural ties.

5. The Azerbaijan Government is overprinting Persian postage stamps with the words "National Government of Azerbaijan, 21st Azar 1324."

6. A notice was sent out by the Azerbaijan Government summoning all democrats in Tabriz to appear at 6 a.m. on the 11th January. As those over 45 years of age were excluded it was thought and widely rumoured that this foreshadowed some military move on the capital. The meeting was subsequently postponed.

Gilan and Mazanderan.

7. A Persian press report mentions the fusion in these provinces of the Tudeh, Democrat and Jangali parties. The revival, under Russian auspices, of the last named is interesting, and recalls the exploits of the Jangalis under Kuehik Khan in 1917, who, with Bolshevik backing, constituted a serious threat to Persian and British interests in the Caspian region. A confidential report by the Officer Commanding Gendarmerie Regiment of Mazanderan (Headquarters, Sari), shown to the British Military Attaché by a senior Persian officer at Gendarmerie Headquarters in Tehran, gives some interesting facts about the local situation. All Persian officials from the Governor downwards are under Tudeh supervision. No Government official is allowed to send telegraphic messages in code. No movements of gendarmerie can take place without prior permission of the Tudeh. The railway administration is completely under Tudeh control. The author of the report is of the opinion that Mazanderan can be taken over by the Tudeh party when it wishes to do so.

Qazvin.

8. Some rioting on a small scale is reported from Qazvin in connexion with the elections for provincial councils. Two Ministry of Interior inspectors have been sent to investigate.

Hamadan.

9. The Chief of General Staff informed the British Military Attaché that the four clashes with the democrat rebel forces (referred to in paragraph 5 of last Intelligence Summary) were, in fact, the work of guerilla bands of partisans which the General Staff had organised and armed as part of a resistance movement. The four bands so far organised are each in charge of an officer and work with the Garus and Zenjan branches of the Afshars and the Zulfiqar and Kazemi families, who are loyal supporters of Government in that neighbourhood. They are armed with obsolete patterns of Persian army rifles. They have strict orders to avoid clashes with Red army personnel when in uniform. While some see in this the germ of civil war in Persia and deplore the possible results, the General Staff, seeing the apathy or cowardice displayed by the present Government and seeing the lack of success so far achieved by British and American intervention on Persia's behalf, cannot be blamed for taking steps to prevent further infiltration southwards of rebel forces from the Russian Zone. (The Chief of General Staff has requested that the existence of this resistance movement be kept secret.)

Iranian State Railway.

10. A number of armed democrats, estimated by the Persian General Staff at about a thousand, headed by the Tudeh leader Sarabi, held a meeting recently in Semnan after which they forcibly deported the Governor. They held up the train due to leave for Tehran on Thursday but allowed it to proceed on Saturday. No train has arrived from Zenjan since Thursday. In answer to telegraphic enquiries, the Russian Movements Staff first said that the line was snow-bound, then that a strike was in progress and lastly that the train "would not be proceeding." It is believed that fighting between Democrats and Government supporters in the vicinity of the railway line near Zenjan may be the cause of the interruption in traffic. Meanwhile, with characteristic futility, the Persian railway administration has been despatching trains both to Semnan and Zenjan thus affording free transport for any rebel move on the capital—a contingency hitherto supported by rumour only.

Fars.

11. Reference Intelligence Summary No. 47, paragraph 8, His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, states that the offer of the monthly allowance of 30,000 rials by Nasir Khan Qashgai was made not to Ali Khan but to Amir Husain Khan, one of the sons of the late Sardar Instisham, a half-brother of Ali Khan.

Bakhtiari (reference Intelligence Summary No. 49, paragraph 14).

12. There is some hope of a settlement between Murteza Quli Khan and his opponents among the Bakhtiari. Jehan Shah Khan, his son, has approached His Majesty's Consul, Isfahan, with a proposed agreement reached between him and Abdur Reza Bakhtiar, who is a cousin of Abul Qasim Khan. (Abul Qasim, being a son of Amir Mufakham, is of the Haji Ilkhani family, whereas Murteza Quli Khan belongs to the rival branch of the Ilkhani.) The agreement which, on the recommendation of His Majesty's Consul, Isfahan, it is believed Murteza Quli Khan will accept, is as follows:—

- (i) Murteza Quli Khan should remain as Governor of Bakhtiari;
- (ii) Jehan Shah Khan should act for him in current business;
- (iii) Abdur Reza should be appointed assistant to the Governor, to represent the interests of the Haji Ilkhanis;
- (iv) Amir Bahman should retire from the affairs of the tribe and reside at Isfahan.

Khuzestan.

13. On the 9th January Sheikh Abdullah, the fourth and slightly demented son of the late Sheikh Khazal (Sheikh of Muhammerah) crossed from Iraq into Persia and established himself with some armed retainers in one of his father's old palaces at Fahliyah (some 4 miles upstream of Khorramshahr) from which he evicted the four Persian gendarmes who were on guard there. He then proceeded to occupy Gusbeh (on Abadan Island), but on the approach of Persian troops which the General Officer Commanding, Persian Army Division of Khuzistan, had despatched against him with commendable promptitude, Sheikh Abdullah fled into Iraq. Some comment has been heard to the effect that in the British "Zone," unlike the Russian, Persian troops are allowed to move freely and are even encouraged by the British military authorities to deal with disorder promptly and in their own way.

Persian Army.

14. The officers who deserted from the Meshed garrison at the time of the recent mutiny (see Intelligence Summary No. 34, paragraph 6), are now reported to have joined up with the Democrats in Azerbaijan and to have been appointed to positions in the Azerbaijan People's army. Colonel Nawai is stated to be in Zenjan and Colonel Azar, a deserter from the General Staff at Tehran, to be holding the post of Director of Recruiting.

15. A further batch of officers of the Azerbaijan division has recently arrived in Tehran accompanied by their families. In Zenjan they had been closely examined and detained for a day by the Democrat road picquets. They were relieved of all their spare clothing and cash in excess of 150 rials (about £1 3s.) per person. Owing to lack of transport, many of the officers were unable to bring their families with them.

16. The composition of the court-martial to be assembled for the trial of General Darakshani, the former General Officer Commanding, Tabriz, has been announced, though that fact, in itself, is no indication that the trial will ever take place.

Persian Gendarmerie.

17. Seven new regiments of gendarmerie are at present in process of formation in Tehran. They will eventually be centred on Tabriz, Rezaieh, Tehran, Meshed, Mazanderan (Sari) and Bujnurd. The two destined for Tabriz and Rezaieh will be replacements for those which were completely lost (except for about 100 officers and men who managed to return to Tehran) in the recent disturbances. All these new regiments are for the Russian occupied zone and it is intended that they should be trained and ready to follow on the heels of the departing Soviet troops when they evacuate the country by the 2nd March. There will, therefore, be an additional five regiments to the gendarmerie force as a whole making a total of eighteen. Whereas hitherto the squads, of which there are sixteen per company, contained only six men each, owing to overall shortage of personnel, the new regiments will have squads of eight men, bringing the company strength up to 172. There are nine companies per regiment, which, allowing for battalion and regimental headquarters personnel gives an approximate total strength per regiment of 1,862. There is now a total of four motorised companies, an addition of two in the last six months. A total of eight is visualised. It appears, however, that the supply of further equipment from the United States in the form of the 500 vehicles and wireless sets for a "net" of ten stations for which Colonel Schwarzkopf negotiated during his visit to America in April 1945 (see Intelligence Summary No. 28, paragraph 6, of the 22nd July, 1945), has not been obtained due to the Persian Government's lack of dollars.

Appointments.

18. Jawad Daryabegi to be Director-General in the Ministry of Agriculture.

Administration.

19. The Governorate of Garus (on the Qizil Uzun river about 100 miles north of Hamadan) which hitherto formed a part of the Fourth Governorate-General (Western Azerbaijan) has been brought under the direct administration of Tehran.

Economic.

20. Stocks of wheat, flour and barley held in the Tehran silo on the 10th January are reported to have been approximately 46,000 tons, of which barley accounts for 12,000 tons. Owing to the recent events in Azerbaijan 45,000 tons of cereals belonging to the Government have not been transported to Tehran, and it has therefore been decided to suspend the sale of barley for the time being. In addition to the stocks held 17 or 18 tons of wheat and barley are delivered daily in Tehran from Government properties in the Kermanshah, Hamadan and Qazvin areas. The daily consumption of cereals in Tehran, as measured by issues made by the Tehran silo, is reported to be 170 tons, while the bakers are said to bring a further 130 tons from other sources.

British Interests.

21. Various Persian newspapers have reported the handing back of the port of Khorramshahr to the Persian Government by the British military authorities. This news is incorrect. It was the Persian naval base at Khorramshahr which was handed back to the Persian military authorities (in the absence of the Persian navy) on the 23rd December, 1945.

American Interests.

22. On the 8th January all Russian papers came out with a Tass agency report to the effect that Mr. Rossow, the new American Consul in Tabriz, had met Pishaveri the Prime Minister of the Azerbaijan National Government, had expressed his pleasure at meeting him and, through him, tendered his greetings

to the new Azerbaijan Government. After some conversation on the subject of future plans and recognition by the Persian Government, the consul is reported to have promised every support to the new Government. The United States Embassy in Tehran have denied any knowledge of any such call having been paid and deny any statements regarding help from the United States Government.

Belgian Interests.

23. His Excellency Count Antoine de Laubespain, the new Belgian Minister, presented his letters of credence to His Imperial Majesty the Shah on the 12th January.

Tehran, 13th January, 1946.

[E 905/315/34]

(3)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 3, Secret, for the Period 14th January to 20th January, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 27 of 22nd January; Received 30th January.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

DURING the past week the Cabinet and Deputies have been wandering about in a political Kafir. Lacking chart, compass or objective, they are yet surprised that they have not attained their journey's end. Having finally rejected the Anglo-American suggestion of a tripartite advisory commission, the Government wasted a precious fortnight before it decided to appeal to the U.N.O. Having announced its intention to do so, it neither follows it up with detailed instructions to its representative nor seeks the agreement of the Majlis to what it had done. In regard to Deputy Tehrani's interpellation of the 30th December, the Prime Minister has come to an agreement with its author that he will withdraw it, not in order that Hakimi may remain in office, but in order that he may resign. Another Deputy has made a fresh interpellation with a view to retaining Hakimi for, according to the law, a Prime Minister may not resign till he has replied to an interpellation. Dr. Musaddiq, consistent only in his inconsistency, at first urged an appeal to the U.N.O. during his attacks on the Anglo-American suggestion, but now, when the appeal has been made, states that he did not really urge this but merely wanted Persia to retain the right to do so. Hakimi is reputed to desire to regain the support of some of his former adherents who, alarmed at the appeasement tactics of Nariman and Saleh, had fallen away. He cannot, according to the law, purge his Cabinet of these two by dismissing them. He intends to resign and re-form his Cabinet without them. He does not appear to realise that he may not be re-elected, and that this will pave the way for Qawam-us-Saltaneh, whose intentions, if elected, of giving the Russians what they want have already been made known. Neither does he appear to realise that the resignation of a Government, which a moment before made an appeal to the U.N.O., will have a disastrous effect on the reception of that appeal. To complete this Mad Hatter's tea party, a group of generals, announcing themselves as disgusted with Hakimi's inertia and its effect on Persia's security, are planning to overthrow him and form a Cabinet themselves under the leadership of no other than Qawam-us-Saltaneh!

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

2. The elections for the municipality of Tabriz have been held by the Azerbaijan National Government. The council will consist of sixty-five members with a smaller Executive Committee. Similar councils, but smaller, will be elected shortly for other towns in Azerbaijan.

3. The formation of a Government trading company with a capital of 20 million rials has been announced. Half the capital is to be subscribed by the public with easy payment terms for workers and peasants wishing to obtain shares. The company will undertake all export and import trade and will ensure that all profits are returned to Azerbaijan. The Prime Minister of the Azerbaijan

National Government has announced the introduction of legislation to regulate trade. He also mentions negotiations through "proper channels" to establish direct trade relations with neighbouring foreign countries. The Azerbaijan Ministry of Finance announces that all goods entering Azerbaijan must pay customs duties whether they have paid elsewhere in Persia or not.

Iranian State Railway (see paragraph 10 of last Intelligence Summary).

4. The Democrats are running a train service between Mianeh and Zenjan. They have retained some sixty wagons and six locomotives for this purpose. They have refused to remit to Tehran the railway earnings.

Qazvin.

5. The *Journal de Tehran*, in its issue of the 15th January, gives the names of Dr. Afzal, Navid, Farhudi, Razavi and Pakravan as having been elected to the Provincial Council. Enquiries are being made into the antecedents of the above, but with Qazvin in complete control by the Russians, it is assumed that they are all staunch Tudeh members.

Khuzistan (see paragraph 13 of last Intelligence Summary).

6. It is now learned that Sheikh Abdullah, hearing that Iraqi forces had also been set in motion against him, took refuge in Kuwait.

Semnan (see paragraph 10 of last Intelligence Summary).

7. The Tudeh Democrats, under the leadership of Iskandar Sarabi, are said to be in complete control of the town. The Tudeh, under Russian advice, completely control all railway operatives from the railway junction of Garmsar eastwards to Shahrud and northwards to Bandar Shah.

Yezd.

8. Sadri, the former Governor of Yezd, was relieved by Bahadur on the 8th January. The new Governor, one of Saleh's earliest appointments, is reputed to have strong leftist leanings. Yezd, it will be recalled, is Seyyid Zia-ud-Din's constituency.

Fars.

9. According to a consular report, some consternation among the Qashgai has been caused by the rumoured advent to power of Qawam-us-Saltaneh. A report, received in the General Staff from the General Officer Commanding Fars Division and almost certainly exaggerated, states that after a recent meeting in Firuzabad resolutions were taken by the Qashgai to start a rebellion if Qawam-us-Saltaneh became Prime Minister.

Bakhtiari (see paragraph 12 of last Intelligence Summary).

10. As a result of further discussions between the Ilkhani and Haji Ilkhani branches of the tribe, a new proposal has been put to Murteza Quli Khan whereby all the leading khans to the number of thirteen will be represented in the governorship and, what is far more important, secure a share of the pickings. Whether the Bakhtiari will gain from being ruled by thirteen thieves instead of one remains to be seen.

Khorasan.

11. The Russians are reported to be active in attempting to gain the goodwill of the religious authorities, who have not forgotten the bombardment of the shrine by Cossack artillery at the time of the Persian revolution. The Russians have now tried to curry favour by constructing a well near the shrine at their own charges.

Kurdistan (South).

12. With the surrender of Hassan Khan Rezabi to the Persian military the situation is returning to normal. General Humayuni has been able to withdraw his outposts and concentrate his troops in Merivan, Sardasht, Senneh and Saqqiz with detachments at Tikab (formerly Tikan Tappeh) and Bijar. Bukan, some 50 miles north of Saqqiz, is the nearest place known to be in rebel hands.

Kermanshah.

13. Some increased Tudeh activity is noticed as the result of the preparations for the new Provincial Councils.

Persian Army.

14. Although money was recently voted by the Majlis for the formation of two extra infantry divisions, only one is at present envisaged. It is being formed in Hamadan from conscripts of the Hamadan and Bijar districts and will eventually be named as an Azerbaijan Division.

15. His Majesty's Consul-General, Tabriz, has reported the numbers on some rifles seen in rebel hands in Azerbaijan. They were in English figures and were in the series 60,000 or 90,000. Enquiries from the General Staff have elicited the information that rifles bearing those series of numbers formed part of the 100,000 sold by the Persian army from surplus stocks to the Russians through the British in 1942.

The Court.

16. According to a press report, His Imperial Majesty the Shah is now convalescent after a chill.

Appointments.

17.—(i) His Imperial Majesty the Shah has appointed Dr. Mir Seyyid Hasan Imami to be Imam Jum'eh of Tehran. He is a relative of the recently deceased Imam Jumeh and is a doctor of law as well as a doctor of Muslim theology.

(ii) Dr. Ali Sajjadi, formerly Governor of Saveh, to be an inspector in the Ministry of the Interior.

(iii) Ahmed Karubi to be Governor of Saveh.

(iv) Sadiq Shahbazi to be Governor of Sirjan.

(v) Ali Asghar Kaivani to be counsellor to the Persian Legation in Bagdad.

(vi) Abul Fazl Shahrakhi to be Persian Consul at Suleimanieh.

British Interests.

18. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company are experiencing difficulties in obtaining passes for their officials from the Russians to travel on duty in the Russian occupied zone.

19. Agents for M.O. 1 publications have refused to take delivery of any material intended for distribution in North-West Persia. They say that the Democrats will not permit these publications to be taken into Azerbaijan.

American Interests.

20. A party of twenty-six American technicians recently visited Mehrabad aerodrome. Their visit was in connexion with the provisional agreement recently secured by T.W.A. (see paragraph 17 of Intelligence Summary No. 1).

P.S.—A Persian press report, as yet unconfirmed, states that Nariman, the Minister of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, has resigned. He continues to hold the office of Mayor of Tehran.

News has just been received of the resignation of Hakimi, the Prime Minister. Reliable details are not yet available, but it is believed that His Imperial Majesty the Shah forced him to this step.

Tehran, 20th January, 1946.

[E 1218/315/34]

(4)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 4, Secret, for the Period 21st January to 27th January, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 36 of 29th January; Received 11th February.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

AS reported in a postscript to last Intelligence Summary, Hakimi tendered his resignation to His Imperial Majesty The Shah on the 20th January. On the 26th January the Majlis chose Qawam-us-Saltaneh as his successor by 52 votes, 51 being cast for Husain Pirnia (Mutamin-ul-Mulk), (F.O. 171—M.A. 212), and 1 for Hakimi. In a letter to the press, Hakimi is reported to have said that, having represented his country's case to U.N.O., he had done his duty and was

prepared to resign. Apart from the unceasing hostility of the Left, who, at Russian instigation, opposed his policy of appealing to U.N.O., Hakimi's Government had lost many of its erstwhile supporters from the Right by the actions of Nariman and Saleh, whose appeasement tactics were displeasing and endangered their chances in the future elections. The Qawam-us-Saltaneh's supporters had been most active on his behalf, even spreading false reports that His Majesty's Embassy entirely approved of his policy and had withdrawn any objections to his candidature. After receipt of the Royal Firman Qawam has now to select his Cabinet and present them and his Government's programme before the Majlis. Having but a narrow majority, he will be obliged to offer some Cabinet posts to the Right. How far he will go in submission to the Russians is not for the moment predictable, but neither he, nor any other Persian, would see anything illogical or incongruous in now opening direct negotiations with the Russians although his Government has previously lodged with U.N.O. an appeal against the Russians.

Administration.

2. According to the press, elections for provincial and city councils have been concluded at Shahi and Sari in Mazandaran and at Birjand in East Persia.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

3. Little news of importance has come out of Azerbaijan during the past week. His Majesty's acting consul-general reports that there are still no signs whatever of any Russian military withdrawal. It is not upon the absence of such signs or preparatory measures that the acting consul-general bases his opinion that the Russians do not intend to leave by the 2nd March. Indeed, having no disposable assets or heavy stores or equipment, they could steal away as silently as any Arab. It is upon the fact that their departure would cause the instant collapse of the Democrat movement, the ruin of all they have built in the past four years, and much loss of face among their Persian hirelings, that he bases his opinion. A further reference to the Russians' right to keep troops in Persia by virtue of the Perso-Soviet Treaty of 1921, made this time by M. Vyshinsky before the U.N.O., lends colour to the views expressed by His Majesty's acting consul-general.

4. There are no indications that progress is being made in the Autonomous Kurdistan movement. Pishehvareh, the Azerbaijan Government Prime Minister, is reported to have said in conversation with the American Consul that the Kurds were not yet ready for such a movement. The Russians are clearly keeping the two issues of autonomy for Azerbaijan and Kurdistan quite separate.

Iranian State Railway.

5. No trains are running between Tehran and Qazvin. Between Qazvin and Mianeh the Democrats are running a limited service of three trains each way per week. At Takistan, though this place is in Democrat control, a gendarmerie post of twelve men still remains. At Diwandarreh, some 30 miles further on the Tabriz road, there is no gendarmerie and there is a Russian military garrison of fifty men.

Tehran.

6. The nearest Russian military check posts are now as follows:—

- (i) At Firuzkuh, 90 miles east of Tehran on the Tehran-Meshed road;
- (ii) At Garmsar railway junction, 50 miles east of Tehran;
- (iii) At Baghat-i-Kalat, 25 miles west of Tehran on the Tehran-Kerej road.

There are Persian military check posts on all roads leading into Tehran. On the two roads mentioned above they are situated at Jajerud bridge, 17 miles east, and Caravansarai Sangi, 15 miles west, of Tehran respectively.

Khamseh (Zenjan).

7. The Persian Chief of the General Staff states that the guerrilla bands of his resistance movement are more than holding their own against the rebel forces of the Democrats. The band under Zulfigari, operating in the Khamseh province, south of Zenjan, though forced to retire when the rebels brought into action some of the light tanks recently captured from the Persian garrison at

Rezaieh, managed, nevertheless, to inflict casualties on the rebels, and succeeded in taking prisoner three Red Army soldiers dressed in civilian clothes.

Bakhtiari.

8. Murteza Quli Khan has arrived in Tehran. He was received in audience by His Imperial Majesty The Shah. In conversation with His Majesty's Ambassador, he stated that, in Government circles, there was some intention of appointing a military governor for Bakhtiari. He also said that he was tired of these squabbles among the Khans and was retiring for a few weeks' rest to his estates near Shush.

Appointments.

- 9.—(i) Ali Soheili (F.O. 217—M.A. 283), according to a press report, has arrived in London to join the Persian Delegation to the U.N.O.
- (ii) Dr. Hejazi to be Chief of the Passport Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- (iii) Muhsin Shabrukh to be Director of the 1st Political Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs;
- (iv) Ahmad Mirfindiriski to be Third Secretary at the Persian Embassy in Moscow;
- (v) Dr. Ali Siasi has been re-elected Dean of Tehran University for a further period of three years.
- (vi) Reference Intelligence Summary No. 3, paragraph 17 (i), the new Imam Jum'eh is a nephew of the deceased Imam Jum'eh, his father being full brother to Zahir-ul-Islam and to the deceased.

Persian Army.

10. A proclamation has been made recalling to the colours conscripts of the solar year 1300 (1921).

As a result of the incidents reported in paragraph 14 below, the Persian army infantry battalion at Hamadan has sent out detachments of one platoon to Awej, and one company, less one platoon, to Razan.

Persian Gendarmerie.

11. A press report states that 47 out of 102 gendarmerie officers stationed in Azerbaijan have now arrived back in Tehran. Two hundred and sixty-three other ranks have also reported to headquarters.

Russian Interests.

12. Majors Veniamine Malighine and Constantin Kassorine have arrived to take up their duties as Assistant Russian Military Attachés. With Colonel Razin, Colonel Ivanof and Lieutenant-Colonel Krachevsky, the Russian Military Attaché's staff now numbers five.

13. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires, M. Yakubof, has left. As at the time of the ambassador's departure no intimation was given either to the Persian Government or to his diplomatic colleagues. The Russian Embassy is now believed to be in the charge of the First Secretary.

14. Some days ago a Russian civilian styling himself the Consul at Qazvin (there is no Russian Consul at Qazvin), accompanied by two Russian officers, visited the villages of Razan and Awaj (54 and 75 miles respectively from Hamadan) and Hamadan. At the two first named places they contacted the population and urged them to enlist in the Azerbaijan People's Army. The officer commanding of the newly-arrived Persian army infantry battalion at Hamadan reports a rumour current in that town to the effect that Russian troops will soon arrive there.

15. Certain Assyrians who frequent the Russian Consulate at Kermanshah have stated that the Russian Consul has spoken to them of a scheme to establish a Christian State west of Lake Urmieh. Great importance is not attached to this statement. It has long been known that the Russians have been using Persian minorities to further their own ends and it may well be that, having promised the Kurds an autonomous Kurdistan and the Armenians a welcome to Soviet Armenia, the Russians may feel obliged to hold out some bait for the Assyrians and Chaldeans of this area. In any case, in the light of past history, no Assyrian or Chaldean living in an enclave surrounded by Kurds could be regarded in insurance parlance as a first class life.

American Interests.

16. Several Tehran papers publish the text of an official communiqué from the United States Embassy in Tehran, denying allegations recently made in certain sections of the Tehran press that the United States Government has opposed any steps taken by the Persian Government to lay their complaint before the U.N.O. These allegations, the communiqué states, are completely untrue. It is the opinion of the United States Government that every member of the U.N.O. must be free to make its own decision as to whether or not it is necessary to draw the attention of the U.N.O. to any of its problems. No direct or indirect action has been taken by the United States Government to exercise any influence in the decision taken by the Persian Government in connexion with the current problem.

Tehran, 27th January, 1946.

[E 1383/315/34]

(5)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 5, Secret, for the Period the 28th January to 3rd February, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 41 of 5th February; Received 15th February.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

QAWAM-US-SALTANEH has not yet formed his Cabinet and does not seem in a hurry to do so. Having been elected only by the narrowest majority, he realises that it will not be easy for him to choose a Cabinet which is acceptable to the Shah, the Russians and those lukewarm supporters who only voted for him because they did not approve of the policy of the extreme Right, which was to vote for Mutamin-ul-Mulk (who had already announced his unwillingness to take office) merely in order to register a defeat for Qawam-us-Saltaneh. Qawam-us-Saltaneh, meanwhile, is despatching current business and watching how relations with Russia develop, after instructing Soheili in London to ask Vishinsky what he means by direct negotiations. That Persia's appeal is still on the books of U.N.O. is not due to Qawam's efforts, but he is probably glad to have this second string to his bow should the Russians prove unaccommodating in their demands. It is not clear where these direct negotiations will take place. Soheili, who has recently joined the Persian delegation in London, may be selected as more acceptable to the Russians than Taqizadeh. There are rumours that instructions to negotiate are being sent to the timorous Ahi, Persian Ambassador in Moscow. A Reuter message, for which at present there is no confirmation, states that a delegation of eight Persians will proceed to Moscow. The only course so far not suggested is that Qawam should negotiate with the Russian Embassy in Tehran, and this for the good reason that after the unannounced departure of both the Ambassador and chargé d'affaires the official now in charge seems to be a first secretary. To-morrow he might also make his unobtrusive exit and Russian diplomacy be carried on through the medium of the embassy gatekeeper.

Internal Security.

Isfahan.

2. A series of strikes in the textile mills has occurred recently. It lasted for about ten days. The ostensible reason was a demand for a 20 per cent. increase in wages, but there is little justification for this demand as prices, if still high, have not risen again lately in Isfahan. The Tudeh party was certainly at the bottom of it, but a local politician who has evolved a novel system of graft probably had a hand in the game. He stages a strike at one or more of the mills and then intimidates the mill owners into paying him handsomely to call it off. As he has influence with both owners and workers, he has been able to effect this by securing for the workers some unimportant concessions which cost the owners but little.

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Fars.

3. According to reports from consular sources, uneasiness still prevails among the Qashgai and Mamassani at the turn of events in the north of Persia (see Intelligence Summary No. 3, paragraph 9), and they are trying to elicit advice from the British consulate as to the action which the tribes of Fars should take in the event of a puppet Russian Government coming into power in Tehran.

Hamadan. (Reference paragraph 14 of last Intelligence Summary.)

4. His Majesty's Consul, Kermanshah, who visited Hamadan recently, reports that there seem to be no good grounds for believing that Russian troops will soon occupy that place. The Persian army detachments at Razan and Awej have established road check posts, where vehicles are examined for suspicious travellers and arms.

Kermanshah.

5. His Majesty's Consul reports that Tudeh activity is on the increase and that the rival parties are melting away. The achievement of their immediate objects in Azerbaijan by the Democrats, the paramount influence of the Tudeh Democrats in Gilan, Mazanderan, Gorgan and, to a slightly less extent, in Khorasan, and the departure of British troops from Kermanshah would account for this.

The Court.

6. Prince Ghulam Reza Pahlevi, the third son of the late Reza Shah (by his second queen, Malikeh Turan, daughter of Majd-us-Saltaneh and granddaughter of Haji Majd-ud-Dowleh), arrived by air from America on the 28th January. Some weeks previously, in conversation with the British Military Attaché, His Imperial Majesty the Shah disclosed the fact that he had been expelled from Princetown.

Communications.

7. Exceptionally heavy falls of snow have been reported from nearly all parts of Persia, and all roads to the north of Tehran remained blocked for two or three days. Railway traffic to the south was not seriously interrupted. The Ministry of Roads and Communications have failed to continue the arrangements for snow clearance on the passes on the main routes which were in force while the roads were under British military maintenance.

8. A press communiqué states that the Soviet officials working on the railway lines Tehran-Mianeh, Tehran-Shahrud and Tehran-Bandar Shah have been recalled, and the operation of these sections is being handed back to the Iranian State Railway. This, no doubt, is a concession made by the Russians to show their satisfaction at the assumption of the premiership by their candidate Qawam-us-Saltaneh. In point of fact, it means little to the Persian Government since the line from Qazvin to Mianeh is in complete control by the Democrats and the remaining sections entirely under Tudeh management. With the assistance of certain railway officials previously interned by the Allies and now reinstated in their appointments, Tudeh influence is said to be spreading rapidly along the southern section as far as Durud and even Andimishk.

9. The Persian Government has been invited to send a delegate to the forthcoming telecommunications meeting in Cairo, at which representatives of the Middle East countries concerned will discuss ways and means to maintain the telephone and telegraph net-work hitherto operated by the British military authorities.

Civil Aviation.

10. On the 22nd January an aeroplane belonging to the Persian Aero Club took off from Tehran and did not return. Other aeroplanes were despatched in search of it but not traces of it were found till, on the 27th January, a report was received that the plane had landed at Binab, some 9 kilom. south-east of Zenjan. The pilot is now in Zenjan. It is thought that he may have joined the Democrat forces.

Polish Interests.

11. The last transport conveying Polish refugees from Ahwaz to the Lebanon left on the 30th January. The Polish camp at Ahwaz has been closed.

Russian Interests.

12. *Corrigendum.*—Paragraph 12 of last Intelligence Summary, for "Kassorine" read "Zassorine."

13. According to what is now almost standard Russian political tactics, they are endeavouring in their Persian controlled press to divert attention from their own nefarious doings in Northern Persia by accusing the British of arming and organising the tribes of the south for revolt against the Central Government. Sheikh Abdullah's recent incursion into Khuzistan is cited as an example. Murteza Quli Khan's dictatorial rule in Bakhtiari is said to be upheld by the British. It would be easy to find British rifles among the southern tribes, for there are many which date from the last war, in addition to those stolen from our troops in the recent war. In Azerbaijan, however, the Russians have been careful to arm their supporters with rifles of Persian army pattern, of which they have bought about 140,000 and captured a great many more out of the 80,000 which the Persian army is said to have lost during the operations of August 1941.

Tehran, 3rd February, 1946.

[E 1716/315/34]

(6)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 6. Secret, for the Period 3rd February to 10th February, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 49 of 12th February; Received 26th February.)

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

QAWAM-US-SALTANEH informed the Oriental Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy that he intends to go to Moscow himself but only "for a short time," either to introduce his delegation and leave them to their discussions or, at the end of the discussions, to sign any agreement reached. Qawam-us-Saltaneh would not appear to realise that getting into the bear's den is easier than getting out and that, once in Moscow, apart from the physical difficulties of air travel, the Russians will certainly try to keep him there and maintain pressure upon him, as their nominee and chief hope, to extract from the Persian delegation as many of their demands as possible. Such were thought to be: (i) an oil concession; (ii) the cancellation of the recent law to postpone the Majlis elections; (iii) the recognition of the Azerbaijan National Government; (iv) a general amnesty of all Democrats, Kurds, &c., who took part in the recent independence movement. There is a real danger that Qawam, realising the storm which would arise, not only in Persia but in the U.N.O., from acceding to such demands, may conclude a secret agreement with the Russians. In the meanwhile broadcasts from Delhi and Angora, to the effect that Qawam intended to recognise officially the Azerbaijan National Government, and to grant the Russians enlarged concessions for fisheries in the Caspian and a concession for oil in Azerbaijan, have elicited a firm and indignant denial by the Persian Government. In an interview with Reuter's correspondent in Tehran on the 9th February, Qawam is reported as having said: (i) that he would form his Cabinet within a few days; (ii) that he did not propose to invite any Tudeh or Democrat members to join it; (iii) that he had not as yet taken any decision about going to Moscow; (iv) that he did not propose to recognise the Azerbaijan National Government as the Persian Constitution did not permit of such a step; (v) that the new elections could not be held at present because of the recently passed law which prohibited the holding of the elections as long as foreign troops were on Persian soil. There is no doubt that Qawam is in a quandary. He is naturally cautious. Being a Persian, he has the Persian's natural aversion to coming to a decision. He has probably made contradictory promises to his supporters and to his erstwhile opponents in order to win their support and now sees these promises coming home to roost. His majority in the Majlis, originally of one, is no longer safely predictable at even that low figure. He knows that the Security Council have announced their intention of keeping an eye on the progress of any negotiations which the Persians may conduct directly with the Russians. Finally, there is the strong

temptation to avoid any action and to sit and wait, ticking off on his calendar the bare twenty days which remain before the 2nd March. If, by that date, the Russians have withdrawn, he will have succeeded in freeing Persian soil from Russian military domination without having committed his Government to any concessions. If, by that date, Russian troops are still in Persia, he has always the Security Council of U.N.O. to fall back on. There will be many, apart from Persians, who in this particular problem will see wisdom in a policy of "wait and see."

The Majlis.

2. In political circles there is much discussion concerning the interval between the end of the present Majlis on the 12th March and the new elections which, according to a recently passed law, cannot be held till all foreign troops have left Persia. Qawam-us-Sultaneh may present his Cabinet and programme to the Majlis and, on receiving a vote of confidence, that Cabinet would continue to govern the country between the dissolution of the present Majlis and the election of the next. Again, he might, though this is improbable, contrive to delay the presentation of his Cabinet till the dissolution and, under those circumstances, he would continue to direct Persia's affairs single-handed. A third possibility is the prolongation of the life of the present Majlis by special enactment. A fourth possibility is the repeal of the recent law for postponement of the elections. Yet a fifth course has found an advocate in Dr. Musaddiq. He proposes that, as Tehran itself is not occupied by foreign troops, the elections for the Tehran Deputies for the next Majlis should be held on the original and not the postponed date and that, when elected, these Deputies (to be increased by a special law from twelve to thirty), by virtue of Article 8 of the Constitution, should direct the affairs of the country.

3. According to Persian law an official against whom an indictment is pending cannot continue to serve in a Government appointment until the case is concluded. It will be recalled that some two years ago an indictment was made against Ali Soheili, the then Prime Minister, and Tadayyun, the then Minister of Interior, for having illegally interfered in and having derived pecuniary benefit from the Majlis elections. Dr. Musaddiq, in a Majlis session of the 11th November, 1945, asked that speedy action be taken to conclude these two cases. Apart from this, little more has been heard of the matter and it was thought that, as usually happens in Persia, the cases would fizzle out. Recently, however, on hearing that Soheili had been instructed to approach M. Vyshinski in London to learn what he meant by the phrase "direct negotiations," Dr. Musaddiq went to the Ministry of Justice and demanded a report on the progress of the case against Soheili and an assurance to the effect that it had not been dropped. Dr. Musaddiq does not like Soheili but, in this instance, his motives were probably not those of revenge but arose from his crusade against public dishonesty.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

4. As the result of a recent visit to Senneh by His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah some interesting news has been received from him and also from other sources concerning the relations between the Kurds and Democrats. A reference to this subject was made in paragraph 19 of Intelligence Summary No. 50 of 1945 and paragraph 4 of Intelligence Summary No. 4 (current). The first issue seems to be that of a Kurdish refusal to admit Democrat officials into the zone they claim as Kurdistan, Mahabad being one of the places mentioned. The second dispute concerns the degree of control which the Democrats shall exercise over the foundation of an autonomous Kurdistan. Ghazi Muhammad of Mahabad was summoned to Tabriz and instructed to form a local Government under Democrat superintendence. This he refused to do, saying that he had direct relations with the Russians and that, according to his instructions from them, Kurdistan was to be independent of and not subordinate to Azerbaijan. To this the Democrats are reported to have at first demurred but finally agreed. (Indeed, without Russian armed support it would be impossible for them to dictate terms to the Kurds.) Ghazi Muhammad is now reported to have assumed at Mahabad the Presidency of the "Kurdish Republic," to have appointed Haji Baba Sheikh as his "Prime Minister" and to have hoisted a flag of his own design. The third difference of opinion is that of the proposed boundary between Azerbaijan and the "Kurdistan Republic." His Majesty's Consul reports that the Kurdish area is from Miandoab to Sardasht, but other sources

report (with what seems to be more probability) that the Kurds are claiming Maku, Khoi, Shahpur, Rizaieh to the west of the lake and Miandoab and Maragheh to the east of it.

Kurdistan.

5. His Majesty's Consul, Kermanshah, reports that Hama Rashid, whose escape from *résidence forcée* in Kirkuk and whose entry into Persia was reported in paragraph 7 of Intelligence Summary No. 1, after satisfying the Russians of his *bona fides*, was presented by them with a sword of honour and a medal and was appointed commander-in-chief of the Kurdish forces in Mahabad. His personal following is estimated at 180 mounted men. One of his Begzadehs has returned to Panjwin and has made his peace with the Iraqi authorities. His wife is said to be under Iraqi surveillance in Daru Khan.

6. Mulla Mustafa Barzani does not appear to enjoy the full confidence of the Russians, who doubt his complete loyalty to their cause. His followers, billeted, as previously reported, on the villages around Rezaieh and Nagadeh, are said to be in a miserable plight and that many of those not under sentence of death by the Iraqi authorities may endeavour to return to Iraq in the spring.

7. Movement by Democrat troops south of Saqqiz (reported from sources in Iraq but not in this summary) appear to be unconfirmed. According to General Humayuni, the Persian G.O.C. at Senneh, the southernmost limit of their activities is the line Sardasht-Baneh-Saqqiz-Tikab. The G.O.C. expressed himself as confident of his ability to deal with the situation unless Ghazi Muhammad, Hama Rashid and Mulla Mustafa were to combine for a southward movement, in which case the situation might become serious.

Bakhtiari.

8. No settlement has as yet been reached in the dispute between the Ilkhani and Haji Ilkhani families concerning the governorship of Bakhtiari. According to Saifpur Fatemi, the Deputy for Najafabad and the brother of Muteza Quli Khan's unpopular henchman Misbah Fatemi, the latest proposal is that an additional governor, co-equal with Murteza Quli Khan, and four vice-governors be appointed, of whom one would be Abul Qasim Khan. According to Saifpur Fatemi, Murteza Quli Khan would prefer to resign rather than accept this arrangement.

Mekran.

9. Three privately-owned lorries were held up by three armed Baluch robbers on the 4th February on the Zahidan-Meshed road, 36 miles north of Zahidan. The drivers were relieved of their cash. The gendarmerie, as usual, failed to make contact with the robbers, who fled towards the Perso-Afghan frontier.

Persian Gendarmerie.

10. Colonel Schwarzkopf, the American adviser to the gendarmerie, complains that he is making little headway in his efforts to improve the force. A recent order placing the gendarmerie under the orders of the army for operational purposes during the present crisis has, according to Colonel Schwarzkopf, been interpreted by the latter as giving them a right to interfere in his dispositions and to take a number of his men for duties which should properly be an army responsibility. He has not yet succeeded in establishing a separate court to deal with offences committed by his personnel and complains that, owing to lack of evidence or interference, he can never secure a conviction by the army tribunals of any gendarmerie offender. Until his officers are not placed on a separate cadre from the army, he can neither secure the promotion of those whom he considers fit nor the dismissal of the incompetent. He admits that while he has achieved something in the improvement of the pay, clothing and rations of the gendarmerie (and these improvements are noticeable more in Tehran than in the provinces), he has made no headway in eliminating dishonesty and peculation.

Persian Navy.

11. For the past four years little or no mention has been made in these Intelligence Summaries of the almost non-existent Persian navy. Now that the re-establishment of this force is under discussion between His Majesty's Government and the Persian Government, a short note on the present position (included as an appendix to this summary) may not be inopportune.

Appointments.

- 12.—(i) Muzaffar Firuz, the editor of *Rad-i-Imruz*, has been appointed Political Under-Secretary to the Prime Minister and Director-General of the Department of Propaganda. A personality note on this individual will be published in the next Intelligence Summary.
- (ii) An unconfirmed press report states that, as Persia has decided to renew diplomatic relations with Italy, Fathullah Pakravan, Amir-i-Arfa (F.O. 169, M.A. 208), has been appointed Persian Ambassador at Rome.

British Interests—Disposals.

13. Some time ago the Persian State Railways asked the British Military Authorities whether they could purchase certain items of rolling-stock, consisting of passenger coaches, goods wagons, refrigerator vans and portable cranes. The price fixed by the British Military Authorities was £156,200. The Persian State Railways are also anxious to buy a sawmill at a cost of £40,000, and some second hand lorries for £7,000. As rials are unacceptable to the British Military Authorities, the Persian State Railways have asked for Cabinet sanction to borrow the sterling amount from the Persian National Bank.

Russian Interests.

14. When the Russians withdrew their troops from Qaleh Murgheh aerodrome on the night of the 18th–19th September, 1945, they left behind some twenty-five civilian personnel of Intourist to operate their air services to Tabriz, Meshed and Moscow. These have now been transferred to Mehrabad aerodrome, and Qaleh Murgheh is in undisputed possession of the Persian Air Force. The Russian personnel at Mehrabad are said to number about fifty and to be composed of men and women. They also maintain a meteorological station.

15. M. Ali Abdul Oglu Iliev, the First Secretary of the Russian Embassy, referred to in paragraph 1 of last Intelligence Summary, has now been appointed chargé d'affaires in place of M. Yakubof, who left some time ago.

16. The Russians have now made another gesture of goodwill towards the Persian Government, presumably to mark their pleasure at the appointment of Qawam-us-Saltaneh as Prime Minister. They have permitted some officials of the Ministry of Agriculture to visit Azerbaijan to study the locust situation. Most Persians would say that in Azerbaijan the pest which requires eradication is not the locust.

Polish Interests (see paragraph 11 of last Intelligence Summary).

17. Thirty-four Polish Jew refugees still remain in Tehran. They refuse to recognise the Warsaw Government or its legation in Tehran. On account of the Palestine problem the Lebanon Government refused them entry into Lebanon along with the other refugees. Owing to their attitude to the Warsaw Government and to the Russians, their continued presence in Tehran was embarrassing. Fortunately the Government of India has now agreed to admit them.

Appendix.

THE PERSIAN NAVY.

1. List of Persian Naval Vessels as believed to exist prior to August 1941, showing present whereabouts.

Name.	Type.	Ton-nage.	Present Situation.	His Majesty's Government's Recommendations.
1. <i>Bahr</i> ...	Sloop ...	950	Sunk by R.N. in 1941 ...	His Majesty's Government has under consideration the question of providing two suitable vessels as replacements.
2. <i>Palang</i> ...	Sloop ...	950	Sunk by R.N. in 1941 ...	
3. <i>Shahbroke</i> ...	Gunboat ...	331	Taken over by British naval authorities for use with the Royal Indian Navy.	His Majesty's Government has proposed a gift of three H.M.D.L's (a) to replace cannibalised gunboat (b) in place of hire of four gunboats used by British.
4. <i>Shabaz</i> ...	Gunboat ...	331	Now in Indian waters.	
5. <i>Simurgh</i> ...	Gunboat ...	331	One of these has been cannibalised	
6. <i>Karkas</i> ...	Gunboat ...	331		

Name.	Type.	Ton-nage.	Present Situation.	His Majesty's Government's Recommendations.
7. <i>Euphrates</i> or <i>Humai</i>	Ex steam yacht Icy used as depot ship	700	Used by R.N. until recently. Now in charge of Harbourmaster, Khorramshahr. Sunk at her moorings	No action so far proposed.
8. <i>Shahin</i> ...	Minesweeper ...	135	Scuttled by R.N. July 1944	No action so far proposed.
9. ...	Floating dock ...	600	Removed by R.N. Present whereabouts Alexandria	To be returned to Bandar Shahpur.
10. <i>Neyrou</i> ...	Tug	Previously in use by R.N. in the Persian Gulf. Now returned to Persians	No action required.
11. <i>Tundkash 1</i> (Admiral's barge)	Motor launch 33 ft. x 7 ft. x 2 ft.	...	Returned to Persians	No action required.
12. <i>Chinchilla</i> ...	Steel-hulled cabin cruiser 32 ft. x 13 ft. by 4 ft.	...	Handed back to Persian Government but they are unserviceable as engines cannot be repaired	Sanction by Admiralty awaited to install new engines.
13. <i>Karun</i> ...	Motor store carrier 40 ft. x 10 ft. x 8½ ft.	...	Two were sunk and are still submerged; two are in service with R.N.	No action so far proposed.
14. Four motor dhows (Booms) at Khorramshahr	Transferred to the Inland Water Transport	No action so far proposed.
15. R.N.M.B. 16	Motor launch cabin type 43 ft. x 10 ft. x 3 ft. 6 in. with Kelvin 4-cyl. engines	...	Taken over from the Persians and converted from oil to water barge. Now at Bahrein	No action so far proposed.
16. R.N.W.B. No. 2	Water barge, dumb	...	Large and old motor dhow. Engine shaft and housing removed prior to sale on 13th May, 1944, at Bandar Shahpur	No action so far proposed.
17. K. MD. No. 1	Motor dhow—ex <i>Golden Hind</i> . 60 ft. x 13 ft. x 5 ft. 6 in. Kelvin 4 cyl. engine	...		

2. Persian Government's Policy.

A committee in the Ministry of War (there is no separate Ministry of Marine) has examined the question but no decision was reached. The Ministry of War, which is concerned solely with the financial aspect, has no money available and no separate budgetary allotment, money needed for the navy or for the air force being met from the general Ministry of War budget of 100 million tomans which, originally laid down as the maximum by Dr. Millsaugh, still remains the official figure. The Ministry is believed to favour (i) compensation by His Majesty's Government but not replacement for Nos. 1 and 2 in the above list, (ii) a cash payment for the hire of Nos. 3, 4 and 5, and cash compensation for No. 6, but not the gift of any new vessels by His Majesty's Government in lieu of hire or compensation, (iii) the temporary laying up of vessels 3, 4 and 5 under caretaker crews, (iv) limiting the operational functions of the navy to river police, preventive duties, and maintenance of liaison between army detachments on the coast where land communications are difficult.

The General Staff, while realising the difficulty of collecting the now widely-scattered personnel of the navy in a period of less than two months, is in favour of accepting (if offered—and, as yet the offer has not been disclosed to them) replacements for Nos. 1 and 2 and the offer of three H.D.M.L's, (a) in place of the cannibalised gunboat, and (b) as hire for the use of the remaining three. It also wishes to acquire some motor launches for river police and preventive duties.

His Imperial Majesty the Shah, with that total disregard for considerations of finance which characterises his discussion of plans for his army, and air force, is reported to favour the General Staff's plan plus the acquisition of a "cruiser or two," which he imagines may be available free of charge from captured ex-enemy sources.

[E 1962/315/34]

(7)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 7, Secret, for the Period 11th February to 17th February, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 57 of 19th February; Received 5th March.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

Qawam-us-Saltaneh has made up his Cabinet. Their names and portfolios are as follows:—

- (i) Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of the Interior: Ahmed Qawam (Qawam-us-Saltaneh), (F.O. 183—M.A. 295).
- (ii) Minister without Portfolio: Dr. Ahmed Matin Daftari (F.O. 131—M.A. 168).
- (iii) Minister of Justice: Anushirwan Sepahbudi (F.O. 205—M.A. 282).
- (iv) Minister of War: General Ahmedi (F.O. 16—M.A. 23).
- (v) Minister of Finance: Murteza Quli Bayat (Saham-us-Sultan) (F.O. 47—M.A. 65).
- (vi) Minister of Roads and Communications: General Muhammad Hussein Firuz (F.O. 72—M.A. 94).
- (vii) Minister of Industry and Mines: Sipehr Muwarrikh-ud-Dowleh.
- (viii) Minister of Education: Bahar, Malik-ush-Shuara.
- (ix) Minister of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones: Saham-ud-din Ghaffari (Zuka-ed-Dowleh) (F.O. 75—M.A. 97).
- (x) Minister of Health: Dr. Manuchihr Iqbal (F.O. 94).

The retention by Qawam of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in his own hands is understandable when he is to lead the deputation to Moscow. More sinister is his retention of the Ministry of the Interior, in view of the forthcoming elections.

- (ii)—a Minister of Justice and Prime Minister under Reza Shah; was interned by the Allies;
- (iii)—was Minister for Foreign Affairs in Sadr's Cabinet;
- (iv)—represents a sop to the extreme Right, without whose support Qawam's slender Majlis majority of one would be speedily transformed into a minority. The Russians are believed to have opposed this appointment very strongly;
- (v)—an ex-Prime Minister, needs no introduction as an outstanding dolt;
- (vi)—was a member of the last Cabinet, but resigned. He made no secret of his views that appeasement of the Russians was the only practicable policy. The family estates are in Azerbaijan;
- (vii)—is chiefly renowned for being a political go-between, posing as being in the innermost councils of both the British and Russian Embassies. Is mistrusted by the Shah, as by everybody, but is used by him as a sort of political pimp;
- (viii)—is a notable poet who has recently sold himself to the Tudeh;
- (ix)—belongs to a family suspected of having contacts with the Japanese Legation in Tehran during the war;
- (x)—has mixed little in politics and has some good ideas of improving Persia's health services. He has not much energy and will cut little ice in this Cabinet. Is a brother of Khosro Iqbal the ex-internee editor of *Iran-i-Ma*.

The above were presented to H.I.M. The Shah on the 14th February and were due to be presented to the Majlis on the 17th February.

2. The composition of two Persian delegations to Moscow has been announced. The first, a political mission, consisting of the following:—

Leader: Qawam-us-Saltaneh.

Members: Dr. Matin Daftari.

General Firuz.

Hamid Sevyah (F.O. 292).

Dr. Reza Zadeh Shafaq.

Jawad Ameri (F.O. 18).

Deputy Durri (re-elected by Tudeh pressure after his credentials had been rejected).

The second delegation, styled a commercial delegation, comprises the following:—

Ali Muhammad Oveisi (F.O. 164): Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Industry and Mines.

Nikpur: President of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce.

Salman Assadi: (F.O. 33).

The *Journal de Tehran* announces that the missions will remain in Moscow for two weeks. A large Russian aeroplane arrived in Tehran on the 11th February.

3. The Prime Minister has issued a proclamation cancelling the Military Governor's orders prohibiting political and party meetings. The portion of the orders pertaining to the press will remain in force until further notice.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

4. A consular report states that conscripts of the 20 to 29 age groups are being called up for service in the Azerbaijan Peoples' Army. The National Government claim that, so far, 15,000 men have volunteered, but it is doubtful whether anyone has done so. The Prime Minister of Azerbaijan has admitted that there is no money with which to clothe, feed and pay them. The Russians are believed to have helped by providing cloth and buttons for officers' uniforms.

5. More rifles of Persian army pattern have been seen in rebel hands whose numbers show them to belong to the consignment sold by the Persian army to the Russians. A "Democrat" from Marand disclosed the fact that he could get no ammunition for his Russian pattern rifle from the Russians as they had given strict instructions that no rifles or ammunition of Russian pattern were to be distributed to the rebels, though B.R.N.O. rifles of Persian army pattern and Persian army ammunition could be supplied in large quantities.

6. The economic position of the National Government shows no improvement. Only moderate success is being achieved in the collection of income tax. Trade and banking are at a standstill. A drastic cut has been made in wages which has resulted in a slight drop in prices. Factories are either idle or have been taken over by the Democrats and are working with reduced hands.

7. Azerbaijan has adopted Moscow time (3 hours ahead of G.M.T.) instead of Tehran time (3½ hours ahead of G.M.T.).

8. The scattered bands of "Fidais" are said to be proving an embarrassment to the People's army, who are now trying to organise them into units and bring them under effective control.

9. The National Government is now submitting all British, Indian and American films to a strict censorship. No doubt political more than moral lapses are searched for, but it is obvious that this censorship could be used for commercial discrimination in favour of Russian films.

10. The news of the death of Ghulam Yahya, Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Defence of the National Government, reported in Intelligence Summary No. 1, paragraph 6, has now been denied.

Khorasan.

11. Major Pikhlin, Russian Publicity Officer, recently visited Turbat-i-Haidari in order to open a branch of the Tudeh party there. He is reported to have had an altercation with the local commander of the gendarmerie who had recently expelled from the town a number of hooligans who were the Tudeh's main supporters.

Fars.

12. Merdi Farrukh, the Governor-General, has been summoned to Tehran for consultations. It is thought that he will not return to Shiraz as opposition to him has increased from many influential quarters. A consular report states that Reza Hekmat, Sardar Fakhir (F.O. 86—M.A. 112) claims to have arranged his recall and is trying to secure his own appointment as Governor-General.

Bakhtiari.

13. An unconfirmed report states that Qawam-us-Saltaneh has dismissed Murteza Quli Khan from his governorship of Bakhtiari.

Appointments.

- 14.—(i) General Farajullah Aghovli (F.O. 23-M.A. 6) to be Chief of the General Staff vice General Hasan Arfa.
 (ii) General Purzand to be General Officer Commanding 3rd (Hamadan) Division—the new division which is forming at Hamadan and which is earmarked for the reoccupation of Azerbaijan.

Both of the above named were interned by the Allies during the war. General Arfa's distrust of Qavam-us-Saltaneh, his hatred of the Russians and their agents the Tudeh, and his implacable hostility to the Democrat rebels have long marked him out as the first victim should Qavam-us-Saltaneh come into power. His strong stand against appeasement and the energetic measures which he took to safeguard the capital against any Russian inspired rising have earned him the respect of nearly all patriotic Persians. He has, however, certain inherent defects of character which have alienated the sympathies of many who would have otherwise given him their support. He is excitable, overbearing and harsh and adopts a tone of moral superiority which exasperates his fellow countrymen. He is a good hater and relentlessly pursues all whom he imagines to be the friends of his predecessor and rival, General Razmara. To strengthen his position (as he vainly thought) he has intrigued with politicians and newspaper editors. He has founded a party in the army. He has a spy-hunting mania and daily discovers plots against the realm and even against the life of the Shah himself. His departure is a loss, for, despite his inverted patriotism which sometimes showed itself in xenophobia, he has co-operated wholeheartedly with the British, believing that their policy and Persia's were one and the same, *i.e.*, the continued existence of Persia as an independent State.

Personalities.

15. Reference paragraph 12 (i) of last Intelligence Summary, a personality note on Muzaffar Firuz is given at Appendix "A" to this Summary.

[Reference paragraph 1 (vii) of this summary, a personality note on Ahmad 'Ali Sipih (Muvarrikh 'd-Dauleh) is given at Appendix "B" to this summary.]

British Interests.

16. A press communiqué states that Mr. J. H. Le Rougetel, C.M.G., M.C., has been appointed as His Majesty's Ambassador in Tehran to succeed Sir Reader Bullard, K.C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E.

17. On the 12th February a clash occurred between a patrol of Indian troops and a patrol of Persian military. The Indian patrol opened fire upon a Persian watchman whom they mistook for a wire thief. When a Persian military patrol arrived upon the scene they were mistaken for reinforcements for the thieves and were fired upon. Two Persian soldiers were wounded.

American Interests.

18. Complaints have been received of the indiscipline of crews of American ships at Abadan and Khorramshahr, and also of smuggling of arms by them. This is on a small scale but nevertheless affects adversely the security of the area. The arms are of two kinds: (a) war souvenir rifles of Japanese pattern held under permit and (b) rifles illegally bought in Far Eastern ports. Both are sold by seamen to the local inhabitants.

Russian Interests.

19. A new Russian vice-consul, Mr. Nicolas Denisov, has been appointed to Isfahan. His previous post has been in Pahlevi and he is reported to have served in Kabul for four years prior to that. The staff of the Russian Consulate in Isfahan thus consists of Mr. Krutchov as consul, Messrs. Marchenko Denisov and Sagov, vice-consuls, an interpreter and a secretary.

20. Owing to the high standard of security prevailing in the Russian-occupied parts of Persia, information as to Russian strengths, dispositions and troop movements has been difficult to obtain. There is, unfortunately, no British consular post between Tabriz and Meshed. The Persian general staff does not seem to have any system of obtaining military information or of checking such vague rumours as reach its ears. This is unfortunate at a time when it is

important to know what preparations, if any, the Russians have made to remove their troops from Persia by the 2nd March. Such information as has been gleaned amounts, in some instances, to little more than indications of a possible withdrawal. From Meshed a consular report states that the Russians have abandoned their plan of opening a large hospital and have terminated the lease of the premises and discharged the staff locally engaged. They are stated to be about to return to the Persian army the official residence of the General Officer Commanding Khorasan Division which has been in their occupation ever since the entry into Persia of their troops. From Miandoab comes a report that the Russians are disposing of their surplus stocks of potatoes and forage. In Tabriz they are reported as having told all contractors to settle their accounts by the 2nd March. The Minister of Finance of the Azerbaijan National Government informed the manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia that his Government intended to form a large army before the 2nd March, "when the Russians were due to leave." Some reductions have been noticed in the military posts which the Russians maintained to guard the railway, that at Garmsar Junction having been reduced from 200 to 50. No Russian military are now to be seen on the road between Garmsar and Semnan and the garrison at this place is said to have been reduced to one cavalry regiment. The source of information which has proved to be the most accurate hitherto, *i.e.*, observation of arrivals and departures at Tehran railway station, no longer furnishes a guide since it is anticipated that the three main concentrations of Russian troops in Khorasan, Mazandaran and Azerbaijan will return to Russia via Askhabad, Pahlevi and Julfa respectively.

P.S.—Reference paragraph 1 above. Dr. Matin Daftari has resigned from the Cabinet.

Reference paragraph 2 above. Neither Dr. Matin Daftari nor Oveisi have been included in the mission to Moscow.

APPENDIX "A."

Personality Note.—Muzaffar Firuz.

A Qajar, and inclined to call himself "Prince." Born about 1910, son of Nusrat-ud-Dauleh and, hence, grandson of the late Farman Farma. Educated at Harrow and Cambridge. Speaks English and French fluently. A man of excitable and nervous disposition who gives full rein to his feelings and ideas in the newspaper *Ra'd-i-Imruz*, which he owns and edits. All his political activities directed to one end—opposition to the present Shah, whom he wishes to see removed as vengeance for the death of his father at the hands of the Shah's father, the late Reza Shah. His hostility has recently been sharpened by the fact that his wife's relation, Ismet-ul-Muluk, one of the wives of Reza Shah, was recently evicted from the Palace on a charge of improper behaviour.

He was at one time employed in the Persian Legation at Washington whence, it is believed, he was removed at the request of the United States Government for abuse of diplomatic bag privileges.

It was Muzaffar Firuz who went to Palestine and brought from there Seyyid Zia's first manifesto. He remained an ardent supporter of Seyyid Zia until May 1945, when he broke with him. He says the breach was caused by Seyyid Zia's becoming more and more dictatorial; Seyyid Zia's version is that they had to part because Muzaffar Firuz would not abandon his newspaper campaign against the Shah, and Seyyid Zia felt that it was impossible to fight the Russians and the Shah at the same time. After this, Muzaffar Firuz tried to compose his differences with the Tudeh, meaning, he says, to break them later, but he failed, and towards the end of 1945 he became one of the chief supporters of the candidature of Qavam-es-Saltaneh to the premiership. As a reward for this, the Qavam, when he became Premier, appointed Muzaffar Firuz "Political Under-Secretary" (an office apparently created for the purpose) and Director of Propaganda (February 1946).

Muzaffar Firuz is clever and can write well, but he is rash, unbalanced, dishonest, untruthful and malicious. He would probably sacrifice anything to bring about the downfall of the Shah. The Shah is aware of this, and will find it difficult to work with a Prime Minister who could make such an appointment.

APPENDIX "B."

Personality Note.—Ahmad 'Ali Sipihri (Mucarrikhū'd-Dauleh).

Was Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry at the beginning of 1944. In February of 1944 he was Acting Minister of Commerce and Industry for a short while after the resignation of Nakh'i. He was removed from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in the summer of 1944 and remained without an appointment until August 1945, when he was appointed Head of the Caspian Fisheries, a post which he still occupies.

In June 1942 he was a member of the Hizb-i-Millium, and was also mixed up in another German plot involving Qavam-us-Saltaneh and the old Husain Ali Qaraqzlu (not M. Ala's brother-in-law, the son of the late Regent). C.I.C.I. distrusted him intensely. The opinion of His Majesty's Ambassador was that he was obstructive to us, an incorrigible intriguer, and very corrupt even by Persian standards. He was assumed to be working for the Russians, with whom, as Head of the Fisheries, he is in close touch.

In 1945 he was an active member of a committee to put Qavam-us-Saltaneh in as Prime Minister. Now that they have succeeded he confidently expects the Commerce and Industry portfolio.

[E 2098/315/34]

(8)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 8, Secret, for the Period 18th-24th February, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 60 of 26th February; Received 8th March.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

Qavam-us-Saltaneh presented his Cabinet to the Majlis on the 17th February. In his speech he said that he was not presenting his programme as yet because all the programmes of the numerous Cabinets which had come into power during the past few years had remained but empty words. The present crisis called for deeds not words. In his opinion Persia's foreign policy required the restoration of good relations with the Soviet Government, balance and the maintenance of friendship based on mutual respect between Persia and the three Great Powers. Regarding internal policy the most pressing needs were the superannuation of worthless officials, the lowering of the cost of living and a vigorous campaign against hoarders and profiteers. By not presenting his programme Qavam has skilfully avoided the risk of a defeat which might have resulted from the request for a vote of confidence on it. By leaving the next morning for Moscow he adroitly escaped from a possible peremptory summons to present his programme. While the Left is jubilant at Qavam's tactical success and his swallowing of the Moscow bait, the Right are despondent, cowed and bewildered. With the inclusion in the Cabinet of so many Ministers of pronounced pro-Russian views they fear that their country will be sold in Moscow without even the meagre consolation of hearing the terms of sale till it is too late. With the recent changes in the General Staff and gendarmerie and General Firuz's machinations in the Ministry of the Interior they fear that their chances of re-election to the next Majlis are slender indeed. Many people think that Qavam will not dare to agree to Russian demands openly but that he will include them in an agreement which will remain secret till the next Majlis meets, when, packed with a substantial Tudeh majority, it will proceed to ratify such an agreement. Those few of the Right who, after the shock of Qavam's victory, still retain their senses, are talking of measures to outwit him. Some are in favour of presenting a petition to the Shah expressing their disagreement over Qavam's policy and asking the Shah to dismiss him (as he has the constitutional right to do when the life of the Majlis expires on the 12th March) and appoint another Cabinet composed of stable elements who would govern the country during the interim between the 12th March and the election of the next Majlis. A few hotheads are prating of a *coup d'Etat* which would seize power, throw out the Qavam and govern the country by a military Cabinet till the next Majlis is formed.

2. (Reference paragraph 2 of last Intelligence Summary.)—General Firuz did not, after all accompany Qavam-us-Saltaneh to Moscow. It is believed, on fairly reliable evidence, that he was left behind to keep an eye on things in general and on the Ministry of the Interior in particular, the importance of which grows daily in view of the forthcoming elections. Hasan Pir Nazar, an official of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, was included in the delegation. Oveisi excused himself from the commercial delegation on grounds of ill health. The Persian press has devoted much space to accounts of the cordial reception given to the Persian delegations, to Qavam-us-Saltaneh's meeting with Generalissimo Stalin and to the expression of hopes that much of lasting benefit to Persia both in the political and economic fields will result from the visit.

Internal Security.

Khorasan.

3. A consular report states that a fracas occurred on the 9th February between Tudeh and anti-Tudeh elements over the distribution of ballot papers for the elections for provincial councils. Three lorry loads of Russian soldiers armed with tommy guns were seen moving about the streets of Meshed. The Russians subsequently gave out that they were preventing any possible breach of the peace at a time when feelings were running high but, as the Persian police and military were present in sufficient strength to cope with any outbreak, it seems more probable that the Russians were using their soldiery (not for the first time) to overawe the Tudeh's opponents. The Governor-General wisely postponed the elections nominally for one week but it is generally believed that they will not be held till after the 2nd March.

4. Beyond the indications given in paragraph 20 of last Intelligence Summary the consul-general reports that there are no further signs of the Russians withdrawing by the 2nd March.

Azerbaijan.

5. A press report states that a Kurdish chief (whose name is given by the Persian General Staff as Umar Khan Shakkak) has captured an official who had been despatched to Rezaieh by the Azerbaijan National Government as governor and that the town of Rezaieh, though claimed by the Democrats as lying within autonomous Azerbaijan, is still in Kurdish hands.

Bakhtiari.

6. On the 21st February the Minister for War confirmed that Qavam-us-Saltaneh had dismissed Murteza Quli Khan from his governorship of the Bakhtiari (Intelligence Summary No. 7, paragraph 13 refers). A press report stated that Varasteh, Governor-General of Isfahan, was now in charge of Bakhtiari affairs in addition to his other duties but the Minister of War stated that, pending a settlement of the question of a future governorship representing both Ilkhani and Haji Ilkhani interests, he had instructed the General Officer Commanding Isfahan Division to send a military officer to keep an eye on things in Bakhtiari and prevent any disturbances which might follow the sudden withdrawal of Murteza Quli Khan's strong hand.

Communications.

7. M. Husein Nafisi, director-general of the Persian State Railway, informed the British military attaché on the 21st February and again on the 23rd February that, as yet, the Russians had not in fact handed back the three sections of the Persian State Railway under their operational control. (Intelligence Summary No. 5, paragraph 8, refers.)

Appointments—dismissals.

8.—(i) Qavam-us-Saltaneh has dismissed Sartip Itimad Muqaddam, the Military Governor of Tehran. A Colonel Muzaffari has been appointed in his place. Little is known of this officer save that he has commanded a brigade in Gurgan and has been recently employed in the military tribunal department of the Military Governor's office.

(ii) On Qavam-us-Saltaneh's instructions General Muhammad Husein Firuz, Minister of Roads and Communications and officiating Minister of the Interior during Qavam's absence in Moscow, has dismissed Sartip Khosro Panah, chief of the gendarmerie. Neither Colonel Schwarzkopf, the American adviser to the gendarmerie, nor the Shah, to whom normally all appointments of senior army

officers are referred, was consulted. No successor to Khosro Panah has yet been appointed. It is a significant fact that the Minister of the Interior arranges the election of his nominees to the Majlis largely through the medium of the chief of the gendarmerie.

Personalities.

9. A personality note on General Aghevli, the new Chief of the General Staff, is given as an appendix to this summary.

British Interests.

10. Major-General R. A. Savory, C.B., D.S.O., M.C., General Officer Commanding Persia and Iraq Force, visited Tehran from the 21st to 23rd February to bid an official farewell to the Persian Government on the occasion of the evacuation of Persia by British troops and to thank the various Ministries concerned for their co-operation during the war. He was received in audience by His Imperial Majesty the Shah and had interviews with the Minister for War, C.G.S., and Minister of Roads and Communications, also officiating as Minister of the Interior. At a press conference, a communiqué giving some details of the evacuation was given to newspaper representatives.

Russian Interests.

11. Baku Radio, in their Persian transmission on the 24th February, announced that the Soviet Government proposes to appoint as Ambassador to Persia Mr. Sadtkhikof, at present Russian Ambassador in Belgrade.

Afghan Interests.

12. At the Majlis session of the 21st February a Deputy for Birjand demanded immediate and energetic action by the Persian Government in respect of an alleged diversion of the Helmand river by the Afghans which, he claimed, would result in the ruin of the peasantry of Seistan. The Deputy stated that during the past nine months Afghan navvies, varying in numbers from 24,000 to 36,000, had been employed under foreign engineers in constructing a canal from 5-9 metres in depth, 59 metres in width and 210 kilom. in length. As long ago as July 1945 requests were made by the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Embassy and by the local officials to His Majesty's Consulate General, Meshed, for historical information concerning agreements and awards previously made in this long-standing dispute. While studiously refraining from taking sides in the controversy, His Majesty's Embassy made available to His Majesty's Consul-General, Meshed, copies of the MacMahon Arbitral Award of 1905.

Appendix.

Personality Note on General Farajullah Aghevli.

BORN in Isfahan in 1880. A son of the late Dr. Amanullah Khan, a well-known physician. Educated in Tehran. Speaks French, English and German. His brother, Colonel Fazlullah Khan, committed suicide when a member of the Anglo-Persian Military Commission which sat in 1919-20. Entered the service of the gendarmerie in 1911 and was trained under the Swedish officers of this force. Promoted Sartip (brigadier) in 1922, he was employed as Chief of Staff to the Western army in Hamadan. Military Governor of Gilan 1925. Military Governor of Gurgan 1927. Military Governor of Khuzistan 1922 to 1931, during which period he showed administrative ability in establishing the new régime of Reza Shah. Accused of partiality towards the tribes, he was placed on the retired list in 1931. Appointed director-general of the Registration and Civil Census Department in 1932. Relieved of this appointment in 1934. Remained unemployed till the departure of Reza Shah. Director of Recruiting October 1941. Chief of the gendarmerie December 1941. Promoted Sarlashgar (major-general) June 1942. Military Governor of Tehran, in addition to his duties as chief of the gendarmerie, February 1943. Fell out with Colonel Schwarzkopf, the American adviser to the gendarmerie over the question of executive powers, maintaining that these should be vested in him as chief and that Colonel Schwarzkopf's

functions were only those of an adviser. Relinquished the post. Head of the Conscription Department vice Sartip Khosro Panah June 1943. He was a leading member of the committee of the German fifth column, the Mellian party. Is reported by a Persian fellow-conspirator to have provided the motor car which conveyed Franz Mayr to Isfahan and to have assisted actively in his escape when the latter was wanted by the Persian police. Was on the British list for arrest but was not arrested because of his eminent position and reputation for integrity. As, however, his name appeared on the Russian list, he was included in the joint list and arrested in July 1943. Was taken by the Russians to Resht for special interrogation and is reported to have been made much of by them. Shortly afterwards they announced that they had nothing against him and gave publicity to the fact that his further internment was due solely to British insistence. It was suspected at the time that the Russians had come to some understanding with Aghevli and had promised him release or, at any rate, the cessation of their insistence on his continued internment, in exchange for some *quid pro quo*. Interned till the end of the war with Japan. Head of the Military Tribunals Department November 1945. Appointed Chief of the General Staff in February 1946 when Qawam-us-Saltaneh became Prime Minister.

Aghevli has the reputation of being honest, efficient, energetic, conscientious and a devout Moslem. (Colonel Schwarzkopf, however, does not consider him honest as he detected a tyre swindle in which General Aghevli was implicated.) General Fraser, who knew him intimately over a long period, and whose opinion regarding him has subsequently been confirmed by many Persians, thought that Aghevli was patriotic and that any action taken by him in connexion with the fifth column was neither common treachery nor out of a desire to sell his country to the Germans for whom he had no special liking. Like many other intelligent, patriotic but misguided Persians he saw in a German victory a chance to free his country from its unenviable and century-old position between the upper millstone of Russian aggression and the nether millstone of British imperialism.

[E 2269/315/34]

(9)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 9, Secret, for the Period 25th February to 3rd March, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 60 of 5th March; Received 14th March.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

The 2nd March has gone, but the Russians have not. For some months past there have been many who thought that they might not go. Ever since Qawam-us-Saltaneh went to Moscow many more thought that they would not go. When only a few days remained before the due date everybody realised that they could not go. The general feeling is that of blank despair. Some resentment is felt at the Russian announcement to the effect that Qawam-us-Saltaneh was informed as long ago as the 25th February that the evacuation would be limited to the "comparatively tranquil" areas of Semnan, Shahrud and Meshed, and that Russian troops would remain in the remaining parts of their zone till the "situation had clarified." It was too much to hope that the Qawam would keep his Government or the Majlis informed of the progress of the negotiations, but they feel that information of such importance should have been communicated. Adding insult to injury, the Qawam's political private secretary, Muzaffar Firuz, having repeatedly warned the populace to listen-in to a forthcoming broadcast of the greatest importance, announced "as a piece of good news for the Persian nation" the beginning of the evacuation by the Russians of the three towns mentioned above.

2. In Persian circles, official or unofficial, in Tehran, nothing is known of the progress of the negotiations or even of their scope, since Qawam was allowed to go to Moscow without any limiting directive from the Majlis. From a certain

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source, however, it is learnt that the Russians appear to have made three demands, viz.: (a) the recognition of the complete independence or autonomy of Azerbaijan, (b) the maintenance of Russian troops in North Persia after the 2nd March, (c) an oil concession. The same source reports the Qawam as saying that he had no authority to agree to these demands. A rumoured willingness on the part of the Russians to waive (b) if (c) were granted will deceive but few, since the need for protecting their newly-acquired oil interests in Persia would serve them as an adequate pretext for bringing back their troops on to Persian soil.

3. It is believed that the possibility of the Shah using his constitutional powers to dismiss the Qawam during the interval between this Majlis and the next has not escaped the Russians and that they may take measures to forestall this by bringing pressure to bear upon the Shah either to secure his submission or possibly his abdication. Such measures would suit the book of such as Muzaffar Firuz and his uncle, Muhammad Husein Firuz, who bear an implacable hatred towards the Pahlevi dynasty.

4. A general purge of all Ministries is being carried out. Those with anti-Tudeh sympathies are, in general, being dismissed, but members of Seyyid Zia's Iradeh-i-Milli party, in particular, are singled out for expulsion.

Internal Security.

Gilan.

5. A band of armed democrat insurgents marched during the past week from Astara on Pahlevi. According to the latest information, based on press reports, after having taken Karganrud and Shifarud, they are now about 30 kilom. from Pahlevi. The band is said to number about 600, to be armed with rifles, machine guns and a field gun and to have started their march from Russian Astara.

Khorasan.

6. According to an estimate by His Majesty's Consul-General, Meshed, the Russian military garrison in that town numbers about 1,500. In Sabzevar and Kuchan there are small detachments of about fifty men. In Shahrud the numbers are larger and show a recent increase, but this is probably due to concentration at this railhead of troops recently evacuated from Semnan.

Azerbaijan.

7. The Azerbaijan National Government passed two new laws on the 20th February. The first provided for the division among the peasants of all lands which had become State lands since the accession of Reza Shah. The second law dealt with the confiscation of all movable and immovable property of all persons who had left Azerbaijan and who were carrying on propaganda against or fighting against the Azerbaijan National Government.

8. The fact that calling-up notices for the Azerbaijan People's Army were posted in Rezaieh indicates that the Azerbaijan National Government does not recognise Kurdish claims to this place.

9. The Minister of Finance in the Azerbaijan National Government has called upon the local manager of the A.I.O.C. to pay to his Government all excise duties hitherto paid to the Central Government. The manager has replied that, as these dues were previously paid over in Tehran, he is not in a position to comply with the order. The duties amount to rials 13.50 per 4-gallon tin of petrol and rials 9.90 per 4-gallon tin of kerosene. The National Government's desire to lay their hands on this considerable source of revenue has long been known.

10. According to a consular report, a Russian cavalry regiment with horse-drawn A.T. guns, A.A. guns and transport was seen at Tabriz railway station presumably about to entrain for Julfa and Russia. Apart from this move and the move of some Red Army women soldiers, the number and size of Russian military garrisons in Azerbaijan remain at much the same figure as before.

11. On the 2nd March about 8,000 people attended a mass meeting of the Democrat party. This was followed by a military parade in which some 2,000 "regulars" and 3,000 "volunteers" of the People's Army took part. The "regulars" had new uniforms and equipment and were armed with rifles, three or four machine guns per company being also seen. The "volunteers," of whom about 100 were cavalry, in addition to their rifles, had two or three field guns. A women's detachment also took part.

Appointments, Dismissals.

12.—(a) *Military.*

(i) Sartip Abdullah Hidayet (F.O. 81) to be Under-Secretary in the Ministry for War. (A "Personality" note on this officer is given as an appendix to this Summary.)

(ii) Colonel Ghulam Ali Basti to be head of the Military Criminal Court.

(iii) General Kupal, Prosecutor in the Military Tribunal, to be chief of that Department. (This officer is an ex-internee and is the third to be appointed in the past few days to an important post, the other two being Generals Aghevli and Purzand.)

(b) *Civil.*

(i) Husein Nafisi, Director of the Persian State Railways, has been granted four months' leave. Engineer Musaddiq will officiate.

(ii) Muhammad Rashad, a junior official in the Ministry of Justice with Tudeh sympathies, has been appointed to the important post of Public Prosecutor in the court which tries officials.

(iii) Ali Muhammad Oveisi (F.O. 164) has been dismissed from his post of Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry by his chief, the notorious double-dealer Muwarrikh-ud-Dowleh, who is systematically weeding out all who fail to toe the Tudeh line.

Personalities—corrigendum.

13. Reference appendix to last Intelligence Summary: the date of birth of General Aghevli should read 1885.

Persian Civil Aviation.

14. It is reliably reported that an agreement has been reached between the various Ministries concerned (principally War and Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones) for the establishment of an autonomous Department of Civil Aviation, responsible directly to the Council of Ministers. The Ministries concerned will turn over to the new Department all their assets, including budgetary credits, covering their civil aviation activities, including signals, meteorology and the operation of the State Air Line. The director of the new Department will be Ahmad Shafiq, the Shah's brother-in-law. He is a licensed pilot with considerable aviation experience in Egypt, and has already shown more appreciation of the needs and deficiencies of Persian civil aviation than any of the many and often conflicting authorities who have hitherto mishandled it. The policy with regard to air lines seems to be to encourage foreign air lines to come to Tehran, to reserve the Tehran-Bagdad route for the State Air Line and to allow private enterprise to operate internal services, possibly under a system of licensing certain organisations to run over specified routes. There are two possible private concerns in the field, the Iranian Airways, of which the moving spirit is G. H. Ebthaj, the late mayor, and a sort of co-operative enterprise of pilots which is believed to have the backing of the Shah and Shafiq himself, but which has not yet come into the open. It is fairly reliably reported that Iranian Airways, who have been enquiring for British Dominions, have also made an agreement with the Americans (probably T.W.A.) covering technical and financial management in exchange for a 10 per cent. share participation.

British Interests.

15. The evacuation of Persia by British troops was completed on the 1st March, the last man crossing the Perso-Iraqi frontier on the afternoon of that day. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chief of the General Staff have been informed.

Syrian Interests.

16. Asad Haroun has been appointed Syrian Minister to Persia.

Appendix.

Personality Note on Sartip (Brigadier) Abdullah Hidayet.

Born about 1902. Nephew of Ghulam Reza Kemal-Hidayet, Mukhbir-ud-Douleh, nephew of Nasr-ul-Mulk (M.A. 140) and of Fahim-ud-Douleh (M.A. 141), and thus comes of a family which has usually been pro-British. Sartip Abdullah Hidayet is not markedly so, but is friendly. He is intelligent and cultured. Was trained at the French École de Guerre and also at Fontainebleau. He is a well-qualified, serious and patriotic officer, more Staff Officer than Commander. Has a good reputation for honesty, but became the object of suspicion to many on account of his close friendship with General Razmara. He speaks good French and some English. His recent appointments include:—

Head of the 3rd Bureau General Staff: 1941.

Director of the Staff College: 1941.

Deputy Chief of the General Staff: 1942.

Commandant of the Officers' Training College: 1942.

Under-Secretary for War: 1943.

Commandant of the Officers' Training College (in addition to his other duties): 1944.

Acting Minister for War: 1944.

Appointed Persian Military Attaché, Paris: 1945 (did not proceed).

Sent to Meshed by General Arfa (Chief of the General Staff) to investigate the mutiny, but returned after four days saying that he had not succeeded in making any investigations.

Placed *en disponibilité*: 1945.

Director of Artillery (a sinecure): 1945.

Under-Secretary, Ministry for War: 1946.

[E 2605/315/34]

(10)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 10, Secret, for the Period 4th March to 10th March, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 75 of 12th March; Received 23rd March.)

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

Qawam-us-Saltaneh returned by air from Moscow on the 10th March. Information from a certain source in Moscow regarding the demands made on Persia by Russia was given in paragraph 2 of last Intelligence Summary. The *London Evening News*, on what authority it is unknown, stated that the demands totalled six and comprised:—

- (i) A treaty of alliance between Persia and the U.S.S.R.
- (ii) Recognition by the Central Government of the Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan.
- (iii) Co-ordination of Persia's foreign policy with that of the U.S.S.R.
- (iv) An oil concession.
- (v) The organisation, location and employment of the armed forces of autonomous Azerbaijan to be under Russian military direction.
- (vi) The Persian Government to invite the Russian military forces to remain in Persia pending acceptance of the above.

In conversation with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, Qawam-us-Saltaneh referred only to two demands, namely, for an oil concession and recognition of an autonomous Azerbaijan. In reply to the first, Qawam states that he informed the Russians that he had no authority to grant this, a recent law making even the discussion of oil concessions an offence punishable by impeachment. He was equally powerless to recognise an autonomous Azerbaijan, as he had been forbidden to discuss this by the Majlis. When the Russians suggested the election of a Majlis which would repeal the law against discussion of oil concessions, Qawam replied that a law had recently been passed prohibiting the holding of elections for the next Majlis until such time as all foreign troops had left Persia. Qawam also informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that he sent a written protest to the Soviet Government on the 4th March when he learnt of their decision to maintain their troops in Persia. In the course of the

conversations the Russians, in addition to advancing the usual reasons for maintaining their troops in Persia, such as the danger to the Soviet Union arising from Fascist and Imperialist elements so close to its borders, the vulnerability of the Baku oilfields, &c., introduced a novel argument by referring to past history and claiming that Persia's demands at the Peace Conference of Paris had included Baku, Turkestan [*sic*] and Armenia. Hakimi had been a member of the Persian delegation. Hakimi had recently been Prime Minister. Hakimi had appealed to U.N.O. Ergo Persia's claims to Russian territory still stood and Persia's hostility to the U.S.S.R. was still in evidence. The 1921 treaty was, of course, also brought in to the discussions. Qawam said that no agreement had been reached, even on commercial matters. A communiqué was published at the conclusion of the visit which stated that the conversations had been carried on in a friendly atmosphere and that, after the new Soviet Ambassador had arrived in Tehran, the two Governments would renew their efforts to place their relations on a friendly basis. That the Qawam has come back empty-handed causes no surprise. Most people will be relieved if subsequent events confirm that he told the Russians what he avows he told them.

The Majlis.

2. In yesterday's session of the Majlis Deputy Dr. Musaddiq made a long speech in protest against the continued presence of Russian troops on Persian soil after the 2nd March. The main points of his speech were that the presence of such troops constituted a direct violation of the Tripartite Pact and that the Prime Minister had gone to Moscow to discuss other problems, not the evacuation of Persia, for which clear provision had been made in the Tripartite Pact. He expressed surprise that no official news had been sent from Moscow by Qawam, even though he had been informed of the Soviet Government's decision on the 26th February, especially in view of the few remaining days of the life of the present Majlis. A significant point in Musaddiq's speech was that he said that because the Prime Minister's journey to Moscow had lasted longer than was at first envisaged and because no news had been received from him the Persian nation and people were anxious. Their anxiety was based on the memories they had of the journeys made by the leaders of small nations to the capitals of large and powerful nations during the war which had just ended. He sincerely hoped that such anxiety was groundless.

3. There have been several rowdy demonstrations outside the Majlis and in other parts of the town staged by the Tudeh against any move by the Deputies to prolong the life of the present Majlis beyond the 12th March. The police and gendarmerie, though present at the scene of these demonstrations, took no action to maintain order and several casualties occurred, mostly in the ranks of the anti-Tudeh.

*Internal Security.**Azerbaijan.*

4. A consular report states that the country round Rezaieh seems to be completely under Kurdish control. The Kurds have formed a Government in which Ghazi Muhammad of Mehabad holds the post of Prime Minister, with Omar Khan Shakkak as Minister for War, Rashid Beg Herki as commander-in-chief and Zero Agha as Commandant of Gendarmerie. Kurdish patrols in Rezaieh wear arm-bands inscribed "Jumhuriyet-i-Kurdistan" (Kurdistan Republic).

5. Conscription for the Azerbaijan People's Army is arousing bitter discontent in Tabriz. Few of those called up are responding voluntarily and "Fidais" (literally "devotees," but here signifying volunteers in the national cause) are arresting young men on the streets. A notice has been published that all those called up who do not report before the 26th February will be tried and punished as deserters.

6. His Majesty's Acting Consul-General reports that the place of the mounted units which recently left Tabriz for Russia (see paragraph 10 of last Intelligence Summary) has been taken by mechanised units of at least equal strength. A number of tanks (sheeted) were seen at Tabriz railway station being unloaded from a train which had come from Julfa, and subsequently a column of 40 lorry loads of Russian troops, 20 tanks and 21 armoured cars was seen moving down the road to Zenjan, presumably to reinforce the Democrat troops in action against the Zulfiqari partisans in that area. The Deputy Minister for War in the Azerbaijan National Government is reported as having

said that he could not continue to hold Zenjan without further support by the Russians. The Prime Minister of Azerbaijan also alluded in a speech on the 3rd March to the impending arrival of Russian military equipment for the People's Army. His Majesty's Acting Consul-General reports two other Russian columns as on the move, viz., one on the 3rd March towards Miandoab (rumoured as being bound for Khaneh, on the Iraq frontier) and the other towards Maragheh. A number of Caucasian and Russian officers in civilian clothes are now believed to be attached to the People's Army. An American consular source at Tabriz also reports the move of a column towards Khoi, to the west of Lake Urmieh. The total Russian evacuations up to date, according to His Majesty's Acting Consul-General, are the cavalry unit of 800 men (alluded to above and in paragraph 10 of last Intelligence Summary) with A.T. guns and A.A. guns and, on the 8th March, a further force of 2,000 Russian cavalry, twelve light field guns and five tractor-drawn heavy guns. There are unconfirmed reports of more arrivals of infantry and tanks by rail from Russia on the 7th March.

7. An unruly mob of Democrats attacked and damaged the P.R.B. premises in Tabriz, where a loud-speaker was installed. The popularity of British radio programmes and news had long been a cause of anxiety to the Azerbaijan National Government, who would prefer its subjects to listen only to the Moscow brand of truth.

8. The Azerbaijan National Government recently announced that part of the Province of Gilan as far as Shiffarud (also spelt Shafarud—about 65 miles south of Astara and 20 miles north-west of Pahlevi) had been amalgamated to Azerbaijan and placed under the governorate of Ardebil (paragraph 5 of last Intelligence Summary mentioned a move of Democrat forces down this coast from Astara towards Pahlevi).

Kurdistan.

9. The Minister for War informed the British Military Attaché on the 10th March that, in view of the deterioration in the situation in Kurdistan and of the vulnerable positions of the garrisons of one battalion each at Sardasht and Baneh, he proposed to withdraw these to Saqqiz, which he regarded as a better defensive position. The garrison at Merivan would remain.

Khorasan.

10. A reliable report, based on personal reconnaissance by a British consular official, states that the Russian military garrison of 2,500 of all arms evacuated Meshed on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th March, moving to Askhabad. Most of the Persian military buildings and barracks have been handed back by the Russians. Very few Russian military personnel were seen in the town. The American Assistant Military Attaché, who recently travelled as far as Shahrud and back, saw a cavalry regiment in process of evacuating this place and another on its way from Semnan to Shahrud. While the Tehran-Meshed road from Semnan to Meshed is therefore almost clear of Russian troops by now, the Russians still maintain a small military post of about twenty-five men at Garmsar Railway Junction, which is only 50 miles east of Tehran. About a week ago this post stopped and prevented the further advance towards Semnan of a small force of Persian military composed of two battalions of infantry, a battery of artillery and some tanks. After some days' delay permission to proceed was given by the Russians, but the General Staff judged it unwise to advance with the Russians in their rear and possible rearguards of evacuating Russian units in front in the neighbourhood of Semnan. Gendarmerie reinforcements for Semnan, Damghan and Shahrud were similarly stopped at Garmsar and their officers disarmed and detained in Russian military custody for twenty-four hours.

Appointments.

- 11.—(i) Tagavi, counsellor in the Court of Cassation, to be Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Justice vice Dr. Khushbin, resigned.
- (ii) Sartip Muhsin Diba to be Director of Artillery vice Sartip Abdullah Hidayet, appointed Under-Secretary of War.
- (iii) Sarhang Husein Mahin to be head of the 2nd Bureau of the General Staff.

British Interests.

12. Sir C. P. Skrine, O.B.E., has arrived in Tehran to take up the appointment of Government of India Counsellor in His Majesty's Embassy.

13. A contract has been signed between an Isfahan company and the firm of Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners for the design of a steam turbine electrical generating plant. The capacity of the plant is said to be 11,000 kilowatts.

14. The Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs have officially expressed their thanks to His Majesty's Embassy for the evacuation of Persian territory by British troops.

Russian Interests.

15. The Persian Government have notified the Soviet Government of their agreement to the appointment of M. Sadtkhikof as Russian Ambassador to Persia. Radio Baku had announced the Soviet Government's intention to appoint M. Sadtkhikof to this post as long ago as the 25th February.

[E 2858/315/34]

(11)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 11, Secret, for the Period 11th March to 17th March, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 81 of 18th March; Received 29th March.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

The Qawam, both in the Majlis and outside of it, has been guarded in his statements concerning his mission to Moscow. In conversation with His Majesty's Ambassador he said that he had found the Russians "cold and arrogant" and adamant in their refusal to evacuate Azerbaijan. He had offered them a provincial council in Azerbaijan and the selection of a Governor-General, a mayor, a chief of police and a director of education in accordance with the wishes of this council. The Russians refused this offer and insisted on the retention of Pishevari as "Prime Minister" of an autonomous Azerbaijan. During the discussions on the question of an oil concession the Qawam had been surprised when M. Molotov expressed his readiness to negotiate "on the basis of the proposal already made by Bayat." Qawam was puzzled by this allusion as neither he nor anyone else was aware that Bayat, when Prime Minister, had made any such proposal. Subsequent enquiries showed, however, that Bayat had, without informing his Cabinet colleagues, proposed the exploitation of Azerbaijan oil by a Persian company in which the Persian Government and Soviet Government were to hold 51 per cent. and 49 per cent. of the shares respectively. Qawam, as already reported in last week's Intelligence Summary, replied that he was not empowered to discuss the question of an oil concession. Qawam doubtless feels there is now no other course open to Persia but to renew her appeal to U.N.O., but he is perturbed by a recent threat by the Russians that if Persia appeals it will go ill with her. He feels therefore that it would be less provocative of Russian resentment if a third party were to raise the issue in U.N.O. The Russian refusal to evacuate their troops and the recent arrivals of armoured forces so near to the capital as Zenjan and Kerej have caused something akin to panic in Tehran.

The Majlis.

2. On the 11th March a crowd of Tudeh supporters several thousand strong gathered near the Majlis with the object of preventing the attendance of members lest they should enact legislation to secure the prolongation of the life of the present Majlis. So successful was this intimidation that only six Deputies were present, thus preventing a session for lack of a quorum. On the 12th March some seventy Deputies attended and a secret session was held at which the Prime Minister gave an account of his mission to Moscow. He is reported to have said that his mission was warmly received, that he hoped that the discussions would be continued through diplomatic channels after the arrival of the new Soviet Ambassador in Tehran and that the Persian nation was held in warm regard by the Soviet Government. (In conversation with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, the Qawam had described the Russians as "cold and arrogant.") He admitted that his mission had been unsuccessful in that he had not been able to agree to Russian demands for an oil concession, or for the recognition of an autonomous Azerbaijan, and that he had been unable to secure the evacuation of Persia by Soviet troops. The Majlis, at the same session, elected a presidential

body to deal with the administrative affairs of the Majlis during the interim period between the dissolution of the fourteenth Majlis and the election of the fifteenth. As the fourteenth Majlis dissolved without having passed a one-twelfth Budget Bill to cover the period of Isfand (the 20th February-20th March), the Ministry of Finance propose to submit the Bill to the Cabinet for approval and then to begin payments. Apart from the Deputies themselves, no one will shed a tear at the passing of the fourteenth Majlis, which must surely go down to history as one of the most inefficient, idle and corrupt which has ever been elected. It has passed some forty laws, most of them consisting of one-twelfth Budget Bills. The remainder either remain a dead letter for lack of the administrative energy required to carry them out or are so badly drafted as to be incapable of being put into effect. Some sixty Bills remained on the agenda.

3. On the 11th March an editor of a weekly paper, by name Ahmad Kasrawi, and his munshi were being examined in the Ministry of Justice on a charge of having printed some articles derogatory to Islam. Two Isfahanis burst into the court-room and, drawing revolvers, shot Kasrawi and his munshi dead. Though the press of the Left and Right have both accused each other of instigating the deed, it is, in fact, believed to have no political significance whatever and to be merely an example of that religious fanaticism of which Persians are still capable, despite the outward indifference to religion so prevalent throughout the country to-day.

Russian Military Dispositions in North Persia.

4. In order to present a clearer picture, information concerning Russian evacuation, troop movements and strengths is condensed under the above heading instead of reporting it under the title of "Internal Security" under provincial sub-headings. It must be realised that a tight control of all movement and an exceptionally high degree of security prevail in the Russian-occupied zone of Persia. Even if access to an area is obtained, little is seen as all Russian military installations and dumps are cordoned off. Troop movements nearly always take place by night. The local officials are Democrats. The local populace is too scared of the Russians to impart any information. Hence it is almost impossible to get definite confirmation of any information. The following brief summary is based on the best information available. The situation is described from west to east.

Azerbaijan, northern portion.

A previous estimate put the Russian strength in the area between the Turkish frontier and Lake Urumiyeh at one cavalry and one infantry division. These have now been reinforced by 2,800 cavalry with one or two batteries of A.A. guns and one or two batteries of anti-tank guns which recently left Tabriz and are now reported to have arrived at Maku via Khoi. A report on subsequent moves of artillery to Maku mentions an unspecified number of guns, but states they were sufficiently heavy to be forced to by-pass all bridges *en route*.

Azerbaijan, southern portion.

The infantry regiment with an unknown number of artillery and engineers previously in the area between the Iraqi frontier and Lake Urumiyeh has now been reinforced by the arrival of two columns (strength unspecified but probably not exceeding a battalion each) from Tabriz. A source of unknown reliability, states that further reinforcements to these columns consisted of twenty-eight tanks, and an unspecified number of guns on lorries and lorried infantry.

Azerbaijan, eastern portion.

Tanks and guns are reported as arriving by rail at Tabriz from Russia and a consular servant estimated that, at Tabriz Railway Station and at the Russian barracks on the 13th March, the number of vehicles were: tanks 7; 10-ton lorries full of stores, 6; field artillery on lorries, 27; and on the 15th March, a further 50 lorries full of troops and stores, and 25 field guns. The Russian garrison at Tabriz itself probably does not number more than a 1,000 men, as bands of "Fidais" and Democrat rebel troops, stiffened with Russian officers and soldiers, exist or are coming into being and are sufficient to maintain order in the town and surrounding districts.

Khamseh Province (Zenjan).

A force of 800 lorried infantry, 20 armoured cars and 20 tanks, which had arrived in Tabriz from Russia by rail during the first week of March, left for

Zenjan a few days later. Subsequent additions to this force are reported, but without confirmation, as consisting of a column of vehicles, including 70 tanks, on the 10th March.

Kerej (25 miles west of Tehran).

Here the Russian military garrison of one battalion is believed on good grounds to have been increased to two. (Statistics of bread and meat ration deliveries would indicate an overall strength of 2,500.) Arrivals of Sherman-size tanks to the number of twelve and approximately twelve guns by rail by night from Zenjan, are reliably reported. The crews travelled with their vehicles and guns, but the infantry arrived by road in lorries.

Gilan, Mazanderan, Gorgan.

No information has been received lately, but there is no reason to believe that any changes in strength or locations have been made. The last estimate of the total strength was about 5,000 men.

Garmsar Railway Junction (50 miles east of Tehran).

Here there is a small Russian control post of twenty-five men. According to the Minister for War, it is visited daily by a patrol of one company from Bun-i-Kuh, some 15 miles away, where there is a battalion of infantry. The brigade headquarters and the remainder of the brigade are said by the Minister for War to be located at Firuzkuh, 90 miles east of Tehran.

Semnan.

This place would appear to be clear of troops.

Shahrud.

The latest information showed that a cavalry regiment was in process of evacuating this place and proceeding, presumably, to Kuchan by the direct route avoiding Meshed. A strong check post, however, has been left behind to deny access to Gorgan by the Shahrud-Gorgan road.

Meshed.

The latest estimate, from consular sources, puts the number of Russian soldiery at 500 cavalry and two guns. The main Russian garrison of 2,500 of all arms, which evacuated Meshed on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th of March, has not proceeded any further than Kuchan where they are encamped.

Internal Security.

Fars.

5. No Governor-General has yet been appointed to succeed Mehdi Farrukh. A consular report states that 300 gendarmes have been sent to Tehran.

Dashti.

6. According to the two Bushire Deputies Khalil Dashti and Safawi, two local sheikhs, by name Abdul Rasul and Nasir Chakutai, sons of Sheikh Husein, have established themselves in Baluk by means of a small tribal force supplied by Nasir Khan Qashgai, who is said to be anxious to extend his influence into this area.

Kuh-Gilu.

7. The principal Kuh Gilu chiefs left for Behbahan during the month. They were all to some extent disappointed at the amount of cloth, tea and sugar rations they received in spite of the fact that the Governor-General and the Finance Director stretched a point and gave them their allotment not only for the month of Bahman but also for Esfand, which does not come to an end till the 21st March. The reason for their dissatisfaction is curious. The statistics on which the issue of rations is being made at present are the figures which the tribe gave to the census department in Reza Shah's time when conscripts were being taken from them. The total then shown was 25,000. The tribe now say that of course that was an absurd under-estimate and should have been 85,000 at least. The question whether to issue rations for the excess of 85,000 over 25,000 has been referred to Tehran and no reply has yet arrived. Practically none of the rations ever reached the individuals of the tribe. The bulk issues were sold at a profit

in Ahwaz and Khorramshahr by the tribal chiefs concerned. One result of this has been internal difficulties from certain disappointed "Kedkbudas."

Mekran.

8. A British consular officer on tour was recently informed by a local Bakshdar that Tudeh agents had become more active in his area and that two of them had visited a place called Bahu Kalat near the Indian frontier some 50 miles north of Gwatar.

Kurdistan.

9. In paragraph 9 of last Intelligence Summary mention was made of the Persian General Staff's intention to withdraw the garrisons of Sardasht and Baneh to Saqqiz in view of their vulnerable positions. Before this could be done, it is now learned, a force of some 500 Mangur Kurds attacked the garrison of Sardasht and inflicted about a dozen casualties. The Minister of War also informed the British Military Attaché that a force of Kurdish horsemen, said to number 1,000, composed of Herki and Shakkah Kurds, had assembled at Miandoab. He feared that they would be supported by Russian troops and would move south to attack, firstly, the Afshar tribal partisans in the Tikab and Shahin Dej areas and, secondly, the Persian army garrison at Saqqiz. Success in this area would, he rightly observed, have disastrous consequences for the Persian Government as it would open up to Democrat penetration the Bijar and Hamadan areas and, indeed, the rest of Persia. General Amanuallah Jehanbani has hurriedly left for Semneh to examine the situation.

Administration.

10. According to a Government communiqué to the press the elections for provincial and district councils have been completed in the following towns: Isfahan, Senneh, Sari, Nishapur, Sabzavar, Turbat-i-Haidari, Qazvin, Shahrud, Shahi, Babul, Gorgan, Yezd, Gulpaigan, Kashan, Quchan, Bujnurd, Rafsinjan, Gunabad and Bam.

Appointments—Dismissals.

11.—(i) Ghulam Hussein Muazzi, the Chief of the C.I.D. in Tehran, has been dismissed.

(ii) Sarlashgar (Major-General) Fazlullah Zahidi to be Director of the Officers' Club. (This general officer was interned by the British during the war. He was holding the appointment of General Officer Commanding Isfahan Division at the time of his arrest.)

(iii) Ahmad Itibar (Itibar-ud-Dowleh) to be Governor-General of Vth Ustan (Kermanshah) *vice* Kalantari. (Itibar was Minister of Agriculture in Soheili's Cabinet of December 1943.)

Persian Air Force.

12. A Hind aircraft of the Persian air force, piloted by a Lieutenant Jawad Zarineh with an n.c.o. mechanic as passenger, took off on the 10th March and did not return. A report from His Majesty's Acting Consul-General, Tabriz, states that this machine subsequently forced-landed at Shibli some 20 miles south-east of Tabriz. The machine was damaged and the pilot was injured. His intention was to desert and join the Democrat forces in Azerbaijan. This is the second case of desertion with an aeroplane from the Persian air force.

British Interests.

13. Colonel E. P. J. Ryan, representing the British Aircraft Manufacturers' Corporation in the Middle East, visited Tehran during the week. The newspaper *Iran* quotes Colonel Ryan as having said that there was a great future for civil aviation in the Middle East. The newspaper *Journal de Tehran* came out with a less innocuous remark to the effect that Colonel Ryan had arrived to renew contacts with the friends which he had made during his four years' service on the General Staff of Paiforce.

Belgian Interests.

14. Colonel (Aviateur) Victor Biver has arrived in Tehran to assume the appointment of Belgian Military Attaché, vacant since the departure of Lient.-Colonel Dothee in December 1944. This is Colonel Biver's second tour of duty in Persia as he succeeded Colonel Alis Nordquist, a Swede, as head of a

Belgian Air Mission in July 1934. His contract was renewed for a further period of two years in May 1936 but, on its termination, it was not renewed again and he left Persia in May 1938. He was not replaced.

American Interests.

15. The following officers have arrived in Tehran to take up the appointment of Assistant American Military Attachés:—

Captain Archibald B. Roosevelt (Junior).

Captain Paul M. Moomaw (Junior).

P.S.—Reference paragraph 4 above, a recent telegram from His Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Tabriz gives the following additional information regarding Russian military movements in his area:—

- (i) Russian cavalry were seen moving from Maragheh towards Tabriz on the 12th March. This would be in accord with previous moves, which seem to have the object of concentrating their cavalry on the Turkish frontier and replacing them in the remaining parts of Azerbaijan by armoured forces;
- (ii) Twenty-four tanks, one armoured car and a convoy of lorries carrying troops and equipment were seen on the 13th March moving south from Maragheh to Miandoab. Some tanks had already arrived in Miandoab by the 12th March;
- (iii) There is some evidence to show that the Russian troops in Maragheh and Miandoab are fresh arrivals from Yugoslavia;
- (iv) The Russians are said to be making a new road from Miandoab to Shahin Dej, 40 miles distant in a south-easterly direction. This would imply that recent troop movements in this area are designed for the reinforcement of Democrat or Kurdish rebels fighting against the Afshar tribal partisans in the neighbourhood of Shahin Dej and Tikab, and possibly later against the main Persian Army garrison at Saqqiz and not to threaten Iraq from the frontier at Khaneh where climatic conditions in the Kurdistan mountains for at least another month would hamper the resumption of Russian-aided operations by the Barzanis against the Iraqi Government.

CHAPTER II.—IRAQ

[E 305/226/93]

No. 10

Sir H. Stonehewer-Bird to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 10th January, 1946.)

(No. 535.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 31st December, 1945.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that last Thursday His Royal Highness the Regent summoned the Cabinet and members of both Houses of Parliament to the Amanah Hall, where he delivered an address of which the following is the substance:—

2. After reviewing the series of troubles which have delayed the carrying out of fundamental reforms in the country since the death of King Ghazi, His Royal Highness outlined the basis of national policy "on which all Governments and political parties and organisations are agreed, and on which they differ only so far as details and methods of execution are concerned." This policy is based on the two corner-stones of the Iraqi State: (1) a free and independent democratic monarchy; (2) the "well-known" plan of the late King Faisal I in the field of foreign policy. On this basis no political party or organisations can dispense with the following fundamentals of a common national policy: (1) social insurance; (2) real social justice, giving every Iraqi countryman his full due without racial or religious discrimination; (3) the training of a useful new generation. The country has succeeded in producing many highly educated young men. Full opportunity has, however, not been given to these young men to occupy high positions and undertake responsibility. Ministers and high officials should loyally strive to prepare such a new responsible generation for the country.

3. His Royal Highness went on: "Political parties and organisations, which it is no longer right that the country should remain without, will come forward to the nation with plans and programmes in the election campaign. The party that wins the people's confidence and support will rule and undertake responsibility for carrying out that national policy in its own way, which will have been made clear in its election programme to the electorate. The new electoral draft law which, it is hoped you will shortly consider for legislation, will enable electors to express their will and turn the country's policy towards full democracy. This law is the result of the need arising out of the country's development during the past quarter of a century, and the long strides of progress it has made in all fields. We hope that you will share its discussion with the nation and consider what measures should be taken with the responsible people to lead the country towards its ideal in the light of the Constitution which is the guide of every one of us in the fulfilment of his duties, so that the people may feel that the Government is of them, by them and for them. The speech was loudly applauded.

4. The Regent's object in calling this meeting, which is, I believe, without precedent, was to reply to critics (and they are many), who are very ready to decry in the press and elsewhere the shortcomings of the present Government, but are most reluctant to assume any share of responsibility in the direction of affairs. These critics have always affected to suggest that the present Government is a dictatorship and that, if only political parties were in existence the millenium would arrive. The Regent, by thus publicly addressing the Legislature and by practically directing them to form political parties, has intended to give a new lead to political life in Iraq.

5. In general, the *démarche* has been well received. The servile press has hailed it with enthusiasm, and so have a number of political leaders. Some cynics, chiefly the older generation, have adopted the attitude that the more the situation changes the more will it remain the same; but among the younger generation there is no doubt that the Regent's initiative has been welcomed.

6. From our own point of view, the fact that in the forefront of his programme he places the traditional policy of King Faisal, that is to say friendship with Britain, is a cause for satisfaction.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER-BIRD.

[E 2173/226/93]

No. 11

Sir H. Stonehewer-Bird to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 8th March.)

(No. 183.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, 6th March, 1946.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Following is summary of new Government's programme as outlined by the Prime Minister to Chamber of Deputies yesterday:—

Foreign Policy.

(a) The maintenance of cordial relations with ally Great Britain. This depends on the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. During the sixteen years which have elapsed since its signing, Iraq has made great progress and amendment is therefore called for in order to bring treaty in harmony with present conditions.

(b) Arab countries: the realisation of Arab aspirations following the steps of King Faisal the First. The Palestinian question is an integral part of our cause. We cannot admit severance of this limb from the Arab body and we intend to enforce the boycott on Zionist goods.

(c) Work for *bon voisinage* with our neighbours and amity with all United Nations on the basis of San Francisco Charter.

Internal Policy.

2. The restoration of normal conditions by—

(a) Abolition of martial law.

(b) Abolition of measures for safeguarding public security and war emergency legislation.

(c) Closing of internment camp and removal of the censorship.

(d) Permission to form political parties.

(e) Enactment of a Deputies' Electoral Law ensuring freedom of elections.

(f) Reorganisation of the State machinery by encouragement of the education of youth.

(g) Removal as far as possible of war restrictions on supply and trade and increase of exports.

Note.—Effect has already been given administratively to (a), (b) and (c) above.

The Solution of Land Problems.

3. The solution of land problems in Iraq by—

(a) Increasing efficiency of land settlement.

(b) Settlement of Muntafiq land problem by special legislation.

(c) Organisation of cultivation in Amara by bringing it into line with other Liwas.

(d) Distribution of spare Government land amongst smallholders.

Note on 3 (b).—The Muntafiq lands are occupied by about 30,000 cultivators from whom landlords claim rent. This is a long-standing dispute and it is now proposed to solve it in the only satisfactory way, namely, the expropriation of landlords and confirmation of interferences in their holdings.

Note on 3 (c).—In Amara Liwa about 120 lessees hold their land on triennial leases from the Government. They thus have no security of tenure. It is proposed to give lessees and some other cultivators firm titles as in other Liwas.

4. The Cabinet will follow the principles contained in the Regent's speech to Members of Parliament on the 27th December last, namely, social security and training of the younger generation to assume responsibility. Special plan will be provided in budget to this end.

5. The Government's policy is to strengthen the army and reorganise the police, and also to ensure the enforcement of Liwa administrative law.

Sir H. Stonehewer-Bird to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 20th March.)

(No. 85.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 4th March, 1946.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a review of political and economic developments in Iraq during the year 1945, written in the main by the commercial counsellor, Mr. Pelham, and the head of chancery, Mr. Neil Hogg. It was unfortunately not possible to complete this report earlier owing to pressure of work in the chancery resulting from the lack of a counsellor during the months of December and January.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 12

POLITICAL REVIEW 1945.

I.—General.

THE great world events of 1945 have served to bring the Iraqi Government a little way out of their domestic shell. At the same time, serious internal problems have called for much discussion and some little action. To the people at large, however, there has been no great change. The war impinged on them only as a state of economic stringency, and its cessation has brought no considerable relief. The factors contributing to an increased interest in the outside world have been the conferences at San Francisco and London, the tours of the Regent in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Turkey, and the development of Arab solidarity, particularly in regard to the Palestinian and Syrian problems. Within the country the Government have been obliged to deal with a troublesome local revolt, with economic problems arising out of shortness of supplies and foreign currency, and with social problems related to unemployment and the standard of living.

2. In all these activities the Government have achieved a degree of success that was not to be expected from the somewhat undistinguished Cabinet in power. At San Francisco the Iraqi delegation played a vocal part and held its own in comparison with other Middle Eastern delegations. The tour of the Regent in America, though marred by financial extravagances, was successful, and his visits to the United Kingdom and Turkey produced a satisfactory impression. In the deliberations of the Arab League on Middle Eastern problems Iraq played a leading, and on the whole creditable, rôle. In general, the Iraqi Government are ambitious of becoming the leaders of the Arab countries in foreign affairs; they are, however, hampered, as will be seen from the section on Middle Eastern affairs, by a total lack of followers. As regards internal problems, the Kurdish revolt was brought to an end, for the time at least, by a mixture of force and bribery. The difficulties of supply of goods and foreign exchange were discussed amicably with His Majesty's Government and a financial agreement was concluded which is acceptable to the more reasonable politicians and is working smoothly; the existence of serious labour problems owing to the shortage of skilled men and the high cost of living has been recognised, and machinery has been set up to deal with them.

3. Relations with the United Kingdom have been satisfactory throughout, although potential sources of friction were not lacking. The expected revolt against foreign interference and constraint has not developed. Among the political leaders the realisation that friendship with Great Britain is vital to the development of Iraq has been strengthened. Anti-British feeling is centred in those classes which are opposed to the Government for social, economic or, in rare cases, ideological reasons; that is to say, the underprivileged, the underpaid and the half-educated. These groups constitute a formidable percentage of the population, but they are so far without serious political influence. One of the chief expressions of anti-British feeling is a slightly hysterical worship of an imaginary Russia—formerly it was Germany; and to this corresponds a morbid fear of that country in the minds of the governing classes, a fear that has been stimulated by Russian activities in Persia and the establishment of diplomatic

relations with the Soviet Union. There has been much talk about the need for a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but there is no indication of any serious feeling of grievance, except perhaps as regards the restrictions placed on diplomatic representation. Relations between the Iraqi population and the British armed forces in Iraq have been excellent.

II.—Internal Politics.

4. The Cabinet formed by Hamdi-al-Pachachi in August 1944, though expected to be of short life, has survived many difficulties and still shows no signs of early collapse. The sole defection this year has been that of Arshad al Umari, who resigned from the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs in August on account of criticism of the part which he played at San Francisco and because, according to his own statement, he felt uneasy at the unchecked growth of communism in Iraq and at the extravagances of the Regent during his tour in America. He has not been replaced, and the Prime Minister has held the portfolio since his resignation. The constitution of the Cabinet at the end of the year is as follows:—

Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs: Hamdi-al-Pachachi.

Minister of Interior: Mustafa-al-Umari.

Minister of Finance: Saleh Jabr.

Minister of Justice: Ahmed Mukhtar Baban.

Minister of Defence: Ismail Namiq.

Minister of Communications and Works: Abd-ul-Amir al-Uzri.

Minister of Education: Ibrahim Aqif al-Alusi.

Minister of Economics: Tawfiq Wahbi.

Minister of Social Affairs: Abdul Majid Allawi.

Minister of Supply: Yusuf Ghanima.

His Majesty King Faisal.

5. On the 2nd May the King entered his 11th year. His health has at times given cause for anxiety, owing to a recurrence of his asthma, but on the whole he has continued to make good progress, both mentally and physically. On his public appearances his dignity and good manners are very noticeable, though in private he is still sometimes afflicted by a nervous tic. He is a versatile child, and at Christmas entertained his friends with a one-man performance, in which he recited and acted in Arabic, English and French, all delivered with complete composure. There is no doubt that he has benefited very greatly from the services of his English governess, Miss Rosalind de Ramirez. Her original contract was for one year, but she was asked to stay on for another two. She has now been replaced by a tutor, Mr. Pitt Rivers, who was chosen at the Regent's request by Sir Louis Greig.

The Regent.

6. His Royal Highness has had an active and eventful year. He has taken an intense personal interest in the reconstruction of the Iraqi army and in the suppression of the Kurdish revolt. He has paid visits to the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Turkey. He has launched out into industrial enterprises and has thereby brought on himself sharp criticism from leading and influential politicians. On the other hand, his prestige and popularity with the army and with the masses has increased. Meanwhile, it has become apparent that, although he enjoys the dignity and privileges of his position, he has no great liking for the work that he has been called upon to perform and is easily discouraged; on more than one occasion he has spoken of returning to private life.

7. His travels began with a visit to the United States, undertaken at the invitation of President Roosevelt. He had originally intended to leave in late spring, but the death of the President caused him to delay his departure till the latter part of May. He visited New York, Washington, Boulder Dam, and agricultural districts of the Middle West, showing particular interest in agricultural development and the engineering works connected with it. On the 27th June he left Chicago for Canada, where he made a short tour. On the 7th July he arrived in England, where he was entertained by their Majesties The King and Queen. During his visit he broadcast a talk to Iraq from the British Broadcasting Corporation, inspected housing developments, visited aircraft factories, and took part in the V.J.-Day celebrations. He paid a brief visit to Germany,

at the invitation of the British military and Royal Air Force authorities. On the 25th August he left the United Kingdom for France, and thence went to Italy, where he made a tour of the north and visited Rome and Naples. On the 12th September he sailed from Naples in a British warship and arrived in Istanbul on the 15th September. During his visit to Turkey he had the opportunity of establishing good personal relations with the Turkish President and leading Turkish politicians, and discussed with them outstanding Iraqi-Turkish questions. One result of these talks was the surrender of the traitor, Salahuddin al-Sabbagh, for execution. His Royal Highness returned to Iraq in a Royal Air Force aircraft on the 21st September, and was received with popular enthusiasm.

8. Since these journeys he has acquired greater self-confidence and calm: the attitude of petulant defeatism, so unhappily apparent in the spring, has only reappeared once, and that briefly, on the occasion when he learnt of the arrival of Rashid Ali in Saudi Arabia. He remains profoundly convinced of the necessity of British assistance for the development of Iraq.

Communism.

9. The Russian victories, Russian activities in Persia, the advent of a Russian Minister, and labour troubles at home, have caused the governing classes to take an even blacker view than before of the perils of communism. Superficially there is some justification for their fears. Communism of a sort is undoubtedly on the increase. It is a subject of discussion among the small student class, and there has been a persistent flow of illicit propaganda of a professedly Communist type. The clandestine paper *Al Qa'ida* has appeared regularly and has achieved a fairly wide distribution, and the civil authorities have not been able to discover who is responsible for it or how it is produced. There is, moreover, no doubt that a considerable section of the working classes look to Russia as a possible protector of their interests. Nevertheless, the problem is not, as yet, that of counteracting foreign penetration or the advance of an alien ideology; it is rather a domestic issue, the solution to which lies in obtaining the confidence of the underpaid and underprivileged in the desire and the ability of the Government to provide better living conditions. There has so far been no evidence of any connexion between the underground Communists of Iraq and Moscow. The new Russian Legation is busying itself with observation, and has so far shown no desire to interfere in local affairs. Communism of the type now to be seen in Iraq is bred of the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, the delays in carrying out measures of social reform, and the lack of any effective organisation of labour. The intellectual element is small. There is also a small number of self-styled Communists who are opposed to the Government for various reasons, mostly personal, and to the alliance with Great Britain. These were formerly supporters of fascism and can be relied on to rally to any country that can be regarded as a serious rival of Great Britain in the Middle East.

Kurdistan.

10. At the end of 1944 the Iraqi Government were preparing to embark on a policy of conciliation in Kurdistan. It was not long, however, before Mulla Mustafa's activities put a stop to all such endeavours, and armed conflict soon followed. The Iraqi Government failed to inflict a military defeat, but succeeded in bribing other Kurdish chieftains to drive the Mulla out of Iraq. At the end of the year, Mulla Mustafa and his men were still in Persia, where they were alleged to have been sympathetically received by the Russian military authorities.

11. The policy of conciliation involved the despatch of grain and cloth to Kurdistan, the planning of social improvements and the grant of an amnesty to the Barzanis, who had taken part in the rising of the previous year. The amnesty was signed at the end of April and an apparently satisfactory meeting took place between the Minister of the Interior and Mulla Mustafa in the same month. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Ambassador made it clear to the Iraqi Government that His Majesty's Government did not regard the Kurds as a separate community, but simply as Iraqi subjects. At the same time, the Iraqi Government were advised to pursue and intensify their measures directed towards social betterment in Kurdistan, and also to give wider publicity in the press and elsewhere to what had been accomplished. The policy of conciliation was not popular in political circles in Bagdad, which favoured a punitive expedition. Nor did it content Mulla Mustafa, whose men became involved in skirmishes with the police. The situation deteriorated rapidly when Mulla Mustafa, having appointed himself arbiter in a tribal murder case, proceeded to Dohuk with an armed band, in defiance of Government orders and the advice of His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires.

This action, coupled with the forcible seizure of several thousand yards of cloth from the Serai at Mergasur and the occupation by the insurgents of Government posts, finally decided the Cabinet to take action by calling on the Iraqi army to proceed without delay to the north.

12. It was some time before operations commenced. Apart from the lack of trained personnel and inadequacy of staff arrangements for a major military operation, disagreement arose between General Renton, head of the British military mission to the Iraqi army, and the Cabinet, regarding the plan of operation, which the former looked upon as militarily unsound. After some discussion, agreement was reached, with the proviso that in the event of the Ministry of Defence ordering operations which, in General Renton's opinion, were militarily unsound or involved more than normal risks of war, the mission would not participate in the field. Furthermore, it was made clear to the Government by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that no British or Indian troops or members of the Royal Air Force would be sent to the disaffected areas to assist the Government in the event of failure of the operations. Steps were taken to evacuate the Royal Air Force Rest Camp at Ser Amadia; deputy assistant political advisers and area liaison officers were withdrawn from the scene of operations and, on the 4th September, approximately six weeks from the time of Mulla Mustafa's *démarche* at Dohuk, three columns of the Iraqi army, numbering in all some 14,000 men, began to advance from Aqra, Rowanduz and Amadia. It is unnecessary to give a detailed account of the operations. Before the main advance, referred to above, a column was hurriedly, and without the knowledge of General Renton, ordered to advance from Bafistian to Sidaka, and, after suffering very heavy casualties, was only extricated from this deplorable position by the clever intervention of the Minister of the Interior, who, taking advantage of a quarrel which had arisen between Mulla Mustafa and one of his chief supporters, Mahmud Agha Zibari, bribed the latter and other tribal chiefs to join the Government forces. By the middle of October the rebels were in full retreat, thanks mainly to the Minister of Interior's tribal irregulars, whose help prevented the campaign from dragging on through the winter. Although the Government and army had lost a certain amount of prestige, official communiqués spoke of the operation as a complete success. Mulla Mustafa, defiant to the end, crossed over the frontier into the Russian-occupied zone of Persia with 2,000 followers, of whom 500 were armed. The Government made representations to the Persian and Russian authorities requesting that the Barzanis be treated as fugitives from justice and their arms be handed over to the Persian commander of the area. These representations have so far met with no success. It is reported that Mulla Mustafa has now enlisted the support of the Russians; and the Iraqi Government fear that he has every intention of making a counter-attack in the spring.

13. In Barzan the Government are endeavouring to carry out a policy of reconstruction and re-settlement. Compensation has been paid to owners of destroyed houses, measures have been taken to look after refugees, and grain has been distributed in some areas, but the building of a Government police post has taken priority over the building of a school and dispensary, a step which, though necessary, is not likely to influence the Kurds in favour of Iraqi goodwill. In November the Regent visited the north, where he was joined by the Ministers of Interior and Defence, and decorated members of his armed forces for their part in the Barzan operations and Kurdish chiefs who had sided with the Government.

14. But Kurdistan is still a source of grave concern. Many Kurds, while blaming the rebel leaders for bringing misery to Kurdistan, have come to regard Great Britain as hostile and now tend to look to Russia for help. The present revolt in Azerbaijan is strengthening this tendency.

Economics.

15. Economic affairs continue to occupy a large place in the minds of the people. While merchants with visions of large fortunes and politicians with axes to grind are indignant that the end of the war has not brought them a flood of imported goods and a decrease in the cost of living, both Government and commercial circles are busy planning to take advantage of increasing relaxation of war-time control and availability of supply.

16. Relaxation of Middle East Supply Centre control over a wide range of commodities came into effect on the 1st January and was greeted with satisfaction as a most important step towards re-establishment of normal trading practices although shortage of shipping, exchange control, and export control

in the loading areas remained as considerable handicaps to free supply. With the cessation of hostilities in Europe and later in the Far East the additions to the decontrolled list grew, with the result that a large volume of business was placed abroad. The effects of the new system became apparent in March and between that month and October licences for the supply of decontrolled commodities from the United Kingdom alone covered orders to a value exceeding £7 million of which £6 million were for goods to be delivered over a period of eighteen months. In October the Iraqi Government abolished the import licencing system in respect of all goods released from Middle East Supply Centre control which were manufactured or produced in the sterling area. In November the Middle East Supply Centre was dissolved. Its successors, the British Supply Mission (Middle East) and an American mission, now maintain control only over a short list of goods which are still in world short supply.

17. While some measure of success in controlling and stabilising the prices of both imported goods and local products has been achieved by the Iraqi supply authorities, it has been quite impossible, in such a comparatively primitive country, to counter the inflationary effects of British military expenditure. Ministry of Food purchases of export surpluses and shortage of imports. The cost of living having soared has therefore remained at a very high level and severe press and public criticism of the Government has naturally been unavailing. It is of some credit to the Government that inflation has been arrested. The total currency circulation throughout the year remained, with but slight fluctuation, at ID. 41.5 million. In this country it has been found practicable only to ration tea, sugar and cotton piece-goods and the system worked more satisfactorily in 1945, particularly in respect of piece-goods. More regular supplies enabled a distribution during the year totalling over 14 yards per registered person as compared with only 4 metres last year. To ensure the procurement of some essential commodities barter agreements were concluded during the year with Palestine, Syria and the Lebanon. In this connexion the main item of supply from Iraq was livestock for which the adjacent countries had pressing need.

18. This year the Ministry of Food decided not to make a bulk contract for the Iraqi barley surplus estimated at 200,000 tons but to enter the open market. Owing to the fact that private merchants could not obtain shipping freight this policy has generally been successful and the Ministry have bought at prices ranging from 14½ to 16 dinars per ton as compared with the contract price of 19½ dinars per ton for the 1944 crop. After the end of the war, however, merchants, feeling that they would be able to ship, entered into private negotiations with the result that deliveries to the Ministry of Food's representative were held up and local prices soared. As shipping continued to be difficult and Argentine prices remained comparatively low, speculation died down in the latter part of the year and delivery to the Ministry has proceeded at a slow pace.

19. In 1944 it was realised that Iraq's balances and earnings of scarce currencies were, owing to the wartime economic disequilibrium, becoming insufficient for essential imports from scarce-currency countries. Negotiations between His Majesty's Government and the Iraqi Government were commenced in December of that year, but not concluded until May 1945, by which a scarce-currency target figure of some 14 million dollars was established within which Iraq could draw on the sterling area dollar pool to satisfy her needs during the year. Owing to the continued uncertainty of the situation negotiations were again opened in November 1945 for a *pro rata* extension of the agreement for three months ending the 31st March, 1946.

20. The conclusion of the Anglo-American Loan Agreement in December has given rise to the optimistic belief that dollars may become more readily available after the expiration of the present agreement. It is well-nigh impossible to get the Iraqis to appreciate international economic and financial complications, especially when these are opposed to their intense desire to exchange accumulated sterling balances for imports which they presume are more readily available in America. The task of combating criticism directed against the United Kingdom is, therefore, considerable, though it may be somewhat relieved by increasing availabilities of goods from the sterling area.

21. The two internal loans mentioned in the last report were floated in January. The first issue of ID.1 million (bearer bonds of ID.10 each carrying 2 per cent. interest for twenty years and a further 2 per cent. in lottery prizes, both free of tax) was received with great enthusiasm and there is little doubt that another 3 million could have been floated at that time. The success of this loan being assured, the Government issued ID. 500,000 of the 3 per cent. loan (bearer bonds of ID. 100 and ID. 1,000 redeemable in three years). This was

sold immediately and two further tranches of ID. 250,000 each were offered and taken up within four days. The original intention early in 1943 was that the loans should be floated as a deflationary measure, but by the time action was decided in January of this year it had been realised that, with a currency circulation which had risen during the war from 6 million to 40 million dinars, the issue of bonds amounting to ID. 2 million would have little deflationary effect. As, however, Iraq has never before floated an internal loan the issues have an educational and experimental value and it is hoped that the way has been paved for further issues. The proceeds of the present loan are reserved for use in connexion with capital projects and there is little doubt that much more will be needed if Iraq is to engage in all the developments planned and at the same time eschew external loans.

22. The four leading banks agreed in May appreciably to reduce the rate of interest and charges on documentary credits for imports into Iraq opened in the sterling area. Later the bank discount rate for bills was reduced from 7 per cent. to 6 per cent. and the rate for loans reduced by 1½ per cent.

23. Industrial developments and capital works schemes held in abeyance during the war have become live issues this year. A cement making plant and a cotton spinning and weaving mill, both in Bagdad, are nearing completion. Final plans have been laid for the establishment of a brewery. These projects are entirely new industries in Iraq. Progress has also been made in considerable expansion and reorganisation of the leather tanning industry. Messrs. Balfour, Beatty & Co., Ltd., are constructing for the Government a new railway line from Kirkuk to Erbil a length of 68 miles and much of the material for this will be purchased from British army disposals. A revised contract has been concluded between Messrs. Balfour, Beatty & Co. and the Government for the undertaking of the Habbaniyah Flood Relief Scheme which had been suspended in 1941 owing to the war. A British geologist has examined the Bekme Dam site, made a favourable report, and will supervise borings next year. Towards the end of the year a contract for the construction of a railway bridge across the Tigris at Bagdad was awarded to Messrs. Holloway Brothers, London, who are also negotiating for contracts for two further bridges required by the Iraqi State Railways. A contract for the establishment of a twenty kilowatt wireless transmitter 10 miles north-west of Bagdad has been secured by the Marconi Company who expect to engage also in further development.

24. A scheme designed to settle smallholders on the Dujaila lands, which has been under consideration for some years, was approved and put into operation in June. Each smallholder is to develop his 100 or 200 misharas (1 mishara = 2,500 square metres) according to a plan laid down by a committee. After ten years of satisfactory operation smallholders will be given freehold titles free of cost.

25. It has been stated that it is the intention of the Government to multiply such schemes and to supply housing materials, &c., to smallholders. While such developments are greatly to be desired it is considered that measures so designed by Iraqi Ministers, most of whom are large landowners, are more likely to be inspired by fear of what doctrines may infiltrate from the north-east than a spirit of democratic benevolence.

Iraqi Army.

26. On the 23rd May, 1944, Major-General Renton succeeded Major-General Bromilow as Inspector-General of the Iraqi Army and head of the British Military Mission. He was appointed for the purpose of reorganising the army, still suffering from the defeat of 1941 and many other ills of longer standing, and making of it a force capable of taking the field successfully against any subversive elements that might appear and of co-operating with British forces in the defence of Iraqi territory. This work involves the discovery and training of officers capable of leading armed forces, the training of the men in the use of modern weapons and other materials of war, the provision of those materials, and the establishment of conditions of service that will permit the development of an efficient fighting force. All these tasks raise serious difficulties. In the first place, many of the outstandingly inefficient senior officers are very well connected and there is strong opposition to any move to deprive them of their posts. There is a certain amount of talent to be found among the junior officers, but this should not be overrated. Inadequate educational facilities, the general inertness of the Middle Easterner, and the prevailing atmosphere of corruption and nepotism, ensure that in the military sphere, as elsewhere, there is a dearth of first-class

material. Similarly, in instructing the rank and file in the use of modern weapons there arises the difficulty that the ordinary recruit has little knowledge of modern mechanisms and habitually neglects the normal measures to maintain them in a state of efficiency. The question of supply, since it does not lie in Iraqi hands and the Iraqi Government are willing to pay for the necessary material, would appear to be easier. Unfortunately, however, the need for armaments of all kinds in various theatres of war and the complications connected with Lease-lend have greatly delayed and impeded the supply of what is required. Only in the matter of improving conditions of service has no major obstacle been encountered, chiefly owing to the Regent's appreciation of the need for reform.

27. Despite these obstacles, Major-General Renton has made good progress. A purge of useless officers on a fairly wide scale was successfully achieved, and with the support of the Regent, who has thrown himself wholeheartedly into the task of building up a useful army, it is to be hoped that more dead wood may be pruned away in the near future. A number of exercises in mountain country, desert and marshlands were carried out during the early summer and led to marked improvements. Unfortunately, progress had not yet reached a stage at which the army was ready to take the field in earnest when it became necessary to conduct military operations against the rebels in Kurdistan. These operations cannot be described as successful but, on the other hand, no disaster occurred and the rank and file maintained good morale.

28. As regards supplies, the outstanding need is for motor transport. Every effort has been made to arrange for an early release of the required vehicles, and it appears probable that the minimum requirements for the anticipated return march against the Kurds will be delivered in time to allow for training in advance. The financial side of the transaction is still under discussion. The difficulties that have been encountered in this field and an unhappy series of misunderstandings over the supply of aircraft to the Royal Iraqi Air Force have given colour to the perennial rumour that it is the policy of His Majesty's Government to keep Iraq in a state of military weakness.

29. The Chief of Imperial General Staff visited Bagdad in November and discussed with members of the Iraqi Cabinet the question of supplies of equipment and partnership in defence.

Labour Conditions.

30. The problem of securing a fair and even set of conditions for labour throughout the country has been engaging the attention of the Iraqi Ministry of Social Affairs throughout the year, together with that of avoiding wide-scale unemployment and unrest among the large number of workers (at present over 30,000) who are employed by the British army, when the latter eventually withdraws from the country.

31. Committees on which the embassy and Headquarters, Paiforce, are represented have been set up to deal with these problems, and, in addition to performing extremely useful day-to-day work, have made what will, it is hoped, prove to be a major contribution towards the betterment of social conditions in general throughout the country by preparing a scheme, which has been adopted by the Cabinet, for the establishment of labour exchanges throughout the country, with a central bureau in Bagdad whose duty it will be to observe the general trend of labour and to ensure a fair wage and a reasonable standard of industrial conditions. A British expert on labour conditions has been engaged to assist in this work.

Technical Experts.

32. In connexion with the industrial developments and the capital works schemes mentioned in the section of this report dealing with economics, and in pursuance of their general plans for social reform, the Iraqi Government have made application for many British experts and advisers. In particular they called for an engineer of international reputation to draw up a long-term plan for irrigation and agriculture in conjunction with a team of technical advisers of his own choosing. Mr. F. F. Haigh has been made available for this post, and his arrival in Iraq was expected early in the New Year. Other requests relate to health services, education, engineering, statistics, &c. Two Egyptian advisers were also engaged, one for irrigation and the other for agriculture.

The Press.

33. With the relaxation of Government censorship that followed the end of the war, the press took advantage of its new-found freedom. Although the

one or two of the more solid newspapers, such as *Al Akhbar* and *Al Zaman* continued to be sensible and friendly, most of the others published many criticisms of British policy, ranging from the thoughtful (if often mistaken) articles of *Saut al Ahali* to the vicious yappings of *Al Nida* (Extreme Right) and *Al Rai al A'am* (Extreme Left). The main subjects have been Palestine and the revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, although writers on the latter subject seldom, if ever, give specific suggestions, thus giving the impression to their readers that the treaty is more oppressive than it actually is. There was a burst of anti-French feeling at the time of the Levant crisis which produced such bombastic phrases as "Iraqi bayonets are ready to defend Arab freedom," coupled with a seemingly illogical complaint against the British for not intervening sooner. The word imperialism (*Al Ista'amar*) now appears regularly in the hostile press, but as no specific definition of imperialism is ever given it probably does not make anyone's flesh creep—or not much. In the later months of the year the newspapers were preoccupied with domestic politics and the Anglo-American Palestine Commission. A more favourable side of the Iraqi press is that a great deal of pro-British material such as commentaries on the international situation from the British angle and articles on British industry is regularly published. Altogether more than 4,000 words of material issued by the Embassy Public Relations Section is published daily in the vernacular press, and, whatever the reasons which prompt editors to use it (cash is not one of them since they are not subsidised in any way), it is a pleasing enough position. There are now fourteen daily Arabic newspapers (and one British-owned English-language one) and, although they have some unpleasant characteristics, they are, on the whole, better in tone than those of some other Middle East countries.

34. Throughout the year the ambassador continued to emphasise to the Iraqi Government the importance of giving adequate guidance to the press on controversial matters, internal and external. The present Director of Propaganda is, however, such a feeble individual that it would be optimistic to hope for much success.

III.—Middle Eastern Affairs.

Arab League.

35. At the beginning of the year the Iraqi statesmen interested in Arab unity, and, in particular, General Nuri al Said, had good reason to hope that their aspirations would soon be given concrete form. The Alexandria protocol, signed in October 1944, foresaw an Arab Commonwealth with some degree of sovereignty acting through a council holding executive powers. When the committee, set up to draft the constitution of the league, met in Cairo in February, it rapidly became clear that these hopes were vain. Two States opposed any surrender of sovereignty by the members of the League, the Lebanon, because of her fears of being swallowed up in an expanded Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, because of Ibn Saud's suspicions of the Hashimite family. Nuri al Said, and those in favour of a league with real power were obliged to content themselves with a centre for discussion. Iraq found herself ousted from her position as leader of the movement for Arab federation, but was powerless to prevent it. The covenant, drafted by the Preparatory Committee, was signed on the 22nd March and was ratified by Iraq in that month.

36. In spite of this disappointing start, the work of the council on the problems presented by the Levant States and Palestine, was not unsatisfactory. These problems and the league's attitude to them are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

The Levant States.

37. The position at the beginning of the year was a deadlock, the French upholding their demands for the maintenance of special rights and the States resolutely refusing to conclude any agreement on such terms. As the situation developed towards a crisis in Syria, public feeling in Iraq and especially in Government circles, became increasingly bitter against the French and there was much talk of intervention and the supply of arms to the Syrian Government. Nuri Pasha, on a visit to Jerusalem, made a public statement implying that Syria had only to define her needs and Iraq would meet them. The Government, however, wisely avoided giving any such undertakings and confined themselves to sympathy and representations directed against the French: they showed throughout a good understanding of the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the dispute and took to heart the advice to avoid precipitate action.

The Regent also used his influence as a stabilising factor. Nevertheless, when fighting broke out a dangerous situation began to develop, and the call for armed intervention by Iraq would have been difficult to resist had not order been restored in Syria by British action. This action was received with widespread thankfulness and relief, although there were many who felt that it was no more than the duty of the British Government and long overdue. At this point, the centre of discussion moved to the special meeting of the Council of the Arab League convened in Cairo on the 4th June, to which Iraq sent a delegation consisting of the Prime Minister, Tawfiq as Suaidi, and the Iraqi Minister in Cairo. The decisions of the council condemning the action of the French and the presence of French troops in the Levant States, and declaring that the league would take all necessary steps to counter French aggression, were regarded as satisfactory by the Iraqi Government. At intervals during the year the suggestion cropped up that the troubles in Syria should be used as an opportunity for advancing the old plans for a Greater Syria under Hashimite leadership. The good sense of the Regent and the Prime Minister ensured that these suggestions were not developed.

38. During the last weeks of the year attention centred upon the Anglo-French agreement for the withdrawal of troops.

Palestine.

39. Towards the latter part of 1945 the Palestine problem again emerged as a burning political question. Musa Alami made two visits to Iraq during the year, and was eventually successful in obtaining the sum of ID. 100,000 as a practical contribution to the Arab offices in London and Washington. Provision has also been made in the Iraq budget for support of an Arab Land Redemption Fund, if such should finally be inaugurated. The murderous outrages committed by the Zionists in Palestine have sharpened Iraq's fear that any form of Jewish State in Palestine would be administered by an oligarchy of gangsters and would form a bridgehead of armed aggression against the Arab world. Nevertheless, the Government has shown great firmness and restraint in dealing with the matter. No demonstrations have been allowed and the tone of the press compared with that of the surrounding countries has been commendably moderate. Despite all provocation from without and agitation from within, the Iraqi Government have shown themselves determined to maintain order and have shown themselves to be fully aware of their responsibility in having as their capital the second biggest Jewish city in the Middle East. Nevertheless, if His Majesty's Government eventually decide to adopt in Palestine any policy which is widely at variance with the 1939 White Paper, the Jews of Iraq will almost certainly suffer, both in life and property. The reception of Mr. Bevin's memorandum of the 13th November was on the whole favourable, and in the subsequent deliberations of the Arab League the Iraqi delegation was a moderating influence.

Egypt.

40. Relations with Egypt have not been good. In the first place, the Regent does not like King Farouk, who, he says, has, on more than one occasion, been discourteous to him. Secondly, there is a general feeling here that, whereas Iraq was the pioneer both in declaring war on the Axis and in the formation of the Arab League, Egypt is now trying to thrust Iraq aside and put itself forward as the leader of the Arab world, not only culturally but politically as well. Some of the statements of Abdul Rahman Azzam, secretary-general of the Arab League, have given substance to this resentment, and it cannot be denied that the disappearance of the Minister of State's office has given colour to the impression that the negotiations between the Arab League and the outside world, including Great Britain, are conducted exclusively through Egyptian media.

41. A grave political crisis was precipitated in February by the omission to invite either the Regent or the Amir Abdullah to meet President Roosevelt and Mr. Winston Churchill in Cairo. The fact that not only King Ibn Saud and King Farouk, but also the President of Syria, were invited to confer with the two statesmen, whereas the Hashimites were pointedly excluded, nearly led to the abdication of the Regent. Only the receipt of a gracious personal message from the King restored the situation.

Saudi Arabia.

42. Relations with Saudi Arabia have not been of the happiest owing to the antagonism of Ibn Saud to the Hashimite family and the appearance in Saudi Arabia in September of Rashid Ali al Gailani, leader of the 1941 revolt, who had

been sentenced to death *in absentia* by an Iraqi military court in January 1942. The defeat of the Iraqi plans for the Arab League by a Saudi-Arabian/Lebanese combination has been mentioned above. The arrival of Rashid Ali in Saudi Arabia was a severe shock to the Regent personally and to the Iraqi Government. Despite the advice of His Majesty's Government and the personal representations of the Regent and of the Amir of Transjordan, Ibn Saud has felt himself bound by the Arab code of honour to grant protection to Rashid Ali. No progress had been made towards a solution of the problem at the end of the year.

IV.—International Relations.

United Nations.

43. The Iraqi delegation to San Francisco was headed by Arshad al Umari, then Minister for Foreign Affairs. They were assisted by Mr. H. I. Lloyd, formerly a British official in the employ of the Iraqi Government. In common with other Arab delegations they took strong exception to the provisions of the Charter relating to Trusteeship, and Arshad al Umari refused to sign the document. The necessary powers were therefore conferred on Dr. Fadhil al Jamali, Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

44. Iraq was represented at the meeting of the United Nations Preparatory Commission that took place in London at the close of the year by the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires and a secretary to the Iraqi Legation in London.

United States of America.

45. The Americans have been in bad odour with the Iraqi Government and all political circles during the past year. The Iraqis view with suspicion the American attempts to extend their economic influence in the Middle East, despite the fact that Iraq is anxious to purchase many American products, and they are bitterly indignant at the open Zionism of many leading figures in United States politics. As a result, American visitors, and to some extent the American diplomatic representatives in Iraq, are inclined to the belief that British influence is poisoning the minds of the Iraqis against them.

46. American attempts to persuade the Iraqi Government to set up, or allow American interests to set up, a direct radio telegraphic link between Bagdad and the United States have met with a refusal. Repeated and insistent endeavours to obtain unrestricted "Fifth Freedom" rights for United States airlines have so far resulted in nothing more than temporary and restricted concessions to two American airlines.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

47. The Soviet Legation in Iraq has so far confined its activities to observation and some small social activity. The Minister has toured the southern provinces, maintaining a very discreet attitude. Nevertheless, all things Russian are viewed with the deepest suspicion by Iraqi politicians, and the Russian manoeuvres leading up to the establishment of an "independent" Azerbaijan touching the frontier of Iraq have caused apprehension and dismay.

V.—Conclusion.

48. The most serious problem that Iraq has to face in the immediate future is one of internal security. If the Kurdish rising, which is confidently expected in early summer, can be met effectively by the Iraqi army, trained and reorganised by the British Military Mission, there is good hope of stability and progress. Fortunately it appears probable that, provided the necessary equipment can be made available in time, the army will be able to deal with any unaided attempt of Mulla Mustafa and his followers to return to Kurdistan. Failure would create a most serious situation both for Iraq and for British interests in the Middle East and the first objective of British policy must therefore be to support the Iraqi Government in their coming difficulties.

49. Apart from this threat the situation in Iraq is not unfavourable. She has emerged from the war as the one relatively stable country in the Middle East, apart from the anachronistic Saudi Arabia. In educated circles it is generally appreciated that little hardship and practically no damage have been suffered during the war, despite an attempt to draw in by the Axis Powers; and this attempt, if it had succeeded, would have brought the country to ruin. The British attitude towards the Rashid Ali rebellion is still remembered as an almost incredible example of forbearance in circumstances where forbearance could not

possibly be construed as weakness. The position of Great Britain is therefore strong, and it has further been strengthened by fear of Russia and distrust of America.

50. On the other hand, disruptive forces are at work. It is impossible for the young and educated Iraqi to reconcile the present conditions of his country, where the vast majority of a relatively small population are underfed, disease-ridden, uneducated, and miserably housed, and where even the rich man must go abroad to find a passably comfortable life, with the potential riches in agriculture and oil of which he has become aware. The fault is to a great extent his own, but this he will never believe and he is persuaded, to a degree incomprehensible in England, that the British "run the country" and are directly responsible for its failure to achieve satisfactory progress. Among the classes on which the future of this country depends, therefore, Great Britain is rapidly losing friends and the process is being hastened by the irresponsible accusations of imperialism that constantly appear in the press. It is of great importance that Great Britain should recover her reputation as a leader of material progress. Practical assistance in recruiting technical experts, training Iraqi technicians and craftsmen (the latter are still almost entirely lacking in Iraq), together with judicious advice upon internal problems and wide distribution of carefully chosen propaganda, appear to be the right methods, and these are being assiduously applied.

CHAPTER III.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON

[E 1422/1422/89]

No. 13

Mr. Shone to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 10th February.)

(No. 19.)

Sir,

Beirut, 5th February, 1946.

WITH reference to Library letter of the 5th December last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on the heads of Foreign Missions in Beirut and Damascus.

2. I apologise for the fact that this is the first report of its kind to be sent from this post, and that its arrival is so long overdue. But, as will be seen from the contents, the Diplomatic Corps here is still in the early stages of constitution, and the position of the representatives of the different Powers is consequently both curious and unstable. For example, the representative of France, whom the Syrian Government decline to recognise any longer as "Delegate General" and with whom they have no dealings, still enjoys in the Lebanon many of the trappings of the mandatory era, and is accorded courtesy precedence by the Diplomatic Corps, but is, in fact, not a member of the corps at all; the representatives of Turkey, though career officers, are not accredited to the Governments, which Turkey has not yet recognised; Mexico has recognised the Lebanon but not Syria, and Syria, but not the Lebanon, has recognised the Warsaw Government of Poland. Finally, Afghanistan, the Argentine, Chile, China and the Yemen, though they have all recognised both Governments, are not yet represented locally. The position changes constantly, and I have, therefore, included in this report not only those who are heads of missions at the moment, but all local representatives, some of whom may find themselves elevated to this rank in the future. For convenience I have divided them into four categories, though these may well be out of date by the time they are received:—

- (A) Countries which have recognised the Levant States, and are represented by Ministers or *Chargés d'Affaires*: i.e., Belgium, Egypt, Iraq, Persia, Poland ("London" Government), Saudi Arabia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States.
- (B) Countries which have recognised the Levant States, but are not represented by diplomatic missions: i.e., France, Brazil, Czecho-Slovakia, Greece, Switzerland, Transjordan, Yugoslavia.
- (C) Countries which have not yet recognised the Levant States, and are represented by career consular officers not accredited to the States: i.e., Turkey.
- (D) Countries represented by honorary consular officers: i.e., Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Panamá, Peru, Spain, Sweden.

(No details of these honorary consuls are given, as they are ineligible for promotion to diplomatic status.)

3. All the heads of diplomatic missions, except the Saudi Arabian Minister, are normally resident in Beirut. (With the same exception the dates given below are those of the presentation of letters at Beirut.)

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

Enclosure in No. 13

(A.)

Belgium.

M. Roger Taymans.
Chargé d'affaires.

About 36, unmarried. Was "chef du Cabinet" to M. Pierlot and later served in a Commando battalion. Is quieter and less forthcoming than his vigorous predecessor, M. Deleigne, but seems anxious to be friendly and appears, like all Belgians here, to be genuinely pro-British. He cannot have much to do except hold a watching brief for the local tramway company, which is a Belgian interest.

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Egypt.

Abdul Rahman Hakki Bey.
Minister. 11th April, 1945.

Formerly *chargé d'affaires* in London for some time; later minister at Ankara.

A charming, distinguished and intelligent colleague. Speaks excellent English. I knew him in Cairo, where he occupied a senior post in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for a year or two before his appointment to Beirut, and always found him friendly and helpful. This he has continued to be.

both in Beirut and Damascus; and of all the representatives of the Arab League States he seems the most inclined to take a reasonable and dispassionate view of most questions.

His wife is a worthy consort to him.

Iraq.

Satid Ahmed ar-Rawi.

Minister. 3rd July, 1945.

Director-General of Police since 1941, an appointment which he only left for his present post at the personal request of the Regent. I am told that since he has been here, he has been offered, and refused, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

He is obviously a man of considerable character and ability, who, I understand, collaborated excellently with the British security authorities in Iraq and was highly esteemed by them. He speaks his mind frankly—"more like a policeman than a diplomat," as he himself says—is well-informed and appears to be sincerely pro-British and anxious to co-operate with us.

Married and has several children.

Persia.

Massoud Moazed.

Minister. 13th April, 1945.

A rather gloomy-looking colleague, whom I seldom see except at formal receptions. He does not have much to say, and (apart from some very halting French) only his own language to say it in.

Married.

Poland ("London" Government).

M. Zygmunt Zawadowski.

Minister. 18th February, 1944.

Until the enforced dissolution in July 1945 of the Government which he claims to represent, M. Zawadowski enjoyed a good position here, partly because the Lebanese were grateful to Poland for being the first country, after Great Britain and France, to recognise their independence. Since then his position has become increasingly equivocal for, although he is still recognised by the Lebanese Government and continues to enjoy full diplomatic privileges, he is like a general without an army as the whole of his staff have been absorbed into the Polish Welfare Organisation, which is run under my auspices on behalf of the Treasury Polish Committee. M. Zawadowski (who is, technically speaking, the doyen of the Diplomatic Corps in the Lebanon), has expressed his intention to fly his flag till the last, and has declined to be absorbed into the Welfare Organisation and receives no funds from us. The policy of the Lebanese Government is explained by their desire to avoid trouble among the large Polish colony which at our behest they have received here from Persia, and whose allegiance is still overwhelmingly pro-London.

The arrival of a Warsaw representative, which is sooner or later inevitable, is likely to cause disturbances which may embarrass not only the Lebanese authorities, but also His Majesty's Legation. Meanwhile, the Lebanese Government are under constant pressure from the Soviet Legation to withdraw their recognition from M. Zawadowski. Syria has already done so, but there is not yet any representative of the Warsaw Government at Damascus.

M. Zawadowski bears his burdens with fortitude and took in good part the transfer of authority over his staff to His Majesty's Government. Neither he nor his wife speak English.

Saudi Arabia.

Sheikh Abdul Aziz Zeid.

Minister. 20th June, 1944.

Resides in Damascus. Decorative and impressive, in his rather morose way, but talks only Arabic and while well-disposed, is not very forthcoming.

Married.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

M. Daniel Solod.

Minister. 30th October, 1944.

About 40; I believe of Georgian origin.

M. Solod's arrival was preceded by lurid stories of the vast cargoes of caviare, vodka and precious metals he would bring in his train, and of the hordes of sinister secretaries who would be installed in his colossal legation. In fact, he proved to be a quiet young man, with a very small staff, and few pretensions in the way of extravagant hospitality. He has so far shown little sign of playing a very active part in local affairs; but he and his staff have at times complained of the local press (including a protest against a reference to Stalin during an episode in the adventures of "Jane") and he also complained to the Syrians that the British Council enjoyed more favourable treatment than the "Friends of the Soviet Union." The report that he had formally protested against the Anglo-French agreement was denied; but he may well have given the States' Governments to understand that the Soviet Union would not be unsympathetic to their cause. I should not be surprised if he and his staff engaged in unobtrusive work outside my ken. He talks no English and indifferent French, but seems intelligent and friendly. He has never asked me to a meal, though we attend each other's receptions. His tend to be in the genuine Moscow manner; one ended with the company, including General Beynet, singing French folk-songs, while M. Solod abstractedly stroked Mme. Beynet's head.

Mme. Solod is shy and has language difficulty, but is said to be a lady of considerable character. She has told me she does not care for life in Beirut.

The Damascus Legation is usually left in the charge of M. Tchernaguine—also young, intelligent and married—who is perhaps rather more forthcoming than his chief.

United States.

Mr. George Wadsworth.

Minister. 17th November, 1944.

Born 1893. Taught at American University, Beirut, 1914-17. Clerk in United States Consulate-General, Beirut 1917. Served in various Middle East posts and as counsellor in Rome 1941. Diplomatic agent at Beirut and Damascus October 1942.

A complex character who, to my regret, has latterly seemed to be drifting away from this legation. By training and environment an ardent Arabist (he is referred to locally as "the American Spears"), he has become increasingly intolerant of what he regards as our inadequate championship of the Levant States against the French. I believe he is fundamentally well disposed to Great Britain; but his dislike of British foreign policy in the Levant, coupled with resentment at British success in resisting American economic pressure, particularly in the field of civil aviation, in this area, and tinged, perhaps, with envy of the good relations which this legation still enjoy with both the Governments and peoples of the two States, have engendered anti-British feelings which he has at times made little effort to conceal. This is the more regrettable as he is personally a man of considerable charm and good nature, as well as being gifted with an acute, if somewhat legalistic, mind. (He is, however, long-winded to an almost incredible degree.) He had left Beirut for consultations in Washington before my return from London in October; but by then there had been a falling off in the close relations and frequent exchanges of view which I and my staff had enjoyed with him during the first half of 1945. He was expected to return to Beirut from Washington at the end of 1945, but went instead to London for the United Nations' Conference.

Mrs. Wadsworth is an eccentric but cheerful lady, whose pose is to utter remarks of a "frankness"

which is usually offensive and occasionally obscene.

During Mr. Wadsworth's absence, the United States Legation has been in charge of a young secretary, Mr. Mattison, who is friendly but not very communicative.

France.

General Paul Beynet.

One of General Beynet's favourite remarks is that he is a simple soldier, and not a diplomat. This is perfectly true. He shows a tendency to see any political problem in terms of an enemy and of the amount of strength necessary to deal with that enemy. This would not in itself be so bad if he were not also afflicted with a "whiff-of-grapeshot" complex. Political manifestations which to the average student of international affairs would appear the normal results of emergent nationalism or economic change, appear to him as factious demonstrations organised by the traditional enemy and capable of being suppressed either by the establishment of a puppet Government, with the backing of the necessary French divisions, or by a military demonstration calculated to put the natives in their place, with the degree of punishment and even bloodshed demanded by the occasion. Nothing will ever convince him that the Syrians are no longer willing to be governed in this way, or, indeed, that there is any other way of governing them. He may perhaps realise that he belongs to an outmoded school; he makes no secret of his desire to go home and cultivate his garden in peace. This weariness of a life of politics in which he is out of his depth lends a certain cynicism to his outlook; "Tout passe, tout casse, tout lasse," or "what will it all matter a hundred years from now?" might be his motto. He leaves an increasing amount of responsibility to his brilliant if rather ferret-like lieutenant, Count Ostrog, who knows all the answers.

Mme. Beynet is a lady of great charm, and socially they make a very pleasant couple.

Brazil.

Senhor Fernadez Pinheiro.

Consul-general.

Senhor Pinheiro and his over-blown peony of a wife are a friendly, but unexciting couple who, apart from attending diplomatic functions, appear to have nothing to do.

Turkey.

Fatin Rustu Zorlu.

Consul-general, Beirut.

About 35. He and his wife are a very pleasant couple. Both talk fluent French, and are easy to get on with. Mme. Zorlu is the daughter of Tefik Rüstü Aras, the former Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and ambassador in London, and she speaks some English.

His position is inevitably a little difficult so long as his Government refrain from recognising the Levant States, but he has, nevertheless, made a good position for himself locally.

The Damascus legation has a chargé d'affaires, Mr. W. Porter, who is not accredited to the Lebanon. He is on very good terms with our legation and has always shown himself co-operative. He is young—about 32—and a little excitable.

(B.)

Czechoslovakia.

M. M. J. Pritel.

Chanceller and acting vice-consul.

A harassed little man who has been here for many years, and, as he is never tired of emphasising, remained loyal to the Allies during the Vichy period here.

Greece.

M. D. Kypréos (Beirut).

Consul-general.

M. Kypréos was consul-general in Beirut from 1939 to 1942, and during the Vichy period here co-operated loyally with our consulate-general at some risk to himself. He was transferred against his will in 1942 through political intrigue, but recovered his post by similar methods in 1945. He has an anti-Soviet complex and delights in ferreting out Soviet intrigues, on which subject (as on most others) he is very voluble and a crashing bore.

His wife is musical and has much charm.

Switzerland.

M. H. Blanchard.

Vice-consul.

Pleasant and well-disposed; was helpful to our security authorities during the war period.

Unmarried.

The Lebanese Government have sent a chargé d'affaires to Berne and it is reported that the Swiss Government are about to reciprocate.

Yugoslavia.

M. Branislav.

Vice-consul.

Transjordan.

Beehir Bey Shureiqi.

Consul.

Is being recalled, but his successor has not yet been appointed.

(C.)

Turkey.

Ahmed Omar.

(Turkish Consul, Damascus.)

Born about 1896. Married. Holds rank of consul though the post is a consulate-general. He is accepted by the Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and invited to official functions despite the fact that Turkey has not yet recognised Syria. Not very intelligent but gets on well with his colleagues and with Syrians; entertains extensively; speaks no English.

[E 1211/1211/89]

No. 14

Mr. Shone to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 11th February.)

(No. 13.)

Sir,

Beirut, 21st January, 1946.

RECENT reports from Middle Eastern posts suggest that events in Azerbaijan and Iraqi Kurdistan have created a suspicion in certain Middle-Eastern circles that the Soviet Government may have embarked on a long-term policy designed to encircle Turkey by fomenting nationalist and separatist

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movements amongst the minorities on either side of Turkey's southern, eastern and south-eastern frontiers, particularly amongst the Kurds and Armenians. It may therefore be worth while to place on record the little information so far obtainable on this subject as regards Syria.

2. The Kurdish community in the Levant States may number upwards of 200,000 (no accurate figures are available), many of whom are now more or less assimilated to the local population. Very few are in the Lebanon; there are small colonies in the main Syrian towns; but the great majority live in tribal groups in the area along the eastern half of the Syro-Turkish frontier, where they are intermingled with Bedouins and Turkomans. These tribal groups, who are engaged in agriculture and kindred pursuits, are backward and mostly illiterate, and are wholly dominated by their Aghas (tribal chiefs) and Mureddin (the religious and learned class). While their leaders are apt to complain on occasion, as do most other minorities, that the Syrian authorities discriminate against them, they have not so far shown any tendency to develop a separatist movement; and although they have of late been taking increased interest in the affairs of the Kurdish communities on the other side of the Turkish frontier, there is no evidence that they have any close connexion with the Kurds in Iraq or Persia. How far the force of attraction might affect these isolated communities if the idea of a united Kurdistan became a reality, is a matter for speculation; at present the idea seems to have little or no appeal to them, and for the reasons given in paragraph 5 below their leaders are not attracted towards the Soviet Union.

3. Amongst the small Kurdish community in Damascus there are two factions entitled respectively the "Kurdish League" and the "Society of Salah Iddin." The former, led by the brothers Jeladat and Kamaran Badr Khan, are professed partisans of the formation of an autonomous Kurdish State; it is this faction which produced the pamphlet enclosed in Beirut Chancery letter of the 3rd October, 1945. The latter faction are concerned with reviving the Kurdish language and with raising the status of Kurds in the countries of their domicile, but do not appear inclined to exchange their present situation for a problematical Kurdistan.

4. Amongst the Damascus Kurdish community there exists a well-organised band of thugs, available for hire for any illegal activities. This band was reported before the events of May 1945 to have been hired to create incidents between the French and the Syrians.

5. The leader of the Lebanese Communist party, Khalid Bagdash, is of Kurdish origin but received his training in Moscow. Although his name was recently mentioned in a secret report from Bagdad in connexion with Russian intrigues amongst the Kurds, there is no evidence that he has ever devoted himself to his own community or enjoys any special influence amongst them; he appears to be a Communist first, a Lebanese next, and a Kurd last. Communism has little chance of spreading amongst the Kurdish tribal groups in present circumstances, since the leaders and learned class referred to above are wholly opposed to a doctrine which would in the end destroy their own influence and position. There is no evidence that it is any more popular amongst the more sophisticated Kurdish colonies in the Syrian towns. There have been vague rumours of Soviet approaches to the Kurds, but no details have come to light and no particular pro-Soviet sympathies seem as yet perceptible, even amongst the town Kurds; Kamaran Badr Khan, in a recent conversation with the Oriental Secretary, showed plainly that his hopes were pinned on eventual British support for the Kurdish movement. But the Kurdish leaders in Damascus have expressed disappointment at British reticence on the subject of Kurdish aspirations, and it is possible that they may eventually turn towards Soviet Russia. Even were they to do so, however, their chances of organising a separatist movement amongst the relatively unimportant Kurdish community in Syria, appear at present to be remote.

6. The Armenians number some 120,000 in Syria and 70,000 in the Lebanon. The majority of these are refugees from persecution in Turkey, who came to the Levant States between 1922 and 1938, and strong anti-Turkish feeling is latent amongst them. They are for the most part artisans or workers in various forms of arts and crafts which are little practised by the other local inhabitants. Since their arrival they have received Syrian or Lebanese nationality and in the majority of cases have established themselves in their trade and are making a satisfactory living. Recently both the Syrian and the Lebanese Governments have made particular efforts to convince the respective Armenian communities that they have nothing to fear and that their skill and industry are in fact welcomed. The Armenians have, moreover, vivid memories of their sufferings in Turkey, and,

therefore, desire above all to live in harmony with the surrounding population and to avoid calling attention to themselves by engaging in any political activities of which that population might disapprove. The Armenian Catholics, who form about 25 per cent. of the Syrian Armenians, and who, having been particularly protected and worked on by the French, have been less completely absorbed into the Syrian State than the Orthodox majority, are particularly concerned not to endanger their position in the highly nationalist State in which they may have to live.

7. The *Tass* message referred to in Moscow telegram No. 5193 of the 4th December, 1945, advertising facilities for Armenians to immigrate into Soviet Armenia, aroused some excitement amongst the Armenians, especially in Aleppo, where the press for a few days published a number of comments on the subject. One such comment was that, while many Armenians preferred to stay where they were, some of the younger ones might wish to take advantage of this Soviet offer. The broadcast from Erivan on the 7th December, 1945 (Moscow telegram No. 5326 of the 13th December) also had some effect in promoting racial pride amongst the Armenians; and pro-Russian rumours, including one that the Soviet Government intended to open a consulate-general in Aleppo, and another that the Syrian Government were to be asked to accept a Soviet Armenian representative, began to circulate, though subsequently denied.

8. At least two of the political divisions amongst the Armenians are more or less permeated by Soviet influence, which can readily appeal to their hatred of Turkey; and many Armenians belong to the local Communist parties, which, in fact, find their principal supporters amongst the Armenian community. Nevertheless, the excitement aroused by the *Tass* message and the Erivan broadcast was short-lived, doubtless for the reasons given in paragraph 6 above; and it was soon afterwards announced in the Aleppo press that a large gathering of Armenians had been urged by speakers to remain where they were. Similar results were reported at meetings held amongst the Lebanese Armenians. It should be added that many Armenians who might have welcomed an opportunity to return to their former homelands in the north-eastern vilayets of Turkey probably had little enthusiasm for the offer of emigration to unknown Soviet Armenia.

9. While, therefore, there are no serious signs at present of separatist or subversive movements, Soviet-sponsored or otherwise, amongst either the Armenians or the Kurds in the Levant States, these communities, particularly the Armenians, would clearly provide the readiest instrument to the Soviet hand should the Soviet Government decide to embark on a forward policy in the Levant States. As previously reported from this post, however, this does not yet seem to be the case: the Soviet Legations in Beirut and Damascus still appear to be concerned rather to inform themselves of every detail of the local situation than to engage in any positive activities. There are, indeed, no signs of active Soviet propaganda anywhere in the Levant States, except in so far as the activities of the local Communist parties can be said to be Soviet-inspired. Fear and mistrust of Soviet Russia are as strong as ever amongst the tribal leaders, feudal landlords, and merchants who are still chiefly responsible for forming public opinion in both States. The events of Azerbaijan came, however, as a rude shock, and undoubtedly created a considerable impression amongst these classes, who saw Soviet influence spreading so much the nearer to them and were quick to foresee that it might spread still further. The present dissatisfaction with French, and to some extent with British, policy in the Levant States makes it not inconceivable that some elements might eventually come to argue that Soviet influence was bound to come anyway, and might be harnessed in support of Syrian and Lebanese national aspirations, with which the Soviet Government are believed to sympathise.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo, Bagdad and Tehran, the High Commissioner for Palestine and Trans-jordan at Jerusalem, His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, and the British Middle East Office, Cairo.

I have, &c.
TERENCE SHONE.

[E 1209/2/89]

No. 15

Mr. Shone to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 11th February.)

(No. 15.)

Sir,

Beirut, 26th January, 1946.

I REGRET that owing to constant pressure of work, both here and in Damascus, it has not yet proved possible to supplement the weekly summaries

with a general review of the events of the last six months in the Levant States, which would bring the story up to date since my despatch No. 161 of the 25th August, 1945.

2. I have, however, compiled a short note on the present situation in Syria, which I have the honour to transmit herewith.

3. I am sending copies to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Cairo and Bagdad, to the High Commissioner for Palestine, to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda and to the Middle East Office in Cairo.

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

Enclosure in No. 15

Notes on the Situation in Syria.

SINCE October last the Government has been under the control of Saadullah Bey Jabri, a Nationalist and Francophobe, who is hot-tempered and apt to take sudden and ill-advised decisions, from which he cannot later withdraw without loss of face and without risk of being overthrown by the violently Nationalist and Francophobe Chamber of Deputies. Being Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence, as well as Prime Minister, he has far too much to do himself; he is difficult with subordinates, and the Syrian Ministries are in any case sadly lacking in capable officials. The Chamber of Deputies is divided into small groups, in which not only party but also personal rivalries play a large part.

2. The President, although he is also a fervent Nationalist who makes no secret of his hatred for the French, is a man of more reasonable views and statesmanlike outlook than the Prime Minister. Although he often asserts that he wishes the French to retain no interests in Syria, he probably realises that there must be some eventual settlement of outstanding questions with France, but only on the same basis as with other Powers. Unfortunately, his health has been far from good lately, and he is no longer able to exercise the same firm control over affairs as he did.

3. There is much criticism of the régime throughout the country, and considerable feeling that a monarchy would be more satisfactory than the republican form of government, which, *inter alia*, is criticised as a French importation. In certain regions, *e.g.*, the Jebel Druse and the Alawite territory, the extent to which the Government writ will continue to run after the withdrawal of British forces from Syria will depend on the pitch of efficiency to which the Syrian security forces can be brought. In Aleppo there is much jealousy of Damascus and much criticism of "government by Damascenes," although the Prime Minister comes of an Aleppan family. His Majesty's Consul in Aleppo reports that the recent intensification of anti-French measures there (*e.g.*, the placing of a guard on the house of M. Fauquenot, the French "assistant delegate," and the closure of French schools) has, by giving the impression that the Government is adopting a firm policy towards France, done much to stop criticism of its failures in other ways and to increase its prestige, which had already reached a very low ebb. Homs and Hama are strong Nationalist centres with many unruly elements amongst the population, and there is considerable monarchist feeling in both places. Apart from tribal dissatisfaction with the central Government, of which there have been signs of late, the danger of inter-tribal clashes is ever present. The Prime Minister recently spoke forcibly to the commander-in-chief and me of the inadequacy of the Syrian security forces in numbers, training and equipment—compared, for example, with those of Iraq—to ensure the maintenance of order in a country with such long frontiers and so many internal security problems. They had, he said, more than enough to cope with, apart from the difficulties created by the continued presence of the French in Syria.

4. The President appointed Saadullah Jabri to be Prime Minister last October, because he was the only man who was likely to command enough support in the Chamber to keep a Government in office for any length of time. Fares Bey el-Khoury, the elderly Christian Prime Minister who had headed the Syrian Delegation to San Francisco and is now leading the delegation to the United Nations Conference in London, had failed in this respect; Jamil Bey Mardam,

who has had more experience and understanding of diplomacy than any other potential Syrian leader, and who was Acting Prime Minister during the long absence of Fares-el-Khoury, was not invited to form a Cabinet although he would have been ready to do so. He had been criticised for his handling of the situation during and after the events of May and June; he is not much trusted by his compatriots, largely because he is less intransigent than most other Nationalists, and more disposed to settle matters in a conciliatory way; he has at times been reported to have toyed with the monarchical idea and to have had a line out to the Emir Abdullah of Transjordan; and he is regarded by many as an intriguer and a somewhat slippery customer. When Saadullah Jabri became Prime Minister, Jamil Mardam was sent as Syrian Minister to Cairo, where he has been playing a leading rôle in the affairs of the Arab League and has gained considerable prestige. Apart from these three politicians, the only other possible Prime Ministers appear to be Khaled-el-Azm, Dr. Kayali and Lutfi Haffar; none would be likely to command a majority in the Chamber.

5. There can be no doubt that the appointment of Saadullah Jabri, who at once made it clear, even in October, that he intended to do all he could to make the lives of the French remaining in Syria a burden to them, and, in particular, to prevent, in so far as he was able, all movement on their part except away from Syria, has given rise to more difficulties—for instance, as regards French convoys under British escort or in the matter of the French schools—than would have been experienced with, say, Jamil Mardam as Prime Minister. But there was no alternative to Saadullah Jabri in October and there seems to be no alternative now. Even Saadullah Jabri only secured a vote of confidence in the Chamber in the main debate on the Anglo-French Agreement by declining to give them a lead after he had, under pressure from us, made some effort to defend it largely against his own feelings.

6. It was reliably reported at that time that the President and Prime Minister had threatened the Chamber with dissolution. If the Chamber were dissolved, it is unlikely that fresh elections would greatly change its complexion; its colour would not be less Nationalist; and, pending elections, the present Government would have to carry on, if perhaps in somewhat easier conditions owing to the absence of constant pressure from the extremists in the Chamber. The main trouble with the Syrians is that they seem only capable of uniting, in so far as they can unite, *against* something (particularly against the continued presence of the French in the Levant and Jewish aspirations in Palestine), and not for constructive purposes.

7. The present session of the Chamber comes to an end shortly, but it is always possible for the Deputies to insist on an extraordinary session. If the present Government fell and another Prime Minister were found who could obtain a vote of confidence, he would only be able to remain in office by pandering to the extremists in the Chamber—not to mention the demonstrators outside and the Nationalist press. It seems, therefore, that we shall have to do the best we can with Saadullah Jabri, as long as he remains Prime Minister, using the President, in so far as may be possible, to exercise a restraining influence. It is fortunate that, despite the increasing difficulties referred to below, His Majesty's Legation and the British military authorities enjoy good relations with both.

8. It is, however, clear that the Anglo-French Agreement shook the confidence of the Syrians in Great Britain to a considerable extent; this, in turn, affected our influence with the Syrian authorities, particularly as regards questions involving the French.

9. It must be recorded, in fairness to the Syrians, that it is now nearly eight months since the events of last summer, the memories of which still rankle deeply and are not likely to be assuaged for years to come. During all this time the Syrian Government have pressed for the withdrawal of the French forces which, in their view and in that of most impartial witnesses of the events, had been guilty of a wholly unjustified use of force in so many of Syria's principal cities and towns and whose continued presence was not only hotly resented, but, in the opinion of the Syrian Government, had no longer any legal or moral basis. While there have been occasional attacks on Frenchmen—though none with fatal results since the weeks immediately following the British intervention—it is on the whole surprising that there have not been more incidents and provocations from the Syrian side. If this has been mainly due to the rapid and effective measures taken by the British military authorities in June and subsequently, and to the continued and unresented presence of British forces wherever Frenchmen still remain in Syria, it cannot be denied that the Syrian authorities have co-operated creditably in maintaining order, and that in circumstances of considerable difficulty. Their

gendarmerie suffered many casualties in the summer; the "Troupes Spéciales" transferred to them in July were, for the most part, of indifferent quality and often of doubtful loyalty; the equipment of these troops was poor and inadequate; above all, the Syrian Government lacked competent officers and administrative means to organise and train their security forces, while the extent to which it has been possible to assist them has been severely limited by political considerations.

10. During the weeks of waiting while the Anglo-French conversations were in progress, the Syrian Government accepted our counsels of patience and restraint, despite the provocations and intrigues in which they maintained the French were still indulging. There was great disappointment when I returned from London in October, after an absence of six weeks, without an assurance that agreement as regards evacuation had been reached. Difficulties arose over such matters as the entry of French vehicles into Syria, even under British escort; and the continued French control of Mezzé aerodrome was a particularly sore point. But the Syrian Government refrained, albeit under increasing pressure on our part, from actions likely to embarrass the British military authorities. The country, and even the Chamber of Deputies, remained calm, in expectation of an Anglo-French Agreement which would give Syria early satisfaction as regards the withdrawal of French troops; they were in no hurry to see the British forces go and only wanted to be certain that the British would not leave without the French.

11. The Syrians are not by nature the most patient of people, and, like many children, they are apt to cry for the moon. The first favourable reaction to the Anglo-French Agreement was short-lived; the attacks on it in the press and the Chamber, and on Great Britain for having concluded it, steadily increased in violence. Demonstrations in various parts of the country began to show an anti-British tendency for the first time, though they were mainly anti-French. From the President downwards, Syrians feared that the agreement represented the continued recognition by His Majesty's Government of a French zone of influence in the Levant; in both States the belief was universal that the French had no intention of quitting the Lebanon, at least; and the apprehension was widespread that, even if the terms of the agreement, as published, did not imply some engagement on the part of His Majesty's Government to support the claim of France to a strategic base in the Levant, there was some secret annex or understanding to that effect.

12. The Syrians will never willingly accept a French base in their country, and they will do all in their power to resist the grant to France of a base in the Lebanon, even if the Lebanese could be brought to accept one; because the vast majority of Syrians believe, despite anything the French may say, that France intends not merely to cling to the Lebanon but also to reimpose herself, if she can, in some form or other, on Syria.

13. Since the suspension of the military discussions in Beirut, the nature of the divergence between the British and French interpretations of the agreement has come, to some extent at least, to be realised; and while the press continues to inveigh against the agreement, its tone, in so far as Great Britain is concerned, is less violent, except for the Communist organs, because of the fervent hope that we shall insist upon the complete evacuation of both Levant States by all Allied forces. For the rest, the States look to the Arab League and the United States of America—with a sidelong glance at the Soviet Union—for support in the attitude they have adopted towards the agreement; and they no doubt hope that the United Nations Organisation will see to it that they are not placed again under the French wing. The Syrians attach much importance to the maintenance of a common front by the Lebanese and are gratified by the extent to which this has so far been achieved.

14. In the atmosphere of disappointment and apprehension caused by the Anglo-French Agreement, the sudden return of General Oliva Roget and the arrival of a small number of French troops on the *Sagittaire* had an electrical effect on an excitable people. The Syrian Government felt impelled to take immediate measures to prevent, in so far as they could, all French movement into Syria. The Prime Minister issued orders to the Syrian gendarmerie to stop and search French vehicles, even when accompanied by British escorts; any Frenchman found circulating in Syria would at once be arrested and handed over to the British military authorities. The latter could not acquiesce in the searching of vehicles under British escort which, the Prime Minister was told, must pass. He replied that he could not rescind his order but intimated that the frontier posts had been made aware that they were not expected to resist strong British escorts. The latter have had to be strengthened accordingly.

15. At the present time the main local Syrian grievances against the French may be summarised as follows:—

- (a) They maintain that the French are conducting organised intrigue and propaganda amongst their minorities and dissident elements, through the medium of the French personnel still in Syria or introduced into Syria either in British-escorted convoys or clandestinely, with the object of discrediting the present régime and of paving the way for an eventual resumption of French tutelage, if not indeed control, by spreading the belief that this will inevitably occur.
- (b) They therefore object to the continued presence in Syria of M. Fauquenot (whom they regard as an arch-intriguer) and of the remaining French political officers and garrisons (whom they regard as foci of intrigue); and to the movement into Syria of French convoys, which the British military escorts will not allow them to search and which they allege can therefore bring in agents and "undesirables."
- (c) They resent the continued French occupation of Mezzé aerodrome and (to a lesser degree) of other landing-grounds in East Syria, since the French are thereby enabled to fly their agents, and undesirables like Captain Boussiquet, about Syria without the Government being able to exercise any control over them; moreover, the Syrians desire to have free disposal of Mezzé aerodrome for civil air-traffic. The Syrians also object to the low flying over Damascus and other towns in which French aircraft have frequently indulged of late.
- (d) They fear that the recent arrival of a draft of French troops indicates that the French are not seriously contemplating evacuation but are thinking rather in terms of reinforcement.

16. Local French grievances against the Syrians are mainly on the subject of—

- (a) The Syrian refusal to allow their schools to open.
- (b) Constant venomous attacks on them in the press, which they consider the Government could prevent or at least mitigate if they chose.
- (c) Aggressions against their civil and military personnel, such as the attack on M. Fauquenot and various bomb-throwing and similar incidents, so far only minor ones, in Aleppo, Lattakia, and elsewhere.
- (d) In general, the French consider the Syrians not only unable but unwilling to ensure the protection of French lives and property.

17. As regards the aerodromes, the French maintain that much of the land and buildings, particularly at Mezzé, is French Government property, which can only be transferred to the Syrians as part of an eventual settlement.

18. It emerges from the above that, while the French have some concrete grounds for complaint against the Syrians, the latter's grievances are based almost entirely on fear and mistrust of French intentions. It is in the light of these fears, which (apart from more recent events) largely spring from the recollections of the French action in 1920 when they overthrew the Arab government of King Faisal from their base in the Lebanon, that the Syrian attitude and actions must be judged. So long as the French insist on an interpretation of the Anglo-French Agreement which seeks to eliminate British troops from the Levant States altogether whilst delaying indefinitely the date of their own military withdrawal, so long do they risk giving colour to these Syrian fears and therefore increasing the chances of an explosion.

[E 1593/2/89]

No. 16

Mr. Shone to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 21st February.)

(No. 186.)
(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, 20th February, 1946.

FIRST reaction in both Syria and the Lebanon to U.N.O. debate on the Levant problem seems mainly one of bewilderment, largely owing to incomplete and conflicting press reports of the proceedings.

2. It is reported from Syria that the result has been comparatively little discussed and that much greater interest has been taken in reported statements of M. Bidault to the London press correspondents, especially one to the effect

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that France considered she should provide any help the Levant States might require in connexion with security. The Syrian President informed member of my staff yesterday that he could form no opinion until he had seen the full text of the debates and of M. Bidault's conference, but that if the above-mentioned statement attributed to the latter was correct it only showed that the French had not and would never change. The Syrian Prime Minister has made some fiery statements to representative of the Colombia Broadcasting Corporation and has also strongly criticised to the United States Chargé d'Affaires the lukewarmness of the American attitude on the Levant question before U.N.O.

3. In the Lebanon opinions are likewise not yet formed, but so far the result is not taken too tragically. There has been some popular enthusiasm for Russia, which is being exploited by the vernacular press.

[E 1806/2/89]

No. 17

Mr. Shone to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 28th February.)

(No. 26.)

Sir,

Beirut, 10th February, 1946.

IN my despatch No. 15 of the 24th January, I enclosed a note on the situation in Syria, with special reference to internal political conditions, the disappointment and apprehension aroused by the Anglo-French agreement of the 13th December last, and the increasing tension resulting from the continued presence of French forces in Syria. I also referred to the growing difficulties experienced by the British military authorities in arranging for the necessary movements of French military personnel into Syria, on which I have reported in various recent telegrams. Since the above despatch was written, the appointment of General Monclar to command the French forces in the Levant has further exacerbated the Syrians and has thereby added greatly to our difficulties. Except for General Oliva Roget (or General Beynet himself) no more unfortunate appointment could have been made at this juncture.

2. The Syrian Prime Minister's reactions to General Monclar's appointment and his intention to visit French troops in Syria were reported in my telegram No. 140 of the 4th February. In my telegram No. 146 of the following day, I reported briefly on the interview which the General Officer Commanding British Troops, North Levant, and I had with the Syrian President and Prime Minister on the 5th February. Apart from General Monclar, the main points which they then raised were the relief of some 250 Senegalese troops at Mezzé aerodrome by a similar number from the Lebanon and some recent disturbances at Massiaf in the Alaouite territory, where several Syrian gendarmes had been killed and wounded in rounding up bandits. According to the Syrian Ministers, some of these bandits had confessed that they had organised three separate acts of violence to cut communications and disturb the area; and the Syrians are convinced that they were put up to this by the French, notably Captain Boussiquet, who is said to have supplied them with arms some five months ago. The Syrians stated that a quantity of these arms had been stored in a Jesuit monastery. The Prime Minister promised to furnish a report of the investigation into these alleged French activities; but this has not yet been received.

3. The demeanour of the President and Prime Minister (who had already blown off a good deal of steam on the above-mentioned subjects to His Majesty's Consul and the British Area Commander in Damascus) was amicable enough throughout the interview, despite some pretty plain speaking on the part of Major-General Pilleau and myself. They appeared to appreciate our difficulties in connexion with the continued presence of French forces in Syria and they again assured us of their intention to avoid any clash between the Syrian security forces and British troops. But they maintained that their own difficulties, in the face of public opinion in Syria, were even greater; and they made it clear that, short of armed resistance, they were determined to do all in their power to oppose General Monclar's movements. No Syrian Government, they said, could acquiesce in his entering Syria, where he was regarded as responsible for causing the deaths of many Syrians last May; and if we insisted on facilitating his visits to inspect the French troops in Syria, we alone must bear the responsibility and the odium.

4. The manner in which the Prime Minister and even the President now speak of their hatred and suspicion of the French makes it clear that their feelings, like those of other Syrian nationalists, verge on the pathological. The

months which have passed since the events of last May have only served to increase their impatience and their determination to be rid of the French. The Anglo-French agreement, particularly the clause referring to the re-grouping of French troops in the Lebanon, aroused again all their old suspicions of French intentions; the breakdown of the Anglo-French military discussions increased these suspicions. They now firmly believe that the French have no real intention of withdrawing from the Levant and that even if they withdrew from Syria, they would remain in Lebanon, from which, sooner or later, they would seize the opportunity to "teach the Syrians a lesson" and resume, if they could, their predominant position in Syria as well as Lebanon. They maintain that French propaganda is actively instilling this idea into people's minds and that French agents, often of Syrian or Lebanese nationality (some of whom they claim to have captured and put through the mill), are engaged in suborning opponents of the Syrian Government and in exciting the fears of the Christians and other minorities. They assert that Syrian workmen employed by the French military authorities at Mezzé aerodrome are being used in this way. They resent the continued French control of this aerodrome (on the 5th February the Prime Minister complained particularly that he had been unable, because of that control, even to find out when General Nuri el Said Pasha would arrive there). They complain with increasing bitterness of French persistence in refusing to agree to our furnishing the arms and equipment which alone can enable the Syrian security forces to keep order; this, they regard as part of a sinister French design to render the Government incapable of preventing some outbreak on which the French will seize as a pretext for intervention to restore order. In this frame of mind nothing will persuade them that General Oliva Roget's recent visit, the maintenance of M. Fauquenot at Aleppo, the arrival of French military and particularly air personnel by sea, even in small numbers, any considerable relief of French troops in Syria and General Monclar's appointment to the French command are anything else but deliberate provocations on the part of the French.

5. The President and the Prime Minister, when asked for evidence in support of their charges of subversive activities by the French, seldom do more than quote police reports, confessions of captured "agents," tapped telephone conversations, &c. It serves little purpose to urge them to treat such evidence objectively, still less to seek to disprove it, as they are incapable in their present mood of believing anything good of the French here, and to all intents and purposes impervious to argument in so far as they are concerned. Inasmuch as our own reports of the mentality of many Frenchmen here and of French propaganda in both Levant States lend colour to the Syrians' fears, the latter cannot be dismissed as wholly unreasonable. But the Syrian state of mind is certainly unreasoning as regards the French.

6. The Prime Minister who, as long ago as October last when he took office, proclaimed his intention of putting every difficulty he could in the way of the French who remained in Syria, has only been restrained by ever-increasing pressure on our part from implementing such measures as interference with French convoys even under British escort, cutting off French supplies of food, water and light, preventing Syrian citizens from serving the French in any capacity, &c. General Monclar's appointment has served to inflame feelings which have long been smouldering and to bring the Syrian Government a stage nearer open defiance. Beset as they are by internal difficulties and criticism, they cannot afford to show any "weakness" as regards the French.

7. On the 5th February the Prime Minister's attitude was one of exasperation mingled with despair. He said more than once that a "blood sacrifice" by Syrians might well be necessary to bring home to the world his country's protest against the continued presence of French forces under the command of a man whom the Syrian Government and countless Syrians regarded as a murderer. He had previously gone so far as to speak to Mr. Weld Forester and Colonel Morgan of trying to block General Monclar's path to Lattakia by crowds of women and children. When the futility of any action involving a "blood sacrifice" was put to him, he asked bitterly why an end was not made of the fiction of Syria's "independence"; he could do nothing against the superior forces of which we and the French disposed. His only defence in Parliament and the country could be that he had to bow to force. In another interview with Mr. Weld Forester he strung together a number of recent happenings, including His Majesty's Government's decision to "impose 1,500 Jewish immigrants per month into Palestine," and their reply to the Egyptian note on treaty revision; and he

remarked that it seemed as if the British were determined to make themselves hated by the Arabs.

8. I have thought it as well to quote these remarks of Saadullah Jabri's, as, even if all due allowance be made for oriental extravagance and rhetorical effect, they are such as to inspire real concern as to the measures he may take in a moment of temper or frustration. While he has probably, for the time being at all events, abandoned the idea of using women and children, he lost no time in despatching the head of the Syrian gendarmerie to Lattakia to organise at least a show of resistance to General Monclar by gendarmes. The result was evident on the 8th February, the day on which General Monclar had intended to make his visit. The Syrians had not been told that he had postponed it; and when a British truck arrived at the frontier a whistle was blown and some forty armed gendarmes took post across and on both sides of the road. On the following day some ten Syrian armoured cars were patrolling the road in the neighbourhood of Lattakia. If the British military authorities had in fact been compelled to escort General Monclar to Lattakia by road, it is by no means certain that even a strong British escort would have ensured the general's passage without incident, or even a series of incidents, along his route. The escort would certainly have been confronted with the most difficult situation which any escort has yet had to meet, and the conditions in which the maintenance and movements of French personnel in Syria have now to be assured, against the declared opposition of the Syrian Government, are likely to impose increasing strain on all concerned.

9. Happily, the relations between the British civil and military authorities and Syrian officials (not least the head of the gendarmerie) are still in general excellent, and the British forces are little, if any, less popular than they have always been with the Syrian people. It is largely thanks to this that it has been possible to smooth over the many difficulties which have arisen, especially during the last few weeks, and which might, in different circumstances, have led to unfortunate incidents. But this goodwill can be stretched too far; and if British troops were to be involved in a clash with the Syrians, particularly when escorting General Monclar, the effect in Syria, where we would be accused of lining up with the French, would be deplorable. The repercussions might well be far-reaching.

10. The recent difficulties between French and Syrians in Lattakia, reported in my despatch No. 16 of the 26th January, were smoothed over by tactful handling; but feeling runs very high there, and the reappearance of General Monclar, of whose past activities in that area the Syrian Government have constantly complained, would inevitably be hotly resented in Syria. A visit by the general to Aleppo—which no doubt he would have wished to make next—would be a further cause of anxiety and almost certainly of serious disturbances, as he was in command there last May and threatened at one moment to bombard the city.

11. Major-General Pilleau and I were convinced that it would have been fruitless to ask either General Monclar or General Beynet to forgo such visits merely because of the Syrians' attitude. There can be no doubt that many Frenchmen here would be by no means sorry to see us forced into the position of lining up with them against the Syrians. The young French officer at Lattakia, referred to in my despatch No. 16 of the 26th January, is a case in point. When the Commander-in-chief, Middle East Forces, and I last saw General Beynet, he agreed that it was desirable to avoid incidents with the Syrians; and, in fact, the French have shown praiseworthy restraint in the face of the Syrians' treatment of their schools and the recent attack on M. Fauquenot, in which the Syrians, if not wholly, were, on all the evidence, mainly at fault. But General Beynet then remarked that it was sometimes wise "to show one's teeth"; he doubted whether enough had been done in this way, but the matter was beyond his competence. On the particular point of the right of General Monclar to visit French troops, I have no doubt that he would have looked to us to see General Monclar through thick or thin.

12. In the circumstances, I felt I had no alternative but to telegraph to you in the hope that M. Bidault might be moved to do something to ease conditions which are so embarrassing and potentially dangerous. I regret having had to take such action with regard to a French officer with a fine fighting war record, including service with the British forces in Norway, who rallied at once to General de Gaulle, and who takes evident pride in his British decorations. I have not myself seen much of General Monclar, beyond exchanging courtesy visits. But by all accounts he is both touchy and hot-tempered and the type of man most likely to have recourse to ill-considered use of strong-arm methods. In any

case, the Syrians' attitude towards him is such that his continued presence here as commander of the French forces can only militate against an eventual Franco-Syrian settlement, quite apart from the local difficulties which it creates for the British authorities.

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

[E 1872/2/89]

No. 18

Mr. Shone to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 1st March.)

(No. 33.)

Sir,

Beirut, 19th February, 1946.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 10th January the Syrian Chamber of Deputies passed by unanimous vote a law for the abolition of the administrative autonomy of the Mohafazat of Lattakia, of which the following is a translation:—

Article 1.—The financial administrative autonomy of the Alawite Mountain Mohafazat, as determined by Decision No. 23 of the 21st January, 1942, and laws arising out of this decision shall be abolished. All laws and regulations in force in the various Syrian Mohafazats shall apply to the Mohafazat of Lattakia from the 1st January, 1946.

Article 2.—Until specific establishments are laid down and the final classification is completed, the special establishment of the Lattakia Mohafazat shall continue to apply, and the salary of officials shall be paid on this basis.

Article 3.—Reserve funds of the Lattakia Mohafazat shall be assigned to an "exceptional works enterprise," which will be carried out in the above-mentioned Mohafazat on the understanding that a special fund be provided for such work in the national budget.

Article 4.—The Ministers of the State are responsible for the execution of this law.

2. The genesis of this measure is worthy of record. On the 19th December last, during a debate in the Syrian Chamber on the abolition of the Councils of the Syrian Mohafazats (a record of which was enclosed in Beirut Chancery letter of the 1st January), a Deputy enquired whether the Mohafazat of Lattakia was included in the proposals. The Minister of the Interior replied that it was not; whereupon, at the suggestion of an Alawite Nationalist Deputy, a resolution was passed for the abolition of the financial and administrative autonomy of the Alawite Mohafazat. The Government were then asked to prepare a draft Bill putting the resolution into effect. This Bill has now become, in the circumstances described in paragraph 1 above, Law No. 233 of the 15th January, 1946.

3. I learn that the decision to pass this law, while welcomed in Lattakia by the Nationalists, who are mostly Sunnis and represent not more than 20 per cent. of the population of the Mohafazat, has caused considerable dissatisfaction and misgivings among the Alawite and Christian majority. Government officials fear that they may now be posted to other parts of Syria, where they have no desire to go, and where they fear that their position as Christian or Alawite officials among a Moslem population might be difficult. The impression is also current that the Syrian Government may eventually split up the Mohafazat and join portions of it to neighbouring Moslem Mohafazats in order to weaken the influence of the Alawites. The most general objection is, however, that the territory may in future be deprived of some of the benefits of its revenues.

4. The view has also been widely expressed that the action of the Chamber of Deputies in abolishing the autonomy of the Mohafazat of Lattakia was high-handed and even unconstitutional. It is argued that the resolution of the 19th December was passed without Deputies having been given an opportunity to study its terms, and that the autonomy of the Mohafazat can only be terminated by a resolution of the Alawite Provincial Council itself (in the case of the abolition of the autonomy of the Jebel Druze, which is held to furnish a precedent, a resolution by the Druze Council for the integration of the Mohafazat with the rest of Syria was presented to, and adopted by, the Syrian Chamber of Deputies). There has been talk at various times during the past two years of the Alawite Council adopting some such motion, but the strength of the Alawite and Christian

elements has always been sufficient to make the Mohafez and the Nationalist partisans of the abolition of autonomy hesitate before proceeding with it. When the resolution for abolition was passed in the Syrian Chamber on the 19th December only two non-Moslem Alawite Deputies happened to be present, and they both declared subsequently that the nationalist feeling during the sitting was so strong that it would have been impossible for them to make any protest without endangering their lives.

5. The integration of the Alawites' territory into Syria is undoubtedly a logical step towards the accomplishment of the internal unity of the State. Its results will largely depend on the degree of moderation and common sense with which the Central Government handle the affairs of the territory in the future. The feudal Alawite chieftains and their followers, with a long tradition behind them of virtual freedom from control, and with their more recent memories of support by the French against the Syrian Government, would be unlikely to consent passively to any abrupt extension of full governmental authority to their areas, were this to be attempted. On the other hand, since the events of last May, and the subsequent confinement of the French garrison in the territory, the Syrian Government have been enabled gradually to reassert control and to re-establish gendarmerie posts, while the new Mohafez is endeavouring to arrange a settlement of the thorny problem of Suleiman Mursheid's land-cases (see my despatch No. 45 of 1945). Provided that the Government ride the chieftains on a light rein, refrain from any excessive introduction of their personnel in the local administration, and are careful not to allow grounds for suspicion that they are exercising discrimination against the Alawites as regards either administrative benefits or the allocation of Government posts, it should be possible for them to maintain order and to bring the territory within the aegis of their control; especially if the withdrawal of Allied troops convinces the Alawite leaders that they can no longer hope for foreign support against the Government. Failing such moderation, however, this remote and turbulent territory, the rugged nature of which favours guerrilla outbreaks and hampers the deployment of such regular forces as the Syrian Government are likely to command, will always be liable to disturbance.

I have, &c.
TERENCE SHONE

[E 2088/2088/88]

No. 19

Mr. Shone to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 7th March.)

(No. 34.)
Sir,

Beirut, 21st February, 1946.

I HAVE the honour to report that a large-scale movement of unrest recently began amongst industrial workers in the Lebanon. Representatives of the employees of the Electricity and Tramway Company, the Damascus-Haifa-Prolongement Railway, the Banque de Syrie, and other large concerns addressed to their employers demands for considerable increases, averaging in most cases at least 50 per cent., in cost-of-living bonus, on the ground that the constantly rising cost of living had made it impossible for the employees, particularly the lower paid ones, to live. The Shell and other oil companies, who must be counted enlightened employers and who were known to be envisaging certain increases of bonus, were not seriously affected.

2. A number of the syndicates of workers in these various industries are federated into one organisation, the president of which is a certain Mustafa Ariss. This man, a young Lebanese Communist who recently attended the World Trades Union Congress in Paris, was several times imprisoned by the French Mandatory and Vichy authorities for Communist activities. He appears to wield considerable influence amongst the workers, and his recent activities have been directed towards organising a general strike with the object of enforcing their demands.

3. The Lebanese Government's initial reaction to the strike threat was to refuse permission to the concessionary companies, which are under their control, to increase wages. Ariss was also summoned by the Sureté and instructed to cease organising a strike; he refused and has since been openly abusing the Government. The President and the Acting Minister of the Interior both informed a member of my staff on the 12th February that they would not allow the general strike to take place, and were prepared to take any measures required, such as the picketing of industrial establishments by gendarmerie and military personnel,

in order to protect blacklegs, of whom they seemed to believe there were many. Their view was that they were not unsympathetic towards the justified demands of the workers, but could not bow to coercion. Later, however, after the Prime Minister had received a petition from the federation, the Government decided to adopt a more conciliatory attitude. They still maintained their objection to any general increases of wages or allowances, on the ground that, in so small a country as the Lebanon, such increases could only result in a further cost-of-living spiral; but they decided to seek alternative methods of giving at least some satisfaction to the workers.

4. The Acting Minister of the Interior accordingly received federation delegates on the 14th February, and after a long discussion reached agreement with them on the basis that the strike would not be called but that certain general measures to improve the lot of industrial workers would be pursued; these included the creation of co-operative stores; the provision of cheap bread; the grant of allowances for needy workers; the formation of a commission including representatives of the Government and of the workers' syndicates to examine the workers' demands; and the prompt ratification of certain labour legislation at present before the Chamber. During the discussions the Government representatives refused to receive Ariss, and their refusal was accepted without protest by the syndicate representatives, who seem now to believe that Ariss had over-played his hand and was endangering their case.

5. So far as I can judge, some improvement in the conditions of the lowest-paid workers, at least, is overdue. The cost of living, after a tendency to fall last summer, has again been rising in the last three months; and there is little doubt that daily-paid unskilled workers, for example, nowadays exist dangerously near the starvation limit when they have families to support. I am informed that at the meeting referred to in the preceding paragraph the workers' representatives showed clearly that they attached most importance to the provision of co-operatives. The measures now promised should afford sensible relief to the most deserving cases, provided that they are carried out.

6. While the threatened strike seems to have been averted for the present by the Government's action, the recent agitation has shown that the industrial workers in the Lebanon are now considerably better organised than at any time in the past. It is noteworthy that this improved organisation has coincided with increased activity on the part of the local Communist party, on which I am reporting separately.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo, and the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.
TERENCE SHONE.

[E 2272/2088/88]

No. 20

Mr. Shone to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 14th March.)

(No. 39.)
Sir,

Beirut, 27th February, 1946.

DURING the past few weeks there have been indications of increased Communist activity in the Lebanon. Communist demonstrations in Beirut, Tripoli, Zahlé, and elsewhere, are being organised with increasing frequency, and on a scale which is obviously beyond the means of the local branches. Reports from the provinces suggest that the party's membership is rising and that branches are being formed in many villages where formerly none existed. Improved solidarity amongst industrial workers (see my despatch No. 34 of the 21st February) is generally ascribed to Communist organisers; it is reliably reported that the increase in the space allotted to Soviet activities in the local press is due to pressure on newspaper proprietors by the Typesetters' Union, which is strongly permeated by communism. Incidentally, this union, by refusing to allow its members to work for the Parti Populaire Syrien (on which party, as you will be aware from previous reports from this post, the local Communist party has waged unremitting warfare for the past two years), has effectually prevented the party from commencing publication of its recently authorised organ.

2. The Lebanese Government, while disquieted by these manifestations of Communist activity, have so far hesitated to repress them, doubtless for fear of offending Soviet Russia and thus losing her support in the international field.

3. The Communist party and the organ they control have naturally made the most of the unequivocal support given by the Soviet delegate to the United Nations' Assembly to the Syrian and Lebanese appeal for the evacuation of Allied troops. They have circulated many thousands of copies of M. Vyshinski's speech, and the *Saut-esh-Shaab* and other Communist papers have unremittingly stressed that Soviet Russia alone had emerged as the champion of the States against the "imperialist Powers."

4. Lebanese public opinion on communism is still divided. The feudal landowners; the merchants and the *intelligentsia*, who between them direct public opinion, are still generally opposed to communism, either because its spread would destroy their own privileges and influence, or (in the case of Moslem) because its tenets are held to be incompatible with those of Islam. Since the Deputies are without exception drawn from these classes, no single one of them is known to have Communist tendencies. On the other hand, an increasing number of middle-class Lebanese of some education, particularly Christians, appear to be now flirting with communism, partly through disgust at the manifest inefficiency and corruption of the independent Lebanese Administration, partly because of the general tendency to confuse communism with Soviet Russia. The numerically strongest element in the Lebanese Communist party, however, still remains the Armenians, who are at the same time its toughest adherents; and if the recent appeal from Erivan should be followed by a mass exodus of Lebanese Armenians, the party's influence would be reduced even more than its members.

5. Admiration for Soviet Russia is, however, more widespread than ever before and is rapidly increasing. The average Lebanese is always liable to espouse the cause of what he believes to be the strongest power; hence the tendency to transfer the sympathies successively manifested for France and for Great Britain to Soviet Russia in the belief, not untinged with fear, that she will have the final word in the destinies of the Middle East. Several notables visited the Soviet Legation after the debate in the United Nations' Security Council to express thanks for the Soviet delegate's intervention; and although some politicians profess to see through the motives behind the Soviet attitude, the man in the street is undoubtedly impressed with the advantages to be gained from Soviet support. The Lebanese press, as a whole, is devoting a steadily increasing proportion of its space to items and articles with a Soviet flavour, and though this may be attributed partly to pressure from the Typesetters' Union (see paragraph 1 above), it is evident that editors appreciate an increased public demand for information about Soviet policy and activities.

6. The Communist organs, *Saut-esh-Shaab* and *Jhaghovourti Tzain*, on whose activities I reported in my despatch No. 71 of the 6th May, 1945, besides publicising the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all its works, have since the publication of the Anglo-French agreement on the Levant, adopted an uncompromisingly hostile line to Great Britain. They lose no chance of emphasising that the agreement has shown up the insincerity of Great Britain's intentions towards the States, and her "colonial designs" on them in connivance with France; and Great Britain's policy and actions in world affairs are systematically attacked on the lines which are all too familiar in other parts of the world. The *Saut-esh-Shaab* was recently suspended for a few days by the Lebanese Government for having exceeded all bounds in its attacks on the States' Governments for not showing a firmer resistance to Great Britain and France, but has now been allowed to reappear.

7. The propaganda lines adopted by the Communist party in meetings and private contacts are as follows: The Arab world will continue to be the playground of rival imperialisms until it unites in resistance against its old masters. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the most powerful State interested in the Middle East, is ready to ally herself with the Arabs for this purpose. She is determined never again to allow the Middle East to be used as a base against her; hence she must liquidate British influence there. This has all but been accomplished in Persia; she will next then bring pressure on Turkey by sponsoring a Kurdish autonomous movement; and, lastly, the workers in the Levant States, and then in other Arab countries, will be assisted to establish régimes controlled by themselves and opposed to British influence.

8. Apart from this adoption by the local Communists of what appear to be standard party lines from Moscow, there is still little evidence that the Soviet Legation exercise direct control over them, though it is generally believed locally that this is the case; while the Soviet Legation, apart from their sensitiveness of the local press, reported in my savingram No. 17 of the 31st January, appear to confine their contacts with the local governments to routine diplomatic representations designed either to protect Soviet interests (*e.g.*, Russian Orthodox

properties) or to keep themselves informed of the policy and intentions of the local governments.

9. In conclusion, I should perhaps mention reports which have reached this legation from time to time that the Lebanon has now become the centre for Soviet-directed Communist activities throughout the Middle East. The only direct evidence in support of this is provided by information received from the Palestine Government, and a statement by my Iraqi colleague, that the Communist pamphlets distributed in Palestine and Iraq respectively emanate from Beirut; though I have heard a story that an obscure Communist newspaper in Cairo, in commenting on a labour dispute there, expressed regret that the workers, of whose methods it disapproved, "should have to take their directives from Beirut." Communist activities in the Lebanon certainly seem to be on a larger scale than in Syria; though this can perhaps be explained by the greater resistance of the Syrians to anything savouring of foreign intrigue, a resistance which was recently shown by the anti-Communist demonstration in Damascus reported in Beirut Chancery letter No. 105/4/46 of the 25th January. I should be interested to learn whether His Majesty's Representatives in neighbouring Arab countries, to whom I am sending a copy of this despatch, have any corroborative evidence of the reports referred to above.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo, Bagdad, Moscow, Paris and Ankara, and to the High Commissioner for Palestine, Jerusalem.

I have, &c.
TERENCE SHONE.

[E 2710/74/88]

No. 21

Mr. Duff Cooper to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 26th March.)

(No. 232.)

Sir,

Paris, 22nd March, 1946.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 245, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of an aide-mémoire which has been handed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Lebanese Legation in Paris, and which has been communicated to me for information by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

2. It will be seen that the 1st April, 1947, has been given as the ultimate date for the withdrawal of all French troops stationed in the Lebanon. The aide-mémoire goes on to ask for the support and co-operation of the Lebanese Government in providing labour and other services in connexion with the evacuation. If the Lebanese Government is prepared to meet the French demands the French Government consider that it would be possible to evacuate all combatant troops by the 31st August, leaving only thirty officers and about 300 technicians to supervise the checking and transport of the remaining material. These could be withdrawn before the end of the year. The aide-mémoire concludes by stating that the French Government is desirous of withdrawing the greater part of the combatant troops before the 30th June. It will be for the Franco-Lebanese staff to propose to the French Command measures for putting this intention into effect.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to Beirut, Cairo, Middle East Office and Washington.

I have, &c.
DUFF COOPER.

Enclosure in No. 21

CONFORMEMENT aux vues exposées par le Conseil de Sécurité et suivant l'adhésion donnée le 17 février dernier par M. Bidault et M. Bevin, les experts militaires français et anglais se sont réunis à Paris pour établir le plan d'évacuation du Liban. Le Président de la délégation française a reçu pour instructions de préparer l'évacuation des troupes françaises dans les plus courts délais possibles, compte tenu des moyens matériels dont le Commandement disposerait sur place. Ainsi que le Gouvernement libanais en a été informé, c'est la date du 1^{er} avril 1947 qui sur cette base a été prévue par les experts militaires français comme

dernière limite pour le retrait de la totalité des troupes françaises stationnées au Liban.

Cette première étude une fois terminée, le Ministère a pris contact avec la délégation libanaise, présidée par son Excellence M. Hamid Frangie, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, pour chercher dans quelle mesure les délais prévus par les techniciens pourraient être abrégés et aménagés, compte tenu de moyens et facilités supplémentaires qui seraient offerts par le Gouvernement libanais. C'est dans cet esprit que le Gouvernement français demande l'appui et la collaboration du Gouvernement libanais, notamment en ce qui concerne :

1°. De la part des Services publics : le concours de la gendarmerie, de la police, des organes administratifs, et la mise à la disposition du Commandement français de contingents de travailleurs, dont les autorités militaires auraient besoin pour le conditionnement, le transbordement et l'embarquement du matériel.

2°. De la part de l'armée libanaise : la fourniture des moyens matériels nécessaires, d'une certaine main-d'œuvre, d'équipes spécialisées, et de la prise en charge, sur la demande des autorités françaises, de tous les services de garde qui pourraient lui être passés.

Pour assurer une liaison constante entre le Commandement français et le Commandement libanais, le Gouvernement français considère qu'il serait désirable de constituer un Etat-Major franco-libanais, qui aurait pour mission d'assister les deux Commandements et de les renseigner sur les progrès des opérations d'évacuation.

Sur la base d'une pleine et efficace collaboration et sous réserve de l'adhésion du Gouvernement libanais au programme exposé dans les trois paragraphes précédents, le Gouvernement français pourrait abréger de manière très sensible les délais prévus par les experts militaires. L'ensemble des troupes combattantes serait en pareil cas évacué du Liban à la date du 31 août prochain, de telle sorte qu'il ne subsisterait plus qu'un groupe de 30 officiers et d'environ 300 techniciens pour assurer le contrôle et le transport du matériel. Le départ de ce dernier contingent s'effectuerait avant la fin de l'année.

Pour répondre au souhait exprimé par le Gouvernement libanais, le Gouvernement français est désireux d'assurer le retrait du gros des troupes combattantes avant le 30 juin 1946. Il appartiendra à l'Etat-Major franco-libanais de proposer au Commandement français, compte tenu des conditions matérielles et du progrès des opérations, les mesures propres à faciliter la réalisation d'un tel programme.

Direction Afrique-Levant,
Ministère des Affaires étrangères,
Paris, le 19 mars 1946.

[E 747/213/89]

No. 22

(1)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 196, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 10th January, 1946.—(Received 24th January.)

General.

THE Anglo-French military committee on evacuation held a further meeting in Beirut on the 4th January, and reached general agreement on a plan for the evacuation of Syria and for the retention there of British units with French representation. Fundamental differences, however, became apparent in regard to the Lebanon, and there was also a divergence of opinion on the question of the measures to be taken to improve the efficiency of the local forces, the French maintaining that this was a political matter which could be dealt with only at the subsequent Four-Power discussions. After this meeting, General de Larminat, on the 7th January, informed the British military authorities that he had been instructed by his Government to suspend the negotiations until such time as an agreement had been reached between the British and French Governments, through diplomatic channels, on the question of the Lebanon. Although no information has been given to any local authority by the British on these differences of opinion, the French appear to have made no secret of them, and the fact that they exist has been reported in the press.

The Lebanese Government, on the 7th January, gave both the British and French authorities an advance copy of a note, drawn up after consultation with the Syrian Government, protesting against the terms of the Anglo-French agreement. In this note, which was officially communicated on the 9th January, the Lebanese Government declared themselves alone responsible for the maintenance of security and for the protection of legitimate foreign interests in the Lebanon, and demanded the immediate and complete application of the principle of the evacuation laid down in the agreement. They protested against any clause contradictory to the terms of the United Nations Charter, and referred in particular to the clause by which foreign troops withdrawn from Syria are to be regrouped in the Lebanon. They also qualified as "unjustifiable" the words "interests" and "responsibilities" in the second agreement. The press reports that the Lebanese Minister in London has also presented a note on this subject to the Foreign Office. The Syrian note, also received on the 9th January, while making the above points include specific complaints against the French not referred to by the Lebanese.

All the main towns in Syria and the Lebanon were closed on the 2nd January as a sign of protest against the Anglo-French Agreement. In the Lebanon there were no demonstrations, but in Syria orderly crowds paraded the streets. It is apparent, from both the press and public contacts, that opinion in both countries is continuing to harden against the Anglo-French Agreement. The assurances given by His Majesty's Government that French troops will not remain alone in the Lebanon do not appear to be generally known; and ignorance of this assurance, joined to the widespread conviction that the French have no intention of ever leaving the Lebanon—a conviction which the acts and words of French officials and agents and incidents, such as the arrival of French troops and General Oliva Roget's visit, do nothing to dispel—is breeding a feeling that the British have now aligned their policy with the French and will support their plans to remain indefinitely. Increasing fear and even indignation at this so-called "betrayal" are being met with expressions of determination not to yield such a privileged position to the French at any cost.

The press in both countries, on the 6th January, prominently featured a Reuter message from Cairo, stating that it had been learned there that the Soviet Minister in Beirut had handed a note to the Lebanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the effect that the Anglo-French Agreement had been drawn up without Soviet participation, and that if the Lebanese Government decided to oppose it the Soviet Government would support them. The Lebanese President stated, in reply to enquiries, that the report was quite unfounded; but he seemed at first disinclined to issue a *démenti*, being not ill-pleased at the idea that the Lebanese Government should be thought to enjoy Soviet backing in their opposition to the Anglo-French Agreement. Later, however, he changed his mind and had the report denied and the Soviet Legation also issued a denial.

On the 5th January His Majesty's Minister, on instructions from the Foreign Office, handed to the Lebanese President a further note on Palestine, in which His Majesty's Government reiterated their conviction that Jewish immigration at a rate not exceeding 1,500 per month, less illegal immigrants, must be allowed to continue during the comparatively short period required for the Anglo-American Commission to make its enquiry and report. An identical note was handed, on the same day, by His Majesty's consul at Damascus to the Syrian President, with whom His Majesty's Minister discussed the matter on the following day. The reaction of both Presidents was not unfavourable, but they stated that they were unable to reply to the note without first consulting other Arab Governments.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 31st December–6th January amount to 471 tons, a daily average of 67 tons, which brings the total for the 1945–46 crop up to 185,251 tons.

Both the Syrian and Lebanese Governments have agreed, as a result of meetings with the Director-General of the British Security Mission (Cairo) to conform to the British Security Mission policy in regard to commodities on the so-called "short list." The most immediate problem to be tackled in this connexion is that of cereals, M.I.R.A. having established that imports of up to 50,000 tons will be essential if the States' needs are to be satisfied up to next harvest and a balance left over with which to begin next season. The States' Governments have not yet decided whether, after the dissolution of M.I.R.A., they will

themselves set up an inter-State grain-collecting organisation or allow free trade in cereals. They have been advised to adopt the former course, in view of the uncertainty of the world cereals position.

A strong team of Pan-American Airways personnel arrived by air in Damascus on the 30th December and left for Bagdad on the 3rd January. They are understood to have proposed to both Governments the conclusion of a civil aviation agreement which would include the grant of "Fifth Freedom" rights and to have claimed that they had already secured, or were about to secure, such rights in both Egypt and Iraq. After reference to the British authorities concerned, His Majesty's Legation has informed both Governments that these claims are unsubstantiated, and it has again been urged upon the two Governments that, in the view of His Majesty's Government, they would be ill-advised to grant, even temporarily, the "Fifth Freedom" rights, which would strangle the development of their local air lines; this is particularly true of the Lebanon, in which "Middle East Airlines," a Lebanese company with B.O.A.C. participation, is just coming into operation. Both Governments, though anxious not to lose the advantage of having a trunk American air line passing through their territories, now seem disposed to stall on the question.

According to the press, the Syrian Directorate-General of Supply has issued instructions that applications for import permits in respect of goods from Palestine should be accompanied by a certificate of origin issued by the Arab Chamber of Commerce in Palestine.

The Lebanese Government, on the 5th January, published a decree implementing the Arab League's decision to impose a boycott on Zionist goods. The decree stated that the issue of import licences for goods from Palestine had been suspended with effect from the 4th January, that holders of licences to import goods from Palestine, who had made a contract on the basis of these licences, had one month in which to fulfil it, and that all possessors of Jewish goods made in Palestine must declare them or risk their seizure. It also laid down that Jewish goods might not be transported between the Lebanon and Syria after the 1st February. The Lebanese security services have also been studying methods to tighten up still further the control on the Lebano-Palestinian frontier, with a view to preventing clandestine immigration or imports of Zionist goods.

Syria—Damascus.

As a result of the arrival at Mezzé aerodrome of General Oliva Roget on the 31st December (see Weekly Political Summary, No. 195, section 1, paragraph 3), the Syrian Prime Minister immediately issued instructions that no reliefs for French units in Syria were to be allowed to enter the country, even with British escorts, that all French vehicles were to be searched, even when under escort, that no Syrian workmen or food supplies were to be allowed to enter Mezzé aerodrome and French workers were to be prevented from landing there. On being informed that General Oliva Roget would leave by the next weekly aeroplane, probably on the 8th January, Saadullah Bey Jabri cancelled the first three of these instructions but reversed his decision the next day, alleging that on several occasions recently French soldiers or vehicles had penetrated clandestinely into Syria. After a most difficult interview with His Majesty's consul and the area commander, the Prime Minister reluctantly told the head of the gendarmerie to conform to the instructions of the area commander as regards convoys, but disclaimed all responsibility for any troubles which might ensue.

While the convoy question seems to have been arranged for the moment, the Syrian Prime Minister is undoubtedly greatly incensed over the arrival of General Oliva Roget and of French troops, which have produced violent reactions in the Syrian press. There may well be further difficulties of a similar nature, especially as Saadullah Bey has already been accused in the press of weakness in his recent attitude to the French.

The first sitting of the extraordinary session of the Chamber of Deputies took place on the 5th January, and was presided over, in the absence of Fares el Khouri, by Mohamed el Ayes, the Vice-President. A draft law providing for the extension of the competence of the national courts to cover criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the mixed courts was referred to the competent commissions of the Chamber.

The resignation of Naim Antaki, Minister of Finance and Acting Minister of Public Works, has been accepted, and it is understood that the name of Fathallah Assioun (Syrian Personality No. 19), an Armenian Orthodox Deputy from Aleppo, has been submitted to the President as Minister of Public Works. Hassan Bey Jabara is likely to take over finance for the time being.

Mr. P. Price, a Labour M.P., spent a few days in Damascus last week. He was received by the Prime Minister and gave an interview to the newspaper *El Balad*. A translation of the remarks attributed to him by this paper is attached.

Fares el Khouri, Nejib Armanazi, Nazim Coudsi and Fared Zein ed Din, have been appointed Syrian representatives at the United Nations Organisation conference. Faris Bey, Nazim Coudsi and two secretaries left by air for the United Kingdom on the 5th January.

Lebanon.

Following the French undertaking to give prior notification to the Lebanese Government of future troop movements (Weekly Political Summary, No. 195, section 11, paragraph 2), the Lebanese Government on the 5th January issued a communiqué, which had previously been agreed with the Délégation Générale, explaining the circumstances under which certain French troops arrived on the *Sagittaire* and quoting figures to show the substantial overall reduction in French troops in the Levant States during the last six months of 1945. The communiqué went on to deny a report in a French newspaper suggesting that the Lebanese might concede a strategic base to France, and stated that the Government would accept no military base on Lebanese territory, but demanded the complete and early evacuation of all foreign troops. In an interview with the Prime Minister on the 8th January, however, General Beynet informed him that a further French ship was expected shortly bringing another 250 troops but taking away some 500; the Prime Minister is apprehensive that this further movement, although notified beforehand, may be difficult to explain to the Chamber and may lead to further trouble. The Lebanese President and Prime Minister have made it clear to this legation that what they chiefly fear is the building up in the Lebanon of a powerful French air base, masked by the withdrawal of greater numbers of troops. There is reason to believe that these apprehensions are not without foundation.

The Lebanese Delegation of the United Nations Conference, composed of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of the Interior and Riad Solh, left Beirut for Cairo on the 3rd January in a Lebanese aircraft.

Some publicity has been given to various scandals which are alleged to have occurred on the occasion of the departure of the s.s. *Sagittaire* to France on the 3rd January. The French personnel are accused of having bought up large quantities of pepper which were taken on board the boat without licence in defiance of customs regulations, and members of the crew are alleged to have been caught selling forged dollar bills and to have been given safe custody on the boat when the Lebanese Sûreté tried to arrest them. There are also rumours of drug smuggling. The Prime Minister spoke strongly to General Beynet on these matters, pointing out that such occurrences did not increase Lebanese enthusiasm for the arrival of French ships.

A well-printed anonymous pamphlet calling upon the Lebanese Christians to unite against the alleged Moslem threat to the "National Christian Home" in the Lebanon has been widely distributed in Beirut during the past week. Its only apparent effect has been to call forth indignant comments from nationalist newspapers, who maintain that the Lebanon is the home of Lebanese and not of any one sect.

For the first time for several years a case of banditry has been reported on the Beirut-Damascus road, where a gang held up several cars and robbed their occupants. It is understood that the gang were "amateurs," and that they have already been apprehended by the gendarmerie.

Enclosure in (1)

Interview given by Mr. Price to El Balad. (See Syria—Damascus Section, Paragraph 5.)

IN answer to a question as to whether the policy of the British Government, towards the Arab countries had changed, Mr. Price said that the policy of the Labour party and that of the Labour Government were not quite the same. For while the rank and file of the party favoured the Jewish side of the Palestine question, the Labour Government held a different view. This means that British

foreign policy is not one of sentiment or inclination, but one which takes into account fundamental problems, and also that the Labour Government cannot make any decision concerning the Palestine question, in the light of the party's attitude. Therefore we find that the Government has had to resort to the formation of an Investigating Committee.

"I myself believe" said Mr. Price, "that it will not be at all justice if Palestine alone is asked to give shelter to Jewish refugees at a time when all European Powers are making a show of their sympathy with the principles of humanity and liberty."

"There are certain moral responsibilities which Britain and America should work together to have realised."

Concerning Syria and Lebanon, Mr. Price said "It is illogical for the French to stay in Lebanon and the British to leave Syria. Furthermore, the presence of two foreign forces on the territory of these States is not in their interests. . . . The Labour Government's policy in no way envisages leaving the French in Syria and Lebanon but its present action is meant to assure organised evacuation from the two countries." "I personally think," said Mr. Price, "that peace cannot be maintained in the Middle East unless France departs. . . ."

"The difference between Britain and France is limited to an interpretation of the evacuation terms of the text and how they are to be put into effect. So long as Syria and Lebanon are considered independent in their own territories then they should have their say concerning evacuation, and they should be informed on all negotiations going on between France and Britain regarding their security. . . ."

Concerning the disembarkation of French troops and the landing of General Oliva Roget at Mezzé airfield, he said: "This act seems very unwise at the present moment, especially since public opinion is so sensitive in this country."

"I used to believe that the May incidents had given the French Government a good lesson in politics but it seems that there are still other lessons for them to learn."

Concerning "Greater Syria project," Mr. Price said "We have not heard of the plan and the Labour party has never thought of it. It would not be easy to discuss such questions, for it is the nations concerned who possess the right to select the kind of Government they wish to have. Personally, I am against imposing a monarchy on Syria if the Syrian people dislike the idea. All that I can see for the Arab States is the creation of an economic unity between them."

Concerning a Communist danger to the Middle East, he said "If a good Government is established in the Arab countries which works for the realisation of the principles of social justice and equality of opportunity for all, then there will be no scope for communism in these countries. . . . but if these Governments cannot conform to modern social and political currents they are then bound to find themselves confronting new troubles similar to those which have arisen in Northern Persia. The Labour party has come into office to see that the principles of justice be put into effect in England and the party wishes to find a similar move in the Middle East."

[E 985/213/89]

(2)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 197, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 15th January, 1946.

General.

Following the suspension of the Anglo-French military discussions in Beirut, General de Larminat has returned to Paris for consultation with the French Government. Count Ostrorog has also left for Paris, and, according to the press, is expected to be absent for a month.

The Syrian and Lebanese notes of protest against the terms of the Anglo-French agreement (see Weekly Political Summary No. 196) were duly delivered to His Majesty's Legation on the 9th January. The Lebanese Prime Minister subsequently announced that he had given a copy of the Lebanese note to the Soviet Minister, with whom he had had a "cordial conversation," and that the Soviet Minister had reaffirmed his Government's recognition of the complete independence of the Lebanon. (See also "Economic.") The Prime Minister later informed His Majesty's Legation that he had also communicated the note to the United States, Egyptian, Iraqi and other legations.

Public opinion in both States has been to some extent reassured during the past week by the following events:—

- (1) A number of newspapers have suggested that the suspension of the Anglo-French talks was occasioned by the French interpreting the agreement to mean that French troops alone would remain in the Lebanon and that British troops would be regrouped outside the Levant, an interpretation which His Majesty's Government were not prepared to accept. Some newspapers also suggested that the Anglo-French military committee had not been able to agree about the command of such French troops as were to remain in the Lebanon.
- (2) The election of Egypt to the United Nations Security Council has given great satisfaction in both countries, as it is felt that Egypt, being a member of the Arab League, will now be in a position to press the Syrian and Lebanese case when the Council comes to consider the regional security of the Middle East.
- (3) The press has prominently featured despatches from the Lebanese journalists at the United Nations Conference, reporting (a) that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had assured the Lebanese Minister in London that French and British troops will evacuate the Levant States simultaneously, and (b) that the United States Minister at Beirut, now in London, had there informed the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs that the United States Government did not approve of the Anglo-French Agreement and would probably inform the Governments concerned in that sense.
- (4) Several reports have been published that while the Soviet Minister in Beirut has presented no official communication to the States' Governments on the Anglo-French Agreement, he has nevertheless indicated to them that his Government also do not approve of the terms of the agreement.

There is therefore a growing feeling that the States may be able to count on sufficient international support to safeguard them against the possibility of the United Nations Council imposing upon them a French or even a French-commanded base, though there is still universal disbelief that the French have any intention of leaving.

In Syria the deadlock over the position of the French and Vatican schools continues. The French complain that the Syrians have no right to close the schools, which, the French say, have now fulfilled all Syrian formalities; and they allege discrimination. The Syrians say that by failing to provide information demanded last spring, the French schools have placed themselves on a different footing from other foreign schools which supplied it; and the Syrians insist on their applying for permits to open.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 9th to 15th January amount to 593 tons, a daily average of 84 tons, which brings the total for the 1946-47 crop up to 185,844 tons.

The Lebanese Prime Minister, in the announcement of his conversation with the Soviet Minister (see "General," paragraph (3) above) indicated that he had discussed the possibility of increasing commercial exchanges between the Lebanon and Soviet Russia, to compensate for the loss of Zionist trade, and that a Soviet commercial attaché would shortly arrive in the Lebanon.

Damascus.

The question of French military movements continues to present difficulties. General Oliva-Roget left Beirut on the 8th January, but the orders of the Syrian Government forbidding the movements of French convoys even under British escort, were not cancelled (see Weekly Political Summary No. 196). The Syrian Prime Minister's attitude is that if the British authorities insist on these movements, they should accept the responsibility and bring French convoys through by force, in which case the Syrian authorities could only submit. A French convoy with a British escort was turned back from the frontier on the 8th January, but two days later passed through to Mezzé without incident under a heavy British escort. Difficulties of a similar nature have also occurred in connexion with Syrian patrols at the Aleppo aerodrome. No written orders have been issued by the Prime Minister, that Syrian forces should avoid clashes with the

British, but the Officer Commanding Gendarmerie has been given verbal instructions that no such situation must arise.

His Majesty's Minister, the Commander-in-chief, Middle East Forces, and the General Officer Commanding, British Troops North Levant, were received by the Syrian President and the Prime Minister on the 13th January, when the two principal points discussed were the recent incidents in Aleppo, including the shooting at M. Fauquenot's car (see Weekly Political Summary No. 196), and French military movements. The Commander-in-chief pointed out that if M. Fauquenot had been killed the French might have insisted on sending reinforcements to Syria, and, as regards French convoys, that a certain amount of movement was necessary for the maintenance of any military force. The President and Prime Minister replied that M. Fauquenot was following a deliberate policy of provoking the population and exposing himself to danger; they begged that the Commander-in-chief and His Majesty's Minister would do their best to secure his removal. With regard to French movements, they argued that these were being used by the French for purposes of propaganda and the encouragement of subversive elements. Although the Syrians stood their ground, the meeting was cordial and it is hoped that they may make a real effort to prevent further incidents.

A violent scene occurred at the sitting of the Syrian Chamber on the 10th January. Sheikh Trad el Mulhem, Sheikh of the Hassaneh tribe, took strong exception to a motion by Akram Haurani of Hama involving the abolition of the tribal directorate. High words followed. Sheikh Trad and two Sheikhs of the Anaiza tribal group, to which the Hassaneh belongs, drew their revolvers and prepared to attack Akram Haurani, who was hastily hustled from the Chamber by his friends. The sitting was then adjourned and the Prime Minister succeeded in reconciling the parties.

On the 12th January the Damascus students attempted a demonstration in favour of Akram Haurani and parliamentary freedom of speech, but as a result of measures taken by the Government, the demonstration was confined to modest proportions.

On the 13th January Sheikh Trad was shot and killed outside the law courts in Damascus. His attackers, who proved to be members of the Naim tribe, were immediately arrested by the police and one of them is alleged to have confessed to the murder. The Naim have been involved in a dispute with the Hassaneh tribe since 1932; during the last few years this has taken the form of a land dispute which has already been responsible for a number of deaths on both sides, including the murder of Sheikh Trad's brother some eighteen months ago. In a communiqué issued by the Government on the same day it was stated that the murder was the result of a tribal dispute, but it is widely believed that the Naim tribe were prompted by the supporters of Akram Haurani. The tribal leaders are insisting on a full enquiry.

Measures taken by the Government to prevent trouble as a result of the murder included the despatch of gendarmerie and desert guard forces with armoured cars to the Homs area (where the main part of the Naim and Hassaneh are at present situated), to Hama and to Quneitra.

The Syrian Prime Minister referred to this at the meeting with the Commander-in-chief and His Majesty on the 13th January, when he spoke forcibly about the inadequacy of the Syrian security forces, especially in arms and equipment, having regard to the country's long frontiers, tribal incidents and the state of feeling resulting from the continued presence of the French. The Syrian Government were expected to keep order with forces infinitely smaller than those of Iraq and they could not get the necessary arms and equipment for such forces as they had.

Sheikh Trad was given a state funeral on the 14th January, to which foreign diplomatic and consular representatives were invited.

The Franciscan School in Damascus opened on the 7th January, when some forty pupils attended, but was closed on the instructions of the Ministry of Education three days later. On the 15th January the principal of the school informed the Syrian authorities that the school was prepared to comply with the Syrian regulations issued on the 31st October, 1945, but the Syrians are insisting that the school should first obtain a permit.

Lebanon.

General Beynet, in fulfilment of the recent French undertaking to give prior notice to the Lebanese Government of any movement of troops into the Lebanon,

has informed the Lebanese President that another ship, the *Ile d'Oléron*, is expected at Beirut shortly with a draft of some 200 more French troops on board. The President has expressed anxiety at the number of French Air Force technicians who he believes arrived on the *Sagittaire*, and of the possibility that more may be arriving on the *Ile d'Oléron*, for he fears that the French may be in process of building up a powerful air base at Rayak with a view to controlling the Levant States by air power as we controlled Iraq before the war. He expressed these misgivings to His Majesty's Minister and the Commander-in-chief, Middle East Forces, when they visited him on the 14th January, and said that he had told General Beynet that the Lebanese Government could not accept such technicians as "alimentation" of existing units.

The Lebanese Chamber on the 9th January debated the arrival of French troops on the *Sagittaire*, and the Government was subjected to considerable criticism by Deputies for having promised the Chamber not to let these troops disembark and then allowing it. The Prime Minister described the circumstances, and also mentioned the irregular export of goods by this ship on her return voyage for which, he said, the person responsible had been fined £Sy. 11,000. He reiterated his Government's determination to give no privileges to any foreign Power and announced the despatch of the note to the British and French Governments (see "Economic" above). A Deputy moved a resolution confirming Lebanese independence and repudiating any decision or agreement contrary to it, which was eventually passed to the competent committee for study.

The Lebanese President and Prime Minister have both informed the French authorities of their concern at the lack of progress over the transfer of the remaining French-controlled services, notably the Grand Sérail. General Beynet has apparently now promised that the latter shall be handed over on the 1st April, as the French were given possession on the 5th January of certain barracks which the British military authorities have vacated to house the French services at present in the Grand Sérail. The Lebanese Government have also published a decree expropriating a large area to the south of the town on which the French are apparently to construct a legation and a "Cité Universitaire."

The Lebanese Government on the 15th January issued a decree constituting a higher security council, with the object of co-ordinating information on all matters touching public security throughout the country. The council, which is to be presided over by the Minister of the Interior, and comprises the heads of the army, sûreté, gendarmerie and police, will have power to take executive action in urgent cases.

In the Lebanese Chamber on the 15th January a Deputy protested against a telegram alleged to have been sent by the Syrian Catholic Cardinal Tappouni to a French archbishop, asking him to use his influence towards maintaining French influence in the Lebanon. This telegram had been published in local French newspapers and had already aroused reactions in the Nationalist press. It may well be authentic, as Cardinal Tappouni has long been entirely under the French influence.

[E 1103/213/89]

(3)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 198, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 22nd January, 1946.—(Received 6th February.)

General.

IN the absence of any news regarding the progress of the Anglo-French discussions on evacuation popular interest has shifted to the United Nations Conference and to internal affairs. The speeches made by Mr. Bevin, the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Fares Bey Khoury have been featured prominently in the press of both countries, and optimism that the Levant States will find world support for their cause continues to grow. The news of General de Gaulle's resignation has been hailed with delight in nationalist circles, and with corresponding despondency amongst pro-French minorities, particularly in the Lebanon, as it is generally believed that General de Gaulle was responsible for the stiffness of the French attitude on the Levant question and that the

Communists, who alone have shown some sympathy for the States' aspirations, are now likely to gain increased power in the French Government.

A general order has been issued by General Beynet stating that General Humblot has been transferred to the reserve list of general officers and that he will be temporarily replaced by General Monclar.

It is understood that the Lebanese and Syrian Governments have requested a meeting of the Arab League on the 28th January to consider the Anglo-French agreement on the Levant; both Governments will be represented by their Ministers in Cairo.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 16th to 22nd January amount to 657 tons, a daily average of 94 tons, which brings the total for the 1946-47 crop up to 186,501 tons.

It has been clear for some time that Mira could not maintain deliveries to the Syrian and Lebanese Ravitaillement Departments at the present rate until grain from the 1946-47 harvest was available, unless they were able to import some 13,000 tons of wheat and 17,000 tons of barley from abroad, even assuming that they could collect a further 20,000 tons of wheat before the 1945-46 buying season closed. Owing to lack of rain and other considerations outside Mira's control, it is now certain that this figure will not be attained. Also, in view of the probability of a very poor harvest next year and of the liquidation of Mira at the end of May, it is essential that Mira should be in a position to hand over the local Ravitaillement Departments sufficient cereals to feed the population until the end of June. Mira therefore now consider it essential to import 30,000 tons of wheat and 20,000 tons of barley.

Negotiations have been initiated with the Egyptian Government through British Supply Mission (Cairo) for the purchase of 10,000 tons of Egyptian barley at £E.30. Negotiations are also taking place for the purchase of 10,000 tons of barley from producers on the Iraqi side of the Syrian border. The barley situation is therefore fairly satisfactory.

On the other hand the wheat situation is very serious. It is estimated that 5,000,000 tons of wheat, above the quantities now available, will be required for feeding the starving population of Europe, so that all consuming countries have been requested to cut consumption to a minimum. It is known that some 10,000 tons of flour and cereals are available from War Department sources in Iraq. Strong representations are being made to Cairo for this to be allocated to Syria, but it would appear that Palestine has an equal claim, especially as its allocation to Syria would have an incidence on the rice/wheat Egyptian scheme.

An offer of 10,000 tons of flour has been received from America through local merchants but although Syria has put up a very strong case, London feels that, in view of the world situation, it will be difficult to ask the United States to grant an export licence. However, British Supply Mission (Cairo) have been requested to review the whole of the Middle East requirements up to the end of June 1946, so that the new picture can be submitted to the Combined Food Board.

Syria—Damascus.

In a note to His Majesty's Legation the Syrian Government have made further complaints about the use of Syrian aerodromes by French aircraft, the movement of a detachment of cavalry to the supply post at Aleppo, and measures taken by the French military authorities to strengthen their defences on military establishments. They declined to accept responsibility for incidents which might occur as a result of these activities.

At a meeting of the Chamber of Deputies on the 19th January the budget was not debated as the budget committee's report had not been completed. The Government gave the following reply on the motion before the House referring to the Mixed Courts (see Weekly Political Summary No. 196, section Syria and Damascus, paragraph 3):—

"The revised text of Arrête No. 316 issued on the 12th February, 1940, provided that courts dealing with cases of foreigners should be composed of a French president and Syrian judges. These provisions became inoperative as a result of the well-known incidents and the departure of the French from the country. In order to escape from this position, legal provision which would permit a native president to preside over a court dealing with cases of foreigners is called for so that cases of arrested persons and pending

cases can be decided; the native Court of Cassation shall further have the right to examine past and future cases in respect of which an appeal has or shall be lodged. The Ministry has, with a view to facilitating business, charged certain Syrian judges to examine such cases as the law puts within their competence."

It is understood that a law on the subject is at present being drafted.

The Syrian Procureur Général, who is investigating the murder of Sheikh Trad (see Weekly Political Summary No. 197, section Syria and Damascus, paragraph 3), has requested the press to refrain from speculating on the case until the completion of the investigation. He has promised that an official report will be published in due course.

The *agrément* of the Brazilian Government has been sought for the appointment of Adel Arslan (Syrian Personalities No. 14) as Syrian Minister to Brazil.

Alaouites.

Difficulties arose during the week over the determination of Commandant Bouvier to enlarge upon the concessions arranged by the British military authorities with the Syrians. On the 12th and 13th January an elaborate ceremony was arranged for hauling down the flag at the gate of the French barracks in Lattakia at sunset; all traffic was stopped, an omnibus was held up and the passengers obliged to get out and salute the flag, and two Syrian soldiers walking past the barracks were seized and dragged inside despite the attempts of two Gurkhas to prevent their arrest. The trouble has been temporarily smoothed over by the intervention of the British military authorities and the Syrian soldiers have been released, but General Monclar has informed the French Zone commander that he does not approve of his action in "giving way to the Syrians," and has instructed him to inform the British authorities that he considers the British attitude and interference unwarrantable.

Lebanon.

It has been obvious for two or three weeks that a campaign against the régime, and particularly against the President, has been started in certain quarters, most of them in touch with the French. The campaign was ostensibly based on the so-called anarchy in the various departments of the Administration, and its promoters were taking the line that since successive Governments have proved incapable of reforming the Administration, the electoral system, and therefore the Chamber elected on this system, should be modified; the President was attacked by implication for his alleged failure to control the Government and to force them to institute reforms. Abdel Hamid Karamé, the former Prime Minister, has associated himself with this campaign with Alfred Naccache and Kamel Jamblat, and has prepared a draft memorandum for submission to the President, threatening resignation and demanding modifications in the electoral law, the calling of a Constituent Assembly for the modification of the Constitution, the reduction of the powers of the legislature, and various other administrative reforms. This memorandum has not, however, been presented to the President, who, in common with the majority of public opinion, feels that the moment is most inopportune for raising constitutional questions, and who has therefore discouraged these Deputies, and particularly Karamé, from any thought of resignation, advising them that any proposals they might have to make should be raised in the Chamber.

Public dissatisfaction with the state of the Administration is nevertheless very real, and although Karamé's manoeuvres have done no good and recent articles in the *Phalange* organ and in a French-controlled newspaper attacking the Administration are dismissed by the nationalists as French-inspired, there is no doubt that sooner or later popular indignation will be vented on the Government, and possibly on the President, for failing even to attempt the clean-up which is so universally regarded as necessary. The President himself is under no illusions on this point.

A further manifestation of internal discontent has been a recent protest to the President, signed by all but two of the magistrates, against the constant interventions of Deputies and notables in judicial affairs. The delegation appointed by the magistrates to convey their grievances to the President complained that they could not obtain an interview with him and threatened a general

strike of magistrates, a proceeding which alienated from them much of the sympathy they might otherwise have enjoyed. The Government have now adopted the usual time-wasting device of appointing a parliamentary commission to examine the magistrates' complaints.

As a result of the stiffening up of security measures in South Lebanon, the gendarmerie have recently stopped two cars belonging to French generals, one containing smuggled goods and the other eight Jews, *en route* for Palestine. In each case the chauffeurs were Lebanese employees of the French, and have apparently been able to use their masters' cars for purposes of private profit in their spare time.

The Council of Ministers on the 17th January decided to recognise the Yugoslav Republic. They also decided that the Lebanese Government should be represented by their Consul in Paris at the forthcoming meeting of the civil aviation legislative committee in Paris.

[E 1580/213/89]

(4)

Weekly Political Summary No. 199, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 29th January, 1946.—(Received 22nd February.)

General.

THE activities and utterances of the Syrian and Lebanese delegations to the United Nations Assembly in London, which are fully reported in the local press, are causing much local satisfaction, and the adoption of the Lebanese proposal on secret balloting in the face of Soviet and United States opposition has been hailed as a "triumph."

In the Lebanese Chamber on the 24th January several Deputies asked why the States' Governments had not brought the Levant question before the United Nations Organisation, and one Deputy expressed disapproval of a statement (apparently misreported), attributed to the Egyptian Foreign Minister in London, to the effect that Egyptian and Arab questions did not fall within the sphere of activities of the Security Council. The Prime Minister, in reply, stated that the Government had no official knowledge of Bedawi Pasha's statement, but considered that the Anglo-French Agreement did fall within the competence of the United Nations Organisation and Security Council. He added that his Government had sent the necessary instructions to the Lebanese delegation, and that he could assure the Chamber that the question of the Anglo-French agreement and of the withdrawal of foreign troops would shortly be raised before the United Nations Organisation and the Security Council. The Syrian Government seem as yet to have sent no such instructions.

On the 23rd January the Syrian Prime Minister was informed by His Majesty's Consul, Damascus, that all British and French military personnel in the Jezireh, including political officers and the French air force staffs at Qamichlié and Hassetché, would be withdrawn by the 6th February. The Prime Minister took the opportunity to make a strong plea for further arms and equipment, pointing out that, in the event of trouble in the desert, the existing resources of the Syrian Government were inadequate to meet the emergency.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 23rd to 29th January amount to 681 tons, a daily average of 97 tons, which brings the total for 1946-47 up to 187,182 tons.

In an interview with the correspondent of a Damascus newspaper, which in an article had raised the question of the Government's policy towards civil aviation, an official of the Syrian Ministry of Public Works stated that it was the policy of the Government to encourage the establishment of a large international airport, but that no progress could be made until Mezzé aerodrome had been transferred. He added that Air France would be given the same facilities as other foreign companies.

Syria—Damascus.

At a sitting of the Syrian Chamber on the 19th January, the Budget Committee's report on the 1946-47 budget estimates was presented to the Chamber. After some little discussion it was agreed that the budget could not be debated until five days after the circulation of the Budget Committee's report. A further sitting was fixed for the 31st January and, since the present

extraordinary session (the seventh in the life of the present Parliament) will come to an end on that day, an eighth extraordinary session is expected to be convened early in February.

A considerable stir has resulted from the action of Syrian Communists, including officials of the Ministry of Education, in addressing a telegram to the Egyptian Government protesting against measures taken against Communist activities in Egypt. A demonstration was staged by students of the Tajhiz schools on the 24th January and a protest was sent to the President, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Education demanding that suitable action should be taken against the officials who had signed the telegram. The demonstrators proceeded to the Ministry of Public Instruction and to the Egyptian Legation, where they were addressed by the Director-General and the Egyptian Minister respectively. Cries of "Down with Syrian Communists!" (later changed on instructions to "Down with those in the pay of foreigners!") were heard, but no counter-demonstration was organised by Communist elements and no incidents occurred. Both the Egyptian Minister and the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires subsequently called on the Prime Minister. The incident was the occasion of a strong anti-Communist campaign in the press, and Sheikh Mustafa Sebai, of the Moslem Youth Society, wrote an article drawing attention to the inconsistency of the Communists in encouraging the occupation of Azerbaijan and insisting on the evacuation of the Levant States, in welcoming student demonstrations in Syria for the return of the Hatay and denouncing similar demonstrations in Turkey. A press report that the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires had handed a note of protest to the Syrian Government was later officially denied.

Toufic Yazigi, the counsellor in the Syrian Legation in Cairo, and Saleh Aqil, who was recently appointed to Jedda, are being transferred to Rio de Janeiro. Farid Khani, at present serving in Alexandria, is to be transferred to Jedda.

The Prime Minister indicated to Bashir Shureiqi, the Transjordanian Consul in Damascus, before his departure that the proposal to appoint Hafez Abdul Hadi as his successor was not agreeable to the Syrian Government. The customary letter from His Majesty's Minister regarding Abdul Hadi's appointment was delivered to the Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs before Saadullah Jabri's wishes in this respect were known. In order to avoid further complications the letter was withdrawn at the request of the Minister, pending communication with the High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan.

Arrangements have been completed for the engagement of a Belgian expert, M. Xavier le Jeune de Schiervel, who will advise the Syrian Government on administrative reforms; it is expected that his contract will provide for a minimum period of six months.

Aleppo.

The past week in Aleppo has been quiet and uneventful, though anti-French feeling continues strong. M. Fauquenot and his staff at the French Délégation continue to remain virtually prisoners under the closest possible Syrian surveillance.

His Majesty's Consul, Damascus, on the 23rd January informed Saadullah Bey Jabri that arrangements had been completed between the British and French military authorities whereby particulars of the arrival of military personnel and civilian officials at Aleppo aerodrome would be communicated in advance to the Syrian Government. Other civilian passengers would be required to comply with the security requirements of the Syrian authorities.

On the 26th January His Majesty's Consul had a further interview with the Prime Minister in connexion with the trenches which the French military authorities were digging outside their barracks in Aleppo. The Prime Minister declined to order the Mohafez to desist from any counter measures which he thought necessary, including the occupation of the site by Syrian forces. If the French persisted, the Prime Minister saw no objection to the British intervening and occupying the site.

On the 21st January a school for French children and for the children of Syrian *avenantaires* was opened in a French military building a few hundred yards from the French barracks in the Jemilieh quarter of Aleppo. Up to the present there has been no reaction from the Syrians, though it is not yet certain that they are aware of the school's existence.

Homs and Hama.

The Political Officer reports that it is unlikely that there will be any serious tribal trouble for another month or six weeks, although there may be isolated raids

on the Naim camps. The Anaiza tribesmen are at present scattered along the Iraq border and in the southern areas of the Syrian Hamad. The sheikhs fear that the Government may try to make a *coup* against them while their tribes are scattered, and Raikan Ibn Murshid and Saleh Ibn Hudeib have moved their camps away from the towns towards the east, posted an elaborate system of pickets, and laid in extra stocks of petrol and tyres; Mudjhem Ibn Muheid is reported to have taken similar precautions. There is no doubt that they view with the deepest suspicion the secrecy with which the enquiry into the murder of Sheikh Trad is being conducted, and Sheikh Raikan has said that if the enquiry does not lay bare the truth, the whole of the Jezireh and Shamiye will rise.

Jebel Druze.

On the 25th January Colonel Abdullah Atfeh, the Syrian Commander, visited Soueida and later called on Sultan Pasha el Atrash, but appears to have gone away without giving any definite undertaking to change his present policy of dismissals and transfers from the Groupement Druze. Feeling on the subject in the Jebel is still high.

Alaouite Territory.

A conference was held in Lattakia on the 24th January between the British and French military authorities to consider the difficulties arising out of the recent incidents in Lattakia (see Weekly Political Summary No. 198). The French recognised they had been in the wrong in holding parades and arresting people in the public street, and undertook that this would not happen again. They further recognised that the responsibility for maintaining order and security outside their barracks was not their concern, and that the British should take whatever measures might be necessary to deal with hostile or provocative persons outside the barracks. The Political Officer reports a considerable easing of the situation as a result of the conference.

Negotiations for the settlement of the Murshid question and for reconciliation between him and his enemies are reported to be making good progress.

Euphrates and Jezireh.

The Anglo-French military evacuation of the Jezireh Province began on the 22nd January when elements of the T.J.F.F. left Ras el Ain. On the 25th January the French "officier en mission" left Qamichlié with his staff and three vehicles containing the furniture of the French Frontier Service previously installed in Qamichlié. Measures were taken to ensure that the last British soldier and the last Frenchman left Qamichlié simultaneously. It is now generally known that the evacuation at Hassetché is to take place and that the T.J.F.F. Mechanised Regiment is to be concentrated in Deir-az-Zor. News of the evacuation has been generally welcomed, though many Syrian officials and notables have gone out of their way to show their regret at the departure of British forces, explaining that any pleasure which may be manifested at the joint evacuation is only an indication of gratitude to the British for taking the French away. Anglo-Syrian relations in the area are excellent.

Tribal.

See under "Homs and Hama," above.

Frontier.

In an affray between smugglers and customs authorities at Tell Kotchek, one customs agent was killed and another wounded; the smugglers escaped into Iraq.

Lebanon.

In accordance with the agreement to notify the Lebanese authorities of the movements of troops into and out of the Levant States (see Weekly Political Summary No. 195), the British military authorities notified the Lebanese Government, through this legation, of the withdrawal of two British units and their replacement by a third; the Lebanese Government promptly signified their consent to this move. The Lebanese authorities have also consented to the arrival of another French draft on board the steamship *Ile d'Oléron* after discussions in which the French gave the necessary explanations and assurances. On the 27th January the Lebanese Government issued a communiqué stating that the French Government had asked their consent to bringing in 100 French troops

on the *Ile d'Oléron*, which would take away at least 200 troops, and that the Lebanese Government had accorded it. The communiqué also stated that the Lebanese Government had consented to the replacement of two British units by another.

The political agitation created by the reports that Abdul Hamid Karamé had threatened to resign from the Chamber unless his reform proposals were accepted has died down. The Government, on the advice of the President and certain prominent Deputies, including Henri Pharaon, decided not to propose the question of confidence when the Chamber met on the 23rd January, and the sitting was devoted to the discussion of the public works budget. It is now generally believed that neither Karamé nor any other Deputy has any serious intention of resigning and that this particular "crisis" has been liquidated.

A number of reports have been received suggesting that unrest amongst industrial workers may shortly develop into a general strike if the workers' claims for substantial increases in cost of living bonus are not granted by the employers. It is known that the employees of the D.H.P. Railway and of the Banque de Syrie have put in demands for increases of bonus averaging more than 50 per cent.; the employees of other prominent concerns, such as the Régie des Tabacs and the Port Company, are expected to follow suit, but the oil companies' employees have not yet formulated demands. It is true that the cost of living, which fell during the first part of 1945, has, during the last three months, risen by rather more than it fell, but even so, the demands so far presented, appear somewhat exaggerated. All reports indicate that the workers are better organised than previously and rumours are circulating that either Communist or French agents are at work stirring up agitation. So far the Lebanese Government have not reacted, except to the extent of giving the D.H.P. employees a warning, which was badly received, that they must not strike. In the absence of the two strongest Ministers in London it is doubtful how far the present Government could deal with labour unrest if it became threatening, which is not yet the case.

Press.

In Damascus several papers have followed the lead given by *Al-Qabas* in an anti-Communist campaign, following the disclosure that many of the officials and teachers employed by the Ministry of Education entertained Communist sympathies, as witnessed by the despatch of a telegram of protest to Egypt against anti-Communist measures in that country. These papers called for the dismissal and punishment of the offenders, and one paper maintained that only ruthless and merciless action can uproot the evil.

Comment on the Anglo-French Agreement was less voluminous, the main point being conjecture as to whether the question would be raised at the United Nations Conference. Several papers affirmed that this had already been decided upon, and expressed the conviction that the Levant States could count on Russian and American support.

General Spears's suggestion in London that the question of the Levant States should be brought up as part and parcel of the whole Arab problem received wide publicity, but was not commented on to any extent. The General was reported to have said that the British nation in general was not interested in the Levant States and would prefer to see Anglo-French relations settled. The British people would not, however, sacrifice their friendship with the Arab States as a whole for the sake of Anglo-French harmony.

A statement, attributed to a Lebanese counsellor of legation in Paris, to the effect that the Lebanon might still conclude an agreement with France, caused a sensation, and it was reported that the Paris legation had been asked for supplementary details.

Russian interest in the Middle East was discussed mainly by the Beirut Armenian papers, and it was reported that the Lebanese Armenian colony had been asked by the Soviet-Armenian authorities to draw up a list of Armenians desirous of repatriation to Soviet-Armenia.

Mr. Bevin's announcement of forthcoming independence for Transjordan was linked indefinitely with the Greater Syria question. Publicity was given to a statement attributed to the Emir Faisal, the Saudi-Arabian Foreign Minister, in which he is alleged to have advocated that nothing should be done with regard to Greater Syria until the people of the States concerned have been consulted regarding their wishes in this respect. The announcement of independence for Transjordan was acclaimed by the nationalist papers; pro-French papers pointed to the discrepancy between this welcome for the resultant Anglo-Transjordan

Treaty and the refusal to consider a Franco-Levant Treaty. A number of Damascus papers praised Great Britain and expressed admiration for her diplomatic master-stroke in isolating Transjordan from the Zionist danger in Palestine.

The statement alleged to have been made by Hamid Badawi Pasha, head of the Egyptian Delegation at the United Nations Conference, to the effect that the Egyptian and Arab questions should not be dealt with by the Security Council caused a sensation.

The Beirut pro-French paper *Al-Hadith* was suspended *sine die* for articles criticising the present Lebanese political régime, though, as the paper subsequently pointed out in a manifesto, nationalist papers publishing stronger articles than *Al-Hadith* were not selected for the same treatment.

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Weekly Political Summary No. 200, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon,
5th February, 1946.—(Received 25th February, 1946.)

General.

On the 4th February a joint Note signed by the President of the Syrian and Lebanese delegations to the United Nations' Conference was submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations' Organisation asking for the adoption by the Security Council of a decision recommending the "total and simultaneous evacuation of foreign troops from the territories of Syria and the Lebanon."

The announcement of the decision of His Majesty's Government to allow immigration of Jews into Palestine at the rate of 1,500 per month pending the completion of the Anglo-American Committee's report, gave rise to considerable criticism in both countries, and a number of written protests have been presented to His Majesty's Legation and Consulates. Violent articles have appeared in the press accusing His Majesty's Government of again failing to keep their promises, and in more than one paper it has been suggested that the continuation of immigration was the price demanded by Jewish interests in the United States of America as a condition for the American loan to Great Britain. The Syrian Prime Minister when informed of the decision was unresponsive and stated that, whatever might be the line taken by other Arab Governments, the Syrian Government could not approve of the principle of admitting any further Jewish immigrants whatever the circumstances, since this amounted to the abandonment of the White Paper. The Syrian President showed more comprehension but took much the same line, adding that since the Palestine Arabs had rejected the continuation of Jewish immigration, the Syrians could not endorse it. The Lebanese President, on the other hand, appeared to accept the decision philosophically.

During the week copies of the *Memoirs* written by the Emir Abdullah of Transjordan reached the Levant States and created a considerable stir; they are understood to contain offensive references to Ibn Saud and to the leaders of Syria. The Syrian President expressed his dismay at the appearance of such an attack by a ruler of a neighbouring State, and the Lebanese President told a member of His Majesty's Legation staff that he hoped that His Majesty's Government would use all their influence to reconcile the Hashimites with their opponents in the Arab League; he clearly regards such action as urgently necessary if the League is not to be disrupted.

Economic.

Grain figures not available.

Damascus.

As a result of various communications made recently to the Syrian Government which they were unable readily to accept, such as the proposed relief movement of 250 Senegalese troops into Mezzé and the proposed visits of General Monclar to Mezzé and Lattakia, the Syrian President asked that His Majesty's Minister should visit Damascus to discuss the situation. His Majesty's Minister and Major-General Pilleau saw the President and Prime Minister on the 5th February. Both were friendly enough, but refused to accept the principle of the entry into Syria of French troops and in particular of General Monclar, whom they said they regarded as a murderer. The Prime Minister said the general's entry into Syria would be opposed by unarmed gendarmes standing with

linked arms across the road, whom the British escort would have to run down or remove. If the British decided to bring General Monclar into the country by force they must bear the responsibility and odium for so doing.

The past week in the Chamber of Deputies has been devoted to the budget. The following are the main points of interest which emerged from the Budget Committee's report:—(1) the budget was reduced from 135 million Syrian pounds to £ Syr. 127,808,000; (2) the Government was criticised for not having sufficiently studied the budget as was clear from the number of amendments put forward subsequently; (3) it was pointed out that the number of civil servants was on the increase and that their salaries now amounted to 50 per cent. of the budget (a unification of financial legislation and an amendment of the existing accounts laws were called for); (4) the Budget Committee were in favour of conscription and urged the Government to expedite the drafting of the law; (5) the committee approved the increases in the gendarmerie and police proposed by the Government.

In debates on the Budget Committee's report the foreign policy of the Government was strongly criticised by Opposition Deputies and the Prime Minister was asked if the Government had referred the Anglo-French Agreement to the Arab League, why no formal reply had been given to His Majesty's Government's note on the question of continued Jewish immigration into Palestine, and why no note had been addressed to the British authorities on the evacuation of foreign troops. The Prime Minister replied that the Arab League had been informed of the Syrian Government's attitude to the Anglo-French Agreement, that a note had been addressed to the British Government on the subject of evacuation, and that the Syrian Minister in Paris had been instructed to inform the French Government of the decisions taken by the Chamber. With regard to Palestine, the Prime Minister said that the Government had preferred to refer the matter to the Arab League and had endorsed the attitude of the Palestine High Committee in refusing to agree to the British proposal. At a later sitting the allocation of £ Syr. 1,000,000 to the fund for the redemption of Palestine lands was approved, and a motion that the Chamber should express its disapproval of the communiqué regarding further immigration of Jews issued by the High Commissioner for Palestine, was referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee for study and report.

Decrees have been published in the Official Gazette creating consulates-general in Buenos Aires and Ottawa and legations in Brazil and in Switzerland, and appointing Asaad Haroun, Minister Plenipotentiary in Iran.

An official communiqué, published in the press on the 29th January, stated that the Syrian Minister in Paris, Adnan Atassi, presented his letters of credence in Brussels on the 22nd January.

Aleppo.

The general political situation in Aleppo remains unchanged though the local population has been encouraged by press reports to believe that the Anglo-French evacuation of Aleppo will take place during the next few weeks; if the evacuation turns out to be long delayed acute disappointment will result.

M. Fauquenot complained to His Majesty's Consul that the British military authorities were aiding and abetting the Syrian authorities in the execution of their recent anti-French measures (see previous Weekly Political Summaries). His Majesty's Consul refuted these charges and reminded M. Fauquenot of the numerous occasions when the local British military authorities had intervened on behalf of French interests, and of French nationals and protégés.

The students in Aleppo went on strike on the 4th February against Mr. Bevin's declaration regarding the continuation of Jewish immigration into Palestine. Violently worded anti-British pamphlets were distributed and a protest was handed to His Majesty's Consul.

Homs and Hama.

No report received.

Jebel Druze.

Nothing to report.

Alaouites.

As a result of the conference between the British and French military authorities in Lattakia on the 24th January (see Weekly Political Summary No. 199), there have been no further incidents during the past week.

The negotiations for the settlement of the Murshid question have been successfully carried on by a lawyer acting on behalf of Murshid and a settlement has been agreed in principle; the lawyer has now returned to Damascus to lay the details before the Syrian Government.

Interrogation of the bandits recently arrested by the gendarmerie in the Lattakia area (see Weekly Political Summary No. 198) has continued. One of the bandits, Shahin Ali, was arrested with two 1944 German rifles in his possession which he confessed he obtained from a servant of a cousin of Mohammed Amin Risan, a Syrian deputy. This servant has now been arrested and has stated that some five months ago he was told to take twelve mules to a point near the coast road between Tartouss and Hamidiye, where he was met by a military truck which came from the direction of Tripoli. Eighty-eight German rifles were transferred from the truck to his mules and were taken by him to Risan's house in Safita; some thirty of them were subsequently sold in the Homs area and the rest in the Alaouites. He gave no accurate description of the truck or its occupants, except that one wore a képi.

The Mohafez of Lattakia states that the two Franciscan schools at Kessab and Barhitche Rhaz, which up to now have been working normally, having requested and received Government permission to open, have been ordered by the Apostolic Delegate to close; and that the Franciscan father at Kessab has sent a telegram to the Pope protesting against this order of the Apostolic Delegate.

Euphrates and Jezireh.

Nothing to report.

Tribal.

Nothing to report.

Lebanon.

A letter from the "Erivan Committee for the Settlement of Armenian Immigrants Abroad" to the chairman of the "Union of Friends of Soviet Armenia in Beirut" was published in the Armenian press in Beirut on the 19th January. The letter announced that the Soviet Government have authorised, by a decree dated the 21st November, 1945, the return of Armenians abroad to Soviet Armenia, that the Soviet Government will pay half the cost of building houses for the Armenians, and that their belongings will be exempt from import duties. This announcement, which caused considerable excitement among the large Armenian colony in Beirut, was followed by the opening on the 1st February of ten registration offices, which are to stay open for four weeks so that all those who wish to avail themselves of the offer may inscribe their names. It is difficult to make an accurate estimate of the number of those who have registered, but it seems probable that some 11,000 may have done so in the first four days. The Armenian archbishop told a member of the legation staff that he doubted whether many Armenians, in fact, would go back—though many would place on record their devotion to their home land—until Kars and Ardahan were ceded by the Turks. This may have been the Armenian archbishop's tactful way of expressing the widely-held view that this gesture is nothing more than a part of the Russians' war of nerves against the Turks and will not be implemented.

Sailim Haidar has been appointed Lebanese Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran with local rank of Counsellor. The President and Prime Minister have been severely criticised, both in the press and in political circles, for recent appointments at Lebanese Missions abroad, which it is maintained are typical of the way in which the country's interests are subject to interference by personal interests.

Jamal Husseini called on the Lebanese President and Prime Minister before leaving for Palestine to thank them for the hospitality which he had enjoyed while in the Lebanon.

The Lebanese Prime Minister has confirmed that there has been opposition to the building of an aerodrome at Khalde near Beirut on the ground that the site was technically unsuitable. The expropriation of land has been stopped and the Minister of Public Works has arranged with the American Legation for two American experts to come from Cairo to advise the Government.

The Beirut newspaper *Saut-esh-Shaab*, the local Communist organ, was suspended *sine die* on the 2nd February for "endangering the internal peace of the country"; the actual reason, however, was the attack made by the paper on the Syrian Government's handling of the Communist protest to Egypt. It is not thought likely that the suspension will remain in force for very long.

Press.

The anti-Communist agitation in Syria, launched by the paper *Al-Qabas*, once again formed one of the principal topics of discussion in the Damascus press during the week. More protests were reported in the press against the action of the Syrian teachers and officials in protesting to the Egyptian Government against its anti-Communist measures. The papers also published an official denial that the Soviet representative in Damascus had lodged a protest against the recent anti-Communist demonstrations.

The Aleppo press also took up the cry and one paper attacked the Syrian Communists, who now support French policy and qualify Syrian patriots as partisans of the British. The papers called for the dismissal and punishment of the offending officials.

The Beirut Communist daily *Saut-esh-Shaab*, which had violently attacked the Syrian press and authorities for their anti-Communist action was, after being forbidden in Syria, suspended *sine die* by the Lebanese Government, but has now re-appeared. In general, the Beirut nationalist papers deplored the spread of Communism, which one paper described as a poisonous foreign merchandise.

The British reply to the Egyptian Note on the subject of a revision of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was reported in the press without any appreciable comment. The Communist daily, as usual, criticised the reply for ignoring completely the question of the evacuation of Egypt by British troops.

The question of Franco-Levant relations has come once more to the fore by the revelation of the arrest of organised gangs in the Alaouite region who, according to the press, were armed and directed by the French, acting through the Jesuit Fathers occupying a monastery in the vicinity. A complete munition dump, allegedly set up by the French, was reported to have been discovered. The press quoted confessions alleged to have been made according to which the French intended to foment a revolt in this region in order to convince the United Nations' Organisation, when the Levant question came up, that the presence of French troops in Syria was essential.

Conjecture as to whether the question of the Levant States would be raised before the Security Council of the United Nations was rife during the week, despite the repeated assurances of *Ad-Diar*, whose editor is in London reporting on the Conference, that the matter would, in fact, be discussed. This latter's insistence on the differentiation between the terms "Franco-Lebanese" and "Franco-Syrian" caused, according to the Communist daily, a certain amount of uneasiness as to the ultimate intentions of Great Britain in the matter of evacuation.

General Spears' statement before the Palestine Investigating Committee in London was given prominence, as was also the British decision to allow the entry of 1,500 Jews per month into Palestine pending the findings of the Investigating Committee. Both the Damascus and the Beirut nationalist papers protested violently against the decision, one paper stating that Great Britain was rapidly losing the confidence and prestige she has recently enjoyed in the Arab States.

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Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 201, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 12th February, 1946.—(Received 5th March.)

General.

THE press has given prominence in the last few days to a number of messages from London describing meetings said to have been held between the French and Levant States' delegations, with the object of reaching agreement on the subject of the withdrawal of troops before the matter came up before the United Nations' Organisation. On the 12th February the Lebanese President showed His Majesty's Minister a note which General Beynet had that day sent to him on the instructions of M. Bidault. This note stated that M. Bidault had had several conversations with Hamid Bey Frangieh in an endeavour to find a formula which could be inserted in the French declaration before the Security Council. They had apparently finally agreed upon a formula which would state that neither of the signatories of the Anglo-French Agreement interpreted it to mean that they would retain forces in the Levant States indefinitely, failing a decision by the Security Council, and adding that the

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agreement raised certain technical difficulties which the French Government were prepared to discuss direct with the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. The President, after consulting the Syrian President by telephone, summoned a Cabinet council the same night, as a result of which a telegram was despatched to the Lebanese delegation in London stating that to accept the proposed formula would be dangerous, since the United Nations' Organisation might then consider that the Lebanese Government had now assumed responsibility for direct negotiations; the only acceptable formula would be one stating a definite date for final evacuation.

Both the Syrian and Lebanese Chambers have unanimously passed resolutions expressing disapproval of Zionist immigration into Palestine, and supporting the policy of the Arab League. In the Syrian Chamber several deputies delivered attacks on the Government and the Arab League for not having categorically rejected the proposal of His Majesty's Government, but while both resolutions were worded in moderate terms, the reaction of the press has continued to be violent. The town of Beirut was closed in protest on the 7th February, but little interest was shown and there were no incidents of importance.

On the 6th February the Lebanese Prime Minister communicated to this legation a note stating that his Government were anxious to receive the Anglo-American Commission, since the Lebanon was a neighbour of Palestine and therefore directly interested in a solution of this question; the commission, the note ended, would no doubt consider that it was only equitable to gather evidence on the spot, as had been done in Western countries. The Prime Minister was told, in reply, that the commission would not have time to visit Arab capitals other than Cairo, but would be glad to receive written or oral evidence there. He begged that this decision might be reconsidered.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 30th January to the 7th February amount to 416 tons, a daily average of forty-six tons, which brings the total for the 1946-47 crop up to 187,598 tons.

The Lebanese and Syrian economic authorities have been holding meetings regarding customs policy and a future wheat-collecting organisation. On neither subject have they yet reached agreement, since in both cases the interests of the two States are fundamentally different. In general, Syria requires protection for her producers, who have considerable political power, and the Lebanon low tariffs for her consumers; whilst as regards wheat, the Lebanon has every interest in an organisation which would ensure the supplies she requires for her internal consumption at an agreed price, whereas the Syrian producers are out to obtain a free market in order to be able to enhance their profits. Economic difficulties between the two States are, in fact, likely to increase rather than to decrease in the future.

At a sitting of the Syrian Chamber on the 9th February, a bill was passed authorising the formation of a new service to be called the Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Service, with the object of setting up an automatic telephone network and a broadcasting station; for this purpose the new service will be authorised to draw on the Treasury sums amounting to L.S. 26 million.

In the debate in the Syrian Chamber on the budget chapter for the Ministry of Public Works, the question was raised of the procedure to be adopted for the granting of permits to search for minerals. Several deputies stressed the point that the Government could not, under article 105 of the Constitution, grant any concession to exploit the natural resources of the country unless a special law was passed by the Chamber to authorise such a concession. A motion was tabled to the effect that no new permits authorising exploration for mineral deposits should be granted until a new law had been prepared, and that all permits already granted should be considered as cancelled.

Syria—Damascus.

During the week sittings of the Chamber of Deputies have taken place almost daily to enable the budget to be passed before the end of the session. The Ministry of National Economy came in for considerable criticism, and there was a renewed demand for the abolition of the Department of Supply. In reply the Minister of National Economy said that although he was, in principle, in favour of abolishing this department since it had failed to perform its functions, it was a source of considerable revenue and included three sub-departments which

could not yet be dispensed with—Commerce, Bread and Provisions, and the control of commodities in short supply such as iron and yarn. As a result of this criticism, the budget chapter for the Supply Department was referred back to the Budget Committee, who later recommended that the department should be abolished. The budget for the Supply Department was finally adopted.

The Syrian Government have in no way modified their attitude towards General Monclar's proposed visits to French garrisons in Syria (see Weekly Political Summary No. 200, Syria and Damascus). As a result of strong representations in London to the French authorities, instructions have been sent to General Beynet which resulted in his agreeing to postpone General Monclar's proposed visits to Lattakia and Aleppo for the present. General Monclar visited Mezzé aerodrome by air on the 7th February before these instructions had been received.

General Nuri Pasha Said passed through Damascus on his way to Turkey, via Beirut, and was received by the President and had interviews with the Prime Minister. An official communiqué was issued stating that economic problems concerning Syria and Iraq had been discussed, but public opinion is reluctant to accept this explanation, and there is a widespread belief that he discussed the possibilities of closer political relations between Syria and Iraq. He is known to have received deputies and others who are interested in the substitution of a monarchy for the present régime; his explanation for so doing is that he felt it was a suitable opportunity to tell them that any action of this kind at the present moment would seriously endanger the future of Syria and of the Arab League.

The Minister of Justice has agreed to submit to the Chamber during the next ordinary session a draft bill for the abolition of the mixed courts. He has informed a member of His Majesty's Legation staff that the bill will propose that those countries previously entitled to capitulatory rights should retain them insofar as "commercial cases are concerned," but not in criminal or civil cases, and that a judge from the International Court at The Hague should be appointed to preside over the hearing of such cases.

Letters have been sent, at the request of the Chamber of Deputies, to those deputies who have accepted salaried posts under the Government, and who under the Constitution must after six months resign either from the Chamber or from their appointments under the Government; the Syrian Ministers in Washington, Paris and Cairo, and the Mohafez of Lattakia will be affected.

Lebanon.

Franco-Lebanese negotiations for the transfer of powers continue, but it is understood that a hitch has occurred as regards the telephone service, as the French, apparently wishing to ensure that any future concession for the Lebanese telephone service shall be granted by the Government to a company including French interests, are stated to have put forward a claim for L.S. 50 million for the expenses of the Lebanese Troupes Spéciales during the war period, which the Lebanese will not even consider.

The position of the Lebanese Government, and particularly of the Prime Minister, appears to be weakening. Acrimonious telegrams are understood to have been exchanged between the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs in London on the subject of a French reception which the Prime Minister accused the delegation of not having attended, and Hamid Frangieh is unlikely to view with favour the various diplomatic appointments which the Prime Minister has made in his absence, although they have been held up by the President. It is, therefore, probable that the return of the Lebanese delegation next month will see a reshuffle. In the meantime, the Government are faced with a number of internal problems.

The first of these is labour unrest, which is now coming to a head. The federation of workers' syndicates is understood to be envisaging a general strike of industrial workers in support of their demand for a large scaling-up of cost-of-living bonuses. The Government, who have already instructed the concessionary companies not to yield to the workers' demands, apparently intend to resist; they have several times threatened the federation with repressive action if their efforts to organise a strike do not cease, and are talking of arranging military and gendarmerie pickets on industrial installations to protect blacklegs. It remains to be seen how far the Government will be prepared to maintain their

attitude in face of intensive pressure from the workers, who show signs of much improved organisation. The Shell and Socony Vacuum companies, who were already envisaging wage increases to meet the steadily rising cost of living, are, alone amongst large employers of labour, not directly threatened with strikes.

The magistrates are also threatening trouble. Their demands for improved conditions and for the abolition of political intervention, made some weeks ago, have received no satisfaction, and when a deputation visited the Prime Minister on the 10th February they were unsympathetically received and retired disgruntled. In support of their demands, which appear largely justified, the Lawyers' Association met on the 12th February and proclaimed a strike. There are, however, political motives involved, and it is thought that the President will be able to find a solution.

Press.

The British decision to allow the monthly quota of 1,500 Jews to enter Palestine, pending the findings of the Investigating Committee, and the repercussions provoked by this decision in the Arab States, brought the Palestine question once more to the fore in the columns of the local press during the week. The protests of the various Arab bodies and organisations were given wide publicity, and the decision was bitterly criticised by the nationalist papers of both Syria and the Lebanon. There was an under-current which gave the impression that the papers were of the opinion that Britain, by this anti-Arab decision, had driven the Arabs nearer to Russia, and one Damascus paper pointedly remarked that though there are more than 3 million Jews in Russia, the Soviet Union had not been invited to participate in the investigation.

The press continued to comment on the subjects of the Anglo-French Agreement and the general question of France-Levant relations. A reported attempt by M. Bidault in London to prevent the raising of the Levant case before the Security Council by the issue of an invitation to talk the matter over in Paris was, though denied by the French Embassy, qualified by a Damascus paper as another French manoeuvre which would not deceive the Syrians. The opinion of the Lebanese Minister in Paris, contained in an alleged dispatch to his Government, that the Levant policy of French Government differed completely from that of General de Gaulle, was accepted with a large grain of salt by a Beirut nationalist paper.

Considerable prominence was given in the local press to the anti-British and anti-Government demonstrations in Egypt.

Russian aims with regard to the Middle East continued to form one of the principal topics of discussion. One of the leading Damascus papers urged that the Arab States, particularly Iraq, should not be inveigled into a revival of the Saadabad Pact, or close collaboration with Turkey and Persia in a *bloc* antagonistic to the Soviet Union; such a step, in the opinion of the paper, would be contrary to the policy of the Arab League, whose aim is, or should be, the maintenance of friendly relations with all the big Powers. Other papers mentioned Turkey's anxiety at the prospect of the withdrawal of Allied troops, particularly British, from the Levant States. The Damascus *Al Kifah*, in an article expressing unalloyed pleasure at the amicable settlement of the Greek question between Britain and the Soviet Union, published high praise of Great Britain who, though never the aggressor, has emerged victorious from every war since she defeated the Spanish Armada. In Beirut the Russian question was discussed mainly by the Arabic and Armenian Communist papers, whose articles were, needless to say, pro-Soviet. One Beirut Arabic journal suggested that opinion in the Lebanon was crystallising into pro-British and pro-Soviet factions.

A considerable amount of space was devoted in the press to the Iraqi-Transjordan talks at Amman, the memoirs published by the Emir Abdullah, and the proposed visit of Nuri Pasha as-Said to Turkey, after visiting Syria and the Lebanon. Much conjecture as to the real object of Nuri Pasha's movements were published, and though it was officially announced that he was discussing economic affairs, the press, particularly the Beirut Communist paper, appeared to be convinced that some deep-laid plot, vaguely connected with Greater Syria, was in the making. Reference was made to a final show-down, albeit hidden for the moment, between the Hashimite and Saudi dynasties, the former supported by Britain and the latter by the United States.

[E 2137/213/89]

(7)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 202, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 19th February, 1946.—(Received 9th March.)

General.

THE proceedings of the United Nations Organisation on the Levant question were prominently, though not always accurately, reported in the local press, and provided the principal topic of interest during the week. In the Lebanon public reaction has mainly been one of bewilderment as to what actually occurred or will happen in the future, but in general the absence of any definite result has not been taken too tragically. In Syria, owing to the complete interruption by a blizzard of all communications, the only information received has been through various wireless broadcasts, and the outcome has been comparatively little discussed. Much greater interest has been taken in the reported statements of M. Bidault to London press correspondents, especially one to the effect that France considered that she should provide any help which the Levant States might require in connection with security. The Syrian President informed a member of His Majesty's Legation that he could form no opinion until he had seen the full text of the debates, and of M. Bidault's conference, but that if the above-mentioned statement attributed to M. Bidault was correct, it showed that the French had not changed and never would. The Syrian Prime Minister has made some fiery statements to a representative of the Columbia Broadcasting Corporation, and has also strongly criticised to the American Chargé d'Affaires the lukewarmness of the American attitude on the Levant question. In the Lebanon there has been some popular enthusiasm for Russia which is being exploited by the Communist press.

On the 19th February the Lebanese President showed a member of the legation staff a note which he had just received from General Beynet, stating that, as a result of recent discussions in London, the Secretary of State and M. Bidault had agreed to begin negotiations on evacuation in Paris with Syria and the Lebanon; that the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had been so informed in London, had urged that these conversations should take place not in Paris but in London, in view of the Syrian disinclination to go to Paris; and that M. Bidault had maintained his point of view and had instructed General Beynet to endeavour to persuade the President to accept it. The French Délégation Générale did not inform His Majesty's Legation that they were making this *démarche*. The President said that he was informing General Beynet that he could not give a definite reply until he had consulted the Syrians, who at the moment were inaccessible owing to weather conditions. He later made it clear that in his view the Syrians would not consent to go to Paris and that the Lebanese Government must keep in step with them. He also expressed concern lest the scope of these conversations should be broadened to include political matters; he considered that this would give the French opportunities for endless procrastination, and that the conversations should be confined to the question of evacuation.

It has now been possible to inform the Lebanese Government, as a result of a communication received from the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry on Palestine, that the Commission appreciate the invitation extended to them to visit the Lebanon, but cannot return a definite answer until the whole Committee, the members of which are at present scattered in sub-Committees, have met together again and until their work is further advanced.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 8th February to the 19th February amount to 359 tons, a daily average of 32 tons, which brings the total for the 1946-47 crop up to 187,957 tons.

On the 13th February the Syrian and Lebanese Finance Ministers met to discuss the questions of future tariff policy and of a grain-collecting organisation to replace M.I.R.A. after its closure. Conflicting reports have been received as to what occurred. According to the Lebanese Finance Minister, agreement in principle was reached on both questions; in particular, it was decided to set up a Syro-Lebanese grain-collecting organisation for the forthcoming season, which would operate on the basis of the maintenance of the existing prices for the purchase of grain, the prohibition of any export of grain until the requirements of both countries had been assured, and the fixing of those requirements in accordance with actual consumption. It seems clear, however, that the two

Ministers only agreed to agree on both questions, and that further meetings will be necessary to work out details. Meantime His Majesty's Legation have informed the Lebanese and Syrian Presidents of the gravity of the world food situation and urged them to give effect to the recent United Nations Organisation resolution calling on all member States to do everything in their power to reduce waste and to encourage production of food-stuffs. The Lebanese Prime Minister is concerned at the possibility of public agitation over the grain situation, and he and the Finance Minister have been making reassuring statements on the position in the Lebanon.

At a sitting of the Syrian Chamber on the 11th February a Homs Deputy put forward a proposal, which was accepted, that Arrêté No. 110 of the 9th August, 1933, on prospecting rights, together with subsequent amendments, should cease to be enforced and that permits granted in accordance with these arrêtés should be considered as cancelled until such time as a special law on exploration for and exploitation of minerals is made. The President of the Budget Committee, the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Economy have all expressed the view that the new article will not affect the agreement between the Government and the Syrian Petroleum Company.

Damascus—Syria.

While the Syrian President was attending prayers at the Omayyad Mosque on the 14th February, a Druze from the Second Battalion of the Groupement was arrested some 200 yards away from the entrance on the route that had been taken by Shukri Bey Quwatli, carrying a knuckle-duster and three hand-grenades. Rumours soon spread that an attempt had been made on the life of the President; there is as yet no indication that the man with the grenades had any intention of attacking the President, and he has now been liberated and told to rejoin his unit.

The final sitting of the eighth extraordinary session of the Syrian Chamber took place on the 8th February; as there was no quorum the Secretary read the presidential decree terminating the session. The first sitting of the next ordinary session was fixed for the 17th March.

The debate on the draft budget was completed on the 11th February, when the budget as a whole was voted upon and accepted by a majority; sixteen members who normally vote against the Government and consider themselves the official opposition voted against it.

On the 16th February, pamphlets printed in Armenian and issued by the "Committee for Repatriation" were distributed among the Armenian population of Damascus inviting all those who desire to go to Soviet Armenia to register. In the first two days it is estimated that some 450 out of a total population of upward of 12,000 had registered. According to the Armenian Commandant of the Syrian gendarmerie, Hrant Bey Maluyan, the Hanshak and Communist parties are jointly sponsoring this campaign, while the Tashnag party are carrying on propaganda against it. Hrant Bey has also expressed the opinion that the real reason for it is that Soviet Armenia lost some 80,000 out of 200,000 soldiers in East Prussia during the war, and now needs to make good this loss of man-power. He does not think that elderly people will be welcome, but that the principal need is for qualified artisans.

Tribal.

The Syrian Government's recent manoeuvre of sending a large force from its security services into the desert east of Homs, under conditions of considerable secrecy, is now becoming clear. It is primarily to move the main body of the Naim tribe, complete with its herds, to an area where it will be safe from attacks by the Aneze, or depredations by the Mawali. At the time of writing, the escorted Naim have reached the area of Agerbat 311344, and their ultimate destination is almost certainly the rocky wilderness country west of Hama known as the "Waar." Here they will have the town of Hama, the Homs-Aleppo main road, and a buffer of semi-nomad tribes between them and the Aneze. Depredations by the Mawali, who have been camped near them at Bir Sleim, have cost the Naim some 400 head of sheep, a severe loss to the Homs merchants, most of whose sheep are in Naim hands. No doubt pressure from Homs obliged the Government to make this unusual move during the difficult rainy season, and at least a month before any danger might be apprehended from the scattered Aneze tribesmen.

This large-scale move of a discredited tribe, under Government escort, to a supposedly safe area, will not be without its effect on the other tribes. Essentially it is a confession of weakness. The "Waar" area, rocky and barren, has been a place of refuge for weak tribes of the Beduin for centuries past. Its wells are few, pasture is scarce, it borders on the uncertain Alaouite territory, and remains cold and windy long after the lambing season. It is thus regarded by tribesmen as the last resort for man and animals. The internment of the Naim there is, in effect, an admission that the Naim cannot be protected in their legitimate pastures. The Beduin will not be slow to perceive this. Weakness in another merely increases his own sense of opportunity. The Naim, though safe perhaps from the Aneze for a season, will be likely to suffer many depredations from the small tribes bordering the "Waar." This, and the losses they will suffer among their flocks from poor pasture, lack of water, and exposure, may well drive them to take their chance again in the open desert.

The Aneze, meanwhile, are awaiting two events: the result of the enquiry into Trad's murder, and the arrival of their own tribesmen from the east. The Beduin is adept at biding his time, and they can afford to wait. No doubt the difficulties of the Syrian forces floundering through the mud east of Homs, in an administrative chaos, will not be lost on them.

The Naim-Aneze crisis is reported to have led to much movement among the semi-nomad tribes, principal of whom are the Mawali and Hadidyeen. Both the Emirs Abed and Shayesh of the Mawali are reported to have given the Government an assurance that they would support the Naim in any clash. But both Emirs are completely unreliable, and it is noteworthy that while Abed is supposed to have pledged his word to support the Naim, his men have been robbing them. The final word, as to what the semi-nomads will do in the event of trouble, lies with Nawaf Saleh of the Hadidyeen. This wise and shifty old Sheikh, who has close relations with the Aneze by marriage, is believed to have given his word to both sides in case of trouble, and he will no doubt come out strongly on the winning side if trouble occurs. This has always been his policy since the Turkish days. If the Aneze can secure him, then they need fear neither the Naim nor the Government. If he sides with the Government, then the Aneze will find the semi-nomads presenting a united and better armed front to them—a front against which they could do nothing without calling in help from their brothers, the Iraqi Amarat, and thus opening up an appalling future of tribal warfare, which Fawwaz Shaalan particularly would be loth to do.

Lebanon.

In the Lebanese Chamber on the 19th February, a debate took place on the United Nations Organisation proceedings, during which the Prime Minister made a statement expressing thanks to those States who had supported the Lebanese cause and expressing confidence that Lebanese aspirations would soon be realised. Habib Abi Chahla, in a long speech, drew the regretful conclusion that the United Nations Organisation had rejected the Lebanese case and demanded that the Powers concerned be asked to define their intentions; if they sincerely desired to withdraw their troops let them say so, otherwise the Lebanese would re-submit the case to the Security Council. A motion thanking the States who have championed the Lebanese case, particularly the Soviet Union, was finally referred to the Chamber's Foreign Affairs Committee. During the debate more than one Deputy commented adversely on the alleged statement of M. Bidault (see section 1, paragraph 1, above).

The threatened general strike of industrial workers in the Lebanon was averted by the action of the Government, which in the course of a meeting with syndicate and employers' representatives on the 14th February succeeded in inducing the former to call off the strike in return for certain promised concessions to the workers. These concessions included the opening of co-operative stores, the provision of cheap bread, the formation of a commission, including representatives of the Government and of the syndicates, to examine the workers' demands, and the prompt ratification of certain labour legislation at present before the Chamber. It was noticeable that the syndicate representatives at this meeting seemed to attach chief importance to the question of co-operatives, thus bearing out the view that they were concerned mainly to obtain better conditions for the lowest-paid workers. They also accepted without protest the Government's refusal to see Mustafa Ariss, the President of the Federation of Syndicates, on account of his truculent attitude, and seemed anxious to disclaim

any suggestion of Communist sympathies. It remains to be seen whether the Government will carry out enough of its promises to prevent a recrudescence of the trouble. The Banque de Syrie employees staged a short sit-down strike on the 19th February, but were persuaded to return to work when the Government had induced the manager to examine their grievances.

Franco-Lebanese conversations on the transfer of powers have continued. There are still difficulties over the Beirut Broadcasting Station, on which the French are claiming two hours per day for uncensored broadcasts, after the transfer which the Lebanese consider to be an unacceptable delegation of sovereignty. The transfer of the telephone system is also giving trouble; according to the President, the French have now raised a counter-claim for £.Syr.50 million in respect of the subsistence of the Lebanese *Troupes Spéciales* during the war period, which the Lebanese regard as wholly unacceptable since these troops were not controlled by them at the time. The French are also claiming the right to retain special lines from Beirut to their delegations in the Lebanese provinces.

The Saudi-Arabian Minister at Damascus presented letters of credence appointing him also as Minister to the Lebanon on the 16th February. According to the press, Canada and Ecuador have also recognised Lebanese independence, though it is thought unlikely that either will appoint separate diplomatic representatives.

The French ship *Ile d'Oléron* (see Weekly Summary for January 29th, paragraph 3) duly arrived with about 100 French military personnel and left with about 200 in accordance with the assurances previously given by the French to the Lebanese Government. The visit attracted little local attention.

The magistrates and lawyers are still on strike, as the Prime Minister is maintaining his refusal to give satisfaction to the former.

General Nuri Pasha Said, who had been the guest of the Lebanese President for a few days, left Beirut suddenly on the 13th February to return to Iraq, where a Cabinet crisis had occurred. Before leaving he made a declaration to local press correspondents, in the course of which he indignantly denied that the Greater Syria project was a British manoeuvre designed to open the doors of the Arab countries to Zionist immigration. He also declared that Iraq was ready to help the Lebanese food problem through the export of surplus Iraqi wheat. He called on His Majesty's Minister on the evening before his departure.

[E 2237/213/89]

(8)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 203, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 26th February, 1946.—(Received 13th March.)
General.

Public interest in both countries during the past week has been largely concerned with the proceedings in the United Nations Security Council on the Levant States. M. Bidault's reported statements to the London press (see Weekly Political Summary No. 202, "General," paragraph 1) have continued to give rise to much adverse comment. In general, the tone of the press has not been optimistic, though in Syria the Government-controlled newspapers have taken the line that, on balance, the country has gained by appealing to the Security Council.

On the 23rd February His Majesty's Minister visited the Syrian President and Prime Minister, and later in the same day the Lebanese President, to inform them of the policy decided upon by His Majesty's Government as a result of their adherence to the resolution in the United Nations Security Council regarding the evacuation of the British and French troops from the Levant States.

The Lebanese President subsequently communicated this information to the Cabinet, but enjoined them to keep it strictly confidential; it does not appear that the Syrian Cabinet have yet been informed. The Syrian Prime Minister intended to meet Lebanese representatives on the following day to discuss the situation, but was prevented from doing so as the roads to Beirut were blocked by snow.

The Lebanese President stated during the interview with His Majesty's Minister that he had finally given discretion to the Lebanese delegation in London to accept the invitation of the French Government to go to Paris for

discussions on the evacuation of French troops from the Lebanon. He stated that the Syrian Government had raised no objection to the visit of the Lebanese delegation, although they did not wish to empower the Lebanese to represent them. The President was not hopeful of the outcome of these discussions and expressed fears that pro-French elements in the Lebanon would now redouble their propaganda efforts on the lines that French troops would remain indefinitely after British troops had been withdrawn. He obviously feared that his régime would be thereby endangered.

It has now been reported that the Lebanese delegation, including Riad Solh, will leave for Paris on the 28th February. Rumours that they were disunited and that Riad Solh was returning alone to the Lebanon have been denied.

Considerable publicity has been given in the press to the disturbances which took place in Egypt during the past week. There is a clearly marked tendency to support the Egyptian claim for the withdrawal of British troops, more particularly because of the support given by Egypt to the Levant States in their own demand for the evacuation of foreign troops. The usual anti-British newspapers have not failed to suggest that the disturbances were organised by the British to justify the retention of British troops and to prejudice the negotiations for the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty; one Damascus newspaper, however, suggested that the troubles were Russian-inspired. A few of the younger members of the Shabab Mohamed (Youth Movement) in Damascus endeavoured to foment anti-British demonstrations in sympathy with Egypt, but the Syrian authorities are understood to have expressed their intention of preventing any such demonstrations.

Although the Lebanese and Syrian Governments still hope that the Anglo-American Commission on Palestine, or at least some of its members, will visit Damascus and Beirut, the Lebanese Government intend to send Mohamad Jamil Beyhum to Egypt to appear before the commission; he is president of the "Association of Parties against Zionism."

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 20th to 26th February amount to 260 tons, a daily average of 37 tons, which brings the total for the 1946-47 crop up to 188,217 tons.

Damascus-Syria.

See also "General" above.

Nassouh Bey Ayoubi, director-general of the Ministry of the Interior, took up his duties on the 18th February as acting director-general of the police in the place of Aref Nakadi.

Lebanon.

The Lebanese Government have passed an uneasy week during which the strike of magistrates and lawyers has remained unresolved and the Vice-President, Gabriel Murr, has for the third time in a month offered his resignation in writing, this time in protest against what he regards as the partisan policy of the Acting Minister of the Interior in respect of municipal appointments in the provinces. The latest reports suggest that the present "ministerial crisis," which as usual has been exploited by the anti-governmental press, has been liquidated and that Gabriel Murr has once again been induced to withdraw his resignation. The Prime Minister announced in the Chamber of Deputies on the 26th February that the Government had no objection to setting up a committee composed of Deputies, officials, and representatives of the magistrates and lawyers, to examine the latter's grievances and recommend remedies. The magistrates and lawyers had previously protested hotly against a statement attributed to the Prime Minister that their strike was due to "foreign intrigues," and maintained that their grievances were legitimate.

Abdul Hamid Mahmud, described as the Iraqi delegate for the Arab boycott of Zionist trade, has arrived in the Lebanon and interviewed the Lebanese Government on the measures which they are taking to implement the boycott of Jewish goods decided upon by the Arab League.

It has been officially announced that recruiting for the Lebanese army will recommence as from the 7th March.

It is learnt that the Lebanese and Turkish Governments have agreed, as the result of discussions with the Turkish Consul-General in Beirut, that the two countries will exchange consular representatives; a Lebanese Consulate-General is accordingly to be established in Istanbul. The question of mutual recognition and the exchange of diplomatic representatives has been left in abeyance for the present, as the Lebanese Government do not wish to adopt a different policy in this regard from that of Syria, which is still adamant on the Hatay question.

The Lebanese Government also propose to open consulates-general at Ottawa and Sydney, and will probably shortly recognise the present Polish Government, an emissary from which has recently visited them for this purpose. They have also been approached with a view to mutual recognition by the Spanish Government, through their ambassador in Cairo, but apparently intend to stall on this question in view of the unpopularity of the Franco régime amongst the Great Powers and in the United Nations Organisation.

It is reported that the leaders of local political parties in the Bekaa are concerned at the interest Russia is taking in the Communist party in the Levant States. The Communists continue to work the principal centres of Zahlé, Merjayoun, Machgara and Baalbek, where branches exist, and from those centres encouragement is given to village activities. There appears to be no lack of funds, and it is obvious that the money disposed of in this area does not come from party members.

French political and S.A.A. staffs are active in all social matters in the Bekaa area, and the political officer reports that there is reason to believe French agents are trying to foment unrest by working on such matters as Russian activities; anti-British rioting in Egypt; the differences between the Hashimite and Saudi families and the situation in Palestine.

[E 2654/213/89]

(9)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 204, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 5th March, 1946.—(Received 25th March.)

General.

THE Lebanese President was visited by the Syrian Prime Minister on the 1st March to discuss the implications of His Majesty's Government's decision in regard to the recall of their troops from the Levant States. They are understood to have agreed to address a communication to His Majesty's Legation arguing that His Majesty's Government's assurances, that British troops would not be withdrawn from the Levant States in such a way as to leave the French there alone, should be maintained. Later, however, on the strength of a telegram received from the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, the Lebanese President informed His Majesty's Minister that he would not for the present reply to His Majesty's Government's decision.

On the 3rd March the Syrian Prime Minister announced at a press conference that he had been informed that His Majesty's Government would in no circumstances be brought again as accused before the Security Council on the question of evacuation from the Levant States; that British troops would be withdrawn and that His Majesty's Government expressed the hope that others would withdraw as well. In Syria this official statement of the position produced almost no reaction and few Syrian personalities seemed to have grasped the true import. Those that have done so have expressed the view that the British will be accused by the Arabs of having again broken their word and that this will enable Communist propaganda to gain ground.

Following the official announcement on the 4th March of the Anglo-French agreement on the withdrawal of troops from Syria, optimistic rumours began to circulate in the Lebanon that a similar agreement would shortly be reached in respect of the evacuation of the Lebanon. In Syria, however, the view has continued to be expressed that the French would never evacuate the Lebanon. On the 5th March the Lebanese Government were informed by the Syrian Prime Minister that he had received an unofficial report that the French were proposing to stay for at least a year in the Lebanon—a statement to this effect was heard in Damascus in a French-language broadcast on the 3rd or 4th March. The Lebanese considered that this proposal, if true, was quite unacceptable and that the French should take no longer to evacuate the Lebanon than they were taking to evacuate Syria.

Demonstrations took place and comment and articles in the press on the disturbances in Egypt continued throughout the past week (for details see subsequent sections).

Economic.

Total purchases of grain for the period the 27th February to the 5th March amount to 432 tons, a daily average of 62 tons, which brings the total for the 1946-47 crop up to 188,649 tons.

Letters have been addressed to the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents giving details of the world food situation and urging the necessity for husbanding supplies and increasing the production of cereals. As nothing can be done to stimulate this season's production of cereals, it being too late for any more sowings to take place, particular emphasis has been placed on the necessity for conserving supplies. As a result of these recommendations, M.I.R.A. has been able not only to combat a tendency on the part of the Lebanese Government to request an increase in issues of cereals to their Supply Department, but also to impose temporarily a small reduction in supplies of wheat. On the other hand M.I.R.A.'s shortage of stocks and the fact that nearly all the grain is in Syrian depots made it inadvisable to impose any reduction in issues to Syria as public reaction might have been so violent as to prevent M.I.R.A. from moving supplies from Syria to the Lebanon. As regards next season, the Syrian and Lebanese Governments have agreed in principle to set up a joint grain-collecting organisation to take the place of M.I.R.A.

The first large post-war bankruptcy in Beirut, that of the Bank Saidah, has taken place, the bank's liabilities being estimated at 1½ million Syrian pounds. It was apparently caused largely by unsecured lending. Large shipments of foreign goods are reported in the press to be approaching Beirut, in which case a general fall of prices and further bankruptcies are to be anticipated.

Syria—Damascus.

Considerable confusion prevails among public opinion and the press as to Syria's attitude towards the negotiations taking place in Paris after the military talks between Great Britain and France. The Syrian Prime Minister has been violently attacked for his proposed intention to leave the representation of Syria in the hands of the Lebanese delegation. With the exception of Fares Bey el Khouri, leader of the Syrian delegation to the United Nations Conference, all other members and secretaries have left London. The general impression gained in conversation with those who have returned to Damascus is that, while they are reasonably satisfied with the Security Council's decision concerning the Levant States, they are horrified at what they have seen and learned of Soviet methods. Farid Zein-ed-Din dilated at some length to a member of the staff of His Majesty's Legation on the necessity for Great Britain and the Arab countries to discuss beforehand their attitude to any matter coming before the various committees of the United Nations, so that there would never arise again the situation in which Russia supported the Arab countries, or the Arab countries supported Russia, against Great Britain.

At a press conference on the 1st March the Prime Minister told correspondents that there was no ministerial crisis and that perfect harmony prevailed among all members of the Cabinet. This statement conflicts with the widespread belief, which was voiced in most papers on the 28th February, that there are considerable divergences in the Cabinet and that a reconstruction of the Ministry is imminent.

On the 4th March an orderly demonstration of 2,000-3,000 students occurred in Damascus in sympathy with Egypt; a letter expressing Syrian solidarity with Egypt was delivered to the Royal Egyptian Legation by the demonstrators and a number of written protests from various Nationalist and Communist groups were received at His Majesty's Legation. The town was partially closed for some hours and some anti-British shouts were raised when the demonstrators passed His Majesty's Minister's house. There is little doubt that the Communist party and the Shabab Mohamed took a leading part in instigating the demonstration, but little enthusiasm was shown by the population in general.

On the 2nd March, the official date on which various classes of income tax and war profits tax became payable, the merchants of Damascus arranged for the town to be closed and a deputation presented themselves to the Minister of Finance protesting against the basis on which the taxes are assessed. Not being satisfied with the reply they received from the minister, who declared that while he was prepared to examine the possibility of making compliance with the law easier, he must apply the law, the deputation called on the President and explained to him

that the existing law was unfair: they could not keep accurate books because a large part of their trade was unofficial and illegal, *e.g.*, contraband trade with Transjordan and Iraq; and their accounts could not show "concealed" taxation, *i.e.*, squeeze and graft which they had to pay to various Government officials in order that business might be conducted. The President is said to have agreed that they were in a difficult position and to have undertaken to look into the matter.

The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs has confirmed that the Syrian Legation in Washington has been authorised to open negotiations with Canada and Ecuador for recognition by both these countries.

A decree has at last been issued confirming the appointment of Mr. Frank Brown, a citizen of the United States, as Director of the Department of Antiquities under the Ministry of Education.

Lebanon.

The Lebanese delegation has reached Paris, and is apparently to begin discussions with the French Government after the termination of the Anglo-French military discussions, in which they have not participated. It is not yet clear what they will discuss.

The Lebanese League of National Action, a Nationalist body which includes Communist participation, staged a demonstration of sympathy with Egypt in Beirut on the 28th February. The Government attempted, without success, to prevent it, but so shepherded the procession that only some 250 people took part, the town only partially closed for two hours and there were no incidents. Representatives of the Phalange and Najjadé parties took part, chiefly in order not to be accused of lacking in enthusiasm for Arab solidarity, but the parties as a whole did not participate. The Communist party, aided and abetted by the French-controlled section of the press, which made the maximum capital out of the incidents in Egypt and accused the Government and the Lebanese people of not supporting their Egyptian brethren against the British, managed to promote a complete closure of Beirut on the 4th March. This second strike generally irritated the population, who regarded it as a senseless loss of money, and may possibly produce a reaction against the Communists, the Government's failure to control whom has been increasingly criticised of late. The Government, after the strike of the 4th March, issued a communiqué forbidding all similar strikes in future; an ineffectual gesture, which has pleased nobody.

The long-drawn-out strike of magistrates and lawyers is apparently to cease on the 6th March in view of the Government's consent to the formation of a commission to examine their grievances.

The political officer in the Bekaa reports that several Moslem and Christian notables in the area have spoken of their concern in learning that the Lebanese delegation have accepted the invitation to the French talks in Paris, knowing that the Syrians had refused. Distrust of French intentions is very evident, and it is thought by some that the opportunity offered by the Lebanese delegation's visit to Paris will result in the French making a determined effort to drive a wedge between Syria and the Lebanon. The action of Riad Bey Solh in taking no active part in the conversations before the Security Conference terminating in the acceptance of the Paris invitation, meets with general approval.

The French authorities at Rayak Air Base are continuing to discharge employees, and the numbers employed at the base are now reduced to some 700, whereas six months ago there were 1,400.

It is reported that some agents in the Bekaa, known to have had contact with the French and with the Communist party, have been active amongst the workers discharged by the French and the British military authorities. A petition is shortly to be presented to the Lebanese Government asking them to pay indemnities for loss of employment, to provide work for those discharged by the French and British, and to grant financial assistance and to provide essential commodities for the unemployed.

It is officially announced that Joseph Salem, Lebanese Personality No. 74, the present Minister of the Interior has been appointed the permanent Lebanese representative on the United Nations Economic Council. This will presumably create a vacancy in the Cabinet and may contribute towards the ministerial re-shuffle which is confidently expected to follow the return of the Lebanese delegation from abroad.

[E 2842/213/89]

(10)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 205, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 12th March, 1946.—(Received 29th March.)

General.

ON the 7th March the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs telegraphed from Paris stating that the Anglo-French military conversations on the Lebanon had resulted in disagreement, as the French had asked for a year to complete their withdrawal whilst the British were envisaging final evacuation by the end of June; that he had informed the Quai d'Orsay that the French date was unacceptable; and that the Anglo-French conversations had been resumed on a diplomatic plane following his refusal. The Lebanese Government, in informing this legation of the contents of this message, confirmed that the French proposal was unacceptable, and added that the French argument, that they were unable to evacuate for so long a period for technical reasons, was untenable, since the Minister for Foreign Affairs had learnt that the British authorities had offered to supply any transport facilities which the French might require to remove their stores; furthermore, he had himself assured the French that the Lebanese Government would give any necessary facilities, such as the provision of transport or of guards for French installations. The Lebanese made it clear that they suspected that the French proposal was based on political considerations only.

On the 9th March General Beynet, on instructions received that day from Paris, informed the Lebanese Government officials that, as a result of the Anglo-French military conversations, the French had decided to fix the date for their final evacuation of the Lebanon at the 1st April, 1947, and that the French Government had been informed of the British plan for evacuation, which differed from the French plan because the conditions as regards the two forces were dissimilar.

The Lebanese President and Prime Minister met the Syrian Prime Minister at Chtaura on the 10th March, in order to discuss this French communication as well as further reports received from the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. It has been learnt that, as a result of this meeting, the Lebanese Government instructed their Minister for Foreign Affairs to press the French Government to evacuate the Lebanon simultaneously with the British, and in the event of failure to proceed to the United States in order to lay the matter again before the Security Council.

Much local comment was aroused by a report that the B.B.C. on the 10th March had stated that the British and French negotiators in Paris had reached an agreement by which British troops would evacuate the Lebanon by the end of June 1946 and the French by the end of March 1947, and it was asked in particular whether His Majesty's Government approved the French plan. The Nationalist press in both countries continue to press for simultaneous evacuation of both forces from the Lebanon. In Syria there is a tendency to blame the British for not having insisted on it and for withdrawing from the undertaking given on the 15th December to retain troops in both countries as long as French troops remained. In the Lebanon, however, people are not prepared to treat the matter too tragically, since it is known that conversations are still proceeding and it is hoped that the Lebanese pressure, backed by the threat of a further appeal to the United Nations Organisation, will induce the French considerably to shorten their proposed period of evacuation.

In answer to an informal enquiry from the French Délégation Générale whether His Majesty's Government could assume responsibility for protecting French property and installations after the withdrawal of the British and French forces, His Majesty's Minister replied that this appeared to be a matter for the Syrian Government; Count Ostrorog appeared to agree that the French must hold the Syrians responsible for any damage.

Economic.

Total purchases of grain for the period the 6th March to the 12th March amount to 1,113 tons, a daily average of 159 tons, which brings the total for the 1946-47 crop up to 189,762 tons.

The Lebanese Government on the 8th March cancelled the licence of the Compagnie Générale des Transports, a Lebanese aviation company which has been using Air France aircraft, on the ground that the company has been fraudulently changing the markings and colours of its aircraft. The company have now been allowed to operate one aircraft, but the remainder are still grounded. Just before the suspension one of the company's aircraft crashed

into and seriously damaged two of the American aircraft belonging to the rival company, the Middle East Airlines, on Beirut aerodrome.

Damascus.

The Syrian President has had a recurrence of internal hæmorrhage, and members of his staff consider the time has come when he will have to see one or more first-class consultants, and have made tentative enquiries as to whether there is a British specialist in the Middle East who could be called in.

The Minister of Finance and National Economy, who is also head of the Supply Department, has left for Cairo to make purchases on behalf of the Syrian Government from the American Disposals Board. Saadullah Bey Jabri has taken over his duties during his absence, and is therefore holding five portfolios. It is possible that this concentration of ministerial work in the hands of one individual and the consequent semi-paralysis of the Government machine may shortly impel a Government change or reshuffle.

Events in Egypt continue to have a disturbing effect on Anglo-Syrian relations, and during the past week the trend of the press in general is slightly more hostile and less compromising than during the previous week.

On the 8th March a gang of civilian youths gained entrance to the French military cemetery and did extensive damage to head stones, trees and plants. The police arrested several individuals, and the Prime Minister, on hearing of the incidents, sent for the Director of the Police to express his extreme displeasure, and gave orders that the damage should be repaired immediately and an investigation carried out. The Director of Police has given orders that an armed guard should be on duty day and night at the cemetery. His Majesty's Legation informed the French Délégation Générale of the incident and of the measures taken by the Syrian Prime Minister.

The investigation into the murder of Sheikh Trad el Mulhem has been completed and the proceedings forwarded to the Public Prosecutor. According to the press, the findings indicate that six people were responsible for the crime, five men of the Naim tribe and one man from Homs.

The Iraqi Minister to Syria communicated to Saadullah Bey on the 5th March an aide-mémoire containing the information that Turkey had decided to recognise unconditionally the independence of Syria. Saadullah Bey Jabri, considering this method of conveying a decision somewhat extraordinary, sent for the Turkish Consul and suggested that he should telegraph for confirmation to Angora. The Turkish Consul, although well aware of the facts, was without any official instructions and undertook to do so. Saadullah Bey consequently indicated to His Majesty's Consul that he was in some doubt as to whether the procedure adopted could be considered to afford a sound juridical foundation on which relations between Syria and Turkey could be placed on the basis of mutual recognition of sovereignty.

The Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs has confirmed that the Czechoslovak Consul-General in Beirut on the 4th March handed to Saadullah Bey a note dated the 16th February, stating the decision taken by the Czechoslovak Government on the 10th February to accord unconditional recognition of Syrian independence.

The Prime Minister was quoted by the press on the 6th March as having stated that the Swiss Government have accredited the Swiss Minister in Cairo to the President of the Syrian Republic.

Lebanon.

The Beirut Moslem community have formed a supreme Moslem council, presided over by the Mufti of the Lebanon, and including most leading Moslems, with the object of safeguarding the interests of their community, reconciling political differences between the leading Moslem Deputies, and securing a fair share of political and administrative posts for Moslems. They are particularly concerned to shake up the Prime Minister, who, in their view, is too subservient to the President and is not sufficiently active on behalf of the Moslems. Confessionalism in the Lebanon dies hard.

Reports have been received that a number of prominent politicians formerly considered pro-French, including Emil Edde and Mouses Nammour, have now joined forces with the Maronite Archbishop of Beirut in making approaches to the Soviet Minister on the grounds that the French are obviously leaving the Lebanon and that the Christians must, therefore, seek their protection elsewhere.

The recognition of Lebanese independence by Turkey and the establishment of mutual diplomatic relations, has been officially announced.

Concern is still being expressed in the Bekaa at the presence of the Lebanese delegation in Paris, though a few Christian leaders are known to be pleased. The announcement of the Anglo-French agreement to evacuate Syria by the end of April has been received with satisfaction in Moslem circles, though the fear is still real that the French may make one more effort to control Syria.

The strike organised in the Lebanon to mark sympathy with the Egyptians was not observed in the Bekaa, though efforts were made in Zahlé by several Communist workers to effect the closure of shops and the stoppage of work.

The Sous-Délégué for the Bekaa held a reception on the 6th March, which was well attended; it is learnt that members of the French political and S.A.A. staffs circulated among the guests, introducing such topics of conversation as the present considerate attitude of the French Government to Lebanese claims; the century-old link between the French and the Lebanon; the need for a Great Power to take care of Lebanese interests; and that the interests of Syria and the Lebanon are not identical; attention was also given to the embarrassments of Great Britain in Egypt and Palestine.

Both the Syrian and Lebanese press continued during the week to comment on the tension in Anglo-Egyptian relations. Comment was mainly fair and objective, although there seemed to be a consensus of opinion that there is full justification for the Egyptian demands. The editorials, in most of the papers, were far from being anti-British in tone, consisting principally of appeals to Great Britain to ensure the continued friendship of the Arabs by letting wise and generous counsels prevail in her treatment of Egypt. The Beirut Arabic and Armenian Communist dailies, needless to say, continued to depict Britain as the villain of the piece.

No official news of the Paris military agreement on the evacuation dates for the French and British troops having been received before the end of the period under review, comment on this topic in the local press consisted mainly of conjecture, though some Nationalist papers protested against still another Anglo-French agreement being reached without the participation of the Levant States representatives. Pro-French papers, on receipt of a press agency report of an agreement under which the French would evacuate some months after the British, were openly jubilant, and justified the decision on the grounds that the French, unlike the British, have the residue of twenty-five years' presence in the Levant to liquidate, and also have to face enormous transport difficulties, both by land and sea. Nationalist papers, in the absence of official news, were either silent or pessimistic, the only comment published at this early stage being that of a Beirut paper, which expressed astonishment that a period of thirteen months should be necessary to evacuate 8,000 French troops, and suspicion that the delay would be used by the French to convince the Security Council that security bases in the Levant are essential, in the hope that they will be manned by French troops.

Comment on the Soviet Union centred mainly on the danger, or otherwise, of an expansion of Soviet influence into the Middle East. Opinion in the majority of Syrian and Lebanese papers has not yet crystallised, and will probably remain nebulous until the Levant question, together with those of Egypt and Palestine, are settled. Mr. Churchill's Missouri speech was given wide publicity, but little comment appeared during the period under review.

Comment on the Palestine question was scanty. Two Beirut journals pointed to the danger of Zionist infiltration into the Lebanon under cover of commercial corporations operating behind a Lebanese label.

CHAPTER IV.—SAUDI ARABIA

[E 1331/150/25]

No. 23

Lord Killearn to Mr. Bevin. (Received 13th February)

(No. 152)

Sir,

Cairo, 27th January, 1946

WITH reference to Mr. Graftey-Smith's despatch No. 10 of 16th January, I have the honour to submit the following report on King Ibn Saud's visit to Egypt.

2. The Royal yacht *Mahroussa*, conveying King Ibn Saud and his suite, arrived at Suez on the morning of 10th January. Preparations had been made at the quayside to give King Ibn Saud a full ceremonial welcome. King Farouk, who was present at the harbour, went on board the Royal yacht to greet his guest and accompanied him in the Royal train to Cairo, where there was a large gathering of Egyptian notables, including Prince Mohamed Aly and other members of the Egyptian Royal Family, to meet the train at the station. The Royal train was escorted along the route from Suez to Cairo by aircraft of the Egyptian Air Force. A salute of twenty-one guns was fired on the arrival of the Royal train in Cairo.

3. Their Majesties proceeded to Abdin Palace in the State Coach followed by King Ibn Saud's brother and the twelve sons who had accompanied him and by the numerous suite of King Ibn Saud's advisers and higher officials. Four triumphal arches had been erected along the route taken by these processions. King Ibn Saud, still accompanied by King Farouk, then proceeded to Zaafarane Palace which was placed at his disposal for the duration of his stay.

4. On the evening of 10th January, heads of diplomatic missions in Cairo paid their respects to King Ibn Saud at Zaafarane Palace and later attended a State banquet given by King Farouk at Abdin Palace. The banquet was followed by a theatrical performance followed by a reception attended by some hundreds of Egyptian and foreign notables. Former Egyptian Prime Ministers absented themselves from this reception because they considered that they ought to have been invited to the banquet which preceded it. Nahas Pasha was not invited to this reception nor to any of the other festivities connected with the Royal visit. King Ibn Saud wore the Collier of the Order of Mohamed Aly which King Farouk had just conferred on him, and his sons, including the 13-year-old, wore the Grand Cordon of the Nile.

5. On the following day the two Kings attended Friday prayers at the Azhar Mosque at which the new rector preached the sermon. King Farouk subsequently entertained King Ibn Saud to luncheon at Abdin Palace at which the Rector of El Azhar and various other Egyptian Moslem notables were present. The Egyptian Prime Minister gave a banquet at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the evening.

6. On 12th January the two Kings paid a visit to Cairo University where they were welcomed by Nokrashi Pasha in his capacity as Acting Minister of Education, and by the acting rector Dr. Musharaffa Bey. An athletic gala was held for the occasion. In the evening King Ibn Saud entertained King Farouk, leading Egyptian notables and members of the Diplomatic Corps, including myself, at dinner at Zaafarane Palace. During the afternoon King Ibn Saud was present at a Beduin demonstration of horsemanship arranged in his honour by Sheikh Abdalla Lamloom, a prominent Egyptian tribal chief.

7. In the afternoon of 13th January the two monarchs were present at the races at Heliopolis at which special arrangements were made in honour of King Ibn Saud.

8. A large military review was held at Almaza on 14th January. King Farouk and King Ibn Saud were each saluted on arrival by twenty-one guns. I was present at this review, a feature of which was the display of equipment illustrating the mechanisation of the Egyptian forces. The Chief of the General Staff subsequently issued an order of the day congratulating the forces on their turn-out and expressing the satisfaction of King Farouk and King Ibn Saud. After this ceremony I entertained King Ibn Saud to lunch at this embassy, as I have reported separately in my despatch No. 81 of 15th January. The Royal party subsequently visited the Pyramids.

9. King Ibn Saud visited the Mohamed Aly barrage on 15th January and later attended a reception in the Egyptian Parliament where he was formally

received by the President of the Senate who, in his speech of welcome, referred to the Royal visit as a factor strengthening the union and the solidarity of the Arab nations.

10. The morning of 16th January was occupied in visits to the Zoological Gardens and to the Giza Reformatory. King Farouk and King Ibn Saud then attended a luncheon party given at the Monasterli Palace, which is a recent gift from King Farouk to the Arab League, presided over by the Secretary-General of the Arab League. At this function Nokrashy Pasha read out the joint declaration by the two Kings, a translation of which was enclosed with my despatch No. 91 of 17th January. I was invited to this luncheon but was unable to attend owing to a long-standing engagement at the prize-giving at the English Girls' College in Alexandria.

11. The following day was taken up with a visit to the spinning and weaving mills of the Misr Group at Mehalla el Kubra, where His Majesty was received by Hafez Affi Pasha and the board of directors. On 18th January King Ibn Saud spent the day with King Farouk at the latter's country estate at Inchass.

12. King Ibn Saud travelled by the Royal train to Alexandria on 19th January where he was received by Prince Said Toussoun, the Director-General of the Municipality, and many other local notables. His Majesty was accompanied by Prince Abdel Moneim and Nokrashy Pasha. He inspected the Institute of Hydrobiology and the Fuad 1st Hospital. King Farouk was present at a luncheon given by the Alexandria Municipality in honour of King Ibn Saud. King Ibn Saud also made a tour of the harbour by launch.

13. On return to Cairo on 21st January His Majesty was again the guest of King Farouk at a luncheon party at Abdin Palace.

14. King Ibn Saud and his suite left Cairo on 22nd January and were seen off at the station by King Farouk, members of the Egyptian Royal Family and other dignitaries. They embarked at Suez on the royal yacht *Mahroussa* which was to convey them to Jedda.

15. In the short intervals between the festivities and sight-seeing mentioned above King Ibn Saud received visitors privately, notably a delegation of Palestine Arabs, to whom he was reported to have expressed his full support of the Arab cause in Palestine and his irrevocable opposition to the creation of a Jewish State. I have already reported in my despatch No. 87 of 17th January the conversation which I had with King Ibn Saud at Zaafarane Palace at His Majesty's request. King Ibn Saud is also reported to have received Nahas Pasha who, as indicated above, was not invited to any of the ceremonial functions held in honour of His Majesty.

16. In the public declarations and in the exchange of complimentary messages between the two monarchs in connexion with this visit the emphasis has consistently been placed on the value of this Royal visit as a factor tending to strengthen the union and solidarity of the Arab nations. The special reference to their Majesties' solicitude for the Palestine Arab cause in their joint declaration at the Arab League luncheon was presumably directed towards the Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry on the Palestine problem which had then begun its sittings in Washington. Press comments which have underlined the significance of this visit to the Arab cause have followed stereotyped lines. The Wafdist press, however, generally preferred to abstain from comment, though it did give suitable prominence to reports of the Royal visitor's day-to-day activities.

17. During the whole time that King Ibn Saud was in Egypt very strict precautions were taken to ensure the safety of His Majesty and his suite. In Cairo the traffic diversions and delays occasioned a good deal of inconvenience to the general public and there was some grumbling, especially among the lower classes, whose means of transport to and from their work were often considerably disorganised. The poorer classes were reported also to have criticised the lavish expenditure on the various preparations for the visit at a time when they are impatient for some relief from the high cost of living.

18. No effort was spared to impress King Ibn Saud with Egypt's material progress and to demonstrate the validity of her claim to the leadership of the Arab world. His entertainment was on a lavish scale reminiscent of the days of Khedive Ismail, and he stood the strain remarkably well. His Majesty has not, however, seen anything approaching a complete picture of Egypt, for he was not shown any locality where he might have been able to observe at first hand the stark realities of provincial life, a factor which is of prime importance in any assessment of the Egyptian economy and standard of civilisation. It can be

said, however, that from the Egyptian point of view the visit has greatly contributed to cementing the general relationship between two countries whose cohesion and collaboration may enable them to exert together a decisive influence in the affairs of the Arab world.

19. In spite of some expectations to the contrary, there is no evidence of any specific agreements having been concluded between the two Monarchs.

20. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, the British Middle East Office and Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East.

I have, &c.

KILLEARN.

[E 2249/2249/25]

No. 24

Mr. Grafftey-Smith to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 13th March.)

(No. 31. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, 23rd February, 1946.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith my annual report on Saudi Arabia for the year 1945.

2. I must apologise for the undue length of this review. Your circular No. 012 of the 4th February, 1946, cancelling an earlier instruction, only reached me last week, when the enclosed report, fashioned in the fuller-skirted mode of pre-war days, was already all but completed.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to the British Middle East Office, and to the Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East.

I have, &c.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 24

Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1945.

Introduction.

1945, the year of V.E.-day, V.J.-day and the atomic bomb, was rich in events and developments affecting King Abdel Aziz Al Saud and his dominions. In 1945 the King left his country for the first time in over twenty years to meet President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in Egypt; and himself received the visit of King Farouk at Yenbe. At other points, for good or evil, the barrier of isolation that traditionally has protected Saudi Arabia from an embarrassing involvement in world affairs was formidably breached: by her reluctance, but definitive, association with other Arab States and Egypt in the establishment and operation of the Arab League; by her declaration of war on the Axis Powers, and by her consequent assumption of international responsibilities as a member of the United Nations. For Ibn Saud, whose instinct is to distrust all manifestations of internationalism and—apart from one or two selective friendships—to draw strength from an unsullied desert air, such processes reflect weighty and not always congenial decisions. It may be asserted that, without advice and some pressure from His Majesty's Government, these various decisions would not have been taken.

2. Within the larger framework of regional and global co-operation, 1945 saw a marked intensification of tendencies already earlier manifest. The calamitous arrival of Rashid Aly al Gailani in Riyadh, as a suppliant for sanctuary, added explosive fuel to the smouldering fires of Saudi-Iraqi suspicion and mistrust; and tensions around the Arab League council table were not diminished by Hashemite reactions to King Farouk's visit to Yenbe and Ibn Saud's meetings in Egypt with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill.

3. The measure and pace of United States economic penetration, also, which had become more and more apparent in 1943 and 1944, increased very notably during 1945; and this bids fair to dominate all other economic considerations in 1946.

4. Undiminished, and indeed magnified by the record of 1945, is Ibn Saud's anxiety about Russian designs, and about the future of Palestine. The virtual

abandonment by His Majesty's Government of the Palestine policy laid down in the 1939 White Paper came as a very grave shock to the King, whose loyal support for our cause in the darkest hours of the war, and invaluable counsels of moderation to Arabs throughout the Middle East, sprang from a genuine belief that His Majesty's Government would abide by their formal undertakings. Our reasons for a change of policy may be respectable, but it is asking too much of Ibn Saud to expect them to be acceptable to him.

5. The year under review saw no improvement in the local machinery of government. Gross extravagance and dilapidation of public funds went side by side with tragic misery and starvation. The diverse and largely alien elements who intrigue for their individual profit in the King's council chamber effectively prevented any mitigation of the distress of the mass of minor officials or the general public.

6. The annual pilgrimage, only slightly more numerous than in 1943 and 1944, passed off without untoward incident. Complaints about the extortionate rate of official dues, and the continued neglect of elementary municipal improvements, were loud, general, and entirely justified. Nothing is more discouraging, or more obviously stupid, in Saudi Arabian Government practice than the indifference, bordering on contempt, with which the grievances and enlightened recommendations of Moslem pilgrims are received.

Arab Affairs.

7. Since the formation of the Arab League, the Council has, on many issues, expressed the agreed resolutions of its members; and it would be tedious, even were the necessary data available, to attempt a full account of the manoeuvres of the Saudi Arabian, or indeed any other, delegate, as manifested during the council meetings. Occasionally, however, attitudes were significant enough, or divergences of opinion between various delegations startling enough, to merit record. In this review Ibn Saud's policy towards and within the Arab League will be examined separately from his acts of personal initiative in such matters as Palestine and the Levant States, on which collective Arab League decisions were duly announced. His Majesty has never allowed the existence of an Arab League to cramp his own style, though he finds it a usefully anonymous vehicle for occasional intransigence.

Arab League.

8. His Majesty's authority rests, more intimately than the outer world suspects, upon the impression of integrity in the fundamentalism of Wahhabi doctrine which he succeeds in making upon the 'Ulama and tribal leaders of Nejd. He is Imâm before he is King; and his awareness of this dependence on obscurantism inspires him to constant caution in his less orthodox associations. The Alexandria protocol of the 7th October, 1944, which marked the first serious approach of Middle Eastern States towards the unity blessed by Mr. Eden in 1941, seemed to Ibn Saud not only to threaten a northern (Hashemite) combination against him, but also to jeopardise the cause of true religion; and it required much persuasion by Abdurrahman Azzam, and some honest advice by His Majesty's Government, to dispel these hesitations. Ibn Saud's last act in 1944—or, more probably, his second last act—was to instruct his Minister for Foreign Affairs to inform the president of the Preliminary Committee on Arab Unity that His Majesty was prepared to sign the Alexandria protocol, subject to seven reservations.

9. Four of these reservations were more or less platitudinous: three, however, represented genuine anxieties. Ibn Saud stipulated that arbitration in all disputes between Arab States should be obligatory—in the hope of thus sterilising Iraqi animosity on the frontier; that Syria and the Lebanon should continue as independent republics—and thus not become a field of Hashemite and monarchist intrigue for a "Greater Syria"; and that "Islamic principles" alone should dictate the judicial and educational systems of Saudi Arabia. Without this last reservation Ibn Saud could not have won from his 'Ulama in Riyadh approval for his association with the Arab League.

10. The decision was not popular in Saudi Arabia, where British official blessing for the Arab League was suspect.

11. A sub-committee of the Arab Conference met in Cairo on the 14th February to elaborate the statutes of the League, and these were signed on the 3rd March. They were passed to a preparatory committee on the 17th March, which transformed itself into a general Arab conference; and the

Covenant of the League was finally signed on the 22nd March. It was later ratified by Saudi Arabia on the 4th April. During these proceedings sharp conflict arose between the Saudi and Iraqi delegates over the matter of compulsory arbitration, and the latter succeeded in torpedoing Ibn Saud's proposal to make arbitration automatically binding upon all members. Rivalries "tending towards Arab division rather than unity" were also frequently displayed; Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria forming one *bloc*, and Iraq and Transjordan another. Iraq, as the initiator and prime mover in earlier discussions about Arab unity, resented Egypt's easy assumption of Arab hegemony. Ibn Saud, as Iraq's dynastic enemy, gravitated naturally towards King Farouq's corner of the ring. A proposal for an Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian Treaty, obviously anti-Hashemite in inspiration, was only quashed by critical comment from His Majesty's Government. Indeed, during 1945, His Majesty's Minister had all too often occasion forcefully to represent the necessity of sinking personal feuds and of cultivating at least an appearance of unity within the League. Iraq and Saudi Arabia alike, not to mention Transjordan, seemed to be childishly unaware of the relative importance of their own jealous bickerings and of the large and hopeful potentialities of the League.

12. Shaikh Yusuf Yasin, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, was Saudi Arabian delegate during the preparatory stages of the League's development and at most of the meetings later held in Cairo; and all contentious questions were the subject of discreet consultation by him, of His Majesty's Embassy and the office of the Minister Resident in Egypt, and/or by Ibn Saud himself of His Majesty's Minister in Jedda. The King's standing instructions to his delegate prescribed an attitude of consideration for the special difficulties of His Majesty's Government and constant contact with their representatives. The relations of non-independent Arab States with the League; the ever-thorny problem of Palestine; the Arab attitude towards the French in Syria and the Lebanon, and the League's reaction to President Truman's demands for Jewish immigration, were among the subjects upon which Ibn Saud sought to moderate League policy and to conform, as nearly as circumstances allowed, to the counsels of His Majesty's Government. By and large, the influence of the Saudi Arabian delegate, acting on His Majesty's instructions, was, throughout the year, helpful to His Majesty's Government rather than hostile or obstructive. Much valuable information about council proceedings was also made confidentially available to us from this source.

13. It may be that some measure of individual goodwill is lost in the collective deliberations and resolutions of the Arab League, but it seems even more probable that a good deal of the competitive extremism evaporates in the council chamber, and that the final temperature of League resolutions is less inflamed than any sum of individual statements would be. Ibn Saud, by striving for accommodation with the views and requirements of His Majesty's Government within the limits of what is practicable for him, has done much to keep the League constantly aware of political realities, and to check chauvinistic and imprudent manifestations.

14. Towards the various projects sponsored by the League—(propaganda offices in London and Washington; land settlement for Arabs in Palestine, and so forth)—he has shown no great enthusiasm; partly because he dislikes responsibility without control, but mainly because his budget can ill afford any but the humblest financial contributions, and this hurts his pride. His moral support for international organisations is already but grudging; when material support is demanded as well, he is embarrassed.

Palestine.

15. From September 1939 through 1944, Ibn Saud's attitude on the Palestine issue was carefully unprovocative. He preferred, and he advised all and sundry among the Arabs, to refrain from words or action embarrassing to Great Britain while at war and to trust in the integrity of His Majesty's Government's undertakings in the White Paper of 1939.

16. His Majesty's faith in the permanence of the British Palestine policy proved foolish, and it would be idle to pretend that this has not dismayed and angered him. The announcement on the 13th November of His Majesty's Government's decision to reopen the problem of Jewish immigration into Palestine by submitting it to a Joint Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry and, in the light of this body's recommendations, to the United Nations Organisation, was, however, but the last of a series of jolts and shocks which kept Palestine constantly in the foreground of Ibn Saud's preoccupations during the year.

17. Most of these alarms and provocations were of transatlantic source; and His Majesty's representatives in the Middle East have had no cause to thank the politicians and journalists of America for their inflammatory pro-Zionist interventions during 1945.

18. Early in January, when it seemed likely that the American Senate might pass a formal resolution about the future of Palestine as a Jewish State, Ibn Saud sponsored a suggestion, originally made by Musa al Alami, that the head of each Arab State should send an envoy to London and to Washington with letters to His Majesty the King and to the President setting out the Arab claims to Palestine. His Majesty's Government were not enthusiastic about this procedure, which was later modified; and a personal letter was sent by Ibn Saud both to President Roosevelt and to Mr. Churchill, on the 11th March. Other Arab rulers sent similar, and more or less simultaneous, communications; presumably less lengthy than the Saudi Arabian thesis, which contained an historical survey of Palestine dating from 3500 B.C. A non-committal acknowledgment was returned by Mr. Churchill. Mr. Roosevelt's reply, dated the 5th April, was more meaty. He assured Ibn Saud that no decision would be taken with regard to the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews, and that he, as Chief Executive of the United States, would make no move hostile to the Arab people. This letter must have been one of the last documents signed by President Roosevelt before his death.

19. Mr. Roosevelt's letter, which gave great satisfaction to Ibn Saud, confirmed earlier oral assurances in the same sense, given when Ibn Saud and the President met on board U.S.S. *Quincy* near Ismailia, on the 14th February, after the Yalta Conference. At this meeting, as at the subsequent meeting between the King and Mr. Churchill in the Favoum on the 17th February, Palestine was the main subject of conversation. Neither statesmen was able to persuade Ibn Saud to share the view that Jewish immigration should not cease; and the King gave vivid expression to Arab apprehensions of militant Zionist infiltration. Mr. Churchill's argument, that His Majesty's Government deserved some return from the Arabs for their establishment of Hashemite rulers in Iraq and Transjordan, fell on deaf ears. Both interviews ended with undertakings to Ibn Saud that the Arabs would be consulted before any change in Palestine policy became effective.

20. The mood of security created by these assurances was not of long duration. In a press conference in Washington on the 16th August, on his return from Potsdam, President Truman favoured maximum Jewish immigration into Palestine. On the 13th September publicity was given to Senator Gillette's disclosure of the President's demand, made to Mr. Attlee, for the urgent admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine from Germany. Mr. Earl Harrison's tendentious report to the President on the state and future of Jews in the American Occupied Zone of Germany, which received infinitely more publicity than General Eisenhower's dignified rebuttal of its charges, further inflamed the issue of Jewish immigration. Faced with these evidences of what he interpreted as American official bias, Ibn Saud proliferated notes and telegrams of protest. The President's peculiar statement at a press conference, that he had been able to find no documentary proof of President Roosevelt's alleged assurances to Ibn Saud, stung the King to a personal telegraphic message to Mr. Truman on the 2nd October. The United States Minister in Jedda, who had personally drawn up the record of the Roosevelt-Ibn Saud conversations, and had obtained the President's personal approval for this text, was naturally much embarrassed by Mr. Truman's remark. The documents were duly found in the State Department's archives, and, after some debate, the text of President Roosevelt's letter of the 5th April was officially published in Washington and in Mecca on the 18th October. The text of Ibn Saud's lengthy letter of the 13th March to Mr. Roosevelt, arguing the superiority of the Arab claim to Palestine, was published in both capitals at the same time. Considerable kudos accrued to Ibn Saud throughout the Middle East from the publication of these documents, and from a consequential message sent to the King by President Truman, assuring him that the President's policy was identical with that of President Roosevelt.

21. Meanwhile, the policy of His Majesty's Government was taking shape. The advent to office of a Labour Government, whose sympathies with the Zionist cause were official and whose opposition to the White Paper of 1939 was historical, had much alarmed Ibn Saud. (Mr. Churchill's own great zeal in the Zionist cause had escaped His Majesty's attention.) He refrained, however, from manifesting mistrust in the new British Government's intentions, and in August forbade his Minister in London to proceed with a suggestion, made at a meeting

of Arab League diplomats, that the Emir Faisal and the Regent of Iraq, both then in London, should make some combined *démarche* on the subject. In this the King may, of course, have been reacting typically to the idea of any joint Saudi-Iraqi activity.

22. The summoning of His Majesty's representatives in the Middle East to London in September enabled them to describe the attitudes of their various territories towards the issue of Jewish immigration and at the same time to appreciate the pressure under which His Majesty's Government laboured in this particular. Their views were listened to with the utmost consideration, and the shift from full White Paper policy was made as gently as possible. The very important condition of consultation with the Arabs was maintained.

23. President Truman's interventions forced the issue, but, in the event, no communication could be made to the Arabs before the 13th November, owing to complicated electoral considerations in the New York municipality. As Pilgrimage Day fell in 1945 on the 14th November, a less suitable date for this unwelcome announcement to Ibn Saud could hardly have been selected. His Majesty's reception of His Majesty's Government's statement of policy betrayed his distress. He had taken the questions of Jewish immigration into Palestine, and of His Majesty's Government's further responsibility for the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, as closed by His Majesty's Government's 1939 pronouncement. Now both questions were to be reopened, and he was asked to approve the continuation of Jewish immigration for an indefinite period, with the prospect of American and internationalist influence deciding the final terms of "trusteeship." He asked what had happened to the White Paper of 1939, and why reference was no longer made to the prospect of independence for Palestine. His bitterness was not diminished by the fact that he had made a speech to 800 leading pilgrims and notables only two days before His Majesty's Government's statement was made known to him, expressing sympathy with British difficulties in Palestine and preaching continued confidence in British intentions. When pressed later in the year to approve continued Jewish immigration into Palestine, Ibn Saud exclaimed in his "Majlis": "I don't know where I am with these people. If I agree now, will that be their last demand?" He left a formal reply to His Majesty's Government's representations to the decision of the Arab League.

24. On the 28th December, the Saudi Arabian Government officially prohibited the import of Zionist-produced goods from Palestine. No time-limit was granted for clearance of orders already placed, and successive subsequent arrivals of oranges have rotted while argument rages about their origins.

Levant States.

25. Incessant friction between French and Arabs in Syria and the Lebanon, which burst into tragic flame at the end of May, involved Ibn Saud in frequent interventions. His advice to the Syrian President, generally given after consultation with His Majesty's Minister, was sensible and sound, and such counsels of moderation were not always welcome to Shukri Quwatly. Once, at least, the King's advice to him to abandon various Syrian demands and make a quick treaty with France, went far beyond what was politically practicable in Syria at the time. This was panic advice, reflecting an alarmist report by Shaikh Fuad Hamza that recalcitrance on Shukri's part would lead to his disappearance from the Syrian scene and that the Amir Abdullah would then slide into authority in Damascus. Mischievous rumour, at which Fuad Hamza and the King's other Syrian advisers excel, never fails to provoke Ibn Saud to anti-Hashemite attitudes. His Majesty's Minister was able, not long after this, to obtain the return of Fuad Hamza from Syria, where he had been staying far too long, to his post as Saudi Minister at Angora.

26. Correspondence between Ibn Saud and Shukri Quwatly ended in an invitation to the Syrian President to visit Mecca, and special B.O.A.C. aircraft flew him to Jedda from Damascus on the 8th January and back to Cairo on the 12th January. The opportunity was taken by His Majesty's Minister to press the views of His Majesty's Government about the necessity of Syrian accommodation with the French, during this visit. Mr. Jordan left Jedda with Shukri Quwatly, to prepare the Ibn Saud-Churchill meeting in Egypt.

27. During the agitation in early April about the recognition of the Levant States as members of the United Nations, Ibn Saud publicly supported their claim. He proposed, however, to write to King Farouq privately, urging that this issue should not be pressed to the embarrassment of His Majesty's Government. He was dissuaded by His Majesty's Minister from this course which, though kindly

intended towards His Majesty's Government, was based on a complete misunderstanding of the facts, and which might well have led at some later date to big trouble for Ibn Saud himself, should it ever please King Farouq to give publicity to this correspondence. This was not the first nor the last time when His Majesty's Minister had to advise Ibn Saud to refrain from untimely advertisement of his goodwill towards Great Britain. His Majesty's influence in the Arab and Moslem worlds is considerable, but it can only be diminished by the creation of an impression that Great Britain has in him a bigger and better Amir Abdullah. Just as a long Anglophile speech by the latter would be less weighty propaganda for us than half a dozen friendly words from King Farouq, so Ibn Saud's expressions of sympathy with our policy are more effective if not too frequently heard.

28. As the tension in Syria and the Lebanon increased during May, Ibn Saud consulted His Majesty's Minister again and again about the replies he should make to Syrian and Lebanese appeals for assistance. He made similar requests to the United States Minister in Jedda. A message which he addressed to General de Gaulle on the 18th May after reference to His Majesty's Minister, was dignified and unprovocative; and two Notes sent to the British and American Legations, though their more peremptory tone betrayed the crescendo of Arab anxieties, stated, truthfully, that His Majesty was constantly urging calm and restraint upon the Syrian leaders. British military intervention in the interests of law and order after the bloody incidents of Damascus was deeply appreciated by Ibn Saud.

29. A Syrian consular representative arrived in Jedda in November and the affairs of the Levant States have since then been in his charge and not, as heretofore, subject to French representation. Jamil Mardam Bey, first Syrian Minister to Saudi Arabia, presented his letters of credence on the 28th December, but he left immediately for Egypt, without making contact with his new colleagues.

"Greater Syria."

30. The project of a "Greater Syria," and its associated monarchist activities, continue to inspire suspicion and hostility in Saudi Arabia, because of their implicit enhancement of Hashemite influence in the Peninsula. Referring to rumours that a Saudi Arabian prince might some day reign in Syria, in conversation with His Majesty's Minister on the 26th September, Ibn Saud swore a great oath, condemning himself and his posterity to continual Jewry if he or any of his descendants accepted such a throne. His family, he explained, was too strongly traditionalist in religious outlook to be able to make contact, as rulers, with a population of heterodox thought and practice.

Iraq.

31. Nothing that happened during 1945 helped to reduce, and much occurred to exacerbate, the personal and dynastic rivalry between the rulers of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Allusion has been made above to the constant friction between the Hashemites on the one hand and Saudi Arabia and Egypt on the other, during the various deliberations of the Arab League. Nuri Pasha's policy on the issue of League arbitration was interpreted by Ibn Saud as personally hostile, and the frustration of the King's hopes in this matter was followed in middle March by a flutter of vague charges of Iraqi bad faith on the frontier and elsewhere. Ibn Saud, in terms, asked His Majesty's Government to arbitrate.

32. As a matter of fact, the Permanent Frontier Commission provided for by the Saudi-Iraqi Treaty of Mecca has functioned satisfactorily, and it was obvious that Ibn Saud's grievances went deeper than any mere frontier dispute. Such outbursts by him are seasonal, and they reflect a pathological suspicion. This ebullition was allowed to evaporate, unanswered. The appointment of Sir Hugh Stonehewer Bird (for whom Ibn Saud has much affection) as His Majesty's Ambassador to Bagdad, doubtless served to reassure the King.

33. December brought two more scares, with reports of a movement of Shammur Abdah from the Jezira across the Euphrates, and of suspicious movements in Salman. The Bagdad Embassy's categorical denial of the first report has since proved to be not wholly justified. The second still awaits comment. His Majesty's Minister's advice that such rumours should primarily be frankly discussed with the competent Iraqi authorities and not only darkly whispered to himself, was maliciously related to Ibn Saud by the ever-mischievous Shaikh Yusuf Yasin as proof of His Majesty's Government's indifference to what the Prince-Regent Abdul Ilah might be plotting against Saudi Arabia; and a stormy

appeal for enlightenment came in from the King. His Majesty's Minister was able to explain to Ibn Saud that His Majesty's Government's anxiety for frontier peace did not absolve Saudis and Iraqis from their prime responsibility for its maintenance, and to warn him against provocative reports sent by those who sought to trade upon His Majesty's sensitivity to all that his Hashemite neighbours might be alleged to be planning. The offer of His Majesty's Ambassador in Bagdad to assist in checking such reports with the Saudi Minister before their despatch to Ibn Saud should go far to sterilise future trouble of this kind.

Rashid Aly Al Gailani.

34. The greatest obstacle to an improvement in relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia during 1945 was, however, the presence in Riyadh from September onwards of Rashid Aly Al Gailani, the Iraqi quisling of 1941, who is under sentence of death for sedition by the Iraqi courts. This has been described by Ibn Saud himself as a major calamity, and the description is just.

35. Having made his way from a Germany in collapse to Czechoslovakia and thence via Brussels and Paris to Beirut and Damascus, Rashid Aly Al Gailani presented himself under a false name at the Saudi Arabian frontier, posing as one of a party of three Syrian journalists who sought leave to approach Ibn Saud "on a matter of grave political importance." After some hesitation Ibn Saud authorised their onward journey to Riyadh, probably expecting some tit-bit of scandal about the Amir Abdullah's designs on the Syrian throne. The party reached Riyadh on the morning of the 24th September, just before the King was due to start on a four days' trans-desert drive to Mecca. When Rashid Aly, whose white hair and beard now effectively disguised him, knelt and declared himself, claiming Arab sanctuary the King exclaimed: "There is no strength and power except in God," and left the room without another word, greatly distressed.

36. His Majesty's Minister returned to Jedda on the 25th September from the Middle East conference in London, and he was urgently summoned by the King to Duwadimi, some 300 miles to the north-east. There on the 26th September the King informed him of Rashid Aly's presence in Riyadh. It became immediately apparent that any request for the surrender of the Iraqi traitor to Iraqi justice conflicted with a code of Arab behaviour and honour with which Ibn Saud, a Bedu ruler of Bedouin, literally cannot afford to compromise.

37. The conflict between eastern and western conceptions of duty in this matter is absolute. A not unfair analogy would be Mr. Churchill's position if asked to fight his way through a crowd of women and children to a lifeboat, in the full glare of world publicity. There is no written law about this, either.

38. His Majesty's Government's appeal for the surrender of Rashid Aly to the Regent of Iraq, and the Regent's own later representations, shipwrecked on this convention of desert sentiment. After numerous courteous but rather futile exchanges between the two rulers, the matter was left for discussion between the two Governments on a strictly legal basis; and here Saudi resistance was fortified by the comparative weakness of the Iraqi legal case. The extradition agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iraq is exclusive of all "political" crimes, except those involving actual attack on the Head of the State or a member of the Royal Family. It is not certain that the Regent was a "member of the Royal Family" of Iraq, by definition of the Iraqi Constitution, at the time of Rashid Aly's revolt, or that he or any member of the Iraqi Royal Family can be described as having been "attacked" by Rashid Aly. The Iraqi Note, conveying the charges on which extradition is sought, is not forcefully convincing on these points; and various non-Saudi experts have declared that Bagdad has no case at law. It is relevant that the Iraqi courts condemned Rashid Aly for "sedition" only; and that the Turkish Government only handed over Salah-ed-dine Sabbagh, similarly sentenced, as a personal favour to the Regent and not as a right under their own similar extradition treaty with Iraq.

39. The hardest cases are those in which two rights conflict. A solution of some sort is still not impossible; but neither Ibn Saud nor Abdul Ilah will fully grant each other's case. It is not, perhaps, now relevant, but not unjust, to remark that it would have been probably less difficult in the first instance, and certainly more rewarding, for the Regent to spare Rashid Aly's life than for Ibn Saud to hand him over for execution. Moslem opinion, as displayed during the pilgrimage, was heavily on Ibn Saud's side in this matter; and the Iraqi Minister himself, a most unhappy man, had to advise his Government not to press their claim in the hostile atmosphere then manifest.

Egypt.

40. As mentioned above, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have a common antipathy in Iraq, and a glow of successful complicity incarnadined their 1945 relations. With a probable view to establishing some such Saudi support for Egyptian leadership within the Arab League, King Farouq, whose ancestor smashed the first Wahhabi Empire, had, as remotely as October 1944, proposed a private visit to Saudi Arabia. This took place at Radhwa, north of Yenbo on the Red Sea coast, between the 24th and 28th January. King Farouq took the opportunity to visit Medina, thus acquiring some Islamic merit; and, by most of the press of the Middle East, the occasion was hailed as historically important. In fact, politics were hardly discussed: Ibn Saud lectured his young guest on the necessity of keeping on good terms with Great Britain and invoked his moderating influence with Shukri Quwatly in Damascus. But the advertisement of an Egyptian-Saudi *entente* did no harm to either party, and some good to both.

41. Subsequent approaches towards an Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian Treaty were sharply discouraged by His Majesty's Government as being provocative and certain to disrupt Arab unity.

42. A proposal made by King Farouq in September, that all Arab Kings and Presidents should meet to draw up a joint pronouncement against Zionism, proved no less abortive. It dwindled down to a yachting cruise by the King of Egypt in the Red Sea, in the course of which he rather casually visited Jedda. King Ibn Saud, who was then in Riyadh, delegated the Amir Mansour to welcome him.

43. Egypt had formerly been represented in Saudi Arabia by her Minister in Bagdad. In 1945, as a compliment to both countries, separate Ministers were appointed, and Awad El Bahrawi Bey came from Iraq to Jedda as whole-time Egyptian representative here.

44. Some amusement was caused locally by the efforts of the Egyptian Government to ensure obscurity and oblivion for their political opponents during the Pilgrimage. Sabri Abu Allam Pasha and other leading Wafdists were, however, duly entertained by the Saudi Arabian Government, with other notable pilgrims.

45. The services of Abdel Honeim Bey Riad, a judge of the Alexandria Court of Appeal, were made available by the Egyptian Government for purposes of legal consultation by Ibn Saud, in December. He left early in the new year. It is a pity that more Egyptian experts—economic, financial, medical or administrative—are not employed by Ibn Saud. They are of a relatively high standard of competence and, generally speaking, appear more disinterested and objective than other alien elements in the King's service. Unfortunately the Syrian and Nejd sycophants who make fortunes out of their Government jobs are united in resisting any attempt to recruit officials from outside their own ranks, whose efficiency would expose their own incompetence.

Transjordan.

46. The dynastic ambitions of the Amir Abdullah are a matter of jealous interest to Ibn Saud, and rumours of His Majesty's Government's intention to terminate the Transjordan Mandate, and of later plans for a union of Transjordan with Iraq, have put a keen edge on the King's anxieties. His Majesty's suspension of his claims on both the Nejd-Transjordan and the Hejaz-Transjordan frontiers is valid only for so long as His Majesty's Government retain responsibility in Transjordan; and the treaties of Hadia and of Jedda contain Ibn Saud's formal reservations to this effect. Both the north-south frontier and the east-west frontier between Transjordan and Saudi Arabia (the latter involving Aqaba and Maan) threaten to give us a good deal of trouble, if the Amir Abdullah's independence becomes effective without some satisfactory frontier delimitation and settlement. The Saudi claims to Aqaba and Maan are, of course, directly inherited from the Amir Abdullah's father, the late King Hussein.

47. Incidents on the Transjordan frontier during 1945 were few and were generally settled on the spot. A tour by motorised elements of the Transjordan Arab Legion along one confused stretch of the country in the Sabit, Al Hanat and Talaat-al-Shireiya area, for the purpose of identifying what Transjordan considers to be the frontier line, caused some effervescence in Riyadh, because the Saudi Government claimed that this patrol had compromised the *status quo* by erecting "frontier marks." The British Resident at Amman informed His Majesty's Minister that this was wholly untrue; and the Transjordan Arab

Legion in due course removed the offending cairns to which the Saudis had alluded.

Yemen.

48. Relations between Ibn Saud and the Imam Yehia remained cordial during 1945. Each kept the other informed of important initiatives made by or to him in matters of general Arab concern. Many wireless messages to the Imam have to be routed through Ibn Saud's secretariat, and the King was disagreeably surprised when he discovered that greetings from Generalissimo Stalin to the Imam were being relayed by his station.

49. The Amir Seif-ul-Islam Abdullah, one of the Imam's sons who, after a long sojourn in Egypt on Arab League business, was an official guest of the Iraq Government, paid a brief visit to Ibn Saud, when in Mecca, between the 17th and 29th December.

The Ex-Mufti.

50. It is convenient to include under this general heading of Arab affairs some reference to Ibn Saud's interest in the fate of Haj Amin al Husseini, the former Mufti of Palestine. Like most Moslems, and almost all Arabs, the King accepts religion rather than politics when judging this man's behaviour, and inclines to attribute his misadventures during the war to his anti-Zionist zeal, of which the anti-British manifestations are dismissed as merely incidental. When the Imam Yehia suggested to Ibn Saud in late May that they should make a joint approach to His Majesty's Government for the ex-Mufti's pardon, the King snubbed him sharply; but only because he preferred to put out feelers of his own and, if His Majesty's Government admitted any public request for leniency, wished to be the man to make it. Appeals for Ibn Saud's assistance to prevent his punishment by His Majesty's Government, and an apologia for his wartime activities, were brought from the Mufti by Sheikh Fuad Hamza in September; but the only approach on the subject by the King has been made confidentially to His Majesty's Government, with no public advertisement.

Other Foreign Relations.

International.

51. It was decided at the Yalta Conference that the United Nations, as they existed on the 9th February, 1945, should be invited to attend a conference on World Organisation, together with any "associated nations" that might declare war before the 1st March. A hint was dropped to Ibn Saud on the 12th February on Foreign Office instructions about the proposed conference and the criteria of eligibility for an invitation; but, as Russian approval for the inclusion of Saudi Arabia was still outstanding, nothing effective could be done. His Majesty wished to concert action with Egypt, and he obviously hoped not to have to make a declaration of war.

52. Ibn Saud had refused in 1940 to continue in relations with Germany, and had later broken off relations with Italy. He had even asked His Majesty's Government's advice about declaring war on Germany at an early stage of the war, and had then been discouraged from such a course. Throughout hostilities he had accorded consistent and valuable friendship and assistance to the cause of the United Nations. These arguments were pressed by Mr. Eden and at last prevailed upon M. Molotov; but it was the 26th February before Russia agreed to Saudi Arabia's conditional invitation to San Francisco. The forty-eight hours which remained for a Saudi Arabian declaration of war before the 1st March were not made less anxious by the fact that Ibn Saud was at the time in process of moving from Mecca back to Riyadh.

53. His Majesty's Minister caught the King at Taif on the 26th February, before news of Russia's agreement came through, and attempted to organise plans for eventual urgent action, if this became necessary during the King's trans-desert trip. He found His Majesty clearly disinclined to make any declaration of war and by no means eager to be involved in any international conference. Arguments in favour of action by Saudi Arabia were put to him, and these were renewed in writing, after his departure, when it was learned that the door into the conference room was definitely open. Ibn Saud then consulted his 'Ulama, through the Crown Prince in Riyadh, and, having made up his own mind, decided to play. On the 28th February the British and American Governments were informed that he would declare war on Germany and Japan on the 1st March; and on that same day his Government's adhesion to the United Nations Declaration was communicated to the United States Secretary of State.

54. The King's declaration of war excepted the area comprising the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina, for which complete neutrality was reserved: "They shall neither wage war nor shall war be waged against them, for the area in which they lie is one of peace and security for all its inhabitants and for all Moslems who proceed thither."

55. In due course a Saudi Arabian delegation headed by His Royal Highness the Amir Feisal left on the 5th April for Washington, where the United Nations Declaration was formally signed, and San Francisco. Three other princes went along with them, for the ride. The Saudis seem to have kept in close contact with the United Kingdom delegation, as instructed by the King, and to have shown some reasonableness in deliberations.

56. The United Nations Charter was ratified by the Saudi Arabian Government on the 2nd October.

57. The Amir Feisal and Sheikh Hafez Wahba represented Saudi Arabia in the meetings of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations Organisation Assembly at the end of the year, and His Royal Highness was appointed to be principal Saudi delegate at the subsequent full session of the Assembly in January 1946.

Great Britain.

58. Frequent allusion is made throughout this report to Ibn Saud's consultation of His Majesty's Government on a wide variety of subjects. Most of these approaches were met by advice from His Majesty's Minister, without reference to London; others, of more interesting import, became the subject of correspondence with the Foreign Office. There may have been important matters connected with the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia in which His Majesty's representative was not consulted or kept confidentially informed by the King; but it is difficult to imagine what these could have been. His Majesty's much advertised friendship for Great Britain, and his protestations of reliance upon British advice, certainly find practical reflection in almost daily communications about Saudi relations with Egypt, Iraq, France, the United States, &c., and in Ibn Saud's patent desire to do nothing in the field of foreign affairs without British knowledge and, if possible, British approval. He has described himself, in conversation with His Majesty's Minister, as "Britain's spy in the Arab world": a picturesque overstatement, with a hard core of truth. He has also, with less hyperbole, described His Majesty's Minister's functions as fundamentally dual; to represent His Majesty's Government's case to Ibn Saud and, also, to represent Ibn Saud's case to His Majesty's Government. Compared with His Majesty's use of His Majesty's Legation in Jedda as a channel of communication to London, the use he makes of his own Minister in London is negligible. This has the advantage of enabling local adjustment of much in Saudi Arabian foreign policy to appropriate ends and local liquidation of occasional Royal imprudences.

59. During 1945 controversial frontier questions were allowed to sleep; and the only shadow darkening British relations with Saudi Arabia was cast by His Majesty's Government's enforced abandonment of the White Paper (1939) policy in Palestine. This is not an issue on which Mecca can be expected to share the views of London, and it is not surprising that Ibn Saud should regard with some anger and much dismay a change of front by His Majesty's Government which makes his own war-time appeals for Arab confidence in British intentions seem ill-judged and foolish. His confidence has, indeed, been much shaken by this development; and the temperature of his relations with His Majesty's Government cannot but decline, though His Majesty will not transfer to any other Power the trust and affection which he thinks Britain has temporarily forfeited.

60. The King's reception of the news that in 1945 His Majesty's Government would reduce by one-half their 1944 contribution to the Anglo-American joint subsidy, was sympathetic and entirely friendly. Nor did he make any audible protest against later indications that His Majesty's Government would offer no financial contribution at all in respect of 1946. In this economic context it is only fair to record, also, His Majesty's steady refusal to play off Great Britain against America. The many and lavish offers of material assistance made to him by the United States Government during the year were scrupulously reported by Ibn Saud to His Majesty's Government, but with no implicit invitation of auctioneering counter-offers. His Majesty's intention seemed rather to invite British blessing for his somewhat apologetic acceptance of American favours.

61. At the same time Ibn Saud's growing discomfort at his undue economic dependence upon American aid was often made plain to His Majesty's Minister;

and His Majesty hoped throughout the year for some manifestation of British interest in local development, over and above their share in the joint subsidy, to offset the stifling massive pressure of United States Government benevolence. Britain's own state of acute financial stringency, and the slowness of her reconversion processes, prevented any such gesture on a generous scale. The King was, indeed, promised the equipment for a small military hospital and for an eye hospital, but this had not arrived by the end of the year. His more expensive requests for a Military Mission, for a civil aviation unit, and for the training of Saudi Arabian pilots and ground staff, are still under consideration. Practical British assistance has, however, been given during the year in the training in Egypt and the Sudan of Saudi military and civilian elements in such matters as the driving and maintenance of vehicles and elementary public health. From the angle of Jeddah there seems to be much political advantage in the free provision by His Majesty's Government of certain services, beneficial to Saudi Arabian development.

62. Ibn Saud's personal bonds of friendship with Great Britain were notably strengthened by his meeting in the Fayoum with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden in February. It is very regrettable that the motor car offered to His Majesty by Mr. Churchill as a memento of this occasion still awaited shipment from the United Kingdom at the year's end. Visits by the Viceroy of India in June, and by Lord Alanbrooke, General Paget, Admiral Tennant and His Majesty's ship *Sirius* in December, also gave lively satisfaction. His Majesty's ship *Stevenstone* revived a pleasant peace-time practice soon after VJ-day by calling at Jeddah for a few days in early October.

63. His Royal Highness the Amir Feisal and three of his brothers stayed for some weeks in England on their return journey from San Francisco in August. His Royal Highness returned to London, on medical advice, in November. While in London in August he delivered to the Foreign Secretary a message of cordial goodwill from the King to His Majesty's Government, which was no less cordially reciprocated.

64. A lifetime of friendly relations with the British is not easily forgotten, and Ibn Saud is not a man to forget or revile his friends. His Majesty's Government can always count of much goodwill and sympathy in his consideration of any case they present, and on his open support for any policy not conflicting with traditional Arab or Moslem prejudice. It irritates and distresses him when, in his view, British behaviour fails to conform to the standard his friendship has set; and his sincerity in speaking his mind on such occasions is absolute. But he by no means enjoys such differences of opinion, and he fears more than anything else the occurrence of a situation in which he finds himself obliged to choose between the dictates of his religion and his race and the loyalties of his oldest friendship.

France.

65. The appointment in March of a new French Minister, bearing greetings from General de Gaulle, was followed by an official invitation from the General in April to the Amir Feisal, to visit France as a guest of the French Government on his way home from the San Francisco Conference. Having obtained British blessing for acceptance of this invitation, a friendly reply was returned. Later developments in the Levant States, envenomed Saudi relations with France, and written and telegraphic protests to General de Gaulle issued in a crescendo of Arab emotion. The Amir's visit was quietly cancelled, for reasons of health, in late August. As His Royal Highness was under medical treatment for ulcers on the stomach at the time, the excuse was a valid one.

66. Ibn Saud has shown no enthusiasm, and taken no initiative in the matter of French North Africa. Apart from his responsibilities for two aeroplane-loads of token-pilgrims, the French Minister in Saudi Arabia appears to have observation duties only. These, from June to November, he performed from the agreeable distance of Alexandria, leaving no chargé d'affaires in Jeddah.

Holland.

67. A Mecca group, in correspondence and contact with Indonesian elements in Egypt, was active in propaganda for the Indonesian Republic towards the end of the year. The movement had no official encouragement. The main interest of the Hejaz in Indonesian affairs is limited to the prospects of an early resumption of the Far Eastern pilgrimage, which provides the richest and most docile of sheep for local slaughter.

68. After long experience of Arabia, Mr. Daniel Van der Meulen was replaced as Netherlands Minister in November by Dr. H. Dingemans, who had held the post briefly at the beginning of the war. Collaboration between the British and Dutch Legations in the operation of health and educational services, useful to both Javanese and Malay residents in Mecca, was cordial and complete throughout the year.

Turkey.

69. Fuad Jarim Bey, who arrived as Turkish Minister in August after a succession of very dim chargé d'affaires, began his mission by offering to act as intermediary in any matters at issue between Ibn Saud and His Majesty's Government, and by pressing for the King's support against Syrian sentiment for the Turkish claim to Hatay. Neither initiative produced any response, and Fuad Bey's energies thereafter wilted. There is a Saudi-Turkish dispute of some sort about house-rents which, if he wishes, Fuad Bey can pursue in his new functions as Assistant-Secretary General in the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The present chargé d'affaires is even dimmer than usual.

United States.

70. To one who, like the writer of this report, last knew this territory in the days of King Hussein, the recent American invasion of the Arabian political and economic scene is a remarkable and somewhat disturbing phenomenon. It may be stimulating that British initiative and enterprise should be vigorously challenged in a part of the world, the very heart of Islam, where British influence has been for so long predominant; but it is painful, to say at least, that this challenge should, for reasons both of higher policy and of temporary material necessity, provoke no active response either from His Majesty's Government or from British industry and commerce. The rôle of His Majesty's Minister in a territory which appears to have been abandoned to American economic penetration is, like that of anyone else compelled to live on a lightning-conductor, an ungrateful one. It is not made easier by the fact that, for reasons familiar to psychiatrists, the very processes of American penetration generate in American minds the darkest suspicions of British jealousies and intrigue.

71. During the year under review, the tempo of the American advance upon Saudi Arabia greatly increased, and a new forcefulness informed their policy here. It would not, perhaps, be an over-simplification of this policy to describe it as pivoting on the consideration that nothing must be done to weaken, and everything must be done to strengthen, the American hold on Saudi Arabian oil. Whatever altruistic presentation the policy may have, and whatever by-products of value to American interests it may breed, the oilfields at Dhahran explain it and, to the Americans, amply justify it.

72. This seems, indeed, to be an official attitude. When the State Department was suppliant for a Lend-Lease allocation in June 1945, to cover the American share of the joint subsidy, the newspaper *United States News*, of the 29th June, published the following paragraph:—

"Ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia, is down for about 10 million dollars of Lend-Lease from United States in the next year on the theory that the oil of Saudi Arabia contributes to the defence of this country. Officials explain that it is necessary for the United States to play its part in meeting Saudi Arabia's budget needs as an alternative to having the British use some of their funds for that purpose and thereby gain an inside track in the world's richest oil area."

The United States Government is well aware that the only manifestation of British interest, or lack of interest, in the oil of Saudi Arabia for many years past has been the abandonment in 1942 of the last British oil concession held in the Asir.

73. The risk of friction resulting from American penetration, which seemed to be aggravated by a local conflict of personalities, had led in 1944 to a series of round-the-table talks in London with Mr. Wallace Murray, of the State Department. No obvious concessions on the American side resulted from these conversations, but a general agreement was reached on the necessity of mutual goodwill and co-operation, and the principle of close consultation was established.

74. President Roosevelt's invitation to Ibn Saud to meet him, on his return from the Yalta Conference, in Egyptian waters, was not, however, made known to His Majesty's Minister by his United States colleague. The King, when informing His Majesty's Government of the Roosevelt invitation, made it

clear that he would refuse it unless he were able at the same time to meet Mr. Churchill in Egypt. This was arranged, and both meetings passed off pleasantly and, from Ibn Saud's point of view, not unprofitably. They have been reported in greater detail in the section on Palestine above. There was some American resistance to the King's return to Jedda on board a British cruiser, after travelling to Egypt in an American destroyer; but this was overcome. The very fine gift, seventeen-seater Douglas aircraft, presented by the President in April, has proved most valuable to His Majesty.

75. In May, the United States Government raised again the question of an airfield at Dhahran, which Ibn Saud (without informing His Majesty's Government) had refused to consider in 1944. On recommendation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, His Majesty's Minister was instructed to endorse the American request, as militarily desirable, and a Note was addressed accordingly to the Saudi Arabian Government on the 6th May. Colonel Eddy, the United States Minister, visited Riyadh to present his Government's application.

76. The American approach, as His Majesty's Minister was later informed by a very flustered Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, was not limited to a request for permission to construct a military airfield at Dhahran. A sixty-year concession for its use by United States civil aircraft was asked for, and, in the same Note, an American Military Mission of fifty officers and 110 other ranks was offered to the Saudi Arabian Government, to provide staff and operational training, medical services, air training, road construction and petroleum exploitation and development. Ibn Saud's reaction was to exclaim: "Now that Berlin has fallen they turn on me!"

77. His Majesty was much incensed by these large-scale proposals for penetration, and not unnaturally surprised that they should have had—or appeared to have—the prior endorsement of His Majesty's Government. There was, indeed, some impropriety on the part of the United States Government, in exploiting the Combined Chiefs of Staff ruling in this way. They compromised His Majesty's Legation, and gravely prejudiced the prospects of acceptance of the basic airfield proposal. But for British endorsement of the Dhahran project, Ibn Saud would certainly have refused it again, out of hand. Neither at the time nor since was there any consultation with regard to the extensive supplementary proposals between the United States Minister and His Majesty's Legation.

78. Pressed by His Majesty's Minister, Ibn Saud agreed to grant permission for the construction of a military aerodrome, and his terms, less favourable to the United States than those proposed by them, were duly accepted.

79. As regards the other American proposals, discussions continued throughout the summer, with frequent references by Ibn Saud to His Majesty's Minister. The King refused to accept any supervisory military mission, but welcomed practical assistance in road construction, medical services, agriculture, &c., by some American civilian agency. The Americans insisted that only under military auspices could the assistance be given, because of domestic finance and expropriation complications. In the end, the whole complex of proposals was dropped by the United States Government, and Ibn Saud received neither the military mission he did not want nor the various other measures of assistance he did. These came up again for presentation later, in another guise.

80. Details are not available of the programme of His Royal Highness the Amir Faisal's visit to the United States during the April-August period, but he and his brothers and suite appear to have been royally entertained, and intensively cultivated, by the State Department, and by the Arabian-American Oil Company and by Transcontinental and Western Airlines Incorporated. Advantage was taken by the State Department of His Royal Highness's presence in Washington to discuss with him a variety of questions affecting subsidy and other assistance during 1945; further financial aid during 1946; an American W/T link at Dhahran; civilian aviation and Fifth Freedom rights, &c. So far as is known, no consultation with His Majesty's Government occurred, and no communication was made to them by the United States Government regarding these discussions.

81. The question of a direct W/T link with the United States, at Dhahran, which has caused "wholly disproportionate irritation" in America, was amicably settled at the end of the year. Cable and Wireless, Limited, whose concession is prejudicially affected by this American demand, made no practical effort to offer Ibn Saud any competitive project, and, in view of their unhelpful attitude and the bitterness which informs the United States Government's attitude towards telecommunications, His Majesty's Minister commended, and His Majesty's Ambassador in Washington agreed, that the Americans should be

allowed to have their way. The desired concession was made in the course of the Bermuda Telecommunications Conference in late November.

82. The other major fetish of American post-war behaviour, civil aviation and "Fifth Freedom" rights, produced here, as elsewhere in the Middle East, a situation of some tension. Messrs. T.W.A., forcefully represented and supported, pressed for a concession in internal civil aviation, and what boiled down to the right to raid other Middle Eastern territories from a Saudi Arabian base. A request by Ibn Saud in June for a gift of British aircraft was only answered in December, with the gratis offer of one Avro XIX and two Tiger Moth aircraft, with instructional and other staff; a generous offer in any circumstances, but one not easy, against the rival United States proposals, to represent as wholly adequate for the territory's needs.

83. Steady aviation pressure was exerted by the Americans throughout the second half of the year. Their fortnightly A.T.C. service became a weekly, then a twice-weekly service charging a £E.22 fare to Cairo as against B.O.A.C.'s £E.38, with the additional attraction of a customs-free airport at Payne Field, where Moslems flying northwards after the pilgrimage could also dodge international quarantine regulations. A draft agreement on reciprocal civil aviation facilities was presented by the United States Minister in August, and survey flights were carried out by American aircraft. The vexed issue of "Fifth Freedom" rights in Saudi Arabia was firmly and unilaterally settled by an American ultimatum that work on the Dhahran airfield would be abandoned if these were not granted. Without obstruction on a dog-in-the-manger level, His Majesty's Government could not press Ibn Saud to deny "Fifth Freedom" facilities in such circumstances.

84. The United States Government's attitude towards the calculation of Ibn Saud's subsidy needs is discussed in the economic section below. It was entirely consistent with the general policy alluded to in paragraph 71 above. They provided 10 million Lend-Lease riyals, 17 million riyals for resale to American interests in Saudi Arabia, and 3 million dollars worth of commodities over and above their 50-50 share of the 10 million dollar joint subsidy.

85. In the autumn the United States Government offered Ibn Saud a loan of 5 million dollars for "remunerative public works," the intention being thus to supply some, at least, of the services forming the object of their abortive offer of May. The King balked at the rate of interest of 4 per cent. demanded, and, indeed, seemed chary of accepting further American assistance. President Truman's pro-Zionist interventions and the attitude of the American Congress and press towards Jewish immigration into Palestine did much to reduce American popularity, as became manifest to His Majesty during the pilgrimage. These loan negotiations hung fire, but later merged into negotiations for a 3 per cent. 25 million dollar loan, which were still in progress at the end of the year.

86. In December a Syrian doctor and dispenser, trained at the American University, Beirut, and a United States nurse, opened an American clinic in Jedda. They have been very active, and sometimes a little unprofessional, in self-advertisement and unsolicited intrusion; but it would be ungrateful to be over-critical of any institution which improves, by however little, the health prospects of the European and American community in this most insalubrious place. The doctor possesses no outstanding competence, and the object of the institution seems to be primarily propagandist.

87. With the completion of the new refinery at Ras Tanura, in early 1946, Ibn Saud's oil revenues will considerably increase. The State Department informed the Amir Faisal in July that they estimated Ibn Saud's 1945 revenues from Dhahran at 4½ million dollars, as against 3 million dollars in 1944; and his 1946 revenues at 8 million dollars. It is significant that the United States Government's latest loan proposals provide for the application to repayment of the loan of one-half of any oil royalties "in excess of the equivalent of 30 million dollars in any one year after 1950."

88. The interests of the oil company and, to a lesser extent, of T.W.A. in the field of civil aviation, inspired and shaped United States official attitudes. On a lower level of mercantile activity Americans were no less enterprising. Messrs. the American Eastern Corporation, an unsavoury group with a more than chequered war-time record in Iraq, opened up in Jedda in the spring, and appear well set to monopolise American agency business deriving from the proposed Export Import Bank 25 million dollar loan. In association with Mr. Karl S. Twitchell, whose local energies have been conspicuous over many years, this group plans to form a 4 million dollar syndicate, with Saudi participation, to engage in public works construction, &c.

89. The recently re-established monthly direct sailings from New York to Jedda by vessels of the Isthmian Line offer obvious advantage over the more expensive and dilatory processes of transshipment to which goods from the United Kingdom are liable; and this consideration goes far to compensate for any difference in sterling and dollar f.o.b. costs.

90. Ibn Saud's decision to open a legation in Washington is a recognition of the important part played by the United States in Saudi Arabian economy. The minister designate is Sheikh As'ad al-Faqih, a Druse, formerly Saudi Minister in Bagdad.

91. It would be a miracle if, with so much and such aggressive activity by the Americans in this territory, no frictions were generated. Ibn Saud himself is the most outspoken critic of United States Government methods, for he is genuinely distressed by their forceful pressures towards ends—e.g., in the fields of civil aviation and telecommunications—which he knows to be unwelcome to His Majesty's Government. More than once he has appealed to both legations for a concerted Anglo-American economic policy, so that any projects presented by one party may be assured of the prior agreement of the other, and he himself spared the grievous embarrassment of choice between his two friends. Much misunderstanding has arisen because visiting Congressmen—and of these there was no lack during 1945—aggrieved to find that American views in these contentious issues were instantly accepted by Ibn Saud, have reported (quite falsely) that British influence is obstructively exercised in Saudi Arabia, and have distorted the King's embarrassment when faced with an unwelcome choice to mean that British menaces alone prevent his acceptance of the American case. Fortunately, relations between the British and American Legations in Jedda are uniformly cordial at all levels; and the pathological American suspicions which accompany occasional frustrations are admitted by the United States Minister to have no local justification.

Russia.

92. Saudi Arabia has no relations with Russia, and Soviet manifestations in this country are limited to the annual despatch of an aeroplane-load of Russian Moslem pilgrims for the Haj. But Russia looms very large in Ibn Saud's more anxious thoughts. He shares with King Farouk and most oriental potentates a complete terror of communism, and with Hitler a belief that that snake should have been scotched. His warnings to His Majesty's Government to beware of Soviet encroachments and intrigue are omitted from no conversation. He regards Soviet championship of Arab causes with particular suspicion and dislike.

Finance, Subsidy and Supply.

93. The Government of Saudi Arabia is a benevolent but complete personal autocracy; and the so-called Ministry of Finance and its occasional budgetary manifestations are merely an attempt to provide a Western *alias* for the Arabian Nights system by which one man, Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman (one of the few Finance Ministers in the world to drink both methylated spirits and scent), is personally responsible to Ibn Saud for the provision of: (i) the King's own and his family's needs; (ii) the wherewithal to subsidise tribes and individuals; (iii) other Government expenses, official salaries, &c. This system carries much advantage for the Minister in question, and for his family and cronies, who compose the façade of the Finance Department; but Ibn Saud's reliance on Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman is absolute, and His Majesty is not really interested in changing or in controlling this man's methods.

94. These methods are by any standards unusual. The occasional short-term loans obtained from Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. are backed by a pledge of pilgrimage revenues; but the more frequent and considerable advances of millions of riyals, made by Sadaka Kaki and other local money-changers, have less orthodox collateral and are deviously refunded. American gold bullion, at a Jedda market rate, is one means of repayment. More common, and more ruinous, is the Finance Ministry's practice of compelling its creditors to accept cereals, piece-goods and sugar (supplied to the Government gratis under subsidy) at inflated values, and to recoup themselves in the black market. The short-sighted policy of charging outrageously high pilgrimage dues reflects the same mentality; and it is, of course, a commonplace of local administration for the salaries of Government officials and the army to be three months in arrears. Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman, as the man who is expected to produce up to a million riyals at a moment's notice, has to try everything at least once. He has

always before him the picture of his brother Hamad, who, as Acting Minister of Finance, once told Ibn Saud that there was nothing in the till. The story has it that he was put in a sack and dropped many miles out in the desert, and was only rescued from death in the nick of time.

95. We are dealing in Saudi Arabia with a museum-piece oriental potentate in a desert setting. Ibn Saud has known poverty; unlike his vast spoilt brood of princelings, he has philosophy enough to be poor again if destiny so will it. He has no private hoard of his own, whereas all around him are busily milking the Treasury to protect their own future, by purchases of real estate, or by business investments, in India or in Egypt. It is not easy for a Bedouin Arab ruler to refuse any favour; and Ibn Saud's generosity to tribal leaders and others, though carefully calculated, is so natural to his conception of his rôle as it is assumed to be natural by the recipients. His Majesty, whose personal tastes are simple, will spend anything he gets. He sins against the orthodoxy of chartered accountants in the grand manner of Caliphate tradition; which is strictly incorrect in a monarch receiving a joint Anglo-American subsidy. It is relevant to record that he gets good value for his money—or, more precisely, for ours—in terms of internal peace and public security. Present conditions in his dominions are without precedent in this respect; and British and other pilgrims benefit hardly less obviously than the frontier tribes of Iraq and Transjordan.

96. Against this background, the budgets and final accounts for the years 1943-45, as presented by the Minister of Finance to the British and American Legations, had no very convincing air of reality. Heavy financial deficits in 1943 and 1944 were alleged, which Mr. Jordan, in his recommendations to London, dismissed as unproved and non-existent. The United States Minister, on the other hand, was not prepared to challenge them, and he accepted the fact of a budgetary deficit in his recommendations to Washington. Much trouble and very much delay in the establishment of a 1945 joint Anglo-American subsidy to Ibn Saud resulted from this basic difference of approach to the problem by His Majesty's Treasury and the State Department respectively. The former, wearied of vicarious largesse at the British taxpayer's expense, preferred to rely solely on their own calculations of the Saudi Arabian balance of payments, which convinced them that the territory had funds abroad adequate to pay for its 1945 imports. The Americans, whose controlling motive was the retention of Ibn Saud's goodwill, preferred to consider the position as regards both internal and external expenditure, and thus to assure relief both for budgetary and for supply needs.

97. After Mr. Jordan's departure, the British Legation's attitude betrayed rather more sympathy for the Saudi case. His Majesty's Minister, after observation of the fantastic expedients to which the Finance Minister was driven to raise the wind, gave it as his opinion that, while the Saudi Arabian budget figures were obviously unreliable, the alleged financial deficits were entirely probable, though not necessarily resulting from the particular arithmetical calculations presented to us. He deprecated, on political grounds, any joint Anglo-American discussion with the Saudi Government about their budget figures in which the American Minister was allowed to retain his markedly non-objective attitude, for it seemed, in such circumstances, as embarrassing for His Majesty's representative to attempt to refute the Saudi figures in detail as it would be unrealistic to take them literally. Above all, a situation in which a difference of view between His Majesty's Government and the United States Government about the measure of credence to be attached to the Saudi Arabian Government figures might receive advertisement, with the United States Legation firmly on the side of the Saudis, seemed to His Majesty's Minister to be one to be avoided at all costs. His Majesty's Treasury were naturally anxious to justify their attitude to the Americans, both to encourage economy and to prove that they at least were not the dupes of Saudi Arabian fantasies, by a detailed presentation of their own calculations. These, however, seemed to His Majesty's Minister to conflict in certain particulars with verifiable facts, and, as the occasionally pejorative tone of the Treasury memorandum would have been dynamite if communicated by the Americans to Ibn Saud, he pressed for a change of accent from controversial guess-work to the hard but patent fact of British financial stringency, as an explanation of any reduced British assistance during 1945. In the event, this argument was never disputed, but was immediately respected, by Ibn Saud; and painful and unprofitable recriminations were avoided.

98. Discussions regarding the nature and extent of a joint Anglo-American subsidy for 1945 were proceeding as far back as September 1944; and the Middle East Supply Centre's overall 1945 supply programme for Saudi Arabia, upon

which estimates could be based, was produced in November 1944. Owing to various reasons, however, it was not until the 29th July, 1945, that any communication on the subject could be made to the Saudi Arabian Government. This inordinate delay created a difficult local situation and caused acute embarrassment to all concerned here.

99. The difference of opinion about Ibn Saud's financial needs, to which allusion has been made above, was a major reason for this delay, but there were many other contributory factors. The State Department considered continued reliance on Lend-Lease for subsidy purposes unsatisfactory and of dubious constitutional propriety, and explored the possibility of approaching Congress with a view to obtaining a special appropriation. Nothing came of this. The Department's consequent inability to commit itself beyond the 30th June, 1945, when Lend-Lease appropriations fell to be reviewed, led to a suggestion from Washington, endorsed by the two ministers in Jedda, that subsidy arrangements for the first six months of 1945 should be continued on the 1944 scale, and an eventual settlement over the year adjusted in the light of increased pilgrimage and oil revenues. This was not acceptable to London. The urgency of the need for a decision was underlined by the unhelpful behaviour of His Majesty's Government's purchasing and supply agents, the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, who suddenly cut off supplies to Saudi Arabia "for lack of financial cover." His Majesty's Government repeatedly asked the United States Government to share in a guarantee to the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and were as repeatedly refused. The reasons which prevented His Majesty's Government, after they had decided on a contribution of £1½ million, from increasing their own financial guarantee to their own agents above the figure of £600,000 were never fully appreciated in Jedda.

100. The British contribution to Ibn Saud's supply programme was fixed at £1½ million, *i.e.*, one-half of what it had been in 1944; and every effort was made to persuade the United States Government similarly to reduce their contribution, making a total joint subsidy of £2½ million or 10 million dollars. It was at this point that the clash of view about the territory's needs became most apparent. The Americans disputed His Majesty's Government's arguments about Ibn Saud's resources and indebtedness and were clearly determined to be guided by oleo-political rather than strictly economic considerations. Their own estimates were less staggering than had been feared: they called for a 50-50 subsidy, at £1,650,000 cost to each partner. London, fearing that consent might lead them on to a slippery slope, stuck to their £1½ million offer; and the principle of a full 50-50 basis of subsidy was thus officially abandoned.

101. This decision carried important political implications. It advertised a difference of opinion as to Saudi Arabia's needs. It left the provision of the major share of these needs to American generosity, with all that that implies in a land of natural gold-diggers. It coincided, most unhappily, with the end of the war in Europe, creating an inevitable impression that earlier assistance had been measured by British, and not by Saudi, needs. And it is not, perhaps, a coincidence that the first indication of His Majesty's Government's abdication of equality in contribution was almost immediately followed by a series of forceful and far-reaching demands upon Ibn Saud by the United States Government.

102. During May and June the details of the composition of subsidy programmes, sources of supply, dollar settlements for freights, and other matters were voluminously discussed. As so often, the mass of telegraphic correspondence seemed to represent a total of official expenditure far exceeding the cost of the items under argument. When everything had been settled, Congress sanction of a new Lend-Lease appropriation still had to be awaited.

103. At long last, the joint Anglo-American note was presented, on the 29th July. It provided for a joint programme of supply of cereals, United States textiles, tyres and tubes, sugar, tea, automotive replacement parts for the Saudi Arabian Government cars of United States manufacture, and the usual £10,000 a month contribution to the maintenance of Saudi Arabian Government missions abroad: the whole representing £2,500,000. Simultaneously, the United States Minister announced his Government's intention to supply Ibn Saud during 1945 with 10 million (credit) riyals; 17 million (re-sale) riyals, and 3 million dollars' worth of supplementary commodities; and His Majesty's Minister announced his Government's regret that the problems of reconstruction prevented a larger contribution, and their decision to leave Indian textiles, and spare parts for Saudi Government cars of British and Canadian manufacture, for purchase through Saudi Arabian commercial channels.

104. Though the Saudi Government grumble at the quality of Ethiopian wheat and Egyptian rice, and at the inadequacy of their sugar supply, the

country's economy has been valuably maintained by this assistance. Ibn Saud has been advised to expect no subsidy from His Majesty's Government during 1946, and the Government has ordered on its own account the first quarter's requirements of cereals and sugar from the British Supply Mission (M.E.) pool. Prospects of a large American loan doubtless reconcile His Majesty to the disappearance of direct British aid. Of the 25 million dollars to be advanced by the Export-Import Bank between January 1946 and June 1948, 11 million dollars are payable in 1946. All this money is, of course, earmarked for expenditure on American products and services.

105. The provision of extra supplies of cereals, sugar and tea for the special needs of pilgrims involved the Saudi Arabian Government in an expenditure of £100,000 which they did not expect to have to pay. The refusal of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation to ship these commodities unless their bill was paid in advance gravely delayed the arrival of any essential need, at a most critical time.

106. A phenomenon of disturbing effect is the continuing importation by the Saudi Arabian Government of gold from the United States, representing the equivalent of oil royalties and seigniorage on riyals minted for the use of American concerns in this territory. Three million dollars' worth of gold came in in this way during 1945. With a Middle Eastern rate of exchange of around £E. 6 per sovereign, the profits of smuggling are obvious, and in this the Saudis were much helped by the fact that there was during 1945 no customs office at Payne Field, outside Cairo, where the American A.T.C. aircraft from Jedda land.

107. The United States Minister was able to inform Ibn Saud on the 13th September that lend-lease assistance would be continued as programmed for the calendar year 1945, "as a special exception in favour of Saudi Arabia." One almost wished that American oil interests held a concession in the United Kingdom.

108. The unexpectedly early dissolution of the Middle East Supply Centre on the 1st November coincided with a great reduction in the volume of control to be imposed over Saudi Arabian imports, but, even so, it involved a considerable accretion of work for His Majesty's Legation. For some time past the Jedda office of the Middle East Supply Centre has been directed by Mr. F. Awalt, who was at the same time F.E.A. representative, U.S.C.C. representative and economic attaché of the United States Legation. British participation in the executive administration of the office had, for months, been nominal only. The British Legation in Jedda has never had a commercial secretariat, and was inadequately equipped to inherit the still considerable responsibilities of the Middle East Supply Centre's residuary legacy. Mr. Awalt and at least two other members of the Middle East Supply Centre office staff transferred their loyalties and local experience to the United States Legation. After an uncomfortable delay His Majesty's Minister succeeded in obtaining the services of the only British member of the Jedda office willing to remain in the Middle East.

109. The Director of the British Supply Mission (M.E.) visited Jedda in late November, and usefully explained to the Saudi Government officials concerned (and to His Majesty's Legation) the mechanics of new supply arrangements. Local inertia and ignorance are such, however, that no system of import-licensing or intelligent allocation supplies can be relied upon. Vested interests, generally in high authority, twist procedure for personal ends, and the change over from years of gratis subsidy supplies to normal processes of commercial exchange is one which the Government seems unwilling to face. Great delays in the communication by the Combined Boards in Washington territories of authorised sources of supply of short-list commodities make the legation's task no easier.

110. The concession granted in 1944 to Lieutenant-Colonel de Gaury to exploit minerals other than oil was relinquished by him in early 1945. His official connexion with His Majesty's Government, though not active at the time of his visit to Saudi Arabia, was held to debar acceptance of such a concession.

111. The conditions attaching to the American Government's offer of a loan (paragraph 104) seemed to exclude any possibility of British co-operation in local development. On representations by His Majesty's Minister, however, Ibn Saud agreed to leave certain projects, in which a British engineering group had already shown interest, for closed tender by this group and by the American group mentioned in paragraph 88 above. These projects include a town-lighting scheme for Jedda, an electrified light railway from Jedda to Mecca, and a water supply for Jedda. It is to be hoped that the British group will succeed in obtaining the contract for the provision of these amenities; but the association of much local influence with the American group is likely to weigh down the scales against us.

Pilgrimage.

112. Arafat Day fell on the 14th November.

113. The number of pilgrims from overseas, according to Saudi Arabian Government and legation statistics, was slightly less than 40,000; with the usual numbers of overland pilgrims, the total was thus only negligibly greater than in 1943 and 1944. No tragic incident marred the sacred occasion; but pilgrims' complaints at the extortionate tariff-charges and at the unmitigated discomfort of local transport and municipal services were loud and general.

114. The internal (motor) transport situation threatened at one time to compromise the success of the pilgrimage, for the number of lorries known to be available to carry pilgrims to Medina—a long and shattering journey—seemed notably inadequate. Fortunately, two consignments of F.W.D. lorries from the Persian Gulf, totalling over 200, which the United States Government provided as aid additional to subsidy, relieved this crisis. His Majesty's Minister was asked by the Minister Resident (M.E.) during the summer to state by how much the then estimated numbers of prospective pilgrims from all territories should be reduced to conform to the limitations of Saudi transport. He not unnaturally refused to usurp the responsibility of the Saudi Arabian Government by making an invidious pronouncement which could not but have had unfavourable echoes.

115. All countries of pilgrims' origin, except India—and except such territories as French North Africa and the U.S.S.R., which sent one or two plane-loads of token pilgrims only—followed the practice of recent years and pre-collected pilgrimage tariff dues on behalf of the Saudi Arabian Government. These dues were identical with those charged in 1944; but, in order to disguise their ugly and arbitrary rate of riyals 8 to the £E., the Government announced the dues for 1945 in terms of the currency of individual territories, and not in riyals. The Government of India refused, owing to clamour from Indian Moslems anxious to take advantage of market rates of exchange, to pre-collect dues. The Saudi Arabian Government at first consented to Indian payments in rupees or otherwise on arrival in Jedda at the market rate of the day; but later, at Shaikh Yusuf Yasin's instance, withdrew this concession. The irresponsibility of this tiresome fool was well illustrated by his solemn suggestion that Indian pilgrims should pay a 25 per cent. supplement of dues, as a penalty for not paying in their country of origin. This proposal was withdrawn, after some straight talk by His Majesty's Minister.

116. In the event, both the Indian pilgrims and the Jedda money-changers parted on good terms; an unusual consummation of local financial transactions. The Indians brought from India sovereigns which had cost them 53 rupees each. These are normally worth 80 rupees in Jedda. Both the Hajji, who received as much as 60 rupees for his gold pound, and the sarrâf, who obtained a sovereign for as little as 60 rupees, thus had cause for self-congratulation.

117. The King, who had abstained from pilgrimage in 1944 in order not to complicate the transport situation, and the Crown Prince, the Amir Saud, who had missed two years' pilgrimages, attended the Haj in 1945, together with the rest of the numerous royal family. His Majesty's customary speech to notable pilgrims, at a banquet held in Mecca, contained many friendly allusions to Great Britain.

118. As in 1943 and 1944, arrangements for co-ordinating pilgrimage arrangements in various territories of the Middle East, more particularly shipping arrangements, were made by the office of the Minister Resident, later the British Middle East Office, in Cairo. The unfortunate delay in the despatch by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation of extra cereals, &c., for pilgrimage needs has been mentioned in paragraph 105 above.

Military.

119. The British and American Training teams, which were established at Taif in 1944 to instruct the Saudi army in the use of equipment forming the joint Anglo-American gift of arms, &c., completed their task by the late spring of 1945 and left the country. Tedious and voluminous correspondence with the Saudi Arabian Government has continued ever since, about the replacement of ammunition and material used during the training period, the provision of spares, &c.

120. The Amir Mansour, as Minister of Defence, is keen to improve the standards and efficiency of the army. Training of small groups of officers and men went on throughout the year, in Egypt and the Sudan. A formal request by Ibn Saud for a full-dress British military mission, composed in the main of Sunni Moslem elements, is under consideration at the time of writing.

Aviation.

121. External air communications were maintained by the B.O.A.C. and, at an increasing tempo, by the United States A.T.C. A marked difference in price-rates favours the latter organisation. No internal air services exist. Charter flights to Dhahran on behalf of Messrs. Aramco, are frequent, and President Roosevelt's gift aeroplane has done yeoman service in transporting official and royal passengers and goods across the desert. Ibn Saud made his first flight in September in this machine, from El Afif to Taif; but he has not yet repeated the experience.

122. The King's private plane, for long piloted and serviced by United States airforce personnel, was provided with a T.W.A. crew at the end of the year. This company has made a comprehensive offer, based on detailed surveys, for the establishment of internal and external air-lines. The King's decision will depend upon what His Majesty's Government decide to offer him instead.

123. One of the 7,000-yard runways of the Dhahran airfield, whose genesis provoked the excitements recorded in paragraph 76 above, was in use before the end of the year. The whole installation is, by all accounts, impressive. Associated work on landing grounds at Lauqa and elsewhere is still in progress.

Locusts.

124. The good work done in the 1944-45 campaign by the staff of the Middle East Anti-Locust Unit, with personnel and equipment far below their needs, can hardly be over-praised. The infestations with which they had to cope far exceeded even the 1943-44 record. Most unfortunately, however, the agricultural station at Al Kharj—in which Ibn Saud takes a keen personal interest—and the district and neighbourhood of Riyadh itself were severely damaged by locust infestation in 1945; and this all too visible devastation of his own palm groves and crops has resulted, unreasonably but not wholly unexpectedly, in a marked decline in the King's confidence and interest in the activities of the unit. His Majesty is less impressed by accounts of vast swarms annihilated elsewhere in his dominions or of perils averted from neighbouring territories, than by the vision of his own ruined flower beds, palm trees and cultivation; and he is now inclined to claim that the traditional practice of shoo-ing the locusts away on to someone else's fields, by petrol-tin percussions and the waving of red petticoats, is at least as effective as modern methods. The unit began work in November again, probably for its last season, against this background of royal disillusion. Every effort was made to associate Saudi Arabian elements, on every level, with its activities, but without much success.

Transport.

125. The Saudi Arabian Government's transport services provided, throughout the year, as in previous years, a happy hunting ground for the disreputable family of the Minister of Finance and other racketeers. This is perhaps inevitable in a country where Government is still so exclusively personal a function, but it is none the less disastrous. No local transport technician or administrator can stand up to the demands of spoilt young princes, or to the raids upon Government stocks of the sons and nephews of Shaikh Abdullah Sulaiman. Owing to an almost complete absence of roads, repair stations and maintenance facilities, the life of a vehicle in Saudi Arabia is about one-tenth of its life elsewhere. To this must be now added the dilapidation of spares and the literal theft of new material by irresponsible young men who consider that what is Government property is, first and foremost, destined for their own personal use and enjoyment.

126. A dangerous pilgrimage-transport situation was averted, as reported in paragraph 114 above, by the provision of about 200 lorries, under Lend-Lease, from United States Army stocks in the Persian Gulf. In October, on finding transport in the Mecca garage far below his expectations, Ibn Saud blew up. He asked His Majesty's Minister to find for him one or two British technicians, capable of organising and maintaining the Government's transport services. Captain H. S. S. Hart arrived in Jedda on the 31st December to wield the first broom in this Augean stable. All, except those who can best prevent it, pray for his success.

Propaganda.

127. Good use was made throughout 1945 of films, books and other material supplied by the Ministry of Information. A visit to Jedda by Mr. J. H. Driberg in June was particularly helpful.

128. British Council assistance, *e.g.*, school-books—during 1945 was as welcome as ever. The council's plans for scholarships for Saudi boys at Victoria College, Alexandria, were frustrated by budgetary considerations. Their offer of scholarships at El-Dueim Secondary School (Sudan) was refused, after brief trial, by the Saudi Arabian Government. The boys selected by the Government and sent—each with his personal body-servant—to El-Dueim, were of the pampered "fils à papa" type. After a few days' experience of the spartan system of El Dueim, where (among other simplicities) they had to wash their own clothes, these young gentlemen flounced off to Cairo; and the Saudi Arabian Government refused to replace them.

Royal Family.

129. As has been made apparent throughout this report, the authority of Ibn Saud throughout his dominions, and the energy with which he pleads the Arab cause abroad, have continued undiminished during 1945. Indeed some might consider that the year's development in the international field have enhanced his influence. His Majesty's health, according to a team of British doctors who examined him and some members of his family in January 1945, was then remarkable for a man around 67 years of age; better, indeed, than that of some of his sons. The doctors' only warning was against the continued use, or abuse, of "stimulants"; meaning thereby the hormone injections upon which the King has long relied for the fulfilment of one aspect of his personal legend.

130. It was difficult to avoid an impression, however, towards the end of the year, that old age is rapidly gaining upon Ibn Saud. He dozes off during council meetings, and seems to tire more easily than before. This impression may be a false one. Neither Taif nor Mecca suit His Majesty's health, which improves in the more rigorous climate of upland Nejd. Once he is home again, he may throw off the tentacles of the years.

131. One must, nevertheless, face the fact that the Lord of Arabia is not immortal. The Crown Prince, the Amir Saud, has been named by his father and accepted by his brothers and by the 'Ulama as Ibn Saud's successor. His ability to hold Nejd, at least, is undoubted. But the rest is a series of question-marks. Will the Amir Faisal, Viceroy of the Hejaz, serve his brother as loyally as he now serves his father? Will the various ambitions of the Amir Mohammed—a hot and thunderous No. 3 of the Amir Abdullah ibn Abdurrahman, only surviving and jaundiced brother of Ibn Saud—and of the Amir Mansour, Minister of Defence, whose frustrations of sexual impotence lends edge to his natural energies and to his Armenian mother's legacy of wits, unite, clash, effervesce or evaporate, when Ibn Saud dies? What of the forty-odd sons who have no hope of succession? Will they remain an object of fraternal, as now of paternal, affection—and extravagance? Will they split away from their present avenue of Sphinxes into groups and particular maternal hierarchies of tribal chieftain, religious divine and slave; or will they find a common end in some large and prudent massacre? And what part in the shaping of dynastic events will be played by dollar-diplomacy and by the specific interests of the Arabian American Oil Company? These and kindred speculations are insistent.

132. The Amir Faisal's delegation to San Francisco, whither a group of his brothers accompanied him, and his return visit to London in October for convalescence after treatment for severe ulcers on the stomach, kept him much abroad during the year. The Amir Mansour acted in his place as Viceroy of the Hejaz, and showed unexpected energy and ability in that rôle. Indeed, some measure of irritated jealousy seems to have seized Faisal when he found himself back in the Hejaz, but unable for medical reasons to resume his official duties, in September.

133. The Amir Talal, a boy of about 15, like Mansour, the son of an Armenian woman, seems to enjoy a large share of Ibn Saud's affection. But this, where his sons are concerned, is expansive, and he dotes, like most elderly parents, upon the little ones.

British Legation.

134. Mr. S. R. Jordan was succeeded as His Majesty's Minister, on the 23rd February, by Mr. L. B. Graftey-Smith. Mr. P. G. D. Adams succeeded Mr. G. H. Baker as Second Secretary in June.

135. A special effort was made during the year to enable members of the legation staff to take some of the United Kingdom leave, of which war-conditions had long deprived them. This, and the ravages of ill-health, inseparable from

life in Jedda, reduced the total legation strength in midsummer from fourteen to five. During an arduous month, the Arabic composition and transcription of every communication to the local authorities had to be undertaken by the two surviving members of the executive staff.

136. Twenty-five years ago, the total foreign community of Jedda varied in numbers from six to twelve. The tradition then established of communal solidarity and goodwill has, fortunately, survived both the expansion of this little group to the present Anglo-American, European and diplomatic community of, approximately, eighty, and the inevitable social strains arising from contrasting British and American standards of salary and entertainment. The often advertised, but lamentably authentic, hardships of life in Jedda, only precariously and inadequately mitigated by occasional battery sets and plumbing, are still a stimulation to stoical attitudes rather than a pretext for collapse. Visitors from other parts of the Middle East speak kindly of the community's morale. The same effect is probably produced on visitors to St. Dunstan's.

CHAPTER V.—PALESTINE

[E 1419/1419/31]

No. 25

Convention Regulating the Transit of Mineral Oils by the Trans-Arabian Pipe-Line Company through the Territory of Palestine.

THIS Convention made the Seventh day of January, 1946, between the High Commissioner for Palestine (hereinafter called "the High Commissioner") of the one part and Trans-Arabian Pipe-Line Company, a company incorporated in the State of Delaware in the United States of America whose principal office is situate at 100, West Tenth Street, Wilmington, in the State of Delaware aforesaid (hereinafter called "the Company") which expression wherever used shall be deemed to include its assigns or any duly constituted subsidiary or associated company or any other company which may be recognised under Article XXVI as being formed or employed by the Company for the purpose of constructing, maintaining or operating pipe-lines, refineries or works ancillary thereto which form the subject of this Convention, of the other part.

Whereas the Company, in connexion with the exploitation of certain concessions granted by the Government of Saudi-Arabia, is desirous of laying a pipe-line or pipe-lines from Saudi-Arabia to a terminal port on the Mediterranean coast, the said pipe-line traversing the territory of Palestine, and for the purposes of this Convention of erecting and maintaining within that territory offices, pumping stations, workshops, stores, storage tanks for oil and water, bridges, residences for employees, rail and tram lines, aerial ropeways or telerage, roads, rolling stock, overhead or underground cable lines, ferries, road, water and aerial transport, aerodromes, electric cables (whether overhead or underground), telegraph and telephone lines, wireless installations, refineries, tank farms, hospitals, power schemes, oil, gas and water lines, either exposed, buried, or submerged, and other works (whether of the kind aforesaid or not) appertaining or auxiliary thereto (all of which works are hereinafter collectively included in the expression "the undertaking").

And whereas the High Commissioner, in consideration of the benefits which the country will derive from the undertaking, is desirous of facilitating the undertaking by the means prescribed in this Convention.

Now it is hereby agreed between the High Commissioner and the Company in the manner following:—

ARTICLE I.

Rights granted to Company.

The High Commissioner grants by these presents to the Company the right (hereinafter called "the concession") to construct, maintain, and operate one or more pipe-lines, refineries and all the works ancillary thereto, and to do all things necessary for the undertaking, on the following conditions:

ARTICLE II.

Duration of Concession.

The duration of the concession shall be for seventy years from the date of signature hereof.

Termination of pipe-lines.

The pipe-line or pipe-lines shall terminate at such point on the coast of Palestine as may be agreed between the High Commissioner and the Company.

Pipe-lines ordinarily to be contiguous.

So far as reasonably possible, all pipe-lines laid by the Company shall be contiguous.

Submission of plans.

Before beginning the laying of any pipe-line or the erection or construction in connexion therewith of any pumping station, refinery or other work of the undertaking, the Company shall submit to the High Commissioner plans

showing the lands in, on or over which the pipe-line is to be laid and the lands on or over which the pumping station, refinery or other work of the undertaking is to be erected or constructed, and shall obtain the approval of the High Commissioner to such plans. Such approval shall not be unreasonably withheld or delayed. The plans shall be plans of a character which will enable the High Commissioner to ascertain the citing of the proposed works and the lands to be acquired in connexion therewith and the ownership of such lands.

Surrender of property at expiration of Concession.

At the expiration of the concession the rights granted to the Company under this Convention shall determine and all the immovable property of the Company and all fixtures in Palestine, which property and fixtures are part of the undertaking, shall become the property of the High Commissioner free of charge, provided that on or before the expiration of the concession, should the Company so desire, the High Commissioner undertakes to consider sympathetically an extension or renewal of the concession on terms to be agreed and provided further that the High Commissioner may require the Company to remove on the expiration of the concession any of the said fixtures, other than the pipe-line or pipe-lines, which the High Commissioner may reasonably require the Company to remove.

Abandonment.

The Company shall have the right to abandon permanently to the High Commissioner all rights hereunder, upon giving three months' notice in writing of its intention so to do, and this Convention shall absolutely determine on the date fixed for such determination in such notice, and if such notice be given not later than twenty-five years after the date of this Convention the Company shall be entitled, on such determination, to remove, free of all taxes and duties, all plant, buildings, stores, material and property of every sort, provided that for a period of three months from the receipt of such notice the High Commissioner may purchase the same at a price equal to the replacement value at that date, less depreciation, which price shall be agreed or, failing agreement, settled under Article XXIV.

ARTICLE III.

Holy Places.

No works of the undertaking may be erected within the precincts of cemeteries, places used for religious worship and places of antiquity as scheduled or as defined in the Antiquity Laws or Regulations.

Antiquities.

Works of art and antiquities discovered during construction shall be subject to the Laws and Regulations relating thereto.

ARTICLE IV.

Exemption from tax on products.

No import tax, transit tax, export tax or other tax, or fiscal charge of any sort shall be levied on petroleum, naphtha, ozokerite, natural gases, whether in a crude state or any form of derivatives thereof, which is or are intended for consignment in transit or for utilisation for the industrial operations of the undertaking.

Local Marketing.

If the said products, crude or refined, are marketed locally for consumption in Palestine, or if they are utilised for requirements other than those of the undertaking they will be subjected to the same duties and fiscal charges, including import dues, as are leviable on similar products in Palestine.

The conditions of the sale of such products in the local market will form the subject of an arrangement between the High Commissioner and the Company.

ARTICLE V.

Customs duties, import dues and facilities.

The Company shall be entitled to import into Palestine free of Customs duties or other importation dues (which duties and/or dues are hereinafter collectively referred to as "import dues") all stores, equipment, materials and

other things whatsoever which may be necessary for the works of the undertaking and for its transportation purposes, including all equipment for offices, houses, hospitals or other buildings, which will be the property of the Company and used for its operations (all of which stores, equipment, materials and other things whatsoever are hereinafter collectively referred to as "materials").

Materials imported free of import dues if sold or otherwise disposed of by the Company in Palestine to a company, firm or other institution or person not entitled to free importation of such materials shall be liable to the import dues leviable at the time of such sale and the principles of section 139 of the Customs Ordinance, as amended by the Customs (Amendment) Ordinance, 1939, shall be applied in the calculation of such import dues.

The Company shall be entitled to re-export free of dues materials imported free of import dues.

In view of the exceptional nature of the undertaking, the High Commissioner will cause special facilities to be granted to the Company, if necessary, for the import of materials at points convenient to the Company, and will permit the loading and unloading of ships and the import and export of cargo at all times, whether by day or night, and on public holidays. The Company for its part undertakes to erect and maintain any special buildings that may be necessary for this purpose and to pay the additional fees of Customs officials prescribed by regulations.

All things and materials imported or exported by the Company's employees for their personal use, or imported by the Company for sale to its employees, shall be liable to the import dues in force.

No refund of the duties paid on materials purchased locally by the Company will be made, but orders placed by the Company with local merchants for materials which under this Convention are exempt from import dues shall, on importation, be likewise exempted from import dues; all such orders must be notified to the Customs authorities and must be supported by a certificate signed on behalf of the Company and approved by the Customs authorities, declaring that such orders have been placed for the account of the Company, and for the requirements of the undertaking.

ARTICLE VI.

Port, Harbour and other dues.

The Port Authorities will render to the Company or its contractors all possible assistance in the unloading and handling of cargo within the facilities at the disposal of the Port Authorities.

In the event of the Company's requirements being beyond the scope of the Port Authorities' resources the Company shall by arrangement with the Port Authorities be entitled to make its own arrangements for the unloading and handling of cargo within the port of Haifa or such other port as may be used by the Company for the purpose of the undertaking.

Subject to the provisions of Article VII hereof the Company shall make use of existing facilities at the Port of Haifa or such other port as may be used by the Company for the purpose of the undertaking but in the event of these not being sufficient for its requirements the Company shall by agreement with the Port Authorities be entitled to use its own lighters, launches and other craft in such port.

In agreement with the Ports and Customs Authorities the Company shall be entitled to store the materials required for the purpose of the undertaking in its own enclosures and sheds should it not be possible for the Port Authorities to provide the necessary accommodation.

Ships owned or specially chartered by the Company shall pay port dues and the Company shall pay cranes, wharfage, lighterage and other harbour dues on schedules of special rates to be agreed between the High Commissioner and the Company, in the compilation of which schedules regard shall be had to the large tonnage of goods to be handled.

ARTICLE VII.

Company's Port: Construction of.

The High Commissioner will cause to be given every facility for the construction, maintenance and use by the Company, should it so desire, for the purposes of the undertaking but not for the purposes of general trading, of a

port or ports in the zone adjacent to the pipe-line terminal, the location to be approved by the High Commissioner, such approval not to be unreasonably withheld or delayed.

The Company may, within the limits of any such port or ports, and in agreement with the High Commissioner, lay mooring, guiding and lighted buoys, establish shore marks and lights, breakwaters, jetties, wharfs, submarine loading lines, and may generally undertake dredging works and such works of arrangement, conservancy, sanitation and maintenance as the Company may deem necessary for the efficient working of such port or ports by day or night.

The plans for the construction of such port or ports shall, before the work of construction is begun, be submitted to the High Commissioner and approved by him, such approval not to be unreasonably withheld or delayed.

The right of entry or access to such port or ports shall be at the discretion of the Company: Provided that nothing in this paragraph shall restrict the right of entry or access of any officer of the Government of Palestine acting in the course of his duty as such.

The Company alone shall have the right to levy port, harbour, light, wharfage, cranes, or other dues, on ships entering or leaving the Company's ports. These dues shall be fixed in agreement with the High Commissioner.

Ships using the Company's port or ports shall pay to the Government of Palestine any lighthouse or anchorage dues which may from time to time be payable.

The appropriate Government Departments, under arrangement with the Company, shall discharge the necessary customs, quarantine, immigration services, and police supervision.

For these, and any other special services rendered, the Company, or vessels using the Company's ports, shall pay to the Government of Palestine on such scale as the High Commissioner shall reasonably decide to be appropriate.

The High Commissioner shall cause anchorage near the Company's dolphins, submarine or submerged loading lines to be prohibited.

Save as otherwise provided in this Article, the laws of Palestine shall apply in relation to any port or ports established under this Article as they do in relation to ports generally.

ARTICLE VIII.

Railway rates.

In connexion with the construction, maintenance and operation of the undertaking, the Company may use the existing railway system in Palestine and extension thereof on such schedule of rates as may be reasonably fixed by the High Commissioner on the basis that, during the laying of the pipe-line or pipe-lines, the lowest possible rates consistent with economic operation will be granted in relation to the tonnage and passengers expected to be carried and in so far as any reduction in rate is consistent with international obligations, and further may provide its own rolling stock during the said period if the Railway Administration is unable to provide suitable rolling stock or to carry the Company's traffic without unreasonable delay.

ARTICLE IX.

Construction of Railway by Company.

The High Commissioner grants to the Company the right to construct any system of railway required for the undertaking if the existing railway system and extensions thereof do not meet the Company's requirements provided that the existing railway undertakings shall first be given the opportunity of providing any extensions as part of the railway system operated by the Palestine Government.

The Company undertakes that before proceeding to any such construction, other than the construction of a portable service line, it will deposit with the High Commissioner, and obtain his approval of, a scheme for the construction, maintenance and working of the railway, and that it will construct, maintain and work the railway in accordance with the said scheme.

In the event of the Company exercising the right of constructing a railway, the railway shall not be used for the public conveyance of passengers, animals or goods and the Company shall not, therefore, have the right, nor be subject to the liabilities, of a common carrier in respect of the railway, but Government stores and personnel may be carried under arrangements and on terms and conditions to be agreed with the High Commissioner.

The High Commissioner shall have the right if the interests of the public so require, to purchase at a price to be agreed, or failing agreement, fixed under Article XXIV hereof any railway of a gauge exceeding 0.762 metre constructed by the Company, but on any railway so purchased the High Commissioner shall cause all the goods and passenger traffic of the Company to be carried on terms to be agreed between the High Commissioner and the Company.

ARTICLE X.

Roads: Use by Company.

The Company shall have the same rights as the general public to use the system of roads constructed in Palestine.

Construction of, by Company.

The Company shall not be entitled to any contribution from the public revenue towards the cost of construction or maintenance of any roads constructed by the Company for the purpose of the undertaking.

ARTICLE XI.

Labour.

The Company undertake to employ local labour for the purpose of the undertaking in Palestine provided that if the supply of suitable local labour is insufficient, the High Commissioner will cause special facilities to be granted for the admission into Palestine of labour for the purposes of the undertaking, upon the condition that, if any such labour is admitted for a temporary purpose, the Company undertakes to repatriate, when such purpose is accomplished, any persons so admitted who may not have obtained the consent of the High Commissioner to remain in Palestine.

The Company shall have the right so to arrange its labour shifts that construction, maintenance and operation of the undertaking may proceed by day, by night, and during public holidays.

During special construction or repair work when large quantities of labour may be required as a temporary measure, the High Commissioner will cause special facilities to be granted for the free and unhampered movement of the Company's employees, vehicles and materials, whether by day or by night, over certain frontier points to be agreed.

Frontier Crossings.

Having regard to the special requirements of the undertaking which call for uninterrupted operation, the High Commissioner will cause to be granted at all times such facilities for the movement of the Company's staff, employees and materials at the agreed frontier points, and will favourably consider, and if at all possible will cause to be adopted, any measures of reciprocity in this respect which the Company may arrange with the Governments of adjoining territories.

Any extraordinary expense incurred by the Government Departments in facilitating such movements at the agreed frontier points will first be agreed between the High Commissioner and the Company and will be paid by the Company.

Restrictions.

The High Commissioner may prohibit, in the interests of public security, any person employed by the Company from entering into or remaining in any specified area.

Notwithstanding anything contained in this Article, any labour employed by the Company in Palestine shall be employed in conformity with any legislation governing employment in Palestine from time to time in force.

Company to observe fair labour conditions.

The Company shall pay rates of wages and observe hours and conditions of labour not less favourable than those generally paid and observed in Palestine by good employers in similar circumstances and shall secure that any contractor carrying out any work on behalf of the Company in relation to the undertaking is bound by the like obligation in relation to labour employed by him on such work.

ARTICLE XII.

Taxation.

No property tax, income tax, or any levy or fiscal charge of any sort shall be imposed on the Company in respect of its property, employees, the income or the turnover of the Company or the operation of the undertaking, save in respect of any profits accruing from sales of the Company's products for local re-sale or consumption in Palestine outside the requirements of the undertaking, provided that exemption shall not extend to any of the Company's dividends distributed to taxable inhabitants of Palestine or to salaries of employees in so far as they may be taxable in Palestine.

No stamp duty shall be charged on the present Convention or the documents annexed thereto, nor on any supplementary Conventions, plans, specifications or similar instruments executed with, or submitted to, the High Commissioner.

The Company shall be liable to stamp duty and registration fees for all transactions other than those for which exemption is granted under this Article.

To the extent to which the Company shall provide at its own cost adequate services within the precincts of the areas acquired for its terminal ports, refineries, tank farms, pumping stations, and similar works of the undertaking, in connexion with and for the purpose of education, police, sanitation, water, light and other services ordinarily provided by a local authority, the Company shall be exempt from liability to be assessed to rates in respect of services so provided, but nothing in these presents shall impose on the Company any obligation whatever to provide any such service.

On the other hand, in respect of any installation by the Company in Palestine or of any operations which it may carry out in Palestine, which shall not be for the purpose of the working of the undertaking, or shall not be justified by the operation of the undertaking, it shall be subject to all obligations to which the general public is subject, and shall be liable to all taxes applicable under the laws for the time being in force.

ARTICLE XIII.

Communications.

The Company shall be entitled on making due application therefore to receive a licence on such terms and conditions as the High Commissioner thinks fit, under section 38 of the Post Office Ordinance (Cap. 115) or any provisions of any enactment amending or replacing the same, to construct, maintain and work a telegraph and telephone system providing communication between the various places, works, offices and other establishments used or to be used by the Company in connexion with the carrying out, construction, use, safeguarding and maintenance of the undertaking. The Company shall also be entitled on making due application therefore to receive a licence on such terms and conditions as the High Commissioner thinks fit, under section 3 of the Wireless Telegraphy Ordinance (Cap. 152) or any provisions of any enactment amending or replacing the same, to construct, maintain and work a wireless telegraph system providing communication as aforesaid and also providing communication with ships at sea. The High Commissioner may from time to time by written notice to the Company vary the terms and conditions of any such licence or add new terms and conditions or delete any terms and conditions. Notwithstanding any provisions of law to the contrary, any licence to which this paragraph refers shall be of indefinite duration and shall not be liable to be revoked so long as this Convention remains in force, except as provided in the licence.

The Company shall be entitled to use for the purposes of the undertaking any public services functioning in Palestine, even if not specifically provided for herein, on payment of the charges, if any, ordinarily imposed upon other industrial undertakings for the like use of such services.

ARTICLE XIV.

Transport.

The Company shall have the right to use any form of transport, whether by land, water or air for the movement of its employees or materials, subject to the due observance of the laws and regulations governing the use of such transport.

ARTICLE XV.

Building and construction material.

The Company shall have the right, subject to existing rights, to use for the purpose of the undertaking free of charge but subject to such licence fees for quarrying as may be in force, such soil, clay, ballast, lime, gypsum, stone and similar substances vested in the High Commissioner as the High Commissioner may agree to be available, such agreement not to be unreasonably withheld or delayed.

The Company shall also have the right, subject to existing rights and on the terms and in accordance with the relative laws and regulations to cut such timber, wood and brushwood in Government forests as may be necessary for the undertaking and as the High Commissioner may agree to be available having regard to the maintenance of the forests, such approval not to be unreasonably withheld or delayed.

ARTICLE XVI.

Water.

In agreement with the High Commissioner, the Company shall have the right, subject to existing rights, to sink wells, make dams, catch and conserve surface water, and otherwise to take such measures as are necessary to provide water for the purposes of the undertaking without fee or charge other than the cost of any land acquired for the purpose in accordance with the provisions of Article XVII.

The Company shall have the right, with the consent of the High Commissioner, to take such quantities of water from rivers and lakes vested in or under the control of the High Commissioner in Palestine as may be agreed to be necessary for the purposes of the undertaking, provided that, in so doing, rights acquired or already granted shall first be satisfied and the Company shall not, in any case, deprive the local inhabitants of a reasonable supply of water, for household, industrial and agricultural purposes and for the watering of animals and the irrigation of land.

Water in respect of which special rights of user have been granted or acquired shall, if the High Commissioner agrees that such water is required for the purposes of the undertaking, be expropriated in the manner provided by law and at the expense in all things of the Company, provided that such expropriation shall not, in any case, deprive the local inhabitants of a reasonable supply of water for household, industrial and agricultural purposes and for the watering of animals and the irrigation of land.

The Company will take all reasonable steps to make available for local use any waste water from its plants and installations.

Nothing in this Convention shall exempt the Company from liability to pay water rates for water supplied to the Company by any local authority.

ARTICLE XVII.

Lands: State.

The High Commissioner will grant to the Company, for periods which shall not be greater than the duration of this Convention, leases of State lands which the High Commissioner agrees are required for the purposes of the undertaking.

The Company shall pay a nominal rent in respect of any such land which is leased for the purpose of laying therein the pipe-line or pipe-lines or of erecting thereon pumping stations, tank farms, refineries and other terminal facilities, or for any accommodation works required during the construction period. In all other cases, the Company shall pay a rent based on the value of the land leased.

Lands: Private.

Lands required for the undertaking and not vested in the High Commissioner shall be acquired by agreement between the Company and the owners thereof. Failing agreement, if the High Commissioner regards the acquisition of such lands as being necessary for the purposes of the undertaking, such lands will be expropriated in accordance with the provisions of the Land (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance, 1943 or such other Expropriation Law as may be substituted therefor, and at the expense in all things of the Company.

Lands acquired compulsorily shall be registered in the name of the High Commissioner and shall be leased to the Company at nominal rents and for period not greater than the duration of this Convention.

ARTICLE XVIII.

Security.

The High Commissioner will take such measures (including the provision of police and/or military protection and the construction and maintenance of appropriate works and accommodation in relation thereto) as he may deem practicable and reasonable for the protection of the undertaking and of the Company's employees especially during periods of construction. All expenses incurred by the Government of Palestine in connexion with the taking of such measures shall, in so far as they are reasonable measures and to the extent that they are taken for the purposes aforesaid, be defrayed by the Company.

ARTICLE XIX.

Share Participation.

Whenever an issue of shares is offered by the Company to the general public, for the purpose of the undertaking, subscription lists shall be opened in Palestine simultaneously with lists opened elsewhere.

ARTICLE XX.

Company to comply with Companies Ordinance, Cap. 22.

The Company shall within three months from the date of this Convention comply with Section 248 of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 22.

ARTICLE XXI.

General Operations.

So soon as the Company shall have come to agreement with the Governments of the other territories in which the Company desires to lay the pipe-line or pipe-lines, the Company shall take all reasonable measures to carry out the objects of this Convention, but if at the expiration of ten years from the date of signature of this Convention the Company shall not have submitted the plans to be submitted under the provisions of Article II hereof the Company shall pay to the High Commissioner a licence fee of £P.1,000 per annum on the first day of January in each year until such plans shall have been submitted.

Protection by High Commissioner.

The High Commissioner will cause all reasonable measures to be taken to facilitate the carrying out of the objects of this Convention in the area in which the undertaking is operated, and when entering into, granting or confirming any agreement, licence or concession other than this Convention, the High Commissioner will protect the rights of the Company acquired hereunder.

The Company shall take all such precautions and measures as are practicable and reasonable to prevent its operations causing pollution of soil, air or water. Nothing in this paragraph shall affect any liability for loss, damage or injury arising from pollution which the Company would have had apart from this paragraph.

ARTICLE XXII.

Damages.

The penalty for any breach of this Convention shall be damages, which shall be fixed by agreement, or under Article XXIV hereof.

ARTICLE XXIII.

Force majeure.

No failure or omission, whether by the Company or by the High Commissioner or any public officer, in the observance or performance of any of the stipulations, agreements, or conditions herein contained, and on the part of either party to be observed or performed shall give rise to any claim or demand against any party or in any manner operate to the prejudice of such party or be deemed a breach of this Convention, if it be shown to the reasonable satisfaction of the other party that the default has arisen from any

of the following causes, namely, Act of God, insurrection, riots, war, strikes, or lock-outs of workmen, or any other extraordinary or unforeseen circumstances which may be reasonably considered to be beyond the control of either party to this Convention.

ARTICLE XXIV.

Arbitration.

If at any time within the duration of this Convention or thereafter any doubt, difference or dispute shall arise between the parties hereto concerning the interpretation or execution hereof, or anything herein contained, or in connexion herewith, or the rights and liabilities of either party hereunder, the same shall, failing any agreement to settle it by other means, be referred to two arbitrators, one of whom shall be chosen by each party, and an umpire who shall be chosen by the arbitrators before proceeding to arbitration. Each party shall nominate its arbitrator within thirty days of being requested in writing by the other party to do so. In the event of the arbitrators failing to agree upon an umpire, the parties hereto shall, in agreement, appoint an umpire, and in the event of their failing to agree, they shall request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint an umpire. The decision of the arbitrators, or, in the case of a difference of opinion between them, the decision of the umpire, shall be final. The place of arbitration shall be such as may be agreed by the parties, and, in default of agreement, shall be London.

ARTICLE XXV.

International Conventions and existing Concessions and Agreements to prevail.

This Convention shall not be construed so as to impose on the High Commissioner any obligation which conflicts with any obligation imposed on him by any International Convention nor shall this Convention or any Article hereof be construed so as to prejudice, or derogate from, any rights or privileges created by any existing concession or agreement by which the High Commissioner is bound.

ARTICLE XXVI.

Power to assign Convention.

The Company shall have the right to assign or otherwise dispose of this Convention or any interest herein or any of the powers conferred hereby, provided that the previous consent in writing of the High Commissioner shall first have been obtained, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld or delayed.

ARTICLE XXVII.

Marginal Notes.

The marginal notes of the contents of this Convention are for convenience of reference only and shall not affect the construction or interpretation of the Convention.

Done in duplicate at Jerusalem on the seventh day of January, 1946.

Signed by the High Commissioner
for Palestine in the presence of (Sgd.) A. CUNNINGHAM.
(Sgd.) L. B. GIBSON.

Signed by (on behalf of Trans-
Arabian Pipe-Line Company) in
the presence of (Sgd.) W. J. LENAHA.
LOWELL C. PINKERTON

[E 1512/4/31]

No. 26

Mr. Smith to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 20th February.)

(No. 19.)

Sir,

Jedda, 11th February, 1946.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 46 of the 9th February, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy in translation of the Saudi Arabian Government's reply to the joint note which my United States colleague and I presented to them on behalf of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry into European Jewry and the Palestine Problem.

2. The Saudi Arabian Government's reply was accompanied by an invitation to the United States Chargé d'Affaires and myself to take luncheon with King Ibn Saud on the 10th February at Shumaisy, the hamlet which lies some twelve miles from Mecca, on the Jedda-Mecca road.

3. In the course of conversation with us before luncheon, His Majesty spoke at length, and with unusual bitterness, on the question of Palestine. While pointing out that His Majesty's Government would have to bear the largest share of responsibility in this matter, he blamed America for what he described as her denial of those principles of justice and equity in defence of which she had proclaimed her entry into the war. Instead of acting as an intermediary between the Arabs and His Majesty's Government, America had sided with the Zionists to the detriment both of the Arabs and the British, and had thereby alienated massive Arab sympathies. She would have to bear much responsibility for whatever evil consequences ensued. If, as His Majesty ventured to assume, America eventually shirked the logical consequences of her own attitude, and left Britain to face the Arabs alone, this would be a great disaster, for the Arabs wanted no other friend but Britain. They could not stand for long against Britain, even if they wanted to; but, he asked, could Britain really treat her old friends in this way and force an injustice upon them? Could she afford a hostile Arab world in her next war?

4. The King continued with a warning to His Majesty's Government that Russian policy was transparently designed to set the Arabs and Britain against each other. If the Arabs, as a result of His Majesty's Government's abandonment of the 1939 White Paper policy in Palestine, continued to nurse a grievance against their British friends, it might well be that Britain would be unable to count on Arab friendship and support in any future emergency. Ibn Saud, who at one moment described himself as "Britain's spy in the Arab world," made it clear that his own support for His Majesty's Government could, after such a betrayal of faith, not be expected.

5. I begged His Majesty not to yield to such unrelievedly pessimistic speculation regarding the outcome of present investigations into the Palestine question; and both my United States colleague and I explained to him that the Committee of Enquiry would approach the Palestine problem with an open mind and judge the facts of the case as they saw them. (His Majesty cannot, of course, conceive of American delegates reporting otherwise than in the sense of President Truman's September demands.) We pressed Ibn Saud to await the results of their findings before passing judgment.

6. The interview ended on this note. It is obvious, however, that King Ibn Saud is deeply distressed that His Majesty's Government have not acted in conformity with his wartime propaganda on their behalf, and also aggrieved that the committee does not intend to visit him and give him the opportunity of displaying those powers of personal persuasion which he has been flattered into believing he can employ with unique effect in the cause of Palestine.

7. Although Ibn Saud spoke throughout with sincere emotion, and some acrimony, his tone was markedly more moderate than in a recent public Majlis in Mecca when, according to Mr. Philby who was present, His Majesty expressed despair at His Majesty's Government's abandonment of the 1939 White Paper policy and admitted that he had been a fool to believe that His Majesty's Government's undertakings meant what they said. He then declared that, if any Arab felt like killing him for his misguided trust in British promises, he for one would not blame him.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad, to the High Commissioner for Palestine and to His Majesty's Minister at Beirut.

I have, &c.

L. B. GRAFFTEY SMITH.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
Mecca, 8th Rabi al Awwal 1365.
(9th February, 1946.)

(Translation.)

THE Saudi Arabian Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to their Excellencies His Britannic Majesty's Minister and the United States Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda, and have the honour to state that the Ministry have submitted to His Majesty the King their Excellencies' joint note of the 7th February, 1946, concerning the inability of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry into the Palestine Question to visit Saudi Arabia, their statement that they would only visit Cairo, and their offer to receive a representative during their stay there who will acquaint them with the views of His Majesty's Government. The Ministry have pleasure in informing your Excellencies that His Majesty expressed his satisfaction and gratification at the concern shown by the British and American Governments towards finding a just solution to this intricate problem. They have pleasure in informing your Excellencies that His Majesty expressed the wish that the committee could have come themselves to meet him, in order to assure themselves direct of the irrefutable arguments of the Arabs, to see for themselves how anxiety and grief preoccupy men's minds regarding the question of Arab Palestine, which has been so grievously misrepresented, and to a just solution of which the whole Arab and Moslem world looks. They look to a solution that will not make Palestine one of the tragedies of history, bringing in its train confusion and disorder of which only God knows the extent. As, however, the committee is unable to come to Saudi Arabia as stated in your note, His Majesty has ordered the necessary delegation to appear before the committee at the appointed time in Cairo, in order to explain the views of the Saudi Arabian Government, and all Arabs, regarding this most difficult problem, regarding which His Majesty has often advised the two Allied Governments with the object of co-ordinating Arab and Allied interests on the one hand, and securing justice and equity on the other. You will be informed in due course of the names of the representatives and the date of their departure.

The Ministry take this opportunity of expressing their highest consideration.

[E 2198/14/31]

No. 27

Memorandum on the Present State of Jewish Affairs in the United States:—
(Communicated in Washington Despatch No. 344 of 25th February;
Received 12th March, 1946.)

(Confidential.)

SINCE the date of the previous memorandum of the 10th September, 1945, on Jewish affairs in the United States, Zionist hopes have turned to disillusion. At the close of the war American Zionists were buoyantly optimistic that, with the destruction of Nazi tyranny, the wishes of the surviving remnant of European Jewry would be given immediate attention, that a removal of Jewish displaced persons to Palestine on a substantial scale would be set in hand, and that plans for a Jewish commonwealth could revive and ripen in an atmosphere of sympathy and universal approval. In short, six months ago American Zionists were hoping for the moon. They know now that they are not going to get it.

2. Consequent recriminations in the press, in public demonstrations and in the thousands of written protests addressed to British representatives in the United States and abroad have been extremely violent and it is not difficult to sense the pathological emotions beneath them. The memory of a persecution may be as bitter as the persecution itself. Moreover, the protracted though remote spectacle of the Hitlerian fury engaged in the methodical annihilation of European Jewry has produced in American Jews that type of vicarious experience by which resultant mental impressions are notoriously darkened and exaggerated. It will not do, they argue, to say that European Jews have had a bad time, but that they have come through it. Six million have not come through it, for Hitler has put them underground. How nearly his policy of Jewish extermination came to total success is shown by the numbers of the survivors: 80,000 in Germany, 25,000 in Austria, 20,000 in Holland—the bare figures attest the murderous efficacy of the modern police State. No imaginative Jew could be

blamed for refusing ever to feel safe in Europe again. The appeal to contribute their industry and talent to the rebuilding of Europe is unlikely to arouse enthusiastic Jewish response.

3. Leaving aside the impossibility of guaranteeing future security, the immediate prospect is sufficiently discouraging. Already fresh persecutions have been reported from Central Europe. The Tripoli riots, occurring in an area where Jew and Arab have lived together in amity for more than a thousand years, caused a profound impression of uneasiness, not yet dissipated, since it is claimed that official protective measures were dilatory, inadequate and unmarked by determination. Anti-Jewish demonstrations have taken place in Hampstead and Golders Green. The receding tide of German aggression has left an undoubted trail of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. Closer to home, and in the New World itself, there have been anti-Semitic incidents in Argentina and more are expected there. The Jewish future, in the opinion of many competent observers, is none too rosy in the United States. The American Jew has never before felt so insecure. Zionism, hitherto supported by him as a philanthropic gesture of assistance towards his less fortunate European co-religionists, has suddenly become a matter of personal concern.

4. The belief that the fundamental cause of the Jewish tragedy is Jewish homelessness gains a widening currency, overrides common sense and logic and banishes historical perspective. The Jewish State is the panacea and no argument is too crude to defend it. It can and should be established by force if necessary, since the Arab States are devoid of military power by modern standards. Once established, it would immediately confer such substantial economic benefits upon the Arab inhabitants of Palestine that the latter would adjust themselves to its existence with alacrity. The Jewish State could then apply for admission to the British Commonwealth, which would thereby secure an influential and valuable ally athwart its Middle Eastern lifeline. The obvious defence handicaps and dubious prospects of military survival implicit in such a creation, together with the objection that a State of this kind, wholly repugnant to the ethos of British political evolution, would be unable to meet the minimum decent requirements of Commonwealth membership, are dismissed with the bland assurance of an outsider crashing an exclusive country club. Similar short shrift is accorded the argument that, whatever the military shortcomings of the Arabs, both within Palestine and outside it, they are quite capable of making life miserable for the Yishuv.

5. Thus far the rank and file, the weakness of whose argument is betrayed by its violence. Among Zionist leaders, on the other hand, it has been apparent for some time that the necessity for compromise is appreciated. Compromise in practice means partition, still theoretically abhorrent to and publicly repudiated by most Zionists, but now reluctantly accepted in private as the only solution likely to afford their aspirations the possibility of continuing existence. Thus Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Washington representative of the Jewish Agency, recently addressing the British Zionist Federation in London, said: "I do not say that we will get 100 per cent. of what we want. We will have to make a reasonable compromise. But whatever the solution, it must be a solution whereby we continue to build and to grow, and much faster than in the last twenty-five years. We are isolated and must depend primarily upon our own strength, but the power of the Yishuv will not be easily brushed aside, and if this is attempted there will be trouble and bloodshed." A Jewish State, however reduced in area, would ensure that sovereignty in immigration matters which American Zionists clearly consider the crux of the matter. It does not appear that the course of the hearings before the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry has encouraged their leaders to hope for more. All available indications point to the fact that they would still settle for partition and be glad to get it.

6. As originally put forward, Zionist surrender to the concept of partition was coupled with an expressed acquiescence in the cession to Transjordan of the contiguous Arab-populated Jenin-Nablus-Tulkarem triangle, as a sop to the Emir Abdullah. The recent announcement of early independence for Transjordan has, however, been roundly denounced in Zionist circles as an "illegal" violation of the provisions of the mandate, of the 1924 Anglo-American Convention on Palestine and of article 80 of the United Nations Charter. "Western Palestine," as a description of the remaining mandated territory, is being more frequently heard from Zionist spokesmen, especially the Bergson group.

7. Since immigration into Palestine bulks so largely in the foreground of the Jewish problem, some of the most interesting evidence heard at the Washington hearings of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry was undoubtedly that of Dr. Frank Notestein, professor of demography and director

of the Office of Population Research at Princeton University. Dr. Notestein contended that, the Jewish fertility rate being only half that of the Arab, the Jews could never hope to maintain a majority in Palestine, unless their numbers were augmented by continuous immigration. This argument raises some interesting points. In the first place, it can scarcely be true that religious tradition is the dominant inspiration of Jewish settlement in Palestine, for strict Jewish religious tradition encourages and commands large families. On the contrary, the main stream of Jewish influx is an only too obvious alien Western invasion, sharing the secular tendencies of the soil from which it is transplanted. Secondly, a continual immigration of this kind, while rendering Arab apprehensions and insecurity chronic, would fail to secure that permanent Jewish majority which is its objective.

8. In this context it is worth recapitulating the figures for surviving European Jewry (outside the Soviet Union) based on the records of the World Jewish Congress and checked with the various available official estimates. Although these are necessarily rough approximations, since changes are constantly occurring due to the movement of displaced persons, they give an overall picture of some significance:—

Country.	Surviving Jews.	Country.	Surviving Jews.
Roumania ...	350,000	Holland ...	20,000
Hungary ...	200,000	Sweden ...	25,000
Poland ...	225,000 ⁽¹⁾	Switzerland ...	25,000
Germany ...	80,000	Yugoslavia ...	9,000
Austria ...	25,000	Greece ...	10,000
France ...	180,000	Bulgaria ...	35,000
Belgium ...	20,000	Italy ...	35,000
		Total ...	1,239,000

9. It is naturally impossible to conjecture accurately how many of the above total wish to go to Palestine. The Anglo-American Committee is at present ascertaining this among other objects of its investigation in Europe. Dr. Joseph Schwartz of the Joint Distribution Committee, probably as reliable a Jewish authority as any, told the committee that about half the total, or some 650,000, were anxious to do so. In point of fact it is difficult to see how this number is to be made up, even if it is assumed that all the displaced Jews in Germany, Austria, Poland, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden and the Balkans will elect to emigrate and to emigrate to Palestine. (Large numbers would in effect undoubtedly like to go to the United States.)

10. Looking at the figures again, we have Dr. Schwartz's testimony that about 75,000 Jews from Roumania and the same number from Hungary wish to go to Palestine. Let us assume that all Jews, displaced and otherwise, in Poland, Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece and some 10,000 from Italy are candidates for Palestine—a surely somewhat exaggerated assumption. Fifty thousand French Jews have registered for Palestine certificates. There are 10,000 Jewish refugees in Sweden and 10,000 in Switzerland. The score then is:—

Country.	Optants for Palestine.
Roumania ...	75,000
Hungary ...	75,000
Poland ...	225,000
Germany ...	80,000
Austria ...	25,000
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece ...	54,000
Italy ...	10,000
France ...	50,000
Switzerland ...	10,000
Sweden ...	10,000
Total ...	614,000

Even if we add in all the 40,000 Jews from Holland and Belgium, we fail to reach Dr. Schwartz's figure of 650,000. We have only approached it by using maximum figures.

⁽¹⁾ Including estimated repatriates from U.S.S.R.

11. But for the sake of argument let us concede Dr. Schwartz's 650,000; and assume further that they could all be miraculously transported to Palestine to-morrow on a magic carpet. The 650,000 newcomers, added to the 600,000 present Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, would produce a total of 1,250,000 Jews, giving the Jews a slight majority over the existing 1,200,000 Arabs. But with the Jewish increase rate of 1 per cent. and the Arab increase rate of 2 per cent., the Jewish majority would last no longer than a few years. Even if the several hundred thousand economically depressed Jews of the North African littoral and the Middle East, with their higher birthrate, were thrown in, the resultant increased Jewish majority would disappear before 1960. As an extreme measure, permit the whole of surviving European Jewry (assuming they were willing to go and could get there) to enter Palestine within the next ten years: by 1980, at latest, the Jews would again be a minority. Thereafter the fountain of potential Jewish immigration dries up.

12. From what source indeed is Jewish immigration to flow, when admittedly nearly all Western countries face the phenomenon of stationary or declining populations in a future far nearer than is generally realised? If the Jewish reproduction rate is low in Palestine on the land, where it ought to be fairly high, it is not surprising to find it even lower in urban life, and, indeed, inferior to the average low fertility of city dwellers. In the United States it is unquestionably low and the Jewish populations of the major American cities are expected to show a continuing numerical decline during the remainder of the current century. Hitherto, their numbers, continually augmented by immigration, have been diminished only by those relatively few Jews who surmounted (to some extent) the barriers of segregation by accepting Christianity or hovering equivocally on the ethical culture and Unitarian fringe. From now on there is not only demographic decline to reckon with, but also the reluctance of United States policy to facilitate any further substantial immigration from Europe. A reaction to these threats can be seen in an accentuation of Jewish religious identity and in an attempted return, expressed in various observances, to the requirements of more orthodox practice.

13. The point to be noted in the circumstances just described is that Dr. Notestein's thesis adds to existing obstacles barring Jews from Palestine the further question of where they are to come from. The argument, indeed, might cut both ways. On the long-term view the Arabs have not a great deal to worry about; and the Zionists are frankly attempting an impossibility. But even if the Arabs refuse to dampen their immediate apprehensions with the cold comfort to be extracted from the above conclusions, these might at least be expected to dispel the Zionist fantasy that a solution of the Jewish problem can be achieved by Sisyphean attempts to establish and maintain a permanent Jewish majority in a Zionist Palestine State. Admittedly these *a priori* demographic calculations are liable to be upset. They may well be modified by unforeseen political developments, war or even a decline of Arab fertility, induced by better living standards or forced by the pressure of increased Jewish immigration. But such factors are unlikely to operate effectively in the immediate future.

14. In effect it is unlikely that any such rational sequel can be expected, for in the Jewish puzzle the wood can rarely be seen for the trees. And in justice it must be conceded that the Jews have good reason for their refusal to entertain serious hopes that the pressure on Palestine can be relieved by other countries taking a proportionate share of the burden of Jewish immigration. The presidential directives permitting the Oswego internees to enter the United States for permanent residence and ordering the reopening of the United States quotas are, it is true, a welcome, though belated, initiative. Of a more generous complexion, considered as a corollary to her liberal refugee policy of the last thirteen years, is Britain's hospitable gesture towards the close relatives of refugees already domiciled in the United Kingdom. These measures are, however, modest palliatives. The Jewish organisations assisting migration know from long experience the obstructions and difficulties that beset even the most moderate transfers of refugees to the Western World. From various countries of South and Central America they receive continual reports of Government hostility, covert or open, to further Jewish immigration, together with a constant stream of protest and complaint from disgruntled or disillusioned Jewish settlers. Australia's urgent need of population has not induced the Commonwealth Government to extend the slightest encouragement to the very modest group agricultural settlement proposals of Dr. Steinberg and his Freeland League. Among executives of these Jewish organisations one finds a scarcely veiled distrust of Governments, by contrast with a warm and appreciative recognition of the generous and often extremely courageous assistance accorded Jews by individuals and private

organisations under the Nazi terror. The Greek Government is, however, praised for seeing the light in renouncing its rights to unclaimed Jewish property, which will be used for the benefit of surviving Jews in Greece.

15. This distrust of Governments extends to the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, not out of any hostility to its members, either individually or collectively, but because it is regarded as an evasive governmental expedient. Much Zionist bitterness derives from the belief, expressed noisily and without reticence, that His Majesty's Government look to procrastination to shape the Jewish problem to more manageable proportions. As demonstrated above, demographic speculations have a good deal to say in support of this theory. The committee's decision to inspect the situation in Europe at first hand is, however, welcomed. American Jewry is stubbornly convinced that the conditions under which Jewish displaced persons are living in the British zones are unsatisfactory, not only on account of British insistence on the policy of non-segregation, but also because of an alleged contemptuous attitude towards Jews displayed by British army personnel. Charges of brutality and indifference on the part of British troops towards Jews in Germany and Austria have circulated persistently in the United States during recent months. On investigation these have proved to be completely unfounded, and His Majesty's Embassy, in drawing attention to their inaccuracies, has attempted, without much success, to induce Jewish leaders and organs of opinion to accord a similar publicity to the facts. It is no less firmly an article of American Jewish belief that conditions in the American zones are much better. The United States authorities, however, plainly share British concern at the influx of Jews into the occupation zones. The General Morgan incident naturally caused a furore, but in point of fact his contention that European Jewry is on the march west and south out of Europe, shorn of its picturesque and provocative embellishments, has been appearing fairly frequently in American Jewish publications ever since last summer.

16. In recent months American Communists, doubtless in sensitive response to party directives from Moscow, have given the Zionists considerable aid and comfort in their press, in public demonstrations and in picketing. They have exploited with relish the congenial openings presented by the Jewish problem for belabouring Britain and sowing discord between Britain and the United States. The Zionists have not been above accepting the assistance of their dubious allies, but since on the long view they clearly have less use for the Communists than the Communists for them, the alliance is unquestionably embarrassing and of precarious durability.

17. The integrationists have lately received exceptionally rough handling in the Zionist press. Lessing Rosenwald's intelligent and courageous testimony before the Anglo-American Committee is contemptuously dismissed as a colourless and bungling performance, and its author comes in for such epithets as "sheepish-looking" and "ludicrous Lessing" in the best manner of Dr. Goebbels. Rosenwald's American Council for Judaism remains a small organisation. He himself claims for it no more than 11,000 members, of whom only seventy-five are Rabbis. Rabbi Elmer Berger, the council's executive director, has recently published a straightforward plea for assimilation entitled *The Jewish Dilemma*, in which he asserts that in the fight against anti-Semitism Jews adhering to the nationalistic concept of Jewry are beaten before they start, and roundly berates Zionism as a philosophy of despair. On the other hand, Mr. Elmo Roper, who conducts polls for *Fortune* magazine, estimated in a public opinion survey of Zionism, undertaken at the end of the year, that 80 per cent. of the Jews who have an opinion on the subject are pro-Zionist.

18. The truth is that normally a good many American Jews think very little about Zionism, but at times like the present when its emotional tides are running high, and in a country where the most moderate championship of the Arab cause produces immediate and violent accusations of anti-Semitism (the Arabs not counting as Semites) few can afford to stay off the Zionist bandwagon. Mr. Roper also finds that rich Jews are on the whole anti-Zionist and poorer Jews pro-Zionist. He has now published the results of another and more recent investigation of anti-Semitism. The more Jews, he concludes, the greater anti-Jewish antagonism. Anti-Semitism in the United States is directly proportionate to the concentration of Jewish population: strongest in the north-east and Middle West and in the large cities; weakest in the Far West, the south and in small towns where Jewish numbers are negligible. It is more liable to crop up among the well-to-do (anyone with a knowledge of the poorer sections of large American cities will subscribe with difficulty to this opinion), it increases with age and is mitigated by education. In other words the rich, allegedly the most hardened anti-Semites, are less susceptible to the anti-Semitic virus as they are

better rather than worse educated; and the favourable influence of education is equally marked through the various economic levels. That anti-Semitic tendencies are found to be weak among better-educated youth is put forward as one of the more hopeful discoveries of the study.

19. Mr. Roper incidentally claims that anti-Semitism is inclined to run parallel with distrust of Britain. "It is ironical," he observes, "that Great Britain, which has always worked on propaganda, should be assailed by the Jews because of her policy in Palestine and at the same time be distrusted by anti-Jews." Yet he also finds anti-Semitic prejudice strong among those who distrust Russia, anti-Semites evidently inclining to believe the worst of both worlds. The study concludes with the statement that anti-Semitism in the United States is now being given more open expression, but has not noticeably increased in volume. The qualification is Job's comfort to American Jews, who believe that a major depression will inevitably multiply their handicaps, of which the weight and persistence are sufficiently attested by the Report on Discrimination in Institutions of Higher Learning, recently prepared by the Mayor of New York's Committee on Unity, and the failure of the Fair Employment Practice Bill to reach the Senate floor. Dr. Isador Lubin, former United States Commissioner of Labour Statistics, voiced these apprehensions before the General Assembly of the Council of Jewish Federations on the 10th February in Detroit, with the warning that a serious depression of prolonged duration could easily become the basis of a powerful Fascist and anti-Semitic movement in the United States. It is no doubt largely for this reason that, apart from Dean Virginia Gildersleeve's forthright demand for a more liberal United States immigration policy, few voices, either of Jews or their non-Jewish sympathisers, are heard urging an increased admission of European Jews to the United States as America's contribution to the problem of Jewish resettlement.

20. The Hebrew Union College at Cincinnati celebrated its 70th Anniversary in September and received messages of congratulation from numerous distinguished Americans in various walks of life, of both Jewish and non-Jewish faith, among the latter President Truman. The college is a deservedly famous institution, a pioneer and pillar of Reform Judaism, which has in its time trained many outstanding Jewish Rabbis and in recent years a substantial proportion of those who served in the armed forces during the war. Its president, Dr. Julius Morgenstern, a lifelong anti-Zionist, notwithstanding announcements that he contemplated a commemoration speech somewhat modifying his position on Zionism, delivered what turned out to be a classic exposition of the integrationist theory, which counsels Jews to merge with their nationality of domicile, while making their own distinctive contribution to its culture and development. It is learned, however, that despite the college's strong integrationist traditions, the faculty has of late experienced considerable pro-Zionist pressure from the student body.

21. The Christian Council on Palestine (clerical) has amalgamated with the American Palestine Committee (lay) into the American Christian Palestine Committee. As the chief focus of Christian Zionist sympathies, it has sponsored various conventions throughout the country, to which Mrs. Orde Wingate has contributed the prestige of her late husband's name and reputation and the disturbing eloquence of her own Zionist convictions.

22. Peter Bergson is still in the United States, his influential friends having succeeded in securing a suspension of his orders to leave the country. It is understood, however, that the authorities have no intention of legalising his residence while he remains in this country and he will therefore eventually be obliged to cross its borders in order to make a legal re-entry. In the meantime he seems very much at home in Washington and did not fail to put in an appearance before the Anglo-American Committee. His Hebrew Committee of National Liberation and supporting organisations, of which ex-Senator Gillette's American League for a Free Palestine is chief, continue to attack Britain in expensive full-page newspaper advertisements and to persevere in their attempts to educate the public into an appreciation of the difference between a Hebrew (defined as a Jew who is a citizen of Palestine or would like to become one) and a Jew pure and simple (who is contented with his domicile and citizenship elsewhere). Gillette has applied for permission to visit Palestine about the time the Anglo-American Committee arrives, in accordance with the Hebrew Committee's familiar technique of keeping itself well in the picture.

23. The hue and cry for the Mufti's blood continues, fanned by lurid accusations of Edgar Ansel Mowrer, among others, that he counselled an accelerated tempo for the Nazi Jewish extermination policy and personally

witnessed gas chamber executions. The opportunity to testify before the Anglo-American Committee accorded an Arab star witness by His Majesty's Government's decision to readmit Jamal el Hussein to Palestine is vociferously categorised as unfair by Zionists, who have been permitted to put on the stand every conceivable advocate they wished in support of their own cause.

24. An Arab Information Office was opened in Washington in the latter part of 1945. It faces an uphill job. Publication of the single newspaper advertisement on the merits of the Arab case to appear to date (a half page placed by the office as an experiment with the *New York Times* in November) was relegated to a day when New Yorkers were far too engrossed with the elections to give it any serious attention, and minor expurgations were insisted upon. The *New York Herald-Tribune* would not accept the advertisement. On the other hand, during the period under review innumerable Zionist advertisements and statements have regularly appeared in the press throughout the entire country. The speaking activities of the Arab Office are mainly confined to educational institutions (they could not be ensured a fair field on the public platform). However modest a start, this is undoubtedly a sound one. A growing American interest in and demand for information about the virtual *terra incognita* of the Middle East is bound to develop as the area claims the place in the headlines ensured by the numerous international stresses apparent and latent within it. But confronted in every direction with powerful Jewish influence and resources, which enable the Zionists to hammer home their story everywhere and all the time, the Arab propagandists undoubtedly find themselves very much bewildered, as the first Saudi Arabian technical student must have felt, *en route* to take up his scholarship at a south-western university last autumn, when he arrived at the Washington railroad station to find a thousand Rabbis detraining for their protest march on the Capitol.

25. The Arabs certainly have much to learn in the presentation of their case. It needs no public relations expert to see that they would do better to concentrate less on the Palestine question and such dead history as the King-Crane Report and more on social and economic life and progress in the various Arab States, about which the average American knows no more than he does of the moon. Indeed, most of the few Americans who know anything about the Arab League at all regard it as a purely political entity. The scope of the league's economic and social activities and the fact that these are already functioning are hardly suspected in the United States. Thus Senator Mead (Democrat, New York) speaks unchallenged on the floor of the United States Senate when he states that economic advance can hardly be conceived as starting from a lower level than that at present prevailing in the countries of the Arab world.

26. The *New York Times* recently printed an article on B'rith Trumpeldor of America, Inc., United States affiliate of the Palestine Jewish youth organisation, Betar. The accompanying photographs of the organisation's "officers' school" in New York City, depicting a strapping young Jewess reducing a lanky youth to Danny Kaye contortions by means of ju-jitsu and a squad of Jewish boys and girls performing physical exercises and undergoing related training in preparation for eventual departure to Palestine to participate in a Jewish liberation movement, reflect credit on the press agent who thought them up. It is hardly necessary to state that this protégé of the Revisionists, repudiated by the Zionist Organisation of America and the Jewish Agency, need not be taken too seriously. American-Jewish parents are unlikely to encourage a children's crusade. For those adolescents who are old enough to make the decision for themselves, there are passport and federal security regulations to be evaded. The organisation has already drawn the attention of federal investigators and would undoubtedly attract a great deal more, if suspected of effectively aiding terrorism in Palestine, where indeed Jewish terrorists are sufficiently expert in their craft and need no recruits from the United States, even if they could get them. Trumpeldor has, however, certain undoubted advantages as another publicity manoeuvre to keep the Palestine issue in the public eye and as a potential fund raiser, and as such is worth watching.

27. It remains to notice various blackmail threats. One, of immediate consequence, is promised Zionist opposition to the British loan. Strong indications are, however, already in evidence that, if the Administration wants the loan legislation passed, as it undoubtedly does, it will get it, as long as individual Congressmen are allowed, as they certainly will be, to waste all the time they need to keep the record straight with their disgruntled constituents, both Zionists and others. The second, of more permanent significance, is apparent in insistent Zionist attempts to make our blood run cold by hinting at the possibility of

Jewish spleen muddying Anglo-American relations in the difficult years ahead, in the manner of the Irish issue in former days. On balance, it would seem safe to regard this particular threat as distinctly exaggerated. American Jews face plenty of future trouble on their own doorstep.

28. Thirdly, there is the advancing Middle Eastern shadow of the Soviet Union, already the protector of Orthodox Christians, which shows signs of injecting itself into the Palestine question, if Britain and the United States fail to solve it. Zionists raise this possibility with tongue in cheek, for the bulk of American Jewry harbours no illusions about political or economic conditions in the Soviet Union and the Yishuv looks west rather than east in more than commercial matters. A disturbed Palestine, however, is unquestionably a standing invitation to that Soviet partiality for exploiting the troubles of the Middle East, which will inevitably be stimulated to further manifestation, should Britain and the United States fail to formulate and carry through a working partnership to assist long-overdue political, economic and social developments in the various Middle Eastern countries.

29. As to Palestine itself, the problem largely comes back to Britain in the end, for the United States is mainly considered a useful goad to prod British policy into line. Association of the two countries in the Palestine problem is conceded to be a forward step, but few American Zionists seriously believe that, barring a major international catastrophe, the United States will ever get down to the dirty work in the Middle East. As to the proposal to place Palestine under the U.N.O., better the known devil than fifty-one uncertain masters. Thus for all their bitterness responsible Zionists still hope to work with Britain, for lack of an alternative collaborator; and they can be brought to admit that only in a framework of British-American co-operation with the Middle Eastern countries can those countries hope to achieve stability and progress, failure to secure which is likely to make the Soviet Union a present of the entire area. Looking at the problem in this way, it does not seem unreasonable to hope that the Arab States might conceivably be brought to adjust themselves to the entry of what at most are unlikely to amount to more than half a million Jews into Palestine, if the productivity and living standards of the Middle East can be raised by bold engineering, technical and social projects. Whatever the merits of this argument, the hard facts behind it force the conclusion that the Middle East problem can only be solved as a whole and that piecemeal tinkering will lose the battle.

30. To an observer in the United States it seems fairly clear that Jews and Arabs at least agree in regarding the present moment as climactic. Both realise that some kind of decisive action on the tortured Palestine question will have to be taken soon and that both stand to suffer if the decision is not sound enough to last for a long time. Hence violence on both sides. For the Jews to say that the Arabs will give way before a show of force cloaks a tacit fear that they themselves will have to knuckle under. Certainly much of the present Zionist fury is due to this fear. Hence Wise's outburst before the Anglo-American Committee; and the overemphasis of his hope, voiced in a nationwide broadcast at a Town Hall Meeting of the Air, that no Jew would set foot in Germany for 500 years. Einstein, as the most distinguished living Jew, is pushed forward like a movie star before the cameras, to testify before the Anglo-American Committee in a statement which, in the characteristic comment of the American chairman, sheds no more light on the problem under consideration than an address he himself once gave on the subject of relativity. But everything is worth trying. All the showpieces must be put into the window. To the Zionists it is unthinkable that so much effort, sound and fury should not produce some favourable result.

31. As it is, the efficacy of Jewish pressure is attested (the Zionists claim) by the decision to keep the Palestine immigration quota open until the 15th March and by the action of Senate and House in passing the Palestine resolution (abandoned in 1944 on the representations of General Marshall), a concurrent resolution, however, be it noted, which, unlike a joint resolution, is not signed by and does not bind the President, but merely represents a general expression of view by members of Congress. It is also noteworthy that, whilst advocating immigration up to the limit of economic absorptive capacity, the wording of the resolution now calls for a Palestine as distinct from a Jewish State. Meanwhile, Zionist hopes have again risen somewhat as reports come in of the progress of the work of the Anglo-American Committee, which is stated to have been deeply moved by its visits to the European scenes of Jewish martyrdom.

CHAPTER VI.—TRANSJORDAN

[E 874/46/31]

No. 28

Lord Killearn to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 29th January.)

(No. 93.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit, with reference to Cairo Embassy telegram No. 89, dated the 19th January, copy of a memorandum from King Ibn Saud dated the 18th January regarding the aims of His Majesty's Government in Transjordan.

Cairo, 19th January, 1946.

Enclosure in No. 23

HIS Majesty King Abdul Aziz has perused the contents of the statement which will be made by Mr. Bevin on the 17th January before the General Assembly of the United Nations Organisation explaining the aims of His Britannic Majesty's Government in connexion with the future official status of the countries which are now under the administration of the League of Nations. His Majesty notes their desire in most cases to place those countries under trusteeship in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to take measures to grant independence to Transjordan in the near future and that the British Government reassures His Majesty that the interests of Saudi Arabia will be taken into full consideration during the negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty with the Transjordan Government.

2. His Majesty the King thanks the friendly British Government for informing His Majesty of its intentions before taking any steps. His Majesty is also pleased that Transjordan as well as every Arab country is granted its independence. He also thanks the British Government for its promise that it will safeguard the interests of Saudi Arabia in Transjordan when they come to be discussed in the treaty which it will conclude with His Highness the Amir Abdulla. For this reason His Majesty wishes to inform the British Government of his views in this connexion in order that the friendly British Government should be aware of them and that it will therefore not approve of any matter which affects the rights and interests of Saudi Arabia in Transjordan without full consultation with the Saudi Arabian Government.

3. His Majesty the King is pleased with the independence of Transjordan, and wishes every good to Transjordan and to any Arab or non-Arab country. He is anxious to live in peace with all his neighbours, but at the same time he is anxious to be aware forthwith of the attitude of the British Government towards the Government of Transjordan in the event of any provocation or movement taking place against the Saudi Arabian Kingdom, especially if undertaken in co-operation with the Iraqi Government, since the acknowledgment by His Majesty the King of the Government of Transjordan and the conclusion of a treaty with it was in accordance with the obligations which the British Government had undertaken.

4. The east-west frontiers between the Saudi Arabian Kingdom [*sic*] which were defined in the Treaty of Hadda were fixed at the British Government's insistence, to remain as long as the mandate lasts. This is in pursuance of the provisions of article 14. The Saudi Arabian Government only agreed to these frontiers temporarily, *i.e.*, until the termination of the mandate: then it will return to the charge and demand its legal rights in the ratification of those frontiers.

5. The connexion of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom with Syria is essential for its economic and material life. This point was the subject of a long discussion with General Clayton during the drawing up of the Treaty of Hadda. It was for that reason that article 13 of the aforementioned provisional treaty was drafted to guarantee the interests of the subjects of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom in their connexion with Syria. Since the responsibility of the British Government in Transjordan will end, we are of the opinion that it is essential for the Saudi

Arabian Government to ensure this connexion as required by the articles of the treaty and the promise of the British Government.

6. The British Government imposed the north-south boundaries of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom and Transjordan. The Saudi Arabian Government announced that it reserved its right in respect of these frontiers which include Akaba and Maan as laid down in the letters exchanged and attached to the Treaty of Jeddah [*sic*] concluded between the British Government and the Saudi Arabian Government. The Saudi Arabian Government therefore requests that these two towns should be annexed to the Hejaz because of the established rights of the Hejaz in these two towns. His Majesty requests the friendly British Government to take into consideration the aforementioned rights of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom as the British Government promised they would do.

18th January, 1946.

[E 2639/46/G]

No. 29

*Mr. Baxter to the Colonial Office.**Foreign Office, 22nd March, 1946.*

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that he received the Amir Abdullah on the 22nd March following the signing of the Treaty between Great Britain and Transjordan.

2. The Amir expressed his very great friendship for this country and said that he thought that the problems of the Middle East would become really acute. The amount of propaganda being done by the Russians, the large number of people employed in their legations and the organisation that was being built up, left on his mind the implication that there was a real intention to challenge both the Arab and the British position in that area. He was gravely concerned about the Russian agitation among the Kurds, and it was his belief that it would be worked up and ultimately interfere with British interests. He had, therefore, for some time been considering closer union with Iraq and also a close association with Turkey. He regarded Syria as being the really weak spot, and with our withdrawal from Syria and the weakness of the administration there he felt that we would have to be particularly watchful. He hoped that the policy which had been pursued for many years between Great Britain and the Arab countries would be continued, and he was quite sure that the maintenance of some divisions in Iraq and Transjordan would have a very salutary effect. In this respect, however, he was very anxious that the Arab officers and others whom we sent back to work with the British army from the colleges here should be thoroughly trained.

3. His Highness then raised the question of Palestine. There had been lots of commissions, and the Arabs felt rather sore about the apparent departure from the 1939 White Paper. Now we had set up another commission, and when their report was presented and His Majesty's Government had made up their mind as to their course, they should come to their decision and apply it. He thought that, if we started further conferences and arguments, we should keep the whole of the Palestine question seething, and it was time it was settled once and for all. He said the Arabs had kept very quiet in order to reveal to the world the aggressive and unruly tendencies of the Jews.

4. Mr. Bevin asked whether there was any truth in the story that Transjordan was likely to leave the Arab League; if she left it, would it not create disunity among the Arabs and so produce just the kind of situation that would allow of exploitation by others? The Amir replied that there were grounds for a suspicion that a close connexion existed between Ibn Saud and King Farouk, whose idea was to run the whole of the League. On the other hand, so far as steps taken up to the moment were concerned, the Secretary of the League had taken decisions and all the other Arab countries were expected to follow, and this situation could not continue. He thought that Syria was not serious in her connexion with the Arab League.

5. Mr. Bevin pointed out to the Amir, however, that, if such a step was taken now immediately after the signing of this treaty, it would be assumed by all other countries that this was due to British inspiration; it would be a fatal step to take. His reply was that there was no hurry and that such a step would not be taken without his advising us.

6. Mr. Bevin then mentioned the question of defence, and indicated that it was his idea that in the Middle East area taken as a whole a partnership in men, in money and equipment should be built up. Unless we could look at the thing rather on collective lines it made our task very difficult. For instance, in view of what the Amir had said of the Arabs' dependence on us and their desire to be associated with us, it was a little difficult to understand the Egyptian attitude.

7. The Amir stated that he had talked to the Egyptian Ambassador here and was seeing him again; he thought that much good might be done now if he saw King Farouk in order to impress upon him the imperative necessity of coming to proper and adequate arrangements for Great Britain to be associated in the defence of the area. Mr. Bevin informed him that the Chiefs of Staff were considering the whole problem, but there must be co-operation, and the attack on Great Britain was undeserved at the moment and most unfortunate. The Jews, whom we had befriended more than any other country in the world, were daily attacking us. In spite of our friendship, a section of the Arabs at least were doing the same. Unity of purpose, therefore, was essential.

8. Mr. Bevin also pointed out to the Amir that the approach of the Labour Government from India to the Middle East was to build up self-reliant States, independent, but working on a basis of partnership both for mutual benefit in trade and for defence.

9. The Amir concluded by asking Mr. Bevin to thank everyone for the treatment he had received while in Great Britain.

CHAPTER VII.—AFGHANISTAN

[E 1428/66/97]

No. 30

Mr. Squire to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 16th February.)

(No. 7.)
Sir,

Kabul, 1st February, 1946.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a review of events in Afghanistan for the latter half of 1945. This period corresponds exactly with the time during which Major Crichton has been officiating as chargé d'affaires during my absence on leave, and it is therefore in the fitness of things that the review should have been written by him. Afghanistan has, indeed, been fortunate in having both as Foreign Secretary in Delhi and as chargé d'affaires in Kabul two officers so intimately acquainted with the problem which has for the past six months absorbed almost the whole attention of the Government. Major Crichton has mentioned in his report the profound gratitude of the Afghan Government to the Government of India for their assistance. He has not mentioned the gratitude expressed both to himself and subsequently repeated to me by the Afghan Prime Minister for his ready understanding of Afghan difficulties and for the clear exposition of their case, which did so much to render the intervention of the Government of India both timely and effective.

2. The report has also a very special value in that it is more than a mere narrative of events and brings out very clearly the vital importance to Afghanistan and, though less directly, to India itself, of prompt and effective action to maintain peace on the Afghan as well as on the Indian side of the border. There can, I think, be no doubt that so long as there is in Afghanistan a Government capable of maintaining a reasonable measure of control throughout the country, so long is it to our own interest to give it our support on our common frontier. The situation in the coming spring will be fraught with dangerous possibilities both in the eastern and in the southern provinces. In the former there is little that we can do, but in the southern province it is a British tribe, the Mada Khel, that is the real seat of the trouble. Anything that the Government of India can do in advance to secure the removal from their area of Mazrak and Sultan Ahmad would help to eliminate one of the danger spots and would be of the greatest assistance in insuring that in 1946 the Afghans are not faced with disorders in two provinces simultaneously, a danger which, serious enough in 1945, might in 1946 prove fatal.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India, the Government of India, the Government of the North-West Frontier Province, the Baluchistan Administration and to His Majesty's Consuls at Kandahar and Jalalabad.

I have, &c.
G. F. SQUIRE.

Enclosure in No. 30

Review of Events in Afghanistan, July–December 1945.

NOT since before the war has the Afghan body politic suffered from such acute internal disorder as during the period under review. The genesis of the trouble was an attempt by the Government to enforce on the tribes of the eastern province a system of conscription for the army similar to that in force in the more settled parts of Afghanistan, viz., the Jadwal system, whereby every physically fit man between certain age-limits is liable to be called up for a period of military training. This system is abhorrent to the tribes, who much prefer the more irregular system, traditional to the tribal areas, under which a quota of men is sent forward for army service, the selection resting with the tribal leaders. The disadvantages of this system, anachronistic in a modern State, are obvious. Broadly speaking, the rich and the powerful evade selection by either bribery or intimidation and mainly the weak and the defective reach the army. The desire of the Afghan Government for reform in this matter is therefore understandable and for some time past they have been seeking to impose the Jadwal system in

the eastern province as a preliminary to extending it to the far more formidable tribes of the southern province. Having failed to make any headway with the more numerous Khugiani tribe of the Jalalabad area, the Afghan Government turned the pressure on the Safis, a comparatively weak and ill-armed tribe of non-Pathan origin who inhabit the valleys on the west bank of the Kunar River between, roughly, Shewa and Asmar. But the Safis stood unexpectedly firm and the Government then decided, probably for reasons of prestige and pour encourager les autres, to coerce them. Rashly denuding the Kabul area of troops to reinforce those already in the Kunar valley and with typical disregard for the political and tactical implications of the situation, the Afghan Government embarked on punitive operations early in July with General Daud Khan, a member of the Royal Family and of the "firm-hand" school of younger Afghans, in command. Since this is not a narrative of military operations it will suffice to relate the broad outline of subsequent events.

2. Meeting with only light opposition General Daud Khan's columns swept up the Kunar valley at creditable speed, driving the Safis to the remote ends of their valleys, and in a surprisingly short time all seemed over except for minor mopping-up operations. The Afghan Government, complacency itself, sat back and waited the formal submission of the tribe; and in the brief glow of victory General Daud Khan, towards the end of July, returned to Kabul for the annual independence celebrations and received a welcome befitting the military hero of the hour. It all seemed too good to be true. It was. In Daud's absence from the Kunar his second in command (who has now been released from jail) dropped a military brick of the first order by sending a column to some place to which no sensible commander would have sent a column. The error was immediately punished, the column being cut off and losing many men and rifles. Daud Khan hurried back in time to extricate the survivors, but by then the mischief was done. As always happens in this sort of warfare, success against regular troops had a tonic effect on the tribes. The Safis, joined now by many sympathisers, returned to the fray with renewed heart and began effectively to harass Afghan military posts and the very vulnerable Afghan lines of communication. Worse, elements of the formidable and well-armed Mohmand tribe, who inhabit the country on the opposite bank of the river, thought this a good opportunity to liquidate the Afghan posts established on the east bank of the Kunar before the war, the existence of which they have never approved.

3. A serious situation now developed. Engaged on both banks of an unbridged river and with all their communications either cut or threatened by the enemy, the Afghan forces were soon in a most unhappy plight. Fortunately for them the operations coincided with the fasting month of Ramazan, a factor which contributed to keeping many potential hostiles at home, but even so their position in places was critical. The crisis came to a head towards the end of August with the close investment of a garrison of 400 men at Kunar Khas on the east bank of the river by a mixed *lashkar* of some 1,500-2,000 tribesmen. The immediate danger was that Afghan troops, here or elsewhere in the valley, might suffer a major reverse. In that event the resultant loss of Afghan military prestige and the prospect of loot might well have caused the neighbouring tribes, both British and Afghan, which had hitherto stood aside, to throw their full weight on the side of the insurgents, a development which would almost certainly, have resulted in complete military disaster in the Kunar and the collapse of Government control in the Eastern Province.

4. Such a situation could not have failed to have had serious reactions elsewhere in the country, notably in the Southern Province, the powder magazine of Afghanistan, where Mazrak, the rebellious Zadran leader, with the assistance of Sultan Ahmad, the latest of a series of pretenders to the Afghan throne to appear on this part of the border, was endeavouring to raise the tribes against the Government. With their military resources stretched to the utmost between the Eastern and Southern Provinces, the operational value of their small air force impaired by a shortage of bombs, and the general population critical and discontented by the shortage of commodities and high prices, the prospect confronting the Afghan Government was anything but pleasant. It was, in fact, in the opinion of qualified observers, about the most dangerous situation in which the Government has been placed since the Ghilzai rebellion of 1938. The key to safety or disaster clearly lay in the Kunar Valley. If the Afghan forces there could regain the initiative and drive off the insurgents investing their posts before the end of Ramazan added to the enemy's strength, there seemed a fair chance that confidence would be restored and the rot arrested. The Afghan Government were not slow to appreciate this once the full implications of their unpleasant situation were revealed, and if their alarm was at times considerable

it has to be admitted that they never lost grip and, indeed, faced their troubles bravely and with energy.

5. At an early stage they had appealed to the Government of India to restrain the Mohmands living east of the Durand Line from joining in the hostilities. This raised awkward issues, for the Durand Line in this area, since it was drawn in 1863, has never been accepted by the rulers of Afghanistan. The line of tribal responsibility as between the Indian and Afghan Governments is consequently indeterminate. There are, in fact, two boundaries, both undemarcated, one the Durand Line and the other the Presumptive Border, the latter a line intended to show the eastern and southern boundaries of certain villages collectively known as the Bohai Dag which the Government of India in 1896 offered to concede to the Afghans in settlement of the dispute, an offer which was not accepted. The area between these two lines, usually referred to as the "Presumptive Area," is thus a sort of no-man's land under no defined control. The nuisance value of this unsatisfactory state of affairs has always been appreciated and often exploited by the inhabitants of the area, more often than not to the disadvantage of the Government of India. On this occasion it recoiled on the Afghan Government. At first, deliberately forgetful or ignorant of the position stated above, and misled by wildly inaccurate reports from the battle area, the Afghan Government made a great show of indignation about the invasion of Afghanistan by hordes of British [*sic*] tribesmen, and demands were made on the legation for transmission to the Government of India, for immediate punitive action, including air bombing, on the British side of the line. But this phase was short lived. Acting on instructions, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires explained the political position of the Presumptive area, with the aid of maps, to the Prime Minister and made it clear that, while the Government of India admitted no direct responsibility, they would do their best to restrain the Mohmands as a measure of co-operation to a friendly neighbour and if compelled to take action, would make it clear to the tribes that they were acting with the concurrence of the Afghan Government. This *démarche* was accepted without demur, and the Government of India thereupon ordered the Mohmands of the Bohai Dag, on pain of punishment, to cease all hostile activities against the Afghan Government and to withdraw their tribesmen from the Kunar valley. Simultaneously, air demonstrations in strength were made over the area and warning leaflets dropped. There can be no doubt that these measures, by keeping large numbers of Mohmands east of the Durand Line at home and by securing the withdrawal of most of those already with the *lashkars*, considerably eased the situation in the Kunar. At the same time, as further evidence of their goodwill and desire to help, the Government of India accelerated the emergent supply of military equipment and munitions to the Afghan Government and the sight of this war material passing westward through the Khyber Pass in impressive convoys at a critical time also tended to steady the tribes. For all these friendly acts of the Government of India the Afghan Prime Minister was subsequently to express the profound gratitude of his Government.

6. In the meanwhile the Afghans themselves had not been idle. By a combination of threat and lavish bribery they secured the neutrality of the larger tribes in the Eastern Province and largely succeeded in insulating the trouble in the Kunar. Their poor and ill-found troops, never famous for fighting to the last man and cartridge, hung on to their positions in the valley with unexpected tenacity, being precariously supplied from the air in the later stages. The small Afghan air force, reinvigorated by a fresh supply of bombs from India and undeterred by the fate of one of their number who had the misfortune to crash-land among the Safis, who promptly cut his throat from ear to ear (he still lives, a horrid sight, to tell the tale!), bombed and machine-gunned the enemy with unflagging zeal, if not with much accuracy or effect. Communications were kept just open somehow, the lack of bridges across the Kunar being compensated for by the use of improvised rafts, often with fatal results to the passengers. Finally, on the night of the 8th September, the eve of Id, when all good Muslims may reasonably expect to be allowed to relax and rejoice after the rigours of Ramazan, General Daud Khan, with probably just this consideration in mind, took advantage of the low state of the river to ford it with a considerable body of troops and assaulted the *lashkar* surrounding Kunar Khas. This commendable enterprise, though falling clearly within the mischief of the Dirty Trick Act by tribal standards, met with the success it deserved. The garrison, after seventeen days of close siege and near starvation, was relieved and the *lashkar* driven off and scattered. This was the turning-point, and there is little left to tell. Defeated in the field, deprived of the prospect of immediate loot and with their

homes threatened by air action on both sides of the border, the tribesmen lost heart and melted gradually away. Sniping and sporadic attacks on posts continued for some time, but by the end of October the Safis, except for a few die-hards, had submitted to General Daud Khan. Nothing definite is known of the terms of settlement, except that these were favourable to the Safis and included, *inter alia*, the postponement or abandonment by the Afghan Government of the conscription issue. It was, in fact, a thoroughly unsatisfactory war for the Afghan Government. They lost heavily in treasure, lives and arms, and had nothing to show on the credit side—not even enhanced prestige.

7. With the restoration of the situation in the east, the fortunes of Mazrak and Sultan Ahmad, who by now, inevitably, had been joined by that hardy perennial Pak, waned in the Southern Province. For a brief period it seemed possible that they would succeed in assembling a lashkar on the Waziristan border and leading it into Khost, a situation full of awkward possibilities in view of the fact that Pasta Mela, Mazrak's refuge and concentration area, although just on the Afghan side of the boundary, is the *de facto* property of the Madda Khel, a wholly British tribe. For a brief period, too, during this little crisis the Afghan War Minister, who regards Pak and Mazrak as his own special enemies, contemplated forestalling them by staging a surprise attack on Pasta Mela with Afghan irregular troops and tribal levies. But matters, fortunately, did not go beyond preliminary fist-shaking—

"Great Chatham with his sabre drawn
Stood waiting for Sir Richard Strahan
Sir Richard, longing to be at 'em,
Stood waiting for the Earl of Chatham"—

and with an early fall of snow to remind both sides that the close season for fighting was at hand, the Southern Province, too, reverted to non-belligerent status. By December Afghanistan was peacefully hibernating.

8. The time spent on this narration would be wasted were no attempt made to draw from it some conclusions relative to Anglo-Afghan relations and to the possible trend of future events. The first and most obvious conclusion is that the Afghan Government, despite six years of peace and the improved armament and training of their forces, are still not strong enough, militarily, to enforce their authority in the tribal areas and would be well advised to avoid, except in circumstances of dire necessity, military adventures of the kind embarked on last summer. That they are conscious of their weakness is evident from their anxiety to secure in the shortest possible time modern military equipment, armaments and aircraft from the United Kingdom and India, and the unprecedented step recently taken in sending large numbers of officers and non-commissioned officers to India for military training. Secondly, the events of the summer are a useful reminder of the extent to which the stability of the Afghan Government may depend on moral and material support from the Government of India in times of tribal crisis. There is little doubt that the decisive factor in averting disaster in the Kunar was the action taken by the Government of India to identify themselves with the misfortunes of the Afghan Government. Their determination, made plain to the British tribes bordering Afghanistan north and south of the Kabul River, to prevent, if necessary by force, any participation in hostilities against a friendly neighbour had an immense stabilising influence on both sides of the frontier. It did more than anything else to localise insurrection to the Kunar Valley and to limit the number of tribesmen opposing the Afghan forces. There were probably never more than 1,000-1,500 Mohmands and miscellaneous hostiles from the tribal territories east of the Durand Line engaged at any one time in the Kunar fighting. But for the pressure exercised by the Government of India and the enormous respect, latent though it may be, of the tribesmen for the power of the sanctions enforceable by the Government of India, the number might well have been anything up to 10,000; and the consequences to the Afghan forces calamitous.

9. If any moral can be drawn from this it is that it pays to come down promptly and heavily on the side of the Afghan Government whenever tribal eruptions or reactions on the British side of the border threaten to upset the precarious balance of power in Afghanistan. The sanction for such action is of course, inherent in our obligations to the Afghan Government under International Law and if anything more specific is required it is to be found in the agreements of most of the major tribes with the Government of India, which bind them to refrain from hostile action, against a State friendly to the British Government. But the nature, extent and timing of the measures to be taken must

always be a matter of difficulty for the Government of India, who have the reactions of their own mass of tribesmen to consider. Action has therefore to be selective and dictated by the circumstances of each particular crisis, but when taken it is important that it should be decisive. It should never be forgotten that while tribal disturbances, even on a large scale, can never seriously threaten the stability of the Government of India they can, in the present condition of this country and given a combination of circumstances favourable to the tribesmen, bring an Afghan Government to ruin with a month or two. This was never truer than to-day when the danger attendant on serious internal disorder in Afghanistan is greatly enhanced by the possibility, greatly feared by the Afghans, that Russia would take advantage of such a situation to intervene in Northern Afghanistan either directly, on the pretext that the Afghan Uzbeks and Tajiks had expressed a wish to share with their cousins across the Oxus the benefit of Soviet "protection," or, indirectly, by instigating these people to claim the right to secede from an alien (Pathan) Government and seek "self-determination" under the aegis of the Soviet. Shorn of its northern provinces, Afghanistan would be, at best, no more than an unstable Pathan republic. In short, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Afghanistan is not, in present conditions, truly a viable State; and the corollary would seem to be that it is to the interests of His Majesty's Government and the Government of India to hasten its progress to that desirable goal by affording it moral and material support to whatever extent necessary in the critical years ahead. This assumes that the continued existence of the buffer state of Afghanistan, as a separate entity, is still a matter of vital interest to His Majesty's Government and the Government of India.

10. It is not easy to forecast the possible trend of future events. Much depends on whether the Afghans will be guided by their unhappy experiences last summer when the melting of the snows makes it necessary for them to tie up some of the awkward loose ends left in the tribal areas of the eastern and southern provinces. The only sensible policy, in their present situation, is one of appeasement or marking-time in the tribal areas, and to make all haste with the process of putting the military and domestic side of their house in order. Unfortunately, the imminent resignation of His Royal Highness Muhammad Hashim Khan, the Prime Minister, the lynch-pin of the Administration for the last fourteen years, reduces the hope that sensible policies will be pursued; and so many imponderable factors sway Afghan action, conceit, faulty notions of prestige and a limitless capacity for self-deception, that the ordinary laws of cause and effect cannot be applied. But encouragement is to be found in the fact that the Afghan Government have got off to an early start in the matter of improving the efficiency of their armed forces and are also endeavouring to remove the more serious causes of internal discontent. Every effort is being made to reduce prices and to secure a wider and cheaper distribution of the main commodities, particularly of cotton piece-goods, petrol and kerosene oil. These two factors, high prices and shortages of commodities, more than anything else, are responsible for the internal discontent which makes such a dangerous accompaniment to tribal trouble, and it is to be hoped that the Government of India will respond as generously as possible to Afghan appeals for more liberal export quotas of such things as piece-goods and petrol.

11. In the tribal areas the obvious danger spots lie along the Mohmand and Waziristan borders. In the absence of details of the settlement arrived at with the Safis last autumn there is no assurance that it leaves no cause for further trouble. There are still some Saffi extremists actively hostile to the Government, keeping the embers of revolt alive in the Kunar and these are not without sympathisers among the neighbouring tribes. On the side of the Afghan Government there is a mortifying realisation of the extent of their climb down over the conscription issue, and of their losses in arms (always a sore point), money and face; and perhaps a desire to "have another go" to put all this right on the part of General Daud Khan and some of the stiff-necked and ambitious younger officers. The Mohmand outlook is no more peaceful. The Afghan sections of the tribes have not been brought to book for their misdeeds last summer and, as the persons responsible for the more spectacular successes scored against the Afghan troops, are in possession of much valuable military booty. The Government tried and failed to make the surrender of this booty a condition of a settlement with the tribe last year, and as the chances of recovery recede with time relations will continue to be strained. Doubtless, in anticipation of this and knowing now all about the unwisdom of fighting battles on both banks of an unbridged river, the Afghan Government are planning to improve their communications in the Kunar valley. They aim at bridging the Kunar river at three places, the Kabul river

at two and at connecting their posts on the east bank of the river to each other and to these bridges by military roads. The plan is undeniably sound, but is unlikely to be favourably viewed by the Mohmands since it would mean the consolidation of the objectionable footing the Government have gained in their country. It would be surprising therefore if the Afghan part of the tribe failed to oppose an attempt to implement the plan and opposition would, in all probability, again attract reinforcements from the sections east of the Durand Line. It might be as well, therefore, to take advantage of the Afghan Government's recent demonstration of their inability to control the Mohmands to make another attempt to clear with them the question of responsibility for the "presumptive area." If their gratitude for the action taken by the Government of India last summer is any indication, there might now be found a certain awareness that British control is better than no control at all.

12. In the Southern Province there can be no real peace of mind for the Afghan Government until some means are found of removing hostile agitators such as Mazrak and Sultan Ahmad from the Waziristan border. As long as these firebrands are at large in a highly inflammable area the situation must continue to be regarded as potentially dangerous. Unfortunately, the difficulties in the way of resolving it peacefully are considerable. Mazrak has so far obstinately refused all inducements to come in on terms to either the Indian or Afghan Governments and tribal notions of sanctuary make it virtually impossible to secure his surrender or that of Sultan Ahmad by the tribes affording them shelter. The position is further complicated, here as on the Mohmand border, by a certain vagueness in the matter of governmental responsibility. The Afghan Government take the view that the liquidation of the hostiles in the Pasta Mela area is the affair of the Government of India who have means of exerting pressure on the Madda Khel denied to the Afghan Government. The difficulties for the Government of India are that direct action beyond the Durand Line, even with the concurrence of the Afghan Government, is a proceeding fraught with many political complications and risks and that coercive measures against the Madda Khel might involve large-scale military operations resulting in even greater danger to the Afghan Government. However this may be, it is unfortunately a fact that the Afghan Government have suffered for many years from the activities of hostile agitators based in or near Madda Khel territory; and the harm to Anglo-Afghan relations would be great if Mazrak or anyone else should succeed in starting a hostile tribal movement against the Afghan Government from this region. Such is the backcloth of the Afghan scene as set for the events of 1946. What will be staged when the safety curtain of winter goes up no one can tell. Pantomime is as likely as drama, depending on whether one is an optimist or a pessimist. All the elements of both are present, including off stage, to the north, the big bad bear.

13. If this review has so far been concerned entirely with parochial matters it is because for five months out of the six it covers the Afghan Government had little time to spare for the affairs of the outside world. Gone for that period was the strange immunity from domestic worry conferred by the war years. But world events did not pass entirely without notice and Afghan reactions to some of them deserve brief comment. Mention of Russia naturally takes first place, for such little time as the Afghans had to spare from their own troubles was devoted mainly to watching, with increasing suspicion and anxiety, the post-war manoeuvres of the Soviet in Europe, and more particularly in the Near and Middle East. Afghan fear of Russian aggression is, of course, historic, and there is little doubt that the defeat of Germany and Japan, in so far as it set the Russian bogey free again, was not as welcome to the Afghan Government as it might otherwise have been. Since the end of hostilities Afghanistan has looked hopefully to the United Nations to keep Soviet exuberance in bounds and her fear has mounted with every fresh manifestation of Russia's apparent determination to pursue an independent line of action whenever it suits her to do so. Russian action in Persian Azerbaijan has provided the latest and worst of such shocks for it affects a neighbouring Muslim country and a fellow signatory of the moribund Saadabad Pact. Moreover, to the Afghan way of thinking, the position of the northern provinces of Afghanistan and Persian Azerbaijan, in relation to Soviet Russia, is unpleasantly analogous, and though there is no cause for immediate alarm, the Afghan mind is obsessed with the fear that sooner or later the Soviet will find a pretext, *e.g.*, the Oxus boundary dispute, for intervention on the Azerbaijan model. While these fears may be exaggerated, it is difficult to deny the grounds for them. There is no reason to disbelieve the statement of high Afghan officials that Russian agents are

already at work in the country, particularly in the north, and the cinema entertainments and other publicity activities of the Soviet Embassy in Kabul provide first-hand evidence of a determined propaganda campaign directed to impressing the benefits of Soviet rule on the populations of her Muslim neighbours. In their fear and perplexity the Afghan Government tend to turn more and more to Great Britain and the United States for friendship and support and the development of the United Nations Organisation is watched with intense interest, with particular reference to its ability to protect the integrity and independence of Turkey and Persia. This, in Afghan eyes, is the acid test. Should the Soviet have her way the disappointment and disillusionment would be great and with the resignation of the present strongly Russophobic Prime Minister there would be no assurance against the emergence in due course of a pro-Soviet faction in Afghanistan.

14. With Germany, Japan and Italy, with all of whom Afghanistan had close connexions before the war, out of the hunt, the field of Afghan foreign policy has considerably narrowed. Aside from her simultaneous wooing of Great Britain and the United States, a proceeding not altogether free of occasional embarrassments, the strain of her relations with Russia and the day to day problems arising from neighbourly intercourse with India, Afghan interests in the outside world are largely academic. Evidence of this is to be had in the number of foreign missions in Kabul yawning their heads off with boredom and in the number of displaced Afghan diplomatists wandering about Europe with nothing apparently to do beyond sending unreasonably optimistic telegrams to the parent Government for money. But no problem has a greater appeal for the Afghan Foreign Office than the academic and in the discussion of these Afghan confusion of thought and remoteness from reality are sometimes illuminated to the full. The Indian constitutional problem is a case in point. As a friendly neighbour, proud of its recently won "independence," and a fully fledged member of the late League of Nations, Afghanistan feels bound to pay cautious lip service to Indian aspirations for freedom and national status and to deplore the deadlock between Hindus and Muslims: as a Muslim kingdom it is moved to sympathise with the ideal of Pakistan: while in the rôle of a small and weak country desperately seeking reinsurance against internal and external dangers, there is nothing its rulers, off the record, view with greater horror than the prospect of a removal of British power from India. Apart from these matters Afghan interest in world affairs has been fleeting. The return of a Labour Government to power in Britain, the troubles in Palestine and the Levant States, the atom bomb, the Japanese capitulation, the trials of war criminals in Germany, all these aroused passing interest and were faithfully reported in the Kabul press. But so well schooled are the Government controlled press and radio in the strict exercise of neutrality, a habit enjoined on them by the neutrality of Afghanistan in the war, that anything in the way of original and intelligent comment is rarely seen or heard. It is consequently always difficult to assess Afghan public opinion with any reliability. But neutrality, no less than successful belligerency, has its rewards and the Afghan Government were to reap theirs from an unexpected quarter and just at a time when they were beginning to feel a little out of the international swim. Mr. Richardson, an American delegate, in a recent speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations, remarked that "Afghanistan is the only country that preserved complete neutrality during the war." His object, doubtless, was to emphasise that this feat, in conditions attending a world war, was more a matter of good luck than of good management. But no utterance in recent times has given more pleasure and gratification to Afghanistan, where it has been interpreted as complete and triumphal vindication of the political wisdom and farsightedness of the Afghan Government. It was headline news for days and the back-slapping had to be heard to be believed. It was deafening.

[E 10151/2313/97]

No. 31

THE PEOPLES OF AFGHANISTAN.

SUMMARY.

1. *Introduction.*—The peoples of Afghanistan are of very diverse origin; and there are still wide differences to be observed in their appearance, mode of life, speech and religious beliefs. The total population is estimated at between 7,500,000 and 10,000,000. Over two million speak Pashtu (which is now the

official language), and as many again speak Persian and kindred Iranian languages.

2. The Afghan peoples may be grouped into five main categories, *viz.*, the Afghans proper, the Tajiks, the Turkish tribes, the Mongoloid tribes, and the Kafirs or Aryans of the Hindu Kush.

3. The Afghans are of Turco-Iranian stock, and speak Pashtu, a language of Aryan origin.

4. The Afghan is as a rule tall and strongly built, and has great powers of endurance. He is, however, very ignorant and is much under the influence of bigoted religious leaders.

5. The Durrani, Ghilzais, Shinwaris, Mohmands and Wazirs are the most important of the Afghan tribes.

6. The Durrani number about 1,200,000; they inhabit the lower valleys of the Helmand, Tarnak and Arghandab rivers, Zamindawar and the country south of Kandahar (Qandahar).

7. The Ghilzais number at least one million. They inhabit the country to the east of Ghazni. The majority of the tribe is now settled on the land, but there is a nomadic section known as the Powindahs, which migrates annually into India during the cooler weather in order to trade, and returns to Afghanistan for the summer months.

8. The Ghilzais are a turbulent tribe, and have very frequently revolted.

9. The Shinwaris inhabit the south side of the Kabul valley. Like the Ghilzais, they are very unruly.

10. The Mohmands in Afghanistan (the larger part of the tribe is on the Indian side of the frontier) occupy the country to the east of Kunar.

11. The Wazirs inhabit the region to the east of the Ghilzais; in addition, there is a colony of Indian Wazirs to the north-east of Kandahar.

12. There are colonies of Mahsuds from India at Logar, Charkh and Bek Samand.

13. The Khost tribes are of mixed descent. They occupy the area known as the Khost salient to the north of the Tochi valley.

14. The Khugianis inhabit the northern slopes of the western Safid Kuh range to the south-west of Jalalabad.

15. The Tajiks are Persian-speaking Sunnis, and are mainly agriculturalists. They inhabit the country round Kabul, Kohistan, the Panjshir valley and parts of the Bamian and Kerat districts. The Ghalcha Tajiks live in the remote valleys of Badakhshan and Wakhan.

16. The Turkish tribes are to be found mostly in the north of Afghanistan.

17. The Uzbeks, who are closely akin to the Bukharan Uzbeks, speak Turki and inhabit Afghan Turkistan. They number 750,000 and are a peaceful and industrious people.

18. There are a small number of nomadic Turkmans south of the Oxus and west of the Uzbek territory.

19. In northern Afghanistan there are scattered pockets of other Turkish tribes.

20. The Hazara and Chahar Aimaq claim to be of Mongol descent, but should be classed as Mongoloid rather than Mongol.

21. The Hazara occupy a large part of central Afghanistan, and are pastoral nomads. They speak Persian and are Shi'as.

22. The Chahar Aimaq, who are Turki-speaking Sunnis, consist of four tribes and occupy the country to the west of the Hazara. The majority are nomadic.

23. The Kafirs of Nuristan consist of many tribes of uncertain, but very ancient, origin. They were pagan, but were forcibly converted to Islam fifty years ago. They live in the area between the Hindu Kush and Kashmir.

24. The Safis, Rekis and Arokis are of obscure origin, and are largely intermingled with the Tajiks.

25. The Barbars, Gabars, Urmals and Tirahis form small communities of aboriginal or alien stock, and are mainly found to the east of Jalalabad.

26. There are some 30,000 Hindus settled in the main trading centres of Afghanistan.

THE PEOPLES OF AFGHANISTAN.

Introduction.

1. The peoples of Afghanistan are of very diverse origin. This diversity is due to a number of reasons, namely, the passage through the area now forming Afghanistan of conquering armies from the west and south, the migration into the northern districts of Turkish and other tribes from remote parts of Asia, the survival in the valleys of the Hindu Kush and the Pamirs of some very ancient races, and the admixture of some Indian and Baluch blood. To this day there are wide differences to be observed between the various components of the Afghan nation; these differences occur not only in appearance and ways, but also in speech and religious beliefs. The total population is estimated at between 7,500,000 and 10,000,000. Of these over 2,000,000 speak Pashtu, while a similar number speak Persian and kindred Iranian languages and dialects. Persian was the official language of the country, but its place as such has recently been taken by Pashtu. Over a million speak Turki. In addition, numerous other languages are still spoken in the remoter parts of the country.

2. Excluding the small scattered communities, the Afghan peoples may be grouped in the following main categories:—

- (i) The Afghans proper.
- (ii) The Tajiks.
- (iii) The Turkish Tribes.
- (iv) The Mongoloid Tribes.
- (v) The Kafirs or Aryans of the Hindu Kush.

I.—The Afghans.

3. The Afghans are of Turco-Iranian stock, but the tribes in the eastern part of the country have an admixture of Indian blood. As Pashtu, the language of the Pathans or true Afghans, is Aryan in origin, it seems probable that these peoples were also Aryan to start with, and that the Turkish and other elements were super-imposed later. The belief (which is held by many Afghans) that they are the descendants of the Lost Tribes of Israel is no more than a literary fiction; the noticeably hooked noses of the majority of the tribesmen may have been one of the reasons why this theory was advanced.

4. The Afghan is as a rule tall and strongly built, and is of rather paler complexion than the majority of his neighbours. He has great powers of endurance, but is, on the other hand, extremely lazy. He is hospitable and friendly, but is very ignorant and is much under the influence of a bigoted priesthood.

5. There are many Afghan tribes, of which the Durrani, Ghilzais, Shinwaris, Mohmands and Wazirs are the most important. Particulars of these tribes are given below.

6. The Durrani. Numbering approximately 1,200,000, the Durrani are probably the largest Afghan tribe. They were formerly known as the Abdalis, but Ahmad Shah, their most illustrious figure in the past, changed their name to Durrani when he himself took the title of Durr-i-Durrani ("Pearl of Pearls") shortly after he had founded the modern kingdom of Afghanistan in 1747. The Durrani inhabit the lower valleys of the Helmand, Tarnak and Arghandab rivers, the district of Zamindawar and the country between Kandahar (Qandahar) and the Baluchistan border. The present ruling family of Afghanistan belongs to the Barakzai clan of the Durrani.

7. The Ghilzais. This powerful tribe consists of at least one million souls. They inhabit the country east of Ghazni as far as Waziristan and Khost, as well as the valleys of the northern tributaries of the Gomal. It is probable that the whole tribe was originally nomadic, but part is now settled permanently on the land. The nomadic Sulaiman Khel Ghilzais were formerly shepherds; gradually, however, these pastoral nomads, who were known as Powindahs, developed into itinerant merchants. Every autumn, with the advent of the cooler weather, many of them descend through the Gomal and Tochi passes into the Indus valley, where they engage in trade until the approach of summer causes them to return to their uplands in Afghanistan. With the introduction of modern means of transport and establishment of customs posts along the frontier, these nomadic Ghilzais are gradually decreasing in numbers.

8. The Ghilzais have often been a cause of trouble to their rulers and neighbours. In 1709 A.D. they revolted and threw off the Persian yoke, and in

1719-1720 and 1722 they invaded Persia. On the second occasion they overthrew the Safavi monarchy, and for seven years Persia was under Ghilzai rule. In more recent times, the Ghilzais took a prominent part in the overthrow of Amanullah in 1929, and in 1938 they were in revolt against the Government of Zahir Shah.

9. The Shinwaris. Numbering some 75,000 souls, this tribe inhabits the south side of the Kabul valley between Jalalabad and the country of the Mohmands (see paragraph 10 below). The Shinwaris have proved to be very unruly on many occasions; like the Ghilzais, they rose against Amanullah in 1928-29.

10. The Mohmands. This formidable tribe is divided into two portions by the Indo-Afghan frontier; those on the Afghan side, who number some 65,000, inhabit the country to the east of Kunar and north of the Kabul river.

11. The Wazirs. Like the Mohmands, the Wazirs are found on both sides of the Indo-Afghan frontiers. The Afghan section, which numbers approximately 50,000, is settled in the eastern fringe of the Ghilzai country north of the Gomal river and round the upper reaches of the Tochi. The tribal area is known as Birmal, of which the chief centre is Urgun. The Gumbaz Wazirs inhabit the strip of country to the south of the country of the Khost tribes (see paragraph 13 below). There is also a colony of Wazirs from India at Shahjui, 120 miles north-east of Kandahar, estimated (in 1927) to number some 420 families. These Wazirs carried out serious raids on places on the Indian and Persian sides of the frontier in 1921-23. These tribespeople are for the most part nomadic, spending the cold weather on the Indian side of the frontier and returning to Shahjui for the summer.

12. Mahsud Colonies. Like the Wazirs, the Mahsuds have colonies on the Afghan side of the border where the colonists go for the summer months. The colonies are at Logar, Charkh and Bek Samand. These Mahsud colonists are of a predatory nature, and gave serious trouble in 1924 when they carried out raids on Indian territory.

13. The Khost Tribes. These tribes, which are of somewhat mixed descent, consist of the Mangals, Zadrans, Jajis, Muqbils, Chakmanis and Khostwals, and number between 170,000 and 180,000 in the aggregate. They inhabit the very mountainous country round Matun, immediately north of the Tochi valley and west of the Tirah. They are very turbulent and lawless.

14. The Khugianis. These wild tribesmen, who number some 60,000, inhabit the northern slopes of the western part of the Safed Koh range between the Kurram Valley and Jalalabad.

II.—The Tajiks.

15. The Tajiks, who number in all a million and a half, are said to be of Iranian stock, but their origin is somewhat obscure. They are non-nomadic, being mainly agriculturalists. A number have settled in the towns, where their industrious nature, intelligence and frugal ways enable them to succeed in industry or trade. The Tajiks are divided into tribes, of which the most important are the Kohistanis, the Khinjanis, the Barbakis, and the Farmulis. They inhabit the country round Kabul (the population of which is mainly Tajik), Kohistan and the Panjshir valley. They are also to be found in the province of Herat and around Bamian. In Badakhshan and Wakhan, in the remote valleys of the upper Oxus, are the Ghalchas or Highland Tajiks who speak Iranian languages. The rural Tajiks are not warlike by nature, but they are good fighters, and are therefore much in demand as recruits for the Afghan army. Bacha-i-Saqao, who usurped the Afghan throne and reigned for nine months in 1929-30, was a Tajik. Though Persian-speaking, the Tajiks are strict Sunnis.

III.—The Turkish Tribes.

16. From early times Turkish tribes have tended to move into and settle in the country which is now known as Afghanistan. There are some grounds for classifying the Ghilzais as Turks, but they have become so assimilated with the Afghans that it has seemed best to include them with the latter. As one would expect, the Turkish element is most pronounced in the north of the country.

17. The Uzbeks. The Uzbeks (or Özbeks), who are of Turanian origin and are Turki-speaking, are closely akin to the Uzbeks of Bukhara, on the further side of the Oxus. They inhabit Afghan Turkistan, the region north of the Hindu Kush which extends northwards to the Oxus and is bounded on the west by the Murghab and on the east by the Faizabad district of Badakhshan. The Uzbeks, who are a peaceful and industrious people, number approximately 750,000. Many

are cotton-growers, while others breed the famous Karakul sheep. They are Sunnis by faith.

18. South of the Oxus and west of the area occupied by the Uzbeks are a small number of nomadic Turkmans who belong to the Sarii, Salor and Tekke tribes. They number between 10,000 and 20,000 souls. Like the Uzbeks and other Turkish tribes, they are Sunnis. In the remote north-eastern province of Wakhan, on the upper reaches of the Oxus, are some nomadic Kirghiz tribesmen; these Kirghiz are of Turkish stock, and are akin to the Kirghiz of Soviet Turkistan.

19. Miscellaneous. In other parts of northern Afghanistan there are small "pockets" of Qazaq (Kazak), Qarluq and Chagatai Turks, who are probably descended from members of those tribes who settled in these regions when the main bodies passed through on various occasions in bygone times.

IV.—The Mongoloid Tribes.

20. Though the Hazara claim to be descended from the warriors of the Mongol conqueror Jenghiz (Chingiz) Khan or of one of his successors, it seems improbable that their blood is purely Mongol. For this reason, it is safer to classify them and their kindred tribes, the Chahar Aimaq (see paragraph 22 below), as Mongoloid rather than Mongol.

21. The Hazara, who number over half a million, occupy a large part of central and northern Afghanistan extending as far as the Haibaq district in the north-east, Daulat Yar, in the Paropamisus, in the north-west, the upper Ghorband valley in the east, part of the Upper Helmand valley in the west, and the hills bordering the Kabul-Kandahar road on the south-east. The Hazara are pastoral nomads, and move with the seasons from their *qishlaqs* or winter quarters to their *yailaqs* or summer grazing-grounds and *vice versa*. They cultivate only what is sufficient for their own requirements. In the winter, when their country is snow-bound, they go in much for spinning, weaving and leather-work. They speak a dialect of Persian and profess the Shi'a faith; for the latter reason, they are not on good terms with their Sunni neighbours, the Chahar Aimaq and the Afghan tribes. In 1888, 1890 and 1891 the Hazara revolted; on the last occasion they were suppressed with great severity and harshness by the Amir Abdu'r-Rahman.

22. The Chahar Aimaq, as their name indicates, consist of four tribes, the Jamshidis, Firuzkuhis, Taimaris or Hazaris and Taimanis. They occupy the country to the west of the Hazara, that is the district round Herat, the basin of the Farah Rud and the western part of the Paropamisus country. The Jamshidis, Firuzkuhis and Taimaris probably have an admixture of Tajik blood; the Taimanis are akin to both the Pathans or Afghans and the Kakars (the latter are mainly in British Baluchistan). The Chahar Aimaq are nomads, with the exception of some of the Taimanis who have settled down to an agricultural life. They number 250,000 in the aggregate.

V.—The Kafirs.

23. The Siyah-Push ("black-clad") Kafirs of Kafiristan (or Nuristan, as it is now called) consist of many tribes; of these the Katirs, the Kam and the Wai are the most powerful and influential. Their origin is extremely uncertain; there is some reason to believe that they may be of Indo-Aryan descent and that they are the decadent remnants of a more civilised race. The Kafirs live in the mountains between the Hindu Kush and Kashmir. They were formerly pagans (as their name indicates), but the majority were forcibly converted to Islam by the Amir Abdu'r-Rahman in 1895-96. Traces of paganism still, however, subsist amongst them. It is possible that the tribes known as the Jazhis, Aroms and Presans, which dwell with the dominant races mentioned above, are the descendants of the aboriginal inhabitants of this part of Afghanistan.

VI.—Miscellaneous.

24. The Safis, Rekis and Arokis are peoples of obscure origin, and are now largely intermingled with the Tajiks. The Safis are the most numerous tribe, and consist of some 40,000 souls; they are probably descended from the aboriginal stock of the country. These tribes still retain their own languages, but all now speak Persian or Pashtu.

25. The Barbaris, Gabars, Urmais and Tirahis form small communities of aboriginal or alien stock, and each tribe has its own language or dialect. The

Barbars are said to be of Dravidian origin; they are now much mixed with the Hazaras (see paragraph 21 above). The Gabars inhabit a few villages in the Kunar valley north-east of Jalalabad; they are believed to have been Zoroastrians (hence their name Gabar or Gabr).

26. Hindus. There are some 30,000 Hindus in Afghanistan; they are settled for the most part in the main trading centres.

*Research Department, Foreign Office,
7th March, 1946.*

[E 2578/66/97]

No. 32

Mr. Squire to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 22nd March.)

(No. 12.)

Sir,

Kabul, 28th February, 1946.

WITH my despatch No. 7 dated the 1st February, 1946, I forwarded a review of the events of the latter half of 1945 in Afghanistan. In the present despatch I propose to give some impressions of the general atmosphere, in Kabul, which I have observed since my return from leave two months ago.

2. The principal development has, of course, been the increase in the now openly expressed fears of Russian intentions. These have been considerably enhanced since the beginning of 1946 principally as a result of the events in Azerbaijan. Previously the Afghans, though nervous of Russia's future intentions, had not had anything particular to complain of, and the Foreign Minister had on more than one occasion informed me that on the whole the attitude of the Russians had been very correct and that except for minor frontier incidents they had no serious complaints to make. This is now all changed and it is hardly possible to meet an Afghan official without hearing bitter complaints of Soviet activities and being asked what the British Government intend to do about it. With the activities themselves and how far they justify Afghan anxiety I propose to deal in a separate despatch.

3. Partly, no doubt, though by no means wholly, as a result of fears of Russian intentions there has been a very definite increase in friendliness towards ourselves. This I attribute mainly to the success of the Afghan Military Mission which toured India a year ago and to the many instances of goodwill which the Government of India have given in connexion with this mission such as the subsequent supply of arms to Afghanistan. This goodwill, as the Afghan Prime Minister said to me only recently, is no longer confined mainly to the senior members of the ruling classes but is now much more widely felt and expressed, particularly in military circles. Perhaps the most important development arising out of the military mission has been the despatch of 150 odd military students to various training establishments in India. All the young officers write very happily of the way they are treated and looked after in India and, as many of them are related to the more important families of the country, their reports are already having considerable influence on the attitude towards us of Afghans generally. Other, though less spectacular, examples of kindness shown to Afghans both in India and England have also not been without effect. An Afghan football team, which has just concluded a tour of India, has returned full of enthusiasm. Sardar Ghulam Muhammad, a cousin of the King, has recently returned to Kabul after having been flown to England for a serious operation and back again after its successful conclusion. Nothing is now too good for him to say about the kindness and consideration shown to him wherever he went. The welcome given to the British Council teachers is also extremely encouraging. That they should have had difficulties to cope with on first arrival in strange surroundings was inevitable, but the jealousy and obstruction which I fully anticipated from their Afghan colleagues and from officials in the education department has been noticeably absent and their advice in all matters seems to be eagerly sought and wherever possible followed.

4. The third feature, which is particularly noticeable to us in Kabul, is the uncertainty and consequent confusion into which the Government and the country have as a whole been thrown, by the news of the impending retirement of the Afghan Prime Minister. Nobody knows what policy will be followed by his successor nor who will enjoy the sweets of office. This unsettled feeling is most noticeable in the Afghan Foreign Office. Both Ali Muhammad, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Najibullah Khan, his principal lieutenant, are known to be

the Prime Minister's men and seem to think that it is quite likely that they will not be kept on after the dissolution of the present régime. As a result there is surprisingly little interest taken in the ordinary work of the Foreign Office. In fact the only person in the Government whose interest in his work seems to have remained quite unaffected is the Prime Minister himself, whose reluctance to hand over the reins of office seems to be largely due to the fact that no one but himself in the Government knows the meaning of a full day's work. The War Minister, whose succession to the Prime Ministry seems a foregone conclusion, is considered to have done an unusually strenuous day's work if he has spent two hours at his desk; though it is true that he devotes a great deal of time to meeting tribal leaders and discussing their problems with them in a friendly way, and by this means contributes much to the maintenance of peace in the country.

5. The only departments unaffected by this uncertainty seem to be those responsible for the consolidation of the country's military strength and its economic development, both of which are considered of vital importance. It is interesting to remark that the Afghan Government are beginning to realise that with progress on both her borders Afghanistan cannot possibly remain backward and isolated; her only hope of countering the influence of revolutionary propaganda from the north, and even of bare survival, lies in the development of the economic and social well-being of the people.

6. On the people, too, the prospect of a change in the Government is having an unsettling effect. There is universal rejoicing that the Prime Minister's iron rule is at last coming to an end and that the popular War Minister is taking his place. All the hardships from which the public suffer are attributed, though quite unjustly, to personal greed on the part of the Prime Minister, and open criticism of the Government is general. The War Minister meanwhile has gone on a holiday to India and it is commonly understood that the changes will take effect with the new year which begins on the 21st March. Although, contrary to the general opinion, the departure of the Prime Minister will be little short of a calamity, the sooner the present uncertainty is ended the better.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

G. F. SQUIRE.

CHAPTER VIII.—GENERAL

[E 794/150/25]

No. 33

Lord Killearn to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 25th January.)

(No. 81.)

Sir,

Cairo, 15th January, 1946.

I HAVE the honour to report that King Ibn Saud lunched at the Embassy on the 14th January. His Majesty was accompanied by his brother, the Emir Abdullah Abdul Rahman, by Sheikh Abdullah Suleyman, Saudi Minister of Finance, by Sheikh Youssef Yassin, Head of the King's Cabinet, by Sheikh Fawzan el-Sabek, who has long been Saudi Chargé d'Affaires in Egypt and has recently been promoted Minister, presumably in view of His Majesty's visit to Egypt, and by Khair ed-Din el-Zerekly, Counsellor of the Saudi Legation.

2. His Highness Seif el-Islam Abdullah, son of the Imam Yehia, was also one of the guests.

3. The Egyptian Prime Minister, Hassan Youssef Bey, Assistant Head of the Egyptian Royal Cabinet, and Abdel Rahman Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the Arab League, were also present.

4. The British Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Air Chief Marshal Medhurst, Admiral Tennant, Flag Officer Levant and Eastern Mediterranean, and General Allfrey, General Officer Commanding British troops in Egypt, were also among the guests.

5. The party was characterised by marked cordiality and His Majesty, who was in great form, seemed to be very much at his ease.

6. I have the honour to enclose a memorandum detailing the main points stressed by King Ibn Saud during our conversation. It is to be hoped that His Majesty's whole-hearted expressions of friendship for Great Britain had some effect on the Egyptians present. It will be noticed that His Majesty dwelt almost entirely on the Zionist question in Palestine. Particularly significant is his emphasis on his own difficulty, namely, that great as was his friendship for us, he must oppose even the British if their action were to endanger Islam. It will be remembered that His Majesty drew Mr. Churchill's attention to this quandary of his in their conversation at the Fayoum in 1945 (see record of Cairo Conversations, February 1945). It was obvious to all present that King Ibn Saud, while insisting on the vital importance for him and for Arab countries of friendship with Great Britain, was conveying a very definite warning that the Palestine question, if not solved in a sense acceptable to the Arabs, would inevitably destroy Anglo-Arab friendship.

I have, &c.

KILLEARN.

Enclosure in No. 33

Lunch Party at British Embassy to His Majesty King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, 14th January, 1946.

DURING the opening phases of the conversation Ibn Saud stressed his strong friendship for Great Britain, who had stood by him as his friend so long. He stated all Arabs looked on Great Britain for protection, and as their particular friend—he said that the British claimed he had stood by them in their dark days, but he claimed he would stand by them in their bright days. If the Arabs gave vent from time to time to anti-British sentiments, it was only like a father when cross with his son wishing him dead. But the same father would immediately strike dead whomever said "Amen" to this sentiment. He further stated that nothing could shatter Anglo-Arab friendship and understanding unless it be through an act of oppression or some act endangering Islam or the future of the Arabs. The only possessions he had were Islam and Arabism, and whoever threatened to endanger these sacred possessions he would fight, even must he die fighting. For the safety of Islam he would even fight the British, whom he considered as his best friends. He considered the Jews were at present a danger both to Islam and Anglo-Arab relations.

The conversation then developed into a general discussion on Palestine and the Jews. The sentiments His Majesty expressed on these questions are summarised below :—

The Moslems had held Palestine for 1,400 years—they had not taken it from the Jews, but won it by the sword from the Romans. Would any country in Europe cede the territories they had gained during the past 1,400 years? God had promised the Moslems the Jews should never rule over them—he didn't believe they would—but a situation was arising where this was threatened and much bloodshed must result if the Jews were granted their unjust demands. He could not understand why the Germans and Poles should kill and persecute the Jews and the Arabs be given the punishment. He constantly referred to the Arab League and maintained they were the fully representative body of Arab opinion, and Britain should learn Arab opinion from this body.

He held this body, as representing Arab opinion, could only be welcomed by Great Britain if Great Britain wanted to know the true Arab aspirations and thought and not be confused by Jewish propagandists. It was embarrassing for Arab rulers to have issues affecting the Arab cause as a whole referred to them individually, but now there was an Arab League such communications could only be referred to them for their opinion.

Asked what he thought of the joint Anglo-American Enquiry Commission, he replied that the question was not anything to do with the Americans, but only an Anglo-Arab problem. He had many American friends and, indeed, his country obtained considerable benefits from American sources, but he could not see what right they had to interfere in Arab-Jewish affairs. When urged by his Excellency of the necessity of the Arabs making a full statement of their case to the commission when it visited these countries next month, His Majesty said the Arab case was short and clear and had been stated by them many times, but still they had not obtained justice. After Britain had sacrificed so many lives, so much money, and such tremendous effort in winning the war for the sake of justice and peace, were they going to sacrifice both for the sake of the Jews in Palestine? Were the Jews stronger than the Germans and Japanese?

The conversation throughout had been most cordial and gave the impression that His Majesty was delivering a friendly warning to Great Britain couched in a most informal, polite and brotherly manner. The conversation then took on a lighter tone, though it still bore on the Jewish question. His Majesty stated that the late President Roosevelt had told him the Jews were of no real political importance in American politics as they only controlled 3 million out of about 53 million votes. He, Roosevelt, did not fear Jewish opinion in America and would see the Arabs were not unjustly dealt with *vis-à-vis* the Jews. Talking of victory, His Majesty said he had always liked our soldiers, but since our victory he had liked them more than ever; he found that all soldiers disliked the Jews, and this had further increased his respect and liking for them. His Majesty added, if he had a beloved friend and later he discovered this friend hated the Jews, he became even more endeared to him than before.

In reply to a query as to whether he had any Jews in his territory, His Majesty replied: "Praise be to God, for 1,400 years there have been no Jews in my territory." His Majesty further stated he had never in all his life set eyes on a Jew to his knowledge—though he nearly did once. This was when he had newly taken Hassa and was visiting the bazaar and smelt a strange smell that was unknown to him. On enquiring, he was informed it was the place intoxicating liquor was made. He asked who made it, and was told, "a Jew." He asked for the Jew in question to be brought to him at once, but unfortunately (fortunately for the Jew) the Jew in question had escaped with the retiring Turkish garrison.

His Majesty spoke with warm affection and admiration for both Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt, and was obviously proud of having had the chance of meeting them.

His Majesty admitted to his Excellency that this occasion was the first time he had set foot on British soil (*i.e.*, His Majesty's Embassy). He also said he in fact considered the British Embassy as his own house.

Observers who had seen His Majesty at some of the recent Egyptian receptions remarked that at this lunch party he seemed more at home and less tired than he had appeared at the former gatherings. He particularly asked his Excellency to have a further meeting and a private talk with him before he left Egypt.

Mr. Roberts to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 25th January.)

(No. 30. Secret.)
Sir,

Moscow, 16th January, 1946.

RECENT developments in Soviet policy towards Persia and Turkey have borne out the fear expressed in paragraphs 13 and 14 of my despatch No. 799 of the 31st October last, that Soviet aims in the Middle East were becoming increasingly embarrassing to British interests. Although the recent Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers did much to re-establish practical collaboration between the "Big Three" and to dispel the atmosphere of mutual irritation and suspicion which had grown up between the Soviet Government and His Majesty's Government since the breakdown of the London Conference last September, it conspicuously failed, owing to Soviet stubbornness and American lukewarmness, to promote a solution of any Middle Eastern problems and more particularly of the Persian problem. These problems now facing us in the middle of the 20th century are much the same as those which faced our ancestors throughout the 19th century. Now, as then, the regions lying along the southern Soviet frontiers between the Bosphorus and India constitute one of the main potential sources of friction between Britain and the Soviet Union. These problems are aggravated by the new Soviet approach towards all questions of foreign policy, their attitude since the war being that there is no question in any part of the world which is not of direct interest to the Soviet Union. This being the Soviet approach to such distant issues as Tangier, Argentina or Indonesia, Soviet interest in the lands bordering upon the Soviet Union, which have for nearly two centuries been traditionally an area of Russian expansion and under strong Russian cultural, economic and religious influence, is bound to assert itself with increasing vigour.

2. It may be asked whether this traditional clash of British and Soviet interests is not affected by the new world order, in which Anglo-Soviet relations should be guided by the Anglo-Soviet Alliance and by their joint participation in the United Nations Organisation, neither of which existed in the troubled days of Anglo-Russian friction throughout the 19th century. As has been pointed out in earlier despatches from this embassy, the Soviet Government attach great importance to both these instruments and they show every intention of maintaining the alliance after the war and contributing to the effective working of the United Nations Organisation. They are, however, equally determined that Soviet interests shall not suffer thereby, and they are not above advancing these interests in every way possible in the present fluid situation following upon the end of the war and preceding the stabilisation of national frontiers and international relations. While, therefore, we cannot regard the United Nations Organisation or the Anglo-Soviet Alliance as precluding a continuation of Soviet penetration, ultimately at our expense, in the area between the Bosphorus and India, we can do everything in our power to induce the independent countries within that area to regard themselves not as bones of contention between the Soviet Union and Britain, but as members of the United Nations. In this way the Soviet Government may eventually be brought to regard these problems, not in terms of whether individual countries are within the British or the Soviet orbit, but as genuine buffer States in which Soviet as well as British interests can be safeguarded. This is, however, for the present at all events, an ideal at which we can aim rather than an existing state of affairs upon which policy can be firmly based.

3. Generally speaking, and leaving ideological considerations on one side, the Soviet Union faces the world in three directions. Its policy towards Europe is based fundamentally upon security and above all upon preventing a revival of German strength or the creation of any grouping of Powers which might become hostile to the Soviet Union. In regard to Europe, British and Soviet requirements are at bottom similar, and the Anglo-Soviet Alliance represents an organic community of interest. In the Far East, the Soviet Union is at present mainly concerned with the United States, whose influence is dominant in Japan and in China and which still, despite Soviet post-war gains, controls the Soviet exit to the Pacific. The whole position in the Far East is more fluid than that in Europe and there would not appear to be the same essential community of interest there between the Soviet Union and the United States as exists between the Soviet Union and Britain in Europe. The danger for us would, therefore, lie in any Soviet tendency to appease the Americans in the Far East in return for American

acquiescence in Soviet policies not only in Eastern Europe but also along the southern borders of the Soviet Union.

4. To the south the Soviet Union faces a Britain which must appear to her in a very different light from the democratic island on the edge of Europe with which she finds herself in natural alliance against Germany or any other potential disturber of the peace. The Soviet Union sees before her, barring her own way to the Mediterranean and to the Indian Ocean, a world empire whose main lines of communication run through the Mediterranean and the Middle East to India and Australasia, and an empire which can be accused in Soviet propaganda of all the crimes of imperialist and colonial exploitation. Indeed, many Russians no doubt sincerely regard us in that light. In this area Britain must appear to the Soviet Union to have established a system of client Arab States, in front of which stands a cordon of more or less satellite States, Turkey, Afghanistan and even Persia, which provide, in the Soviet phrase, springboards for aggression against the Soviet Union. The Governments in all these countries are presumably regarded here as out of touch with the masses of the people and based upon a handful of prosperous landowners and other reactionaries. Existing groupings among these countries, such as the Arab League or the Saadabad Pact, must again appear in Soviet eyes as a sort of *cordon sanitaire* erected against the Soviet Union by their British rivals.

5. Nor is there any longer any other European influence in the Middle East capable of competing with that of Britain. France and Italy have both, though for different reasons, now ceased to be major factors in that area, and Germany, to whom such countries as Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan had often looked for economic and even political support, is no longer of any account. Therefore Britain alone stands in the way of the Soviet Union, and the Governments with whom Britain is allied are for the most part impervious to Soviet infiltration tactics. The Soviet authorities are probably less disposed than the Americans or even we ourselves might be to see weaknesses in our economic, political or strategic position in the Middle East. But a cool appraisal will show them that many of our commitments there might prove beyond our unaided economic and military resources. What is regarded here as our support of existing Governments and of the *status quo* may also be criticised as a sign of innate conservatism and of inability to conceive and carry through radical programmes of reform.

6. It has often been pointed out in despatches from this embassy that the Soviet Union has emerged from the war with an immense sense of power and purpose, although probably as yet without any design of pressing forward with her plans to the point of provoking a major clash with another member of the "Big Three." The southern borders of the Soviet Union, however, provide the line of least resistance along which the Soviet Union is inevitably tempted to expand, using for this purpose political, economic, strategic and ideological weapons. The foundations of this urge to expand are historical. For centuries the lands round the Black and Caspian Seas have seen a constant Russian advance, slow and often imperceptible like the tide coming in. The Soviet Government have inherited the old Tsarist ambition for Constantinople (called by the Russians Tsargrad, the Imperial City). Under Stalin they have taken over and adapted to modern conditions the old Russian policy of protecting the Christians throughout the Middle East, and former Christian peoples such as the Armenians and Georgians of the Caucasus. Under Soviet rule there is an even stronger sense of mission in bringing Western civilisation and material progress to the backward peoples in Central Asia. Here, in contrast to Europe, there is no doubt that Soviet civilisation has much to offer. It can bring material benefits and, above all, the raising of the standard of living, as has been shown already in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Soviet rule, which, despite its democratic façade, is in essence a despotism, is also more familiar and probably more popular with such peoples than any attempts to establish democratic institutions on Western models. It is not too far removed from the old types of despotism which have long existed throughout Central Asia, with, however, the important difference of greater efficiency. In fact it has the same advantages over Western democratic methods in relation to primitive peoples as Islam has over Christianity.

7. The main motive force behind Soviet policy in this area remains the drive towards the open sea. The great land mass of the Russian Empire is still cut off from the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Logically, it might be argued that the Soviet Union—which has shown no signs as yet of any desire to become a major factor in world trade—has no need for an outlet to the seas and that in any case air power and atomic energy have made such conceptions out of date.

But psychologically the new position of the Soviet Union as one of the three great World Powers has immeasurably strengthened this traditional longing. The shift of Soviet industries towards the Urals and the industrial development of Central Asia have also intensified this pressure, if only because the Soviet railway system in the Caucasus and in Central Asia stops at so many points provokingly short of the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Nor can we overlook many recent signs of an increased Soviet appreciation of the importance of sea power and of determination to build up a navy commensurate with the importance of the Soviet Union.

8. As always in Soviet policy, national security also plays a big rôle. Soviet territory north of Turkey and Persia, and more especially the Caucasian oilfields, are of great and growing importance to Soviet economy. The Anglo-French plans for the destruction of the Caucasian oilfields from the Middle East in the early part of the war have not been forgotten, and even to-day Stalin's remarks about the danger to the Baku oil wells from Persia are probably less insincere than they might at first sight appear. The Russian conception of strategic protection consists of defence in depth in the form of a chain of well-organised Soviet-controlled buffer States along the Soviet frontiers. This has been realised in Europe and to some extent in the Far East, but the southern frontiers are not yet so covered. A further consideration is the traditional Soviet fear of anarchy, confusion and weak government along her frontiers and her preference for something stable and dependable.

9. Soviet policy throughout the area in question is therefore likely to be one of gradual penetration with control of North Persia and the Straits as immediate objectives and with long-term aims including the domination of Turkey and Persia, access to the Persian Gulf and, if all goes well for them, an extension of Soviet strategic, economic and even ideological influence throughout the Arab world. Although such long-term aims imply a desire to disrupt existing international alignments in the Middle East, and indeed to upset the present internal organisation of the Middle Eastern countries, they certainly do not at present include any intention to risk a head-on collision with Britain. Many different means are to hand for carrying out this policy of patient penetration and possibly eventual disruption, which, however varied and indeed conflicting they may appear, conform to a central pattern.

10. In their general propaganda about this area the Soviet authorities take the line that it is politically and economically backward and that its peoples are oppressed and exploited either by their own reactionary rulers or by "colonial imperialism." To these countries the Soviet Union represents herself as setting an example of democracy, and of enlightened and economic progress, as instanced particularly in the successful development of the Soviet Republics in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. The allegedly oppressed peoples of the Middle East are therefore encouraged to look with hope towards their great Soviet neighbour. Hitherto, however, this propaganda line, although constant, has not been developed very vigorously except in regard to Persia and to a lesser extent to Turkey. But we should do well to remember that this is not only propaganda. Soviet rule has in fact brought greater material prosperity to the masses in the constituent republics of the Soviet Union bordering upon Middle Eastern countries. Vast industrial and agricultural schemes have been successfully carried out and more are now projected. By Communist standards these formerly "colonial" and oppressed peoples are now members of a democratic society, in which great opportunities are offered to talent. A Stalin or Beriya from Georgia or a Mikoyan from Armenia can control the destinies of the whole Soviet Union. It is hardly surprising therefore that the Soviet Union should contrast such conditions with those prevailing throughout the Middle East and consider that she can give a moral and material lead to her southern neighbours.

11. It is fortunate for Soviet propaganda that the three immediate neighbours of the Soviet Union, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan, all contain minorities, whose woes are set out in much the same terms as Hitler used when he tried to build up world sympathy for the Sudeten Germans. These minorities include the Armenians in Turkey and Persia, the Georgians in Turkey, the Turki population of Azerbaijan and certain elements in the plains of the Oxus in North Afghanistan, where the population is part Uzbek and part Turcoman, and includes some thousands of political refugees from Soviet Central Asia. The most important of these minorities at the moment is that in Persian Azerbaijan, but developments there have already been fully covered in recent reports from His Majesty's Embassy at Tehran, and it does not therefore seem necessary to recapitulate here Soviet policy in that province. The claims made upon Turkey on behalf of Georgia during your recent visit to Moscow are the latest and most outrageous

example of these "Sudeten" tactics. If the case had not been spoilt by over-emphasis there might be more to be said for Soviet demands concerning Armenia. Soviet Armenia is probably one of the most prosperous Republics in the Soviet Union, and, leaving all propaganda on one side, there would seem to be some sympathy with the Soviet case among the large Armenian colonies scattered in America and the Middle East. The claim to Kars and Ardahan is also justified here on the ground that the Soviet Union is entitled to a return to the Tzarist frontiers which she lost in the early days of her weakness. The flaw in this propaganda is, however, that even by Soviet admission there are very few Armenians left in the area now claimed by the Soviet Union. Hence the necessity for encouraging Armenians to return from America and other countries with a view to populating these "primordial" Armenian lands.

12. As regards Afghanistan, the Soviet authorities have hitherto held their hand. There are constant local troubles and even skirmishes along the Oxus frontier which worry the Afghan Ambassador here, but he recently informed me that there had been no signs yet of any Soviet intention to profit from this situation and to develop a forward policy in Afghanistan. On the other hand, Afghan as well as Persian and Chinese representatives were recently invited to the twenty-fifth anniversary celebrations of the Central Asiatic University at Tashkent, and the occasion was turned to good propaganda use. Apart from the fluid situation on the Afghan-Uzbek frontier, it is always open to the Soviet authorities to start a campaign against the existing (relatively pro-British) régime at Kabul on the ground that it is reactionary. That the Soviet Government are not disinterested in these questions and may have a rod in pickle for us is suggested by the special attentions they are paying to Ghulam Sadiq, Amanullah's former Prime Minister, who gave himself up to the Russians when Berlin was captured and is now living with his family in considerable comfort at the expense of the Soviet Government at the Savoy Hotel in Moscow.

13. Apart from these "Sudeten" minorities the Soviet Union, as part of its traditional attitude towards "colonial and imperialist oppression," has also shown some tendency to encourage racial minorities, who have no connexions with the Soviet Union, to agitate for separate nationhood. The most striking example in the Middle East area is that of the Kurds, some of whose chieftains are near enough to the Soviet Union to maintain contact with Soviet officials and even to pay visits to Baku. The Kurds are conveniently situated in Turkish, Persian and Iraqi territory to be used as a means of pressure against either of these three governments, and even to threaten the oilfields in Northern Iraq—the importance of which to Britain you yourself emphasised to Generalissimo Stalin in Moscow last month. Clearly the Kurds cannot look to Britain for the realisation of their national aspirations, since we are committed to maintaining the territorial integrity of our Turkish, Persian and Iraqi allies. Many Kurds are therefore bound to lend a ready ear to Soviet propaganda, more particularly as the Soviet authorities, like their Tzarist predecessors, are ready to work in with "reactionary" tribal chieftains quite regardless of ideological considerations. Soviet solicitude for the Kurds is shown in the programme of the Soviet-controlled Azerbaijan National Council, which includes autonomy and language privileges for racial minorities, among whom are the Kurds.

14. Soviet pressure, hitherto concentrated mainly against Persia and Turkey, has already achieved considerable success in Northern Persia. Turkey, for obvious reasons, is a more difficult proposition. The Russians are not established anywhere on Turkish soil, and the Turkish political and national structure, itself based upon a far-reaching revolution after the first world-war, does not readily lend itself to infiltration tactics. The Russians are therefore reduced to maintaining external pressure and a war of nerves upon the issues of the Straits and of Turkey's eastern frontiers. This constant Soviet threat, which can always be increased by a show of sympathy for Syrian claims to Alexandretta, is maintained above all by the presence of Soviet troops along the Caucasus, and of Soviet and Soviet-equipped Bulgarian troops in Thrace. This compels the Turks to maintain a large army under arms and so aggravates existing economic difficulties. Attempts such as the recent American proposal to meet legitimate Soviet requirements in the Straits are ignored since they would not assist the main aim of Soviet policy, which is to force Turkey away from her present connexion with Britain into the Soviet orbit, or at least into an intermediate position between Britain and the Soviet Union.

15. Behind Turkey stands the Arab world, Soviet interest in which has been gradually increasing since the end of the war. This is instanced by the opening of official diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the majority

of the Arab States and by the increasing space now devoted in the Soviet press to developments in this area. Although this interest is not exactly friendly to Britain, being based for the most part upon traditional Soviet conceptions of the imperialistic exploitation of colonial and semi-colonial peoples, there have not, so far as I am aware, been any signs as yet either in Egypt, Iraq or even in the Levant States of Soviet hostility towards us or of local fishing in troubled waters. For the present the main Soviet aim would appear to be to re-establish the old Russian position in the Near East, to study conditions there, and to build up a position from which the Soviet Government could develop a real threat to British imperial interests if the general state of Anglo-Soviet relations provided any temptation for this.

16. Traditionally, the main source of Russian influence in the Near East has been the Orthodox Church. In Tsarist days Russia vied with France as the protector of Christians throughout the Near East, and more particularly in the "holy places" of Palestine. There seems little doubt that one of the motives behind the new official toleration and even encouragement of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union is to promote such Soviet influence abroad. The new Patriarch's visit to Jerusalem and to other religious centres in the Near East, the earlier visit to Moscow of Orthodox Patriarchs from the Near East for the coronation of the Russian Patriarch, and claims now being put forward on behalf of the Moscow Patriarchate for the leadership of the Orthodox Church, coupled significantly with attempts to gain control of the Constantinople Patriarchate, are all signs of a renewed active Soviet policy in the Near East. This recalls the similar encouragement given by the lay French Republic in the early 20th century to French religious missions in the Levant, despite the expulsion of the same religious orders from France itself. The official propaganda line concerning the Armenian and Georgian Churches also fits into this general pattern.

17. But useful though the Orthodox and Armenian Christians may be to Soviet policy, the Soviet Union are unlikely to repeat the mistake made by Tsarist Russia and later by France of identifying themselves with Christian minorities in an overwhelmingly Moslem area. Although little first-hand information is available regarding those territories in the Soviet Union which were formerly part of Islam, there are signs that the Soviet Union, like Britain, also regards herself as a great Moslem Power. Islam now seems to be receiving within the Soviet Union the same relatively sympathetic treatment as the Orthodox Church, while Soviet foreign policy is groping its way towards improving Soviet connexions with the Moslem, and particularly with the Arab world. The staffs of Soviet legations in Middle East countries include Moslem secretaries, and when the new Soviet policy of claiming separate international status for the Union Republics has been developed to cover the central Asiatic Republics, no doubt these will be encouraged to exchange separate diplomatic missions with Moslem States. This in turn would promote closer contacts, exchanges of visits, &c., between religious leaders of Islam within and outside the Soviet Union and Islamic studies will no doubt be encouraged in the Soviet Union. An important sign of the times is the recent pilgrimage of important Moslems from the Soviet Union to Mecca, for which air and other facilities were provided by the Soviet Government.

18. Despite their growing interest in the problems of the Arab world the Soviet authorities have hitherto been careful not to intervene directly in questions of immediate concern to ourselves. You will recall that Stalin himself expressed satisfaction to you over our presence in Egypt, although he may well have had in mind that this at least excluded any other foreign Power and also that Soviet propaganda in the Arab world can make play with our indirect control of countries such as Egypt. In the Levant States the Soviet Government have at one stage suggested that the Great Powers should jointly settle the difficulties between them and France, but this suggestion was not pressed and was aimed rather at the French than ourselves. Soviet interest in Tripolitania and in Tangier falls rather outside the area we are now considering, but these are plainly issues of close concern to the Arab world, and should the Russians establish their influence in Tripolitania this would no doubt increase the respect and fear with which they are coming to be regarded in the Middle East.

19. There remains Palestine and here alone the Soviet Union is at some disadvantage. This is shown by the fact that the Russians have hitherto been very reticent in regard to developments in Palestine and, although a certain number of news items are beginning to appear concerning the troubles there, there is no hint in them of Arab-Jewish conflict but only of difficulties between British officials and certain elements of the Palestine population. Despite their interest

in conciliating Jewish and "progressive" elements in America and elsewhere the Soviet Government have been very careful not to support Zionism in any way and there have even been indications of Soviet hostility towards it. Communist-inspired propaganda in regard to Palestine has therefore had to fall back upon the well-worn but not very promising theme of appeasement of race hatreds and of the combination of the exploited masses—Arabs and Jews alike—against landlords, capitalists and British Imperialists.

20. India receives surprisingly little attention here, although we have had indications that our position there meets with criticism and our professed policy with scepticism in the highest quarters. On the rare occasions when criticism or scepticism finds expression in the Soviet press, it is connected with the well-worn themes of imperialism and colonial exploitation. But on the whole India has so far been handled with great restraint in Soviet propaganda and policy alike and it is certainly not now regarded here as an area of potential expansion. In fact it seems to be of interest to the Soviet authorities mainly as providing an opportunity occasionally to twist the lion's tail. The Soviet Government certainly have no love for Congress and the Hindus, who seem to be regarded here as socially and economically reactionary influences. The Moslem League and Pakistan are treated with care in view of the growing Soviet concern with the Moslem world. A factor in the situation may be the breach between Congress and the Indian Communist party although the support given by the latter to the Moslem League may only be a tactical coincidence.

21. Sinkiang does not, I think, fall within this review since it should be regarded as part of the great desert borderland between the Soviet Union and China and therefore a factor in Soviet Far-Eastern policy rather than as a part of the vast territory between the Bosphorus and India, where the Soviet Union faces Britain. On the other hand, it is obviously a potential area of Soviet expansion and one where the Soviet Union will make every use of Khazak minorities and the local Moslems in its own interests.

22. I have already suggested that Persia and Turkey are, in that order, the first priorities in the Soviet Government's "southern" policy. Turkey is clearly a much more difficult nut to crack than Persia. It is only, however, if Turkey can be cajoled or browbeaten into granting the Soviet Union what she wants—and this certainly includes something like a puppet Government at Angora, looking to Moscow and not to London—that the southern frontiers of the Soviet Union would, like its western and Far Eastern frontiers, be protected by a belt of States no longer linked to another Great Power and, in effect, vassals of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union would then also have secured an outlet for her commerce and, if necessary, for her navy into the Mediterranean. The search for much-needed oil could proceed without rivals in Northern Persia to supplement what are now regarded as the inadequate oil reserves of the Soviet Union. If experience in Eastern Europe and the Far East is any guide, the economic and political domination, and even absorption, of Persia and Turkey thus weakened should be a relatively easy process, to be completed at leisure, after which the way to the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal would be open.

23. The dangers in all this to our imperial communications and to our stake in the essential oil of Southern Persia are obvious. Whereas in Europe and the Far East the Soviet Union can ensure her own security, however exaggerated her conception of this may be, without damaging British or even American interests, this is unfortunately not the case on the southern borders of the Soviet Union. Throughout the Middle East prestige and security considerations are closely intermingled. Even limited Soviet success in Persia and Turkey, and still more concessions to the Soviet Union in Tripolitania would presumably be interpreted as a severe set-back to Britain throughout the Arab world, and every concession, even to legitimate Soviet aims—as, for example, in the Straits—must be carefully considered against this background. But, as yet, the Soviet Government are probably thinking more in terms of achieving traditional Russian aims and ensuring Russian security than of damaging British imperial interests. In their post-war mood of self-confidence and in their determination to show that the Soviet Union can not only regain whatever Tsarist Russia lost, but also obtain what Tsarist Russia tried and failed to get, the Soviet rulers may show little regard for our interests unless these are very firmly stated to them with the necessary show of power to support our statements. Stalin's attitude in Moscow in regard to Egypt, and also the reception of your own remarks about Mosul, suggest, however, that there is at present no desire here for any head-on collision with Britain, and, indeed, the Soviet Government would, no doubt, be very happy

to make some arrangement with us similar to the old 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement, which left us for the time being in full control of our oil interests in South-West Persia and of our predominant position in the Persian Gulf. Nor does it seem likely that the Soviet Government will go to extremes to secure their full programme of concessions in Turkey in the face of a firm Turkish attitude, with British and American backing. If, however, the Soviet authorities succeed in both Persia and Turkey, they will then be under the strongest temptation to turn their attention to the Arab world, with whose problems they are only now beginning to familiarise themselves. The temptation to penetrate an area divided by local class and dynastic jealousies and to supplant a weakened and humiliated Britain might, in such circumstances, prove irresistible, more particularly as just beyond the now debated territories of Persian Azerbaijan, Turkish Armenia and Kurdistan are to be found the Kirkuk oilfields and beyond them the oilfields of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrein and Saudi Arabia.

24. The Soviet impact on the Middle East has therefore created a situation which must have been very familiar to British statesmen some fifty years ago. Our judgment was at that time often clouded by anxiety regarding the potential Russian threat to India, while at the same time Anglo-Russian relations were constantly strained by our insistence not only on preventing Russian egress from the Black Sea but also on ensuring freedom of entry for our navy. In these two respects at least the position is better to-day. On the other hand, the Soviet Union is clearly much more formidable than Tsarist Russia. She must appear to the easily impressionable peoples of the Middle East in much the same guise of ruthless and irresistible power as Hitler's Germany before the war, with the added danger of being much closer. At the same time the Soviet Union has much to offer in the field of social and material progress to the relatively undeveloped and ill-organised countries along her southern borders and beyond. It would therefore be only prudent in us to assume that the Soviet policy of extending her interests in this area, inevitably at our expense, will be maintained and developed. The area is likely, therefore, to be a source of friction in Anglo-Soviet relations in the 20th century as it was throughout the 19th. On the other hand, Soviet vital interests are not at stake to the same extent as along her western boundaries, or even in the Far East, and the Soviet Government, which seems to attach importance to our remaining a great Power and one of the Big Three, must realise that there is a limit beyond which we cannot allow what are clearly our own vital interests to be endangered in the Middle East. The Soviet Government must also realise, and indeed this may be an additional reason for their present preoccupations, that America is already closely interested in Middle Eastern affairs and has an increasing stake in maintaining British influence there. We therefore have good cards in our hand in the Middle East and to a large extent the initiative lies with us as much as with the Russians. By pressing ahead with plans for social and economic reform and integration throughout the Arab world on the lines forecast in your despatch No. 279 to Bagdad of the 18th October last, and by revising our treaty arrangements with the Arab States to placate rising Arab nationalism we can deprive the Russians of their main propaganda weapons in this area—and incidentally remove a very natural temptation from the Soviet rulers. At the same time we can put heart into our Allies in Turkey and, if it is not too late, in Persia, too, and so remove from them the temptation to come to terms with Soviet power while there is yet time. We can also encourage American interest in the Middle East and so ensure American support against excessive Soviet ambitions.

25. If our local position is strengthened in this way we can then have reasonable hopes of avoiding major trouble, although not constant local friction and irritation, with the Soviet Union. Fortunately, the Soviet Union is, like Britain, a world Power and must take into account not only its ambitions along its southern frontiers but the general world position. Therefore we can strive in the first place to get the United Nations effectively working, with full Soviet participation. In the second place we can maintain, despite all temporary disappointments and even provocations, the reality of Big-Three co-operation. And last, but not least, we can cherish the Anglo-Soviet Alliance. With these three sheet anchors and a positive and progressive British policy in the Middle East, there is no reason for undue despondency, but only for constant vigilance in that area. In so far as the present situation is so clearly reminiscent of that throughout the 19th century we may also take comfort in the fact that only once throughout that period did Britain and Russia actually go to war, and that this war—the Crimean war—has come to be regarded in the Soviet Union as in Britain as unnecessary and futile.

26. This is the picture as we see it in Moscow. But our sources of information are necessarily imperfect, and it would be of great interest to learn how the impact of Soviet Russia presents itself to the British representatives in the vast area with which I have sought to deal.

I have, &c.

FRANK K. ROBERTS.

[J 562/39/16]

No. 35

Mr. Bevin to Mr. Grafftey Smith (Jedda)

(No. 52)

Sir,

Foreign Office, 4th March, 1946

THE Saudi Arabian Minister called on Mr. Howe on 5th February to inform him that the Amir Faisal had received a letter from King Ibn Saud, the contents of which he has been instructed by his Royal Father to communicate to me. In order, however, to spare me the lengthy interview that the translation of this letter and its reading would require, the Amir wished its contents to be communicated to me beforehand.

2. King Ibn Saud, in his letter, requested the Amir Faisal to inform His Majesty's Government that when the Chief of the Imperial General Staff had visited the King in Jedda he had asked him to use his influence with King Farouk to remove misunderstandings between Great Britain and Egypt, so as to improve matters for the British army. Lord Alanbrooke had said that Great Britain liked to have good relations with Egypt and thought that the interests of the two countries were identical. Egypt must, however, take account also of British interests. Great Britain and all the Arab States must be on good terms. King Ibn Saud replied to Lord Alanbrooke that when he went to Egypt he would do his best in the sense desired. When he arrived in Egypt on his recent visit, King Ibn Saud continued, he had spoken to King Farouk as Lord Alanbrooke had desired, and had added that it was in the interests of all the Arabs to have good relations with Great Britain and to regard her as their best Ally. This had been the King's policy for a long time and Great Britain had done a good deal for the small nations in spite of mistakes. Everybody made mistakes. King Farouk replied that he was very happy to hear this from King Ibn Saud as a man of experience. He affirmed his readiness to co-operate with Great Britain and to strengthen Egypt's friendship with her. This friendship, he said, was one of long standing, and Egypt did not contemplate making any arrangements with any other Power against the interests of Great Britain. Egypt had helped Great Britain during the war, but this was in Egypt's own interest. Egypt welcomed an understanding. He regretted the attitude of Great Britain towards Egypt, and was surprised that she did not seem to be taking Egypt's national aspirations and legal demands into consideration. The satisfaction of these demands was in the joint interest of the two countries. If King Farouk remained silent, the internal situation in Egypt became difficult. On the other hand, if the Egyptian Government gave effect to all the demands of the Egyptian people, the situation became equally difficult. Therefore Great Britain should meet the Egyptian Government, which were trying to find a way out of the difficulty. She should help the moderate element in the country. King Farouk was ready for a solid understanding on condition that the whole situation was changed and that his dignity was respected. He wanted Great Britain's help in order to strengthen the Egyptian army in its task of defending both Egypt and Great Britain, but Egypt would want new weapons at low prices.

3. I conveyed an oral reply to the Amir Faisal when he called on me on 21st February before his departure from this country. I asked him to thank King Ibn Saud for his message and for speaking to King Farouk as he did, which could, in our view, have nothing but good results. There was no foundation for the view that His Majesty's Government did not take Egypt's aspirations into consideration, and we were at a loss to understand how King Farouk came to hold that view. It was probably explained by the fact that we had not at that time replied to the Egyptian note asking for treaty revision. But as Lord Alanbrooke had pointed out to King Ibn Saud, Egypt must also take account of British interests. These interests, Egyptian and British, had much that was in common; and in the coming negotiations for the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian

Treaty we should seek to build on that fact, on a basis of partnership. In that way we should hope to arrive at a settlement which would safeguard both British and Egyptian interests, particularly in matters of defence, and would in consequence be a great help in the defence of all the Arab States.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Cairo.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

[J 1388/39/16]

No. 36

Sir R. Campbell to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 29th March.)

(No. 405.)

Sir,

Cairo, 20th March, 1946.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum⁽¹⁾ regarding the lecture given by Abdel Rahman Azzam Pasha to the local Chatham House Group on Saturday, the 16th March, 1946, dealing with the Arab League and the Egyptian situation.

2. Azzam Pasha was evidently out to frighten his British audience, but there is no doubt that, if Sidky Pasha were to resign on the ground that he had failed to obtain from us satisfaction of the Egyptian national aspirations, it would be extremely difficult for any subsequent Prime Minister to maintain order and correct relations with us. (See paragraphs 11 and 12 of the enclosed memorandum.)

3. With reference to paragraphs 9 and 10, Azzam Pasha is quite incorrect in supposing that the British have not the slightest conception of the strength of the new spirit among the youth of the country. It has long been clear to us that the normal Nationalist movement here is being accompanied and intensified by a social and economic revolutionary movement which associates the British with the ruling elements, whose failure, in spite of our persistent representations, to do anything effective in the way of social reform is obviously leading to a situation dangerous to the Throne and the present social order in Egypt. Our difficulty in the Middle Eastern countries is that we have not the power to force their Governments to tread the way of social reform. Unless we are prepared to interfere in the internal affairs of the country in a wholesale way, we cannot possibly bring about the social reforms we would so much wish to see introduced. This position naturally gives great strength to Russian propaganda. The Russians in regions within the Soviet rule have introduced a new economic system which their propaganda represents as a panacea of social evils, and they charge us with maintaining a worn-out capitalist and oppressive system in the countries under our influence but not under our rule. This is the most dangerous factor in our whole situation in the Middle East.

I have, &c.

RONALD I. CAMPBELL.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

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(17213)

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respecting

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 65

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING
EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 65.—APRIL TO JUNE 1946

CHAPTER I.—ARABIA

[E 4560/657/91]

No. 1

Mr. Graftey-Smith to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 20th May.)

(No. 58.)

Sir,

Jedda, 11th May, 1946.

I HAVE the honour to inform you, with reference to my telegram No. 179 of the 9th May, 1946, that my United States colleague returned to Jedda on the 7th May from his official visit to Sana'a, in the course of which he negotiated a consular and economic agreement on standard lines with the Imam of the Yemen.

2. Press reports in the United States had suggested that the American mission might attempt also to obtain extensive mineral and oil concessions in the Yemen. Whether this subject was discussed or not I do not know; but from the somewhat bitter conversational references made by Colonel Eddy to Yemeni obscurantism and xenophobia in general, and to the Imam's unwillingness to be helped by anyone, I should hazard a guess that, if any such approach was made by the Americans, it was unfavourably received. This, however, is mere conjecture.

3. The negotiations were opened, on the Yemeni side, by Mahmud Ragheb Bey, the Turkish ex-diplomat who acts as the Imam's Minister for Foreign Affairs; but he was later supplanted by the Amir Seif-ul-Islam Hussein, the third son of the Imam. Seif-ul-Islam Hussein is his father's Adviser on Islamic Affairs. He appears to be working hard, and not unsuccessfully, to create in the Imam's mind an impression of himself as the only worthy successor to the Imamate, and to prejudice his father against his two elder brothers. He was meticulously obstructive during the negotiations, inspired by that complex of fanaticism, stupidity and suspicion with which, in this country, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin tears our nerves and patience. The passage in the draft agreement providing for the protection of the courts in either country for the nationals of the other aroused His Royal Highness's most violent prejudices: law in the Yemen exists to punish, not to protect; and Yemeni suspicions of American ex-territorial designs prolonged and embittered the discussion of this phraseology. A point was reached, indeed, at which Colonel Eddy found it necessary to state that, in view of the obvious mistrust with which his country's motives were impugned by Seif-ul-Islam Hussein, he preferred to break off negotiations and leave Sana'a.

4. During an audience on the day following this announcement the Imam expressed annoyance at the hitch in discussions, and declared that he would return the responsibility of Yemeni representation to Mahmud Ragheb Bey. The Foreign Minister's reception of this news was dramatic and unexpected. Striding, unbidden, from the far end of the Council Chamber to the table where the Imam sat, he addressed his master in violent tones. "I will not," he said, "be treated like a dog, in favour one day and in disgrace the next; and I will not accept again the task of negotiation, for which I was not considered worthy last week. I have served your Majesty devotedly for over twenty years, and my advice has never failed you. If you prefer that of Seif-ul-Islam Hussein, suffer me to leave you, and to take this grey beard still honourably to the grave. Let

me advise your Majesty to reserve for Seif-ul-Islam Hussein your paternal kisses and affection within the four walls of your palace, but not to entrust to him any affairs of State, for he is stupid and a fool. If his influence prevails, the Yemen will become notorious as the one country on earth with which no foreign country can have dealings, and from its present stagnation it will relapse into barbarism."

5. During this extraordinary outburst one of the Imam's bodyguard drew his dagger and raised his arm to strike Mahmud Ragheb Bey in the back. The two old men faced each other across the table, with death poised behind the younger. Colonel Eddy and his companions, expecting at any moment to witness a one-man blood-bath, sat in stony discomfort. At last the eighty-year-old Imam made a tiny negative gesture of the hand, and the bodyguard's dagger was sheathed.

6. It is difficult to believe that Mahmud Ragheb Bey can expect a long official life in Sana'a after so emotional an act of defiance. The Imam's dual functions of Pope and King make insubordination doubly dangerous. When calling to bid Colonel Eddy and his mission farewell, Mahmud Ragheb Bey wore European clothes and a fez, in place of his usual Yemeni robes, and he explained that his visit was that of a private citizen. Large crowds assembled to watch as his carriage drove away from the Royal guest-house, for news of his defiance had spread like wildfire through the town.

7. It so happens that my French colleague followed close on Colonel Eddy's heels, on an official visit to the Imam in Sana'a. He is due back here at the end of this month, and he will be able to tell us whether Mahmud Ragheb Bey is still, after the departure of the American mission, Yemeni Minister for Foreign Affairs.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington, Cairo and Bagdad; to His Majesty's Minister at Beirut; to the Governor, Aden; to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and to the British Middle East Office in Cairo.

I have, &c.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

[E 5722/5722/25]

No. 2

Mr. Grafftey-Smith to Mr. Berin.—(Received 22nd June.)

(No. 80. Secret.)

Sir,

Jedda, 17th June, 1946.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, when in Riyadh on the 14th June, I thought it expedient to speak to Ibn Saud with some frankness about the state of public opinion in the Hejaz, which appears to be increasingly outspoken in its criticism of the present régime.

2. The Hejaz has, as you are aware, lost much and gained little by its incorporation into the Saudi Empire. Wahhabi doctrines and puritanical attitudes are about as popular in Jedda, Mecca and Medina as the dogma and discipline of Plymouth Brethren would be in Vatican City; and a hundred private and particular religious rackets, designed to exploit the devotion of pilgrims, have been checked by Ibn Saud's imposition of a fundamentalist orthodoxy. The lucrative pilgrimage revenues now flow into the Riyadh Treasury; the King's incessant demands for money for his vast family extravagances and for the subsidies of Nejd tribesmen are largely met from Hejaz resources; finally, a traditionally mercantile community finds itself baulked of trade and profits by large processes of Government monopoly. Food-stuffs, meanwhile, are scarce and very expensive, and among the poorer classes hunger is rife.

3. On the 17th May last a sudden rash of leaflets on the walls of the Haram in Mecca (to the number, according to one report, of fifty) carried to the embarrassed worshippers at their Friday prayers accusations of tyranny and despotism against the Saudi Government, and complaints that all authority affecting the welfare of the country and its inhabitants lay in the hands of two individuals: presumably the Minister of Finance, Shaikh Abdullah Sulaiman, and his crony and Government banker, Sadaqa Ka'ki. These leaflets, which in effect called for a revolt, are said to have much disturbed the local authorities, following, as they do, anonymous threats on the life of Abdullah Sulaiman and others. Nothing has yet been discovered to identify the so-called "executive

organisation" in whose name they were issued; but it seems certain that the physical task of pasting up so many leaflets in so closely controlled an area must have called for a number of hands.

4. There has been no press or public reference to this incident, and I did not, of course, reveal my knowledge of it to His Majesty. But I ventured to tell him that, speaking as a friend, I was disturbed by the prevailing atmosphere of discontent in the Hejaz, which, in my opinion, threatened to have an unfavourable effect upon the thousands of pilgrims shortly expected. I pointed out that no propaganda favourable to the régime can be looked for from officials whose salary is three months in arrears, or from a general public condemned to pay black-market prices for the necessities of life, mainly because it is only by selling subsidy and other imports at black-market prices that Sadaqa Ka'ki can recover his advances to the Government. The Hejazis, in the view I expressed to Ibn Saud, had come to think of themselves as His Majesty's step-children, whereas the Nejdīs were the apple of his eye. Jedda and Mecca saw—or thought they saw—that the plate was always tilted away from the Hejaz, so that all the good things flowed away from them into Nejd. I suggested that Ibn Saud might usefully, in his own interests, do something to remove this sense of grievance.

5. His Majesty, whose views on the relative merits of Hejazis and Nejdīs are exactly as alleged above, took these remarks very well. He damned all Hejazis as rogues, smugglers and liars, and said that, when he was giving free meals to a nominal 150,000 persons in this territory, he found that only 50,000 were actually getting anything. However, he asked me whether I had any specific suggestions to offer.

6. I urged that at least the salaries of his officials, both civil and military, should be punctually paid; also that a few shops should be opened in the main towns, at which the poorer classes might buy food-stuffs and textiles at reasonably low prices. This should be possible, because the Government holds all stocks that came in, or still come in, under subsidy, and is still the sole importer of cereals, sugar, tea, &c. (His Majesty interposed that they would at once sell their purchases at a profit!) I also ventured to suggest that the Emir Faisal, as Viceroy of the Hejaz, might invite leading Hejazis to make constructive and concrete proposals for the improvement of local conditions.

7. It remains to be seen whether these representations bear any fruit, and it would certainly be optimistic to expect any redress of the present uneven balance between Nejd and the Hejaz. But I felt that the King should be made aware of the discontent caused by his own and his subordinates' favour towards Nejd, and I felt also that I was probably the only person in the country able to speak frankly to him on this delicate subject. I may add that His Majesty was at pains himself to say that he took such plain speaking on my part as the surest evidence of personal affection.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad and to his Majesty's Minister at Beirut.

I have, &c.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

CHAPTER II.—IRAQ

[E 3215/265/93]

No. 3

Sir M. Peterson to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 10th April.)

(No. 150. Confidential.)

Sir,

Angora, 1st April, 1946.

WITH reference to Mr. Helm's telegram No. 190 of the 29th March, I have the honour to transmit to you the accompanying copies of the French texts of the following agreements signed at Angora on the 29th March by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, on the one hand, and Nuri Pasha Es Said and Abdulilah Hafidh, on behalf of the Iraqi Government, on the other :—

A.—General agreement with attached protocols relating to :—

- (1) Control of the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates and their tributaries.
- (2) Mutual assistance on matters of public security.
- (3) Co-operation in educational and cultural matters.
- (4) Postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications.
- (5) Economic matters.
- (6) Frontier matters.

B.—Extradition Convention.

C.—Judicial Assistance Convention.

2. These French texts were sent to Mr. Helm by Nuri Pasha, who requested that they be regarded as confidential pending ratification by the Turkish and Iraqi Governments. I understand that for the present the two parties have agreed to give to third parties no further information regarding these agreements additional to that embodied in the official communiqué which was quoted in Mr. Helm's telegram No. 64, Saving, of the 30th March to you.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, His Majesty's Minister at Beirut and to the Middle East Office at Cairo. I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON

Enclosure 1 in No. 3

Traité d'Amitié et de Bon-Voisinage entre la Turquie et l'Irak.

SON Excellence Ismet Inönü, Président de la République Turque, et Son Altesse le Prince Abdulilah, Régent du Royaume d'Irak,

animés de l'idéal d'intensifier davantage les rapports d'amitié et de bon voisinage heureusement établis entre la Turquie et l'Irak et de renforcer la sympathie et les liens de fraternité qui existent depuis des siècles entre les deux peuples,

considérant l'identité de l'idéal de paix et de sécurité des deux pays avec la paix et la sécurité des peuples de l'univers et plus spécialement du Moyen-Orient comme le fondement inaltérable de leur politique étrangère,

heureux de découvrir dans les clauses de la Charte des Nations Unies, récemment signée à San-Francisco et visant le développement de la solidarité internationale, autant de dispositions qui confirment leurs propres aspirations et leur donnent la possibilité de prendre de nouveaux élan pour leurs efforts dans ce sens,

considérant que la réalisation d'un rapprochement effectif ne peut être que facilitée grâce à l'appui d'une compréhension et d'une entraide réciproques dans le domaine économique,

tenant compte de la légitime joie de pouvoir être les premiers à mettre en exécution les susdits principes de la Charte des Nations Unies et ayant la volonté de rester fidèles aux obligations qui découlent de la Charte,

se sont convaincus de la nécessité de conclure un accord susceptible de réaliser l'ensemble des considérations ci-dessus indiquées et ont nommé à cet effet les Plénipotentiaires dont les noms sont ci-après :

Son Excellence Ismet Inönü, Président de la République Turque :

Son Excellence Hasan Saka, Député de Trabzon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères ;

Son Excellence Feridun Cemal Erkin, Secrétaire Général du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Ambassadeur de Turquie ;

Son Altesse le Prince Abdulilah, Régent du Royaume de l'Irak :

Son Excellence Alfarik Nuri Essaid, Président du Sénat, 1^{re} Classe de l'Ordre de Rafidai ;

Son Excellence Abdul Ilâh Hafidh, membre de la Chambre des Députés,

lesquels, après avoir exhibé leurs pleins pouvoirs, reconnus en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engage à respecter leur intégrité territoriale et leurs frontières communes telles qu'elles sont définies et tracées dans le Traité conclu en 1926.

ARTICLE 2.

Chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engage à suivre une politique d'abstention absolue dans les affaires intérieures de l'autre.

ARTICLE 3.

Dans les questions internationales d'ordre général et plus particulièrement dans celles qui ont un caractère régional qui les intéressent, les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à se consulter et à se prêter, dans la politique qu'elles poursuivent, un plein appui et coopération dans le cadre de la Charte des Nations Unies.

ARTICLE 4.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à saisir sans délai l'organe compétent de l'Organisation des Nations Unies de toute menace d'agression ou de toute agression contre l'intégrité territoriale ou l'inviolabilité frontalière de l'une d'elles.

ARTICLE 5.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent, conformément aux dispositions de l'article 33 de la Charte des Nations Unies, à résoudre par les voies pacifiques tous les conflits qui pourraient surgir entre elles et de saisir le Conseil de Sécurité, conformément aux dispositions de l'article 37 de ladite Charte, de tout différend qu'elles ne réussiraient pas à aplanir par ces voies.

De même, les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à déployer tous leurs efforts pour assurer la solution selon les mêmes dispositions des différends qui pourraient surgir soit entre l'une d'elles et un tiers Etat voisin, soit entre deux Etats voisins.

ARTICLE 6.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes animées, dans l'esprit de ce Traité, du désir de réaliser leur coopération dans tous les domaines de leurs relations, ont conclu les Protocoles ci-dessous indiqués, qui feront partie intégrante du présent Traité :

Protocoles—

Protocole Annexe No. 1 relatif à la régularisation des eaux du Tigre et de l'Euphrate et de leurs affluents.

Protocole Annexe No. 2 relatif à l'assistance mutuelle dans les questions de sûreté.

Protocole Annexe No. 3 relatif à la coopération en matière d'Education, d'Enseignement et de Culture.

Protocole Annexe No. 4 relatif aux communications postales, télégraphiques et téléphoniques.
 Protocole Annexe No. 5 relatif aux questions économiques.
 Protocole Annexe No. 6 relatif à la frontière.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes ont également conclu les conventions suivantes :

Conventions—

Convention d'Extradition.

Convention en matière d'assistance judiciaire, civile, pénale et commerciale.

ARTICLE 7.

Le présent Traité aura une durée illimitée, et pourra être, à la demande de l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes, révisé tous les cinq ans.

Il sera ratifié par chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes et les instruments de ratification seront échangés à Bagdad aussitôt que possible.

Fait à Ankara, le 29 mars 1946, en trois exemplaires, en langues turque, arabe et française, cette dernière faisant foi en cas de contestation.

HASAN SAKA.

NOURY SAID.

FERIDUN CEMAL ERKIN.

A. HAFIDH.

Protocole Annexe No. 1 : Régularisation des eaux du Tigre et de l'Euphrate et de leurs affluents.

Le Gouvernement turc et le Gouvernement irakien, reconnaissant l'importance que présente pour le Gouvernement irakien la construction d'ouvrages de conservation sur le Tigre et l'Euphrate et leurs affluents, afin d'assurer le maintien d'un approvisionnement régulier en eau et la régularisation du débit des deux fleuves, pour éviter le danger d'inondation pendant les périodes annuelles de crue,

estimant qu'il est probable que, après investigation, les emplacements les plus convenables pour la construction de barrages et autres ouvrages similaires, dont la totalité des frais sera à la charge du Gouvernement irakien, soient situés en territoire turc,

d'accord, également, sur la nécessité d'installer des stations permanentes d'observation, en territoire turc, en vue d'enregistrer le débit des fleuves susmentionnés et de communiquer régulièrement au Gouvernement irakien le résultat de ces observations,

acceptant le principe de conformer, autant que possible, et dans l'intérêt des deux pays, la construction des ouvrages de conservation sur ces eaux aux fins d'irrigation et de production de force hydroélectrique,

sont convenus de ce qui suit :

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Le Gouvernement irakien pourra, aussitôt que possible, envoyer en Turquie des groupes de techniciens à son service, afin de procéder à des investigations et arpentages, recueillir les renseignements hydrauliques, géologiques et autres qui leur permettront de choisir les emplacements pour la construction des barrages, stations d'observation et autres ouvrages à construire sur le Tigre, l'Euphrate et leurs affluents et pour préparer les plans nécessaires à cet effet.

Les cartes à établir d'après les résultats des arpentages effectués seront préparées par les services compétents du Gouvernement turc.

Tous les frais nécessités par les travaux mentionnés au présent article seront assumés par le Gouvernement irakien.

ARTICLE 2.

Les groupes de techniciens susmentionnés collaboreront, dans leurs travaux, avec les techniciens du Gouvernement turc, qui les autorisera à se rendre aux endroits à visiter et leur fournira les informations, l'assistance et les facilités nécessaires pour l'accomplissement de leur tâche.

ARTICLE 3.

Le Gouvernement turc procédera à l'installation des stations permanentes d'observation et en assurera le fonctionnement et l'entretien. Les frais de fonctionnement de ces stations seront assumés, à parts égales, par les deux Gouvernements, à partir de l'entrée en vigueur du présent Protocole.

Les stations permanentes d'observation seront inspectées, à intervalles réguliers, par des techniciens des Gouvernements turc et irakien.

Pendant les périodes de crue, les niveaux d'eau observés tous les jours à 8 heures du matin par les stations où la communication télégraphique est possible, comme, sur le Tigre, Diyarbakir, Cizre, etc., et Keban, etc., sur l'Euphrate, seront communiqués par télégramme aux autorités compétentes que le Gouvernement irakien désignera à cet effet.

Les niveaux d'eau observés en dehors des périodes de crue seront communiqués par bulletins bimensuels aux mêmes autorités.

Les frais des communications susmentionnées seront payés par le Gouvernement irakien.

ARTICLE 4.

Le Gouvernement turc accepte, en principe, la construction par le Gouvernement irakien des ouvrages qui se révèlent nécessaires à la suite des études prévues à l'article 1^{er}.

Chaque ouvrage, hormis les stations permanentes d'observation, fera l'objet d'un accord séparé, en ce qui concerne son emplacement, son coût, son fonctionnement et son entretien, ainsi que son utilisation par le Gouvernement turc, pour les fins d'irrigation et de production d'énergie.

ARTICLE 5.

Le Gouvernement turc tiendra le Gouvernement irakien au courant de ses projets de construction d'ouvrages de conservation, sur l'un des deux fleuves ou leurs affluents, afin que ces ouvrages puissent être adaptés d'un commun accord, dans la mesure du possible, aux intérêts irakiens, aussi bien qu'aux intérêts turcs.

ARTICLE 6.

Chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes désignera, aussitôt que possible, après la signature du présent Protocole, un représentant.

Les deux représentants se consulteront sur toutes les questions relatives à la mise en exécution du présent Protocole et serviront d'intermédiaires entre les deux Gouvernements dans leurs communications y relatives.

HASAN SAKA.

NOURY SAID.

FERIDUN CEMAL ERKIN.

A. HAFIDH.

Protocole Annexe No. 2 : Assistance mutuelle dans les Questions de Sécurité.

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engage à recevoir, en cas de leur expulsion, les étrangers ressortissants d'une tierce Puissance qui, passant par son territoire, seraient entrés dans le territoire de l'autre partie sans être munis d'un passeport ou d'un titre en règle.

ARTICLE 2.

Dans le cas où l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes désirerait expulser un étranger ressortissant d'une tierce Puissance, et le diriger vers son pays d'origine, l'autre partie accordera le visa de transit qui lui sera demandé à cet effet, et, dans le cas où la personne expulsée n'est pas admise par son pays d'origine, la partie qui a formulé la demande d'expulsion sera tenue de recevoir en son territoire la personne expulsée.

ARTICLE 3.

Chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes se réserve le droit d'interdire, soit à la suite d'une sentence légale, soit en vertu des lois et règlements sur la police des mœurs, sur la police sanitaire ou sur la mendicité, soit pour des motifs de sûreté intérieure ou extérieure de l'Etat, soit en vertu des dispositions de la législation locale, à des personnes ressortissantes de l'autre partie de s'établir ou de séjourner sur son territoire et de les expulser pour ces motifs.

Les personnes qui ne sont pas en possession d'un passeport ou d'un titre en règle, au cas même où elles ne feraient pas l'objet des dispositions de l'alinéa précédent, pourront être expulsées à leur pays d'origine si elles ne peuvent pas obtenir et présenter, dans un délai d'un mois à partir de la date de l'avis qui leur sera adressé ou, en tout état de cause, leurs identités seront communiquées à l'autre Partie Contractante. Cette clause ne déroge pas au traitement prescrit par la législation locale.

Dans le cas où certaines de ces personnes seront renvoyées à l'Etat requérant, parce que leurs nationalités se seraient, d'après l'enquête effectuée, révélées comme étant autre que celle de l'Etat requis, ces personnes seront admises par l'Etat requérant.

ARTICLE 4.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes assumeront les frais occasionnés sur leurs territoires du fait d'expulsion dont il est question dans les articles précédents.

ARTICLE 5.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à se prêter mutuellement aide et assistance pour réprimer le trafic illicite d'armes et de stupéfiants, empêcher l'enlèvement de personnes et de biens à travers les frontières et le faux monnayage.

ARTICLE 6.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à se communiquer, dans les cas où cela est possible, les photos et identités de toutes les personnes suspectes d'être les auteurs des actes mentionnés ci-haut et les renseignements détaillés qu'elles possèdent à leur sujet.

ARTICLE 7.

Dans le cas où l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes demandera des renseignements ou l'ouverture d'une enquête au sujet des crimes, des criminels et des personnes suspectes qui causent la perturbation de la sécurité en son territoire, il sera satisfait à cette demande.

Dans le cas où l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes demandera des renseignements ou l'ouverture d'une enquête au sujet d'un de ses ressortissants se trouvant sur le territoire de l'autre partie, il sera satisfait à cette demande.

ARTICLE 8.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes consentent à ce que leurs services de sûreté se communiquent des renseignements complémentaires au sujet de personnes suspectes ayant commis un crime dans la zone frontalière de l'autre partie, sans tenir compte de leur nationalité.

ARTICLE 9.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à échanger les renseignements autres que ceux prévus à l'article 22 du Protocole relatif à l'Assistance Judiciaire et, dans la mesure du possible, les empreintes digitales des condamnés.

ARTICLE 10.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à échanger les renseignements qu'elles possèdent au sujet des propagandes nuisibles et subversives contraires aux lois des deux pays et de nature à compromettre la sécurité de l'autre partie et à éveiller un esprit de rébellion.

ARTICLE 11.

Toutes les communications mentionnées dans le présent Protocole se feront en turc ou en arabe.

ARTICLE 12.

Les fonctionnaires des deux pays autorisés à correspondre entre eux en vertu des dispositions du présent Protocole sont :

Pour la Turquie : le Directeur Général de Sûreté,

Pour l'Irak : le Directeur Général des Affaires de Sûreté.

ARTICLE 13.

Dans les cas urgents et exceptionnels et en attendant que les autorités mentionnées à l'article précédent soient prévenues, les Directeurs de Sûreté des vilayets et des sous-préfectures (Mutasarriflik) pourront procéder à la communication prévue à l'article 14 en vue de prendre certaines mesures d'urgence.

ARTICLE 14.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à se communiquer, par listes trimestrielles ou, dans les cas urgents, tout de suite, les noms des personnes expulsées et des indésirables qui intéresseraient l'autre partie.

ARTICLE 15.

En vue d'aider réciproquement au développement de l'activité des services de sûreté des deux pays, d'assurer, avec le temps, l'homogénéité et l'uniformité dans la formation et les méthodes de travail de leurs éléments employés, en particulier, dans les services de renseignements et de la police technique, de permettre aux membres des services de sûreté des deux pays de faire connaissance entre eux en se rendant visite sur les lieux de leur activité, les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à assurer la communication réciproque des lois et règlements policiers ainsi que les réformes et amendements qui y seront apportés, à envoyer des étudiants ou fonctionnaires aux institutions scolaires de l'autre partie, et à organiser des visites réciproques entre les membres de leurs services de sûreté.

ARTICLE 16.

Aucune des dispositions contenues dans le présent Protocole ne porte atteinte aux engagements pris par la Convention d'Extradition, ainsi que par celle relative à l'Assistance Judiciaire.

HASAN SAKA.

FERIDUN CEMAL.

NOURY SAID.

A. HAFIDH.

Protocole Annexe No. 3: Relatif à la Coopération en matière d'Education, d'Enseignement et de Culture entre la République Turque et le Royaume de l'Irak.

Le Gouvernement de la République Turque et le Gouvernement du Royaume de l'Irak,

désireux de mettre en exécution les principes consignés dans le Statut de l'Organisation d'Education, d'Enseignement et de Culture, signé à Londres le 16 novembre 1945 entre les membres des Nations Unies,

considérant la nécessité de la coopération dans les domaines de l'éducation, de l'enseignement et de la culture découlant de leur voisinage,

et sous la réserve des dispositions des accords culturels conclus par l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes avec une tierce Puissance, sont convenus de ce qui suit :

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes, se conformant aux principes contenus dans le Statut susmentionné de l'Organisation d'Education, d'Enseignement et de Culture des Nations Unies, s'engagent à se prêter mutuellement aide et

assistance dans tous les domaines pour réaliser entre elles le rapprochement culturel, à assurer l'échange provisoire ou définitif d'étudiants, de professeurs et de spécialistes, à faciliter les recherches et les études sur tous les sujets intéressant la culture et l'histoire des deux pays et à s'accorder réciproquement, sous la réserve des dispositions légales en vigueur dans les deux pays, le bénéfice de l'enseignement scientifique et pratique donné dans les institutions scolaires et scientifiques existant sur leurs territoires.

ARTICLE 2.

La commission dont la composition est déterminée par les articles 5 et 6 prendra les décisions nécessaires pour que les mesures appropriées soient prises, en vue d'assurer la réalisation des principes énoncés à l'article 1^{er}.

Toutefois, les décisions de ladite commission ne seront exécutoires qu'après leur approbation par le Gouvernement intéressé.

ARTICLE 3.

Les objets principaux de la coopération à réaliser conformément aux dispositions du présent Protocole, dans les domaines de l'éducation, de l'enseignement et de la culture, sont les suivants :

1. Reconnaissance de l'équivalence des diplômes (y compris le doctorat) délivrés par les écoles des deux pays, pour l'admission aux échelons correspondants de l'enseignement.
2. Admission réciproque de l'enseignement du turc et de l'arabe parmi les langues étrangères, dans les écoles de commerce, cet enseignement demeurant, toutefois, facultatif pour les élèves.
3. Echange d'un nombre déterminé d'étudiants à admettre dans les internats d'Etat.
4. Faculté de recourir aux services de l'autre partie pour la surveillance et le contrôle des étudiants turcs et irakiens dans les pays étrangers.
5. Création de prix pour encourager la jeunesse des deux pays à apprendre, avec une compétence parfaite, la langue du pays voisin.
6. Organisation de rencontres et de concours sportifs et de scoutisme entre les jeunes des deux pays.
7. Assurer la connaissance et la coopération entre les étudiants des écoles secondaires et supérieures des deux pays, par l'organisation de voyages et de réunions scientifiques et de scoutisme.
8. Echange de professeurs pour les cours de turc et d'arabe à enseigner dans les écoles de commerce.
9. Echange de professeurs entre les diverses branches d'enseignement dans les universités et les écoles supérieures.
10. Organisation de semaines culturelles par les universités et les écoles supérieures des deux pays, dans les grands centres de la Turquie et de l'Irak, pour assurer la coopération et la connaissance entre les membres de l'enseignement supérieur des deux pays.
11. Faculté de profiter réciproquement de l'enseignement des écoles, des instituts et des cours destinés à former les instituteurs pour l'enseignement professionnel.
12. Faculté de profiter réciproquement, de façon provisoire ou continue, des écoles et instituts techniques et professionnels de tous degrés, des universités et des écoles supérieures, ainsi que des moyens et possibilités de travail, de recherches et d'études que ces institutions possèdent.
13. Création d'un "Institut de la Langue et de la Littérature turques" à Bagdad, à l'instar des "Instituts de la Langue et de la Littérature arabes" qui existent déjà au sein des Universités d'Ankara et d'Istanbul.
14. Etude en commun des possibilités d'unifier et de rapprocher, dans la mesure du possible, l'organisation et les programmes des écoles dans les deux pays.
15. Envoi réciproque de spécialistes et de professeurs pour faire des études sur la vie scientifique et sur les questions d'enseignement dans les deux pays.
16. Application réciproque de tarifs réduits, sur les moyens de transport appartenant à l'Etat, pour les groupes de professeurs, spécialistes, artistes et étudiants se rendant d'un pays à l'autre, pour participer aux rencontres culturelles, artistiques, sportives et de scoutisme ou pour faire un voyage de vacances ou d'étude; assurer leur hébergement gratuit dans les établissements d'Etat.

17. Introduction d'heures turque ou irakienne dans les programmes des radiodiffusions des deux pays pour faire des diffusions permettant d'assurer une meilleure connaissance mutuelle entre les deux parties, publication, pour les mêmes fins, de renseignements utiles sur les deux pays, par les journaux, revues, cinémas et autres moyens analogues.

18. Organisation réciproque de tournées de troupes officielles ou privées d'artistes (musiciens, comédiens, peintres).

19. Organisation, réciproque ou en commun, d'expositions artistiques, culturelles et techniques.

20. Echange de toutes sortes de publications culturelles, scientifiques et sportives, des catalogues de bibliothèques et des bibliographies entre les institutions intéressées des deux pays.

21. Echange entre les organismes d'Etat intéressés des publications de toutes sortes concernant le développement des efforts gouvernementaux déployés dans les deux pays et leurs législations.

22. Utilisation réciproque des spécialistes en ce qui concerne les musées, les bibliothèques et les archives des deux pays.

23. Echange des objets anciens et de musée, dont les deux pays possèdent des pièces en surplus.

24. Informer les spécialistes intéressés du pays voisin des travaux de recherches et de fouilles archéologiques, de la réparation ou de la restauration des monuments historiques; ou les inviter à prendre part à ces travaux, assurant ainsi la coopération mutuelle soit dans l'exécution des travaux, soit dans l'appréciation des résultats obtenus.

25. Autorisation réciproque de photocopier les manuscrits conservés dans les bibliothèques, leur transmission provisoire, échange des exemplaires en surplus.

26. Utilisation réciproque des matériaux de toutes sortes des archives d'Etat (y compris les archives des tribunaux "Cheri" et du Cadastre), pour les études d'histoire.

27. Organisation de réunions scientifiques pour assurer l'étude, en commun et avec une même compréhension, de la culture islamique et des autres aspects communs de l'histoire des deux pays. Faire des publications mixtes en assurant la coopération intellectuelle entre les savants des deux pays.

28. Invitation de représentants du pays voisin à prendre part aux cérémonies et démonstrations nationales organisées à diverses occasions et aux congrès scientifiques et pédagogiques.

ARTICLE 4.

En vue de mettre en exécution les dispositions du présent Protocole, une "Commission pour la Coopération turco-irakienne en matière d'Education" sera instituée sous la présidence des Ministres de l'Education Nationale des deux pays. Cette commission sera composée de six membres, dont trois turcs et trois irakiens. Un des membres turcs et un des membres irakiens rempliront les fonctions de secrétaire général de la commission et, pendant les périodes où celle-ci ne sera pas réunie, ils la représenteront auprès de leurs Gouvernements respectifs.

L'un des trois membres nationaux sera désigné par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de son pays. Les deux autres membres nationaux, ainsi que celui qui aura la qualité de secrétaire général, seront désignés par le Ministre de l'Education Nationale de leur pays. Les Ministres des Affaires Etrangères des deux pays se feront connaître, par la voie diplomatique, les noms et qualités des membres choisis pour la commission.

ARTICLE 5.

La Commission pour la Coopération turco-irakienne en matière d'Education se réunira, une fois par an, en Turquie ou en Irak, à tour de rôle et sous la présidence du Ministre de l'Education Nationale du pays où la réunion a lieu. A la demande de l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes, qui fera savoir, au préalable, l'objet de la réunion, et avec l'accord des deux parties, en ce qui concerne le lieu et la date, la commission pourra tenir des sessions extraordinaires.

Les procès-verbaux et les résolutions prises dans chaque session seront consignés dans un rapport, dont les copies seront communiquées aux chefs de Gouvernement des deux pays, au Ministre de l'Education Nationale du pays voisin et au Secrétaire Général de l'Organisation d'Education, d'Enseignement et de Culture des Nations Unies.

ARTICLE 6.

Le présent Protocole pourra être dénoncé, à tous temps, par l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes, avec un préavis de six mois.

HASAN SAKA.

NOURY SAID.

FERIDUN CEMAL ERKIN.

A. HAFIDH.

Protocole Annexe No. 4: Communications postale, télégraphique et téléphonique.

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à appliquer réciproquement leurs tarifs postaux internes en vigueur, aux lettres expédiées de Turquie en Irak ou d'Irak en Turquie.

ARTICLE 2.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour assurer la transmission, par la voie Alep-Nusaybin-Telkotchek, de colis postaux ainsi que de lettres et boîtes avec valeur déclarée, échangés entre leurs services respectifs.

ARTICLE 3.

Le Gouvernement de la République turque et le Gouvernement irakien s'engagent à mettre en exploitation, entre Ankara-Diyarbakir et la frontière turco-irakienne et entre Bagdad et la même frontière, une ligne construite avec les dispositifs les plus modernes, munie d'appareils courants-porteurs, télégraphiques et téléphoniques.

Jusqu'à l'achèvement et l'utilisation de la ligne ci-dessus indiquée, les Administrations turque et irakienne prendront les mesures nécessaires, en vue d'assurer un échange régulier du trafic sur la ligne actuelle entre Diyarbakir et Mossoul.

Le Gouvernement irakien s'engage à appuyer les démarches faites par l'Administration turque des P.T.T. auprès de l'Administration des téléphones en Syrie, en vue d'assurer la communication téléphonique entre la Turquie et l'Irak, à travers la Syrie.

ARTICLE 4.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à accorder, réciproquement, une réduction de 50 pour cent sur les taxes de télégrammes d'Etat et de presse.

La réduction de taxe de deux tiers, en ce qui concerne les télégrammes de presse, pourra être envisagée après la mise en service de la ligne mentionnée dans l'article 3.

ARTICLE 5.

Les modalités, ainsi que les conditions de la mise en application du présent Arrangement, seront fixées, et les mesures qui s'avéreront nécessaires en ce qui concerne le service seront prises, d'un commun accord, par les Administrations compétentes des deux Hautes Parties Contractantes.

HASAN SAKA.

NOURY SAID.

FERIDUN CEMAL ERKIN.

A. HAFIDH.

Protocole Annexe No. 5: Relatif aux Questions économiques.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes, animées du désir de créer les conditions nécessaires en vue d'assurer, à l'avenir, entre leurs deux pays une collaboration plus étroite dans le domaine de la coopération économique, sont convenues des dispositions suivantes:

Section I.—*Commission Economique Mixte.*ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Il sera constitué une Commission Economique Mixte, qui tiendra des réunions périodiques en vue de préparer, pour être soumis à l'examen et à l'approbation des deux Gouvernements, des projets où seront étudiés en commun les modalités d'application ainsi que les modifications et perfectionnements à apporter aux dispositions des Sections Nos. I, II, III, IV et V faisant l'objet du présent Protocole, ainsi qu'à celles des Protocoles annexes No. 1 et No. 4.

ARTICLE 2.

Cette commission sera composée des comités suivants:

1. Comité des Affaires commerciales, douanières et financières.
2. Comité du Tourisme.
3. Comité des Communications et Ports.
4. Comité pour la Régularisation des eaux du Tigre et de l'Euphrate.

ARTICLE 3.

La date et le lieu de la réunion de cette commission ou de l'un quelconque de ses comités seront fixés entre les deux Gouvernements à la demande de l'une des deux parties contractantes faite par voie diplomatique.

Section II.—*Clause douanière.*

Chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engage à faire bénéficier les marchandises d'origine et de provenance de l'autre partie de la suppression de droits douaniers ou d'une large réduction. Cette réduction sera calculée sur le tarif douanier le plus bas actuellement appliqué ou qui sera appliqué à l'avenir aux pays qui ne font pas partie des pays détachés de l'Empire Ottoman en vertu du Traité de Lausanne.

Au cas où l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes accorderait à l'un des pays détachés de l'Empire Ottoman une réduction plus avantageuse que celle qui est envisagée plus haut, cette réduction sera automatiquement applicable en faveur de l'autre partie.

Section III.—*Relations bancaires et financières.*

Les Gouvernements turc et irakien faciliteront, dans le cadre des dispositions générales en vigueur dans chacun des deux pays, le rapprochement entre les institutions bancaires et commerciales turques et irakiennes ainsi que la formation et l'établissement sur leurs territoires respectifs d'institutions bancaires et commerciales à capitaux mixtes turcs et irakiens.

Section IV.—*Tourisme.*

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes, en vue d'assurer le développement du tourisme dans leurs pays respectifs, se déclarent d'accord sur les points suivants:

1. Organiser une propagande commune visant le développement du mouvement touristique entre les deux pays et avec les pays étrangers.
2. Echanger les règlements douaniers en vigueur dans les deux pays, afin de simplifier le contrôle des visiteurs et les formalités douanières se rapportant aux effets personnels et touristiques et de préparer un projet d'unification à cet effet.
3. Exempter des droits de douane les objets de propagande, expédiés des deux côtés à destination des Touring et Automobile Clubs, des Consuls et des Bureaux de Tourisme à instituer.
4. Faire bénéficier les porteurs de cartes touristiques des deux pays des facilités de voyage et des réductions dans les tarifs de transport en commun.
5. Reconnaître aux voyages effectués entre la Turquie et l'Irak et vice versa, le caractère interne du point de vue de paiement des frais relatifs aux moyens de transport et accorder des facilités réciproques de transfert pour les frais de séjour.
6. Renforcer le contrôle sur les prix d'hôtels, de pensions et de restaurants.
7. Créer des bureaux communs de propagande dans les pays étrangers et des bureaux particuliers dans leurs pays respectifs, pour la distribution des objets de propagande, pour la vente de billets de voyage sur les moyens de transport

existant sur leurs propres territoires et enfin pour l'organisation de voyages pour les touristes et pour les étudiants, soit entre les deux pays, soit entre ceux-ci et les pays étrangers.

8. Inviter les autorités compétentes de chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes à accorder réciproquement des facilités et à prêter leur aide aux nationaux de l'autre, lors de la sortie, de l'entrée et du séjour de ceux-ci sur le territoire de l'autre partie. Assurer également à ces nationaux, sous réserve des lois en vigueur, la liberté de circulation sur leurs territoires respectifs.

9. Entreprendre les démarches nécessaires en vue d'assurer l'adhésion de leurs pays aux Conventions internationales de tourisme, cette adhésion étant de nature à contribuer à la réalisation du développement du tourisme, visé par les dispositions ci-haut énumérées.

Section V.—Facilités portuaires.

Les signataires du présent Protocole s'engagent, dans le délai le plus court, à procéder aux études soit en ce qui concerne les facilités qu'ils s'accorderont réciproquement dans les ports de Basra et d'Iskenderun en matière de chargement et de déchargement, d'entreposage, de transit et de création de zones franches, soit en ce qui concerne toutes autres facilités similaires, et à signer, après avoir achevé aussi vite que possible les études en question, un Protocole complétant le présent Protocole et contenant les dispositions relatives aux facilités prémentionnées.

HASAN SAKA.

FERIDUN CEMAL ERKIN.

NOURY SAID.

A. HAFIDH.

Protocole Annexe No. 6: Relatif à la Frontière.

Titre I.

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes, se référant au paragraphe (e) de l'article 6 de l'Accord signé en date de ce jour, relatif aux perfectionnements à apporter au régime frontalier pour en renforcer la sécurité, conviennent d'assurer, dans les conditions fixées par le présent Protocole, l'exécution de leurs engagements réciproques ainsi que le règlement de tout incident ou constatation qui viendrait à se produire dans une zone de 75 kilom. de chaque côté de la frontière entre les deux pays et qui serait de nature à troubler l'harmonie des relations frontalières.

Titre II.—Des Autorités frontalières.

ARTICLE 2.

A cet effet, les Hautes Parties Contractantes conviennent de charger, sous leur responsabilité, des obligations définies au Titre I:—

Du côté de la République Turque:

au premier degré: les Kaimakams ou autres fonctionnaires chargés par les autorités du deuxième degré;

au deuxième degré: les Valis ou leurs intérimaires;

Du côté de l'Irak:

au premier degré: les fonctionnaires nommés par le Gouvernement;

au deuxième degré: les Mutasarrifs ou les fonctionnaires nommés par le Gouvernement.

En dehors de la communication par la voie diplomatique, prévue à l'article 10, chacune des autorités frontalières informera directement, dans les moindres délais, les autorités frontalières correspondantes de l'affectation au poste frontalier d'un nouveau titulaire ou de la désignation d'un intérimaire.

ARTICLE 3.

En vue d'assurer le règlement des incidents ou contestations dont elles ont à connaître dans les conditions fixées par le présent Protocole, les autorités

mentionnées à l'article 2 se réuniront alternativement en territoire turc et en territoire irakien:

(a) Au premier degré: dans la première semaine de chaque trois mois.

Chacune d'elles aura le droit de se faire assister d'un officier appartenant à une des formations chargées de la sécurité dans le secteur frontalier, avec voix consultative, et d'un secrétaire-interprète.

A l'initiative de l'une d'elles, les autorités du premier degré pourront aussi tenir des réunions extraordinaires.

Avant toute réunion et dans un délai qui ne pourra être inférieur à 48 heures, les autorités frontalières devront, par écrit, indiquer le jour, l'heure et le lieu de la réunion projetée ainsi que l'ordre du jour de la réunion.

S'il est nécessaire, les autorités frontalières pourront entendre, en réunion du premier degré, les plaignants, victimes, témoins, ainsi que les experts appelés par les parties en cause.

(b) Au deuxième degré: deux fois par an.

Les autorités frontalières du deuxième degré pourront se faire assister, avec voix consultative, d'un nombre égal d'officiers ou agents des services publics, ainsi que du personnel de secrétariat et d'interprétariat qui leur sera nécessaire.

Quinze jours au moins avant la réunion projetée, elles se mettront d'accord sur le jour, l'heure et le lieu de la réunion et se communiqueront les noms et les qualités de leurs assistants, ainsi que l'ordre du jour de la réunion.

Les autorités frontalières dresseront en quatre exemplaires originaux, deux en langue turque et deux en langue arabe, un procès-verbal de chacune de leurs réunions.

ARTICLE 4.

Les autorités frontalières du premier degré peuvent décider, d'un commun accord, de procéder sur les lieux aux constatations nécessaires.

L'enquête sur les lieux se limitera à une zone de 3 kilom. de part et d'autre de la frontière.

Pour les besoins de l'enquête, les autorités frontalières pourront se faire accompagner des plaignants, des victimes, des témoins ainsi que des experts appelés par les parties en cause.

Les résultats de l'enquête seront consignés dans un procès-verbal établi en deux exemplaires en langue turque et arabe.

En cas d'empêchement, l'autorité frontalière pourra être représentée à ces réunions sur le terrain par un officier ou fonctionnaire dont les noms et qualités auront été préalablement communiqués à l'autorité correspondante.

ARTICLE 5.

Tout incident ou contestation de frontière sera examiné et réglé en premier lieu par les autorités respectives du premier degré de chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes.

Les questions sur lesquelles les autorités ne seraient pas arrivées à s'entendre, seront soumises à l'examen et au règlement des autorités respectives du deuxième degré.

ARTICLE 6.

En vue de coordonner l'action des autorités désignées à l'article 3, les Hautes Parties Contractantes constitueront une Commission permanente de la frontière turco-irakienne, composée d'un nombre égal de représentants de chacune des deux parties.

Cet organisme se réunira au moins une fois par an, et plus souvent si les circonstances l'exigent, alternativement en Turquie et en Irak.

L'invitation sera faite par l'autorité supérieure du pays sur le territoire duquel doit avoir lieu la prochaine réunion.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes fixeront par la voie diplomatique le lieu et date de la réunion; elles se communiqueront, par la même voie et au moins un mois avant la date fixée pour la réunion, les noms et qualités de leurs délégués, ainsi que les questions qu'elles entendent mettre à l'ordre du jour de la session.

La première réunion de la Commission permanente de la frontière turco-irakienne aura lieu en territoire irakien au plus tard six mois après la mise en vigueur du présent Protocole.

La Commission permanente devra s'efforcer de régler à l'amiable les questions de frontière sur lesquelles l'entente n'aura pu se faire entre autorités frontalières du premier ou du deuxième degré. Elle soumettra également à l'approbation de

chacun des Gouvernements représentés les mesures qu'elle jugera utile de prendre en vue d'assurer, dans les meilleures conditions, l'ordre et la sécurité sur la frontière.

ARTICLE 7.

Les autorités frontalières du premier ou du deuxième degré, ainsi que le personnel chargé de les assister et de les accompagner, auront, après s'être fait reconnaître, à la frontière, libre accès du territoire voisin pour se rendre au lieu de la réunion décidée.

Les fonctionnaires participant à ces réunions du premier ou du deuxième degré auront le droit de s'y rendre et d'y prendre part en uniforme et en armes.

ARTICLE 8.

Chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes apportera l'assistance nécessaire au personnel en mission sur son territoire à l'occasion de l'exécution des dispositions du présent Protocole, notamment en ce qui concerne son transport, son logement, ainsi que les moyens de liaison avec les autorités du pays dont il représente les intérêts.

Les fonctionnaires en mission pourront faire passer, sans être obligé de payer une taxe quelconque, leurs moyens de transport ainsi que les vivres qu'ils prendront avec eux et bénéficieront, sur le territoire de l'Etat voisin, d'immunités personnelles.

ARTICLE 9.

Les plaignants, victimes, témoins ainsi que les experts désignés par les parties en cause devront, pour avoir accès en territoire voisin en vue d'être entendus au cours d'une réunion frontalière, être munis d'un laissez-passer individuel délivré par l'autorité frontalière qui les a convoqués et visé par l'autorité correspondante.

Le titulaire d'un laissez-passer ne bénéficie d'aucun privilège ou immunité; toutefois, il pourra transporter avec lui, pour ses besoins personnels et en franchise de droits de douane ou autres taxes, des vivres et des articles de tabac pour un poids total ne pouvant excéder cinq kilogrammes.

ARTICLE 10.

Dans un délai de deux mois à compter de la date de l'entrée en vigueur du présent Protocole, les Hautes Parties Contractantes se communiqueront par la voie diplomatique les noms et qualités des autorités frontalières, l'indication du lieu de leur résidence habituelle, de leur secteur d'activité, le nom des localités où doivent se tenir les réunions frontalières, la liste des postes frontalières, en mentionnant spécialement celles où auront lieu la livraison des personnes, la restitution des biens, l'échange des correspondances entre autorités de frontière et la rencontre des courriers.

A titre de confirmation de la communication prévue par l'article 2 *in fine*, avis sera donné par la voie diplomatique et dans un délai de deux mois de tout changement de titulaire d'un poste frontalier.

Titre III.—De l'Ordre public et de la Sécurité dans la Zone frontière.

ARTICLE 11.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent réciproquement à prévenir par des mesures appropriées laissées au choix de chacune d'elles, en ce qui concerne son propre territoire, l'utilisation, à titre isolé ou collectif, de la zone frontière pour des actes dirigés contre la sécurité ou l'intégrité territoriale de l'autre partie.

ARTICLE 12.

Lorsqu'elles apprendront que les préparatifs sont faits par un ou plusieurs individus dans le but de perpétrer dans la zone frontière des actes dirigés contre le régime ou la sécurité de l'autre partie, les autorités frontalières compétentes s'en aviseront immédiatement et se communiqueront tous renseignements qu'elles pourront recueillir à ce sujet.

Elles s'avertiront réciproquement de tous actes de banditisme de quelque nature qu'ils soient, commis sur leur propre territoire, dont les auteurs pourraient chercher refuge dans le pays voisin.

Les autorités de l'un et de l'autre pays prendront toutes les mesures utiles tant pour prévenir ces actes que pour empêcher leurs auteurs de franchir la frontière; à cet effet, les dispositions à prendre pourront, s'il est nécessaire, être arrêtées d'un commun accord, en réunion frontalière.

ARTICLE 13.

Au cas où une des deux parties déciderait d'entreprendre de sa zone frontière des opérations de sécurité, elle pourra, si elle l'estime nécessaire, en aviser, par l'intermédiaire des autorités frontalières, l'autre partie, qui prendra toutes les mesures qu'elle jugera utiles au succès de ces opérations.

Les dispositions ainsi arrêtées seront consignées au procès-verbal de la réunion frontalière qui sera tenue à cet effet.

ARTICLE 14.

Dans le dessein de protéger d'une manière permanente la frontière contre les entreprises d'individus armés, agissant isolément, ou en groupes, les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à prendre toutes mesures utiles en vue d'interdire l'accès de la frontière à tout individu porteur d'armes ou de munitions de guerre, y compris les pistolets et revolvers de toute nature.

Toutes mesures ou actes législatifs pris à cet effet seront signifiés à l'autre partie.

ARTICLE 15.

Afin d'éviter toute méprise, les Hautes Parties Contractantes conviennent que les exercices de tir auxquels se livrent les formations militaires ne pourront avoir lieu, dans une zone de 5 kilom. de part et d'autre de la frontière, que sur les champs de tir aménagés à cet effet et sous le commandement d'un officier.

ARTICLE 16.

Les auteurs de tous délits et de tous actes de banditisme commis dans la zone frontière ainsi que les auteurs de tous délits et de tous actes de banditisme commis hors cette zone et réfugiés dans ladite zone seront immédiatement arrêtés par les autorités respectives, qui prendront toutes mesures en vue de la réparation des dommages.

Si les coupables sont ressortissants de l'Etat où le crime a été commis, ils seront remis sans autre formalité à la demande écrite des autorités du premier degré de cet Etat; cette demande devra être conforme au modèle constituant l'Annexe No. 1 au présent Protocole; dans l'attente de la demande de livraison, le coupable sera placé sous surveillance; cette surveillance ne pourra excéder trois mois.

Si les coupables sont ressortissants de l'Etat sur le territoire duquel ils se sont réfugiés, ils y seront poursuivis conformément aux lois de ce pays; dans cette éventualité, les autorités de l'Etat sur le territoire duquel le délit a été commis devront fournir, par la voie frontalière, tous éléments d'appréciation capables de faciliter l'action de la justice.

Dans les deux cas, les autorités frontalières se tiendront informées du résultat de ces poursuites.

Toute acquisition de nationalité, de quelque manière que ce soit, si elle est postérieure à la perpétration de l'infraction pour laquelle un individu est réclamé, ne sera pas opposable à la demande de livraison suivant la procédure définie ci-dessus.

ARTICLE 17.

A l'exception des papiers et documents dont la livraison serait jugée, par les autorités du deuxième degré, nuisible ou de nature à porter atteinte à la sécurité du pays, tous les effets personnels, les armes, les marchandises et le bétail trouvés, lors de son arrestation, en possession d'un coupable livré suivant la procédure frontalière, seront remis aux autorités frontalières voisines, au moment de la livraison.

Toute livraison effectuée dans ces conditions est faite contre récépissé délivré par l'agent qualifié à cet effet.

ARTICLE 18.

Toute saisie d'armes ou de munitions effectuée dans la zone frontière sera signalée par écrit à l'autorité frontalière voisine du premier degré lorsque le délinquant est un ressortissant de l'autre Etat ou est habituellement résident sur le territoire de cet Etat.

ARTICLE 19.

Les auteurs d'actes de banditisme et les contrebandiers seront, en tout état de cause, éloignés de la zone frontière où ils ne seront plus autorisés à séjourner.

Des mesures efficaces seront prises, en vue de mettre hors d'état de nuire les habitants de la zone frontière dont la conduite ou l'activité ferait l'objet des plaintes ou requêtes continuelles des autorités frontalières, ainsi que les personnes connues comme récidivistes dans des délits commis contre la sûreté de l'autre partie ou comme provocateurs ou animateurs de ces délits.

ARTICLE 20.

Toute personne qui franchira la frontière sans y être autorisée par un titre en règle, sera mise en état d'arrestation poursuivie devant la justice, si elle a contrevenu à la loi locale et, à l'expiration de la peine à laquelle elle aura pu être condamnée, remise contre récépissé aux autorités frontalières de son pays d'origine ou aux agents de la frontière qualifiés à cet effet.

Les personnes qui auraient pénétré dans la zone frontière par erreur ou se seraient égarées, seront rendues aux autorités frontalières sans aucune formalité.

ARTICLE 21.

Les individus, isolés ou groupés, en provenance du territoire voisin, qui pénétreront en zone frontière de l'une ou de l'autre partie en manifestant le désir de s'y réfugier, seront immédiatement appréhendés par les autorités frontalières du lieu de refuge, désarmés et, s'ils ne sont pas refoulés sur leur territoire d'origine dans les conditions fixées à l'article 20, transportés hors de la zone frontière.

L'accès de la zone frontière demeurera interdit à ces réfugiés.

Les autorités frontalières du pays dont proviennent les réfugiés seront informées, par les soins des autorités correspondantes du pays de refuge, des mesures de désarmement et d'éloignement prises en application du présent article.

ARTICLE 22.

Chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engage à n'encourager d'aucune façon l'immigration sur son propre territoire des individus habitant le territoire de l'autre partie.

ARTICLE 23.

Les autorités des deux parties s'abstiendront de toute correspondance ou de toute relation avec les ressortissants de l'autre Etat se trouvant effectivement sur le territoire de celui-ci.

ARTICLE 24.

Si leur identification ou leur possession ne fait l'objet d'aucune contestation, les animaux ou objets dont les propriétaires, Etats ou particuliers, auraient été dépossédés illégalement seront, lorsqu'ils auront été trouvés dans la zone frontière voisine, restitués contre récépissé aux autorités correspondantes.

La procédure frontalière telle qu'elle est définie par le présent article est applicable à la restitution des animaux égarés ou conduits par erreur au delà de la frontière et trouvés dans la zone frontière voisine; dans ce dernier cas, le pouvoir d'appréciation de l'administration des douanes reste entier.

Aucune taxe ou indemnité ne sera perçue à l'occasion de la restitution des animaux ou objets suivant la procédure définie ci-dessus; toutefois, les frais d'entretien seront à la charge du propriétaire.

ARTICLE 25.

Le présent Protocole remplace le Chapitre II de l'Accord du 5 juin 1926 relatif aux rapports de bon voisinage entre les deux pays.

ARTICLE PROVISOIRE.

Les incidents et contestations frontaliers, survenus avant l'entrée en vigueur du présent Protocole et dont l'examen ou le règlement ne serait pas encore achevé

par les autorités et organismes frontaliers fonctionnant conformément à l'Accord du 5 juin 1926, seront examinés et réglés dans le cadre des dispositions contenues dans ce Protocole; les questions sur lesquelles l'entente n'aura pu se faire par cette voie, seront soumises à la décision définitive de la Commission permanente turco-irakienne de la Frontière, lors de sa première session.

HASAN SAKA.

FERIDUN CEMAL ERKIN.

NOURY SAID.

A. HAFIDH.

ANNEXE No. 1.

Demande d'Arrestation et de Livraison.

Yakalama ve teslim talebi.

No.....

Nom de l'inculpé :

Sanigin adi ve soyour :

Nom du père ou de la mère de l'inculpé :

Sanigin baba veya anasinin adi :

Lieu de naissance :

Dogdugu yer :

Date de naissance :

Dogdugu tarih :

Nationalité de l'inculpé :

Sanigin uyrukluğu :

Date de l'incident :

Olayin tarihi :

Lieu de l'incident :

Olayin yeri :

Nature de l'incident :

Olayin nevi :

Résumé de l'incident :

Olayin özeti :

Direction prise par l'inculpé :

Sanigin kaçış istikameti :

Lieu de refuge probable de l'inculpé :

Sanigin iltica etmesi umulan yer :

Nous demandons l'arrestation et la livraison de l'inculpé :

Sanigin yakalanmasını ve teslimini dilerim :

Signature :

Imza :

Observation :

1. Ces premiers renseignements pourront être complétés ultérieurement.
2. Les traces des inculpés dont l'identité n'a pu être établie seront prises dès réception de cette demande; le résultat des recherches sera adressé le plus tôt possible à l'autorité réclamante.
3. Si le refuge et l'identité de l'inculpé sont inconnus, une enquête sera effectuée sans retard et le résultat communiqué à l'autorité réclamante.

Ihtar :

1. Bu ilk bilgiler ek olarak da tamamlanabilir.
2. Kimliği belirtilemeyen sanıkların izleri talebin hemen yapılmasında teslim alınacaktır. Arastırma sonucu mümkün olduğu kadar çabuk bildirilecektir.
3. Sanigin kimliği ve iltica yeri belirsiz kaldığı halde, acele soruşturma yapılarak sonucu talep eden makama bildirilecektir.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3

Convention d'Extradition.

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

LES Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent, conformément aux dispositions du présent Traité, à se livrer réciproquement les individus poursuivis ou condamnés par les autorités judiciaires de l'une d'elles, et qui se trouvent sur le territoire de l'autre.

Il reste bien entendu que les nationaux des Hautes Parties Contractantes sont exceptés de l'extradition.

L'extradition n'aura lieu qu'en cas de poursuite ou de condamnation pour une infraction commise hors du territoire de l'Etat auquel l'extradition est demandée.

ARTICLE 2.

En cas de demande concernant une personne qui est l'objet de poursuites, ou contre laquelle un jugement a été prononcé, l'extradition ne sera accordée que si l'acte dont cette personne est inculpée est puni, d'après la législation des deux pays, d'une peine d'au moins un an d'emprisonnement ou d'une peine plus grave.

Lorsque l'extradition est demandée en vue de l'exécution d'un jugement devenu définitif, elle ne sera accordée que si le délinquant a été condamné définitivement à une peine supérieure à six mois d'emprisonnement, pour un fait punissable, d'après la législation des deux pays, d'une peine d'au moins un an d'emprisonnement ou d'une peine plus grave.

ARTICLE 3.

L'extradition sera accordée également en cas de tentative ou de participation, sous n'importe quelle forme, et de n'importe quelle nature, au cas où la tentative ou la participation seraient, conformément aux dispositions de l'article 2, passibles de peines dans les législations de l'Etat requérant et de l'Etat requis.

ARTICLE 4.

L'extradition ne sera pas accordée dans les cas suivants :

- (a) pour les infractions politiques et les faits connexes;
- (b) pour les infractions militaires et les faits connexes;
- (c) pour les infractions qui ne peuvent être poursuivies que sur la plainte de la personne lésée et dont la poursuite doit être arrêtée par le désistement de celle-ci;
- (d) si l'individu réclamé est poursuivi par l'Etat requérant pour une infraction prescrite ou éteinte d'après ses lois, celles de l'Etat requis ou celles de l'Etat sur le territoire duquel l'infraction a été commise;
- (e) si l'individu réclamé est poursuivi pour le même fait dans le pays requis, ainsi que s'il y a déjà été définitivement mis hors de cause, condamné, déclaré irresponsable ou acquitté également pour le même fait;
- (f) si les autorités de l'Etat requis sont, d'après les lois de celui-ci, compétentes pour juger l'infraction;
- (g) si, le fait étant commis sur le territoire d'un Etat tiers, les lois de la partie requise n'admettent pas la poursuite pour un tel fait commis à l'étranger.

Cependant, ne seront pas considérés comme une infraction politique ni comme fait connexe à une semblable infraction :

1. Tout délit commis contre la personne du chef d'Etat et contre celles des membres de sa famille;
2. L'assassinat commis sur la personne du chef de Gouvernement ou tentative d'assassinat ou complicité à ce fait;
3. Les actes de brigandage, de torture et de vol accompagné de torture, quel que soit le but pour lequel ces actes ont été commis.

ARTICLE 5.

La demande d'extradition devra toujours être faite par la voie diplomatique.

ARTICLE 6.

Dans les cas qui n'impliquent pas l'extradition du délinquant et qui sont énumérés dans l'article 4, l'appréciation de la nature des actes est, exclusivement, réservée à l'Etat auquel l'extradition est demandée.

Toutefois la demande d'extradition pour un délit politique ne pourra être rejetée que dans le cas où une décision, définissant la nature politique du délit, serait prise par le tribunal compétent de l'Etat requis.

ARTICLE 7.

La demande d'extradition pour un prévenu ou un accusé doit être accompagnée des documents suivants :

- (a) Un mandat d'arrêt ou un acte d'arrestation émanant d'une autorité judiciaire compétente.
- (b) Un acte indiquant la nature du délit et le texte de la loi applicable à l'infraction dont il s'agit.
- (c) Une déclaration ou une carte d'identité aussi détaillée que possible, indiquant l'identité et le signalement du prévenu ou de l'accusé.
- (d) Les actes de déposition, s'il y en a, certifiés conformes par le juge qui a procédé à l'enquête.

2. Si la demande d'extradition concerne une personne qui a été l'objet d'un jugement par le défaut faute de comparaître ou faute de défendre, la demande d'extradition sera accompagnée, en sus de pièces indiquées dans le paragraphe précédent, d'un résumé de jugement et du texte des articles de la loi sur lesquels ce jugement se base.

3. Si la demande d'extradition concerne une personne condamnée par jugement contradictoire, les pièces suivantes doivent être annexées à la demande :

- (a) Une expédition de jugement.
- (b) Une déclaration ou une carte d'identité indiquant d'une façon suffisamment détaillée l'identité de la personne condamnée.
- (c) Une copie du texte de la loi sur laquelle le jugement se base.
- (d) Un document émanant d'une autorité compétente et déclarant le jugement exécutoire.

4. Lorsqu'il s'agit d'infractions contre la propriété, le montant approximatif du dommage réel ou tenté sera toujours indiqué.

5. Les pièces à produire seront dressées dans la forme prescrite par les lois de l'Etat requérant et expédiées en original ou en copie certifiée conforme par le tribunal ou par toute autre autorité compétente de cet Etat; elles seront accompagnées d'une traduction dans la langue de l'Etat requis, certifiée conforme par l'agent diplomatique de l'Etat requérant ou par un traducteur assermenté de l'Etat requis.

6. Il est entendu que, tout en réservant la décision sur la demande d'extradition, les autorités compétentes de l'Etat requis préviendront, aussitôt que celui-ci aura reçu les pièces désignées ci-dessus, par l'arrestation de l'accusé ou par toute autre mesure opportune, l'éventualité d'une évasion, à moins que l'extradition ne paraisse a priori inadmissible.

7. Dans le cas où il y aurait doute sur la question de savoir si l'infraction, objet de la demande d'extradition, est comprise parmi les infractions prévues dans le présent Traité comme comportant l'extradition, des explications seront demandées au Gouvernement requérant, et l'extradition ne sera pas accordée tant que les explications fournies ne seront pas de nature à écarter ce doute. L'individu arrêté pourra être élargi, ou les mesures prises à son égard pourront être rapportées, si les explications n'ont pas été données à l'Etat requis dans le délai de trois mois à partir du jour où la demande en a été transmise au représentant diplomatique de l'Etat requérant.

ARTICLE 8.

La Haute Partie Contractante à laquelle l'extradition est demandée ordonnera l'arrestation du délinquant et fera procéder à l'examen nécessaire de l'affaire, si elle se trouve convaincue que l'infraction comporte l'extradition aux termes du présent Traité. Elle ordonnera l'extradition si, à l'issue de l'examen, elle acquiert la conviction que le dossier est complet ou suffisant, que la personne

dont l'extradition est demandée est bien celle qui a été désignée comme prévenue, accusée ou condamnée, et, en cas de condamnation, que l'infraction qui l'a motivée est de celles qui comportaient l'extradition au moment où le jugement a été rendu.

ARTICLE 9.

Dans le cas où, en attendant la présentation à la partie requise de la demande d'extradition du délinquant et des pièces mentionnées dans le présent Traité comme devant accompagner cette demande, l'évasion du délinquant apparaît comme probable, l'Etat auquel l'extradition est demandée, sans attendre l'arrivée des pièces requises, et sur avis de l'Etat requérant à adresser par voie postale ou télégraphique au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de l'Etat requis, ou sur la démarche à faire par le représentant diplomatique de l'Etat requérant, prévient l'évasion en procédant à l'arrestation provisoire du délinquant ou à l'adoption de toute autre mesure.

Toutefois, dans ce cas, avis devra être donné concernant le genre et la nature du délit, le degré de gravité de la peine, et notification devra être faite qu'un mandat d'arrêt a été lancé contre le délinquant par l'autorité compétente.

Si la demande d'extradition et les documents s'y rapportant concernant la personne ainsi arrêtée provisoirement, ou à l'endroit de laquelle toute autre mesure a été adoptée, n'ont pas été transmis à l'Etat requis dans le délai de trois mois à partir du jour de l'arrestation ou de l'adoption de toute autre mesure, la personne arrêtée sera libérée ou la mesure adoptée à son égard sera rapportée.

ARTICLE 10.

Les objets dans la possession desquels la personne réclamée est entrée par suite de l'infraction, ou ceux qui ont été saisis sur elle, les instruments ayant servi à commettre l'infraction, ainsi que toute autre pièce à conviction, seront, sous réserve des droits des tiers, et suivant l'appréciation de l'autorité compétente, remis, en même temps que la personne, même dans le cas où l'extradition déjà accordée n'a pu être effectuée par suite du décès ou de l'évasion du coupable.

Cette remise comprendra également tous les objets de même nature, cachés ou déposés par la personne réclamée dans le pays accordant l'extradition, et qui seraient découverts ultérieurement.

ARTICLE 11.

Si l'individu réclamé est poursuivi ou condamné sur le territoire de l'Etat requis pour une infraction autre que celle qui a motivé la demande d'extradition, son extradition pourra être différée jusqu'à ce que les poursuites aient pris fin ou que l'individu réclamé ait subi sa peine ou enfin qu'il en ait obtenu la remise.

De même, dans le cas de procédure en cours devant les autorités de la partie requise pour un motif autre que l'infraction aux lois pénales et entraînant la comparution forcée ou la détention de l'individu réclamé, l'extradition pourra être différée jusqu'à ce que les poursuites ou la détention aient pris fin.

Néanmoins, si, d'après les lois du pays qui demande l'extradition, cet ajournement est susceptible d'entraîner la prescription ou d'autres difficultés importantes en ce qui concerne la poursuite de l'inculpé, sa remise temporaire sera accordée, à moins de considérations spéciales qui s'y opposent, sous l'engagement de renvoyer l'extradé aussitôt que les poursuites dans le pays requérant auront pris fin.

Dans le cas où l'individu réclamé serait impuissant, par suite de l'extradition, à remplir les obligations contractées par lui envers des particuliers, son extradition aura quand même lieu, sauf à ces derniers à faire valoir leurs droits par-devant l'autorité compétente.

ARTICLE 12.

Si l'extradition est accordée, l'individu réclamé sera mis à la disposition de l'Etat requérant à la station frontière ou au port d'embarquement de l'Etat requis.

Ledit individu pourra être mis en liberté si, dans le délai d'un mois à partir de la notification de la décision d'extradition, l'Etat requérant n'en a pas pris livraison.

ARTICLE 13.

La personne livrée ne peut être jugée que pour le délit ou les délits qui ont motivé sa livraison.

L'extradé peut cependant être arrêté et jugé pour un délit autre que celui ou ceux qui ont motivé sa livraison dans le cas où le consentement de l'Etat requis y est acquis ou encore dans celui où cet individu, ayant eu la possibilité de rentrer dans le pays qui l'avait livré, n'a pas profité de cette possibilité.

L'extradition, à un Etat tiers, d'un individu livré ne pourra également avoir lieu que dans les conditions haut indiquées. Toutefois si l'individu livré consent à être jugé, le consentement de l'Etat qui l'a livré n'est plus nécessaire : il lui en est seulement donné avis.

Les dispositions du présent article ne s'appliquent pas aux infractions commises, après la livraison, sur le territoire de l'Etat qui a demandé l'extradition.

ARTICLE 14.

Si l'individu dont l'extradition est demandée par une des Parties Contractantes est réclamé également par un ou plusieurs autres Etats, en raison d'autres infractions, il sera livré à l'Etat sur le territoire duquel a été commise l'infraction la plus grave et, dans le cas où les infractions seraient de gravité égale, à l'Etat dont il est ressortissant.

Lorsque l'individu réclamé ne ressortit à aucun des Etats requérants, et que les infractions sont de gravité égale, il sera livré à l'Etat dont la demande est arrivée la première. La gravité de l'infraction sera déterminée d'après les lois de l'Etat requis.

ARTICLE 15.

Si l'extradition d'un délinquant a lieu entre l'une des Parties Contractantes et une tierce Puissance et à condition que l'infraction motivant l'extradition ne soit pas comprise parmi les faits prévus dans l'article 4, l'autre partie autorisera le passage en transit à travers son territoire de cet individu et des objets prévus à l'article 10, à moins que l'individu dont il s'agit ne soit un de ses nationaux.

La demande de transit devra être faite par voie diplomatique, avec production en original ou en copie dûment certifiée conforme des actes mentionnés dans l'article 7.

ARTICLE 16.

Les Parties Contractantes renoncent réciproquement à toute réclamation ayant pour objet le remboursement des frais occasionnés sur leur territoire respectif, par l'arrestation, l'entretien et le transport du délinquant, et par la remise temporaire mentionnée à l'article 11.

Les frais de transit sur le territoire de l'une des Parties Contractantes d'un individu extradé ou remis temporairement à l'autre partie par une tierce Puissance, seront à la charge de l'Etat requérant.

ARTICLE 17.

La présente Convention, qui entrera en vigueur quinze jours après l'échange des instruments de ratification, aura une durée d'un an. Si l'une des parties ne notifie pas à l'autre son désir de dénoncer la Convention six mois avant l'expiration de ce délai, elle sera considérée comme étant prolongée par voie de tacite reconduction pour une durée indéterminée et ne cessera d'être en vigueur que six mois après la notification ci-haut prévue.

Cette Convention sera ratifiée et les instruments de ratification seront échangés à Bagdad aussitôt que possible.

Fait à Ankara, le vingt-neuf mars mil neuf cent quarante-six, en triple exemplaire, en langues turque, arabe et française : cette dernière faisant foi en cas de contestation.

HASAN SAKA.
FERIDUN CEMAL ERKIN.

NOURY SAID.
A. HAFIDH.

M. Feridun C. Erkin à M. Al Farik Noury Essaid.

Excellence,

Ankara, le 29 mars 1946.

ME référant à l'alinéa y relatif de l'article 4 de la Convention d'Extradition, signée en date d'aujourd'hui, aux termes duquel tout délit commis contre la personne du chef d'Etat et contre celles des membres de sa famille n'est pas considéré comme une infraction politique ni comme acte connexe à une semblable infraction, j'ai l'honneur de vous confirmer que les délits commis contre les personnes effectivement investies des fonctions de chef d'Etat, ainsi que leurs successeurs, héritiers ou désignés, ne seront pas non plus considérés comme une infraction politique ni comme acte connexe à une semblable infraction.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

FERIDUN CEMAL ERKIN.

M. Noury Essaid à M. Cemal Erkin.

Excellence,

Ankara, le 29 mars 1946.

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception de la lettre de votre Excellence au sujet de l'alinéa y relatif de l'article 4 de la Convention d'Extradition, signée en date d'aujourd'hui, aux termes duquel tout délit commis contre la personne du chef d'Etat et contre celles des membres de sa famille n'est pas considéré comme une infraction politique ni comme acte connexe à une semblable infraction, et de vous faire savoir, en réponse, que les délits commis contre les personnes effectivement investies des fonctions de chef d'Etat, ainsi que leurs successeurs, héritiers ou désignés, ne seront pas non plus considérés comme une infraction politique ni comme acte connexe à une semblable infraction.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

NOURY SAID.

Enclosure 3 in No. 3

Convention entre la République Turque et le Royaume de l'Irak en matière d'Assistance judiciaire, civile, pénale et commerciale.

SE référant au paragraphe (f) de l'article 6 de l'Accord signé en date de ce jour, relatif à la conclusion d'une Convention d'Assistance judiciaire en matière civile, pénale et commerciale, les Hautes Parties Contractantes sont convenues des dispositions suivantes :

Assistance judiciaire.

Chapitre I^{er}.—Protection légale en matière civile et commerciale.

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

1. Les ressortissants de chacune des Parties Contractantes jouiront, sur le territoire de l'autre, du même traitement que les nationaux, en ce qui concerne la protection légale et judiciaire de leurs personnes et de leurs biens.

2. Ils auront libre accès aux tribunaux et pourront intenter des procès aux mêmes conditions et avec les mêmes formalités que les nationaux.

ARTICLE 2.

1. Aucune caution ni dépôt, sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, ne pourra être imposé, à raison soit de leur qualité d'étranger, soit du défaut de domicile ou résidence dans le pays, aux nationaux de l'autre partie ayant leur domicile dans le territoire de l'une des parties qui seront demandeurs ou intervenants devant les tribunaux de l'un des Etats contractants.

2. La même règle s'applique aux paiements qui pourront être exigés des demandeurs ou des intervenants, en vue de garantir les frais judiciaires.

ARTICLE 3.

1. Les condamnations aux frais judiciaires prononcées dans le territoire de l'un des Etats contractants contre le demandeur ou l'intervenant dispensé de la caution, du dépôt ou de tous autres versements, seront rendues gratuitement exécutoires par l'autorité compétente de l'autre partie.

2. La demande y relative sera faite par voie diplomatique ou bien adressée directement, par l'intéressé, à l'autorité compétente.

ARTICLE 4.

Les décisions relatives aux frais du procès prévus dans l'article 3 seront, sauf recours ultérieur de la partie condamnée, déclarées exécutoires sans que les deux parties soient entendues conformément à la législation du pays où l'exécution est poursuivie.

Pour statuer sur la demande d'exécution, l'autorité judiciaire compétente se bornera à examiner si, d'après la législation du pays où la condamnation a été prononcée, la décision est passée en force de chose jugée. A la demande précitée doivent être annexés les documents suivants :

(a) L'acte de condamnation et une traduction de celui-ci dans la langue de l'Etat requis ou en français, certifiée conforme par l'agent diplomatique ou consulaire de l'Etat requérant ou bien par un traducteur assermenté de l'un des deux Etats.

(b) Une déclaration de l'autorité compétente de l'Etat requérant certifiant que la décision est passée en force de chose jugée. La compétence de ladite autorité sera certifiée par le Ministère de la Justice de l'Etat précité et le certificat et la déclaration en question seront traduits conformément aux dispositions ci-haut mentionnées.

L'autorité compétente, pour statuer sur la demande d'exequatur, évaluera également, pourvu que la partie le demande en même temps, les frais de traduction et de légalisation prévus dans cet article. Ces frais seront considérés comme frais du procès.

ARTICLE 5.

Les ressortissants de l'un des Etats contractants seront admis sur le territoire de l'autre Etat au bénéfice de l'assistance judiciaire gratuite, dans les mêmes conditions que les nationaux.

ARTICLE 6.

Si le requérant n'est pas résident du pays dans lequel la demande d'assistance judiciaire gratuite est faite, il pourra obtenir un certificat concernant ses revenus.

Ce certificat sera délivré au requérant par l'autorité compétente du pays, et, au cas où le requérant résiderait dans son propre pays, le certificat sera légalisé gratuitement par l'agent diplomatique ou consulaire du pays où il doit être produit.

Si le requérant réside sur le territoire d'un tiers Etat, il suffira d'un certificat délivré par l'agent diplomatique ou consulaire compétent de l'Etat dont il relève.

ARTICLE 7.

L'autorité chargée de statuer sur la demande d'assistance judiciaire conserve, dans les limites de ses attributions, le droit de vérifier le certificat et les renseignements qui lui sont fournis et d'obtenir, en vue de s'éclairer suffisamment, des informations complémentaires.

ARTICLE 8.

La partie admise au bénéfice de l'assistance judiciaire par l'autorité compétente de l'un des Etats contractants jouira également, auprès des autorités judiciaires de l'autre Etat contractant et conformément aux dispositions de cette Convention, de ce bénéfice pour tous les actes de procédure afférents à la même cause.

ARTICLE 9.

En matière civile ou commerciale, la signification d'actes émanant des autorités de l'un des Etats contractants et destinés à des personnes résidant sur le territoire de l'autre, se fera, sur une demande, par voie diplomatique.

La demande devra contenir l'indication de l'autorité dont émane l'acte transmis, le nom et le nom de famille des deux parties, ainsi que leur profession et qualité, l'adresse du destinataire, la nature de l'acte dont il s'agit, et devra être rédigée dans la langue de l'Etat requis ou en français. Une traduction certifiée conforme de l'acte à signifier sera annexée à la demande.

2. L'autorité à laquelle la demande est adressée enverra à l'agent diplomatique l'acte constatant la signification ou indiquant le fait qui l'a empêchée.

ARTICLE 10.

1. La signification se fera par les soins de l'autorité compétente de l'Etat requis, dans les formes prescrites par la législation de cet Etat.

2. La preuve de la signification se fera, soit par un récépissé daté et signé par le destinataire, soit par une attestation des autorités de l'Etat requis, constatant le fait, la date et la forme de la signification.

ARTICLE 11.

1. En matière civile ou commerciale, les autorités judiciaires de l'un des Etats contractants pourront, conformément à sa législation, s'adresser, par commission rogatoire, à l'autorité compétente de l'autre Etat, pour lui demander de procéder, dans son ressort judiciaire, soit à un acte d'instruction, soit à d'autres actes judiciaires.

2. La commission rogatoire sera transmise par voie diplomatique. Elle devra être accompagnée d'une traduction faite dans la langue de l'Etat requis ou en français.

Cette traduction sera certifiée conforme par un agent diplomatique ou consulaire de l'Etat requérant ou par un traducteur assermenté de l'un des deux Etats contractants.

3. L'autorité à laquelle la commission rogatoire est adressée enverra à l'agent diplomatique l'acte constatant l'exécution de la commission rogatoire ou indiquant le fait qui l'a empêchée. En cas d'incompétence *ratione loci*, l'autorité en question transmettra d'office la commission rogatoire à l'autorité compétente et en informera l'agent diplomatique.

ARTICLE 12.

1. L'autorité judiciaire à laquelle la commission rogatoire est adressée sera tenue d'y satisfaire, en usant des mêmes procédés de sanctions que pour l'exécution d'une commission rogatoire émanant des autorités de son pays. Dans le cas où il s'agira de la comparution personnelle des parties en litige, l'usage de ces procédés de sanctions ne sera pas obligatoire.

2. En ce qui concerne le procédé à suivre lors de l'exécution de la commission rogatoire, l'autorité requise appliquera les lois de son pays.

3. L'autorité requérante sera informée, si elle le demande, de la date et du lieu d'exécution de la commission rogatoire afin que la partie intéressée soit à même d'y assister.

ARTICLE 13.

Toutes les difficultés qui pourraient résulter d'une signification demandée par un agent diplomatique ou d'une commission rogatoire transmise par celui-ci, seront réglées par voie diplomatique.

ARTICLE 14.

L'exécution d'une signification ou d'une commission rogatoire pourra être refusée, si l'Etat sur le territoire duquel elle aurait dû avoir lieu la juge de nature à porter atteinte à sa souveraineté, à sa sécurité ou à l'ordre public.

En outre, l'exécution d'une commission rogatoire pourra être refusée, si l'authenticité de l'acte n'est pas établie ou si, dans le territoire de l'Etat requis, cette exécution ne rentre pas dans les attributions du pouvoir judiciaire.

ARTICLE 15.

1. L'exécution des significations et des commissions rogatoires ne pourra donner lieu à aucun paiement de taxes ou de frais, de quelque nature que ce soit.

2. Toutefois, l'Etat requis aura le droit d'exiger de l'Etat requérant le remboursement des indemnités payées aux témoins et aux experts, ainsi que des frais occasionnés par l'intervention d'un officier de justice ou d'un notaire rendue nécessaire par le fait qu'un témoin n'a pas comparu volontairement.

ARTICLE 16.

Chacun des Etats contractants aura le droit de faire exécuter des significations par ses agents diplomatiques ou consulaires, directement et sans contrainte, à ses ressortissants se trouvant sur le territoire de l'autre.

ARTICLE 17.

Chacune des Parties Contractantes fournira, à la demande des autorités judiciaires de l'autre partie, transmise par voie diplomatique, les textes de la législation en vigueur sur son territoire et, le cas échéant, tout autre renseignement juridique nécessaire.

Chapitre II.—Dispositions relatives à l'Entr'aide judiciaire réciproque en matière pénale.

ARTICLE 18.

Les Parties Contractantes en matière criminelle s'engagent à maintenir une entr'aide réciproque dans les cas suivants :

- (a) La signification de tous les actes judiciaires, en particulier des citations;
- (b) L'exécution des commissions rogatoires concernant l'audition des inculpés, des témoins et des experts;
- (c) L'exécution d'autres actes judiciaires tels que perquisition, constatation et saisie.

ARTICLE 19.

La demande d'entr'aide judiciaire sera assujettie aux formalités prescrites par les lois de l'Etat requis. Les autorités de cet Etat appliqueront les mêmes moyens de contrainte que pour les demandes correspondantes des autorités du pays.

Si la demande ne peut être exécutée, les motifs de cet empêchement seront communiqués à l'Etat requérant.

ARTICLE 20.

Lors de la signification des citations, les autorités de l'Etat requis demanderont à la personne citée si elle a l'intention de se conformer aux dispositions de la citation et transmettront sa réponse à l'Etat requérant.

Un témoin, ou un expert qui, sur une citation signifiée par les autorités de l'Etat requis, a accepté de comparaître devant les autorités de l'Etat requérant, ne pourra, quelle que soit sa nationalité, être poursuivi ou puni comme auteur du délit formant l'objet des poursuites, ni du chef de complicité ou de recel, ou pour tout autre fait commis antérieurement à l'époque où la personne citée avait quitté le territoire de l'Etat requis. Il ne pourra pas davantage être l'objet d'une restriction dans sa liberté personnelle pour tout autre motif judiciaire antérieur.

Toutefois, cette clause cesse d'être applicable au cas où la personne citée n'aurait pas quitté, dans un délai d'une semaine à partir de la date de son audition, et du jour où il lui serait possible de sortir du pays, le territoire de l'Etat requérant.

ARTICLE 21.

Dans les cas suivants il n'y a pas obligation d'assistance réciproque :

- (a) Quand le délit pour lequel l'assistance judiciaire est demandée n'implique pas l'extradition aux termes du Traité relatif à l'Extradition;
- (b) Quand l'Etat requis estime que la demande est de nature à porter atteinte à sa souveraineté ou à sa sécurité;
- (c) Quand la demande d'assistance judiciaire est faite au sujet d'une affaire purement politique ou militaire.

ARTICLE 22.

Les Etats contractants se donnent réciproquement connaissance des condamnations devenues définitives, prononcées par les tribunaux de l'un d'eux contre les ressortissants de l'autre et qui devront être inscrits au casier judiciaire, suivant les prescriptions de l'Etat où a lieu la condamnation.

Les documents ainsi transmis devront contenir des indications concernant l'état civil du condamné, le tribunal qui a prononcé le jugement, le délit, la date de la condamnation et la peine prononcée.

ARTICLE 23.

Les frais occasionnés aux autorités de l'Etat requis par l'octroi de l'entraide judiciaire, selon les dispositions de la présente Convention, seront supportés par cet Etat.

Il en est de même lorsqu'il n'a pas été donné, à la demande d'entraide, la suite désirée.

ARTICLE 24.

Les demandes d'entraide judiciaire prévues par la présente Convention doivent être faites par voie diplomatique.

ARTICLE 25.

Les pièces à remettre suivant les dispositions de la présente Convention seront dressées dans la forme prescrite par les lois de l'Etat requérant et accompagnées d'une traduction dans la langue de l'Etat requis ou en français. Cette traduction sera certifiée conforme par l'agent diplomatique de l'Etat requérant ou par un traducteur assermenté.

ARTICLE 26.

Chaque Partie Contractante, sur la demande des autorités judiciaires de l'autre partie, faite par voie diplomatique, fournira les textes des lois en vigueur sur son territoire et, le cas échéant, tout autre renseignement juridique nécessaire.

Il est bien entendu que la question juridique pour laquelle des explications sont demandées doit être exposée clairement.

ARTICLE 27.

La présente Convention, qui entrera en vigueur quinze jours après l'échange des instruments de ratification, aura une durée d'un an. Si l'une des parties ne notifie pas à l'autre son désir de dénoncer la Convention six mois avant l'expiration de ce délai, elle sera considérée comme étant prolongée par voie de tacite reconduction pour une durée indéterminée et ne cessera d'être en vigueur que six mois après la notification ci-haut prévue.

Cette Convention sera ratifiée et les instruments de ratification seront échangés à Bagdad aussitôt que possible.

Fait à Ankara, le vingt-neuf mars mil neuf cent quarante-six, en triple exemplaire, en langues turque, arabe et française, cette dernière faisant foi en cas de contestation.

HASAN SAKA.
FERIDUN CEMAL ERKIN.

NOURY SAID.
A. HAFIDH.

[E 3739/3739/93]

No. 4

Sir H. Stonehewer Bird to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 26th April.)

(No. 141.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 16th April, 1946.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith an account of my recent tours through southern provinces of Iraq, for which I am indebted to Mr. Perowne, oriental counsellor to this embassy. This review contains everything of note that occurred during these tours and will, I trust, prove more interesting and more useful than a detailed itinerary.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 4

Tours through Southern Provinces of Iraq by His Majesty's Ambassador during March and April 1946.

DURING the second half of March and the first week of April the ambassador visited the Dulaim, Hilla, Basra and Nasiriyah. On the first trip he was accompanied by Colonel Aston, chief political adviser, on the second by Major Richmond, on the third by Lieutenant-Colonel Dowson, and on all three by myself. The programmes had been admirably drawn up by Colonel Aston and Colonel Dowson, in conjunction with the Iraqi Government authorities.

2. It is unnecessary to cite each itinerary in detail, but there are certain general impressions which it may be useful to record. The tours served to show once again, first, the baffling diversity of Iraq; secondly, the considerable fund of goodwill for Great Britain which still exists here; and, thirdly, the desire of the Iraqi Government to show all possible courtesy to the British Ambassador.

3. As regards the first point, nothing could be more different in race, religion, occupation and outlook than the cultivators and tribesmen of the Dulaim and the inhabitants of the marshes below Nasiriyah, or the jolly merchant princes of Basra, from the gloomy hierophants of Hilla. The upper stretches of the Euphrates have been described by many travellers from Xenophon to Gertrude Bell, and it is sad that so famous a highway should now have fallen into decay. The process of deterioration started well over a century ago and was due primarily to insecurity. The Bedou raids made life impossible for the cultivators of the valley, and even the numerous islands which have supported settlers since time immemorial no longer afforded sanctuary. In our own day, however, the process has been accelerated by one of those periodical changes in lines of communication which seem particularly to afflict the Middle East. The present Mutessarif of the Dulaim, and his predecessor, will tell you that, as boys, when they went to school in Syria or Stamboul, the first stage of their journey was from Bagdad to Aleppo, which took them thirty days by mule or carriage. The advent of the automobile and the aeroplane has changed all this, and the ancient highway is deserted. The inhabitants have tended progressively to drift to the cities, so that a considerable section of the famous town of Ana is now crumbling into dust. There are, however, compensations. At Hit, for instance, where the whole town, men, women and children, turned out to greet the ambassador, the bitumen pits which provided Noah with the pitch for his ark, and aroused the curiosity of Alexander the Great, are still in operation, and are used not only as they were by the Babylonians in building and boat-making, but also to provide the surface for such of the roads of Iraq as have any. The Iraq Petroleum Company pipe-line fortunately crosses the Euphrates near Haditha, and K.3 Station, which is shortly to be more than doubled in size and capacity, already provides employment for some 400 local workers. The nomadic section of the population are on the whole content, and the exceptionally heavy rains this spring provided good grazing. The inhabitants of this now remote area are pleasant, friendly and industrious people, and it is always a pleasure to visit the Dulaim.

4. One's feeling of distaste for Hilla was heightened by contrast. It is true, also, that cold and rain were partly responsible for the bleak atmosphere; but, however brightly the sun may shine, the Shias remain fanatical and black-hearted; forever brooding over a death which is followed by no resurrection. There are exceptions, such as our host, the Director of Medical Services, and his uncle, who, fortunately for his character and our relations with him, has devoted his life to commerce and not religion. But how very few exceptions! The general mass of the Shias still remains bitterly Xenophobic.

5. Owing to the rain, which had turned all the roads to mud, the rest of the tour had to be abandoned. Nejuf, Kerbela and, above all, the ruins of Ukheidir still remain to be visited.

6. Basra looks not north or west but southwards towards the Gulf and the Seven Seas. The port is gradually reassuming its peace-time aspect. Its citizens, both British and Iraqi, were as friendly as ever and competed in the generosity of their entertainment. The mutessarif and his wife are, one hopes, typical of the younger generation of Iraqis. He has taken a course at the Birmingham Police School, and before entering the Administration was head of the C.I.D. His wife is one of a quartet of cultivated and charming women, one of whom has a son who is a lieutenant in the Royal Navy—an achievement which is surely unique in the Arab world. Iraqis and British work harmoniously and effectively in the port and the railways and the oil company. The journey down the river to Fao was

full of interest. Khorramshahr, at which during the war the Americans operated a great port entirely devoted to aid to Russia, is now deserted, and the seven wharves are gradually disintegrating. Abadan, on the other hand, looks busier than ever, and it was a welcome sight to see so many British ships anchored in the tideway and to hear that, in the month of January, no less than 163 had been filled and cleared from the world's largest oil port. And so down to Fao, which is the headquarters not only of the dredging organisation which keeps the port of Basra open, but also of the Gulf Light Service. The 150 lights between Basra and Muscat are all maintained from this centre. The Dalen automatic light had made it possible for practically the whole maintenance to be restricted to visits at intervals of six months or more to replenish the acetylene cylinders.

7. The general atmosphere of Fao was completely transformed from what it was three years ago. They are now a happy and contented community.

8. From Basra and the Shatt, the 20th century world, back to the land of Sumer, with its relics of remotest antiquity and departed splendours. Life is supported only in narrow strips of cultivation between the wilderness of sand and the wilderness of water. It is a fascinating part of the world, where the Arabs do not ride camels but glide in gondolas, and where instead of the gazelle and the ostrich there dwell the pelican and the flamingo. Life here is still tribal and feudal, and it is difficult to see how it can soon be changed. Only in Nasiriya itself has the *bourgeoisie* arrived. Here at the school sports the participants wore western clothes, the spectators retained their traditional garb. Clearly, a new class has come into existence which is neither pasha nor peasant. How they are to be absorbed in the economy of Iraq is by no means easy to see. They cannot all be clerks and there is no industry. It is the old Biblical dilemma of digging or begging.

9. Nevertheless, to see the Nasiriya sports meeting, in which the girls took a noticeably active part, does give one some hope for the future. Because, although standardisation may be undesirable, the almost chaotic diversity of this country, between town and country, north and south, Sunni and Shia, ships and aeroplanes and oil, on the one hand, and sheep, camels and goats on the other, can do with some bond of unity. That bond is at present provided to some extent by loyalty to the reigning house, but education, uniform and extensive, may, if rightly directed, prove the cement which will hold the building together.

[E 3735/226/93]

No. 5

Sir H. Stonehewer Bird to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 26th April.)

(No. 143.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 17th April, 1946.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 535 dated the 31st December, 1945, I have the honour to report that the Iraqi Ministry of Interior on the 2nd April sanctioned the formation of the following political parties:—

- Hizb esh Shaab: People's Party.
- Hizb al Watani al Dimokrati: National Democrat Party.
- Hizb al Ittihad al Watani: Party of National Union.
- Hizb al Istiqlal: Independence Party.
- Hizb al Ahrar: Liberal Party.

2. The first three are parties of the Left and the word "Communist" is inaccurately but almost universally applied to their members. The fourth is made up largely of persons who were active in support of Rashid Ali Gailani and many of its members are ex-internees. The last is led by a tribal Sheikh from the Middle Euphrates who has been a Deputy for some years and always resides in Bagdad. With the exception of Kamal Cherdarhi, the leader of the National Democrat party, who was Minister of Economics and Communications in Hikmet Suliman's 1936 Ministry, none of the leaders of these parties have played more than minor rôles in politics hitherto.

3. It is an abuse of language to call these groups representative parties. Their programmes are vague and, in the case of the three Leftist parties, are almost indistinguishable, the lines of division being personal. Attempts have been made to unify the Left, but so far personalities have proved too strong. Every party has, as its main theme, the diminution of foreign influence in Iraq.

4. An interview given by the present Iraqi Prime Minister to the Egyptian periodical *Rose al Yusuf* when in Egypt recently illustrates the relationship between the parties and those in responsible positions. He declared that he could not convince people in Iraq that the country was not yet ready for political party life. Therefore his Government had to allow political parties in order that it should become clear how harmful they are and their abolition be demanded. I have learnt, however, that there is talk of efforts to form a party being made by Taufiq Suweidi himself.

5. If it proves possible for Taufiq Suweidi or any other responsible statesman to form a party which would be more than a clique of personal followers, a welcome element of moderation might be introduced. I confess, however, to but faint hopes of this. It is difficult to believe that the parties sanctioned so far will contribute much to the growth of political responsibility in Iraq, but they do represent the first-fruits of the Regent's speech and indicate the first stirrings of a social conscience.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER BIRD.

CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE

[E 5929/4/31]

No. 6

Correspondence with the States Members of the Arab League, with the Jewish Agency for Palestine, and with the Palestine Arab Higher Committee, concerning the Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry regarding the Problems of European Jewry and Palestine.

List of Documents.

1. Communication addressed by His Majesty's Government to the seven States members of the Arab League, to the Palestine Arab Higher Committee and to the Jewish Agency for Palestine (20th May, 1946).
2. Reply of the Iraqi Government, with annex containing observations and comments on the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee (19th June, 1946).
3. Note from the Iraqi Government, inviting His Majesty's Government to enter into negotiations concerning Palestine with the States members of the Arab League (19th June, 1946).
4. Telegram from the High Commissioner for Palestine, containing the reply of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to the communication of the 20th May (17th June, 1946).
5. Reply of the Palestine Arab Higher Committee to the communication of the 20th May (24th May, 1946).

[*Note on Documents 2 and 3.*—Substantially identical communications have been received from the Governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, as well as from the Secretariat of the Arab League. The Lebanese documents are also in the same form, except that the commentary on the Anglo-American Committee's recommendations is more detailed. The Governments of Transjordan and Yemen have answered the note of the 20th May in the same general sense.

The Iraqi Government's texts have been chosen for printing because they appear to have been most satisfactorily translated into English. The two passages in Document 2 which are enclosed in square brackets appear in the Iraqi and Lebanese versions only.]

(1)

In a statement made in Parliament on the 13th November, 1945, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs announced the intention of His Majesty's Government to consult all parties concerned before reaching a decision on any recommendations which might be made to them by the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry regarding the problems of European Jewry and Palestine.

In pursuance of this undertaking, His Majesty's Government will be glad to be furnished with the views of the Government of [X] on each of the ten recommendations put forward by the Committee. They will further be grateful if these views may be communicated to them not later than the 20th June, 1946.

(2)

*Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Ambassador (Bagdad).
Note Verbale (Communicated in Bagdad Despatch No. 228 of the 21st June).*

Bagdad, 19th June, 1946.

THE Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Bagdad, and with reference to the Embassy's note verbale, dated 20th May, 1946, which requested that the Iraqi Government

should furnish its views on the recommendations of the Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry into the problems of the Jews of Europe and the Palestine question, have the honour to state that the Iraqi Government, in consultation with the States of the Arab League, has studied the report of the above-mentioned Commission and begs to enclose herewith its views on the Commission's report and recommendations and to make the following remarks:—

(1) The Iraqi Government can see no justification for the setting up of an Anglo-American Commission to study the Palestine question. This question has been adequately studied by various Commissions, whose reports are almost unanimously agreed in justifying the fears of the Arabs in the face of the Zionist menace. Justice requires that the fate of Palestine should be determined by its legitimate inhabitants and not by others.

(2) The Iraqi Government did not admit the legal character of the Commission of Enquiry, since it was set up without the consent of the United Nations and without any representation of the Arab States who are directly concerned. These States therefore reject the Commission's report which is prejudicial to the natural rights of the Arabs in their own countries.

(3) The Iraqi Government considers the British Government, in its capacity as the mandatory power over Palestine, as being in fact responsible for the denial of the political and civil rights of the Arabs of Palestine. The Iraqi Government considers also that there is no legal justification whatsoever for the interference of the Government of the United States or for its influencing the existing situation in Palestine, except in its capacity as a member of the United Nations Assembly, if the question was laid before it. The Iraqi Government considers the acceptance of the recommendations of this Commission to be a plain challenge to the political and civil rights of Arabs in their own country.

(4) The work of the Commission recognised by implication the racial distinctions in Europe left over from the Nazi régime—distinctions which it was absolutely incorrect to recognise. The work and decisions of the Commission contribute to the nourishment and perpetuation of these distinctions, contrary to the principles of democracy and those of the United Nations Charter. These distinctions may lead to a state of affairs which did not formerly exist in Arab countries, namely the distinction between Jews and non-Jews, who have equal rights and obligations.

(5) The Iraqi Government is certain that the Mandate over Palestine is fundamentally unsound, for the Balfour Declaration contained in the text of the Mandate and the resultant deprivation of the Arabs of Palestine of the enjoyment of their political and civil rights is contrary to Article 22 (4) of the Covenant of the League of Nations which stated: "The groups detached from the Ottoman Empire have attained a stage of development justifying their recognition as independent nations but they are temporarily dependent on administrative advice and assistance until such time as they will be able to stand alone." The Anglo-American Commission's report, however, ignores the right of the Arabs of Palestine to independence, a right provided for in the Article quoted above, which was recognised at the San Francisco Conference to be an international document which must be respected in accordance with Article 80 of the United Nations Charter.

(6) The British Government, which is responsible for the Balfour Declaration and for the interpretation of the meaning of a National Home, has on different occasions, and lastly in the White Paper of 1939, interpreted the meaning of a National Home and set a limit to its extent. The British Government came to the conclusion that the Jewish National Home had been actually established in spite of Arab protests and resistance. The Iraqi Government consider any retreat from the White Paper, by which Britain is bound in honour, to be a fresh challenge to the natural and legal rights of the Arabs in their own countries.

(7) The Arab States and peoples regard the acceptance of the recommendations of the Commission of Enquiry as an unfriendly act directed against them and intended to put an end to the Arab people of Palestine and to expose the Arab countries to great dangers and difficulties, to whose consequences there is no limit. [If the recommendations are put into effect the States of the Arab League reserve to themselves full freedom of action to adopt all measures to resist this aggression and to save the Arabs of Palestine from the wrong contained in the Commission's recommendations.]

(8) Full responsibility for the troubles which will take place in Palestine and in the whole of the Arab East and the resultant disturbance of peace and security will rest on those who uphold and carry out the Commission's report.

(9) [The Iraqi Government, which attaches great importance to the maintenance of unblemished friendship between the Iraqi people and Great Britain, fears that the situation in Palestine may lead to Arabs volunteering for the assistance of their Arab brethren in Palestine, or that the atmosphere should create problems which might damage the good economic and cultural relations existing between Iraq and the United Kingdom.]

(10) The Iraqi Government, which is anxious to maintain friendship and good relations between Britain and the Arab States, advises its ally not to adopt the contents of the report but to take its stand on the policy outlined in the White Paper until such time as an Independent National Government is set up in Palestine. This necessarily requires the immediate and complete stoppage of Jewish immigration and the expulsion of all immigrants who entered the country by force and without legal justification. Until such time as this is carried out they should not enjoy the political rights of Palestinian subjects. There is no doubt that Great Britain, who desires the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in this part of the world, fully appreciates that the drawing up of any plan and the adoption of any measures which do not assure the national and legitimate rights of the Arabs of Palestine in their country cannot but lead to troubles and the disturbance of the peaceful relations existing between her and the Arab countries—a result which all should work to avoid.

In anticipation of a reply the Ministry avail themselves of the opportunity to express their highest consideration and esteem.

Enclosure to (2).

Observations and comments on the recommendations of the Anglo-American Commission.

AFTER the appointment of the members of the Commission it became clear that some of its members were biased in favour of Zionism. Some of them had actually been propagandists for Zionism before their appointment to the Commission.

2. It is clear that the Commission (or at least some of its members) came to lay down a policy which had been designed in advance, for example its recommendation that immigration this year should amount to 100,000, not less nor more, and this was the figure recommended by President Truman, the President of the United States. This is borne out by the absence of any logical connexion between the findings of the Commission and its recommendations.

3. It appears that, owing to the speed of its deliberations the committee did not appreciate certain fundamental considerations in the present situation in Palestine to which it failed to attach adequate importance. It did not sufficiently consider the growth of Arab nationalism and its right to life and prosperity, nor the Arab League and its right to organise its relations and its territorial interests. Had it considered these points fully it could not have made such recommendations for Palestine, for it must have been known that they are at variance with the interests of all the States of the Arab League.

4. It appears that the Commission's recommendations are not practical and that it was overwhelmed by emotional considerations before studying the economic, military and administrative difficulties which would result from its recommendations. It based its recommendations on economic schemes which would require co-operation between Arabs and Zionists which cannot be realised. It also recommended immigration before establishing the possibilities of its being put into effect, or its results on the life of Arabs and their natural and legitimate rights.

5. It is proved that the committee contradicts itself on a number of points, in particular points of principle.

How can it claim to uphold modern democratic principles and the principles of the United Nations Charter and at the same time, in this era of the defeat of Nazism and Fascism, try to impose by force a policy upon a people who have the right to enjoy a democratic life and to determine for itself its political future.

Comments on the recommendations.

1. It is surprising that the preamble to the first recommendation should state that there is no hope of substantial assistance in finding homes for Jews who wish to leave Europe in countries other than Palestine. In view of the information

obtained by the Commission there are in several countries in the world, especially in the British Empire and in the United States, wide spaces and abundant means for the accommodation of any Jew wishing to leave his present place. The refusal of these countries to facilitate the accommodation of these Jews and to carry out what they call a humanitarian duty to which they pretend to attach importance and are quite capable of fulfilling can only mean sacrifice of Palestine on the altar of the greed of political Zionism. This contradicts right and equity and makes nonsense of the sympathy with the victims of Nazism and Fascism to which these two States pretend.

2. Among the strange contradictions of the Commission is the proposal on the one hand to grant 100,000 immigration certificates to Jews, while on the other admitting that it will be a heavy burden on Palestine. It is admitted that the density of population is very high and has reached 336 per square mile with the exception of the desert Beersheba area. The views of experts have proved that this density will rise in fourteen years to about 450 per square mile without any Jewish immigration. If account is taken of the fact that the greater part of Palestine is mountain and desert and that Palestine is poor in industries and raw materials it becomes apparent that Palestine cannot possibly bear any new Jewish immigration.

3. The recommendation of the Commission that a statement should be issued affirming that Palestine shall be neither a Jewish nor an Arab State and that Arabs shall not dominate Jews, nor Jews Arabs in Palestine; that any constitutional organisation giving power to the majority shall be suspended, and that Palestine is not and shall never become a land to which any people can lay an exclusive claim is strongly resented. This is an unjust settlement of the case between Arabs, who on the Commission's own admission have a right in Palestine of effective and continuous occupation of more than a thousand years, and Jews, whose right is based on a short historic connexion which has been in effective abeyance for two thousand years. These statements conflict with all human rights and constitutions. It is clear that there is a strong bias against the Arabs since these statements tend to deprive the Arabs of Palestine, who are legitimate owners of the country, of the natural rights which have been obtained by their brothers in other Arab countries.

4. The recommendation of the Commission that the existing administration should be maintained in Palestine until hostility between Arabs and Jews disappears is a denial of the principle on which the mandate was established, for the Jews, driven by the hope of obtaining a majority and establishing a Jewish State, will not abate their claims, and the Arabs, impelled by the necessity of defence of their very existence, will not allow the realisation of the oppressive Jewish dream.

5. The Arabs of Palestine enjoy a standard of life and culture, economy, industry and agriculture which is not below that of the Arabs in Egypt, Syria, the Lebanon and Iraq. In all these countries there are Jewish communities having a high standard of living and, in spite of this, there is no friction between these communities and the other inhabitants on account of differences in standard of living. The root cause of the difference in Palestine is the bringing of Jewish groups with different education and habits into an Arab country by the force of fire and steel. Moreover, the mandatory system is the main reason for the falling short in the standard of the Arab as compared with the foreign Jews from the West. The mandatory power allots a very small proportion, not exceeding 5 per cent. of the country's budget for education, a similar proportion for health, and an even smaller proportion for social services, whereas more than 30 per cent. of the budget is spent on public security alone, and a similar proportion on the army of foreign officials and other establishments.

6. In its suggestion that it is the duty of the Mandatory Administration to continue to facilitate Jewish immigration according to the rules of the mandate which declares that the rights of other sections of the population should be safeguarded and not prejudiced, the Commission has ignored the fact that this condition cannot be fulfilled in case immigration is maintained, because prejudices have already taken place by the change of the Arab position from the proportion of 87 per cent. in 1922 to 69 per cent. in 1944, as is stated in the Commission's report. In addition, continued Jewish immigration since that year has changed the proportion and it is probable that the proportion has now been reduced to 65 per cent. The Commission has also ignored the fact that, when the British Government decided to suspend Jewish immigration in its White Paper of 1939, it was compelled to do so by absolute conviction based on extensive studies that Jewish immigration has prejudiced the position and rights of the Arab.

7. In its recommendation to abolish the Land Transfer Regulation of 1940 and its substitution by regulations based on freedom in the sale, lease or use of land irrespective of race, community or creed, and its recommendation to provide adequate protection for the interests of small owners (fellahin), the Commission has ignored the fact that the various attempts made by the British Government for the protection of this class have all been frustrated, and that when it decided to impose the restrictions made by it in 1940, although such restrictions were inadequate, the British Government were compelled by absolute conviction based on extensive studies that the danger was threatening the present and future of the Arabs in consequence of continuing to allow the transfer of Arab lands to Jews, and that it was its duty to stop the danger at the point it had reached.

It is regretted that the Commission in this recommendation also has been inclined to the Jews against the Arabs, as it responded to the demands of the former and ignored those of the latter.

8. The Commission advised that the success of the schemes to raise the standard of Arabs and Jews depended on the co-operation of neighbouring Arab States, and ignored the fact that no Arab Government is in a position to welcome co-operation in any scheme which may lead to any Jewish expansion, as such co-operation threatens the existence and rights of Arabs in their countries. There is no doubt that any assistance sought from Arab Governments for Palestinian economic and agricultural schemes cannot be given unless it is guaranteed in advance that the Arab character of Palestine will be maintained.

9. The Commission's recommendation for the reformation of the educational system and the introduction of compulsory education is acceptable, but in view of the existence of the mandate and the present policy in Palestine, it is not expected that adequate sums will be allotted for education. There is no doubt that the independence of Palestine is an inevitable necessity from this point of view as it is from other points.

10. It is regretted that, in relation to Recommendation No. 10, it must be related that whereas the British Government most cruelly treated the Arabs, when they rose to defend their existence and legitimate rights, by killing, hanging, imprisoning, internment, confiscation of property and imposing fines on them, has and is still facing the aggressions of the Jews which cannot be compared whatever with the activities of the Arabs in every aspect, with every leniency, a matter which contributed to the maintenance of this aggression, the loss of many British and Arab lives, and the destruction of Government property, whereas it dispossessed the Arabs of their arms, and whereas the Arabs now have no military organisations, it is proved that organised Jewish armies exist, fully equipped with various kinds of arms and technical means, actually carrying out acts of aggression on a large scale. The Government, however, have not seriously endeavoured to disarm them. And, whereas the British Government in the past dissolved the Higher Arab Committee and interned its members and deported them, without their having been proved to have had any connexions with the disturbances, it does not now take any similar action with the Jewish Agency, which is challenging the Government and refusing to co-operate with it in maintaining order and is surely conspiring with the terrorists. The Commission's endeavour to put the Arabs and Jews on a footing of equality in this regard is a clear sophism.

(3)

Note from the Iraqi Government to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

Bagdad, 19th June, 1946.

THE Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Bagdad, and have the honour to state that the Iraqi Government, desirous of implementing the provisions of the United Nations Charter and of securing true attainment of its aims, have the honour to draw the attention of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the provisions of the said Charter, to the present state of affairs in Palestine, and to the necessity of permitting the realisation of the national aspirations of its legitimate inhabitants.

The existing situation arising from the mandate imposed on Palestine and the manner of its execution conflicts with these provisions and with the admitted rights of the people of this country at the time of its separation from the Ottoman Empire.

It is essential, therefore, to put an end to the present situation in Palestine and so to alter it as to conform with the spirit and provisions of the Charter,

especially in view of the decision of the United Nations General Assembly, at its first session, to ask the States directly concerned to expedite negotiations and to conclude the agreements referred to in the United Nations Charter.

The Iraqi Government, in its capacity as a State within the meaning of the Charter closely concerned with the affairs of Palestine, and for other important reasons, is anxious to carry out its obligations under the Charter and to respond to the request made by the United Nations General Assembly.

Therefore, the Iraqi Government, in concert with the other Arab States, namely, Syria, Transjordan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Lebanon, Egypt and the Yemen, have the honour to invite the British Government to negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement which will put an end to the present situation in Palestine and transform it into one in conformity with the provisions of the Charter and agreeable with its aims.

It is essential to start negotiations urgently and the Iraqi Government consider that these should begin at the earliest possible opportunity, in order that there should be time to conclude a complete and satisfactory agreement before the next session of the General Assembly to be held in September 1946.

Until the termination of these negotiations and the conclusion of an agreement, the Iraqi Government ask that no measures should be adopted on the British side conflicting with the undertakings given in the White Paper, especially concerning the suspension of immigration, the sale of land, and connected matters, all of which are contrary to the provisions and spirit of the United Nations Charter in addition to being contrary to the official document published by the British Government in the White Paper of 1939.

The Iraqi Government are confident that the British Government will respond to this invitation in its desire to implement the provisions and aims of the Charter, and to avert troubles in Palestine and breaches of the peace in the Arab East.

The Ministry avail themselves of the opportunity to express their highest consideration and esteem.

(4)

*General Sir A. Cunningham to Secretary of State for the Colonies,
dated 17th June, 1946.*

(No. 982.)

FOLLOWING is text of communication from Jewish Agency in reply to request of His Majesty's Government for their views on the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee:—

"The Jewish Agency for Palestine have made abundantly clear in their memoranda and oral submissions to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry their views on the inseparable problems of Palestine and the Jewish people and the reasons for their conclusion that the only just, practicable and lasting solution of those twin problems is the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish state. These views and reasons remain valid and unaltered. The Jewish Agency's memoranda and oral submissions are doubtless available to the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America; a copy of their principal political memorandum is attached for ready reference.

2. The Jewish Agency note the Committee's condemnation of the basic provisions of the White Paper of 1939. They would urge the authorities to carry out with the utmost despatch the Committee's recommendations that 100,000 Jewish victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution be permitted immediately to enter Palestine and that the discriminatory and restrictive Land Transfers Regulations in force in Palestine be rescinded and replaced by a policy of freedom in the sale and lease of land irrespective of race, community or creed. They hope that the Governments of Great Britain and the United States as well as the bodies indicated by the Committee will co-operate whole-heartedly in the tasks of transport and resettlement involved.

3. What has happened since the publication of the Committee's Report has, however, given rise to serious misgivings and perturbation among Jews in Palestine and throughout the world, who see cause for grave concern in the hesitation and delay shown in implementing these positive recommendations of the Committee. The fact that Jews are still confined to displaced persons camps a year after the defeat of Germany and the continuing deterioration in the position of the Jews in Europe makes such procrastination indefensible.

4. After the primary recommendation of the Committee that the first 100,000 Jewish refugees from Europe be enabled to reach Palestine immediately has been implemented in good faith, the Jewish Agency will be fully prepared to discuss with the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States the various aspects of the problems of Palestine and the Jewish people and any matters arising out of the recommendations of the Committee."

Copy of memorandum referred to under paragraph 1 follows by air mail.

(5)

Jamal Al-Husseini to His Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine.

Your Excellency, *The Arab Higher Committee, P.O.B. 268, Jerusalem, 24th May, 1946.*

Subject: *The Report of the Committee of Enquiry.*

IN reply to the statements of the British Government regarding the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry dated the 20th instant, the Arab Higher Committee has decided to reply as follows:—

The Arabs of Palestine consider the recommendations contained in the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry as a violent encroachment upon their natural rights and a breach of all the pledges and principles which were enunciated by the Allies for safeguarding the liberties of peoples. They therefore reject these recommendations completely and shall defend their country with all the power and means at their disposal.

The Arabs of Palestine insist that they alone possess the right to determine their destiny. They reject any foreign intervention in their country and consider that Britain and America have no right to do so.

The Arab Higher Committee declares that the national demands, for the realisation of which the Arabs shall struggle, are summed up as follows:—

- (i) The abrogation of the mandate and the cessation of Jewish immigration and land sales.
- (ii) The establishment of an Arab democratic State in Palestine which shall become a member of the Arab League.
- (iii) The withdrawal of all foreign troops.

With highest respects,

JAMAL AL-HUSSEINI, *Leader,*
Arab Higher Committee.

CHAPTER IV.—PERSIA

[E 3499/5/34]

No. 7

Mr. Farquhar to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 18th April.)

(No. 103.)
Sir,

Tehran, 6th April, 1946.

WITH reference to Sir Reader Bullard's despatch No. 73 of the 9th March, 1945, I have the honour to transmit herewith a review of the principal events in Persia during 1945.

2. Before his departure Sir Reader Bullard asked me to say that his despatches No. 65 of the 3rd March on the Russians in Northern Persia, and No. 76 of the 15th March on Soviet policy in general in this part of the world, may be regarded as an introduction to this review.

3. I am indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel Gastrell, Captain Holt, Air Commodore Runciman, Colonel Pybus, Mr. N. S. Roberts, Mr. Somers Cocks, Mr. Seager, Major Hassan and Mr. Kellas for contributions to the review.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Consular Officers in Persia, His Majesty's representatives in Moscow and Washington, the Government of India, the British Middle East Office and the Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East.

I have, &c.

H. L. FARQUHAR.

Enclosure in No. 7

Review of the Principal Events in Persia, 1945.

Russian Activities.

RELATIONS between Persia and Russia continued to be strained and difficult and at the end of the year had reached a dangerous crisis.

2. At the Yalta Conference in February the Russians made it clear that the manner of the Persian Government's refusal in 1944 to grant them an oil concession in the north of Persia still rankled. But thereafter they gave up exerting direct pressure on the Persian Government to reconsider the law prohibiting the grant of concessions until after the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and developed other methods of achieving their ends. They increased the activity of their consuls throughout the country and intensified subversive propaganda among all kinds of discontented elements. They also undertook surreptitious experimental borings for oil in at least three places in the northern provinces. In the south the Soviet Consuls' efforts to fish in troubled waters generally met with effective counter-action from the Persian authorities, but in the north, fortified and protected by the presence of Red troops, their activities made rapid progress.

3. During the third quarter of the year the Tudeh party gained so much influence in Gilan and Mazandaran that the control of affairs had virtually passed into their hands and neither the civil nor military agents of the Central Government could act without Tudeh agreement.

4. In September a new party, the "Democrats," was formed in Tabriz to take the place of the Tudeh, whose overbearing conduct had brought it into general opprobrium. The Russian inspiration of the new party was at once obvious and former members of the Tudeh were from the outset its most active and prominent supporters. A general congress of the party was held in Tabriz in October, at which a manifesto was published, demanding full provincial autonomy for Azerbaijan under its own elected council, coupled with the recognition of Turki as the official language of the province. About the middle of November there were skirmishes between Government forces and bands of

Democrats strengthened by Caucasian toughs from the Socialist Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. The Russian regular forces in the province repeatedly interfered with the movements of the local Persian forces directed to the suppression of this uprising and more than once disarmed detachments which were trying to restore order. On the 19th November the Persian Government despatched a small force of troops and gendarmes from Tehran to reinforce the garrisons in Azerbaijan, but this column was stopped by the Red army before reaching Qazvin.

5. From this point onwards the situation steadily deteriorated, and the whole of Azerbaijan passed rapidly into the hands of the insurgents. By the middle of December an Azerbaijan National Parliament had assembled at Tabriz and proceeded to appoint an autonomous Government. It chose as Prime Minister the Democrat party leader, Dr. Pishavari, who had been elected through Russian pressure as a member of the Fourteenth Majlis but had not succeeded in getting his credentials accepted; and approved his nomination of a Cabinet of nine Ministers, including Ministers for Defence, Interior, Education, Health, Finance and Justice, but not Foreign Affairs.

6. The Persian Government, having been prevented by the Russians from using their forces to deal with the insurgents, sought to resolve the problem by means of diplomatic action. They addressed a note to the Soviet Embassy asking that permission should be given for the column which had been held up to proceed, and at the same time they appealed for support to the Governments of the United States and Great Britain. The former responded by proposing that all foreign troops should be withdrawn by the 1st January, and the latter by expressing to the Soviet Government the hope that they would be able to instruct their military commanders to cease to obstruct the movement of Persian forces.

7. To the Persians the Soviet Government replied that they had no objection in principle to the despatch of forces to Azerbaijan but doubted the practical wisdom of such action since it might lead to conflict, in which event the Russian forces in the area would have to be increased. They therefore considered it inexpedient that any more Persian forces should be despatched to the northern provinces. The fictitious quality of this pretext is made evident by the fact that the Russians had about 30,000 troops in Azerbaijan at the time, i.e., about five times as many as the Persians had in the same area, while the reinforcements which the Persians proposed to send to Tabriz numbered only about 1,000 rifles.

8. To the British note the Soviet Government replied that the despatch of more troops to Azerbaijan was undesirable as it would lead to avoidable bloodshed. To the United States they responded by a categorical refusal to withdraw their troops before the date stipulated in the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of 1942. (This is discussed in more detail in the section dealing with the withdrawal of Allied troops.)

9. Soon after the failure of this friendly intervention by the United States and Great Britain news was received that Mr. Bevin and Mr. Byrnes were to have talks with M. Molotov at the end of December, and the Persian Government suspended further diplomatic action to deal with the Azerbaijan question in the hope that a solution would be found at Moscow.

10. Concurrently with their encouragement and protection of the Azerbaijan "Democrats," the Soviet authorities in Persia gave a similar stimulus to the Kurdish nationalists. This is discussed below in the section on Tribal Affairs. It can be safely assumed, on the available information, that the Soviet plan is to exploit Kurdish nationalism for Russian ends in much the same way that they have utilised the racial sentiments and aspirations of the Turki element in the northern provinces.

11. At the Moscow Conference the British and American delegations submitted on the 24th December a draft agreement for the establishment, with the consent of the Persian Government, of an Anglo-American-Soviet Commission to assist the Persian Government in re-establishing satisfactory relationships with its provinces through the erection of provincial councils as provided by the Constitution of 1907. This commission would also make recommendations to the Persian Government concerning the use of minority languages and would supervise the first elections to the provincial councils. The commission would also investigate, and make recommendations on, the withdrawal of Allied troops. The object of the proposal was to seek Soviet co-operation in limiting Azerbaijan autonomy and bringing that province back under the authority of the Central Government. The same evening Generalissimo Stalin informed Mr. Bevin that agreement might be reached on this basis subject to minor amendments. These were presented on the 25th December and accepted by Mr. Bevin on the

26th December. M. Molotov, however, then refused to discuss the proposal further, mainly on the grounds that the Soviet Government could not deal on such a question with the "present hostile Persian Government."

The Question of Withdrawal of Allied Troops.

12. The embassy's original suggestion in 1944 was that British troops should be evacuated at least from Tehran as soon as the opening up of supply routes to Russia other than the Persian should render this practicable. It was hoped here that such action would lead to a corresponding Russian withdrawal on the grounds that the Russians could hardly afford the odious comparisons which their continued presence in the country would invite. His Majesty's Government, however, would only agree to a withdrawal of British troops on a *pari passu* basis.

13. While maintaining that even the evacuation of Tehran alone by Allied troops would be better than nothing, the embassy became more and more convinced, in the early part of 1945, that a far more radical withdrawal was required, and required soon, if Persia were to be saved from administrative paralysis and progressive disintegration. The Russians had steadily increased their hold over the rich northern provinces. The longer this process continued the smaller the chances of ever dislodging them; and unless they were dislodged no Persian Government could be expected to function as a Government should. The possibility was therefore mooted of negotiating a British withdrawal to the oil-fields in the south-west and a corresponding Russian withdrawal in the north.

14. At this stage there were three difficulties about a British withdrawal to the oil area. The first, of course, was that security had to be maintained for "Aid to Russia." The second was that Persia and Iraq Command considered it essential for the health of their troops protecting the oil-fields that they should have summer camps in the Kermanshah area, on the plateau. Thirdly, the argument had to be met that the withdrawal of troops was a policy of appeasement: the right policy, it was suggested, was to tell the Russians that we must stay in Persia because of the war with Japan; the Russians always understood a bold front and would respect it. It was suggested in reply that this bold policy would delight the Russians because the more of Persia we occupied the easier it would be for them to justify retention of Soviet troops; that our line, far from being a policy of appeasement, was to use against the Russians the only weapon in our hands, that of exposing their "imperialist" tendencies, if they refused to make any substantial withdrawal, by making the facts public.

15. At the Yalta Conference in February several attempts were made to persuade the Russians to agree to discuss the withdrawal of Allied troops, but both Marshal Stalin and M. Molotov took the line that the exact terms of the Tripartite Treaty should be adhered to and that there was consequently no point in discussing the question. Commenting on this, the embassy pointed out in March that the Russians clearly wished to keep their troops in Persia in order to secure the strongest possible hold over the country before they went. The only weapon left was the weapon of publicity or at least the threat of it. His Majesty's Government did not sanction this, but towards the end of March informed the Persian Government that His Majesty's Government were ready to examine whether some withdrawal could be made before the date fixed by the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of 1942, namely, six months following the armistice with Japan. This heartened the Persian Government, but the full benefit of publicity could only have been obtained by revealing that His Majesty's Government had actually proposed a withdrawal to the Soviet Government and had met with uncompromising refusal.

16. On the 19th May the Persian Government sent notes to the British, Soviet and American Embassies requesting the immediate withdrawal of the Allied troops from Persia on the grounds that they were not necessary for the war with Japan. His Majesty's Government and the United States Government expressed their willingness to consider the matter sympathetically. His Majesty's Government also proposed to the Soviet Government that Allied troops should start withdrawing from Persia in stages before the final treaty date, but the Soviet Government did not reply.

17. On the 10th July the Foreign Office sent a telegram to His Majesty's Embassy which showed that His Majesty's Government had adopted the policy described above; we had no form of pressure except to confront the Russians with the alternative of withdrawal simultaneously with us or of being shown up

publicly as an "Imperialist" Power. We could not be certain the Russians would choose the alternative we desired but there was a reasonable chance that they might.

18. At the Potsdam meeting in July, it was agreed that British and Soviet forces should withdraw from Tehran at once, and that the Council of Foreign Ministers, at their meeting in September, should consider further stages of withdrawal. Under instructions from the Foreign Office, His Majesty's Embassy made persistent attempts to persuade the Soviet Embassy to co-ordinate the withdrawal from Tehran, but received no reply. The evacuation of British troops and stores began methodically soon after the Potsdam decision, but the last stages were delayed by technical hitches. The last troops left by the 2nd October, only a small liquidation party remaining. Without any warning the Russians withdrew their troops from Qaleh, Murgheh airfields on the 18th September, and claimed to have left Tehran, although they continued, in fact, to hold in it about 250 troops, 45 houses, and the railway station.

19. Meanwhile, on the 20th August, His Majesty's Government began to use the weapon of publicity. Mr. Bevin, the new Labour Foreign Secretary, announced in Parliament that His Majesty's Government did not desire, and did not believe that their Soviet Allies desired, to take advantage of the treaty facilities in Persia for any purpose other than the prosecution of the war. Mr. Eden, commenting for the Opposition, added that His Majesty's Government had only one interest in Persia, to see her prosperous, united and strong; the last thing they wanted was a recurrence of the zones of influence of many years ago.

20. On the 9th September the Persian Government sent notes to the British, Soviet and American Embassies requesting that Persian territory should be totally evacuated by the 2nd March, this being six months after the signature of the Japanese armistice, adding that evacuation before then would arouse the gratitude of the Persian nation.

21. At the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in London at the end of September, Mr. Bevin and M. Molotov exchanged correspondence about the withdrawal of British and Soviet troops. Mr. Bevin mentioned the obligation to withdraw by the 2nd March, and proposed that, by the middle of December 1945 the British forces should be withdrawn to the southern oil area and the Soviet forces to Azerbaijan. M. Molotov replied that the withdrawal of troops should be effected within the period laid down in the treaty and that if necessary the plan for the final withdrawal of Soviet and British troops could be discussed towards the end of the said period. He added that the Soviet Government attached exceptional importance to the strict fulfilment of obligations undertaken. (M. Molotov thus evaded any commitment as to the actual date of withdrawal.)

22. On the 5th October the Tass Agency reported that a considerable number of British forces still remained in Tehran. His Majesty's Embassy countered this by issuing a communiqué giving exact details of the small rear party remaining in Tehran. Although the Soviet Government had refused to discuss any further immediate withdrawals, the British forces withdrew from Hamadan, Khorramabad and Kermanshah areas by the 21st November, and the embassy gave publicity to this fact also. The squadron which had been maintaining security north of Zahidan was withdrawn to India by the 28th November.

23. On the 22nd November the Persian Government addressed a note to the Soviet Embassy asking why there were still Soviet troops in Tehran. Stung, no doubt, by this and by the publicity given to British withdrawals, the Soviet authorities abruptly withdrew their remaining personnel, including the railway mission, out of Tehran at the end of November.

24. On the 5th December the Foreign Office instructed His Majesty's Embassy in Moscow to suggest to M. Molotov that plans should be discussed, in accordance with his letter to Mr. Bevin in September, for the final withdrawal of Soviet and British troops. M. Molotov replied that the question need not be discussed before February, assuming it should appear necessary then.

25. On the 24th November the American Ambassador in Moscow had proposed to M. Molotov, in connexion with the Azerbaijan crisis, that all Allied troops should be withdrawn from Persia by the 1st January. The American note referred to the Declaration regarding Persian territorial integrity, signed by President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin, at Tehran in 1943, and stated the American view that the Persian Government should have full liberty to move their forces through Persia if they saw fit. The Soviet Government replied by reiterating their intention to adhere to their treaty

obligations, but added a sinister note by including among them the Soviet-Persian Treaty of 1921, which they claimed gave them the right to introduce troops into Persia.

26. The position then at the end of the year was that British troops left in Persia were limited to small detachments in Andimeshk, Ahwaz, Abadan and Khorramshahr to protect the oil area and in Jask to protect the aerodrome. The Russians continued to have about 60,000 troops in the provinces of Azerbaijan, Qazvin, Gilan, Mazandaran and Khorassan, and to control the railway from Firuzkuh to Bandar Shah, on the Caspian. The Americans had executed their declared intention of withdrawing their troops by the 1st January, except for 500 men, hurriedly put into mufti, who were operating the American airfield at Abadan. It was beginning to look, therefore, as if the Russians were going to choose the less welcome alternative of the two foreshadowed by the Foreign Office on the 10th July. His Majesty's Government's tactics, however, had already forced the Soviet Government to unmask itself to some extent. In an obviously inspired article on the 14th December, *Pravda* affirmed the right of the Soviet Union under the treaty of 1921 to bring its troops into Persia. *Pravda* went on to ask what right, on the other hand, had the British to bring their troops into Persia in 1941 before the Anglo-Soviet-Persian treaty of 1942 was signed (possibly a pertinent question, but an indecent one for a Russian to ask, seeing that we invaded Persia, by agreement with Russia and mainly to establish a supply route to Russia). *Pravda* concluded by querying the presence of British troops in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Greece, Indonesia, Belgium, France, Holland, Denmark, and Norway, and of American troops in Persia, Egypt and China. The Russians had, therefore, already been driven back onto the weakest of all arguments, the *tu quoque*.

Russian interest in Aerodromes and roads in East Persia.

27. Paragraph 35 of this embassy's Political Review for 1944 reads as follows:—

"There is one aspect of British activities in Persia which may have given the Russians reasonable cause for suspicion. The aerodromes at Mirjawa and Zahidan were completed at a time when, as a result of the discontinuance of the East Persia supply route, they were no longer needed for military aid to Russia; and work on the aerodrome at Kerman was still continuing at the end of the year. The Zahidan-Kerman and Zahidan-Meshed roads are still being maintained, though they too are no longer needed for sending supplies to the Soviet Union. It seems that the work begun on the aerodromes when the Germans were in the Caucasus was continued with a view to their eventual use as communication airfields on what is, in fact, the most direct route between India and Europe. The Meshed road has been kept up as a potential route for aid to China through Soviet Central Asia, and the Kerman road is being maintained in connexion with the work proceeding on the airfield at Kerman. A visit to South-East Persia late in the year by the Soviet military attaché suggests that the Russians are not without interest in these activities."

28. Work on the Kerman aerodrome continued through the first half of 1945 (though in a more desultory fashion), and it was being maintained until the British military authorities handed it over to the Persians in December. The Zahidan-Kerman road was also maintained until it was handed over at the same time as the aerodrome. The Zahidan-Meshed road likewise continued to be maintained until it was handed over to the Persians in October, although the Burma road had been opened early in the year, thus rendering the maintenance of the Meshed road for potential aid to China superfluous.

29. Russian military and civilian officials continued to show great interest in our military activities in East Persia and it is possible that the latter may have contributed to Russian suspicions of our intentions and to their violent activity in Azerbaijan at the end of the year. The Zahidan-Meshed road was originally built by the British in the last war and was the *sine qua non* for the subsequent British advance to Merv. When we reconditioned it in 1942, the Soviet Consul-General in Meshed was openly sceptical that it was intended merely for aid to Russia. Again, the continued construction of the Mirjawa, Zahidan and Kerman aerodromes for two years after the passing of the emergency for which they were intended, namely, a German break through the Caucasus, may well have reminded the Russians of how we swept forward to

Baku after the last war. Indeed, these aerodromes are likely to be a more permanent source of suspicion than the roads, for the roads are likely to become impassable soon under Persian maladministration, while these concrete aerodromes will remain, a permanent menace to the Baku oilfields. It is to be sincerely hoped that they will, in fact, be used for international civil airlines, so as to establish their innocence.

Security in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Area.

30. This problem engaged the attention of the British military authorities and of this embassy continuously during 1945 and our efforts were directed to urging the Persian Government to provide such forces (army, gendarmerie and police) as were considered necessary, and to assume gradually, increased responsibilities for protection with a view to avoiding any hiatus which might occur between the evacuation of the area by British troops and the re-arrival of Persian forces. A scheme for a special gendarmerie force of 2,000 was put up by Headquarters, South Persia Area, but this was not pressed because money was not available and also because the Russians might use this as a pretext for raising a similar special force for the protection of their fisheries on the Caspian Coast. A conference which representatives of the British Military, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, consulate and embassy, and Persian Government departments concerned attended, was held in Ahwaz on the 5th November, 1945. The strength and location of Persian army troops were adjudged sufficient to deal with any tribal trouble likely to arise or to act as mobile reserves for reinforcement of the gendarmerie in prevention of road banditry. The American adviser to the gendarmerie, while unable to supply extra personnel, reorganised its existing personnel so as to provide six mobile platoons for protection of the oil company, relieving them of their other normal gendarmerie duties. The police, again, through lack of budget provision, could not make up their strength to the total judged necessary and remained 190 men short. Some progress towards the unified command deemed essential by Headquarters, South Persia Area, was achieved by securing the agreement of the Persian representatives to place, for operational purposes, the gendarmerie and police under the orders of the Persian Divisional Commander. The scheme had worked well up to the close of the year and no complaints about insecurity of the area had been received from the oil company.

Anglo-Soviet-Persian Censorship.

31. In January 1945, His Majesty's Embassy proposed to the Soviet Embassy to discontinue the political censorship of incoming English and Russian printed matter posted by publishing firms within the British Commonwealth, United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, by virtue of which the Soviet section of the Censorship had prevented the delivery of quantities of British newspapers and magazines. Consistent reprisals by the British section against the Soviet press eventually induced the Soviet authorities to agree to this proposal, and large consignments of stopped material were released by both sides in March. This success was accounted to be an interesting justification for retaliation as the most effective policy in the conduct of Anglo-Russian affairs.

32. In July the Persian Government formally requested that the censorship should be discontinued. His Majesty's Embassy had already entered into consultation with the United States Embassy with a view to the complete cessation of the political, as distinct from the military, censorship. The necessity of defeating the political censorship imposed by the Russians was becoming increasingly urgent as political troubles developed in Persian Azerbaijan, which could not, owing to the strenuous Soviet censorship of press messages, be reported to the press except by the Soviet Tass Agency, which was not liable to censorship. With the complete cessation of hostilities, however, it became possible to discontinue all forms of censorship, and the British section ceased to operate on the 30th August. The Soviet section followed their example with obvious reluctance.

Non-Persian Internees.

33. In respect of the non-Persian internees, both deported from Persia to India and Australia and interned in Persia, the principal concern of His Majesty's Embassy during the year was the problem of their disposal after release. The Combined Intelligence Centre, Iraq and Persia, decided in February

that the return to Persia of deportees should in principle be opposed on grounds of the inadequacy of the security staff remaining in Persia, of the proximity of neutral countries, and of the prevailing unemployment of Europeans in the country. At an inter-departmental meeting which took place in June, attended by a representative of the Combined Intelligence Centre, this decision was confirmed on the further grounds that even after the end of the Japanese war the resettlement of some hundreds of Axis sympathisers, having now particularly no cause to be favourably disposed towards the British, would not be in the British interest, and that there was no reason to offer an opportunity to past enemies and potential troublemakers to resume their commercial and social relations in Persia so soon after the war. It was therefore decided to recommend that all internees should be returned to their countries of origin, exception to be made only on compelling compassionate grounds. It has already been decided that none of the twelve Europeans who remained interned in Persia should be allowed to stay in the country.

34. In accordance with this policy, when at the cessation of hostilities the control exercised by Combined Intelligence Centre, Iraq and Persia, over entries into Persia was surrendered on the 18th August, the Persian Government were informed that there was no objection on the part of the British authorities to the return to Persia of certain individuals named; and it appeared to be understood from this by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that it was not desirable to readmit, without reference to His Majesty's Embassy, any person who had been deported.

35. A large number of applications were received for permission for internees to return to Persia from their relatives in the country, and especially from the Government of India, who were not unnaturally anxious to be rid of their guests as soon as possible, and who forwarded a list of eighty-nine applicants for readmission at the end of the year. Although the hardship involved in some cases was fully realised, a strict interpretation of the policy of disposal by repatriation was upheld, and very few applications have been granted. It was decided, *e.g.*, that no special exception, such as was at one time recommended by the Government of India, should be made in favour of Jews, nor of persons with family interests in Persia, but that these people also should be required to return to their countries of origin first. A number of cases remained under consideration at the end of the year.

Persian Internees.

36. In reply to a violent press campaign for the release of Persian internees, touched off by an incident, copiously misreported, which occurred in the internment camp in Tehran when an inspecting British officer was involved in an altercation with one of the internees, and to a parliamentary interpellation by Dr. Musaddiq, which was feebly answered by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, demanding by what right Persians had been arrested by the Allies and were still detained, the full story of the activities of the Persian fifth column was issued to the international press in February, and His Majesty's Ambassador made a written protest to the Minister regarding the disloyalty of press and Government. It became necessary, also, in order to make sure that the odium should be fairly shared by the Soviet authorities, who appeared to be only too anxious to take advantage of the Persian tendency to attack only the British authorities, to publish a further notice in the press emphasising the collaboration of the Russians in the arrest and detention of suspects. The Soviet security authorities took several of the more important internees to Resht "for interrogation," and there is good evidence from several sources that they used the opportunity to try to recruit them for the cause of Russia.

37. Numbers of internees were released by agreement with the Russians in the following months. On the 25th May, however, the Soviet Embassy proposed the immediate release of all remaining internees, and their security authorities at once informed the Persian police that only the British continued to prevent such a consummation. When His Majesty's Ambassador was authorised a few days later to inform the Persian Government that there was now no British objection to the release of all except those who had been arrested for their connexion with the Japanese, the Soviet Embassy availed themselves of the opportunity to publish in the press a statement to the effect that the Soviet authorities were not opposed to the release of any of the internees.

38. Authority for the release of the thirteen Persians, who thus remained interned in Persia, and of the five in detention abroad was issued on the 15th August upon the cessation of hostilities with Japan. In order, however, to counter any claim to popular sympathy on the part of the Mullah Kashani, one of the most prominent of the internees, who was expected also to prove one of the most venomous on release, his correspondence with the Mufti of Jerusalem and Rashid Ali was published in the local press. Nothing more was heard of him before the end of the year.

Internal Politics.

39. The instability which was so marked in 1944 remained an outstanding feature of the political life of the country during the year under review. The Administration of Bayat, which was formed in November 1944, was already showing signs of weakness, after only three months in office, and by the middle of April 1945 the Prime Minister and his colleagues gave up the struggle to maintain their position against factious opposition of the Majlis.

40. Bayat was succeeded by Hakimi, a deaf old gentleman who had played no considerable part in Persian public life for many years. His Cabinet lasted less than a month: he was ejected for no particular reason and replaced by Sayed Mushin Sadr. M. Sadr at once found himself in difficulties, but he refused to ask for a vote of confidence, leaving it to the Deputies to take the initiative if they wished to get rid of him. The issue was not faced till almost three months later, when the news from Azerbaijan aroused the patriotic feelings of the Majlis and enabled M. Sadr to obtain a vote of confidence from them. His majority soon proved, however, to be as unstable and ephemeral as those of his predecessors, and a month later he was forced to resign. The chief feature of his time was his attempt to prevent the Tudeh from stirring up violent disorders. Political clubs and demonstrations were forbidden, and this earned for him the usual titles of Fascist and Reactionary from the Tudeh and the Russians.

41. The Majlis then reverted to Hakimi, who was still in office at the end of the year. Nevertheless, by the middle of December it had become evident that his Cabinet could not last much longer in spite of the changes which he made in its members in the vain hope of silencing his critics and of appeasing the Russians without alarming the British.

42. In this atmosphere of constant change and uncertainty, neither the Government nor the Majlis accomplished much work of value. Some fifty draft laws were brought before the House, but the great majority passed into oblivion in the committees to which they were referred. No budget for the current financial year was adopted, and the public services had to depend on small periodic fractions of the budget for 1943, the last complete annual budget to have been passed by the Persian Parliament.

43. In spite, therefore, of the crying need for reforms and planned development, and of the frequent assurances given by Ministers that these needs would receive their urgent attention, nothing was achieved and the administration of the country continued to deteriorate.

44. The only measures of note which were put in the State Book were the laws for the Ratification of the United Nations Charter and the Bretton Woods Agreement, the law for the increase of the establishment of the army by two divisions and the law prohibiting the holding of the next general election until after the withdrawal of all foreign troops.

45. The instability to which reference has been made is due to two main causes. The first is the inherent fickleness and irresponsibility of most of the Deputies, and the second the conflict of Russian and British influences. Of these the former is apparently ineradicable, and the latter has for so long been a forceful element in the political life of the country that its early elimination cannot be hoped for. There is accordingly little prospect of good government for Persia within any foreseeable time. Indeed, as the year closed, confusion and perplexity were dominant, and few could see the way out of political chaos to stability and reform.

Persian Press.

46. The arguments over the Russian demand for oil concessions at the end of 1944 developed into a first major split in the Persian press—the Freedom Front representing the Russian point of view and the Left generally, and the Independence Front providing—to begin with—a rather nebulous opposition.

The tone of the press became increasingly embittered as time went on, the Tudeh party and the Seyyid Zia group respectively drawing towards themselves the various independent elements. This became particularly marked after the Azerbaijan crisis.

47. This situation was met by harsher measures on the part of the authorities, and suppressions became a regular feature of the life of the press. At first this tended to operate in favour of the Left, owing to the pressure of the Soviet Embassy, but during the latter half of the year the majority of the Left-wing papers were suppressed, leaving the Right virtually free to campaign at will. A large number of releases at the end of November were followed by a further wave of suppressions at the end of the year. Nevertheless, throughout the whole period sufficient alternative licences were available to enable the Left-wing point of view to be put forward with its usual virulence.

48. The Right-Left split was in many respects a reflection of real or imaginary differences between the great Powers nearest to Persia. There was an increasing tendency to regard Russia and the Anglo-American bloc as natural rivals; and party differences followed international rather than domestic lines. Both sides showed enthusiasm in searching out and magnifying differences between the Allies, notably in comment on the Foreign Ministers' Conference and on the Anglo-American oil discussions. Difficulties in Persia and throughout the world were freely attributed to Anglo-Russian differences. Nevertheless, it was the Right that began to take an increasingly international point of view. When the Azerbaijan situation became acute, the Left showed great anxiety to remove the question from the international sphere, denying that the Russians were in any way connected with the movement, and describing it as the natural popular reaction to the oppression of the Central Government. The Right were equally vehement in their belief that the Democrats had no popular support and relied on "foreign hirelings"; and they appealed to Britain and America to intervene. Curiously enough, there was little reference at this stage to the U.N.O. All parties showed alarm or uneasiness at the prospect of partition or disintegration, the Left wing being at as great pains to deny the separatist motives of the Democrats as the Right wing were to assert them.

49. While a few Left-wing papers openly advocated the formation of a pro-Russian Government in Tehran, the tendency among other sections of the press to appease Russia became less noticeable, especially as the Azerbaijan situation developed; some Right-wing papers were outspoken in their criticisms of Russian foreign policy. The popular desire for Allied evacuation of Persia after the end of the European war (the Far East was virtually ignored) was fully exploited, the Russian attitude being awaited with hope rather than confidence.

50. By way of diversion, the Left-wing press developed an increasingly violent anti-British campaign. While at the beginning of the year this was confined to general attacks on imperialism and international reaction, later more specific references to India, Greece, the Arab League, Indonesia and so on, made it quite clear where the target lay. The final stage was an open campaign against alleged British interference in Persia's internal affairs. Circumstantial accounts were given of British influence over the tribes of the south, and allegations were made of collusion between British authorities and the Persian General Staff. A campaign was started against the A.I.O.C., and the demand for the return of Bahrein was revived. It was asserted that a cardinal point of British policy was to maintain a servile and backward Persia and a buffer State between India and Russia.

51. The advent of the Labour Government in Britain was greeted with suspicion on both sides. The Right feared closer Anglo-Russian co-operation, while the Left suspected it of being no more than a façade. A statement attributed to Mr. Bevin by a Tudeh journalist reporting a conversation at a party in London—that British policy in the Middle East would not be changed, provided a recurring text for the development of this theme.

52. The tone of the press towards America sharpened a little over the question of the disposal of military assets, but in general it was friendly and almost sycophantic; she was rarely included in the attacks on international capitalism.

53. Considerable anxiety was shown over the internal economic situation, and much of this was attributed to Persia's hardships and sacrifices during the war. While, however, there were usual attacks on the Governments of the day and the Majlis, there was little in the way of concrete proposals. Demands for economic and social reform came at the bottom of the list and were usually of an *ad hoc* character—for example, reductions in the prices of monopoly goods.

54. Public opinion, so far as it was formed, was more heavily weighted on the anti-Russian side than the balance of the press might suggest. All classes showed considerable alarm over the events in the north-west, and rumours of "Democrats" incursions southwards and towards Tehran were freely discussed. Many people feared similar outbreaks in other parts of the country. The attitude towards Britain became progressively more favourable as Russian support of the Tudeh elements became more obvious.

Tribal Affairs.

55.—(a) *General.*—With the exception of Kurdistan, 1945 was a quiet year in respect of tribal affairs. The Persian Government, with its hands full in the north and its forces in no trim for conflicts with well armed tribesmen, was only too glad to leave them alone. The Khans, for their part, were happy to live undisturbed, to retain their arms and to amass much ill-gotten wealth by selling on the black market the stocks of tea, sugar and piece-goods which were handed over to them by the Government for distribution to their tribesmen.

(b) *Bakhtiari.*—This area remained quiet except for some raiding on a small scale in the extreme south by Bahmai and Teyyibi on Murteza Quli Khan's properties near Deh Diz. The Persian Government, after more than three years incessant pressure by His Majesty's Embassy, succeeded at last in apprehending the murderers of Mr. Harris and Dr. Griffiths and his son. They are now awaiting trial by a military tribunal in Tehran. Rivalry between the Ilkhani and Haji Ilkhani branches of the Haft Lang section of the Bakhtiari increased and was partially responsible for the ever-growing volume of complaints against the rule of Murteza Quli Khan. Even the khans of his own branch, however, became sore at failing to be represented in the governorship or to secure a share of the fruits of office. Murteza Quli Khan, though he could justly claim to have kept Bakhtiari quiet during a difficult period, was largely to blame on account of his rough ways and unbending attitude. Perhaps the greatest cause of resentment was his retention as a general factotum of an unprincipled adventurer by the name of Misbah Fatemi who, himself no Bakhtiari, enriched himself considerably at their expense. A scheme for wider representation of some of the khans in Bakhtiari Government was therefore proposed and was under discussion at the end of the year.

(c) *Qashgai.*—There is little of importance to report from this tribe. Nazir Khan acquired sufficient confidence to pay a visit to Tehran and to see the Shah. According to unconfirmed reports, his younger brothers Khosro Khan and Muhammad Husain had some undesirable contacts in Tehran among Tudeh and Russian circles. Some resentment was felt by Nasir Khan and his brothers at the appointment of Mehdi Farrukh as Governor-General, but it appeared to be growing less. Towards the end of the year the Persian Government proclaimed a general amnesty for the tribes of Fars, giving them permission to bear arms under licence for the duration of the present emergency. It was a wise gesture as the tribes now feel reassured that they will not be called to answer for their share in the hostilities of Semirun of two years ago when a small Persian military force was severely defeated at their hands and lost most of its arms.

(d) *Khuzistan.*—The disarmament operations against the Arabs were concluded and about 1,000 rifles were collected from the Aha Dasht area and a slightly larger number from the Beni Turuf who subsequently fled across the Iraq border.

(e) *Kurdistan.*—It is convenient for the purposes of this report to divide this area into two, i.e., Northern and Southern Kurdistan, not for any ethnographical reasons, but because the former lies within the area occupied by Russian troops or under "Democrat" rebel influence and presents, therefore, special problems of its own. The boundary may be considered to be about Bukan, some 80 miles south-east of Lake Urmieh.

(f) *Northern Kurdistan.*—In this area the attitude of the tribes caused the Persian Government the greatest concern. For a long time past the Soviet authorities had prevented the Persian Government from taking any measures to enforce their authority, with the result that the tribes from Maku to Bukan were a law unto themselves except in so far as they were restrained by Russian officials. For a time endeavours were made by the Russians to induce the Kurds to join the "Democrat" party, but its principles of industrial and agrarian reforms found little favour in the eyes of the Kurdish chiefs. Russian support was then transferred to the movement for Kurdish independence known as Komala. A party of Kurdish chiefs were taken on a visit to Baku where they

were given to understand by the President of the Azerbaijan Socialist Republic that Russian support would be forthcoming for a movement for an autonomous Kurdistan if the Kurds in their turn supported the Democrat movement for an autonomous (Persian) Azerbaijan. Actually the Kurds took very little part in the "Democrat" movement and were not called upon to fight for it against Persian military, gendarmerie or police forces, though they have been plentifully supplied with arms and ammunition by the Russians. As far as is known they were not being enlisted in the Azerbaijan people's army. They received no seats in the Azerbaijan National Government Cabinet, and it is evident that the Russians are keeping the two movements entirely separate. An added complication in this area was introduced by the entry of Mulla Mustafa Barzani who, with a large following, took refuge in Persia after his defeat at the hands of the Iraq Government. They were billeted by the Russians on Kurdish tribes and villages around the southern end of Lake Urmieh, and Mulla Mustafa was reported to be concerting with the Kurdish ruler of Mahabad, Gazi Muhammad Haziri, further measures of retaliation against Iraq or revolt in Persia. Even if the Russians withdrew from Azerbaijan the Persian Government would be faced with a formidable task in reasserting their authority in this region.

(g) *Southern Kurdistan.*—In August an attack on the frontier post at Merivan by Mahmud Khan Kanisenani forced the Persian army to undertake punitive operations against him. To show the flag in an area but little visited by troops since the entry of the British and Soviet troops into Persia and to collect arms were subsidiary objects in the plan of campaign. For some months the operations under General Hushmand Afshar dragged on with little or no advantage to the military. General Afshar himself, a gallant and energetic commander in the field, is a man of no political insight and is obsessed, moreover, with an implacable hatred of all Kurds. Like many senior officers of the Reza Shah régime he entirely failed to recognise that the tribes, be they Kurds or Qashgais, have, like other Persian subjects, certain elemental rights and that a policy of unceasing oppression was not likely to induce them to be law-abiding subjects. He was succeeded in command by General Humayuni from Khuzistan who evinced a more reasonable outlook. The operations were brought to a temporary successful conclusion with the flight of Mahmud Khan Kanisenani into Iraq, the death of Mahmud Khan Dizli and the surrender to the Iraqi authorities of Hasan Khan Rezabi. With the advent of winter, which would have forced the Persian troops to suspend operations and withdraw to their permanent stations, it was fortunate that events turned out as they did. The Persian forces were able to return to their winter quarters at Merivan, Baneh, Sardasht, Saqqiz and Senneh. About 1,500 rifles were collected, mostly of obsolete pattern and from semi-settled tribes. It will be recalled that Hama Rashid, after sacking Baneh, fled into Iraq and gave himself up to the Iraqi authorities in November 1944. Negotiations for his extradition broke down and the Government of Iraq would only consent to keeping him in residence *forcée* at Kirkuk. At the close of the year, owing to Iraqi negligence, Hama Rashid made his escape and crossed the Persian frontier near Penjwin. He is believed to be in Mahabad conferring with Sadr Ghazi and other Kurdish chiefs. More will probably be heard of him.

Persian Army.

56.—(a) *High Command.*—Ibrahim Zand, the Minister for War, resigned on account of ill health in October 1945 and was succeeded by General Riazi who came into office in November with the Hakimi Cabinet. General Riazi is intelligent, cultured, patriotic and honest, and commands great respect in the army, but he lacks drive, and from the beginning seemed uncertain of his ability to work with the rest of the Cabinet or to cope with the formidable task of improving the administration of the army. General Arfa continued throughout the year to hold the appointment of Chief of the General Staff. His rough tongue, his violent likes and dislikes, his vindictive treatment of those whom he considered inimical to him or who were close associates of his predecessor, General Razmara, gained for him a wide unpopularity. Everyone admits his courage and his energy, especially in the mutiny and Azerbaijan crises, but his endless dabbling in politics and parties did him more harm than good. Much pressure was brought on the Prime Minister, the Minister for War and the Shah to remove him, and his early fall from office was to be expected.

(b) *Administration.*—The American Military Mission under Major-General C. S. Ridley now numbers some twenty officers. As some of the officers' wives

have arrived it appears as if the mission expects to stay. Their contract expired in March 1945 but, at the request of the Persian Government, the United States Government allowed them to stay for the time being. Results of their work are less and less in evidence. The members of the mission appointed to provincial formations attempt, with varying success, to supervise the supply situation and transactions. Those at the centre limit their functions to giving some unheeded advice on transport and medical services and act as agents for the supply of such material as the Persian Government can afford to buy from the United States.

57. The strength of the Persian army stands at about 90,000 officers and men, from which must now be deducted the 6,000 men of the Azerbaijan Division who, after their surrender, either drifted away to their homes or possibly joined the rebel "Democrat" army. A Bill to provide a credit of 165 million rials for the raising of two additional infantry divisions of about 6,000 men each was passed by the Majlis in September 1945. Up to the end of the year recruiting on a small scale had started in Hamadan Province for one of these divisions. A credit of 35 million rials was also granted by the Majlis for the improvement of the living conditions of Persian officers which, with their miserably low rates of pay and the fantastically high cost of living were appalling. Free houses in the vicinity of barracks, a small annual increment, a children's allowance, two free issues of uniform per annum, and the creation of a co-operative society for the supply of certain staple commodities at rates cheaper than those prevailing in the open market were the items in this programme of financial relief. A further credit of 3 million dollars for the purchase of stores (mostly clothing, boots and medicines) from the United States was also passed.

(c) *Morale*.—From the point of view of their effect on morale two events occurred in 1945 which were of the greatest importance, viz.:—a mutiny among the officers and the surrender of the garrisons in Azerbaijan. Regarding the mutiny the story is as follows. Despair over their financial embarrassment, discontent at the slowness of promotion, disgust at the incompetence of their seniors had for some time been felt by most Persian officers. The Russians were not slow to notice this and, both directly and indirectly through their agents the Tudeh party, fanned the flames of this discontent. In mid-August eighteen officers of the Meshed garrison headed by a lieutenant-colonel in the Supply Department obtained possession of a jeep, two lorries, a W/T set and arms and ammunition. To prevent pursuit they immobilised the remaining army vehicles by removing their switch keys and by putting salt in their petrol tanks. (Sugar, though more effective, is too expensive in Persia.) With the connivance of the Russian control post (some say avoiding the control post by a detour) they made their way to Bujnurd, having taken the precaution of cutting the telegraph lines between Meshed and Kuchan. On arrival there they gave out that they were come on an inspection of the cavalry squadron stationed there. This they disarmed and made for the Turcoman steppes. It was thought in Meshed, and the General Staff was so informed by the Russians, that these mutineers would join forces with a band of armed Turcomans said to number between one and two thousand, and subsequently attack Meshed. The Chief of the General Staff, having much experience of Russians, did not think that they would go out of their way to give him accurate information about a gang of mutineers with whom they were probably in sympathy, nor did he think it likely that the Russians would tamely allow them to attack one of their garrison towns. He acted therefore on the assumption that their information was wilfully misleading and reckoned on the mutineers heading in the opposite direction. Having no troops in Gunbad-i-Qabus, through which place they must pass he asked for the assistance of the gendarmerie who acted with the greatest promptness and energy. The local commandant, a lieutenant, hurriedly collected the men from their scattered posts and was able to assemble a force of about 1½ companies before the mutineers put in an appearance. They demanded right of way but were refused. A battle then ensued in which the gendarmerie, first putting the vehicles out of action, then fired upon their occupants. Seven of the mutineer officers were killed and two were wounded and taken prisoner. The vehicles, arms and ammunition were recovered. The next day three officers and four men were picked up in an exhausted condition nearby on the road between Gunbad-i-Qabus and Shahrud. Later, six officers from the Tehran garrison, headed by a lieutenant-colonel on the General Staff, deserted and effected a junction with the Meshed mutineers just before the skirmish at Gunbad-i-Qabus. These seven, and six of the Meshed mutineers, are still at large. Two others from Tehran and Tabriz who deserted later also joined them. In Tehran a commission was appointed to examine the antecedents and contacts of officers

of the central garrison. Thirty officers were found to have close contacts with the Tudeh party or the Russians and were detained under a clause of the Military Governorship law until Military Governorship comes to an end. Ten, less deeply implicated, were sent away to divisions in the south. Further arrests were made as further details of the mutiny came to light. The Chief of General Staff, on the strength of the information so far extracted from the captured mutineers, is of the opinion that a plot for a general uprising existed and that the Meshed party acted precipitately, thus causing the general mutiny to go off at half-cock. Two officers sent by the General Staff to make a full report on the Gunbad-i-Qabus skirmish and to retrieve the captured vehicles and arms were sent away by the Russians without being able to complete their task. A party of 200 gendarmes proceeding by lorry as reinforcements for the gendarmerie at Gunbad-i-Qabus was turned back by the Russians at Firuzkuh. A lorry conveying bombs for the Persian air force detachment at Meshed was turned back by the Russians at Semnan. Reinforcements for the Meshed garrison coming from Turbat-i-Sheikh Jan were stopped at the Russian control post south of Meshed. The fact that the original party of mutineers was able to leave Meshed at all and pass through the Russian control post *en route*, the attitude of the Russian-controlled Tudeh party in Meshed and elsewhere towards the mutiny, and the presence in Bujnurd of the Russian Vice-Consul at Meshed a few hours prior to the arrival of the mutineers, add to the growing weight of testimony to the effect that the whole affair from beginning to end—and the end is not yet in sight—had the knowledge and approval of the Russians. Subsequently, it was learnt that most of the officers still at large had joined up with the Azerbaijan "Democrat" rebels and had been given posts in the Azerbaijan People's army.

Regarding Azerbaijan the sad story can be told in a few words. The Acting British Consul-General, Tabriz, had more than once stated, even during the early days of the Democrat movement, that in his opinion the Persian commanders would not put up a fight if seriously threatened. Cut off from supplies of food and clothing, with little or no backing from the Cabinet, surrounded by Red army soldiers either in uniform or mufti and a populace with scores to settle for past acts of tyranny by the army, gendarmerie and police, it was not surprising that they allowed themselves first to be confined to their barracks by the rebels and later to be disarmed. Of actual fighting there was little, though some officers are reliably reported to have been murdered in cold blood. The garrisons surrendered one by one, all, except Rezaieh, showing only token resistance. Nearly all of the officers have arrived back in Tehran, having been offered by the rebels the choice of departure or joining the Azerbaijan People's army. The 6,000 men of the division, having been told to disperse by their officers, will have made their own way home. Some few, possibly, may have joined the rebel army, for which a recruiting drive is in progress. The 150 rials per month plus uniform and food may attract some. The year 1945, therefore, has been a bad one for the Persian army.

Gendarmerie.

58. There is no evidence available to indicate any substantial progress, except perhaps in the capital, in the efficiency of the gendarmerie as a whole. Co-operation between the army and the gendarmerie is rare, a state of affairs which precludes any effective measures being implemented for the maintenance of security throughout the country.

59. Colonel Schwarzkopf, since his return from the United States, has been obliged, through lack of funds and suitable personnel, to shelve many of the elaborate reforms contained in the reorganisation scheme to which he has devoted most of his attention over a period of two years. During the year under review he has, however, introduced two very essential reforms. Sections are being increased from six to eight men and no post will eventually have the strength of less than a platoon, i.e., thirty-eight men. His Persian gendarmerie officers are to be changed round every two years, thereby minimising the opportunities for graft.

60. During the recent disturbances in Azerbaijan the regiments at Tabriz and Rezaieh were almost completely lost, only some 250 officers and warrant officers finding their way back to headquarters in Tehran. There is a scheme to replace them by two of the seven new regiments which are at present in process of formation in Tehran. This will bring the total strength of the force up to eighteen regiments with a grand total of approximately 34,000 officers and

men. The number of motorised companies has reached four to date and there remain four more still to be formed. During his visit to the United States at the beginning of the year, Colonel Schwarzkopf arranged for the purchase of 500 vehicles and W/T equipment to provide for a "net" of ten stations, also for the employment of two extra American officers for the mission. The officers have arrived and the complement of his staff is now eight, but, owing to the Persian Government's inability to provide dollars, it has not yet been possible to obtain the equipment.

Police.

61. The history of the police force for the period under review is one of steady decline in organisation, administration and efficiency. Corruption and venality prevail throughout. Only a mission of foreign officers with adequate powers, which once granted can be exercised independently of changes in Government, and adequate funds at their disposal, can be expected to turn the force into an instrument for the impartial suppression of disorder, and even they, as the experience of the American officers with the gendarmerie has shown, would have no easy task. So far no official move has been made towards establishing such a mission and it is thought that lack of the funds which would be required to pay for its officers and upkeep is the principal reason against the opening of negotiations.

Persian Air Force.

62. During the year the standard of training, discipline and morale remained low, though some not unsuccessful minor operations were undertaken during the autumn in support of the army in Kurdistan, a small detachment of Hind aircraft being sent to Kermanshah for this purpose. The return of the nine pilots who had done a course of flying training in the United Kingdom gave a slight fillip to training, though one of them typically enough killed himself shortly afterwards by a stupid piece of unauthorised low flying. The most important development of the year, however, was the conclusion of arrangements to re-equip the air force with more modern aircraft and to combine this with a training programme more ambitious than has yet been undertaken by the Persian air force since its foundation.

63. The proposals are, indeed, by modern standards, modest enough. They comprise the purchase of thirty-four Hurricane aircraft with spares and ground equipment, the despatch by Hawker-Siddeley Aircraft of a party of technicians to remain for three years in Tehran and supervise the erection, maintenance and use of the Hurricanes and reorganise the Persian air force factory at Doshan Tappeh, and the provision of a number of courses or attachments to Royal Air Force units in the United Kingdom or Middle East for Persian air force officers and n.c.os. The plan had been approved by the Persian Ministries of War and Finance and by the end of the year the first steps had been taken to give effect to it. If it is carried through, it should have the result of consolidating the attachment of the Persian air force to British equipment and methods for a fair time to come, and is a first and most necessary step towards the survival of that force even at the low level of efficiency which is all it is ever likely to attain.

Civil Aviation in Persia.

64. In spite of much talk the year saw no practical development in Persian airline operation. The State airline continued to run inefficiently but with fair regularity from Tehran to Bagdad and Bushire. Various schemes, backed by private interests and in one case involving American participation, were started, discussed and dropped. It is possible that one or more may be revived, but nothing concrete has yet come to light.

65. In the foreign field, the B.O.A.C. service to Tehran, whose *locus standi* was that of a military service in connexion with the presence of British troops in Tehran, was stopped on the withdrawal of those troops at the end of September and had not been resumed by the end of the year. The Russians continued to run as before, moving their installations from Qaleh Morgheh to Mehrabad airfield at the end of the year. The French ran a fortnightly service, initially by the device of requesting leave to operate a special flight every other week, but have apparently now achieved recognition as a regular line. The Americans have apparently secured temporary rights to use Abadan on their eastern line which is being taken over by the Trans-continental Western Air Company from the

United States Air Transport Command, and Pan-American Airways ran a trial flight through Tehran in connexion with their proposed route through Turkey to India and beyond just after the year's end. The Persian Government seem anxious to encourage foreign airlines rather than otherwise.

The End of Dr. Millspaugh and His Mission

66. It was stated in the Annual Political Review of 1944 that there was a renewed agitation to deprive Dr. Millspaugh of his economic powers, i.e., his functions of purchase, distribution, price control and sale of certain food-stuffs and other goods, as distinguished from his financial powers proper. On the 8th January the Majlis passed a Bill depriving him of them. Dr. Millspaugh thereupon resigned and left Persia on the 28th February, justifiably disgusted at his treatment by the Persian Government and its ingratitude for the considerable services he had rendered. (For an appreciation of his qualities and defects see the Review for 1944.) At first a number of his American staff stayed on. The Persian Government, however, whittled down their numbers and their powers until in October the American Ambassador informed the Persian Government that they were not in a position to do any good and that as this was injurious to the prestige of the United States, the State Department wished the American Finance and Economic Mission withdrawn from the 21st November. It was, however, left to individual members of the mission to exercise their own judgment whether they should make individual contracts with the Persian Government. At the end of the year five men remained.

67. The failure of the Millspaugh Mission, due largely to Persian corruption and intrigue but also, unfortunately, to his excessively rigid and professorial attitude, is a tragedy both for Persia and for British interests which are to see an independent and well-ruled Persia. There is now nothing to save the country from its chronic maladministration, and this will render it perpetually liable to upheavals and Soviet intervention.

Finance.

68. Owing to the absence of the necessary majority, the Government was unable to secure sufficient votes to pass the annual budget for the financial year 1945-46, with the result that the Administration had to continue a hand-to-mouth existence. Credits were voted on the basis of votes covering one-twelfth or two-twelfths of the estimates and this proved to be most unsatisfactory because, apart from the fact that the votes were almost invariably well in arrear of the period they covered, it was impossible for individual departments to make provision for any capital expenditure. On the whole, revenues came in on the scale forecast in the estimates, the principal source of revenue being the monopolies and import duties. The loss of revenue from Azerbaijan, one of the few provinces which really pays its way from the fiscal point of view, is bound to increase the Government's difficulties.

69. A praiseworthy effort to introduce a little long-term planning in the financial administration was made by the Ministry of Finance in the Hakimi Cabinet. A Bill was introduced allocating Government expenditure on a percentage basis, each department being allocated a predetermined percentage of the estimated revenue. It is interesting to observe that whilst army, gendarmerie the police allocations were reduced from 39 per cent. of the 1945-46 budget to 30 per cent. of the 1946-47 budget, there was a marked increase in the allocation for social services. The vote for education was increased from 9.5 per cent. to 14 per cent., and that for the Ministry of Health and its associated organisations was increased from 3.5 per cent. to 10 per cent. The Bill had not been voted by the end of the year.

70. It is also interesting to observe that in the Bill all Government liabilities were to be consolidated and funded in a single account with the Bank Melli, and that these liabilities were to be liquidated within a period of fifteen years from the oil royalties derived from the A.I.O.C.

71. The rate of exchange (rials 128 = £1) continued to be that stipulated under the Anglo-Persian Financial Agreement, due to come to an end on the 2nd March, 1946.

72. The Imperial Bank of Iran's concession as an authorised bank was renewed on the 17th October, 1945, by agreement with the Persian Ministry of Finance. The concession is valid for six months and is thereafter subject to six months' notice of denunciation.

Economics.

73. The closing months of the year were marked by a welcome tendency towards de-control of trade. The monopolies of the importation of cotton piece-goods and of motor cars and tyres were abolished, and the import licensing system was discontinued except for those articles which are still on the controlled list drawn up by the British Supply Mission in Cairo.

74. The Exchange Control regulations, which were generally disregarded, were reintroduced and the Exchange Control Commission was reconstituted. As far as the sterling area is concerned, the measures of control do not impose any restrictions on the transfer of sterling against imports, and authorised banks are free to sell sterling against the presentation of import documents, and to open sterling credits in the sterling area against export documents. The Exchange Control Commission has also placed no undue restriction on the transfer of sterling for personal expenses, transfer of a proportion of the salaries of British subjects, &c. The new regulations stopped the transfer of capital, and this resulted in a black market rate for sterling, which, however, never rose above 152 rials as against the official rate of 130. The Government's endeavours to collect foreign exchange and particularly dollar exchange resulting from exports were not successful, and whilst residents in this country hold many millions of dollars in the United States, the Government's stocks are practically non-existent. In order to pay for the United States rolling-stock the Government was obliged to sell gold, and for private imports practically the whole trade is financed by the purchase of privately-owned dollars, with the result that the black market rate for dollars rose to over 60 dollars as against the official rate of 32½, though it fell somewhat towards the end of the year.

75. The Minister of Finance proposed towards the end of the year the reintroduction of the former system whereby imports should be financed solely from the sale of export certificates, the exporter being allowed to retain 85 per cent. of his foreign exchange or to sell it to a prospective importer. The proposal, although approved by the Cabinet, was not put into practice, and with the ratification on the 27th December, 1945, by the Persian Government of the Bretton Woods Agreement it is hoped that nothing more will be heard of this restrictive measure.

Transport.

76. During 1945, road transport was operated with great difficulty, owing to the lack of tyres and the dilapidated condition of the majority of the vehicles, most of which are at least five years old. The situation was eased to some extent by the sale of a large number of load-carrying vehicles from Allied sources, and by the carefully controlled issue of new tyres. Towards the end of the year, the Government-operated transportation department was closed, which was perhaps just as well, as, with the withdrawal of Allied military control, it is doubtful whether the transport company would have attained even a modest degree of efficiency. The Government sold to private buyers much of the large fleet of trucks used by the Transportation Department, and this, combined with the sale of the department's stocks of tyres and of part-worn tyres offered by the Allied military authorities, made the situation by the end of the year considerably easier, and there was an appreciable fall in the price of load-carrying vehicles. Few passenger vehicles were imported or disposed of by the Allied authorities, but traffic between towns was relieved by the conversion of trucks into buses by private operating companies.

77. With the cessation of hostilities and of Lease-Lend traffic for Russia, very little was done to maintain roads, many of which were showing signs of bad wear and tear. The British military authorities sold over 4,000 tons of bitumen to the Tehran Municipality for account of the Persian Government, but little or no attempt was made to use it.

78. The section of the Persian State Railways operated by the British and American military authorities was turned over entirely to State operation on the 1st July, and discussions were proceeding at the end of the year for the settlement of freight charges during the period of the Allied military operation of the line. The Ahwaz-Khorramshahr line, built by the Allied authorities, was offered to the Persian Government, together with the improvements in the port of Bandar Shahrpur. The extension to Khorramshahr port was included in the offer made

by the United States military authorities and accepted by the Persian Government. The Persian State Railways acquired a valuable addition to their rolling-stock by the acceptance of an offer made by the United States military authorities. This included 461 oil tank cars, which were essential for the adequate distribution of oil. This is important, as a break-down in distribution would have, however unjustly, been blamed on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. An offer for the sale of a limited number of rolling-stock was also made by the British military authorities. This offer had been accepted by the Ministry of Communications by the end of 1945, but still awaited ratification by the Government.

79. The Russians returned the lines from Tehran to Mianeh, Shahrud and Firuzkuh at the end of November, but kept the line from Firuzkuh to the Caspian. Whilst a great deal of consideration was given by the Persian Government to the completion of the line from Tehran to Tabriz and from Tehran to Meshed, a combination of the Russian occupation, political crises, the instability of successive Cabinets, and the difficulty of supply of material from abroad all combined to prevent any progress in this direction.

Disposal of British and American Military Assets.

80. (a) *Telecommunication System*.—The telecommunication system installed by the British military authorities is now being administered, or rather maladministered, by the Persian Department of Posts and Telegraphs, who have incidentally failed to make either of the first two payments specified in the Act of Sale. A quantity of maintenance material was also handed over to them.

(b) *Fixed Assets—General*.—All fixed assets, with the exception of transportation assets and the sawmill in Tehran, have now been disposed of, either by direct sale to contractors or by inclusion in the overall offer made by the American military authorities.

(c) *Transportation Assets*.—An offer was made to the Ministry of Communications for the sale of all fixed transportation assets on the basis of 33½ per cent. of their original construction cost, estimated to be 336 million rials. (Details are given in the section headed "Transport.")

(d) *United States Fixed Assets*.—The United States military authorities made an overall offer to the Persian Government for the sale of all American fixed assets, on the basis of 7½ per cent. of their original construction cost. This offer, made without prior consultation with us, included certain British military installations in areas in which we had a minority interest. The purchase price is payable in dollars, to be covered by Persian Government bills at 3, 5 and 7 years' sight.

(e) *United States Military Stores*.—All surplus United States military stores at Khorramshahr were sold to a group of Persian financiers against a cash payment of 6 million dollars. The payment of dollars was found from private Persian dollar holdings in the United States.

Prospects of British Trade.

81. At the present time the sterling area holds all the aces, as the Persian Government has no dollar resources and can only obtain them by selling part of its gold reserves. It is true that there are considerable private holdings of dollar exchange, and this could be sold, but as the open market rate for free dollars is considerably above the official rate, United States trade would be considerably handicapped if financed by this means. The sterling position is, on the other hand, satisfactory, and no restrictions have so far been placed by the Persian Exchange Control Commission on the sale of sterling or the opening of documentary credits for the importation of goods from the sterling area. There is a widespread demand for goods, but the limiting factors are shipping and supply position in the United Kingdom. It is somewhat unfortunate that the supply position of textiles (cotton, woollen and rayon piece-goods) which are in great demand, is still unsatisfactory, and that the United Kingdom can allocate only a small quota to this market.

82. Merchants in this country are obviously anxious to establish direct relations with United Kingdom suppliers and the Commercial Secretariat has a formidable waiting list of merchants, anxious to go to the United Kingdom in order to re-establish their commercial relationships or to develop new ones. With the present problems of shipping and air transport, the greater part of these applications has had to be held in suspense.

83. Whilst there is a demand for practically every branch of United Kingdom manufactures, it should be borne in mind that this market easily reaches

saturation point, and with the low standard of commercial integrity in this country there is always the risk that merchants will repudiate their contracts when the supply position becomes easier, and prices fall in consequence. For this reason it is recommended that as a general rule business with this country should be transacted on the basis of irrevocable credits.

Middle East Supply Centre.

84. The Middle East Supply Centre ceased to exist on the 31st October, and was replaced as far as the sterling area and sterling area-controlled resources of supply are concerned by the British Supply Mission (Middle East). The general tendency is towards the rapid decontrol of trade, but there are still in existence lists of goods, such as cereals and sugar, which can be supplied only on the basis of annual quota and by bulk procurement from the British Supply Mission. There is also a short list of goods, of which the supply position is difficult, and for which the Persian Government have been requested to maintain the system of import licensing. The work of liaison between the Persian Government and the British Supply Mission, Cairo, has, with the abolition of Middle East Supply Centre, been transferred to the commercial secretariat of this embassy.

United Kingdom Commercial Corporation.

85. With the cessation of "Aid to Russia," the primary functions of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation in this country came to an end, and it is perhaps fitting that in this survey for 1945 the invaluable work carried out by this organisation should be placed on record. The organisation of road transport in Persia presented a formidable task, and its successful discharge by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation was a material contribution to the total war effort. By the end of 1945 the greater part of the staff of the corporation had departed, and the organisation is now represented only by a skeleton staff engaged in the work of liquidation. The bulk of the corporation's claims against the Persian Government are now well on the way towards liquidation, as is also the claim advanced by the Persian Ministry of Finance for payment of income tax for the financial years 1944-45 and 1945-46. The corporation have compounded with the fiscal authorities for a total payment of £3,000 for each year.

Ministry of Economic Warfare.

86. With the close of hostilities, the work of Ministry of Economic Warfare has necessarily decreased. Certificates of origin and interest are still issued where required, and notifications have been sent to the Persian Government in regard to the maintenance of the statutory list, but in general Ministry of Economic Warfare work has virtually come to an end.

Cereals and Agricultural Development.

87. Thanks to hard work by the British officer team of cereals collectors there were, at the time they left in September, 170,000 tons of bread-grains in Government stores in Persia, and of this 108,000 tons was wheat.

88. In addition there were reputed to be some 100,000 tons surplus to the country's requirements and available for export, but the Soviet Government's refusal to countenance its export frightened the Persian Government into silence and to acquiescence in the danger of its rotting in the village granaries.

89. Since then the Azerbaijan granary has been closed to Tehran and the future is unknown, but by all calculations there must be many months' stocks in the capital, although statistics are no longer available.

Locust Control.

90. The locust danger during 1945 turned out to be small, in spite of alarms caused by Persian locust officers inflating the danger of infestation, in order to obtain surplus stocks of poison to sell for their own fraudulent profit. The British anti-locust unit, which had done excellent work in Persia during the war, was withdrawn in September, leaving the Persian locust authorities, much to their distress, to resume full responsibility for operations in their own country.

91. It is of some political importance that Persia should not suffer from a plague of locusts. If Persia were to lose her present self-sufficiency in bread grains, owing to the ravages of locusts, it would be impossible, in view of the present world shortage, to supply grain from outside Persia, and a famine would provide golden opportunities for subversive Tudeh activity. Again, if locusts in Persia were liable to migrate to Soviet Turkmenistan (always a potential danger) this would give the Soviet Government a pretext for interfering in South-East Persia, where the locusts normally breed. This would presumably be unwelcome to His Majesty's Government and the Government of India.

92. The Middle East Anti-Locust Unit is confident, however, of being able to prevent serious infestation of Persia by their operations in Arabia.

Indian Affairs.

93. After its inauguration in Tehran in October 1944, the initial enthusiasm of the Indo-Iranian Cultural Society lasted only until June, when (a) the hot weather, (b) the dispersal to Europe of the leading Persian lights, i.e., Messrs. Hikmat, Rashid Yassemi and Hejazi, (c) the illness of the President, M. Samii (Abid us Sultaneh), (d) the aggressive Russian policy in North Persia, and (e) the successive fall of Persian Cabinets after a two to three months' life, virtually suffocated its activities.

94. By dint of immense perseverance by the secretary (Major Naqvi, the Government of India Consul in Tehran), suitable Persian students and graduates were selected and sent off to India for long courses in agriculture, forestry and engineering, and to take up the generous scholarships granted by the Government of India. Although at first these eleven young men found it strange in India, they gradually settled down to hard work in competition with Indians with better educational qualifications and abilities than ever they could obtain in Persia. One Persian official naively pleaded that these well-meaning grants of scholarships actually embarrassed the Persian Government, for where India offered a dozen or so, the Russians forced the Persians to send forty lads to study at Baku, and all knew how those forty should serve Persia!

95. Enquiries from private individuals—men and women—for educational facilities in India poured in and showed the need for a special Indian educational officer to assist the embassy in their difficult task of advising and placing these enthusiasts.

96. In spite of ceaseless efforts no real progress was made in the efforts to equate Persian school and university diplomas and decrees with recognised standards in India, England, France or elsewhere in the Middle East, and this made it extremely difficult to place students anxious to go to Indian schools and universities or attend post-graduate courses. The fact is that the Persian standards are very low and the Persian Government avoids having to admit it.

97. Some time in 1944 the British Council admitted that they could not obtain English teachers to cope with the large number of requests for Anglo-Persian Institutes and English classes and so it was agreed that Indian educationalists should be engaged to teach English at Meshed, Kerman, Yazd and Ahwaz. After certain vicissitudes the scheme got under way, and, where the teacher is suited by his qualifications and own personality, there has been a good response. Never, however, will the scheme be the self-supporting one it was optimistically expected to be, as in these days of high cost of living in Persia, the income from tuition fees cannot be expected to cover the teachers' normal and legitimate living expenses. That the good work should continue is the opinion of the British Council, who have assisted the teachers by giving them the benefit of their own "refresher" courses and other advice. The not-very-large expenditure that may have to be borne by the Government of India is well worth while. Incidentally, it would be a heavier item had not the Indian trading community in Persia voluntarily contributed most generously in hard cash to this fund for the teaching of English.

98. After many years' delay the Iran League of Bombay (mostly Zoroastrian) succeeded in getting to Tehran a 2-ton bronze statue of the Persian poet Firdausi, sitting on his cushion and writing his epic, the *Shahnameh*. The statue was promised soon after Firdausi's millenium in 1934, but the war prevented the export of the bronze. It is now admirably placed at the head of the avenue bearing the poet's name and surveying the modern city of Tehran.

99. At the end of October Dr. R. E. Mortimer Wheeler, the Director-General of Archaeology in India, and his party came to Persia at the invitation of the Persian Government. He was only able to see Kerman, Yazd, Shiraz,

Isfahan and Tehran before having to curtail his visit, and proceed to Iraq. In fact, his proposed visit to Meshed coincided with the Russian-sponsored *coup* in Azerbaijan and Persian army officer desertions in Meshed itself, and, as the Russian Chargé d'Affaires naively explained when asked why Russian permits were refused, "the time was not considered suitable for his visit"! Nevertheless, Dr. Wheeler was able to make valuable contacts with Persian archaeological and educational authorities and it is certain that in the near future there will be valuable archaeological exchanges of both students and specimens between India and Persia.

100. In the autumn of 1944 the Government of India asked permission of the Persian Government to remove a number of rails from an unwanted railway siding at Mirjawa, where the train between Quetta and Zahidan crosses the frontier. Although these rails had been lying unused since 1931, the Persians successfully procrastinated until after VJ-day and so showed in the true light their much vaunted "co-operation" and "sacrifice" for the Allies in a matter which, at a time when rails were in short supply, was very important for the prosecution of the war against Japan.

101. During the whole time that Indian army detachments were in Tehran the Indian Soldiers' Welfare Association of British Indian Traders generously entertained their fellow-countrymen and made their stay in the capital as pleasant as possible. When His Highness the Maharaja of Kotah visited his infantry regiment, he had as his guest at a reception, M. Maximov, then Russian Ambassador. M. Maximov was extremely interested to meet his first Indian, and a prince at that, and naively expressed his astonishment at the quite unexpected good relations between His Majesty's Ambassador and staff and the Maharaja and other members of the down-trodden "slave" races of India!

Inauguration of an Indian Trade Commissioner's Office.

102. Major M. Hassan, the Indian Government's first Trade Commissioner for Persia, assumed his duties on the 12th June, 1945. The work of his office falls under two main heads: commercial intelligence and commercial publicity. The latter covers activities which will range from organising Indian stands and exhibitions and fairs, to the furnishing of information regarding India on a variety of subjects to official bodies, associations and individuals in Persia. An Indian information officer has recently joined for this work. Mr. K. H. Rahman, joint director of exhibitions in the Government of India, visited Tehran in the end of December 1945 for discussions in connexion with the preparations for a mobile exhibition in the Middle East countries. Although no dates are fixed as yet, it is hoped that the exhibition will come to Persia early in 1947 and will be held in all provincial centres (including those in what is now the Russian zone, if possible). The object is to give a visual demonstration, in a vivid and arresting manner, of India's cultural traditions, general progress, industrial advancement, and her capacity for supplying many of the consumer goods and raw materials previously imported from the Axis countries. The preliminary object of the exhibition is to create a cultural understanding and to promote commercial relations between India and Persia and other Middle East countries by showing the homogeneity of India's culture, her achievements and her capacity as a potential supplier of the needs and requirements of these countries. The main sections of the exhibition will be cultural, artistic, educational, agricultural, industrial, transport, Indian army, amusement and information.

Indo-Persian Trade.

103. Indo-Persian trade in the years immediately preceding the war was not on a very extensive scale. India occupied fifth place in the returns of Persia's "commercial" imports and exports during those years. The lion's share went to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Germany, next came the United States and the United Kingdom, followed by India and Japan. This position has been changed by the war and India has emerged during the war as the principal supplier of consumer goods to Persia. She has also become one of the leading buyers of Persian goods. The latest statistics published by the Persian Government show that for the period the 22nd March, 1944, to the 21st March, 1945, India was the chief supplier of Persia's "commercial" imports. In 1942-43 she supplied as much as 55 per cent. of these imports. In 1943-44 the

percentage dropped to 36.51, and in 1944-45 it was 31.79. These decreases are explained by the enforcement of war-controls in India. Despite the controls in India and the import licensing procedure in this country, India remained in a dominant position in the market. India's share of "non-commercial" imports (i.e., duty-free imports by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, not recorded in the Persian statistics as "commercial"), was also considerable in the year 1944-45. She supplied goods approximately to the value of 31 million rials out of a total of 383 million rials. As regards Persia's exports to India these too have been on the increase during the war. In the year ending the 21st March, 1945, India's share was almost equal to that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and these two countries were the principal buyers of Persian produce (excluding mineral oil). If "non-commercial" exports (mineral oil exported by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and fish exported by the Caspian fisheries) are included, India's share of the total export trade of Persia far exceeds that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

104. The balance of trade was definitely in India's favour despite large imports of mineral oil by her.

105. With the end of the war trade is returning to its normal channels slowly. Some of the war controls have been withdrawn in India and Persia. For instance the Government of India is now allowing exports of natural indigo, certain chemicals and chemical preparations, scientific instruments of indigenous origin, pyridine, cashew nuts, lac, &c., freely; while the Persian Government has abolished monopolies of cotton piecegoods, pharmaceutical products, jute and jute manufactures, &c. Notwithstanding the fact that export controls for essential commodities are still in operation in India, a good ground has been prepared for the promotion of commercial relations between the two countries. Enquiries received show that the goods most needed in Persia are cotton piecegoods, tea, sugar, spices, jute and jute manufactures, electrical equipment, machinery of various kinds, leather products, bicycles, toilet requisites, coir mats and matings, sports goods, &c. The desire to export more goods is keenly felt in India. Efforts are being made to increase the quotas for Persia of the goods, export of which is still controlled by the Government of India.

American Affairs.

106. The American Ambassador, Mr. Leland Morris, who had only been in Persia since August 1944, left on the 19th May and was replaced by Mr. Wallace Murray, for many years the redoubtable and hitherto rather anti-British, head of the Near East Division of the State Department. Mr. Morris was a disappointment. Although not mischievous like his predecessor, Mr. Dreyfus, he was inert and carried no influence. In particular he was unable to co-ordinate the activities of the American advisers, or to curb the intransigence and obstinacy of Dr. Millspaugh.

107. Mr. Murray seemed during the first few months to be in a highly nervous state, and whereas he had hitherto acted as the defender of Persian interests against British imperialism, he began to treat the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs in a highly arbitrary fashion whenever he could not obtain exactly what he wanted, e.g., in the matter of aviation rights. He also spoke in the most violent fashion, on no evidence, of the alleged hostility of Sayed Zia to the Shah and to Dr. Millspaugh, and it was quite evident that his criticism was really aimed at His Majesty's Embassy. Towards the end of the year, however, he calmed down a little, perhaps because his health improved or because events began to prove to him the falsity of some of his assumptions, and a little later Mr. Bevin's stand for Persia at the London meeting of the Security Council was to take much wind out of his sails. He suffers from the constant difficulty that he distrusts the Russians and despises the Persians, but whenever this drives him to the logical conclusion that the British are right, he has to find an excuse for not accepting it, and he therefore lives in a fog of inconsistency.

French Affairs.

108. In October the French Diplomatic Mission, hitherto entitled the "Delegation of the Provisional Government of the French Republic," was raised to the rank of embassy, and the existing delegate, M. Pierre Lafond, presented his credentials as ambassador on the 20th October. In the same month, an office was opened in Tehran by the Agence France Presse. It became increasingly clear

towards the end of the year that a general revival of French cultural influence, predominant before the war, was the purpose of the activities of the press department of the new embassy and the local director-correspondent of the agency. This revival is to be welcomed from our view, since British and French cultural propaganda support each other in strengthening the influence in Persia of Western civilisation and counteracting Soviet cultural influence.

Transfer of Polish Legation to Warsaw Government.

109. On the 23rd July the Persian Government recognised the Warsaw Government, and a new chargé d'affaires, M. E. J. Milnikiel, presented his letters to the Persian Government on the 22nd September. Meanwhile, M. Okoński, the chargé d'affaires of the former London Polish Government, had handed his legation over to the Persian Government, as he refused to acknowledge the new régime. The Persian Government in turn handed it to M. Milnikiel.

110. M. Milnikiel was in peace time an inspector of schools; he was captured by the Russians in 1939 and released in 1941. He then reached Palestine, where he was court-martialled and imprisoned by the former Polish military authorities on a charge of having defamed the (London) Polish Government while in Russia.

Polish Refugees.

111. At the beginning of the year there were 4,435 Polish refugees in Persia.

112. The dissolution of the Polish Government in London caused anxiety lest the refugees in Persia should be deported to Russia against their will. His Majesty's Embassy countered this by forming a Polish Refugee Section and putting the refugees under its auspices. On the other hand their presence in a country partially occupied by the Russians was a potential source of Anglo-Russian friction and it was desirable to move them to less contentious territory. Arrangements were therefore made to transfer most of them to the Lebanon, and by the end of the year there were only about 1,150 refugees left in Persia, of whom 850 were due to leave in the next month, the remaining 300 being mainly a "hard-core" looking after themselves.

113. The new Warsaw chargé d'affaires explained, on arrival, that he could not at present assist any refugees to return to Poland. Nor could he maintain any refugees who adhered to his Government. He approved the move of the refugees to the Lebanon, on the grounds that repatriation to Poland would be easier from there than from Persia. His acquiescence in our arrangements made matters politically much less difficult for us, since it minimised the prospects of Soviet misrepresentation.

Retrenchment of British Propaganda Activities.

114. The peak of the activities of the embassy's public relations bureau was reached in the late autumn of 1944. After that, with the prospect of an early end of the war in Europe, care was taken not to allow any extension of publicity expenditure pending direction from the Ministry of Information as to post-war policy. Indeed, several activities were stopped or curtailed before the Ministry's instructions were received in June to cut expenditure by 25 per cent. in three months and by 50 per cent. in six months. The result of the Ministry's instructions is reflected in the 1945-46 budget estimates, which provide for a net expenditure of £49,315, compared with the estimate for the year 1944-45 of £122,764. Moreover, the net expenditure for the year 1944-45 was reduced to £80,616, a saving of no less than £42,148 on the estimated expenditure.

115. At the beginning of 1945, the bureau's activities were organised under the following heads:—

- (i) Press attaché section.
- (ii) Films section.
- (iii) Allied liaison section.
- (iv) Daily news section.
- (v) Broadcasting section.
- (vi) Visual publicity and distribution section.

116. By the end of the year only three senior British officers were provided for in the budget (the director, the press attaché and an administrative officer whose post is still vacant). Apart from these three, the only British personnel remaining (out of a total of twenty-six at the beginning of 1945) are the editor of the daily news bulletin and the registrar.

117. During the summer of 1945 the press attaché's section ceased the publication of their women's magazine—*Alame Zenan*—as it was not very successful. Publication of the *Tafsir-i-Khabarha-yi-Jehan* (World News Review) and of the very successful children's newspaper—*Now Nehalan*—has been continued.

118. The films section operated seven mobile cinema vans in Tehran and the provinces for most of the year, but will in future only operate five. In addition, until late in the year, the bureau operated a newsreel cinema in the heart of the capital. The cinema has been handed back to its proprietor upon condition that he shows at least three public relations bureau reels with each change of programme and upon the terms that he pays the bureau 20 per cent. of his net takings. This has proved to be a most remunerative arrangement without any loss of publicity value in giving up the cinema.

119. The Allied liaison section was closed down in the early spring.

120. The newspaper *Tehran Daily News* had always been a heavy drain on the bureau's financial resources and it would have been difficult to justify its survival, upon political grounds, after the evacuation of American and British troops from Tehran. It therefore published its final number in mid-October. In its place a daily roneo'd news bulletin is published with a circulation something short of 1,000, some 674 of which are paid for by subscribers.

121. The broadcasting section continued to put out its daily half-hour programme—the Voice of Britain—on Radio Tehran until the 21st March, 1945, when the half-hour was officially handed back to the Persian authorities. The Russians continued to broadcast tendentious material from Radio Tehran under the cover of the Irano-Russian Cultural Society's programme. In July they broadcast a particularly obnoxious quotation from *Pravda* commenting viciously on Persian internal affairs, and their programme was interrupted by the Persians, who thereupon prohibited all foreign broadcasts, only allowing one to continue—the Russian! At least their action, unexpectedly courageous, had one good result—the Russians have never again used Radio Tehran to broadcast directly offensive material. But the British Council English lessons by radio had not started again by the end of the year although the Government of Prime Minister Sadr had promised that they might start again.

122. The visual publicity and distribution section ceased towards the end of the year to produce its own publicity displays and now concentrates upon the preparation of photographic material received from Cairo and London for the Victory House windows and the reading rooms in the provinces.

British Council.

123. The British Council continued to expand its activities. The total number of pupils being taught English went up from 4,000 to 4,600 and the only limitation was shortage of British personnel.

124. The council consulted the Foreign Office as to the desirability of opening two new Anglo-Persian institutes in the provinces, one at Kermanshah and one, if circumstances were politically propitious, at Tabriz or Meshed. The Foreign Office replied that they thought it enough if the council's estimates for 1946 contained provision for one new institute, and that it should be decided after the 2nd March, the date fixed for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Persia, whether this institute should be in Tabriz, Meshed or Kermanshah.

125. Expansion of the council's activities in Persia is most desirable, particularly as the public relations bureau of the embassy is retrenching. The council is popular with Persians, having, one is thankful to say, remained free of suspicion of dabbling in politics, in spite of the many possibilities of malevolent misrepresentation by Persians or Russians.

Mr. Le Rougetel to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 5th June.)

(No. 163.)

Sir,

Tehran, 27th May, 1946.

WITH reference to my predecessor's despatch No. 118 of the 14th March, 1944, I have the honour to transmit herewith a revised list of personalities in Persia.

I have, &c.

J. H. LE ROUGETEL.

Enclosure in No. 8

Report on Leading Personalities in Persia.

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| 2. Afshar, Reza. | 46. Ferouhar, Abul-Qasim (Abolghassem). |
| 3. Ahi (Ahy), Majid. | 47. Fidakar (Fedakar), Taqi (Taghi). |
| 4. Aitron (Ayron), General Muhammad Hussein. | 48. Firuz, Muhammad Hussein. |
| 5. Ala, Hussein, C.M.G. (Mu'in-ul-Vizareh). | 49. Firuz, Muhammad Vali. |
| 6. Amini, Dr. Ali. | 50. Firuz, Musaffar. |
| 7. Amirahmedi (or Ahmedi), Ahmed Agha. | 51. Ghaffari, Amir Saham ud Din (Zuka-ud-Dauleh). |
| 8. Amiri (Amery) Javad. | 52. Ghaffari, Hassan Ali (Mu'avin-ud-Dowleh). |
| 9. Amir-Taimur Kalali, Muhammad Ibrahim. | 53. Ghani, Qasim. |
| 10. Ansari (Ansario), Abdul Hussein Mas'ud (Massoud). | 54. Hajir, Abdul Hussein. |
| 11. Ansari, Ghulam Ali, Brigadier (Sartip). | 55. Hakim, Ibrahim (Hakim-ul-Mulk). |
| 12. Aqevli (Aghevli), Farnjullah. | 56. Hidayat, Abdullah, Brigadier (Sartip). |
| 13. Arasteh, Nadir. | 57. Hidayat, Izzatullah. |
| 14. Ardalan, Dr. Ali Gholi. | 58. Hikmat, Ali Asghar. |
| 15. Ardalan, Amanullah (Haji Izz-ul-Mamalik). | 59. Hikmat Reza (Sardar Fakhr). |
| 16. Ardalan, Nasir Quli. | 60. Homayundjah, Muhammad Ali. |
| 17. Arfa, Hassan. | 61. Hovhannasian, Ardashes. |
| 18. As'ad, Muhammad Taqi (Amir-i-Jang). | 62. Ibtihaj (Ebtchaj), Abul-Hassan. |
| 19. Asadi, Salman. | 63. Ibtihaj (Ebtchaj), Ghulam Hussein. |
| 20. Atabeki, Muhsin. | 64. Intizam (Entezam), Abdullah. |
| 21. A'zam-Zanganeh, Dr. Abdul Hamid. | 65. Intizam (Entezam), Nasrullah. |
| 22. Azudi, Yadullah (Amir A'zam). | 66. Iqbal (Eghbal), Ali. |
| 23. Bader, Abdul Wahhab. | 67. Iqbal (Eghbal), Manuchehr. |
| 24. Bader, Mahmud. | 68. Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Asadullah Yamin (Yamin-ul-Mamalik). |
| 25. Bahar (Malik-ush-Shura). | 69. Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Fathullah Nuri. |
| 26. Bahrami, Farajullah (Dabir-i-A'zam). | 70. Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Musa Nuri (Muvaffaq-es-Saltaneh). |
| 27. Bahrami, Fazlullah. | 71. I'tibar, Ahmad (I'tibar ud Dauleh). |
| 28. Bakhtiari, Murteza Quli Samsam. | 72. I'timadi (Ettehadi), Nasir Quli (Nasir-ul-Dowleh). |
| 29. Bayat, Murteza Quli (Saham es Sultan). | 73. Jahanbani, Amir Lashkar Amanullah. |
| 30. Bayender, Ghulam Hussein. | 74. Jahanbani (Djehanbani), Muhammed Hussein. |
| 31. Bushihri-Dehdashti, Agha Javad (Amir Humayun). | 75. Jam (Djam), Mahmud (Mudir-ul-Mulk). |
| 32. Dadvar, Mehdi (Vossuq-es-Saltaneh). | 76. Kamal Hidayat, Hussein Ali (Nasr-ul-Mulk). |
| 33. Dashti, Ali. | 77. Kambakhsh, Abdus-Samad. |
| 34. Daulatshahi, Abul-Fath. | 78. Kazimi (Kazemi), Baqir (Bagher) (Muazzib-ud-Dowleh). |
| 35. Diba, Abul Hassan (Siqat-ed-Dowleh). | 79. Kazimi (Kazemi), Mustafa (Davir-ul-Mulk). |
| 36. Divanbegi, Agha. | 80. Kashani (or Kashi), Seyyid Abul-Qasim. |
| 37. Fahimi, Khalil (Fahim-ul-Mulk). | 81. Khajeh-Noury, Ghulam Ali (Nizam-us-Saltan). |
| 38. Farhudi, Dr. Hussein. | 82. Khusrovan, Sartip Ahmad. |
| 39. Farrukh, Mehdi (Mu'tasim-us-Saltaneh). | 83. Kishavarz, Dr. Feridun. |
| 40. Farzaneh, Hassan. | 84. Kooros, Issa (Esau). |
| 41. Fateh, Mahmoud. | |
| 42. Fateh, Mustafa. | |
| 43. Fatimi, Mehdi. | |
| 44. Fatimi (Fatemy) Saifpur. | |

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| 85. Kupal (Koupal), Sadiq (Sadegh). | 132. Qaraguzlu, Hussein Ali. |
| 86. Lahouti (known usually as Major Lahouti Khan). | 133. Nizam-Qaraguzlu, Hussein Quli (Amir Nizam). |
| 87. Lankurani, Sheikh Hussein. | 134. Qaraguzlu, Muhsin. |
| 88. Mansur, (Rajab) Ali, C.B.E. (Mansur-ul-Mulk). | 135. Qaraguzlu, Taqi. |
| 89. Marzban (Marzuban), Dr. Ismail (Amin-ul-Mulk). | 136. Qashqai, Muhammad Nasir. |
| 90. Mas'ud, Akbar (Sarim-ud-Dowleh). | 137. Qavam, Ibrahim (Qavam-ul-Mulk). |
| 91. Mas'udi (Massoudi), Abbas. | 138. Qavam (Ghavam), Ahmed (Qavam-us-Saltaneh). |
| 92. Masfin-Daftary, Dr. Ahmad. | 139. Qubadian, Abbas (Amir Makhsus). |
| 93. Miftah, Abdul Hussein. | 140. Quds (Ghodse), Hussein. |
| 94. Mir'at (Merat), Ismail. | 141. Radmanish, Dr. Riza. |
| 95. Misbah-Fatemy, Ali Naghi. | 142. Rahnama, Zein-ul-Abedim. |
| 96. Mu'addil (Moadel), Luft Ali. | 143. Rais, Muhsin. |
| 97. Muazid (Moazid), Mas'ud (Massoud). | 144. Razmara, Haji Ali: Brigadier (Sartip). |
| 98. Mubassir (Mobasser), Amrullah. | 145. Riaz, Ali: Brigadier (Sartip). |
| 99. Mudabbir-Noury, Kazim. | 146. Sadiq, Dr. Issa (Sadiq-i-A'lam). |
| 100. Muqaddam (Moghaddam), Muhammad Ali. | 147. Sadiq, Sadiq (Mustashar-ed-Dowleh). |
| 101. Muqaddam (Moghaddam), Hassan, General (Sarlashkar). | 148. Sadr, Seyyid Muhsin (Sadr-ul-Ashraf). |
| 102. Musaddiq, Dr. Muhammad (Musaddiq-us-Saltaneh). | 149. Sadri, Abdul Ali (Saliq-us-Saltaneh). |
| 103. Mushar, Hassan (Mushar-ul-Mulk). | 150. Sa'id (Sa'id, Saed), Muhammad (Said-ul-Vizareh). |
| 104. Mutamidi (Motamedy), Ali. | 151. Sajjadi, Muhammad. |
| 105. Muzaffari, Hussein Wuli (Prince Nusrat-ul-Saltaneh), G.C.V.O. | 152. Saleh, Allayar. |
| 106. Nabavi, Taqi (Muazziz-ed-Dowleh). | 153. Sami (Samiyi), Hussein (Adib-us-Saltaneh). |
| 107. Nafisy (Naficy), Abol-Ghassem. | 154. Sanjabi, Kerim. |
| 108. Nafisi (Naficy), Fathullah. | 155. Sayyah, Hamid. |
| 109. Nafisi (Naficy), Hassan (Musharaf-ul-Dowleh). | 156. Sayyah, Kazim. |
| 110. Nafisi (Naficy), Said. | 157. Sepahbody, Anushirwan. |
| 111. Najm, Abul-Qasim (Abolghassem). | 158. Shafai, Ismail. |
| 112. Nakhai, Muhammad. | 159. Shahbakhti, General Muhammad. |
| 113. Nakhechevan, Muhammad (Amir Muwassaq). | 160. Shaibani, General Habibullah. |
| 114. Nakhechevan, Ahmad. | 161. Shams-ul-Mulk Ara'i, Asadullah (Shahab-ud-Dowleh), K.C.V.O. |
| 115. Nasr (Nassre), Seyyid Ali. | 162. Shaqaqi, Hadi (Hiss-ed-Dowleh). |
| 116. Naubakht, Habibullah. | 163. Shirvani, Abu Talib (Banan-es-Sultan). |
| 117. Nikpey, Ahmad (Mufakham-ul-Mulk). | 164. Shukuh, Hussein (Shukuh-ul-Mulk). |
| 118. Niqabat, Zia-ud-Din. | 165. Sinsi (or Siassi), Ali Akbar. |
| 119. Nurzad, Ghulam Reza. | 166. Sipih, Ahmad Ali (Muvarrikhu'd-Dowleh). |
| 120. Oveis (Ovaisy), Ali Muhammad. | 167. Suhaili (Soheily), Ali. |
| 121. Pahlavi, Shah Muhammad Reza. | 168. Sururi, Muhammad. |
| 122. Pahlavi Royal Family. | 169. Taba, Dr. Abdul Hussein. |
| 123. Pak-Nazar, Jaafar (Ihtisham-ul-Vizareh). | 170. Tabatabai, Muhammad Sadiq. |
| 124. Pakravan, Fathullah (Amir-i-Arfa'). | 171. Tabatabai, Seyyid Zia-ud-Din. |
| 125. Pirnazar, Hassan. | 172. Tadayun, Seyyid Muhammad. |
| 126. Pirnia, Hussein (Mutamin-ul-Mulk). | 173. Taberi, Dr. Hadi. |
| 127. Pishavari, Mir Jafar. | 174. Taqizadeh, Hassan. |
| 128. Porvali (Pourevali), Abul-Qasim (Abolghassem). | 175. Vasiqi (Vassighi), Sadiq (Sadegh). |
| 129. Qadimi (Ghadimi), Dr. Hussein. | 176. Vossuq, Hassan, G.C.B. (Vossuq-ed-Dowleh). |
| 130. Qajar, Abul Fath (Salar-ud-Dowleh). | 177. Yezdan, Penah, General Murteza. |
| 131. Qaraguzlu, Ali Reza (Baha-ul-Mulk). | 178. Zahidi, Fazlullah (Basir-i-Divan). |

1. Adl (Adle), Mustafa (Mansur-us-Saltaneh).

Born in Tabriz about 1885. Went to Egypt when quite young. There he finished his primary education and afterwards went to Paris. In Paris he studied law, and graduated from the Faculty of Law in that city. Secretary at the consulate at Tiflis in 1903. At the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for a short period, and then transferred to the Ministry of Justice. Appointed a member of the Turco-Persian Boundary Commission in 1913. Since then employed principally as Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Justice until 1927. He became in that year legal adviser to the Ministry and drafted a number of new judicial codes. A member of the Supervisory Board of the National Bank from 1929-32; in 1933 Director of the Legislation Department of the Ministry of Justice, and professor in the Law Academy at Tehran.

Appointed Persian Minister at Berne in 1934. Recalled to Tehran, December 1936. Political

Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, March 1937. Under-Secretary, July 1937. Acting Minister, March 1938. Minister at Rome, July 1938, and also accredited to Budapest, September 1938.

Returned from Rome late in 1941. Director of the Faculty of Law 1941. Minister of Education in Soheily's Cabinet, March to August 1942. He was not conspicuous for help to the Allied cause in 1942 and if it is true that he has now retired from public service it will not be much loss. He was, however, appointed Minister without Portfolio in Soheily's Cabinet, January to March 1944 and again in Sa'id's Cabinet from March to August 1944 when, on the reconstitution of the Cabinet, he was dropped. Minister of Justice in Bayat's Government of November 1944 and again Minister without Portfolio in Sadr's Cabinet of June 1945. Delegate to U.N.O., January 1946.

A quiet little man without much personality. A good bridge player. Speaks French.

2. Afshar, Reza.

Born at Urmieh (now Reza'iyeh) about 1888. Joined the Ministry of Finance as a young man, and during Mirza Kuchik Khan's rebellion in Gilan acted as financial agent to him; and soon after the war he got away with certain funds from the Finance Office in Resht. With these he bought carpets and took them to America for sale. Served also under Sir P. Cox, who paid him well. Returned to Persia in 1921, full of American ideas and education. Joined the staff of Dr. Millspaugh, the American financial adviser. A staunch supporter of the Pahlavi régime; elected to the 5th 6th and 7th Majlis. Opposed Firuz Mirza when the latter was Minister of Finance. Governor of Gilan in 1929. While at that post he organised the Gilan Import and Export Company, which was founded in opposition to Russian trade monopoly methods. As a result he incurred the hostility of the Russian interests there. Governor-General of Kerman in 1931. Minister of Roads in February 1932. Resigned in the following July, being unable to build the Chalus road fast enough for the Shah. Governor of Isfahan September 1932 to December 1933. Since then unemployed. Was put under surveillance in Tehran in 1935 owing to supposed inefficiency (perhaps complicity) in connexion with the Bakhtiari plots in 1934. Sentenced to six months' imprisonment and permanent exclusion from Government service, in June 1936, for accepting a bribe when Minister of Roads.

Governor-General of Isfahan, May-June 1944, until Supreme Court of Appeal decided he was ineligible for office on the grounds of the sentence passed on him in 1936. Secretary to the Iranian Airways, December 1944.

Speaks English fluently. Full of ideas and energy. Very nationalistic, and rather anti-British and anti-religious.

3. Ahi (Ahy), Majid.

Born in Tehran 1886. Educated in Persia and Moscow. Holds a degree in law from the University of Moscow. Returned to Persia in 1914 from Russia. Appointed Commissioner for the Lianosoff Fisheries 1915-18. Director-General of the Ministry of Education 1922-24. A judge of the Court of Cassation 1928-33. Governor-General of Pars, August 1933, where he did good and energetic work. Minister of Roads and Communications, January 1936. Received the 1st Class Order of Humayun on the completion of the Transiranian Railway, September 1938. Suddenly relieved of his duties and placed more or less under house arrest at the end of November 1938. He had failed to satisfy the Shah over arrangements for the Tehran-Tabriz Railway.

Minister of Justice, July 1940, and again in Furughi's Cabinet of September 1941 and Soheily's of May 1942. Ambassador to U.S.S.R., August 1942.

As Minister of Justice he was largely responsible for the details of the law concerning the restitution of the ex-Shah's properties to their former owners. In those discussions he showed more attention to detail than to principle and the resulting cumbersome and complicated enactment pleased few except the lawyers who tried to understand it and interpreted it in various ways.

Speaks Russian, French and a little German. Married a Russian or Polish Jewess. Able, hard-working, and friendly to foreigners in general.

4. Airom (Ayrom), General Muhammad Hussein.

Born about 1882. Son of an emigrant from Erivan. Educated in Tehran and in Russia. Commissioned into the infantry of the Cossack

Division about 1901. In 1912 colonel and staff officer at the Cossack Division headquarters. Fell into disgrace in 1918 as the result of intrigues with women. A favourite of Reza, he was re-employed in 1922 and appointed to command the Northern Independent Brigade at Resht. While in that command he showed enterprise, energy and some power of organisation, and kept Bolshevik intrigues under severe control. He also did a great deal for the improvement of the city of Resht. Appointed commander of the troops at Tabriz in 1925. Fell again into disgrace a year later, probably through his inability to abstain from intrigue. Chief Inspector of the army in 1927, and in the police of Tehran during 1928. Went to Europe; then returned to be chief of inspection missions in 1930 and 1931. Appointed chief of police in April 1931.

At one time, Ayrom was looked upon as having greater power than any member of the Cabinet and to be the Shah's right-hand man. His son even married a sister of the Queen; he subsequently died of a mysterious disease.

Ayrom left suddenly for Germany, ostensibly for medical treatment, in the summer of 1935. Serious charges of taking bribes and of all kinds of trickery have since been made against him, and Reza Shah, furious with "the only one of my trusted servants who has hitherto deceived me," tried to secure his extradition. But he got large sums of money out of the country, and was heard of in 1942 living on the Riviera as a Count of Lichtenstein.

Has an Italian wife, whom no one saw while he was in Tehran.

Speaks Russian and a little German. A strong disciplinarian; he had no use for bolshevism and organised a kind of OGPU in Tehran to counteract Soviet spying.

5. Ala, Hussein, C.M.G. (Mu'in-ul-Vizareh).

Born about 1884. Son of the late Prince Ala-es-Saltaneh, for many years Persian Minister in London. Educated at Westminster School, where he seems to have received rough treatment, which resulted in a strong anti-British bias, at any rate for the next few years. Created C.M.G. in 1905, when he accompanied his father on a special mission to London for the coronation of the late King Edward VII. Appointed "chef de cabinet" in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1906, his late father being then Minister for Foreign Affairs. He remained as "chef de cabinet" to various Ministers until 1915. Appointed Minister of Public Works in January 1918, and continued to direct that Ministry during the Cabinet presided over by Samsam-us-Saltaneh, which was in power from May to August 1918. This Cabinet abrogated the Treaty of Turkmanchai.

Ala was hostile to Sir Charles Marling. His Majesty's Minister from 1915 to 1918, and caused repeated complaints to be made to the Foreign Office through his brother, who was then Persian Minister in London. He accompanied the abortive Persian mission to the Paris Peace Conference in 1918. Appointed Persian Minister at Madrid in 1919, and at Washington in 1920. Conducted negotiations in Washington in 1921-22 for the American Financial Mission to Persia, after he had failed to obtain the North Persia Oil Concession first for the Standard Oil Company and then for the Sinclair Corporation. Returned from Washington in 1925 and took his seat in the fifth Majlis as a Deputy for Tehran. Minister of Public Works for a short time in May 1927. Second delegate to the League of Nations for some time. Attended Locarno in that capacity in December 1928.

Appointed Minister at Paris in 1929. One of the Persian delegates selected to represent Persia before

the League of Nations in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company dispute in 1933. Returned to Tehran early in 1933 to take over a high post in the National Bank of Persia, though he had no particular knowledge of banking. Was also very active in the organisation of the "Red Lion and Sun," and in the Ferdousi Memorial Committee.

In 1931 his transfer to the post of Minister in London was mooted, though it did not materialise. On that occasion His Majesty's Government were unwilling to receive him, on the ground that his attitude in reporting a libel on His Majesty King George V rendered it difficult to suppose that he was then animated by friendly sentiments.

Appointed Minister in London, July 1934. Recalled in the summer of 1936; returned to Tehran in October. Appointed Supervisor of Monopoly Companies, December 1936. Director-General of Commerce in 1937, and given the new appointment of Minister of Commerce in September 1937. Removed from this appointment, April 1938. Chief Persian attached to Major-General the Earl of Athlone and Her Royal Highness Princess Alice during their visit to Tehran for the Crown Prince's wedding, April 1939.

Married Fatimeh Khanum, the only daughter of the late Abu'l Qasim Khan Qaragozlu (Nasir-ul-Mulk), Regent of Persia, in July 1927. Mine. Ala was one of the first of her generation to leave off the veil. President of the National Bank, October 1941. Minister of Court, October 1942, but appears to have done nothing to curb the young Shah's evident intention to rule the country in much the same way as his father did.

A hard worker and a staunch patriot; intelligent and well-read; interested in the literature of many countries and quite a good pianist. Has a perfect command of English and speaks good French. In the past he has had a reputation for anti-British sentiments. In 1943 and 1944, however, his relations with the British Legation were good; he seems a good deal more anti-Russian than anti-British, and is doubtless more pro-Persian than either. He is a sensitive Persian Nationalist who realises the failings of his fellow-countrymen. Tends to overrate the virtues of the Shah.

Appointed Ambassador to Washington in August 1945 when status of Persian Legation there was raised to that of an embassy. Was very active in giving publicity in the United States to the Persian case over the Azerbaijan problem and showed ability in presenting Persia's case to the Security Council.

6. Amini, Dr. Ali.

Fourth son of Mohsen Amini (Amin-ed-Douleh). Born at Tehran in 1903. Educated in Persia and in France. Studied law at Paris. Married one of the daughters of Hassan Vussugh (Vussugh-ed-Douleh). Served for some years in the Customs Administration; appointed acting head of Customs about May 1936, and (1939) head thereof until the autumn, when General Amir Khasrovi had him transferred to the Ministry of Finance as one of the Minister's assistants.

Secretary to Qavam-es-Saltaneh when Prime Minister in 1942. Appointed as head of a commercial mission to Washington by the latter, but did not proceed.

Speaks French and is evidently very intelligent. Accused by his enemies of various kinds of speculation and sharp practice. An agreeable, and usually very helpful, representative of the younger school.

Was sent by the Persian Government to India in 1945 to study the possibilities for developing trade between India and Persia and to examine the foreign exchange control question.

7. Amirahmedi (or Ahmedi), Ahmed Agha.

Born in Tehran about 1880. Comes from an Ardebil family, his forbears having emigrated from the Caucasus. Enlisted in the Cossack Brigade in 1899 and received speedy promotion; he was soon commissioned, and was a general in 1920. Took a prominent part in operations against the Jangalis in 1919. When the army was reorganised in 1922 he was given the rank of Amir Lashkar (chief of a division) and placed in command of the Western Division with headquarters at Hamadan. Was recalled on account of his shameless robbery and for his treacherous oppression of the Lurs; but, being a favourite of Reza Shah's, he was appointed to command the amnieh or road guards. Appointed in 1926 to command the North-West Division, while retaining command of the amnieh. Recalled the next year, and appointed to command in Luristan in the spring of 1928. He succeeded in pacifying Luristan by the summer, and in disarming the Lurs; he also assisted in the construction of the Khorramabad road. Promoted Sepahbod (field-marshal) in April 1929 as a reward for his services. Returned to Tehran for medical treatment, and left for Europe in 1930. Sent to Kurdistan to disarm the Kurds in December 1931. Commanded operations against Jaafar Sultan in 1932, and against Lurs in 1933. Director of Remounts, 1935.

Minister of War in Furughi's Cabinet which negotiated the Tripartite Treaty in 1942. Military Governor of Tehran with wide powers to suppress the rioting in December, 1942; and then Minister of War under Qavam-es-Saltaneh and Soheily. Resigned December 1943 when Soheily reformed his Cabinet and at the Shah's instance appointed Zand, a civilian, as Minister of War. Refused command of the Southern division as he considered he would not be properly supported in Tehran in that appointment. Suspected by the Russians and disliked by the Shah and Yazdan-Panah for his attempt to insist on the authority of the Ministry of War and to limit the Shah's intervention in matters of command and administration. Ambitious and always hopeful of becoming Prime Minister. Though his record of bribe-taking and his sketchy education do not make him a satisfactory candidate for a head of Government, he has shown himself a man of action and determination in times of crisis, and has been very friendly to us since Reza Shah's departure. Minister of War in Qavam's Cabinet, February 1946.

Speaks Russian. His accumulated wealth and large properties appear to have satisfied his desires, so that he seems to have got over his youthful inclination towards robbery.

8. Amiri (Amery) Javad.

Born in Tehran 1895, from a Semnan family. Educated in Persia and France. Speaks French, and has studied law in Paris. Entered the service of the Ministry of Justice in 1914, and was for many years assistant to the French judicial adviser attached to the Ministry of Justice. Was a professor in the law school. In 1928 appointed president of the Tribunal of Commerce. President of the court of first instance in Tehran 1931-34. Director of the Department of Legislation in the Ministry of Justice in 1934. Went to Bagdad with Fathullah Noury Esfandiary in December 1935 as legal and technical adviser in the abortive negotiations about the frontier, &c., with Iraq. Juridical Counsellor in charge of the Advisory Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1938. Administrative Director-General, August 1938, and Under-Secretary, January 1939, in that Ministry.

In charge of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at the time of the invasion 1941. Minister of the Interior in Soheily's Cabinet 1942, and later Minister

of Justice; in the former post he was a disappointment, in the latter he was more at home but was soon replaced. Elected to the 14th Majlis from Semnan, December 1943.

A man of considerable influence and importance in his capacity as technical adviser on legislation. Having been trained by the French legal advisers here, his ideas of law are somewhat different from those held by British lawyers.

Conscientious and hard-working, with a lawyer's capacity for rapid assimilation of detail. Amiable but weak.

Accompanied Qavam-us-Saltaneh on his mission to Moscow in February 1946.

9. Amir-Taimur Kalali, Muhammad Ibrahim.

Born about 1895. Member of a well-known Khorassan tribe. Educated in Tehran. Elected to the Majlis in the time of Reza Shah, and again for Mashhad in the 14th Majlis elections, 1943 where he headed the poll. Vice-President of the Majlis 1944.

A rich landowner who smokes opium. Was on Foundation Committee of Irano-Soviet Cultural Relations Society, March 1944.

In 1945 he showed an inclination to turn to the Embassy for support against Russian pressure.

A talkative demagogue, fond of working himself into passionate indignation about subjects which he does not understand. For instance, he opposed the Tripartite Treaty and caused the Feroughi Cabinet a great deal of trouble. But he is amenable to argument, and, though pig-headed and vain, is not entirely without good ideas.

10. Ansari (Ansarie), Abdul Hussein Mas'ud (Massoud).

The eldest son of the late Ali Quli Ansari Mushavir-ul-Mamluk. Born 1899. Educated at Tehran and in Europe. Joined the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1920. Served for a number of years in the Persian Embassy at Moscow as secretary, and his rapid promotion is largely due to his father's influence. Counsellor at Moscow in 1927, and held that post till he was transferred to Tehran in 1931. Head of the Economics Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in September 1933. Went to Germany as a member of the Persian Economic Mission to Germany in July 1935. Head of the Third Political Section (dealing with British affairs) 1936. Head of the Protocol Department, November 1937. Consul-General, Delhi, May 1938. Minister to Sweden 1941. Returned to Tehran in 1944 and was appointed Head of the Tripartite Pact Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Vice-President of Russo-Persian Cultural Relations Society, March 1945. Appointed Governor-General of Gilan, November 1945.

Married a Russian in Moscow; the lady was suspected of being a spy; she died in Berlin in 1936 leaving one child, a boy. Married an Iranian in 1937.

Civil and fairly energetic, but formal, and lacking in geniality and sense of humour. When he was in charge of the Economics Section it proved impossible to get much useful information out of him, and as the head of the Third Political Department he was not particularly helpful. Speaks Russian, French and German; his outlook is almost as much Russian as Persian, and many of his colleagues distrust him accordingly.

11. Ansari, Ghulam Ali, Brigadier (Sartip).

Born about 1890, of a military family in Isfahan. Educated in France—was private in French army

and later trained at Fontainebleau Artillery School. Soon earned a reputation for honesty and energy in the army. Military attaché at Washington 1917-18. Then studied at Ecole de Guerre in France and passed with distinction. Removed from army in 1937 by Riza Shah, rejoined in 1941. Director of Artillery, November 1941. Commandant of the Officers' School, June 1942. Assistant to General Greely, United States army, when adviser to the Ministry of War, August 1942. Under-Secretary of War September 1943-April 1944. Head of Baluchistan Inspection Commission, November 1944. Deputy Chief of General Staff, January 1945; dismissed when Qavam came into power, February 1946. Inspector in the Ministry of War, April 1946. Was a close associate of General Arfa before Arfa was arrested in April 1946, since when he has been the target for much abuse in the Russian-controlled section of the press. A patriot with anti-Russian sentiments. Honest, hard-working and serious. Unpopular in army because of a rough tongue, a strong temper and an uncompromising mind.

Married to a daughter of Abdul Husain Shaibani (Wahid-ul-Mulk).

12. Aqeeli (Agherli), Farajullah.

Born in Isfahan 1888, the son of the late Dr. Amanullah Khan, a well-known physician. Educated in Tehran; speaks French and some English. Entered the service of the gendarmerie in 1911. His brother, Colonel Fazlullah Khan, committed suicide when a member of the Anglo-Persian Military Commission, which sat in 1919-20.

Appointed general in 1922, and Chief of Staff to the Western Army in Hamadan. Military Governor of Gilan for a time in 1925. Governor-General of Khuzistan 1928 to 1930, during which time he showed administrative ability in establishing the authority of the new régime.

Accused of partiality towards the tribes, he was placed on the retired list in 1930.

Appointed Director-General of the Registration and Civil Census Department in 1932. Relieved of this appointment in 1934.

Re-employed in the army after the departure of Reza Shah, was suspected of pro-German bias at the time of the arrest of Zahidi in 1942. Head of the Gendarmerie in 1942 and did his best to reorganise that force; but was not in close agreement with the American Gendarmerie advisers. Arrested and removed with other suspects to Sultanabad in June 1943. Released at the end of the war with Japan. Appointed President of Military Tribunal, November 1945; Chief of General Staff under Qavam's Cabinet, February 1946.

Has the reputation of being efficient, energetic and conscientious, and a devout Moslem.

13. Arasteh, Nadir.

A Qajar prince. Born about 1893. Governor of Pahlavi in 1928. Deputy-Governor of Azerbaijan in 1930-32. Governor of Khuzistan, May 1932-August 1933. Has also served in the Persian Legation in London. Appointed Minister to Poland, December 1933. Appointed first Persian Minister to the Argentine Republic, August 1935; presented his letters in October 1935. Recalled to Tehran, October 1936; the post being abolished. In charge of the Consular Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for a short while in 1937. Minister at Berlin, August 1937. Accredited also to The Hague in 1939. Recalled from Berlin, May 1940. Governor-General of Mazandaran, January 1942 and of Gilan, January 1943. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, November 1944 in Bayat's Government and for Communications in Sadr's Cabinet, June to November 1945.

14. Ardelan, Dr. Ali Gholi.

Born about 1900; brother of Amanullah Ardelan. Served mostly under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in various posts from 1922. Secretary at Washington, 1932, where he had a dispute with Ghaffar Jalal, the Minister. Counsellor at Vichy after the collapse of France in 1940. Returned to Tehran 1942 and was in charge of the English section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for more than a year, fulfilling his duties with efficiency. Counsellor at Angora at the end of 1945.

Speaks English. Very helpful to us while he was at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

15. Ardelan, Amanullah (Haji Izz-ul-Mamalik).

Born about 1888. Son of Haji Fakhr-ul-Mulk of Kurdistan. Educated at Tehran. Elected a Deputy to the second Majlis through the influence of his father, when the latter was Governor of Arabistan. Served first in the Ministry of Finance. An active member of the Democratic party and elected to the third Majlis from Kermanshah. A pro-German during the war of 1914-18, he left Persia for Turkey at that time. After the war he became financial agent for Kerman through bribing Akbar Mirza, the Minister of Finance, and made a good thing of that post. Financial agent for Fars 1922-23. A member of the fifth Majlis. A close friend of Suleiman Mirza and the Socialists. Minister of Public Works in Sardar Sepah's Cabinet of October 1923. Resigned, April 1924. Again employed under the Ministry of Finance in Kerman and Fars. Governor of Astarabad 1928; of Luristan, &c., in 1932, of Gilan in 1933, and again of Luristan in 1934, of Bushire and the Gulf Ports 1935; and Governor-General of Kerman in May 1936. Recalled in August 1937.

Governor-General of Azerbaijan (West) at the time of the invasion 1941; fled precipitately to Tehran when the Russians advanced, fearing that revenge would be taken on him for various anti-Russian measures which he had been ordered to take. Then Director-General of Ministry of Finance, and Governor of Isfahan in 1942. Minister of Public Health in Soheily's Cabinet of February 1943. Minister of Finance in Soheily's revised Cabinet of December 1943. Has been very helpful to us since 1941. Speaks some English. Minister of Commerce and Industry in Sa'id's Cabinet, March 1944 but dropped in August 1944. Returned to Cabinet under Bayat in November 1944, resigned April 1945. Minister of Justice in Hakimi's Cabinet November 1945-January 1946.

An intelligent and progressive person, though not over-scrupulous when it comes to taking money.

16. Ardelan, Nasir Quli.

Born in Tehran 1896. Third son of the late Haji Fakhr-ul-Mulk, who was a Court official; his mother is the daughter of Izz-ed-Douleh and granddaughter of Mohammed Shah. Educated at Tehran and in Belgium. Spent a year in London learning English. Returned to Persia 1915 and entered the service of the Ministry of the Interior, where he served for fifteen years. Served as Governor of Do-Dangeh in Mazandaran, of Firuzkuh, and in Khuzistan as Acting Governor. Then was Governor of Sari, Acting Governor of Mazandaran, and Governor of Semnan. Governor of Mohammerah (Khorramshahr) in 1925, and Governor of Abadan in 1930. Employed in the National Bank since 1931.

Intelligent and capable. Elected deputy for Senneh in the Majlis elections of December 1943.

17. Arfa, Hassan.

Born about 1890, the eldest son of the late Prince Reza Arfa (Arfa-ed-Douleh). Educated in Russia

and France; his mother, now mentally deranged, being a Caucasian. Joined the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1907 as secretary to the Persian Consulate at Tiflis. Secretary at the Persian Legation at St. Petersburg in 1908. Joined the gendarmerie in 1911; and has been in the army since then. Commanded the crack cavalry "Pahlavi" Regiment in 1931. Has served as military attaché in London for a short time, and has been a prominent officer in the new army. Accompanied the Shah on his State visit to Turkey in 1934. In 1935 on the General Staff, in charge of a training school. Persian delegate to the Zahidan Conference in 1935, where, no doubt under strict orders, he took an extremely nationalistic and anti-British standpoint.

Officially attended Ataturk's funeral in 1938. Promoted Brigadier-General April 1939. Inspector of Cavalry 1942. Commanding the 1st Division 1943.

Speaks French, English, Turkish, and Russian. His anti-British utterances were no doubt a measure of prudence, as he is married to an Englishwoman, née Bewicke.

Appointed Chief of the General Staff, December 1945. Worked hard to resist "Tudeh" activities and had some success in organising resistance to the Azerbaijan Democrats and their independent Government in Tabriz. In consequence he incurred enmity of the pro-Russian groups and when Qavam took office in February 1946 with the task of restoring good relations with Russia, Arfa was at once relieved of his post. Arrested April 1946 by order of Qavam-us-Saltaneh.

18. As'Ad, Muhammad Taqi (Amir-i-Jang).

Born about 1906, son of the late Sardar As'ad: a Bakhtiari Khan imprisoned with other tribal leaders under Reza Shah, released in September 1941. Owns properties near Dizful from where he was elected Deputy for the 14th Majlis. Was from the beginning one of the most loyal supporters of Sayyid Zia. Claims to have influence over Kurds because he had been sympathetic to Kurdish and other tribal leaders when in prison with them. Extremely friendly to the British.

Honest, patriotic and much opposed to the spread of Soviet influence.

19. Asadi, Salman.

The eldest son of the late Mohammad Vali Asadi, mutawalli of the shrine at Meshed, who was shot for treason in 1935. Born about 1895. Educated at the American College, Tehran; spent a few years also at Cambridge and in London; speaks English. Owing to his father's influence elected to the Majlis as member for Seistan for the seventh and eighth sessions.

Served for a short time in the News Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as a translator. In charge of the Department of Propaganda 1941 to March 1942. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Food 1942 and worked hard to ensure the food supply of Tehran with Mr. Sheridan in the famine winter of 1942-43. Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Finance and Head of the Rice Monopoly April 1944. Member of Economic Section of Qavam's Mission to Moscow, February 1946.

Pleasant, well read and intelligent; but a bit of an intriguer and rather lazy. Not discreet, somewhat given to mis-statement and flattery, and unstable.

20. Atabeki, Muhsin.

Born about 1889. Son of the late Ali Ashgar Atabeg-i-Azam, the former Prime Minister. Educated in Persia. Entered the Ministry of Finance in 1918. Secretary to the Persian Embassy in Turkey 1927. Secretary at Brussels 1928. Has

served also at Rome, and as "chef de cabinet" of the Ministry of Public Works. Secretary in London, 1930-32. Second secretary at Washington, 1933. Returned to Tehran the following year after a dispute with the Minister, Ghaffar Jalal. Vice-consul at Damascus 1936.

Brother-in-law of Prince Akbar Massoud. Divorced his first wife, who later married Ali Akbar Devar, and was again divorced. Then married a Persian girl, *née* Chourabehi, from Istanbul.

Speaks French and English, and has good manners. Not a forceful personality, but remembers with gratitude the help which his father received from the British Legation long ago.

Returned from Damascus 1942 and has since been employed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

21. A'Azam-Zanganeh, Dr. Abdul Hamid.

Born at Kermanshah about 1899, of a well-known family; his half-brother being Amir-i-Kull. Educated at Tehran in the Law School and the Political School. Went to Paris 1929 and obtained a doctorate in law and economics, his thesis being on oil; has also been in England. 1935 returned to Persia and was employed in the Ministry of Education; professor in the Law School. Also a pleader in the Court, mostly in mortgage-bank business and agricultural cases. Co-editor with Dr. Suratgar of the newspaper *Iran Javan*.

A small and quiet-spoken man; makes a good impression and seems intelligent.

Deputy for the 14th Majlis for Kermanshah; he seems to regard himself as elected by the personal order of the Shah.

22. Azudi, Yadullah (Amir A'zam).

Born in Tehran about 1890. The son of the late Nusratullah Mirza, and a grandson of Vajihullah Mirza Sepahsalar who was the grandson of Fath Ali Shah. Inherited large estates from his father, all of which were situated in the neighbourhood of Damghan and Shahrud. Educated in Persia; has spent some years in Europe. Married first a daughter of Hasan Pirnia (Mushir-ed-Douleh), who died a few years later; he then married a daughter of Vossugh-ed-Douleh (Hasan Vossugh).

Entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1920. First secretary of the Persian Legation at Berlin in 1928, and for some time was Chargé d'Affaires there. Chief de Personnel at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1929-30. Counsellor at Washington 1931, and acted as Chargé d'Affaires there. Minister at Warsaw in March 1933; but recalled to Tehran as the result of some scandal dating from his Washington days the following December. Chief of the Passport Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, August 1935 (now known as the Consular Department). Administrative Director-General of the Ministry, March 1937, until November 1937. Minister of Roads under Qavam-es-Saltaneh 1942, and did well in that post. Resigned early in 1943 partly owing to accusations of nepotism; appointed Minister to Brazil, and proceeded thither July 1943.

Speaks French and German, and usually very helpful and forthcoming.

23. Bader, Abdul Wahhab.

The eldest son of Mirza Ahmed Khan Bader (Nasir-ed-Douleh). Born in 1889, and for three years studied at King's College, London. Entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as an interpreter in 1916, and remained on the staff for a number of years. Transferred to the Ministry of Education in 1921, and for a time was "chef de cabinet" of that Ministry. Married, as his second wife, a French lady doctor named de Romps. Consul at Karachi 1928-29. Secretary at the Legation at Washington 1930. Consul at Prague 1933. Recalled

to Tehran at the end of 1936. A small man (like all his relations), with a perfect command of English. Quite friendly and agreeable.

Counsellor at Berlin in 1940, and Chargé d'Affaires from May 1940. Living in Switzerland since 1943.

24. Bader, Mahmud.

Younger brother of Abdul Wahhab Bader. Born in 1893. Educated in England. Has been in the service of the Ministry of Finance since 1910. Assistant to the Accountant-General at the Ministry of Finance for a number of years. Chief Accountant of the Ministry of Public Works October 1928. In the same capacity in the Ministry of Roads and Communications 1930. Director-General of the Ministry of Finance 1933. President of the Iranian Economic Mission to Germany in July 1935. Succeeded Abolghassem Ferouhar as Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Finance in April 1936. Appointed Acting Minister of Finance on the death of Davar in February 1937. Minister of Finance, September 1937 until October 1939, when superseded by General Amir Khosrovi, head of the National Bank, with whom he had carried on a long contest for control of the Government's financial operations. M. Bader was said to favour dealings with Germany.

Minister of Finance in Soheily's Cabinet 1942, and in that capacity showed himself helpful in smoothing over financial difficulties and in negotiating currency agreements. Minister of Industry in Soheily's Cabinet of 1943, but was not very successful in settling various wages disputes, and on Soheily's forming a new Cabinet in December 1943 he was not included in it.

Minister of Finance in Sadr's Cabinet, June-September, 1945. Capable and helpful but exposed himself to criticism for failing to suppress corruption and for introducing nepotism which, it was alleged, flourished in his Ministry on an excessive scale even by Persian standards.

25. Bahar (Malik-ush-Shuarā).

Born in Meshed, 1882. Son of a well-known poet named Sabouri. A member of the old Democratic party, and edited a paper in Meshed called the *No-Bahār*. A member of the third, fourth and fifth Majlises from Meshed, and of the sixth from Tehran. Edited his paper *No-Bahār* in Tehran during the war of 1914-18, and was pronouncedly pro-German. Nevertheless, he supported Vossugh-ed-Douleh's Cabinet of 1918-20 during which time he edited the *Iran* newspaper. Opposed the Government during the term of the fifth Majlis and was an opponent of the change of régime. An attempt was made on his life when the debate on the change of régime took place in the Majlis; but another unfortunate man who resembled him was the victim. Seyyid Hasan Mudarris helped him to get elected to the sixth Majlis.

Nothing much was heard of him during Reza Shah's reign, except that he composed some odes in celebration of the Firdausi centenary in October 1934, and translated into Persian verse a poem by John Drinkwater on that occasion. He has been exiled from Tehran on more than one occasion.

In spite of a fondness for opium has been fairly active at Tehran since the change of régime in 1941. Up to August 1942 he and Massoud Sabeti actively supported Qavam-es-Saltaneh's candidature for the post of Prime Minister. After the latter's fall early in 1943, he obtained newsprint from the Russians with which he kept his paper *No-Bahār* going, and published a series of articles apparently critical of but really supporting Qavam. In fact a shifty and over-subtle politician.

Acknowledged to be a leading poet, and a practical newspaper writer. He himself maintains that he

is above all anti-Russian but has been associated with the Tudeh for some years. On Committee of Russo-Persian Cultural Relations Society, March 1944.

Minister of Education in Qavam's Cabinet, February 1946.

26. Bahrami, Farajullah (Dabir-i-A'zam).

Born about 1890. A member of a well-known and numerous Tehran family. Munshi or secretary to Reza Shah before and after his accession to the throne in 1925. Was appointed member of a commission of examination in connexion with the Lionsoff Caspian Fishery claim, but resigned from that position.

Lost the Shah's full confidence in about 1927, and was sent abroad to take charge of the Persian students in Europe, at Paris, Berlin, &c. Returned to Persia about two years later. In July 1930 appointed Governor of Isfahan, and a year later Governor-General of Fars. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in March 1932. Resigned on the fall of the Hedayat Cabinet in September 1933, and was sent to Meshed as Governor-General in the following January. Superseded as Governor-General of Khorasan in October 1934, for reporting that adequate facilities did not exist at Meshed for the accommodation of the orientals attending the Ferdousi millenary. Since that time under a cloud. In the summer of 1935 he was suspected of complicity in some plot and was exiled to Malayer. Allowed to return to Tehran under surveillance, October 1936.

After the change of régime in 1941 he has been a prominent member of the Adalat party. Minister of the Interior in January 1943, but he very soon became involved in a quarrel with his chief, Qavam-es-Saltaneh, which led to the collapse of the latter's Cabinet. His criticisms of his chief in that episode did not create a good impression on this Legation; he is evidently self-opinionated and stubborn. Is very alarmed at the Soviet menace to the independence of Persia. Governor-General of Isfahan, 1943-44.

A very friendly person, who always appears to do what he can to help British consular officers. Has great aspirations to literary eminence; a great admirer of Hafiz. As Minister he incurred some criticism from his fellow-countrymen for inaccessibility and lack of hospitality. Speaks very little French. Businesslike and hard-working.

27. Bahrami, Fazlullah.

Born about 1897. For some time a colonel in the police, and in charge of the detective force. Acting chief of the Tehran Municipality in 1937. Director of Census and Civil Status, January 1938.

Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in Soheily's Cabinet of 1942 and filled that post adequately. Head of the municipality again July 1943; suspended from his functions during the Tehran elections at the end of 1943 owing to accusations of illegal intervention in the elections, but resumed his functions January 1944.

A large individual with some energy; but he seems to have made a good deal of money by dubious land transactions when head of the municipality. Obstinate like all the Bahrami family.

Governor-General of Kerman 1944-45 where he showed great initiative by organising various schemes for improving water supply, raising money for orphanages, &c.—popular there. Offered post of Governor-General, Kermanshah, in August 1945, but refused. Health undermined by malaria. Friendly and co-operative when in Kerman. Normally reserved and placid but clever and not easily taken in.

28. Bakhtiari, Murteza Quli Samsam.

The son of the famous Samsam-us-Saltaneh. Born probably about 1875. Took part in operations against Salar-ud-Douleh in 1911. Represented the Bakhtiari tribe in the Majlis in the same year, and appointed Ilbeggi of the tribe in 1912. Governor of Yazd in 1914. Helped the Germans during the war 1914-18. Made his peace with the British Legation after the war. Has held the appointment of Ilbeggi or Ilkhani of the tribe on several occasions. Was with the tribe when most of the Bakhtiari Khans were arrested in December 1933; he then had the appointment of Ilkhani. He escaped the fate of his fellow Khans, and has assisted the Government in their policy of inducing the Bakhtiari tribe to abandon their traditional nomadic habits. Appointed Governor of Bakhtiari early in 1943 and did well, suppressing various upstarts like Abol Ghassem, and establishing order in that tribal area, thereby serving British interests well during the war. A clever man, not above intrigue. Quick-tempered, jovial and obstinate. Served Reza Shah well. Very pleasant to meet, but not the sort of man one can trust very far, as he is very much in the hands of his strong-minded wife and also places implicit trust in a worthless agent, Misbah Fatemy.

By the end of 1945 he had, however, become unpopular with the other tribal Khans who agitated for his removal. Relieved of his appointment by Qavam-us-Saltaneh for leaving Tehran for his properties in the south despite explicit instructions not to do so until he had reached agreement with the other Khans.

29. Bayat, Murteza Quli (Saham es Sultan).

A landowner from Sultanabad, born about 1882. Owns considerable property. Member of the Majlis on several occasions, and Minister of Finance 1926-27. Deputy Speaker of the tenth Majlis. Member of the Adalat party 1942. Accused of hoarding wheat during the winter of 1942-43. Minister of Finance in Soheily's Cabinet 1943 and performed the useful function of effacing himself completely in favour of Dr. Millspaugh. Not included in Soheily's revised Cabinet of December 1943.

Speaks a little French. A highly respectable and polite man. Minister without Portfolio in Sa'id's Cabinet March-August 1944. Prime Minister November 1944-April 1945. He sought to improve relations with the Russians but his efforts only resulted in the paralysis of the administration of the country. Sent as Governor-General to Tabriz in December 1945 but failed to do anything to check the Azerbaijan independence movement and soon returned to Tehran. Joined Qavam's Cabinet in February 1946 as Minister of Finance.

30. Bayendor, Ghulam Hussein.

Elder brother of Ghulam Ali Bayendor. Was a captain in the army until 1930, when he went to Italy on a course of naval engineering. Returned in 1934, and was appointed engineer officer of the southern naval force. Promoted major in 1935. Port officer of Abadan and Khorramshahr in 1936. Lieutenant-Colonel, 1938.

Keenly interested in mercantile affairs, and helped to float the monopoly company for the landing of cargo in the port of Khorramshahr in 1937. Unpopular with his subordinates. Quick and hot-tempered, but less so than formerly. Uses his position for his financial advantage. Not very intelligent, but very hard-working. Speaks French and Italian. Does not appear to like the British.

Transferred to General Staff 1944.

31. *Bushihri-Dehdasti, Agha Javad (Amir Humayun).*

Born in Tehran 1898. Second son of the late Haji Muin-ut-Tujjar. Educated at Tehran and in Europe. Speaks French and English. Married a daughter of the late Haji Amin-uz-Zarb. Elected a member of the seventh Majlis. More interested in politics than his elder brother Agha Riza. Fond of pomp, and very extravagant in his manner of living. Nicknamed by some of his friends "Prince Merchant."

Was in Hamburg at the outbreak of the war in 1939, and spent some time in Germany thereafter. Finally got away to Stamboul in 1942 with the help of Count Schulenburg and returned to Tehran March 1943. Arrested and sent to Sultanabad as a suspect in June 1943. Released May 1945.

A clever man who in the past has always maintained friendly relations with British officials.

32. *Dadvar, Mehdi (Vussuq-es-Saltaneh).*

Born about 1874. Entered the service of the Ministry of War when quite young. Chief of Accounts of the Mazandaran Regiments 1905. Joined the Nationalists and came to Tehran with the Nationalist forces. Chief of Accounts at the War Office 1909. Held this post for six years. Assistant Minister for War 1916 to 1918. Governor of Zinjan and Khamseh 1918. Minister for War during 1920. Governor of Gilan for a few months in 1922. Governor-General of Fars in 1924; and of Kerman 1925. Governor-General of Khorasan 1926-27. Elected a member of the eighth Majlis. Deputy Speaker of the ninth and tenth Majlis. In the eleventh he was (1939) only a member for Tehran.

Attached to one of ephemeral parties in the Majlis in 1942-43, but having failed in his ambition to become once more Minister of War he is devoting some of his time to promoting trade with India.

Governor-General Tabriz, February 1944. Recalled February 1945. Friendly and pleasant in manner. When in Tabriz invariably took the line of least resistance and was regarded as nothing more than an amiable figurehead. Seemed to be completely amenable to the wishes of the Russians. A voluble talker but carries no weight.

33. *Dashti, Ali.*

Born about 1887. Educated in the schools of the Holy Places of Iraq. Returned to Persia about 1922 and edited a paper called the *Shafaq Surkh*. As an editor he became notorious for slanderous abuse and the extortion of money by blackmail, and his abuse of Great Britain and British statesmen was frequently the subject of complaint from His Majesty's Legation to the Persian Government. He was elected a Deputy to the fifth Majlis in 1924, but he was refused a seat by the Parliamentary Commission, whose duty it was to scrutinise his election proceedings. He was prominent in the abortive Republican movement in 1924, and is said to have received and pocketed large sums from Reza Pahlavi, on whose behalf he worked. After acquiring a share of this world's goods he appeared to become more human and ceased the abuse and vituperation for which he had become famous. He espoused the cause of Reza Pahlavi against Ahmed Shah, and was elected a Deputy to the sixth Majlis in 1926. He was invited to Moscow in October 1927 to attend the tenth anniversary of the Soviet régime. From Moscow he went to Berlin and Paris and returned to Persia early in 1928. He was elected a Deputy to the seventh Majlis in 1928 and to the eighth Majlis in 1930.

Edited or controlled his paper till about July 1935, receiving subsidies now from the Shah and now from the Soviet Embassy. He is a hot-headed

firebrand with no scruples and no principles, and is capable of the basest villainy if it will help him to attain his ends. He speaks no European language, except a little French.

In July 1935 he fell into disgrace and was said to have uttered disparaging remarks about Reza Shah's régime. His paper was suppressed and he himself was allowed to plead sickness and to retire to a Government hospital, where he was made to pay well for his maintenance.

At liberty again at the end of 1936. In charge of the Press Bureau of the Ministry of Interior in 1937.

Since the fall of Reza has returned to the forefront of Tehran politics. A severe critic of Ferouhi and Soheily in 1942, he worked hard for the return of Qavam-es-Saltaneh as Prime Minister. When the latter came back to power and did not make Dashti a Minister, he turned against him and criticised him in many speeches. Dashti is certainly a persuasive orator, who holds the attention of the Majlis as few other persons can do. A prime mover in the Adalat party, he now utters the most enthusiastic praise of democracy on the British model, and evidently hopes that his past will be forgotten by us. As he appears to have much more audacity and forensic ability than most of his rivals, he may well go a good deal further than his present position as a Majlis Deputy. Elected to fourteenth Majlis 1943.

Since the oil crisis of 1944 he has opposed the spread of Russian influence in Persia, and has strongly supported the "resistance" Cabinets preceding Qavam-us-Saltaneh's. Was consistently attacked by Tudeh press during this period. Trusted little even by his friends who regard his excessive attachment to women (which he publicly displays) as not in keeping with high office.

34. *Daulatshahi, Abul-Fath.*

Born about 1879. A son of the late Mishkat-ud-Douleh. His mother was a daughter of the late Zahir-ul-Mulk Zanganeh of Kermanshah. Is married to a daughter of Mirza Hashim Ashtiani. A Qajar prince. Appointed Governor of Tehran in 1929 through the influence of his brother, the late Ghulam Ali Merza Daulatshahi, a relative of the second Pahlavi Queen. Appointed Governor of Luristan in 1925, but did not proceed; Governor-General of Fars 1936, from which appointment he was dismissed in September 1937, and was arrested for numerous corrupt practices. An easy-going spendthrift, up to his ears in debt, but not without intelligence.

Since 1941 has come out of his shell and is evidently hoping for employment, but was disappointed at failing to get elected to the fourteenth Majlis from Kermanshah.

35. *Diba, Abul Hassan (Sigat-ed-Douleh).*

Born in Tehran 1898. Son of the late Vakil-ul-Mulk; a half-brother of Hishmat-ud-Douleh and of Dr. Musaddiq. His mother is a sister of Farman Farma. Educated in Europe. Employed for some time in the Ministry of Finance. Owns considerable property in Tabriz and Tehran. Employed in the Railway Office in 1928. In the Department of Commerce in 1931. Assistant Director of that Department July 1932. Resigned May 1933, and has since then devoted himself to private trade. Formed a private company, which is interested in various projects. Married; one of his daughters was educated in England. Owned the Park Hotel 1943. Delegate to Labour Conference Paris, October 1945.

36. *Divanbegi, Agha.*

Born in Kurdistan about 1891. Educated in Persia. In the employ of the Ministry of the

Interior for some years. Went to Turkey with the Nationalists during the war. "Chef de cabinet" to the Governor-General of Kerman when Teymouratche was in charge there. A member of the sixth, seventh and eighth Majlises. Governor of Gilan in 1931. Resigned in 1933, and appointed Governor of Mazandaran in October 1934; relieved early in 1936.

Governor-General of Khuzistan, July 1942, and showed some energy, but is reported to have lined his pockets pretty thoroughly in connexion with certain contracts. Recalled early 1943.

Speaks French. Agreeable to talk to, but unreliable. Related to the Qaragozlu family.

37. *Fahimi, Khalil (Fahim-ul-Mulk).*

Born about 1885. Related to the Mukhbir-ud-Douleh (Hedayat) family.

Employed in various posts in the Foreign Office early in his career. Minister of Finance in June 1922. Appointed Governor-General of Kerman in October 1925, but did not proceed. Member of the Majlis for Quchan on several occasions. *Rapporteur* of the Financial Commission of the Majlis. Supported, by a speech in the Majlis, the cancellation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company concession. Appointed Governor-General of Azerbaijan in February 1934. Ambassador to Turkey, May 1936. Recalled, November 1939.

Prominent member of the Society of Supporters of the League of Nations, founded in December 1933. Governor-General at Tabriz, 1941, after the fall of Reza. Did not display much energy in dealing with a difficult and delicate situation. Recalled to Tehran at the end of 1942. Minister without portfolio in Soheily's Cabinet of 1943. Minister without portfolio August 1944-April 1945. Minister of Interior in Hakimi's Cabinet, November 1945, but was forced by the Prime Minister to resign at the end of December. Speaks French. Very agreeable and reasonable in conversation.

38. *Farhudi, Dr. Hussein.*

Born about 1899. Son-in-law of Wahid-ul-Mulk Sahibani. Educated in Tehran. Served in various capacities in the Ministry of Education, at Tehran and in the provinces. Has also done newspaper work. One of the Directors-General of the Ministry, 1943. Successful candidate for Dasht-i-Mishun and Susangird in the fourteenth Majlis, 1943, though he had little connexion previously with that district beyond having been representative of the Ministry of Education in Ahwaz about 1933.

39. *Farrukh, Mehdi (Mu'tasim-us-Saltaneh).*

A Seyyid. Born about 1887. Was for some years in the employ of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and head of the 2nd Political Department, dealing with eastern countries. Minister at Kabul in 1927-28. Subsequently Director-General of Industry. Governor of Western Azerbaijan, February 1936. Again Director-General of Industry and Mines, September 1937, and shortly afterwards raised to the newly-created appointment of Minister of Industry and Mines. Removed from this post without explanation, March 1938.

Governor-General of Fars 1940, and of Kerman in 1941. Minister of the Interior of Soheily's Cabinet, July 1942, and in spite of Majlis opposition maintained his place in the Cabinet. Qavam-es-Saltaneh, in August, made him Minister of Food, in which post he displayed a sort of crazy activity which irritated many and did not achieve much. Having fallen out with the American adviser Sheridan, he left the Ministry of Food on the fall of the Qavam Cabinet in February 1943. Elected

a Deputy for Zabol in the fourteenth Majlis, November 1943.

Appointed Governor-General of Fars, December 1945, but was recalled in February 1946.

40. *Farzaneh, Hassan.*

Born about 1892. Educated at Tehran and in France. Was in the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for about twelve years, during which he acted as Chargé d'Affaires for Moscow and Rome in 1924 and 1929. Transferred to the Ministry of Interior in 1935, and appointed Governor of Khorramshahr in February 1936. Assumed charge of the Governorates of Khorramshahr and Abadan in October 1936. Employed in Ministry of Interior 1942. Head of Political Department 1943. Appointed Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior, December 1943. Governor-General of Gilan in November 1944 but recalled a year later as being too subservient to the Russians.

Speaks French, a fair amount of English and a little Russian. Well educated and polished, keenly interested in westernisation.

41. *Fateh, Mahmoud.*

Brother of Mustafa Fateh. Born about 1900 at Isfahan and educated at Tehran and at Montpellier. Trained in agriculture and husbandry. In charge of the Karaj agricultural school for some years. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Agriculture 1943. Has planned a model village at Veramine, of which he is very proud. Minister of Agriculture in Sa'ad's Cabinet, March 1944, but only retained office for a few days.

Helpful and business-like, though inclined to be too optimistic and to imagine that all Persia's agricultural difficulties can be solved by tractors.

42. *Fateh, Mustafa.*

Born in Isfahan about 1897. Son of Fateh-ul-Mulk, a servant of the Prince-Governor of Isfahan, Zill-us-Sultan. Educated at Tehran and at Columbia University, United States, where he graduated in economics. Entered the Anglo-Persian Oil Company about 1922 and is the senior Persian official in that company at Tehran, drawing a large salary. Author of a book on the economic condition of Persia, published in 1926. Has a perfect command of English and is keenly interested in Persian politics. He also has an international outlook and a considerable knowledge of world politics, particularly those of the Left. In 1943 founded the *Hamrahan* party, with the express object of combating communism, though the party's programme contained elaborate socialist ideals far beyond anything which will be practicable in Persia for some time. Always very approachable and desirous of enlisting British help for his schemes; and a mine of information about the foibles of his countrymen, whom he divides into two sharply distinct categories: (1) The old gang who are hopelessly corrupt, and (2) his party members who are sublimely honest. Few other people believe in this dichotomy, and he had many enemies who accused him of devoting the oil company's funds to the purposes of his party and its newspaper, *Imrooz va Farda*. The *Hamrahan* party never came to anything and died a natural death.

Has a son in England and a daughter married to Asghar Mirza, the son of Sarem-ud-Douleh, who surely would come in category (1). His wife was a daughter of the Zill-us-Sultan's head secretary, Siraj-ul-Mulk.

43. *Fatimi, Mehdi (Imad-us-Saltaneh).*

Born about 1886. Has had an official career in the Ministry of Finance, and in 1918 was financial

representative in his native city of Isfahan, where he is influential both through his own family and through that of his wife, who is a daughter of the late Prince Zill-es-Sultan. Appointed Deputy-Governor of Fars in 1922-23. Elected a Deputy from Isfahan in the fifth and sixth terms of the Majlis. Appointed Minister of Education in August 1925, Minister of Justice in December 1925, and Minister of Interior, February to May 1927.

As a Minister and a Deputy he was uniformly popular and successful. In 1928 he fell out with the Minister of Court and was not allowed to be elected to the seventh term of the Majlis. Elected a Deputy to the eighth Majlis, 1930. Is socially agreeable and friendly to His Majesty's Legation, Governor of Gilan from December 1933 until October 1937.

Survived a good many attacks from the Court in connexion with his conduct as Governor of Gilan; one of the charges being that he allowed the level of the Caspian Sea to fall.

Head of the Municipality of Tehran under Soheily's Cabinet, February 1943. Resigned 1943 and elected Deputy for Nain 1943. One of the leaders of the Ittihad-i-Milli group in the fourteenth Majlis which contained about twenty Right-wing members. He speaks no European language except a little French.

44. *Fatimi (Fatemy) Saifpur.*

Born about 1905, one of three brothers, a Naini family which claims relationship with Mehdi Fatemy (Imad-us-Saltaneh), though the latter denies it. Educated at the Stuart Memorial College, Isfahan, where he became a baptised Christian; but he made away with some of the mission funds and the mission do not forgive him. He and another, named Hussein Sandat, wrote a book against Islam. In order to marry his present wife, who is well off, became a Bahai.

Farmandar (Governor) of Shiraz 1941-43; then resigned, apparently because he had amassed too much money there. His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, considered him energetic, helpful and capable. Then returned to Isfahan as candidate for the Majlis for Najafabad, and though he had little real following in that area success was engineered for him by Morteza Quli Bakhtiari and Sarem ud Douleh. Intelligent, entirely unscrupulous, and very ambitious; speaks good English and has studied English and English literature, and can remember many extracts. At present (1944) it suits him to appear pro-British; he is certainly anti-Russian. Has many enemies, both Persian and British, but is a man who can, when he wishes, make himself very useful. Was largely responsible for organising the anti-Tudeh Workers' Union in Isfahan.

Before Qavam came into power in 1946, he pretended to be passionately opposed to him (a ruse enacted to please the British). In fact he almost certainly supported him as was shown by an article appearing in his brother's paper *Bakhtar* on the day that Qavam was elected.

After the demise of the 14th Majlis he went on a visit to the United States.

45. *Ferouhar, Abbas.*

Born about 1895. Though his junior in age, is an uncle of Abul-Qasim Ferouhar. Member of the Protocol Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1934, and acted as head of that department in 1935 and part of 1936. Head of the Personnel Department, July 1936 to April 1937, Counsellor, Angora, until September 1938. Head of the Protocol Department, September 1938.

Speaks French. Married in 1939 a daughter of Muhammad Ali Muqaddam. Polite, friendly and well-meaning, but the head of the Protocol Department under Reza Shah had a thankless task.

Nevertheless, M. Ferouhar, unlike his colleagues at the Court, survived the ordeal of the Crown Prince's wedding celebrations.

Sent to Beirut with the vague title of "Délégué" at the end of 1942. Recalled temporarily in 1943 to give explanations about the conduct of Muzaffar Firuz. Chargé d'Affaires to Greek Court in Cairo, June 1944.

A talkative but somewhat too oily little man.

46. *Ferouhar, Abul-Qasim (Abolghassem).*

Born in Tehran about 1883. A grandson of Mirza Abbas Khan Qavam-ed-Douleh, who was Minister of Finance for some years. Educated in Tehran and Switzerland; studied law. A judge in the Tribunal of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1915-21. Chief of Construction at the Tehran Municipality 1921-24. President of the Tribunal 1926-27. Assistant Director of the Registration Department in the Ministry of the Interior 1927-28. Judge in the Appeal Court in 1929. Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Finance under his great friend Davar October 1933. Accompanied the Shah on his State visit to Turkey in June 1934. Minister to France June 1936; but recalled in January owing to an anti-Persian press campaign in some French newspapers. Acting Minister of Interior, July, and Minister, September 1937. Minister of Industry and Mines, March 1938. Minister of Interior, August 1938 to February 1939, when superseded for no stated reason. A Deputy for Tehran in the twelfth Majlis, October 1939, and in the thirteenth Majlis, 1941. Appears to have lost some of his energy, being unwilling to become Minister of the Interior to run the elections in 1943. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs and later Minister of Finance in Sa'id's Cabinet, March-August 1944. Married to a Bulgarian lady.

47. *Fidakar (Fedakar), Taqi (Taghi).*

Born about 1905, in Isfahan, of humble origin. Educated at the Saremieh school at Isfahan. As a boy he got into trouble for socialistic beliefs. Trained as a lawyer. Worked for a time in the Soviet Consulate-General at Isfahan in connexion with the sale of Soviet textiles in Isfahan. From 1940 onwards has devoted most of his energies to bettering the lot of the Isfahan factory workers and has done much to help them, as he has become the chief workers' representative in disputes about conditions of work. Founded a primitive sort of trade union for the protection of workers' interests, including insurance. Elected to the fourteenth Majlis for Isfahan 1943, being supported by the Tudeh party, of which he is a member, though he disclaims being a Communist and is not looked upon favourably by the Tudeh party in Tehran owing to his moderate views. He is thought not to have had any direct relations with the Soviet authorities concerning the elections. He is, of course, disliked by most of the capitalists of Isfahan, though some of them accept him as a fairly single-minded man. His main political following is among the factory workers and guilds and small bazaar men, who are naturally opposed to domination by the few rich families of Isfahan.

Lost his political following among the factory workers of Isfahan during 1944-45 when the Isfahan workers' union broke away from the Tudeh. On coming to Tehran as a Deputy he immediately fell under Soviet influence.

In April 1946 succeeded in re-establishing Tudeh influence in the Isfahan factories.

48. *Firuz, Muhammad Hussein.*

Born about 1895. The fourth son of the late Farman Farma. Educated at the military college at Petrograd. Entered the Persian army during the 1914-18 war, and was regarded as one of the

promising young officers of the army. Appointed Chief of Staff of the Southern Division in 1925, and did very good work in organising the troops in Fars and enforcing discipline and efficiency. Sent to Delhi as representative of the Persian army at the Indian army manoeuvres early in 1925. Fell under suspicion for some reason about 1929 and resigned his commission. His Qajar origin was no doubt the cause of his collapse. Very attached to his brother Firuz (Nusrat-ed-Douleh) but not on good terms with his father. Married a Miss Namazi, who was educated in Hong Kong and speaks English perfectly.

Returned to Persia late in 1941, and was sent to Fars as G.O.C. and Governor-General in March 1942. Superseded in both appointments by Marshal Shahbakhhti a year later. He had succeeded in keeping a rather precarious order in Fars, but never succeeded in repressing Nasir Qashqai's rebellious movement. Head of the air force, 1943. Again appointed Governor-General of Fars in early summer of 1944 but did not get on with the influential Qavam-ul-Mulk or the Qashqai Khans. His enemies accused him of weakness and of truckling too much to the Tudeh, but His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, on the contrary, considered that his refusal to take unnecessarily repressive measures against the Tudeh was more sound. Appointed Minister of War in Sa'id's reconstituted Cabinet in August 1944 but refused the appointment. Minister of Communications in Hakimi's Cabinet November 1945. Resigned a month later. Returned to the same Ministry in Qavam's Cabinet in February 1946.

Speaks very good French and some English; intelligent and enlightened. A brilliant talker, he seems capable of proving with most convincing reasons that he is always right—but one feels sometimes that he is too convincing.

49. *Firuz, Muhammad Vali.*

Third son of the late Farman Farma. Born about 1893. Educated at Beirut and Paris. Sent to Tabriz as head of the Finance Department, 1915. Said to have taken many bribes while in that appointment. Is very thrifty and has large properties both in Tehran and Tabriz. Elected a Deputy to the fourth, fifth and sixth Majlises for Tabriz. On the fall of his brother, Nusrat-ed-Douleh, in 1931, he retired from public life and was seldom seen. Has been in Europe a good deal.

Elected to the thirteenth Majlis for Sarab in September 1941, and again to the fourteenth in November 1943. His appearance being that of an underfed bird of prey, seems to keep him in the background, but he has a good deal of his father's intelligence.

50. *Firuz, Muzaffar.*

Born about 1910, grandson of Farman Farma, brother of Muhammad Shah, and accordingly uses the title of Prince in social life. Educated at Harrow and Cambridge. Speaks excellent English and fair French: is bitterly hostile to the Pahlavi dynasty and his sole *raison d'être* is to avenge the murder of his father by Riza Shah. His hostility has recently been sharpened by the fact that his wife's relation, Ismit-ul-Muluk, one of the wives of Reza Shah, was recently evicted from the palace on a charge of improper behaviour. At one time employed in Persian Legation in Washington, whence, it is believed, he was removed at the request of the United States Government for abuse of diplomatic bag privileges.

It was Firuz who went to Palestine and brought from there Sayyid Zia's first manifesto. He remained an ardent supporter of Sayyid Zia until May 1945 when he broke with him. He says that the breach was caused by Sayyid Zia's becoming

more and more dictatorial but Sayyid Zia's version was that they had to part because Firuz would not abandon his newspaper campaign, in the newspaper *Ra'd-i-Imruz* which he owns and edits, against the Shah, and Sayyid Zia felt that it was impossible to fight the Russians and the Shah at the same time. Towards the end of 1945 he became one of the chief supporters of Qavam-ul-Saltaneh. As a reward for this Qavam, when he became Prime Minister in February 1946, appointed Firuz Political Under-Secretary, an office apparently created for the purpose, and Director of Propaganda.

A lackey by nature he needs a master which he found first in Sayyid Zia and second in Qavam. He has a bent for propaganda and sensational journalism. At present, May 1946, he has succeeded in making himself extremely unpopular even with his colleagues. His madness is enhanced by a titanic conceit which enables him to believe that he is leading the Tudeh and the U.S.S.R. by the nose. Impartial observers consider the contrary to be the case.

Rash, unbalanced, dishonest, untruthful and malicious, would probably sacrifice anything to bring about the downfall of the Shah. The Shah is aware of this and will find it difficult to work with a Prime Minister who could make such an appointment.

51. *Ghaffari, Amir Saham ud Din (Zuka-ud-Dauleh).*

Born in Tehran about 1880. The second son of the late Muhandis-ul-Mamalik. Educated in Persia and Germany. On the staff of the Ministry of Education 1914-18. First Persian representative to League of Nations. Appointed Persian Minister in Berne 1919-22. Did not venture to return to Persia till the Pahlavi régime was well established in 1931. A chamberlain to Muzaffar-ed-Din Shah and Ahmed Shah. Employed in the Ministry of Education 1934, as a professor of economics. Imprisoned 1939 by order of Reza Shah, on an accusation of having expressed doubts whether the trans-Iranian railway would pay. Sentenced to two years' imprisonment, but kept in prison when his term had been served. Finally obtained release on the fall of Reza Shah in 1941. Director of the Propaganda Section in 1942 and 1943 though he was not very effective in that post and was relieved of his duties early in 1943. Advocated propaganda in favour of religion in order to keep men's minds away from communism.

Speaks French, German and some English. A very voluble, persistent little man, with a great idea of his own importance and infallibility. Has a large family of daughters.

Minister for Posts and Telegraphs in Qavam's Cabinet, February 1946.

52. *Ghaffari, Hassan Ali (Mu'avin-ud-Dowleh).*

Born about 1890, son of the late Moavin-ed-Dowleh, a former Minister for Foreign Affairs. Educated in Europe. Once an attaché to the Persian Legation in Brussels. Has made his career in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, where he became Director of the Protocol Department. After the coronation of Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1926, Ghaffari was appointed Grand Master of Ceremonies at the Court, which post he held until March 1929, when he was appointed Political Director-General at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He was dismissed in November 1929 for permitting publication in the press of the judicial safeguards accorded to foreign subjects in 1928, after the abolition of the extra-territorial privileges, but was reinstated in December 1929. He owed his appointment and reinstatement to Teymourache, the Minister of Court, with whom he was on terms of intimate friendship.

Ghaffari is an agreeable and well-educated man, and speaks French and German fluently. Appointed Minister at Brussels in the spring of 1933. Recalled to Tehran December 1936.

53. Ghani, Qasim.

Born about 1894 at Sabzevar. Sent to Tehran for education by his uncle, Agha Khazra'i, and studied in the Bahai "Tarbiat" school for four years. Then went to Beirut where he qualified as a doctor after a course lasting about seven years. On return to Tehran stayed a short time and then went back to his native town and practised medicine, founding a hospital and doing many good works. Then went to Meshed, where he married a rich wife. A great student of Persian literature. Elected as a Deputy for Meshed in the 13th Majlis. Minister of Health in Sobeily's revised Cabinet of December 1943. Minister of Health in Sa'ad's Cabinet of March 1944. Resigned in April 1944. Member of the Persian Farhangistan or Academy.

A cultured and widely-read man, reputed to be a Bahai, but that is doubtful. Author of a history of Sufism.

54. Hajir, Abdul Hussein.

Born about 1895. The son of one of the "Fidais" of the early days of the Constitution, who served under Taqi-zadeh.

In 1930 served under Taqi-zadeh in the Ministry of Roads and Communications; and in the following year followed that Minister to the Ministry of Finance. Government inspector of the National Bank. A favourite of Davar's, he was given various lucrative posts by him, including the management of the Cloth Monopoly ("Shirkat-i-Qumash") and, most important of all, the direction of the Exchange Control Commission. Relinquished his post at the Exchange Control Commission in the summer of 1937 to proceed to Europe as part of a commission to purchase stocks for the Cloth Monopoly. Head of the Industrial and Agricultural Bank, August 1938. Minister of Commerce and Industry, March 1942, and Minister of Roads and Communications in Sobeily's Cabinet of February 1943. Showed commendable energy in inspecting communications in person.

Went to England to study transport conditions in June 1943 and was still away at the end of the year; meanwhile, in December 1943, on the Cabinet being reshuffled he became Minister of the Interior. Again Minister of the Interior in Sa'ad's Cabinet of March 1944, but was dropped when there was a reshuffle of the Cabinet in August 1944. Minister of Finance in Hakim's Cabinets of May and of November 1945.

An energetic and resourceful man; in his early days he was an interpreter and munshi at the Russian Consulate-General. Speaks French, Russian and English; very talkative but has many sound ideas and a shrewd knowledge of his countrymen. Is unmarried.

55. Hakimi, Ibrahim (Hakim-ul-Mulk).

Born in Azerbaijan 1870: studied medicine in France for ten years; speaks French. Was Qajar Court Physician as was his father. Deputy in the first Majlis 1908. Minister of Finance 1910. Minister of Education 1910, 1911. Minister of Finance 1911. Minister of Finance or Education several times up to 1918. Minister of Education 1920. Lived in retirement throughout Reza Shah's reign. Minister without Portfolio in Qavam-us-Saltaneh's Cabinets August 1942 and February 1943. Associated with Qavam-ul-Mulk in his pro-German intrigues before the invasion. Member of the National Bank Advisory Council in 1943, 1944 and 1945: was considered an ancient nonentity, deaf and infirm, but in May 1945 was appointed Prime Minister because all other candidates were

opposed by one or other faction in the Majlis. His Cabinet failed to obtain a vote of confidence and resigned a month later. He again became Prime Minister in November 1945 and did his best to deal with the Russian-inspired independence movement in Azerbaijan and had courage enough to refer to the Security Council of U.N.O. the situation created by the Russian refusal to allow the Persian Government to send troops to Tabriz.

In December 1945 wished to go to Moscow for direct negotiations with the Russians but his request was turned down. Exhausted by his efforts and intimidated by the growing hostility of the Shah and the factions in the Majlis, he resigned in January 1946.

A respectable old man of rather weak character.

56. Hidayat, Abdullah, Brigadier (Sartip).

Born about 1902, the son of Mukhbir-ud-Douleh (Ghulam Reza Kemal-Hidayat), and so member of a family that has usually been pro-British. Brigadier Hidayat is outwardly friendly; and is intelligent and ambitious but something of an intriguer. Trained at the French Ecole de Guerre, and also at Fontainebleau. Head of the Third Bureau, General Staff, February 1941; at the Staff College, November 1941; Deputy Chief of the General Staff, May 1942; Commandant of the Officers' School, November 1942. Under-Secretary Ministry of War, April 1944. Acting Minister of War, September 1944. Director of Artillery, November 1945. Under-Secretary of War, February 1946.

A well-qualified serious officer, more staff officer than a commander. Has a good reputation for honesty. When with the General Staff supported Yazdan-Panah in his opposition to a foreign military mission. Belongs to the military clique headed by his friend Razmara. Speaks good French and some English.

57. Hidayat, Izzatullah.

Son of the late Sani-ed-Douleh, who was murdered in Tehran during the Constitutional troubles about 1908. Born about 1895. Educated as a civil engineer in Germany. Member of the staff of the Legation at Berlin 1920-23. On the staff of the Ministry of Public Works 1925. Appointed Chief of Railway Construction about that time. Interested in various engineering projects in Tehran, and in a spinning factory. Director of the port of Pahlavi 1930. Arrested and tried for complicity in the irregularities in the Ministry of Roads and Communications, February 1936; sentenced in the autumn to six months' imprisonment and a fine.

Intelligent, and of charming manners. Speaks French and German. His mother was a daughter of Muzaffar-ed-Din Shah. Exonerated after the fall of Reza Shah, but not re-employed in Government service. In 1943 engaged in contracting work. Appointed Inspector of Railways, August 1945.

58. Hikmat, Ali Asghar.

Born about 1894. A member of a Shiraz family and cousin to Mushar-ud-Douleh (Mirza Nizam-ud-Din Khan Hikmat) and Sardar Fakhir (Mirza Reza Khan Hikmat). Educated in the Church Missionary Society School at Shiraz 1908-09. Well read in Arabic. Went to Tehran in 1914, where he entered the American College, graduating in 1917. Joined the Ministry of Public Instruction as an inspector. Appointed Director of Education for Fars about 1920, but kept out of the position owing to intrigues. Candidate for Parliament (the fifth Majlis) in 1923, for Shiraz and also for Jahrum, but was not successful. Employed in the Ministry of Education until about 1930, when he went abroad to Paris to study law. Said to have done well

in his examinations. Returned to Tehran in September 1933, to take charge of the Ministry of Education as acting Minister. Raised to the rank of Minister in February 1936. Dismissed, July 1938, owing to the Shah's displeasure about a telegram connected with the Paris Exhibition, but restored to favour as Minister of the Interior, February 1939. Resigned March 1940. Was proposed for Minister, Berlin, but the German Government hesitated about his agreement. When it did come the Shah decided to re-employ him as Minister of the Interior instead, but dismissed him in June 1940.

Minister of Industry and Commerce in Feroughi's Cabinet in 1941, and had a good deal to do with the negotiations about the Tripartite Treaty of 1942. Minister of Health, March 1942. Minister of Justice in Sobeily's Cabinet of February 1943, but resigned in July owing to differences of opinion with his chief. Headed cultural mission to India 1944. Delegate to United Nations Education Conference 1945.

The author of some literary works, he spends some time instructing students in Persian literature at the university. Often accused of intriguing against Qavam-ul-Mulk, but such accusations have not been proved.

Speaks English and French well; always very helpful to us.

59. Hikmat Reza (Sardar Fakhir).

Born Shiraz about 1888. Cousin of Ali Asghar Hikmat. During the 1914-18 war was a determined enemy of Qavam-ul-Mulk and friendly with the Qashqais. Since that war settled down in Tehran and was employed in various Government appointments. Governor-General of Kerman 1940-41. Head of the Statistics and Civil Status Office 1942. Elected to the 14th Majlis 1944 for Shiraz. He still enjoys the support and friendship of the Qashqais.

A corpulent and polite man, very hospitable, but a man of curious fancies.

60. Homyundjah, Muhammad Ali.

Born about 1888. A graduate of the Tehran School of Political Science. Judge of the Tribunal of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1922-25. Has held various clerical posts in the Ministry, culminating in that of head of the personnel section of the Ministry 1932-34. Sent as counsellor to Paris in 1935; a post to which he was singularly ill-fitted owing to his scanty knowledge of French.

For some obscure reason, said to be connected with seniority, was made Under-Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in April 1942; in which post he maintains his reputation of benevolent and useless stupidity.

A corpulent individual showing few indications of intelligence; his appointment to a foreign post was looked upon as a very good joke in Tehran. Promoted to personal rank of Ambassador April 1946 and awarded Humayun Medal First Class.

61. Hovhannasian, Ardashez.

Born in Resht in 1905. Educated in the American school at Resht and in 1924 went to study at the Sociological College in Moscow. After his return from Moscow took up the cause of the workers and was imprisoned in 1928 and again from 1931 to 1941. Is said to have carried on underground activity from prison. One of the founder members of the Tudeh party. Elected Deputy in the 14th Majlis for Armenians and Assyrians of Azerbaijan; his election was almost unanimous owing to Russian pressure. Gifted with a certain power of invective he writes occasionally for the Tudeh press and is a leading member of the Tudeh organising committee. Said to be on

good terms with the autonomous "Government" of Azerbaijan. Speaks Turki, excellent Persian and Russian and some English, French and German.

62. Ibtihaj (Ebtehaj), Abul-Hassan.

Second son of Ebtehaj-ul-Mulk, and brother of Ghulam Hussein Ebtehaj. Born at Resht about 1900. Interpreter to the British forces in Gilan towards the end of the war. Entered the service of the Imperial Bank of Persia at Resht about 1920. Did well there, and was transferred to Tehran 1925. Assistant to the chief inspector from then till he resigned in 1936.

Head of the Mortgage Bank 1939. Realised one of his ambitions when he became president of the National Bank of Iran (Banque Mellie) in September 1942. In that post he has worked hard and been of great service to us in many ways. He seems to be one of the few Persian financiers with intelligence, ability and energy. On the other hand he is hasty, hot-tempered and easily upset, and his persistence in an unwise legal attack on the Imperial Bank of Iran (a suit which he eventually lost) seems to show that he bears that institution a grudge. Pro-British and anti-Russian to such an extent that he is also regarded as a British agent by his numerous political rivals. Sayyid Zia and his supporters, however, were bitterly opposed to him on the Millsaugh issue. His attitude towards the latter was consistently obstructive and sometimes actively hostile. Delegate to Currency Conference in United States, June 1944. Delegate to Financial Conference, Cairo, 1944. Showed strong hostility to Dr. Millsaugh in 1944.

Married in 1926 Maryam, daughter of Taghi Nabari (Muazziz-ud-Douleh). Both he and his wife speak English, French and Russian well. No children.

63. Ibtihaj (Ebtehaj), Ghulam Hussein.

Born at Resht 1898. Eldest son of the late Ebtehaj-ul-Mulk, who was for years in charge of the Gilan estates of Fathullah Akbar. Educated at Resht and completed his studies at Beirut, and for a short time in France. Interpreter to the British Expeditionary Force 1918-20.

His father was assassinated by the Jungalis, and he, together with his family, fled to Tehran when the Bolsheviks occupied Gilan in 1920. Clerk in the Prime Minister's office 1920-21. Secretary to the Governor of Gilan 1921-22. Transferred to the Ministry of Public Works and assistant to the American adviser, Colonel Morris 1923-28. Dismissed from that post, apparently for dishonesty. Joined the Ulen Company in 1929, when the latter had a contract to construct the railways in the south. Transferred to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1931; first secretary in London April 1932. First secretary in Cairo March 1933. Suspended by the Ministry shortly after, apparently for conduct in London when the d'Arcy Concession was cancelled. In 1934 Chief of Personnel at the Ministry of the Interior; and then director of the Tourist Department and chief of the Touring Club of Iran. Went to Moscow in September 1936 to arrange the transfer of the Russian tourist organisation "Intourist" to his organisation, newly named "Iran-tour". Assistant to the Chief of the Tehran Municipality October 1937, but returned to the Ministry of Interior in 1938. Director of Administrative Services in the Ministry August 1938. Acting Chief of Tehran Municipality July 1939.

Incurred Reza Shah's displeasure and was relieved of his charge of the Municipality in September 1940. He then joined "Iran-tour" and also served on the board of the Caspian Fisheries Mixed Administration. Appointed Mayor of Tehran

in 1944. A supporter of Sayyid Zia he was actively opposed to all Tudeh party influence in the Municipality. He thus incurred the hostility of all Left-wing elements and in December 1945, Hakimi (then Prime Minister) dismissed him as a gesture of conciliation. In 1942 divorced his Persian wife and married a Polish refugee.

Author of a widely used guide book to Iran. Speaks English, French and Russian. Clever, not to be trusted very far.

64. *Intizam (Entezam), Abdullah.*

Born about 1897. Brother of Seyyid Nasrullah. Served the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in various capacities since about 1921. While secretary at Washington married an American lady. At the Ministry in Tehran 1925-27. In the Press Department of the Ministry 1933-35. Transferred to Prague 1936 as consul. Chargé d'Affaires, Berna, May 1938. Head of the Third Political Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, April 1941. Secretary at Berna end of 1942.

A pleasant and go-ahead young man; speaks English and French.

65. *Intizam (Entezam), Nasrullah.*

Born about 1899. Son of the late Entezam-us-Saltaneh, and nephew of Hassan Ali Ghaffari. Educated in Tehran at the School of Political Science. Secretary at Paris 1926. Secretary at Warsaw 1927-32. Secretary to the Persian delegates to the League of Nations during the Anglo-Persian Oil Company dispute in 1933. Member of the Persian delegation to the World Economic Conference 1933. Secretary at London May 1933. Transferred to Washington 1934. Has also served in the Treaty Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. First secretary at Berna 1936. "Délégué suppléant" at the League of Nations May 1938. Head of the Third Political Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs (dealing *inter alia* with Great Britain), July 1938. Attended the Duke of Spoleto's wedding in Italy, June 1939.

Master of Ceremonies at the Court in March 1941. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in the reconstruction of Qavam-us-Saltaneh's Cabinet in February 1943, a post which he retained in the following Cabinet of Soheily. Minister of Communications and subsequently of Foreign Affairs in Bayat's Cabinet of November 1944. Resigned in April 1944. Member of the Persian Delegation to San Francisco. Persian Delegate to Executive Commission of U.N.O. in London with rank of ambassador. Member of Persian Delegation to U.N.O. January 1946.

Quiet and attractive. Helpful and honest. Speaks French and English.

66. *Iqbal (Eghbal), Ali.*

Born in Meshed about 1895. Son of a well-known landowner of Khorasan, with property at Kashmar and elsewhere in the province. Deputy in the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth Majlises. Never in Government service, but well acquainted with Khorasan politics. Aspired to becoming the mutawalli-bashi of the Meshed shrine 1943, but did not succeed owing to the opposition of the Governor-General. An enemy of Soheily, he was a professing supporter of Seyyid Zia-ud-Din when his fortunes were at their height.

67. *Iqbal (Eghbal), Manuchihr.*

Younger brother of Ali Iqbal. Born at Meshed about 1898. Educated at Tehran at the medical school, and then in France, where he qualified as a doctor and received a medal for research. Returned to Persia in 1939 and was employed for some time in the Ministry of Public Health. Under-Secretary of the ministry 1943, he ran the technical side of the

ministry's work with success, and is evidently hard-working and efficient. Minister for Health, August 1944 (Sa'id's Cabinet). Enjoy's patronage of Qavam-us-Saltaneh. Minister for Health in Qavam's Cabinet February 1946. Married to a Frenchwoman.

68. *Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Asadullah Yamin (Yamin-ul-Mamalik).*

Son of the late Yamin-ul-Mamalik and a nephew of Hassan Esfandiari. Born in Tehran 1885. Educated in Tehran and Tiflis. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1901; in 1908 had reached the rank of deputy chief of the Foreign Office Tribunal. Karguzar in Isfahan 1917. Governor of the Gulf Ports 1921-23. Consul-general at Baku 1924-29. Governor of Mazandaran 1930-32. Recalled from that post and under a cloud for some time. Director of the Tehran Telephone Company.

Deputy in the thirteenth Majlis 1941 to 1943. Is a director of most of the important companies of the capital, and finds time to look after the affairs of the Aero-Club as well. Has a typical capitalist and conservative outlook, but nevertheless spoke in the Majlis in favour of the factory workers at Isfahan.

Re-elected to the fourteenth Majlis for Babul.

69. *Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Fathullah Nuri.*

Second son of Hassan Esfandiari (Muhtashim-us-Saltaneh). Born about 1895. Educated in Switzerland and France. Second secretary of the Persian Legation in London 1914-24. Assistant chief of the English Section at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1925. First secretary at Washington 1926-29. Counsellor at Paris 1929-30. Counsellor in London and Chargé d'Affaires 1930-31, and was in charge at the time of the Persian Exhibition. Chief of the Economics Section at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1932. Chargé d'Affaires again in London March to December 1933. Head of the Treaty Department at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1934; served also in the Passport section. For three months from the end of 1935 he was in Baghdad on a mission charged with negotiations over the frontier dispute, but achieved little. "Chef du protocole" May 1936 to December 1937. In charge of the Government-controlled "Iran" Insurance Company 1938. Appointed Persian Government representative with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 1942 in London. Minister to Polish Government in London, January 1944. Returned to Persia 1945.

Married to a Frenchwoman; speaks French and English. Conscientious and helpful; an excellent type of permanent official, though he has not inherited the eloquence of his father, much to the latter's disappointment.

70. *Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Musa Nuri (Mucaffaq-es-Sultaneh).*

Brother of Asadullah Yamin-Esfandiari. Born in Tehran 1894. Educated in Tehran and Europe. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1916. Secretary at Rome for some time. Chief of the Economic Section of the Ministry 1929. Chief of the League of Nations' section 1932. Counsellor and Chargé d'Affaires at Paris 1933. Counsellor at Moscow in December 1933, and very soon afterwards transferred to Angora, where he was Chargé d'Affaires for some time. Head of the Consular Department, March 1937. Director-General of Industry and Mines, July 1937. Summarily relieved of that appointment in September owing to a muddle over the Chalus silk factory that was in reality due to his predecessor, Jehanbani. Administrative Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, December 1937. Minister, Bagdad, August 1938. Sent on a special mission to Berlin 1939.

Left Berlin on rupture of relations in 1941, and returned to Bagdad as Minister; recalled to Tehran, on conclusion of five years' foreign service, in 1943. Though at first suspected of pro-German feelings, owing to his visit to Berlin, he behaved correctly on his second period of office in Bagdad. Minister of Agriculture in Soheily's revised Cabinet of December 1943. Ambassador to Turkey, 1945.

Speaks French and Italian. Pleasant, married very early, and has a son who is a champion at lawn-tennis.

71. *I'tibar, Ahmad (I'tibar ud Dauleh).*

A rich landowner from Burujird, from where he was elected Deputy for the thirteenth Majlis. Exercised considerable influence in the thirteenth Majlis and for that reason was appointed Minister of Agriculture by Soheily in March 1943. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in Sadr's Cabinet, June 1945, but resigned immediately. A man of no scruples who professes to be pro-British because he does not yet envisage the fingers of the Soviet hand of influence reaching Burujird. Will trim his sails to any wind, and not to be trusted.

His son, Abdul Husain (Dr.) was born about 1910 and was partly educated in Germany. Married a German. In 1943 was head of the Technical and Construction Department in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, a post in which he made large sums of money by the gilding of the Palais de Justice. Elected Deputy for Burujird in the fourteenth Majlis, and in April 1945 was a member of the Persian Delegation to the San Francisco Conference.

Speaks excellent German, good English and French.

72. *I'timadi (Ettehad), Nasir Quli (Nasr-ul-Douleh).*

Born about 1886. A Qajar prince, descended from the famous yazar, Mirza Taghi Khan. Occupied various posts in Government service, including Governor of the Gulf Ports in 1923. Sent on an economic mission to Germany in connexion with the settlement of various accounts about 1939. Also held other diplomatic posts in Europe. Returned to Persia 1942, and soon after appointed assistant to the Prime Minister by Soheily, with the rank of Under-Secretary of State. Governor-General of Khorasan, December 1945.

Ambitious and clever, but without much stability. A good bridge player. Speaks French and German.

73. *Jahanbani, Amir Lashkar Amanullah.*

Born about 1890, son of the late Amanullah Mirza, Zia-ed-Dowleh (a descendant of Fath Ali Shah), who committed suicide in the British consulate in Tabriz, where he had taken refuge from the Russians in 1917.

Amanullah joined the Persian Cossack Artillery School in 1907. In 1910 he was sent to the military school in Moscow, where he graduated in 1913. For the following two years he was attached to the Imperial Guard. In 1916 he entered the Persian Cossack Division with the rank of captain, and was made aide-de-camp to the Russian General Staroselsky, then commanding officer of the Cossack Division. He sided with Reza Khan in the coup d'Etat in 1921, and later distinguished himself in the operations against Simitko, being greatly helped therein by former Tsarist officers attached to his staff. Was made a general, and became chief of the General Staff in 1922. He visited France and England in 1923. Although a Qajar prince, he favoured the change of dynasty in 1925. Removed from his post as Chief of Staff for taking matters too easily, but regained the Royal favour, and was appointed to command the Eastern Division in August 1926. He organised and commanded the expedition for the pacification of Persian Baluchistan

in the autumn of 1928, and in November 1928 he was created General of Division (Amir Lashkar) as a reward for his services; in December 1930 went to France to follow a course of two years' training at the Staff College.

Inspector-General of the Army in 1932. Inspector of military schools in 1933. Employed in Baluchistan in 1934 and 1935. In October 1935 fell from favour as the result of remarks made by him criticising certain arrangements for the Senior Officers' Staff College. His eclipse was, however, brief, and he was appointed Director-General of Industry in March 1936. Dismissed in July 1937. The reasons are variously rumoured as friendliness with foreigners, espionage by his Russian wife, or an explosion which occurred in a powder magazine.

He is pleasant and agreeable, though inclined to suffer from swelled head. Intelligent and fairly well educated, he is enthusiastic about sport, which he has done much to encourage in the Persian army; plays polo and tennis moderately well. Fond of European society, easy-going, and somewhat lacking in determination. He does not fleece the populace as do many of his colleagues. He is inclined to imitate westerners, and is ready to accept new ideas and machines without considering their suitability.

Is friendly to Englishmen, but finds Frenchmen and Russians of the former régime more congenial. Reported in prison in Tehran in July 1939, and in poor health. Liberated 1941 and made Minister of the Interior in September. Minister of Roads and Communications, December 1941. Minister of War, March 1942, and employed in the autumn at court as a kind of aide-de-camp in general to the Shah. Useful in doing little jobs with the Soviet Embassy, but gives the impression of being overmuch inclined to subject the present Shah to the same sort of fulsome flattery which turned his father's head.

General officer commanding, Fars, September 1943.

First vice-president of Russo-Persian Cultural Relations Society, March 1945.

Speaks Russian and French fluently; has a Russian, as well as at least one Persian, wife.

74. *Jahanbani (Djehanbani), Muhammed Hussein.*

Born about 1892, brother of Amanullah Jahanbani. Educated at Tehran and in Russia, and joined the Persian Cossack Division about 1916. Chief of Staff to General Amir Ahmedi in the Luristan operations about 1928. Military Governor of the Boir Ahmedi country shortly afterwards, where he governed with some success. Fell from favour with Reza Shah at the same time as his brother, in 1935. Then served in various capacities at the Ministry of Industry, especially in some purchasing commissions. Director-General at the Ministry of the Interior 1943, being in charge of the arrangements for the elections to the fourteenth Majlis, an occupation which nearly drove him crazy. Chief of Police, February 1944. Head of Road Transport Department in January 1945. Resigned two months later.

Speaks French, Russian and some English. The author of an anthology of Persian poetry. Said to be very corrupt financially, but is easy to get on with.

75. *Jam (Djam), Mahmud (Mudir-ul-Mulk).*

Born about 1880. Has had a long career in the customs and other Government departments, and was, for more than ten years, Persian secretary to the French Legation in Tehran. Director of the Alimentation Service, Tehran, from 1916 to 1920, where he did good work. Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the short-lived Cabinet of Sayyid Zia-ed-Din 1921. Acting Minister of Finance,

January 1922, and Minister of Finance October 1923 to August 1924. Appointed as assistant to Prime Minister, Sirdar Sipeh, until the latter became provisional head of the State on the 31st October, 1925, and then assistant to the two following Prime Ministers. Appointed Persian Minister to Brussels in 1926, but did not proceed. Appointed Governor of Kerman Province in September 1927, and Governor-General of Khorassan in April 1928. Recalled from Khorassan in December 1928 and appointed Minister of Public Works. Returned to Khorassan as Governor-General in August 1929. Appointed Minister of the Interior in Ferouhi's Cabinet of 1933, and succeeded him as Prime Minister in December 1935. Headed the mission to Egypt on the Crown Prince's betrothal to Princess Fauzieh, June-July 1938, and received the Order of Muhammad Ali from King Farouk. Minister of Court, October 1939. Ambassador to Egypt 1941.

An amiable and pleasant man who speaks French fluently. The Legation, in their dealings with him, have always found him trustworthy and sincere.

76. Kamol Hidayat, Husain Ali (Nasr-ul-Mulk).

Born about 1880, son of the late Mukhbir-ul-Dowleh, K.C.I.E.

He was prominent in the political events associated with the constitutional troubles of 1909-11, and became a member of the second Majlis in 1913. In March 1915 he was appointed Minister of Posts, Telegraphs, Commerce and Public Works, and in that capacity was suspected (in common with his uncle) of pro-German leanings. He held various ministerial posts between 1917 and 1923.

In 1921 he accompanied the then Crown Prince of Persia on a voyage to India and to various European countries.

In 1925 he was appointed Governor-General of Isfahan.

In June 1927 he was appointed Governor-General of Fars, and in December 1927 went to Bagdad as acting consul-general. His tenure of office at Bagdad was not a success; he fell foul of the Residency owing to certain discourteous omissions in his conduct towards the Residency officials. Whether or not these transgressions were performed on his own responsibility or under instructions from his Government, the latter soon recalled him in some disfavour.

Thereafter he was unemployed until December 1931, when he was appointed Persian Minister at Tokyo. Recalled to Tehran, July 1934. Appointed Governor of Tehran, November 1935 until December 1938. President of the "Cour des Comptes" or Audit Department 1940, and was Minister of Justice for one day in the short-lived Ferouhi Cabinet of March 1942. Minister of Commerce and Industry in Bayat's Cabinet, November 1944; Minister without portfolio under Hakimi, May 1945; again without portfolio in Sadr's Cabinet, June 1945. Minister of Justice, June 1945. Again Minister without portfolio, November 1945 (Hakimi). Ambassador to Afghanistan, January 1946.

He is a pleasant and intelligent little man. His relations with British consular officers at Isfahan and Shiraz were always cordial and friendly, but he is not a great personality.

77. Kambakhsh, Abdus-Samad.

Born 1905, at Kazvin; his father, still alive in 1943, was Ain-ul-Mamalik, a Qajar prince and wealthy landowner at Kazvin. Entered Persian army about 1923; sent to Leningrad for training and became a pilot there; also imbibed the doctrines of communism with enthusiasm. On return was active Communist and was known as the Persian representative on the Comintern. Sentenced to

death by Reza Shah, but was pardoned and then imprisoned with fifty-three other Communists. Exiled in 1940 to Bandar Abbas; released on the fall of Reza in 1941. Married to a Persian related to the Kia family who acts as an accoucheuse in Tehran.

Elected to the fourteenth Majlis for Kazvin, by help of the Soviet representative. Generally regarded as one of the more decent Tudeh members. He is believed to be dissatisfied with the complete subservience of his party to Soviet interests. Put in charge of the publicity of the Tudeh party in August 1944.

78. Kazimi (Kazemi), Baqir (Bagher) (Muazzib-ud-Dowleh).

Born about 1887. Educated in the School of Political Science in Tehran. Began his career in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, being first attached to the Russian section, and later employed in the Cabinet of the Ministry. Appointed Chief of Cabinet in 1921. Appointed counsellor to the Persian Legation in Washington in 1925. Sent to Iraq to inspect Persian consulates in 1928. Later in the same year appointed counsellor to the Persian Legation in Kabul, but could only proceed as far as Herat, where he remained as Persian consul-general. Appointed Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Roads and Communications in 1930, and Acting Minister in 1931. Appointed substantive Minister of Roads and Communications in May 1931, but had to resign in February 1932, owing, it is said, to being unable to build roads fast enough for His Majesty the ex-Shah. He was subsequently appointed Persian Minister in Bagdad, towards the end of 1932.

To almost everyone's surprise, Kazemi was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Ferouhi's Cabinet of September 1933.

Went on official visits to Afghanistan and India November-December 1935, and was the guest of the Viceroy (Lord Willingdon) at Delhi. Resigned March 1936, and unemployed until appointed Governor-General of Eastern Azerbaijan, April 1937. Ambassador, Kabul, July 1938. Ambassador, Angora, October 1939.

Kazemi is socially agreeable and friendly, and speaks English and some French. As Minister for Foreign Affairs he was not a success. He was untruthful and unreliable, and relations between him and His Majesty's Ministers in 1934-36 became very strained. His departure was greeted by all foreign missions with relief.

Minister of Public Health, December 1941 to March 1942. Then Minister of Finance in Qawames-Saltaneh's Cabinet of August 1942, but resigned before its fall in circumstances which did him little credit. Appointed to Angora as ambassador in May 1943, but did not proceed; the Turks appear to like him as little as the Iraqis, who have not forgotten how he opposed them in the dispute concerning the Shatt-el-Arab waters. Minister of Education in Sa'id's reshuffled Cabinet of August 1944. Delegate to U.N.O., January 1946.

A man of intelligence and energy.

79. Kazimi (Kazemi), Mustafa (Davir-ul-Mulk).

Born in Tehran 1891. Educated at the School of Political Science, Tehran. Entered the Ministry of Education 1914, and appointed Director of Education at Kerman in 1915. Caused a great deal of trouble to the British forces and the Imperial Bank of Persia during the war of 1939-45. Financial agent at Isfahan 1920-22. In the Ministry of Finance, 1923-25. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Justice, 1927-28. Chairman of the Caspian Fisheries Committee, 1928-32. Governor-General of Kerman, 1932-33.

Engaged in politics after the fall of Reza Shah; tried to found a new party without success, June 1942. Elected member of the Majlis for Kerman 1943, after vehement protestations of repentance for his anti-British past.

As one of the leaders of the Ittihad-i-Milli fraction in the Majlis, he consistently and strongly opposed the spread of Soviet influence, and right at the end of the fourteenth Majlis he was not afraid to deliver a speech violently critical of the Soviet's breach of the Tripartite Treaty.

80. Kashani (or Kashi), Seyyid Abul-Qasim.

Born about 1888. Educated at Kerbela and lived there for many years as a mujtahid. Expelled by the Iraq Government in 1922 for non-co-operation with our policy in that country, and came back to Persia, where he has been ever since. Kept in the background during Reza Shah's reign, but on the latter's abdication in 1941 came back into prominence and achieved a certain popularity partly owing to his reputation as an opponent of Reza Shah. His anti-British bias, a legacy from 1922, led him into intrigues with German agents and in August 1943 he fled from Tehran to avoid arrest. He was arrested by British security authorities in June 1944 and confessed to having helped German agents. Released in August 1945. He nurses a bitter enmity towards the British.

81. Khajeh-Noury, Ghulam Ali (Nizam-us-Saltan).

Son of Amir Noury (Nizam-ud-Dowleh). Member of the Protocol Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for several years, with an interval as secretary at the Legation in Rome in 1935. Visited London in September 1937 on business connected with the printing of bank-notes for the Iranian Government and commissions for the Royal Palace.

Educated partly in Russia, where he learnt ballet-dancing. Speaks French and Russian. Though of decadent appearance, he is helpful and friendly. Aided by his cultivated and charming wife, who is a daughter of Dr. Ali Asghar Naficy, he is hospitable and popular with the Diplomatic Corps.

Has done various services for the Court after the fall of Reza Shah, the latest one being French instructor to the Queen-Mother, whom he admires with an enthusiasm which is no credit to his intelligence.

He prefers to be known as Nizam Khajeh-Noury.

82. Khusrovan, Sartip Ahmad.

Was in temporary command of the air force in 1931 during the occasions when General Ahmad Nakhchevan was suspended, and again in 1937 when General Nakhchevan was appointed assistant to the Minister of War. Promoted brigadier (Sartip) and placed in command of the air force, 1939. O.C. Troops, Tabriz, 1942, but returned to be head of the air force at the end of 1944, after he had been expelled by the Russians from Azerbaijan.

Shows commendable energy, but his ideas are out of date.

83. Kishavarz, Dr. Feridun.

Born in 1906. Studied medicine in Tehran and has been practising in Pahlevi and Tehran for the past several years. Appointed Deputy for Pahlevi in the fourteenth Majlis. Has been a leading member of the Tudeh party since its foundation. He is an accomplished public speaker and an efficient organiser of public demonstrations. A member of the Tudeh Central Committee and of the supervisory board of its principal organ, *Rahbar*.

In December 1945 went to Tashkend, at the invitation of the Soviet Government, to attend ceremonies held on the twentieth anniversary of the Science Academy there.

84. Kooros, Issa (Esau).

Born about 1896. A commissioned officer in the South Persian Rifles during the 1914-18 war. For many years a leading merchant of Tehran, representative of Imperial Chemical Industries, Metropolitan Vickers, &c. Has a branch in London, and his wife and children are in England (1943). Speaks excellent English and is well disposed towards us. Patriotic and of strict integrity. Fell into disgrace under Reza Shah through no fault of his own. Seems inclined to enter politics and stood for the Majlis for Tehran 1943 without success. Vice-President of Tehran Chamber of Commerce since October 1942. Member of Tehran Municipal Council 1943.

Probably, the wealthiest merchant in Tehran. A director of the Iranian Airways.

85. Kupal (Koupal), Sadiq (Sadegh).

Born in Tabriz about 1889. Educated in Persia and Constantinople. Originally an artillery officer; but joined the gendarmerie in 1911. Was with the Turks when they approached Hamadan in 1916. Went to Angora on a congratulatory mission in 1922 and remained there as military attaché, till 1924. On the staff of the G.O.C. North-West Division in 1924. Chief of police in 1929. In temporary command of the air force in 1931. Liaison officer with the Iraq forces in the operations against Jafar Sultan 1931-32. Head of the Conscription Department 1934. Accompanied His Imperial Majesty the Shah on his journey to Turkey in 1934. Has the Gallipoli star.

Governor of Rezaieh in 1941, but retired thence in a great hurry when the town was threatened with insurrection by Kurds and Assyrians in March 1942. Suspected of complicity in the Zahedy plots. Very intimate with the Turkish Ambassador, 1943. Arrested at the instance of the Allied security authorities September 1943, released May 1945. Director of Military Tribunal, February 1946.

Energetic and loquacious; a brigadier-general in rank. Has a Turkish wife. Neither studious nor professionally ambitious. Shows some interest in horse-racing.

A bovine and brutish appearance gives the clue to his personality.

86. Lahouti (known usually as Major Lahouti Khan).

Born in Kermanshab about 1882. Entered the service of the gendarmerie in 1909, under Yeprin. Became captain under the Swedes in 1911, and was in command at Qum. Earned the special praise of General Hjalmarson for disarming 150 Bakhtiariis at Qum; Lahouti was then decorated with an Order of Valour. In 1913 in the gendarmerie at Sulatana-bad with the rank of major. Accused of taking a bribe from a tribal chieftain, he was recalled to Tehran, but absconded and lived incognito in Tehran for some time. Left Persia during the 1914-18 war, and has been living the life of an adventurer ever since. Joined the Turkish army and served in it for three years. In 1923 obtained a pardon from the Persian Government and given a commission in the Tabriz division with the rank of major. Engineered a *coup d'Etat* in 1923 at Tabriz, in which certain Swedish officers were implicated. The plot fell flat and Lahouti fled to Russia, where he became a teacher of oriental languages in Moscow. Nothing was heard of him for some time, until after the troubles of 1941. He was then heard of as the author of several Communist leaflets and an expert on cultural propaganda in Turkistan. Occasionally broadcasts on Moscow radio.

87. Lankurani, Sheikh Hussein.

Born about 1890 in Soviet Azerbaijan. Elected Deputy for Ardebil in the fourteenth Majlis. Owed election to Soviet intervention. He has taken a house in Tehran and is trying to gather a following. Without Russian backing would have no influence. Noted Tehran intriguer, mob orator and trouble-maker. In 1943-44 was employed by the Shah to stir up trouble against Sayyid Zai-ud-Din. A typical Akhund, venal and double-faced.

88. Mansur, (Rajab) Ali, C.B.E. (Mansur-ul-Mulk).

Born about 1888. Educated in the School of Political Science at Tehran. Began his career in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and was employed in the English section. He subsequently transferred to the Tribunal section, where he rose to be Director of the Civil Court. Appointed Director of the English section in 1917. Appointed Under-Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1919, and Under-Secretary at the Ministry of the Interior in 1920. Created C.B.E. in 1920. Appointed Governor-General of Azerbaijan in April 1927, and held that post until January 1931, when he was made Minister of the Interior. Transferred to the post of Minister of Roads and Communications in January 1933. Arrested in January 1936 on charges of misappropriation and incompetence. Acquitted August 1936. Rehabilitated as Minister of Industry and Mines, August 1938.

Mansur is believed to have made money out of the sale of promotions while at the Ministry of the Interior. During the time he was employed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs he was brought into contact very frequently with this legation, and was always found to be friendly and agreeable. Selected by Reza Shah for the post of Prime Minister June 1940, it was to him that the joint Russo-British ultimatum was delivered on the 25th August, 1941. As the result of the subsequent events he resigned in September 1941. Governor-General of Khorassan, February 1942, in which post he showed some energy in collecting wheat, though his administration of the funds of the shrine laid him open to various accusations of embezzlement. Recalled from Khorassan in the autumn of 1945. A clever man, often in the running for the post of Prime Minister. Speaks French.

89. Marzban (Marzuban), Dr. Ismail (Amin-ul-Mulk).

Born about 1875, at Resht. Studied medicine in France, and has practised as an oculist at Tehran for about the last forty years. Visited London in connexion with the Constitutional movement in 1906. Has had several excursions into politics, having been Minister of Posts and Telegraphs whenever his fellow-citizen, the late Sipahdar, was in power. President of the Iran Club after Jam, a post which he still holds.

Universally liked and respected as an honest old gentleman. Owns a little property in Resht, but is not rich, and still practised up to his appointment as Minister of Public Health under Qavam-es-Saltaneh in 1942. He resigned from that post in December 1942. One son, Nan'chihr Marzban, is now in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Has been a member of the "Taraqqi" party for some years, but has never done much active political work. Unlikely to do much, either right or wrong. Benevolent and agreeable manner. Speaks French. Took a prominent part in supervising the Tehran elections, December 1943. President of the Anti-Narcotic League, January 1944. Minister of Health in Hakimi's Cabinet, May 1945.

90. Mas'ud, Akbar (Sarim-ud-Douleh).

Born 1885. Eighth, and second surviving, son of Mas'ud Mirza Zill-us-Sultan, son of Nasir-ed-Din Shah. Was early recognised as one of the most intelligent of the Zill's fourteen sons, and now has succeeded to the major part of his father's inheritance. Minister of Public Works and Commerce 1915. Minister for Foreign Affairs 1916. Governor of Isfahan in 1917. Minister of Finance in Vusuq-ud-Douleh's Cabinet of 1919; one of the triumvirate who arranged the abortive Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1920; Governor of Kernanshah and Hamadan in November 1920. Governor-General of Fars 1922-23, and again in 1929. Arrested shortly after the fall of Firuz Mirza in 1929, and kept under surveillance near Tehran for several months. Thereafter lived quietly in Tehran till 1932, when he was allowed to return to his vast properties in and around Isfahan.

Killed his own mother at his father's instigation on a point of honour in 1906. He seems to have lived down the odium of this deed. Has been several times to Europe and has visited England. Speaks English and French fluently and is pleasant-mannered, clever and intelligent. The two-fold stigma of being pro-British and a Qajar prevented him coming back to power during the régime of Reza Shah. Since the fall of Reza Shah he has continued aloof from public affairs, though he has kept in touch with what is going on, and has now become the unofficial controller of almost everything in Isfahan. He takes a great pride in his model village at Asgharabad, near Isfahan, and may very easily have a part to play in shaping Persia's future in the next few years. Has one surviving son, and a daughter. A famous hunter.

91. Mas'udi (Massoudi), Abbas.

Born in 1895 in Tehran. Educated in Tehran, and for a year in France. A journalist by profession and by nature. Proprietor with his brother, Jamal Massoudi, of one of the two principal vernacular daily papers in Tehran (the *Ittila'at*) and of the French daily paper *Journal de Tehran*. He accompanied the present Shah, when Crown Prince, to Iraq, Syria and Egypt on his wedding tour as press representative, and kept the Tehran press supplied with a stream of accounts of the Prince's doings, in that quasi-religious style that alone was permitted to Persians when speaking of their monarchy. A Deputy in the eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth Majlises.

In the thirteenth Majlis came out strongly in opposition to Qavam-us-Saltaneh, being severely beaten by some of his opponents in the riots of the 8th December, 1942. Visited Palestine and Egypt in May-June 1943. Appointed Director of Iran Airways, December 1944. Visited United States in April 1945, as one of several representatives of the Tehran press invited by the American Government. Covered the U.N.O. meetings in London in early 1946 as unofficial representative of the Persian press.

92. Matin-Daftary, Dr. Ahmad.

Born in Tehran 1898. A nephew of Dr. Musaddiq, whose daughter he has married. Educated in Tehran, partly at the American College. Entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1918. Persian secretary to the German Legation in Tehran 1920-23. Returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1923-27. Joined the Ministry of Justice in 1927 and appointed Attorney-General of the Court of Appeal. Sent to Europe by the Ministry of Justice in 1929 to take up an advanced course of law, during which he studied in Germany, and for a time was sworn in as a judge in a German court. Obtained a degree as doctor of law. Returned to Persia 1931. Director-General of the Ministry of Justice 1932. Acting Minister of Justice when Davar was away at

Geneva in 1933. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Justice 1934. Represented Persia at the International Law Conference held in Berlin in 1935. Minister of Justice 1936. Member of the mission to Egypt for the Crown Prince's marriage February-April 1939. Prime Minister, October 1939.

Reza Shah made him resign in June 1940, and his conduct of the various negotiations which had taken place while he was Prime Minister gave rise to a strong suspicion that he was favouring the Germans. In fact, in the speech which he made to journalists and Majlis Deputies shortly after Matin-Daftary's dismissal, Reza Shah accused him of not reporting fully to the Shah. However, it is difficult to believe this; the Shah being an absolute autocrat, receiving detailed reports from numerous sources, it seems unlikely that any Prime Minister would risk the Royal wrath by suppressing anything. He himself says it was the Shah who ordered him to favour the Germans. Retired into seclusion in June 1940 until two years later. In 1943 was evidently hoping to re-enter the political arena. Arrested as a suspect June 1943, but soon released. Minister without Portfolio in Qavam's Cabinet, February 1946.

Speaks French and German, and a little English; he has travelled in England. A very hard-working and conscientious official, always very helpful when approached. A good speaker, with a thorough knowledge of local legal administration. Has taken a leading part in the Persian League of Nations Union, being secretary of that organisation.

93. Miftah, Abdul Hussein.

Son of the late Sir Daoud Miftah, K.C.M.G. Was attaché to his father when Minister in London in 1925. Passport Officer, Quetta, 1931-35, during which time he officiated as Consul-General, Delhi, in the absence of the incumbent. Then employed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. A member of the suite attending on the Earl of Athlone and Her Royal Highness Princess Alice during the Crown Prince's wedding celebrations April 1939.

Married an Englishwoman, who was killed in the Quetta earthquake of 1935; he then married his deceased wife's sister, who is a bit of a social climber.

Consul at Stamboul 1940. First Secretary, Angora, 1943.

Slightly loud and self-confident, and does not appear to have inherited his father's well-bred manner. Speaks English and French.

94. Mir'at (Merat), Ismail.

Born in 1892 in Tehran. Son of a prominent politician, Mir'at-ul-Mamalik. Began his career in the Ministry of Interior. Governor-General, Kerman, November 1937. Acting Minister of Education, August 1938. Confirmed as Minister 1939.

Minister of Public Health, September 1941, and resigned two months later, having incurred displeasure by converting an old shrine into a football field and encouraging mixed bathing.

Spent several years in France, and speaks French. Not a very forceful personality.

95. Misbah-Fatemy, Ali Naghi.

Born about 1898. Related to Imad-es-Saltaneh (Mehdi Fatemy) of the well-known Isfahan family, though not related (he says) to Seifpur Fatemy and his brothers. Has had a career under the Ministry of the Interior, in various posts and inspection duties. Vice-Governor of Isfahan 1925, where he fell out with the Governor, Nasar-ul-Mulk, who accused him of taking bribes. Governor-General of Khuzistan in 1940 and again in 1943, where he did well in asserting Government authority over boarders and speculators. He also intervened to great effect in the elections, being successful in

getting the Government candidate elected for Dasht-i-Mishun, but putting in a great friend of his, Niqabat, for Abadan, in defiance of the Government's wishes.

Speaks English and French, and seems to get on well with the authorities of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; but a man who should not be trusted too far. Very voluble and plausible.

96. Mu'Addil (Moadel), Luft Ali.

Born at Shiraz, 1902. Educated at Tehran. A landowner in Fars and considered a specialist in agriculture. 1929-33 head of the municipality at Shiraz. 1934-46 Deputy of the Majlis for Jahrum.

An active and intriguing little man, who was of great use to Soheily in many ways; he did well as rapporteur of the Finance Commission in piloting the income-tax Bill through the Chamber at the end of the thirteenth Majlis.

97. Muazid (Moazed), Mas'ud (Massoud).

Born about 1890. Educated in the School of Political Science at Tehran. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and served in certain Russian posts, also Trebizond. A personal friend of Bagher Kazemy, who, when Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1934, appointed Moazed head of the second political section of the Ministry which deals with Russia. Consul-General at Herat in 1937. Head of the Consular Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, November 1937. Counsellor, Angora, November 1938.

Returned to Ministry for Foreign Affairs about 1940 and in 1941 became the head of the Consular and Passport Department.

Persian Government representative at Beirut, January 1944, with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary.

A somewhat dried-up individual. Speaks Russian and French.

98. Mubassir (Mobasser), Amrullah.

Born about 1904. Younger brother of Mehdi Mubassir, who was for years an interpreter in the Imperial Bank of Persia. Studied law in England, was called to the Bar and at one time proposed to practise from chambers in Chancery Lane. Returned to Persia about 1938, and served in the Ministry of Justice. 1942 was President of the Court of First Instance in Tehran. Lent by the Ministry to assist in the interrogation of the suspects sent to Sultanabad under suspicion of pro-German activities. He was thus placed in a difficult position and did not please us.

99. Mudabbir-Noury, Kazim (Mudabbir-us-Saltaneh).

Born 1894 in Shiraz. In 1912 entered Government service and till 1927 was employed in Government offices in Fars, reaching the rank of Assistant Governor. In 1935 Governor of Yazd; in 1937 of Ardebil; in 1938 of Luristan; and in 1941 of Mazandaran, where he had to cope with the invading Russians in August and September of that year. In May 1943 appointed Governor of Isfahan, and was useful and co-operative in collecting grain, &c. Recalled, 1944.

A talkative man, full of bright ideas and a great sense of his own importance.

100. Muqaddam (Moghaddam), Muhammad Ali.

Born about 1889. Educated in Tehran. Has held various posts under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for the most part in Russia. Director of Archives in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for a time, 1930-31 "chef de cabinet" to the Minister. Sent to the Hejaz and Saudi Arabia as Minister

at the end of 1933. Left Jeddah for Beirut May 1935, and appointed Minister to the Balkan States just after, residing at Bucharest. Accredited also to Czechoslovakia, January 1938. Director-General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, January 1939. Accompanied the Crown Prince to Egypt, February to April 1939. "Chef du Protocole" of the Court, August 1939. Minister in London, 1940.

Relieved of his functions by Taghi-Zadeh, October 1941, but stayed in Scotland for some time before venturing home. Back in Tehran, unemployed and disappointed, early in 1943. Appointed to Cairo to deal with Saudi Arabian affairs, residing at Cairo, December 1943.

Speaks Russian, French and a little English. His wife is of Russian birth. Has developed into a long-winded and foolish man.

101. Muqaddam (Moghaddam), Hassan, General (Sarlashkar).

Born about 1890. Commanded at Sauj Bulagh in 1929. General Officer Commanding North-West Division, December 1929. General Officer Commanding Kurdistan Division at Senneh 1936. When in Kurdistan had a reputation for efficiency and energy. Was the undisputed ruler of the province of Kurdistan from 1938 to 1941. General Officer in command of the troops in the West when the Russo-British invasion took place in 1941, and after handing over to the invading forces retired to Tehran.

Being an old friend of Reza Shah he was retained in the army and in June 1942 was made Governor-General of Azerbaijan, on account of his local knowledge and alleged ability to get on with the Russians. However, being himself a landowner in the district he became involved in all sorts of chicanery concerning his wheat, and failed to produce the much-needed grain for Tehran. He was also accused of giving in to the Russians about the election candidates and other matters, and was summoned to Tehran in May and finally dismissed in August 1943; he appears to have resisted for some time the order to report to Tehran: instead of obeying he retired to his estates near Maragheh. Ministry of War Inspector June 1945.

Muqaddam gives the impression of being a clever though cautious old soldier, unable to resist the temptation to make money whenever possible. His daughter is married to Reza Qavam, son of Qavam-ul-Mulk.

102. Musaddiq, Dr. Muhammad (Musaddiq-us-Saltaneh).

Born about 1885; a nephew of Farman Farma. Has studied law in Paris to a certain extent and poses as a jurist. Appointed Governor-General of Fars in 1920. Appointed Minister of Finance in June 1921, and sought and obtained authority from Parliament to purge and reform that Ministry. However, during his six months' tenure of that portfolio he destroyed indiscriminately the good with the bad, and at the end the organisation was worse than before, as he proved himself entirely incapable of making reforms. Appointed Governor-General of Azerbaijan in 1922, and in 1923 became Minister for Foreign Affairs for a period of four months. Elected as a Deputy to the fourth, fifth, and sixth terms of the Majlis from Tehran. Owing to his opposition to the Government in the sixth term, steps were taken to prevent his election to the seventh Majlis.

Imprisoned and otherwise ill-treated by Reza Shah, he spent the last few years of Reza's reign in a village near Tehran. Headed the poll in the Tehran elections in 1944. Tried unsuccessfully to unseat Sayyid Zia.

Sponsored the Oil Law of December 1944 prohibiting the grant of any oil concession until

after the departure of all foreign troops from Persia. The passage of this law infuriated the Russians, and Dr. Musaddiq has since consistently done his best to make amends in the eyes of the Russians, by criticising any Persian Government which attempts to resist Russian pressure. A demagogue, a windbag.

103. Mushar, Hassan (Mushar-ul-Mulk).

Born about 1874. Started his career in the Ministry of Finance and rose to be an accountant. Appointed Minister of Finance in 1916, and again in 1918 in the Cabinet of Mirza Hassan Khan Vossug, subsequently exchanging that post for that of Minister without portfolio until June 1920. Appointed Minister of Court by Seyyid Zia-ed-Din in 1921. Elected a Deputy to the fourth term of the Majlis in 1921, but, being suspected of plotting against Reza Khan Pahlavi, then Minister of War, he was obliged to resign and go to Europe. He returned to Persia in 1924, his innocence having meanwhile been established. Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in August 1924 and resigned in December 1925. Appointed Minister of Finance in November 1929, but resigned in April 1930, having found that the interference of the Minister of Court in financial administration rendered his position untenable.

He is a man of common sense and intelligence. As Minister for Foreign Affairs, he showed himself very friendly to His Majesty's Legation, and used his best endeavours for the settlement of outstanding questions. He is not popular with many of his compatriots in high places owing to his straightforward character and outspokenness.

In 1931 he was appointed steward of the Royal estates in Mazandaran, a post which appears to have occupied all his energies till 1935. Being unwilling to hand over the whole of his properties to the Shah he was dismissed.

Went to France 1940 and in 1943 was said to be in Switzerland.

104. Mutamidi (Motamedy), Ali.

Born about 1897. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs about 1919. Served abroad as secretary at various posts; Chargé d'Affaires at Rome in 1933. Head of the Third Political Department of the Ministry (which dealt with British affairs) in 1934 and 1935. Transferred to direct the First Political Department, June 1936. Hard-working and intelligent; a good type of the younger school, who showed himself reasonable and conscientious in dealing with our affairs in the Ministry. Head of the Department of Registration of Land and Documents under the Ministry of Justice, March 1938. When the Minister of Justice (Matin-Daftary) was made Prime Minister in October 1939, he took Mutamidi with him as Private Secretary.

Married the sister of Ghulam Ali Khajeh-Noury. Private Secretary to the Prime Minister in Soheily's Cabinet of 1942, and became Minister of Posts and Telegraphs for a few days at the end of Qawam-us-Saltaneh's Cabinet, February 1943. Has also been in charge of the Road Transport Board in 1942 and 1943. Appointed Consul-General at Delhi July 1943. Member of Advisory Council of Anglo-Persian Institute, 1943.

Honest. Speaks French, Italian and a little English.

105. Muzaffari, Hussein Quli (Prince Nusrat-ul-Saltaneh), G.C.V.O.

Born 1894. Fifth and a favourite son of Muzaffar-ud-Din Shah Qajar, by whom he was taken to Europe on that Shah's last tour in 1905. His mother was not of the Imperial family.

Educated for a time in Vienna. On return to Persia he was a classmate of his nephew, the late Ahmad Shah, whose companion he was, and who had a greater affection for him than for his other relations.

Appointed Governor-General of Fars in 1915, but only got as far as Abadan whence he was recalled. Governor-General of Kerman in the same year, until February 1918. Accompanied Ahmad Shah to London in 1920, and was the guest of His Majesty King George V at Buckingham Palace. Appointed Governor-General of Fars in March 1921. Resigned in the troublous times following on the disbandment of the South Persia Rifles in October 1922. Since then he has been in retirement, living for the most part at Tehran, and taking an active interest in the development of his estates in the Veramin district. Married to the daughter of the late Nizam-us-Saltaneh, and has two sons (Mehdi Quli Mirza and Muin-ud-Din Mirza) and one daughter.

When in Fars he kept great state; and he evidently attached great importance to the dignity of his Imperial rank. He is personally very charming and cultivated, speaking French and well read in French literature. Has always been on good terms with members of His Majesty's Legation, to whom he has consistently shown hospitality, even when it would appear against his interests to do so.

In November 1933, as a result of an article in the *Daily Mirror* alluding to the Qajar family, a press campaign against that family began in the Tehran press, and Nusrat-us-Saltaneh, as the principal Qajar in Tehran, wrote a letter to the press stating that the numerous members of that family, who resided in Persia, were completely satisfied with the Pahlavi régime.

After the fall of Reza Shah Nusrat-us-Saltaneh has come back to the lime-light and hopes, hitherto in vain, for a suitable job which would enable him to re-establish the family fortunes.

106. Nabavi, Taqi (Muazziz-ed-Douleh).

Born in Tehran 1882. Joined the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1899. Consul at Batoum 1908. Consul at Ashkabad 1910. Karguzar at Meshed in 1912. Consul-general at Tiflis 1919-21. Has served as consul-general in India. Minister for Foreign Affairs for two months in Seyyid Zia's Cabinet of 1921. Consul-general in Syria 1930. Minister in Iraq 1931-32. Appointed president of the Iran-Soviet Caspian Sea Fisheries Company, 1935. Minister at Brussels, August 1937. Recalled August 1938.

A corpulent little man, speaking French, Russian and English. Was well in with Teymouriche, but survived the latter's fall. Suspected of making irregular use of customs privilege while employed abroad. Quite a well-disposed person, though not exceedingly intelligent.

Head of the Caspian Fisheries Board again 1940. A difficult post which he seems to occupy with some success, as he knows Russian well and is often able to frustrate, by a little diplomacy, the Russian plans to gain complete control of that undertaking. Minister at Lisbon, October 1944.

107. Nafisy (Nafey), Abol-Ghassem.

Born about 1907; son of Dr. Moaddeb Nafey. Educated in Paris and London; spent some months at the Great Ormond Street Hospital and became a specialist in children's diseases. Has been practising in Tehran since about 1935, doing good work in organising maternity clinics and welfare work among the poor of Tehran. A good type of young Persian. Married to Iran, daughter of Qawam-ul-Mulk.

108. Nafisi (Nafey), Fathullah.

Born about 1903; related to Dr. Moaddeb Nafey. Educated in Birmingham, where he graduated in Petroleum Technology at the University. Served for some years with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and then joined the Ministry of Finance. Was at one time assistant director of the Mines Department but left it dissatisfied with its inefficiency; retains his interest in the subject. In 1942 Director of the Concessions, Petroleum and Mines Revenue Department. Placed on unemployed list by Baqir Kazimi August 1942.

Has a good reputation and is intelligent and hard-working. A man of integrity who can serve his country well, and well-disposed to the British.

109. Nafisi (Nafey), Hassan (Musharaf-ul-Douleh) (sometimes known as Dr. Mocharaf Nafey).

Third son of the late Dr. Nazem-ul-Atibba. Born in Tehran 1896. Educated in Persia and went to France in 1909, where he graduated from the Lycée Henri IV. Returned to Persia in 1914 and joined the Ministry of Finance. On the staff of that Ministry till 1921, when he was appointed Director of the Inspection Department of the Tehran Municipality. Left for France in 1922, where he studied law for two years. Obtained the degree of doctor of law from the University of Paris, and the diploma of the School of Political Science. Returned to the Ministry of Finance for two years in 1925. Assistant to the procureur général of the Court of Appeal in 1927, and in 1929 president of the Tribunal of Commerce. Joined the staff of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as legal adviser in 1928. Visited London 1929. Left the company's service in 1930, and set up private practice as an advocate in 1930; but remained the company's lawyer. Has one of the best legal practices in Tehran. Visited London again in 1933 and 1935.

Minister of Finance in Ferouhi's Cabinet 1941, and did good work in the difficult task of reconstructing the country's finances on a new basis. Resigned with that Cabinet early in 1942 and has not since been employed. He now contributes articles on financial subjects to newspapers, and was the author of a brochure on inflation and how to combat it. Not popular with the ordinary run of Persians because he despises flattery and circumlocutions.

Married the daughter of Amin-ed-Douleh in 1931. Speaks English and French. A very sensible man, with a sound knowledge of local and French law; has been very helpful on many occasions to this Legation on legal points.

110. Nafisi (Nafey), Said.

Second son of the late Dr. Nazem-ul-Atibba. Born in Tehran 1898. Educated in Persia and later in France. Returned to Persia in 1911, and was employed in the Ministry of the Interior. Transferred to the Ministry of Public Works in 1916, where he held different posts till 1927. Since then has been professor of the Persian language and literature in various schools. Has also done a good deal of journalism for the *Atilla'at*, the *Journal de Téhéran* and other newspapers. Has also been active in promoting the first Persian cinema film. Has a great reputation as a prose writer. Author of a life of the poet Rudaki, and of a French-Persian dictionary. Published some violently anti-British articles in the local press when the D'Arcy Concession was cancelled. Has a certain knowledge of the Pahlavi language. A member of the Iranian Academy (Farhangistan).

A scholar of sorts and an active propagandist of pro-Russian views. Visited Moscow in autumn of 1945.

Prominent in the Soviet-Iranian Cultural Society.

111. *Najm, Abul-Qasim (Abolghassem).*

Born in Tehran 1893. Son of the late Najm-ul-Mulk, a noted astronomer.

Educated at the School for Political Science at Tehran. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1911. Chief accountant at the Ministry 1920-24, and again from 1926-28. Transferred to the Ministry of Finance, and appointed Director-General there in 1930. Under-Secretary to that Ministry in 1933. In November of that year appointed Minister to Germany. Minister in Tokyo early 1940; recalled on rupture of relations 1942. Said to have expressed admiration for Japanese methods. Ambassador at Kabul July 1943.

A polite and hard-working official, whose appointment to a foreign post caused general surprise, as he does not shine at foreign languages and had had no experience of life abroad. Ambassador at Kabul 1943-45. His Majesty's Minister, Kabul, reported that he was friendly but ineffective, his co-operation with His Majesty's Legation being adequate but no more. Understands English tolerably well. Minister in the short-lived Hakimi Government in the summer of 1945 but had not left Kabul when that Government fell. Minister for Foreign Affairs in Hakimi's Cabinet of November 1945. He did his best to deal with the Azerbaijan crisis but the difficulties were too great for him.

112. *Nakhai, Muhammad.*

Born about 1902. Educated in Persia; speaks French.

Secretary of the Persian Legation in Brussels from 1928 for some years, and then remained in Belgium teaching Persian. Also studied law, and eventually returned to Persia to join the National Bank as head of its legal department. Later transferred to the Ministry of Finance as private secretary to the Minister (General Amirhosseini). 1941 became president of the Exchange Commission. At the end of 1943 private secretary to the Prime Minister (Sobeily). Has visited England, and his thesis for his doctorate was a dissertation on *Le Pétrole en Iran*.

Capable, intelligent and well-disposed towards us. Brother of Dr. Hussein Quds (Ghodse). Brother-in-law of Najm.

Has rank of Director-General. In autumn 1943 helped to organise Government Employees' and Tenants' Association. President of Association of Iranian graduates of Belgian Universities.

Minister of Commerce in Sa'id's reconstituted Cabinet of August 1944.

Minister of Agriculture in Sadr's Government in 1945.

113. *Nakhehavan, Muhammad (Amir Muwassaq).*

Born at Tehran about 1882. His father was an officer in the Cossack Brigade. Educated partly in the Russian Military School at Tiflis. On his return to Persia he joined the Cossack Brigade. Director of the Military Academy at Tehran in 1922, as a reward for loyalty to Reza Shah; he had previously been engaged in the fighting in Gilan with the Bolsheviks and Kuchik Khan. In 1928 appointed Acting Chief of the General Staff. Acting Minister of War in August 1934; attained the rank of Amir Lashkar in 1935. Relieved of his functions as Acting Minister in April 1936.

An exceedingly stupid, fat man, who appears to owe his high appointments to a habit of carrying out orders with no comment; never holding any opinion of his own, he never went far wrong, and finally fell simply from the fact that his stupidity got on his royal master's nerves. Head of the Persian Staff College, 1942.

Speaks Russian, French and a little English.

114. *Nakhehavan, Ahmad.*

Born at Tehran about 1893. The son of an emigrant from Nakhehavan, in the Caucasus. Educated in Persia and France. Entered the Cossack Division School in 1910. Commissioned in the cavalry in 1913. From 1913 to 1920 served in Azerbaijan, Kurdistan and Gilan. At Kazvin in 1920 he became a supporter of Reza Shah and joined him for the *coup d'Etat*. In 1922 sent to France for a three years' course in flying. In returning to Persia in 1926 he flew all the way from Paris to Tehran. Director of the Air Force in 1927. Suspended from duty and reinstated three times during 1930-32. Commanded the air force again from 1933 to the end of 1936. Was considered the best Persian pilot. Employed in the Ministry of War early in 1937. Under-Secretary for War in 1938, and virtually Minister, owing to prolonged vacancy in that appointment. Acting Minister of War throughout the latter part of 1938 and the whole of 1939 and 1940. Imprisoned and nearly executed by Reza Shah in a fit of rage during the attack on Persia in September 1941. Minister for War in Ferrouhi's Cabinet 1941-42. Not employed in official posts since then; he has had trouble with one eye. Proposed as Military Attaché in London but did not proceed. Appointed Head of the Air Force in the early summer of 1944. Paid a formal visit to United Kingdom in November 1944 in connexion with scheme to train the Persian Air Force on Hurricanes, but was promptly replaced by another officer. Subsequently visited America. Appointed Inspector-General of Army in 1945. Transferred General Staff April 1946.

Speaks French and Russian. A gambler, not very interested in politics. A patriotic and fairly dependable person, well-disposed to us and honest.

115. *Nasr (Nassre), Seyyid Ali.*

Born Tehran about 1890, of a well-known family of Seyyids, one of whom was assassinated while serving in the Finance Ministry in 1924. A Government servant whose career has been mostly in the Finance Department, under which he has served in Khuzistan and on various inspection duties. Ministry of the Interior as Assistant, 1943, and was in charge of the Ministry on the departure of Tadayyun in December 1943. Appointed Minister to China, January 1944. Promoted Ambassador when status of Legation was changed to that of an Embassy in February 1945.

One of the moving spirits in the Persian repertory theatre at Tehran; in his youth he was an actor, and has translated and adapted for the Persian stage a number of foreign plays, including those of Molière. Speaks French.

116. *Naubakht, Habibullah.*

Born Shiraz about 1895. Taught in a school at Shiraz and ran a scurrilous paper there 1920. Then went to Tehran and was employed in various posts under the Ministry of Education. Published an eloquent and extravagant panegyric of Reza Shah and was elected for Fasa in the thirteenth Majlis. Opposed the Tripartite Treaty in the Majlis debates in 1941 and 1942, with a great parade of ultra-Nationalist and anti-foreign sentiments; having been struck slightly by another Deputy in a brawl, he came into the Majlis the next day with a very large white bandage round his head to make a still more

vituperative speech. Friendly with Abul-Qasim Kashani and in contact with German agents in 1943, and fled to his friends the Qashqai tribe to avoid arrest as a suspect, August 1943. Arrested 1943 by the British. Released August 1945.

Opium addict of very many years' standing.

117. *Nikpey, Ahmad (Mufakham-ul-Mulk).*

Born in Isfahan 1880, and educated at the Church Missionary Society School at Isfahan. Joined the army in 1903 and served at Isfahan, Shiraz and Bushire. Deputy-Governor of Isfahan 1915, and again from 1916 to 1917. Head of the Finance Department at Isfahan 1919-20, when he is said to have embezzled large sums of money. Arrested by Seyyid Zia's Government; and fled to Europe. Returned to Persia in 1924 and repaid to the Government part of the sum embezzled by him at Isfahan. Governor of the Gulf Ports 1926. Governor of Kurdistan 1929. Governor of Mazandaran 1932-34.

Speaks English and French. A very pleasant man to meet. Colonel Haig, when consul-general at Isfahan, thought highly of him.

Has two sons: (1) *Azisullah (E'saz-ed-Douleh)* *Nikpey*, born 1896; Governor of Kermanshah 1940-41; member of the directing board of one of the Isfahan factories; married a sister of Sarem-ud-Douleh; speaks English and French; clever and charming; did well at Kermanshah. (2) *Mawuchihr Nikpey*, born about 1898; served in the Customs and various posts in the Ministry of Finance; 1943 head of the Tobacco Monopoly. Speaks English and French. Delegate to Cairo Financial Conference in 1944.

118. *Niqabat, Zia-ud-Din.*

Born about 1901. Educated in the south of Persia, where he learnt English. A lawyer practising in the Tehran courts. At one time represented the heirs of the late Sheikh Khas'al. Deputy in the Majlis on various occasions, and succeeded in 1943 in being elected from Abadan, in spite of the opposition of Dr. Raji. In that he was helped by the Governor-General, Ali Naghi Mishah-Fatimy, an old friend of his. Helped to found the "Ta'arun" organisation, a political party disguised as a benevolent society.

A quiet-spoken and clever man, capable of good work, but too much of an intriguer ever to do real service to his country.

During the term of the 14th Majlis he always contrived to be in the provinces or abroad at times of crisis when his services were most needed. When Soviet pressure was at its height during Hakimi's term of office, he conveniently made a pilgrimage to Najaf and Kerbela.

119. *Nurzad, Ghulam Reza.*

Born in Tehran about 1880. Educated in Tehran. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1905 and held different posts in various consulates in Russia. First secretary of the Embassy at Moscow in 1922. Counsellor there in 1924, and later Chargé d'Affaires. Chief of a section at the Ministry 1929. Consul-general at Delhi 1933. Head of the Consular Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, November 1938.

Speaks French and Russian, as well as a certain amount of English. A rather long-winded person, but quite harmless.

Consul-general at Stamboul, May 1941. Recalled July 1943 and appointed head of the International Relations Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, November 1943. Transferred to the Court 1944. On Committee of Russo-Persian Cultural Relations Society, 1944.

120. *Oveisi (Ovaisy), Ali Muhammad.*

Born in Tehran 1884. Educated at the School of Political Science at Tehran. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1903. Vice-consul at Baku 1904. Karguzar at Darejex 1905. Deputy Karguzar at Tabriz 1906. Governor of Enzeli (now Pahlevi) 1908. Passport Officer at Constantinople 1909-14. In the Ministry of Public Works 1918. Served in this Ministry in various posts until 1931, when he was appointed Governor of Yazd. Governor of Khuzistan 1933-35. Appointed as commercial representative in the East (India, China and Japan), with headquarters at Bombay, March 1936. Employed in Tehran 1945 in Ministry of Commerce and Industry, as Under-Secretary of State.

Speaks French fluently, and is a pleasant conversationalist. Married to a European lady. Has great ideas on commerce and development schemes. Not popular with his colleagues.

121. *Pahlavi, Shah Muhammad Reza.*

The eldest son of Reza Shah by the daughter of Teymour Khan; this lady was the ex-Shah's chief consort and was known as the "Malikah."

Born on the 26th October, 1919, and proclaimed Vali-ahd, or heir-apparent, on the 1st January, 1926. Educated in Tehran under tutors at first, and then in Switzerland at La Rosey, under the direction of Dr. Moadeb Nafey. Returned to Persia in the spring of 1936. Extremely keen on football and other sports. Speaks excellent French and good English.

Betrothed in June 1938, and married Princess Fauzieh, sister of King Farouk of Egypt, at Cairo on the 15th March, 1939. The marriage was preceded by a very pompous journey through Iraq, Syria and Egypt. The principal wedding festivities took place in Tehran in April, on the couple's arrival, and were attended by delegations from many countries, including the Earl of Athlone and Her Royal Highness Princess Alice, the Duke of Spoleto and General Weygand. The only offspring so far is one daughter, Shahnaz, born in 1940.

The Shah succeeded to the throne, on the abdication of his father, in September 1941. He is determined to interpret literally the provision of the Constitution which says that the Shah is the commander of the armed forces, and has hitherto delegated little if any responsibility in army matters to the Minister for War. As yet he has no male heir and he has not yet declared any of his brothers to be the "Vali-ahd" or next in succession to the throne.

His attitude in the riots of the 8th December, 1942, and in the re-shuffle of Sobeily's Cabinet in December 1943, showed him to be on the one hand prone to listen to the advice of worthless subordinates, and on the other hand determined to emulate his father and (in the reported words of Stalin to him at the Tehran Conference of November-December 1943) "be a King in fact as well as in name." His admiration for his father, and the influence of his bitterly anti-British mother, must both tend to make him believe the theory which his mother instils into him, that the British expelled Reza Shah, whereas in actual fact the latter abdicated at the advance of Russian troops on Tehran.

He has neither intelligence nor courage but a boundless capacity for intrigue. In public utterances and official interviews he is plausible enough, but he is utterly without will, has no discrimination in the choice of his advisers and tends to take the advice of the last person he sees. The weakness of successive Governments in Persia since he mounted the throne has been largely the responsibility of the Shah. Completely lacking in courage or any sort of moral fibre himself, he

has consistently discouraged all who made a firm stand against the Russians from Sa'id to Hakim. During the latter's tenure of office, he completely collapsed and spent much of his time weeping on his mother's shoulder.

At heart he is bitterly opposed to Qavam-us-Saltaneh, probably because only they know the secret of the bloody events of the 8th December, 1941. Even so he dared not do anything to oppose his coming into power in February 1945.

Before the departure of Queen Fauzieh, his immorality was notorious, but he is said to have curbed his desires since. He is unlikely ever to make a capable monarch, constitutional or otherwise.

He has spent enormous sums of money on worthless political parties and papers, but during the 1946 crisis was unwilling to give a single penny to curb the activities of the Tudeh.

122. Pahlavi Royal Family.

The following are recognised members of the Pahlavi Royal Family:—

Sons—

- (i) Shahpour Ali Reza, born the 1st March, 1922.
- (ii) Shahpour Ghulam Reza, born the 18th April, 1923.
- (iii) Shahpour Abdur Reza, born the 19th August, 1924.
- (iv) Shahpour Ahmad Reza, born the 17th September, 1925.
- (v) Shahpour Mahmoud Reza, born the 3rd October, 1926.
- (vi) Shahpour Hamid Reza, born the 4th July, 1932.

Daughters—

- (i) Shahdukht (Princess) Shams-ul-Muluk, born the 18th October, 1917. Married Feridun, son of Mahmoud Jam, 1937. Has a daughter.
- (ii) Shahdukht Ashraf-ul-Muluk, born the 26th October, 1919. Married Ali Qavam, son of Qavam-ul-Mulk, 1937, but a divorce took place early in 1942, with the Shah's approval. Princess Ashraf has a son, Shah-Ram, who is at present the only male grandchild of the ex-Shah, Reza. Married 1944 the son of an Egyptian Pasha.
- (iii) Fatima Khanum, born the 30th October, 1920. Does not appear to be recognised as a princess.

Of these (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) of the sons, and (iii) of the daughters, are the offspring of the ex-Shah's second consort, Ismat (Esmat) Pahlavi; the rest are offspring of the present Shah's mother, except (ii), whose mother, long ago divorced, is Turan, daughter of the late Razi Majd-ud-Douleh, K.C.M.G.

123. Pak-Nazar, Jaafar (Ihtisham-ul-Vizareh).

Born about 1888. An employee of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In charge of the section dealing with cyphers for many years. Has also been in charge of the passport section. Consul-General at Tiflis 1934. Returned to Tehran 1936. Head of the Minister's Office at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1937 until 1938.

Counsellor in Kabul 1941. Consul-General Herat 1943. Inspector in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1945.

Speaks a little French. Always very friendly, but many years of coping with the cyphers of the Ministry have blunted the edge of his intelligence.

124. Pakravan, Fathullah (Amir-i-Arfa').

Born about 1885. First became known as a member of the second Majlis, where it appears that he was the laughing-stock of his colleagues. In 1910 he obtained the appointment of Persian consul-general in Constantinople, although he had had no previous career in any Government Department. From Constantinople he went to Egypt as consul-general, and later became Persian Minister there until he returned to Tehran early in 1925. In 1925 he was appointed Director of the Russian and Turkish section in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Soviet Embassy objected to this appointment at first, on the score that Pakravan, having been many years in Egypt, was probably a British agent. Finally, the Soviet Embassy withdrew its objection, and Pakravan became *persona grata* with the Russians, so much that when Ansari became Minister for Foreign Affairs in July 1926 the Soviet Embassy asked that Pakravan be appointed Under-Secretary. He duly received this appointment, and was in charge of the Ministry during Ansari's absence in Moscow until he was appointed Persian Minister in Rome in December 1928.

When he assumed charge of the Foreign Ministry, the first impression he conveyed was that of an agreeable and conscientious young man, but closer contact proved him to be a garrulous nonentity. Teymourache exercised a close supervision over matters relating to the Foreign Ministry, and it was evident that Pakravan carried no weight, and was but a figurehead. Teymourache was at no pains to hide the fact that he considered Pakravan merely an amiable fool. Interviews with him were mere waste of time, and during the twenty months that he was in charge of the Ministry affairs remained at a standstill. Appointed Persian Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. in February 1931. Was accredited also to Finland and Estonia as Minister in 1932. Has a Russian wife. Recalled from Moscow in February 1934. Appointed Governor-General of Khorassan November 1934. Order of the Humayun, 1st class, May 1937. In Khorassan he showed that, if backed by the Shah, he is prepared to ride roughshod over all opposition.

After the fall of Reza Shah, was relieved by Ali Mansour in February 1942 and was brought to Tehran under arrest on various charges of peculation and irregular conduct while Governor-General of Khorassan; but managed to get out of prison on bail after a few months. At present living at Tehran unemployed; it is unlikely that the popular indignation against the many arbitrary acts which he had to commit by order of the ex-Shah will soon permit his re-employment. Nevertheless he was one of the very few Persian officials who stood his ground when the Russians invaded the Meshed district in August 1941, and he deserves credit for preventing a good deal of destruction by his firmness on that occasion.

Speaks French fluently. Has a Russian wife who speaks fluent English.

Appointed Ambassador to Italy late 1945. Left to take up appointment May 1946.

125. Pirnazar, Hassan.

Born in Tehran about 1895. Educated in Tehran. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1920. First secretary in Cairo 1925. Chargé d'Affaires in Cairo 1930. Returned to Persia in 1931. Consul at Bombay 1932; Consul-General at Baku April 1935. Head of the Economic Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs from 1941. Promoted a Director-General in 1943.

Speaks French and some English. Seems a conscientious official.

Accompanied Qavam-us-Saltaneh to Moscow in February 1946.

126. Pirnia, Hussein (Mutamin-ul-Mulk).

Born about 1875, the second son of the late Mushir-ed-Dowleh. Educated in France. After finishing his studies he returned to Persia in 1902, and became secretary to his father, who was then Minister for Foreign Affairs. Received his first Cabinet appointment in 1918 as Minister of Education. Was appointed a Minister without Portfolio in 1920. He has generally preferred a parliamentary to a ministerial career, and was elected to every term of the Majlis since its inception until the seventh term. To that term also he was elected, but refused to take his seat, as he did not consider the elections to have been held freely. He was chosen as president for the whole terms of the third and fourth Parliaments and for the greater part of the fifth term and for half of the sixth term, and he showed himself to be firm and impartial.

Has not come back to politics since the fall of Reza Shah, though he is often mentioned in terms of extravagant praise as the most honest man, if not the only honest man, in Persia. He refused to form a Government on the fall of the Qavam-es-Saltaneh Government in February 1943, in spite of the insistent request of the Deputies; and similarly refused to be head of the Committee of Supervision for the Tehran elections to the Majlis in 1943. Elected for Tehran 1944 but refused to take his seat.

Has property in Tehran. Wealthy. Not interested in politics; is influential and respected. Religious and anti-foreign. Has retired from public life but force of circumstances may bring him back. Head of the Pirnia family.

127. Pishacari, Mir Jafar.

Born in Tabriz 1894 but is little known there, having spent most of his life in Tehran and elsewhere. Was imprisoned in Tehran as a Bolshevik in the time of Reza Shah. Edited Left-wing newspaper *Afir* and in 1944 went to Tabriz for the elections for the 14th Majlis and his candidature was supported in every possible way by the Russians but his credentials were subsequently rejected by the Majlis. Founded the "Demokrat" party in Tabriz in September 1945 and was elected "Prime Minister" of the autonomous Azerbaijan "Government" in December 1945. In this capacity came to Tehran in April 1946 to negotiate with the Central Government about the future of the autonomous republic which has been created in Azerbaijan.

128. Pourali (Pourevali), Abul-Qasim (Abolghassem).

Born in Tehran about 1896. Educated in Tehran at the School of Political Science. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1921. A judge in the Foreign Office Tribunal from 1922 to 1924. Second secretary at Brussels 1925-27. First secretary at Rome 1927-30. Transferred to the Department of Commerce in 1931, and employed there as chief of the Import Permits section. In 1933 chief of the Passport and Nationality section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In 1934 appointed counsellor at Berlin. Consul-general, Hamburg, 1938. Head of Personnel Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, April 1939.

Head of the second section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which deals with Iraq and Turkey, 1942. Minister at Berne 1944.

Married to a German lady. Speaks French. A voluble little man, who has a great idea of his own importance, and has never gone out of his way to give us any help.

129. Qadimi (Ghadimi), Dr. Hussein.

Born in Tehran 1895. The second son of the late Asadullah Ghadimi, Mushar-es-Saltaneh. Educated in France, and holds a doctor's degree. Attaché at Paris 1918-21. Married to a French lady. At the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1922-23. Secretary at Berne and for the League of Nations 1924-28. Chief of the League of Nations Treaty Section of the Ministry 1929-32. Chargé d'Affaires at Stockholm 1932. Counsellor at Berne 1936. Director of the League of Nations Section of the Advisory Department of the Ministry, 1937, and of the League of Nations Department, when that section was raised to a department in September 1938. Minister at Berne 1941-44.

Speaks perfect French. A very efficient man at his job.

130. Qajar, Abul Fath (Salar-ud-Douleh).

Born the 1st November, 1881, the third son of Muzaffar-ud-Din Shah. Governor of Kermanshah in 1897; of Zinjan in 1899 and 1900, and of Arabistan from 1901 to 1904, where he married the daughter of a local chief. Fled from Tehran to Luristan in April 1904, but was brought back and appointed Governor of Kurdistan in 1905.

Collected tribesmen from Luristan and rebelled against Muhammad Ali Shah in June 1907. A fight occurred in that month between his followers and the Shah's troops outside Nihavend. He was defeated and took refuge at the British consulate at Kermanshah, but was handed over to the Persian authorities under a promise of personal safety. Thereafter he was placed under surveillance and was considered mentally deranged. Expelled to Europe after *coup d'Etat* of 1908.

Entered Persia again in May 1911 from the direction of Bagdad. In the following July he seized the capital of Kurdistan and advanced on Kermanshah. Having arrived there he collected a large force of Lurs, including the Kalhur tribe, and marched on Tehran via Sultanabad. Bakhtiari and Armenian irregulars were sent against him and inflicted a severe defeat on him near Nubaran in September 1911. He then retreated to Luristan and was again defeated in November 1911.

Having been at large in Kermanshah and Kurdistan for some time, he suddenly appeared near Tehran and threatened, but did not actually attack, the capital. He then betook himself to Asterabad whence, with the assistance of Russian influence, he carried on negotiations with the Persian Government to be appointed Governor of Gilan. After some further adventures he was persuaded to leave Persia with a pension from the Persian Government and resided in Switzerland till 1918.

In that year he formed a project to enter Persia through Transcaucasia and raise a revolt in the Asterabad district. He was caught by a British detachment in about December 1918 before crossing the Persian frontier, and was sent via Kazvin to Bagdad where he was interned till the following autumn, when he was again allowed to return to Switzerland.

He slipped over the Iraq-Persian frontier in June 1926 somehow avoiding the Iraq police authorities. His presence caused considerable embarrassment to the new Pahlavi Government who realised that Salar, however mad, was a possible rallying point for the forces of reaction. However, after fruitless negotiations with various Kurdish chiefs, during which he contracted marriage with the daughters of some of them, he left Persia in the autumn of 1926. The Persian Government from that date paid him a subsidy of 1,500 rials per month from secret funds up to September 1933. Salar was persuaded to settle down at Haifa after having given an ambiguous promise to behave himself.

On the cessation of his subsidy in 1938 he was informed by British authorities that he was free to do what he liked. In 1935 living at Alexandria, where he has employed lawyers to press his claims against His Majesty's Government.

Speaks French. Scatter-brained and under-sized. Still reported to be at Alexandria 1945; has not attempted to return to Persia after Reza Shah's fall; but his two sons, who have been living in penury at Tehran for many years, are now trying to get back some of the family properties.

131. *Qaraguzlu, Ali Reza (Baha-ul-Mulk).*

Born about 1880. Owns property at Hamadan, and is a cousin of the late Nasir-ul-Mulk. Has lived in Europe for a number of years and is a graduate of the School of Political Sciences of Paris. Elected to the fourth Majlis as member for Hamadan. Appointed Minister of Finance in 1923, though he had held no Government office before. Resigned in April 1923, as he found that he was controlled by Dr. Millspaugh. President of the Government Supervisory Board of the National Bank of Persia 1929-32.

Minister of Justice in Qawam-es-Saltaneh's Cabinet of August 1942; resigned in the following January without having accomplished anything valuable. An honest politician, but much too old to learn anything new or useful. Lives in Tehran; used frequently to visit Paris. A queer and eccentric man, with a reputation for honesty.

132. *Qaraguzlu, Hussein Ali.*

Second and younger son of the late Nasir-ul-Mulk, Regent of Persia. Born in 1900. Educated at Harrow and Balliol College, Oxford. Married the daughter of Teymourache in 1931; and divorced her in 1935. An attaché at the Legation in London 1931. In the same capacity at Paris 1932. Returned to Tehran at the end of that year, and since employed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, at first in the Treaty Department, and from the end of 1936 in the Protocol Department. Transferred to the Ministry of Interior at the end of 1937.

Resigned from Government service in 1938 and took to chicken farming. After the fall of Reza Shah was not employed in Government service until he became secretary to Dr. Millspaugh at the end of 1942; and in May 1943 was employed at Court, his brother-in-law, Ala, being Minister of Court.

Charming but ineffective; his failure to fulfil his early promise has been a disappointment, but a believer in Anglo-Persian co-operation. An idealist with a certain intelligence and a reputation for honesty.

Speaks perfect English and French.

133. *Nizam-Qaraguzlu, Hussein Quli (Amir Nizam).*

Born in 1883, the eldest son of the late Amir Nizam. A member of the Qaraguzlu family of Hamadan and a nephew of the late Regent, Nasir-ul-Mulk. Educated in England and Austria. Passed through the Military Academy at Vienna, and served with a commission in an Austrian infantry regiment for three years. Inherited large estates from his father in the district of Hamadan, but owing to his absence in Europe from 1921 to 1929 these estates have been allowed to deteriorate. Was appointed Governor of Kermanshah by Vossuq in 1919, where he was very popular on account of his honesty and integrity. Being a rich man he was imprisoned at the time of the *coup d'Etat* in 1921, and made to pay 20,000 tomans as the price of his release. He was so disgusted at this unmerited treatment

that he left Persia and vowed never to return. During his stay in Europe he lost heavily at Monte Carlo and Deauville. Teymourache met him in Europe in 1928, and persuaded him to return to Persia, which he did in 1929. Appointed Grand Master of Ceremonies at the Court in March 1929. Sent to Europe on private business for the Shah in March 1930 and returned at the end of December.

A reputation for honesty saved him from sharing his friend Teymourache's fall. Grand Master of Court Ceremonies (Foreign) 1938. Dismissed owing to royal irritability during the Crown Prince's wedding celebrations in April 1939, and retired to his estate at Kabud-Rahang, near Hamadan.

An extremely agreeable and likeable man, with more than a veneer of European culture. Is the best type of educated Persian, and is noted for his honesty and integrity. Speaks fluently French, German and English.

Is tremendously rich with ample investments abroad. Devotes much time and energy to improving the lot of his peasants. Obstinate, but great force of character and personality. Has great influence in Hamadan area where he is looked on as experienced, wise and good. Honest, hard working and pro-British. In June 1945 bequeathed all his lands to his peasants and distributed copies of the will among them. Appointed the British Embassy and the Imperial Bank of Iran as two of the executors.

134. *Qaraguzlu, Muhsin.*

Eldest son of the late Nasir-ul-Mulk, Regent of Persia. Born about 1895. Spent about fourteen years in Europe with his late father, and received most of his education there. Elected a member of the seventh and eighth Majlis for Hamadan. Appointed Court Chamberlain when his brother-in-law, Ala, was Minister of Court at the end of 1942; accompanied the Pahlavi Princesses on various visits to Cairo.

Well-disposed but lazy. Charming manners, but neither energetic nor useful. Speaks English and French.

135. *Qaraguzlu, Taqi.*

Born in Hamadan about 1891. The youngest brother of Ali Reza Qaraguzlu. Educated in France. Owns large properties round Hamadan. Employed in the A.P.O.C. office at Paris 1928-29. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1929 and sent to Rome as secretary. Returned two years later. Deputy Master of Ceremonies at the Court in 1934.

Speaks French and English. A handsome man with charming manners; pleasant, but ineffective.

136. *Qashqai, Muhammad Nasir.*

Born 1904. The eldest son of the late Isma'il Qashqai (Saulat-ud-Dauleh). Elected to the 8th Majlis as a member of the Qashqai. Ilkhan and the most influential chieftain of his tribe for a short time during 1930. Deprived of parliamentary immunity and arrested for conspiracy in 1932. Fled from Tehran during the general disorder in September 1941 and recovered his old position in Fars where he is now the accepted but not entirely undisputed, leader of the Qashqai. Is the only one of the four brothers who is married. Does not smoke or drink and is a model family man. Tall, broadly built, staring eyes, slight smallpox marks on face, of commanding presence. A fast talker and a good raconteur. Fond of town society and, when living in civilised surroundings, is very reasonable and amenable. When living with the tribes he seems to lose his balance (where matters outside the parochial affairs of the tribes are

concerned) and to be easily misled. This instability probably results from his varied earlier experiences including imprisonment in Tehran with his father who died in captivity.

Until the summer of 1945, when he eventually screwed up courage to come to Tehran, he seems to have been generally in fear of re-imprisonment. His anxiety to consolidate his position leads him, at the prompting of others, to see in himself a future Governor-General of Fars, Prime Minister and even Shah of Persia.

Speaks a little English and understands much. He had two Germans with him in 1943 and made a landing ground intended for German aeroplanes near Farrashband. He rebelled in 1943 and was attacked by troops under Marshal Shahbakhti but the operations were very half-hearted and soon fizzled out. In April 1944 he handed over the Germans who had taken refuge with him and undertook to co-operate with the Allies. Expresses hatred, disgust and distrust of the Persian Government and says the army only moves to widen its range of extortion. Nasir visited Tehran in the summer of 1945 and was received in audience by the Shah from whom he is said to have received a general amnesty for the tribes.

One of his brothers, *Muhammad Hussain*, was a Deputy in the 14th Majlis, for Abadeh. Studied in England but left because of chronic asthma and studied economics at Berlin University. Voluble speaker and very excitable, unreliable and not to be trusted.

Khuatu, another brother, is the youngest son of Saulat-ud-Dauleh and was born in 1921. The reprobate of the family. Great personal bravery and recklessness. Inherits his father's cruelty and sadism; credited with a number of wanton killings. Was appointed Governor of Firuzabad in November 1943 but is never at his post, preferring to make frequent trips to Tehran. Made large sums of money by selling monopoly goods destined for the tribes at an enormous profit in the open market. Has personal charm, considerable powers of persuasion and a boundless capacity for making mischief. Is generally described as a "child" which is intended by some in excuse of his excesses and by others to mean that it is time he grew up.

The fourth brother, *Malik Mansur*, was born in 1907 and studied at Reading University. Tall and lithe, hawk-like appearance, very attractive personality, talks much but slowly and tends to repeat himself. Speaks good English, German and a little French, Turkish and Turki. Reported to be loved by the tribespeople where Nasir is feared. Devoted to tribal pursuits of hunting and riding. Says that he will do his utmost to oppose any Government attempt at interference with the tribe and that he is prepared to fight the army.

137. *Qawam, Ibrahim (Qawam-ul-Mulk).*

Born 1888. The son of Murza Habibullah Khan Qawam-ul-Mulk, who was killed accidentally in May 1916. During the war of 1914-18 was very friendly to us, and carried on his father's traditional policy of opposition to the powerful Qashqai group of tribes headed by the late Isma'il Khan Saulat-ud-Dauleh. Having inherited vast properties in Fars from his father, as well as the titular headship of the "Arab" tribes of that province, he wielded immense authority in the south of Persia at the time of the *coup d'Etat* of 1921. Reza Khan (late Reza Shah) when Minister for War met the Qawam at Isfahan in August 1923 and expressed a wish that he should reside at Tehran; he therefore became elected to the Majlis as member for the Khamseh (Arab) tribes and thereafter has resided a good deal in Tehran. Always on terms of close friendship with His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz, the Qawam

engaged in 1926 a British agricultural expert to develop his vast estates; the experiment proved a failure through local opposition and the Qawam's stinginess; the British expert left in 1928. In 1929 fled to Europe, doubtless having foreseen the Qashqai revolts of that year. Visited London 1929. Returned to Tehran the following year, having put his two boys to school at Beirut. His vast properties were left in the hands of his servants, who remitted him a monthly subvention. In 1929 various questions of validity of title to property were raised by the Ministry of Finance; and in 1931 the whole question was settled by the exchange of lands. The Qawam was given crown lands in Nishapur, in the neighbourhood of Tehran, and elsewhere in the centre of Persia, in exchange for his Fars properties. It is believed that he did well out of these transactions, and that he is one of the wealthiest landowners of Persia at present.

In the ninth Majlis of 1933 he was a Deputy for Baluchistan. He had also accompanied Reza Shah on several of his journeys, and was generally supposed to enjoy His Majesty's full confidence. In November 1933, however, on the arrest of the Minister of War, Sardar Asad, while in attendance on the Shah at the Turcoman races, the Qawam seems to have become the object of suspicion, and he was placed under arrest with Asad.

He is an attractive personality to meet. Very pro-British in sentiment, he sent his two sons (Ali Muhammad Qawam and Muhammad Reza Qawam) to England to be educated. Until his arrest he appeared to have settled down permanently as a peaceful courtier at Tehran. He plays polo, but does not mix much in society. Quiet in voice and retiring in manner, he is yet capable of driving a very hard bargain with his own countrymen. He does not appear to have much ambition. Though his name is still a household word at Shiraz, he cannot be considered a tribal leader in the sense that the Qashqai chiefs are; he is best considered as a Persian noble whose family had for some time held suzerainty over a group of tribes and who attained great wealth and influence in Fars, partly through backing the right side in the 1914 war.

His son, Ali Muhammad, married Princess Ashraf Pahlavi in March 1937, but the marriage was dissolved. He had previously been an undergraduate at Bristol University, where he did very badly. A daughter married Asadullah 'Alam, son of Muhammad Ibrahim 'Alam (Shaukat) in 1939.

Played his part in the "events of 1941"; he and his family at one time "took bast" in the British Legation at Gulbek; and when Reza Shah abdicated and went to Isfahan it was Qawam who was sent by the Government to obtain Reza's signature to documents handing over his properties and private fortune to the State and to his son respectively.

Visited India 1941-42 and bought a house at Bangalore.

Sent back to Shiraz to help Marshal Shahbakhti with his attack on the Qashqais in June 1943.

His elder son, Ali Muhammad, went to Washington as Assistant Military Attaché at the end of 1941.

Appointed Governor-General of Fars September 1943, but could not agree with any of the military chiefs about tribal policy, and returned to Tehran November 1943. He still enjoys considerable influence in Fars but resides generally in Tehran. The general tendency among his own family, whose obedience but not consciences he commands, is to regard him with the utmost respect as the survival of a day that is gone. He himself does not seem to be conscious of, or will not admit, this passage of time. His elder son, Ali Muhammad, has now returned from Washington.

138. Qavam (Ghavam), Ahmed (Qavam-us-Saltaneh).

A brother of Hassan Vossug, than whom he is younger by a few years. Began his career in the Ministry of Finance. Became Minister of War, July to October 1910, and Minister of Interior, July to November 1911, and again in December 1911. Minister of Finance, July to August 1914, and Minister of Interior, November 1917 to January 1918. Appointed Governor-General of Khorassan April 1918 and remained there for three years, during which he administered the province with uniform success during troublous times. Became Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, June 1921 to January 1922, and again Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs from June 1922 to February 1923. Banished to Europe in October 1923, being accused of having plotted against the life of Reza Khan (Reza Shah). Was allowed to return to Tehran at the end of 1928 and arrived in March 1929, when he went to reside quietly on his property at Lahijan near Resht.

Came back to live in Tehran after the fall of Reza Shah. Prime Minister, August 1942, after the fall of Soheily. Worked hard, but gradually surrounded himself with his own relations and friends. Tried hard to gain control of the Ministry of War, but failed to counteract the young Shah's enthusiasm for the control of the army. The Shah's opposition to him was shown in the disturbances of the 8th December 1942, in which Qavam did extremely well and undoubtedly performed a great public service in re-establishing governmental authority. Thereafter, however, he became more and more involved in petty intrigues and favouritism, and had to resign in February 1943; since when he has been more or less openly accused of being the real instigator of the riots of December 1942.

Believed to have been in touch with the Japanese Legation early in 1942, and to have received, when Prime Minister in 1942, messages from persons whom he knew to be German agents, without informing us. This was brought to the notice of the Shah in January 1944.

A clever man, but sly, intriguing and unreliable. Has generally been friendly to His Majesty's Embassy.

Became Prime Minister in February 1946 with additional offices of Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of the Interior. His policy was to seek reconciliation with the Soviet Government. For this purpose he went to Moscow in February 1946.

Responsible for the arrest of Sayyid Zia and General Arfa in March 1946, probably at Russian insistence. In April 1946, concluded a treaty with the Russians granting them an oil concession in the north from the Turkish border to the Afghan border, to be presented for approval to the 15th Majlis. Submitted to Russian pressure to settle the Azerbaijan problem by conciliatory methods; in return Russians agreed to withdraw their troops by the 6th May, 1946, provided that nothing unforeseen happened. In same month withdrew Persian's complaint against Soviet Union for interference in internal affairs of Persia from Security Council and invited a delegation from autonomous "Government" of Azerbaijan to Tehran for discussions.

139. Qubadian, Abbas (Amir Makhsus).

Born about 1900, son of Daud Khan, first paramount chief of the Kalhurs. Suspected of being pro-German in 1917-18 when Turks and Germans occupied Western Persia. Seized power in the tribe after the murder of Sulaiman Amir A'zam by Pasha Khan, Qubadian's brother, in 1922. He led a revolt against him, was captured and

imprisoned. Vain and obstinate, he is at loggerheads the whole time with most of his own family. Deputy for Kermanshah in the 14th Majlis. In early 1946 succeeded in forming a union of the western tribes to combat the Tudeh and the Democrats in Kurdistan.

140. Quds (Ghodse), Hussein.

Born about 1892. Graduate of the Tehran School of Political Science. Has held various posts under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and was secretary in London for five years. Edited, for a short time, a small literary review. Private secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs 1934. Secretary and, for a time, Chargé d'Affaires at Washington 1935, until relations were broken off. Accused of having abused customs franchise while in charge at Washington. Secretary in London March 1937. Consul, Izmir, 1939. Counsellor in London early 1943.

Speaks English and French. A quiet and level-headed official.

141. Radmanish, Dr. Riza.

Born about 1900. In 1938 he was arrested by Riza Shah for making Communist propaganda. Elected Deputy for Lahijan in the 14th Majlis. Has been a prominent member of the Tudeh party and the Tudeh Majlis group since its foundation and was a dominating member of the Tudeh party General Party Conference in 1944. Edits Left-wing paper *Mardum*. One of six editors invited by the Ministry of Information to visit the United Kingdom in the autumn of 1945, but did not accept. A genuine Communist who is not best pleased with the complete subservience of the Tudeh party to the Russians but unable to help himself. Rather naïve.

142. Rahnema, Zein-ul-Abidin.

Born about 1888, one of the sons of the late Sheikh-ul-Iraqain, a Persian subject and small mujtehid of Kerbela.

Rahnema was educated in Iraq and came to Persia about 1910. He was a member of the Democratic party and edited first the newspaper *Rahnema* and subsequently the semi-official paper *Iran*. He was elected a Deputy to the fifth and sixth terms of the Majlis. Was sent to Europe in 1923 on a mission to "boom" Persia, and stayed most of the time in Paris. Was appointed Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Public Works at the end of 1926 and Under-Secretary to the Minister of the Interior in April 1927. In June 1927 he fell from favour and confined himself to journalism, and accompanied the Shah on his journey to Khuzistan in October 1928 as press representative.

Rahnema is an ambitious man, with plenty of "push." His great ambition has always been to obtain a Government post, which he hoped would culminate in a ministerial appointment. With that object in view, he discarded his turban and gave up his title of "sheikh." This brought him three different under-secretariats in succession. He is intelligent and clever in a certain sense.

Went to Europe in 1933 to purchase printing machinery. In the summer of 1935 was exiled to Iraq and took up his residence in Beirut; the Shah was said to have suspected him of plotting against the régime.

Returned to Persia after the fall of Reza Shah in 1941, and resumed his editorship of the newspaper *Iran*. On a mission to the ulama of Iraq in 1942, and brought back certain messages addressed to the young Shah. Plunged into political intrigue in 1942 and after being disappointed at not being accepted by the Iraq Government as Minister, became a sort of secretary and spy in Soheily's administration in 1943, but

soon resigned. Minister in Paris 1944. In February 1945 made a nuisance of himself to the military authorities in the British Zone of occupied Germany, by consistently ignoring all arrangements made for him when he was granted permission to enter the zone to examine the credentials of a number of persons claiming to be Persian, and by misusing the recommendation given to him by the British Military Mission in Paris to receive accommodation for himself and his unnecessarily large suite and to commandeered the German broadcasting network to summon all Persian subjects to report to him. The Mission in Paris decided that no further help was to be given to him.

Speaks French and English.

143. Rais, Muhsin.

Born in Tehran about 1895. Educated in Persia and France. The eldest son of the late Zahir-ul-Mulk. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1919. Sent to Switzerland as secretary of the Persian delegation to the League of Nations. Returned to Persia in 1924, and served in the Ministry till he was sent to Paris as counsellor in 1930. Head of the Treaty Section of the Ministry in 1933. Minister at Berlin and The Hague 1935. Political Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, September 1937. Minister at Bucharest for Roumania, Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, December 1938.

Transferred to Vichy in 1941, and returned in July 1942 to Tehran. Minister in Bagdad July 1943.

A very agreeable man, not afraid of hard work. Speaks good French. Married, one of the many daughters of Farman Farns in 1935.

144. Razmara, Haji Ali: Brigadier (Sartip).

Trained in France, at Saint-Cyr. Born about 1900. Related to the Kemal-Hedayat family. Joined the army and commanded a regiment in 1931. Military Governor of the Khamseh tribes 1931. Commanded operations against the Kurdish insurrection of Jafar Sultan 1932. General Officer Commanding 1st Tehran Division October 1941. Chief of the General Staff July 1943; relieved by Rizi September 1943. Director of the Shah's Military Secretariat October 1943.

An able, energetic but corrupt officer with a reputation as a disciplinarian; in fact, he is said to have killed a man on parade for insubordination. Very ambitious and a great intriguer, and trims his sails to any wind. An unprincipled adventurer. Speaks some English.

Out of favour with the Shah who is suspicious of him. Was dismissed from the post of Chief of General Staff at the end of 1944. Re-attached to General Staff in March 1946 and member of military delegation chosen in April 1946 to represent Persia at Victory Day celebrations in London.

145. Riazi, Ali: Brigadier (Sartip).

Born about 1891. Entered the army and was trained in France, where he graduated as an engineer officer at the French Staff College, and became Military Attaché in Paris. Was a member of the Anglo-Persian Military Commission of 1920, where he earned the respect of the British members for his honesty and frankness. Was one of the supporters of Seyyid Zia in his *coup d'Etat* of 1920. Retired from the army in Reza Shah's reign and joined the Ministry of Education; became Director of Education in Fars, where he did good work in preserving and restoring old monuments. Rejoined the army on the departure of Reza Shah and was appointed (1941) Deputy Chief of the

Technical College and then of the General Staff. Strongly urged the appointment of foreign advisers for the army and thus came into conflict with the Chief of the General Staff. Then (1942) appointed Under-Secretary of State for War, in which capacity he did good work in piloting various Bills through the Majlis. Chief of the General Staff after Razmara September 1943, but was hampered in his efforts to work by the intrigues of his colleagues and the suspicion of the Shah. Minister of Education in Sa'id's Cabinet of March 1944, but was dropped when Sa'id reshuffled his Cabinet after a few days. Minister of War in Hakimi's Cabinet of November 1945. A serious man, of culture, intelligence and charm, of the studious rather than the commanding type. Universally respected for his honesty and simplicity. One of his daughters works in the Tehran Museum under M. Godard.

146. Sadiq, Dr. Issa (Sadiq-i-A'lam).

Born about 1892. Educated partly in England (where he was for a time munshi to Professor Browne) and partly in America, where he took a doctor's degree. Began his career in a very lowly station in the Ministry of Education. Rose to be Director of Education in Gilan. Attended an international congress on education in England about 1929, where he lectured on modern educational methods in Persia. Principal of the Teacher's College (Ecole normale) since about 1932.

Minister of Public Instruction in Ferouhi's Cabinet September 1941. On the resignation of that Cabinet in 1942 became Dean of the University of Tehran. Again Minister of Education in Soheily's reshuffled Cabinet of December 1943. Minister of Education in Bayat's Government of November 1944.

An intelligent and go-ahead man, speaking English and French. Well disposed towards Anglo-Saxon methods of education. The author of several works on education.

147. Sadiqi, Sadiq (Mustashar-ed-Dowleh).

Born about 1865. Educated at Constantinople. Was a secretary at the Persian Embassy in Turkey for many years. Elected a Deputy for Tabriz, his native town, to the first Majlis in 1906. Elected President of the second Majlis in 1909. An ardent Constitutionalist he was arrested by Muhammad Ali Shah in 1908 and imprisoned until January 1909. Elected a member of the committee which was convened to draw up the Electoral Law. Appointed Minister of Interior in 1911. Minister of Posts in 1914 and 1915, and again Minister of Interior in 1915 and in June 1917. In the following Cabinet he was a Minister without portfolio.

Before the war of 1914-18 he was pro-Russian, but when war broke out he espoused the cause of Germany and Turkey, and was one of the most extreme of "enemy partisans." After the war His Majesty's Legation demanded that he be exiled to some outlying province of Persia. From that time, with the exception of a short period in 1921 when he was a Cabinet Minister without portfolio, he lived a retired life and had little or no influence.

Appointed Persian Ambassador to Turkey in January 1931. Returned to Tehran on retirement at the end of 1935.

Minister without portfolio in Qavam-es-Saltaneh's Cabinet of August 1942, and continued in that capacity, with vague duties, in Soheily's Cabinet of February 1943. Highly respected and considered a wit, but almost useless and senile. Dropped from Soheily's Cabinet December 1943.

Proposed Governor-General of Eastern and Western Azerbaijan, should agreement be reached between autonomous Azerbaijan "Government"

and Central Government. Took part in discussions with Mission from Azerbaijan which came to Tehran April 1946 but with no official status. Speaks French and Turkish.

148. Sadr, Seyyid Muhsin (Sadr-ul-Ashraf).

Born about 1878. An almost unknown person in Tehran politics until appointed Minister of Justice in Feroughi's Cabinet of the 7th September, 1933. Spent the whole of his previous service in various judicial posts under the Ministry of Justice. Has been president of the Court of Cassation. One of the old school, who looks much better in the turban than in a hat. Was responsible for some of the new sections of the Civil Code. Resigned September 1936.

Bitterly attacked in connexion with a water dispute at Qum 1942. Looked upon as an elder statesman and one of the senior members of the Majlis 1943.

Minister of Justice in Soheily's Cabinet of 1943. Said to have been one of the pro-German "Kabud" party in 1942.

Became Prime Minister on the 6th June, 1945. Resigned October 1945. During his period of office he was bitterly attacked by all Left-wing elements and accused of being a reactionary. Did his best to resist Soviet encroachment on Northern Persia, but the pressure was too strong and he was replaced by Hakimi who was less unpopular with the Russians.

149. Sadri, Abdul Ali (Salig-us-Saltaneh).

Born in Tabriz about 1886. Son of the late Sadr-ed-Douleh. Entered the court of Muzaffar-ed-Din Shah when quite young and was appointed a chamberlain. Attached to the court for many years. Imperial Commissioner of the Persian Government to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 1905-18. Persian Minister in Washington 1919-21. Minister in Berlin 1924-25. Minister in London 1926-27. Lived in Europe for five years after that, returned to Persia in 1932.

Speaks French and English. An intriguer, whose reputation is not of the best. His recall from London was said to be due to the Shah's suspicions that he had friendly relations with the Sheikh of Mohammerah. A relation of the late Qavam-ed-Douleh. His brother, Farid Sadri (Farid-es-Saltaneh) is a well-known adventurer, who makes his living by his wits, making himself out to be a fabulously wealthy Persian prince; in this way he married an Englishwoman and deserted her after getting her money; he lives in Europe.

In Germany 1942 and 1943, but returned to Tehran December 1943.

150. Sa'id (Sa'id, Saed), Muhammad (Sa'id-ul-Vizareh). Also known as **Muhammad Said Maraghehi.**

Born about 1885. Educated in the Caucasus. Served in various capacities in the Persian consular posts in the Caucasus: viz., at Baku, Tiflis and Batumi. Acting consul-general at Baku in 1927. Head of the Russian Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1933. Appointed Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow in February 1934. Minister at Rome June 1936. Accredited also to Hungary, 1938. Ambassador at Moscow, April 1938.

A very agreeable official, whose Russian is better than his Persian. He must have an intimate knowledge of the Caucasus and of Soviet methods of administration. He has a handsome Latvian wife. Always willing to help. Appears to have no delusions about Russia.

Recalled from Moscow to be Minister for Foreign Affairs in Qavam-es-Saltaneh's Cabinet August

1942. Held the post in Soheily's Cabinet of February 1943. In the running for Prime Minister, being favoured for that post by the Shah 1943, but the Majlis would not agree.

Appointed Prime Minister in March 1944. Resigned on the 10th November, 1944. After Kavtaradze's arrival he was persistently opposed by the Tudeh and the Russians and was thus able to do little during his tenure of office. His Government's rejection in October 1944 of the Russian demand for an oil concession brought about a crisis which resulted in Sa'id's resignation.

151. Sajjadi, Muhammad.

Born in 1899 in Tehran. Son of a Mulla. Employed in the Ministry of Justice by the late Davar and later transferred to the Customs as Acting Director-General 1934. Then employed in the Tobacco Monopoly until 1937, when he became Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Communications. Acting Minister of Communications on Ahi's dismissal in November 1938.

Minister of Roads in Feroughi's Cabinet of September 1941, and then head of the Tehran Municipality in 1942. Since then has been interested in the "Adalat" party. A talkative and clever man, with a rather attractive air of buffoonery, but superficial. Married his brother's wife.

Arrested and sent to Sultanabad by the Allied security authorities September 1943. Released at end of war 1939-45.

Director of the Exchange Control Department in the Ministry of Finance in Hakimi's Government of November 1945.

Spent several years in France and speaks French.

152. Saleh, Allayar.

Graduate of the American College at Tehran. Born about 1900. For some years employed as a secretary in the American Legation at Tehran. He then entered the Ministry of Justice, where he held various appointments as judge, public prosecutor, &c. Was transferred to the Ministry of Finance through the influence of Davar, and appointed director of the opium monopoly, and afterwards director of the tobacco monopoly.

Head of the customs for a short time. Then accountant-general.

An intelligent and able man. Speaks French and English.

Sent to Washington on an economic mission 1941. Returned in the autumn of 1942 to be Minister of Finance in the hope that he would work well with Dr. Millspaugh, but he proved a disappointment, quarrelled with Dr. Millspaugh, and was allowed to resign by Soheily in March 1943.

Sent on a Commercial Mission to India September 1943.

Member of the Persian Delegation to San Francisco and spent some time in London on his way back to Persia. Minister of the Interior in Hakimi's Cabinet, November 1945 to January 1946 when he dismissed Ghulam Hussain Ibtihaj, the pro-Sayyid Zia Mayor of Tehran and replaced him by Nariman, as being more acceptable to the Russians.

In Hakimi's Cabinet he was regarded as the leader of the appeasement group. Is said to have the ear of the American Embassy where his brother is a Munshi. Member of the Election Council appointed by Qavam to supervise the elections for the 15th Majlis.

153. Sam'i (Samiyi), Hussein (Adib-us-Saltaneh).

Born about 1878, a native of Resht. Spent his early career in the Ministry of Interior and was once

Governor of Resht. Appointed Minister of Public Works 1921 to June 1922. In March 1923 he became Minister of Interior for three months. When the present Shah became Prime Minister in October 1923, Sam'i was chosen as his assistant, until, in August 1924, he was appointed Minister of Justice. Early in 1926 he was appointed Governor of Tehran and held that post until he was appointed Minister of Interior in June 1927. Appointed Governor-General of Azerbaijan in May 1931. Grand Master of Ceremonies (Internal), 1938. Dismissed during the Crown Prince's wedding celebrations, April 1939. Ustadar (Governor-General) of the IVth Ustan (Western Azerbaijan), July 1939.

Ambassador to Kabul 1939. Returned to Tehran July 1942 and became Minister of State, without portfolio, in Qavam-es-Saltaneh's Cabinet of August 1942. Appointed Minister of the Interior by Soheily in July 1943, ostensibly in order to supervise the elections to the 14th Majlis, but he soon resigned. President of the Farhangistan (Academy) at Tehran 1943.

Went to Russia at invitation of Soviet Government for anniversary of Science Academy in Tashkent.

Sam'i is a pleasant man, but of little influence. He is not very energetic nor highly intelligent. He speaks no foreign language.

154. Sanjabi, Kerim.

Born 1904, near Kermanshah; a member of one of the principal families of the well-known Sanjabi tribe. In 1920 came to Tehran for study and completed the courses at the Political and Law Schools at Tehran. 1928 went to France and spent three years in Paris and three in the provinces. Doctor of Law of Paris. In 1934 returned to Persia, and served in the Religious Endowment Department of the Ministry of Education, and also taught law. 1940 head of the statistical department of the Ministry of Finance. Appointed in 1943 professor of law at the Tehran University.

155. Sayyah, Hamid.

Born in Isfahan 1886. Brother of Humayun Sayyah. Educated at Moscow. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1916. For some time a judge in the Tribunal of the Ministry. Commercial secretary at Moscow 1922-26. A director of the Caspian Fisheries Joint Board 1927-31. Chief of the Russian section at the Ministry in 1932. In charge of the Eastern Department, 1933. Consul-general at Beirut, March 1934. Minister at Warsaw, June 1936.

Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in Feroughi's Cabinet of September 1941, and was most helpful to us. Again Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in Qavam-es-Saltaneh's Cabinet of August 1942 until January 1943. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs again December 1943. Minister of Communications in Sa'id's Cabinet March-August 1944. Accompanied Qavam to Moscow in February 1946. Appointed Minister to Moscow, March 1946.

Speaks French and Russian. Married his cousin, Fatimeh Khanum Sayyah, but afterwards divorced her. A charming man, knowing too much about Russian methods ever to incline towards bolshevism. A good bridge player.

156. Sayyah, Kazim.

Born about 1892. A family of Turkish descent, sometimes calling themselves Sayyah-Sipanlou, and not related to Hamid Sayyah. Served in the Turkish army in the 1914-18 war, and taken prisoner by the British troops 1917. Then employed in the Caucasus where he had various adventures in 1920 and 1921. A strong supporter of Seyyid Zia in the latter's *coup d'Etat* of 1921, and when the Seyyid fell he fled with him to Switzerland.

Returned to Persia about 1923 and was imprisoned by Reza Shah for some time. Then employed under the Ministry of Industry in supervising the factories at Isfahan. Was also in charge of the Fine Arts Department at that place 1940 to 1942. Fell under suspicion as pro-German owing to his relations with the factory engineers, most of whom were Germans. Transferred to Tehran 1942 and put in charge of the glycerine factory. In 1943 employed by the Americans in the price stabilisation section of the Ministry of Finance. Appointed "Rais-i-Intizam" or head of the organisation section of the Ministry of Interior. Kazim Sayyah is well known as a strong supporter of Sayyid Zia. His appointment as "Rais-i-Intizam," therefore, raised an outcry by all the Left-wing elements and by those who favoured a policy of appeasement towards the Russians.

A man of the world, capable of good work, and claims to be well-disposed towards us. Married to a Greek.

157. Sepahbody, Anushirwan.

Born in Tehran about 1890. Educated in Tehran. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1907 and worked there till 1910. Vice-consul at Vladikavkaz in 1910, and thereafter served at different posts in the Caucasus till 1918. Then chief of a section at the Ministry; in charge of the Protocol Department in 1926. Minister in Switzerland 1929-33. Under-Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, July 1933. At the beginning of 1934 made Minister at Rome, being accredited also to Vienna, Prague and Budapest. Ambassador at Moscow, June 1936, until April 1938. Minister, Paris, July 1938, and also accredited to Spain in June 1939.

Ambassador to Turkey 1940. Minister for Foreign Affairs June-October 1945. Minister for Justice in Qavam's Cabinet, February 1946.

A man of no particular family, he has made his way to the top while still young. Speaks French and Russian. Is quite well supplied with brains, but is often too lazy to use them. On friendly terms with Shah. Hates Russians.

158. Shafai, Ismail.

Born in Tehran about 1885. Educated in Persia and Russia. Joined the Cossack Brigade in 1910. Appointed chief of the arsenal in 1922. Visited Europe in 1923, and again in 1926, in connexion with the purchase of machinery for a new arsenal. Promoted brigadier-general March 1932. Went to Europe that year to purchase military stores. Ceased to control the arsenal in 1934 on going to Europe, where he remained, usually at Berne, as chief of the Arms Purchasing Commission until 1937, when he returned to Persia.

Speaks Russian and German. Employed at Court 1943, and supervised the arms and powder factories; his services appear to have pleased the Russians.

Minister of Industry, December 1943, but in coping with a strike had the misfortune accidentally to kill one of the strikers. Resigned March 1944. Military attaché to Moscow, September 1944. Returned with Qavam in February 1946.

An amiable and jolly old soldier. Is a Bahai.

159. Shahbakhti, General Muhammad.

Born about 1882, the son of a peasant inhabiting the village of Ishtihar, near Tehran, but has now been heard to describe himself as a native of Azerbaijan, possibly to cover up his humble origin.

He enlisted in the Cossack Brigade about 1901, distinguished himself by bravery in the field, and received a commission. In 1914 he was a captain. He attached himself to Reza Khan, whose influence

with General Starosselsky secured him promotion to the rank of colonel in 1919. After the coup d'Etat of 1921 he was appointed to command the Ahan regiment of infantry. In 1925 he was promoted general and given command of an infantry brigade in Tehran. In 1926 he was sent to command the western division, but was recalled in the spring of 1928 for corruption; he, however, managed to ingratiate himself with the Shah, and was appointed shortly afterwards to command the Persian troops in Kurdistan. In December 1928 he was sent to command the troops in Fars, but was superseded by General Shaibani.

Appointed to command the troops in Azerbaijan in 1932. Promoted to the rank of Amir Lashgar in March of that year. Transferred to Ahwaz as general officer commanding, January 1939.

Appointed commander of the western forces October 1941, with the rank of marshal (sipahbud). Controlled the Kermanshah area pretty thoroughly, ignoring completely the civil governor, till he was transferred to Fars to quell the Qashqais under Naser Qashqai in February 1943. He was not very successful in that campaign and after the defeat of the garrison at Semirum in July 1943 came to Tehran to report. In his old age he seems to have become more arrogant and unapproachable. Suspected of taking large bribes when at Kermanshah.

An almost entirely uneducated survival from the Cossack Brigade, resembling in appearance and manners the more famous product of that corps, Reza Shah.

Placed on retired list October 1943.

160. Shaibani, General Habibullah.

Born about 1885, the son of Nazm-ed-Dowleh, who came of a middle-class family of Kashan.

In 1906 Shaibani went to Saint-Cyr, where he graduated in 1910 and joined a French regiment. Returned to Persia in 1913, and was commissioned into the Swedish officered gendarmerie as a captain. He was highly regarded by the Swedish officers, and was promoted major in 1914. He was strongly anti-Russian, and consequently anti-Ally, during the war, and he joined the Muhajerin (the pro-German party), and remained in Turkey until 1918, when he returned to Tehran and re-entered the gendarmerie. He appears to have made contact with Reza Khan about 1920, and was working in his interests before the coup d'Etat. Promoted colonel in 1921, he served in the operations against the Jangalis and against Simitko. Promoted general of brigade in 1922, and in 1923 went to France in charge of Persian military students. He entered the French Staff College and graduated with distinction in 1925. He attended the Arms Traffic Conference at the League as Persian representative in the autumn of 1925, and was very sore at the success of the British representative in getting the Persian Gulf included in the Maritime Zone. In 1926 he was appointed acting Chief of the General Staff. He resigned that appointment in March 1928 owing to his disagreement with certain orders issued by the Shah. Appointed Minister of Public Works in May 1928 until December, when he lost that appointment and was placed *en disponibilité*. Appointed a member of the High Military Council in January 1929. Promoted general of division in June 1929, he was sent to command the army in Fars to deal with the rebellion in that province. He was successful in restoring order, as the Qashqais, although in a fighting mood, were short of munitions. In 1930 he commanded the operations in the Mamasenni district and against the Kuhgelus, and by October he had succeeded in reducing the Kuhgelus, only one of the khans still refusing to make his submission to the Government.

Shaibani is a man of independent views, and is somewhat rigid and narrow-minded. He is a strict disciplinarian, and does not play to the gallery. His

military ideas are conservative and sound, and he is perhaps the only French-trained officer who has not been led away from the realisation of realities. He regards Russia as the enemy of Persia; of the motives underlying British policy he has a fair understanding, and he thinks that Britain can and should help Persia in her own interests, but he believes that Britain will always sacrifice Persia if it should be in her interest to do so. He is intensely patriotic, and will stoutly oppose whatever he considers to be derogatory to Persian sovereignty or detrimental to Persian independence. At the same time he views with disfavour Persia's hasty efforts to play the rôle of a civilised nation. He is remarkably honest, direct in speech, and prompt in action. He has little sympathy with Persian officialdom. His nickname in the army is "Feranglu," not by reason of any imitation of Europeans, but rather because of the un-Persian nature of his character.

He speaks French fluently.

Tried by a military court-martial in the autumn of 1931, on a charge of military inefficiency in his 1930 operations against the Mamasenni and the Boir Ahmedi tribes, resulting in some 500 Persian casualties. Sentenced to two years' imprisonment and deprivation of all his ranks and dignities. He was released after a few months in prison, and is said to have gone abroad during 1935. Said to be either in Berlin or in Switzerland 1942.

161. Shams-ul-Mulk Ara'i, Asadullah (Shahab-ud-Dowleh), K.C.V.O.

A Qajar prince. Born about 1880. Educated in Persia. For many years employed in the Telegraph Department. Governor of Yazd in 1911. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs 1914-15. Minister of Public Works 1915. Master of Ceremonies at the Court 1922-25. Governor of Kermanshah 1929. Recalled 1933, and appointed Governor of Kurdistan in October 1934. Recalled April 1936, owing, it is said, to having incurred the displeasure of the Shah through not accelerating reforms in his province.

Holds the dignity of K.C.V.O., received when in attendance on Ahmed Shah during his visit to London in 1919.

Governor-General of Fars early 1942, but was superseded in the following summer, without having accomplished much.

A rather pompous man, said to be a great intriguer; but he is not averse to the society of foreigners, and probably regrets the good old days. Speaks English and French fluently.

162. Shaqai, Hadi (Hsn-ed-Dowleh).

Born at Tehran 1890. Educated in Persia, Russia and France. Did his military training in France. A cavalry officer, he has held various posts in the army, and in 1932 was general inspector of cavalry, with the rank of brigadier-general.

Commanded troops at Isfahan 1942. Considered a competent officer without any frills. Inspector of Artillery 1943 and later in the year head of the Military Tribunal. Inspector General Staff 1944.

Speaks French and Russian.

163. Shirvani, Abu Talib (Banan-es-Sultan).

Born in Isfahan about 1890. Educated in the local schools, and also for two years at the Church Missionary School. Studied English, but cannot speak it well. Led a disreputable life in his youth, joining the famous brigand Riza Khan Jauzani; served also under another brigand, Mashallah Khan. Started the newspaper *Mihan* at Isfahan in 1919. On writing an article criticising Major Fazlullah Khan, the head of the gendarmerie, he was arrested and whipped by order of the major. In 1921 started

the paper *Mihan* at Tehran. His paper was Nationalists and scurrilous. Published articles against the Sinclair Company in 1922, doubtless for a consideration. Deputy for Isfahan in the fifth and sixth Majlises. Interested in the Khourian Oil Company. Visited Moscow by invitation in 1927 on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the revolution. Visited London December 1927. Became an advocate in the Tehran courts in 1927.

Came again into prominence on the fall of Reza Shah. Head of the Department of Propaganda 1942, but had to resign owing to hostile criticism in certain newspapers accusing him (with truth) of being a Christian. Has claims to land in Fars.

An unprincipled intriguer, quite without scruple and quite untrustworthy.

164. Shukuh, Hussein (Shukuh-ul-Mulk).

Born about 1880. Educated in Tehran. A relation of Hassan Vussugh (Vussugh-ud-Dowleh). Has been in Government service for about thirty-three years, having held various posts in different Ministries. "Chef de cabinet" to the Prime Minister in 1919 and again in 1921-23. Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs 1924-28. "Chef de cabinet" to the ex-Shah, and in charge of the ex-Shah's special office since 1928. Accompanied the Shah on his State visit to Turkey in June 1934.

Kept his post at the Court on the fall of Reza Shah; still remaining the soul of discretion and eschewing the society of foreigners.

Speaks French. A capable and polite official.

165. Siasi (or Siassi), Ali Akbar.

Born 1893. Educated in France 1911 and stayed in France till the outbreak of the 1914 war. Took a course in pedagogy. Employed as dragoman and Persian secretary at the French Legation from about 1917 to April 1941. At the same time he was instructor in psychology and law at the University of Tehran; later professor. Went to Europe 1927 and took a further course in France, obtaining a doctorate in philosophy. Married the daughter of the late Bayat, and so acquired wealth. One of the founders of the French-sponsored "Young Persian Club" in 1921.

An intelligent man with a perfect command of French; his outlook is more French than Persian in some respects. Always polite and agreeable to talk to. Is also able to make a very good speech in English.

Minister of Education, August 1942. Resigned from Soheily's Cabinet in August 1943. Dean of the University of Tehran. Minister without Portfolio in Bayat's Government 1944.

Member of Persian delegation to San Francisco Conference, March 1945. Visited United Kingdom after the conference.

Invited by Soviet Government to visit Tashkent for the twentieth anniversary of the Science Academy there, December 1945.

166. Sipih, Ahmad Ali (Muxarrikh-ud-Dauleh).

In June 1942 he was mixed up in a German plot involving Qavam-us-Saltaneh and Hussain Ali Qaragzulu (not the same man as No. 132). Was Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry at the beginning of 1944. In February 1944 was Acting Minister of Commerce and Industry for a short while after the resignation of Nakah'i. He was removed from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in the summer of 1944 and remained without an appointment until August 1945, when he was appointed head of the Caspian Fisheries, a post which brought him into close touch with the Russians. Closely associated with Qavam-us-Saltaneh and joined the Cabinet as Minister for Commerce and Industry in 1946. An incorrigible

intriguer and extremely corrupt even by Persian standards. He has the reputation of being a Russian spy, which is probably not undeserved.

167. Soheily (Soheily), Ali.

Born about 1890. Educated partly in Russia and talks Russian well, also French and a little English. His career has been in various Government administrations. In January 1931 was appointed Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Roads and Communications under Kazimi. In September 1933 he was transferred to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as Under-Secretary, when Kazimi was appointed Minister. Soheily had also served as chief Persian representative on the board of the Caspian Fisheries Directorate. Several times Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the absence of his chief. Minister in London, March 1937. Minister for Foreign Affairs, May 1938, but dismissed in July, owing to the late Shah's displeasure over a telegram concerning the Paris Exhibition. Ustadar (Governor-General) of the VIIIth Ustan (Kerman) February 1939. Ambassador, Kabul, October 1939.

Became Prime Minister, rather unexpectedly, in March 1942, after having been Minister for Foreign Affairs in Feroughi's Cabinet from September 1941 (during which time he was the Persian signatory of the Tripartite Treaty of February 1942). His Cabinet fell in July 1942, partly owing to lack of support from the Court and the army. Again Prime Minister on the fall of Qavam-us-Saltaneh in February 1943, once more unexpectedly; this time it was largely because Mu'tamin-ul-Mulk could not stand and the Majlis did not want the Shah's candidate, Saed. Proved himself once more a hard worker, but carried little weight in the country and had to maintain himself by various "combinations" and political deals with Majlis Deputies.

A very reasonable, matter-of-fact person, with a businesslike manner. Hard working, and a good deal more approachable than some of his colleagues. In his contacts with this Legation he has always given the impression of his willingness to help and to arrive at a reasonable settlement. He is notoriously corrupt and has a well-deserved reputation of being a liar. He is quite prepared to agree to do anything but rarely keeps his word. During 1944-45 he was frequently a strong candidate for the Premiership, but was suspected by many of being too well-disposed towards the Russians. Went to Egypt in the summer of 1945 and was made a member of the Persian delegation to U.N.O. in January 1946. Remained in London. Still there May 1946.

Has a Caucasian wife with a "past" and is universally suspected of having taken a great many bribes.

168. Sururi, Muhammad.

Born about 1900. Served in various Government Departments, being one of the favoured young men selected by Davar, then Minister of Justice, when he revised the organisation of the Ministry in 1929. Has been judge in the Tehran courts, and Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Justice. Director of the Agricultural Bank 1942, but removed from that post June 1943. Posted to the Ministry of the Interior to look after it till Hajhir's return, January 1944. Minister of Interior in Sa'id's Cabinet of August 1944 and again in Bayat's Cabinet in November 1944-June 1945. He did well, but incurred the displeasure of the Tudeh party when he arrested the worst of the professional toughs of Tehran and imprisoned them in Bandar Abbas.

Businesslike and said to be honest. Lacking in real initiative, but carries out orders efficiently.

169. Taba, Dr. Abdul Hussain.

Born in Tehran about 1911. Educated in medicine in England and qualified in medicine

and surgery after eight years in Birmingham and at Guy's Hospital. Real name is Tabatabai, of the Yazdi family of that name. Employed by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as a doctor 1940-42, and since practising in Tehran.

A bright young man who seems keen on his profession. Married the youngest daughter of Vosough-Douleh.

170. Tabatabai, Muhammad Sâdiq.

Second son of the late Seyyid Mohammad Tabatabai, who was a prominent figure in the Nationalist movement of 1906 to 1910. Born in Tehran about 1880. Elected to the third and fourth Majlises. In close touch with pro-Germans during the war of 1914-18. Emigrated to Turkey in 1916. Returned in 1918 and co-operated with Suleiman Mirza in forming the Socialist party. During this phase he was in close touch with the Soviet Embassy. Ambassador to Turkey 1924-27. Recalled in 1927 and offered a post as a judge in the High Court of Appeal, but did not accept it.

Speaks French. Said to be intelligent and hard-working. Was more or less under arrest for about ten years in Tehran until the fall of Reza Shah 1941. Gradually entered political life after that and initiated and fostered the only Liberal party of Persia, called the "Millat" party ("The Nation").

Head of the Election Committee for Tehran 1943-44, and himself elected Deputy. Aspires to becoming Prime Minister, but, though intelligent, has ruined his health by excessive opium-smoking.

Elected President of the fourteenth Majlis.

An opium addict for thirty years, he frequently found it difficult to keep awake when he was presiding over the Majlis. Moreover, sessions could not last till after 1:30 p.m. because the time for his pipe had come. An incorrigible intriguer he stands close to the Shah to whom he has always offered bad advice, favouring a conciliatory policy towards Soviet aggression. His "liberal" ideas are not to be taken seriously. He and his friends pride themselves on their patriotism and the pursuit of the middle way between Britain and the U.S.S.R. For reasons unknown he is generally regarded as a "national" figure. Would like to be Prime Minister.

171. Tabatabai, Seyyid Zia-ud-Din.

Born about 1893. Son of the late Seyyid Ali Yazdi Tabatabai. Edited the newspaper *Rad* (Thunder) in Tehran in 1915-16. Played a considerable political rôle in 1917-18. Sent to Baku by Vosuq-ud-Dowleh in 1919 as Persian representative to Caucasian Azerbaijan; returned to Tehran in May 1920. Carried out *coup d'Etat* with the help of the Cossacks in February 1921, and seized the reins of office. Appointed Prime Minister with full powers by Ahmed Shah on the 1st March, 1921, and effected numerous arrests. His reforms were too radical for the country and the time, and he fell from power in June, fleeing the country. He has been in the tobacco business while exiled.

Took a prominent part in the Pan-Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in 1933.

Said to have assisted Kazemi in the negotiations with Iraq at Geneva during 1935.

In 1942, being by that time the owner of a very prosperous farm near Chazza in Palestine, which he had developed himself, he began to think of returning to his native country, and Muzaffar Firuz began with great energy and indiscretion to run a newspaper campaign in his favour in Tehran. He published a letter from the Seyyid in which the Russians were praised in fulsome language. His name came forward a good deal in the Tehran press during 1943, and quite a number of Deputies in the thirteenth Majlis seem to have favoured his return.

The Russians and the Shah, however, were steadfastly opposed to his return, the former because they mistrusted Firuz's unfortunate letter, and the latter through fear that the Seyyid might become a dictator. However, he returned to Tehran in September 1943 and was elected to the fourteenth Majlis from Yazd, his native place. Caused annoyance by insisting on wearing a woollen hat of Caucasian style, and alienated some of his friends by an appearance of stubbornness and obstinacy.

Founded a political party which in the summer of 1945 was officially launched under the name of "Iradeh-i-Milli" or National Will. His followers claimed that the party numbered about 9,000 in Tehran, at the end of 1945. Is the particular bugbear of the Tudeh and the Russians, who never tire of vilifying him as the arch-enemy of his country and the principal tool in Persia of imperialists, reactionaries, &c. During the near-panic which prevailed in Tehran in November-December 1945 as a result of the approach of the Azerbaijan Democrats towards Qazvin many leading politicians and Deputies began seriously to consider that Seyyid Zia should be exiled from Persia as a sop to the Russians.

Arrested by Qavam-us-Saltaneh on the 19th March, 1946.

It is no exaggeration to say that Seyyid Zia rallied the anti-Tudeh forces in Persia and thus made it possible to resist intensive Soviet pressure when it came. Alone among Persians he has never allowed personal or even party interest to interfere with his policy. By his uncompromising resistance to Russian encroachments he became the symbol of Persia's will to resist. Though suspicious of Sa'id when he first came to power, he nevertheless supported him wholeheartedly when he proved that he was determined to resist Soviet demands. Similarly, he strongly supported Hakiini's foreign policy, although his party suffered severely at his hands. Again, when Qavam-us-Saltaneh did not surrender to the Soviets he gave him his support, although the latter has a personal feud with him since he was one of those imprisoned by him in 1921.

A man of outstanding singleness of purpose and courage. Personally attractive, religious without being fanatical or obscurantist, he is at the same time short-tempered and impatient of criticism. These defects, however, were very much less noticeable during the last few months of the fourteenth Majlis. He is both honest and energetic—a very rare combination in Persia. In matters non-political he tends to have very wild ideas which he defends with unreasonable obstinacy.

The comparative lack of success of his party was due first to furious Soviet opposition, secondly, to his having been out of contact with the country for twenty-three years, and thirdly to the impossibility of reconciling his progressive ideas with the conservatism of many of his followers on whose financial aid he was dependent. Speaks French and English.

Has something of the mystic in him.

172. Tadayun, Seyyid Muhammad.

Born about 1884, a native of Birjand in East Persia; educated in Tehran, where he graduated and became a schoolmaster. After the split up of the original Democrat party in 1912 Tadayun became the leader of one of the more important Democrat factions. He was elected a Deputy from Tehran to the fourth term of the Majlis, and from Birjand to the fifth and sixth terms. Was elected President of the Majlis in the second half of the fifth term, and again at the beginning of the sixth term. In February 1927 he was appointed Minister of Education, but in December he resigned that appointment owing to disagreement with his colleagues in the Cabinet, but he resumed office nine days later

at the personal request of the Shah. On the 7th January, 1928, the Shah ordered him to resign, and his fall was said to be due to the personal animosity towards him of Teymourache. In June 1930 he was appointed Governor of Kerman.

He was recalled from Kerman in March 1931, and he appears to believe that one reason for his recall was that he was too friendly with Lieutenant-Colonel Noel, then British Consul.

Returned to politics on the fall of Reza Shah; was Minister of Education in Feroughi's Cabinet of 1941-42, and spoke eloquently in favour of the Tripartite Treaty of 1942. Minister of Food after Farukh in 1942; resigned in July 1943. Minister of the Interior, September 1943, and did well in running the elections. But was not included in the reshuffled Cabinet of December 1943. The Russians, who for some reason are against him, seem to have secured his exclusion.

173. Taheri, Dr. Hadi.

Born at Yazd about 1888. Son of a mulla. Landowner and proprietor of various concerns at Yazd. A great rival of the Nawwah family of Yazd. Elected to the Majlis on various occasions, and has served as president of the Financial Commission of the Majlis. In the thirteenth Majlis was one of the vice-presidents and was considered one of the leading members of the Majlis. Served on the Committee of the Anglo-Iranian Relief Fund, 1943, and was helpful in providing local knowledge. Was largely responsible for the success of Seyyid Zia-ed-Din in the Yazd elections of 1943, thereby incurring the dislike and distrust of the Shah. Very friendly to us. Accused of various speculations at Yazd, but nothing has been proved, and he is considered one of the most solid and reliable Deputies.

In the fourteenth Majlis he was, with Sayyid Kazim Jalili Yazdi, the most influential Deputy. Bitterly anti-Soviet he worked hard to maintain the Majlis majority against Soviet pressure. Though very slow in speech and manner he is extremely astute and had a profound knowledge of his Majlis colleagues and particularly of their weak points. Though patriotic he would not allow his patriotism to interfere unduly with his personal interests in Yazd. He has a congenital aversion to the obvious course and delights to achieve his objectives by devious means through the agency of others. It would be idle to pretend that he has progressive ideas. Although ostensibly on excellent terms with Sayyid Kazim Jalili, he is secretly jealous of him, a sentiment that is reciprocated.

174. Taqizadeh, Hassan.

Born in Tabriz about 1880, the son of a small preacher. He was educated in his native town, and used to haunt the booksellers' shops, where he showed great eagerness to acquire knowledge. In his early youth he was an ardent Nationalist, and was connected with the Nationalist movement in Persia from the beginning. He was elected to the first term of the Majlis and was one of its most prominent members. Mohammad Ali Shah hated and feared him, and, when the Shah made a *coup d'Etat* in 1908 against the Majlis, Taqizadeh took refuge in His Majesty's Legation. The demand made by the Shah that he should be given up was refused, and Taqizadeh was eventually amnestied, on the condition that he went to Europe. He visited London and Cambridge, but returned to Tabriz at the end of 1908. He was elected to the second term of the Majlis in 1909, and, after the capture of Tehran by the Nationalist forces and the abdication of Muhammad Ali Shah in July 1909, Taqizadeh became a prominent member of the Nationalist Committee, which was set up to decide on the Government of the country. Went to Europe in 1910. He was elected in his absence to

the third and fourth terms of the Majlis, but did not take his seat. He stayed in Europe and America during the whole period from 1914 to 1923, and was for years in Berlin, where he edited a paper called *Kaveh*. For publishing certain articles of an anti-Islamic nature he was excommunicated by the Mujtehids. He negotiated the Perso-Soviet Commercial Treaty in Moscow in February 1921, and finally returned to Persia in 1924. He was elected to the fifth term of the Majlis 1924-26, and to the sixth term in 1926. He visited America again in 1926 as Persian delegate to the Philadelphia Exhibition. Appointed Governor-General of Khorasan in January 1929; he was recalled in May and appointed Persian Minister in London, where he remained until April 1930, when he returned to Persia and became Minister of Roads and Communications. In August 1930 he was appointed Minister of Finance in addition.

He is no longer so popular as he was in the early days of the Constitution, and the years have tempered his energy and zeal. His speeches in the Majlis marked him as a man of common sense and moderation.

Taqizadeh fell from grace in September 1933, for reasons which are obscure. The Shah is said to have suspected him of intrigue with Majlis members in connexion with the purchase of gold. He was, however, soon re-employed as Minister in Paris.

Recalled from Paris in August 1934, but obtained prolonged leave of absence and did not return to Persia. Appointed Iranian representative at the Congress of Orientalists at Rome in September 1935.

He is married to a German and talks German fluently. He speaks English and French less well.

Appointed Minister in London by Feroughi 1941, and has been suggested as Prime Minister on more than one occasion since then, but he has always preferred to stay in London. Became ambassador in 1944.

Headed Persian Delegation to the U.N.O. in London in January 1946 and ably presented the Persian case when the Security Council considered the Perso-Russian dispute about Azerbaijan. Appointed to act as Persian representative in winding up the League of Nations in Geneva, March 1946.

175. Vasiqi (Vassighi), Sadiq (Sadogh).

Born in 1898 at Tabriz, but of a Mazandaran family. Employed for many years in the Department of Commerce of the Ministry of Public Works, and in the Ministry of Commerce since the former ministry was divided up. Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce until April 1938, when he became Acting Minister on the dismissal of M. Ala.

He has paid several visits to Europe, notably to Germany when the Clearing Agreement with that country was negotiated in 1935, and to Moscow in 1939, when the question of renewing the Russo-Iranian Trade Agreement arose. Head of Agricultural Bank in 1942, but was removed to make room for one of Qavam-us-Saltaneh's political nominees. Member of the board of the Iran Insurance Company, February 1943. Head of Mortgage Bank, December 1943. Secretary of the Perso-Soviet Cultural Relations Committee, February 1944. Member of the National Bank Supervisory Board, August 1945.

Educated in Tehran at the Ecole Polytechnique (Dar-ul-Funun), and speaks French and English.

176. Vossuq, Hassan, G.C.B. (Vossuq-ed-Dowleh).

Born about 1868. Began his career in the Ministry of Finance. Elected a Deputy to the first and second terms of the Majlis, and in 1909 chosen to be a member of the Nationalist Committee.

which directed the affairs of State after the abdication of Muhammad Ali Shah. His first Cabinet appointment was as Minister of Justice in October 1909. In the following month he became Minister of Finance, but resigned in July 1910. In July 1911 he became Minister for Foreign Affairs. Again Minister for Foreign Affairs in January 1913, he left for Europe in June of the same year. Minister for Foreign Affairs, July-August 1914, and Minister of Finance, August-December 1915. Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 1916 to May 1917. Prime Minister and Minister of Interior from August 1918 to June 1920. Negotiated the Anglo-Persian Convention of 1919. Visited Europe in June 1920, and only returned to Persia at the beginning of 1926. Appointed Minister of Finance in June 1926, but resigned in November to take his seat in Parliament. Elected as a Deputy from Tehran to the seventh term of the Majlis 1928-30. Appointed President of the new "Academy" for the revision of the Persian language, December 1935.

A man of great ability and character. He became unpopular over the Anglo-Persian Convention, but, after a most able and convincing defence of his acts as Prime Minister during the period 1918-20 before the Majlis, he regained a large measure of popularity.

Went to Europe for a serious operation 1940; survived it, and is now reported to be living in Switzerland (1946), unable to return to Persia; he was appointed ambassador to Turkey by his brother, Qavam-es-Saltaneh, in 1942, but could not proceed. Speaks French fluently, also a little English.

177. Yezdan Penah, General Murteza.

Born about 1891; son of Mirza Ali Akbar, a small shopkeeper in the village of Serdasht. In 1907 Murteza Khan entered the Cossack Cadet School. Received his commission in 1912, showed strong pro-Russian sympathies, and consequently gained rapid promotion. Made lieutenant-colonel in 1919 and colonel in 1920. During the whole of his service he was intimate with Reza Khan, and accompanied him on the march to Tehran in February 1921 which culminated in the coup d'Etat. Was promoted general and given command of the Central Division. In July 1927 he fell from favour, and was put under arrest for a short time for an unknown reason. Whatever the suspicions against him were, they appear to have been unsubstantiated, for he was released very soon. In the autumn of 1928 he was appointed inspector of the gendarmerie, but was superseded in 1930 and left without any active command.

Murteza Khan was always regarded until 1927 as a very loyal supporter of Reza Shah, but after his arrest in 1927 he appeared to have lost confidence in Reza Shah. He is active, intelligent, ambitious, and a strict disciplinarian. His military ideas and his general education are very limited, but he has shown anxiety to learn. He is not popular amongst the troops, but is feared and respected. Holds aloof from foreigners, and is a strong opponent of foreign interference in Persia.

Inspector of Infantry in 1932. Commandant of Tehran Cadet College, 1933.

On the fall of Reza Shah, Murteza Khan became Chief of the General Staff, and worked as a loyal supporter of the young Shah. On the appointment of Amir Ahmedi as Minister of War in 1943 it became apparent that the two could not work together, and Murteza's department became quite separate from that of the Minister of War; in fact, the Shah took to giving orders to the Chief of the Staff without the knowledge of the responsible Minister. Murteza took two months' leave in June 1943, but was soon appointed commander of the Tehran garrison.

Appointed adjutant-general to the Shah, autumn 1943, a post he still retains. Member of the Perso-Soviet Cultural Relations Committee, February 1944.

Speaks Russian and has a Russian wife. Leader of military contingent chosen to represent Persia at Victory Parade in London, June 1946.

Honest, genial and staunchly patriotic, he urged the Shah strongly to oppose the candidature of Qavam-us-Saltaneh in February 1946, but without success. Although he is one of the Shah's closest advisers, he does not have a very high opinion of him personally, though he is devoted to the monarchy. He is one of the few senior army officers who are incorruptible. He is reputed to have had close relations with the Soviet Embassy, but this is most probably untrue.

178. Zahidi, Fazlullah (Basir-i-Divan).

Born in Hamadan about 1883. His father was for many years in charge of the late Nasir-ul-Mulk's property at Hamadan. Joined the Constitutional movement and was wounded. Joined the Cossacks and thus came into contact with Reza Khan, under whom he served. Rose to the rank of general in 1921. Commanded the troops at Shiraz in 1922. In 1924 commanded the troops sent to Khuzistan, and helped to arrest the Sheikh of Mohammerah in 1925. Transferred to Resht in 1926, where he commanded the Northern Independent Brigade. Recalled to Tehran December 1928. Commanded the Road Guards 1929. Arrested and degraded for neglect of duty in 1929. Soon after he was pardoned and reinstated. Chief of police 1931. Relieved of this post after a few months owing to the escape of some prisoners from prison. Dismissed from the army in 1931. Turned his attention to business and became a partner in the "Kazadema" Ford agency. Reinstated in the rank of general 1932 and made A.D.C. to the Shah. Member of the Iranian commercial delegation to Russia in April 1935, and subsequently visited Central Europe.

More of a politician than a soldier. Made a good deal of money in Khuzistan. Being capable of generosity he was not unpopular with the troops under his command.

Married the daughter of Hussein Pirnia (Mo'tamen-ul-Mulk) in 1927.

Commanded troops at Isfahan 1942, and gradually took charge of all departments of Government; proof was found that he was working with the Germans, and he was arrested by British troops and taken out of Persia in the autumn of 1942. Released in 1945.

179. Zand, Ibrahim (Ebrahim).

Born about 1890. Educated at the Cadet College at St. Petersburg. Then sent to study law in France, where he was a contemporary and friend of Jawad Amery. Towards the end of the last war became an active member of the Musawat party in Azerbaijan, and in 1919 became a member of the short-lived Azerbaijan Government. After its fall he went back to France, and a few years after returned to Persia, where Davar employed him in the Ministry of Justice as an adviser. He was subsequently transferred to the Ministry of Finance, and in 1938 became a member of the board of the National Bank. On the appointment of A. H. Ebtehaj as director of that bank he left the bank and was employed at Court as Comptroller of the Royal accounts. Minister of War in Soheily's third Cabinet, December 1943. Minister of War in Sa'id's Cabinets, March and April, 1944, in Bayat's Cabinet, November 1944, Hakimi's Cabinet, May 1945 and Sadr's Cabinet June 1945. Suffers from ill-health and makes frequent trips to Palestine for treatment. A patriotic and honest man with

a background of military training of the Russia of Tsarist days. Had sound ideas about eliminating corruption in the army but lacked courage to enforce his will.

Married to the sister of Farajullah Bahramy. Speaks Russian extremely well, probably better than Persian.

180. Zanjani, Hussein.

A native of Zanjan, whose former family name was Qizilbash. Second Secretary at Constantinople 1924-28. In the Treaty Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1928-31. Secretary at Warsaw, 1931-34, and in London, 1934-37. Retransferred to Warsaw, May 1937, and recalled to Tehran to be Acting Chief of the Third Political Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (dealing, *inter alia*, with Great Britain), November 1937. At Geneva, August 1938 to October 1939, studying League of Nations organisation, employed in the Inspection Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, October 1939.

Consul at Basra at the end of 1942. Speaks French and some English. Has an Armenian wife.

181. Zarin-Kafsh, Ali Asghar.

Born about 1885, of a Tehran family of Kurdish descent. Educated at the Political School in Tehran, and employed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in subsidiary posts for several years. In 1923 and 1924 was head of a section of the Ministry and was always very courteous and helpful whenever referred to by members of this Embassy. Served as "chef de cabinet" to Mirza Muhammad Ali

Khan Feroughi while the latter was Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was subsequently posted to Washington, where he spent more than a year as secretary to the Persian Legation. He was recalled to Tehran in about 1927, and served in the Ministry of Justice for a time under Davar, at the time when the Ministry was being fundamentally reformed. He was for a time a judge of the Cour de Cassation. He then was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior, where he was serving as Under-Secretary when the Minister of the Interior, Mirza Ali Khan Mansur, was transferred to the Ministry of Roads on the 26th January, 1933. From thenceforward he served as Acting Minister of the Interior until Feroughi's Cabinet was formed in September 1933.

At the Ministry of Justice earned a reputation for severity, which was no doubt needed.

Proceeded to England as commissioner of the Persian Government with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in December 1933, with his wife and two children. Honorary counsellor to the legation in London 1937.

Returned to Persia December 1940. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Justice from 1941. Has always been helpful in settling cases and giving advice on points of Persian law. On Hikmat's resignation from Soheily's Cabinet in June 1943, became Acting Minister of Justice, but on the appointment of Sadr as Minister returned to the post of Under-Secretary. Minister of Finance 1944. Speaks English and French.

Zarin Kafsh is honest and socially most pleasant. In 1945 he joined the Iradeh-i-Milli party and has a very high regard for Sayyid Zia.

[E 5130/149/34]

No. 9

Mr. Le Rougetel to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 6th June.)

(No. 161.)

Sir,

Tehran, 25th May, 1946.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 738 of the 25th May, 1946, I have the honour to transmit to you a translation of the Labour Law which was approved by the Council of Ministers on the 18th May, 1946. Although the law has not yet been formally promulgated, I understand that it will take effect ten days after publication of its text in the *Official Gazette*.

2. It will be observed that a 48-hour week is provided for, and that overtime must not exceed four hours in any one day, with an annual maximum of 600 hours for seasonal industries and 400 hours for other industries. Overtime pay is to be 35 per cent. in excess of ordinary wages. In its draft form the Bill specified that overtime pay should be 50 per cent. extra, but this was modified as a result of representations made by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

3. The original Bill also provided that Friday should be a holiday, and that a full day's wages should be paid for this day. The law has, however, been slightly modified and now provides that, if an employer does not pay his workmen wages for Fridays, he is bound to fix their weekly wages in such a manner that the wages paid them for six days shall cover their requirements for a week.

4. One of the most important sections of the law is chapter 10, which provides for the settlement of disputes. This section is of great interest in view of the labour difficulties at present experienced by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Article 27 provides for the establishment at each factory of a council to be known as the Factory Council composed of one representative from the workmen of the factory, one representative from the employer, and a representative of the Department-General of Labour. In its draft form the Bill stated that, should the official representative not be available, he could nominate a substitute from the employees of the factory. This provision would have weighted the scales against the employers, as the official representative could at any time shelve his responsibility by going away and leaving the employers' representative in a minority.

5. In the case of individual disputes the decision of the Factory Council is to be final and binding. Disputes of a more general nature, involving a number of workmen or a union of workers or of employers, if not settled by the Factory Council, are to be referred to an Arbitration Board, composed of one arbitrator nominated by the employer and one nominated by the workmen. Should they fail to agree, an umpire is to be appointed by mutual consent. If the Arbitration Board fails to settle the dispute within twenty days, or the arbitrators refuse to give an award, the question is to be referred for solution to the Board for Settlement of Disputes, composed of the local Governor or his representative, the senior legal representative or his representative, the local representative of the Department-General of Labour, two representatives of the workmen, and two representatives of the employer. The award of this board must be given within twenty days and is to be final and binding.

6. Lock-outs and strikes are forbidden before the expiration of the periods mentioned above. Persons inciting others by threats or force to go on strike, or preventing them from striking, are liable to imprisonment from one to three months.

7. The new law marks an important step forward in social legislation in this country, and its provisions are on the whole reasonable. There was an urgent need to protect the interests of labour, to regulate the relations between the workman and his employer, and it is to be hoped that the machinery provided for settlement of industrial disputes will be of real value to the oil company, who can now invoke the provisions of the law in their dealings with their employees.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosures to the Government of India and to the Labour Counsellor at Cairo.

I have, &c.

J. H. LE ROUGETEL.

[E 5134/401/34]

No. 10

Mr. Le Rougetel to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 6th June.)

(No. 169.)

Sir,

Tehran, 29th May, 1946.

I HAVE the honour to refer to the series of telegrams relating to the labour unrest at Abadan and in the oil-fields. There is no doubt that the strikes and other manifestations of disorder were very carefully prepared beforehand by the Tudeh organisers. In this connexion I attach a report on the Tudeh party organisation in the south,⁽¹⁾ prepared by Colonel Underwood, who is in charge of security measures.

2. The first outward manifestations of unrest were a series of attacks on the company's property and personnel during the month of April. A list of these incidents is attached,⁽¹⁾ and it will be observed that appeals to the police authorities were in general quite unavailing. These incidents are still continuing. The first organised trial of strength between the local authorities and the Tudeh party was the May Day demonstration. On the 30th April the police authorities at Abadan summoned the Tudeh leaders and informed them that any May Day meetings must be confined to the Tudeh Club premises, and that overflow meetings must take place only in the vicinity of the club. Despite this intimation a procession, which swelled to 10,000 persons, marched through Abadan Town. The Military Governor was unable to obtain reinforcements, and had there been any violence the local authorities would have been quite powerless to cope with it. Having demonstrated their ability to flout the authority of the Government, subsequent events such as the strikes in the distillation plant and at Agha Jari, the requisition of the company's transport, the forcible occupation of the company's Persian Club, and the holding of a mass meeting for the purpose of inciting the mob to violence against the British personnel of the company were merely further stages in the process of making it quite clear that the Tudeh were masters of the situation.

3. It is, indeed, true to say that at the present time the security of the refinery and fields and the safety of the British personnel depends upon the goodwill and pleasure of the Tudeh party. Reference has been made above and in paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 753 to the fact that inflammatory speeches directed against the British personnel of the company are being made under the

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

noses of the authorities. In this connexion I enclose a copy of the Tudeh party meeting in question.⁽¹⁾ This note was prepared by a Persian who was present. Finally, I attach a copy of a note prepared by the Oil Company,⁽¹⁾ which gives fuller details than it is possible to transmit by telegram of the requisition of the company's transport and forcible occupation of the club premises and of various other minor incidents which make it quite clear that the authority of the Government has, in fact, been seriously undermined.

I have, &c.

J. H. LE ROUGETEL.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 3163/315/34]

No. 11

(1)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 12, Secret, for the period 18th March to 24th March, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 88 of 25th March; Received 9th April.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

AS the result of his refusal to accede to the Russian demands in Moscow, Qavam-us-Saltaneh's stock has risen. His subsequent decision to appeal to U.N.O. has further enhanced his reputation, the more so since it was made in the face of the Russian threat to the effect that the lodging of the appeal would be considered by them as an unfriendly act on the part of the Persian Government. His mercurial temperament does not permit the Persian to have the same emotions for long. (As he himself puts it: "In Persia puff once to light the fire, spit once to put it out.") Already there are signs that he is thoroughly frightened at his own bravery of a few days ago. There is some evidence of dissensions in the Cabinet on the question of the appeal and Qavam is even said to be considering the dismissal of General Firuz, Sepehr and Bahar, who have consistently advocated complete submission to Russia as the only wise policy for Persia.

2. To the account of Qavam-us-Saltaneh's negotiations in Moscow, given in paragraph 1 of last Intelligence Summary and paragraph 1 of Intelligence Summary No. 10, should be added the fact that he presented to the Soviet Government a written claim for 2,000 million rials (about £15 million) on account of customs dues, payments due on a munitions agreement, cereals supplied, payments due to the railway administration and rial sellings credit for which had accrued to the Persian Government in gold and dollars in Moscow.

3. "In the interests of the country" and because of "the suspicion aroused by his actions," the Prime Minister on the 20th March ordered the arrest of Sayyid Zia-ud-Din Tabatabai, in accordance with article 5 of the Military Governorship Law, which says, "Persons suspected of opposition to the constitutional Government or public order and security may be arrested by the executive power. After arrest their interrogation will be begun and if during the interrogation suspicion is not entirely removed the suspect will remain under detention and will be handed over to the civil courts after the period of military governorship has ended." General Riazi, who has a well-deserved reputation for veracity, admitted to the British military attaché that the arrest of a patriot so outspoken in his denunciations of the Russians and so vigorous in his opposition to the Tudeh was "to preserve a policy of balance" and to smooth the feelings of the Russians, so ruffled by Qavam's appeal to U.N.O. Muzaffar Firuz, who has an equally well-deserved reputation for mendacity, stated that the arrest was protective. It is rumoured that a demand for Sayyid Zia's arrest was made as soon as he arrived by M. Sadtkhikof, the new Russian Ambassador. Motives of personal revenge may not be entirely lacking since Qavam-us-Saltaneh was one of those imprisoned by Sayyid Zia-ud-Din when he brought off his *coup d'Etat* some twenty-five years ago. Though Qavam said in conversation with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that the arrest was deemed necessary in view of Sayyid Zia's personal actions, that no further arrests of Sayyid Zia's adherents in his "National Will" party were contemplated and that, in order to preserve order, arrests, if necessary, would be made without distinction between

Tudeh and anti-Tudeh, there are good grounds for believing that orders were actually issued for the arrest of the Deputies Ali Dashti and Jamal Imami and also of General Hasan Arfa, the late Chief of the General Staff. It is believed that they all slipped away from Tehran in time, however, and have not yet been apprehended. Ali Dashti though, like Sayyid Zia, a strong opponent of the Tudeh and of Russia's present policy and actions in Persia, was not a member of the "National Will" party but was the leading personality in a party of his own making named Adalat (Justice). Jamal Imami was a close associate of Sayyid Zia's. General Arfa's firm stand against Tudeh and Russian aggression had long ago marked him out as a target for their hatred. Sayyid Zia's arrest has a twofold importance. Firstly, in that he was popularly supposed to be a tool of the British, his arrest is hailed by his opponents as a resounding defeat for his "imperial masters." Secondly, in that he typified resistance to Russia, his disappearance from the arena has dismayed his adherents and driven underground any further movement to stand up against Russian threats and bullying. In consequence, some signs of panic have appeared and some of the more prudent merchants have already left the capital for destinations in the south. Pilgrimage to the holy places of Iraq has suddenly become popular, and a number of wealthy Persians have recently developed symptoms of diseases which can only be cured by a prolonged course of treatment in Palestine.

The Majlis.

4. Reference paragraph 2 of last Intelligence Summary: the following were elected to the interim presidential body: Dr. Muazzimi, Shahab Firdaus, Merat Isfandiari, Tusi. They have no executive powers.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

5. Rezaieh and Miandoab are still claimed by both Kurds and Democrats as lying within their respective autonomous areas and it is only the presence of Russian troops which prevents armed clashes between them.

Kurdistan.

6. No reliable news of the situation around Sardasht and Baneh has been received but there are rumours that the Russians are affording armed support to the Kurds in their operations against the Persian army garrisons and to the Democrats in their operations against the Afshar tribal partisans of Government in the Shahrin Deh and Tikab areas.

Russian Troop Movements.

7. Very little news has been received during the past week and there is little that can be added to the information given in paragraph 4 of last Intelligence Summary.

Northern Azerbaijan.

The 2,800 cavalry reported as having arrived in the Maku area have been reinforced by a further 1,000 seen leaving Maragheh and passing through Tabriz. Taking the maximum strength of a Russian cavalry division as 5,000, the cavalry now in this area, therefore, account for practically all of the cavalry division which, for some time, has been believed to be located in Azerbaijan. The Turkish Consul at Rezaieh informed his ambassador in Tehran on the 19th March that he estimated the strength of the Russian forces in the area Maku-Bajgir-an-Qutur as 10,000.

Tabriz.

Tanks, guns and lorries continue to arrive in Tabriz by rail from Russia. The United States Consul observed sixty tanks in the Russian barracks area on the 17th March. His Majesty's Consul, though unable to view the whole area, observed fifteen tanks and 120 lorries on the 18th March, and on the 20th March estimated the number of tanks in the same area as between forty and fifty, including ten heavy tanks. The number of lorries, he calculated, had increased to 300.

Qazvin.

By an error, no mention was made in last Intelligence Summary of the Russian garrison at this place which, according to an estimate by the American

military attaché, amounts to two battalions of infantry and two batteries of A.A. guns and two batteries of anti-tank guns. Camp Stalin, the very large camp constructed by the Americans about 2 miles out of Qazvin on the Hamadan road and which was recently sold by their Disposals Board to a local contractor, is still empty, and the Russian troops mentioned above are partly billeted in the town and partly encamped at a village some 7 miles out of Qazvin on the Resht road.

Appointments.

8. (i) Seyyid Mehdi Fatemi, Imad-us-Saltaneh (F.O. 66; M.A. 92) to be Governor-General of Fars *vice* Mehdi Farrukh recalled.
- (ii) Mehdi Mashaikhi to be acting Mayor of Tehran *vice* Nariman resigned.
- (iii) Sarlashgar (Major-General) Razmara (F.O. 189; M.A. 243) to be attached to the General Staff.

A press report, which is premature, if not untrue, states that the Persian Government propose to appoint Hasan Vusuq, Vusuq-ud-Dowleh (F.O. 230; M.A. 296), Ali Mansur, Mansur-ul-Mulk (F.O. 126; M.A. 164), and Hamid Sayyah (F.O. 202; M.A. 258) as ambassadors to London, Moscow and Brussels respectively. As long ago as September 1942 Qavam-us-Saltaneh, when Prime Minister, tried to get his brother, Vusuq, appointed to Angora, but nothing came of it, probably because Vusuq was too ill with cancer of the stomach to leave Berne where he has been living under medical treatment almost since the beginning of the war. Ali Mansur, an exceptionally able man who served for three years as Governor-General of Khorasan under Russian occupation, is known to be *persona grata* to the Russians. Hamid Sayyah is a fool who has somehow managed to pass a long career in various diplomatic and ministerial posts. He speaks perfect Russian and has recently associated himself with the appeasement-mongers among the politicians.

Persian Army.

9. A press report states that all but ten of the officers sent to Kerman by General Arfa, the late Chief of the General Staff, as suspected of complicity in the recent mutiny or of having Russian-Tudeh contacts, have been released from surveillance. A commission will sit to examine the evidence against the remaining ten.

10. Conscripts of the 1305 (1926) class have been called up. Those who belong to the 1295-1304 (1916-25) classes who were not called up when their class was due have now been called up.

11. Three battalions of infantry and two light tanks were sent from Tehran on the 19th March to Hamadan to reinforce the garrison there as it was feared that the Democrats might attempt to move south through Bijar on Hamadan.

Communications.

12. Recent floods have breached the railway line between Andimishk and Ahwaz. Repairs will take at least two weeks.

The Court.

13. The Shah has cancelled his visit to Isfahan to witness the finals of the all-Persia football tournament. Some scaremongering newspapers had hinted that this visit was a blind to cover his flight from the capital out of fear of Russian-aided Democrat risings.

14. The customary levee was held in the Gulistan Palace on the occasion of the Persian New Year on the 21st March.

British Interests.

15. Sir Reader Bullard, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.I.E., left Tehran on the 19th March on relinquishing the appointment of His Majesty's Ambassador to Persia.

Russian Interests.

16. M. Sadtechikof, the new Russian Ambassador to Persia, arrived in Tehran by air on the 20th March. (A brief Personality Note on him, received from Foreign Office sources, is given in Appendix A to this summary.)

Syrian Interests.

17. M. Asad Haroun, the first Syrian Minister to Persia, presented his letters of credence to His Imperial Majesty the Shah on the 19th March.

Egyptian Interests.

18. His Excellency Mahmud Sabit Pasha, the Egyptian Ambassador to Persia, has been transferred to Angora. He had been absent for several months. His appointment to Tehran was believed to be with the object of bringing about a rapprochement between the Shah and Queen Fawzieh. His transfer to Angora lends colour to the widely held belief that his efforts have been unsuccessful and that the estrangement continues.

Tehran, 24th March, 1946.

Appendix A.

Personality Note: M. Sadchikof, Soviet Ambassador, Tehran.

M. Sadchikof is about 37. After studying philosophy at Perm University he became professor of that subject at Moscow University. He then joined the diplomatic service and served in Tehran, and afterwards in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. He became ambassador to Belgrade in March 1945. He is married and has a wife of Ukrainian origin who speaks no language but Russian. Sadchikof seems able, intelligent and a shrewd observer, but speaks only Russian and a few words of French. As Soviet Ambassador his position in Belgrade was one of great prominence. Before the elections last year he appeared on several occasions at political demonstrations in the company of Marshal Tito. Much was made of this by the Government in order to prove to the people of Yugoslavia that the régime enjoyed full support of the Soviet Union.

[E 3485/315/34]

(2)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 13, Secret, for the period 25th March to 7th April, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 107 of the 8th April; Received 18th April.)

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

THE veil of secrecy which surrounded the actions of Qawam-us-Salteneh since his return from Moscow and the arrival of the new Russian Ambassador has been lifted and the period of speculation as to the nature of any agreement he might have been negotiating has come to an end with the publication on the 5th April of an official communiqué on the subject. It states that the conversations which the Persian Prime Minister had begun in Moscow with the Soviet Government had been resumed in Tehran after the arrival of the new Russian Ambassador and had resulted on the 4th April in the following agreement, complete accord having been achieved in all the problems:—

- "(i) The Russian military forces will evacuate Persia in the space of a month and a half from the 24th March, 1946.
- "(ii) The agreement to create a Russo-Persian oil company and the conditions pertaining thereto will be proposed to the 15th Majlis after election within a period of seven months from the 24th March.
- "(iii) Concerning Azerbaijan, this being a Persian internal question, peaceful agreements will be sought between the Persian Government and the populace of Azerbaijan to achieve reforms in accord with existing legislation and in a spirit of understanding of the people's point of view."

The Qawam's supporters claim for him a great victory on the grounds that he has secured the evacuation of Persia by Russian troops; that he has not awarded the Russians any oil concession but has retained the right by the new Majlis to throw out the Bill should they wish to do so, and that by insisting on treating the Azerbaijan issue as a Persian domestic problem he has given the Russians no opportunity to interfere in its settlement. His critics maintain that his initial tactical error was in not insisting on evacuation as an essential preliminary to any talks on any subject and that, by linking the three subjects in the same agreement, he has bartered an undertaking from which it will be difficult for him or for any Majlis to withdraw in return for an evacuation which, in any case, Russia was bound to carry out under a solemn treaty obligation or which she would have been forced, sooner or later, to carry out in the face of world opposition at U.N.O. Regarding the third clause, Qawam's critics object that the moral if not material support which the Russians will continue to give to the Kurdish and Democrat armies will prevent the Persian Government from re-establishing their authority in this province and thus force the Persian Government to conclude an agreement which will give Azerbaijan the autonomy which, at Russian instigation, it has hitherto claimed. These same critics also point out with dismay certain acts by Qawam which have effectively driven underground any further opposition to Russian aims by those who had formed a resistance front. Such are the arrest of Sayyid Zia-ud-Dine and, more recently, of his brother; the suppression of practically every newspaper except those supported by the Russians; the continued pressure on the Minister for War to arrest General Arfa, the late Chief of the General Staff; the cessation of Government support for the Afshar and Zulfiqari partisans who are fighting the Democrat rebel forces; the dismissal of the Chief of Police, Zarrabi; the retention of the control of the gendarmerie in his own hands by the Prime Minister; the dismissal of many officials noted for their anti-Russian sympathies and the retention as his political private secretary of such an unprincipled scoundrel as Muzaffar Firuz.

Evacuation of Russian Troops.

2. With the exception of Azerbaijan and Khamseh (Zenjan) the general impression is one of leisurely evacuation with concentrations at (i) the Russian frontier north of Meshed, (ii) the ports of Bandar Shah and Pahlevi to await the arrival of transport by land and sea respectively. More detailed information is given below.

(a) *Tehran-Meshed.*—Garmsar and Firuzkuh (on the old and new Khorasan roads respectively) are clear as is Semnan, except that a party of civilian engineers is still at work at their oil boring south of Semnan. Damghan is clear. Shahrud is clear but for a party of ten men now clothed as civilians under the guise of Iran-Sovtrans (Russian transport agency). Sabzevar and Nishapur are clear but some ten Russian military trucks were seen on the 28th March and the 1st April transporting stores and broken down vehicles. About 150 Russian military personnel remain in Meshed to evacuate stores. The Persian General Officer Commanding in Meshed estimated on the 31st March that about half the Meshed garrison of 2,500 had actually crossed the Russian frontier at Bajgiran, the remainder being located at Quchan and beyond. At Dugai, 12 miles south of Quchan, the British Military Attaché noticed twenty Russian lorries parked.

(b) *Tehran-Firuzkuh-Shahi-Sari-Gorgan-Bandar Shah.*—The Persian press announces the evacuation of Shahi and the commencement on the 27th March of the evacuation of Gorgan. It will probably take a month to complete the evacuation by sea from Bandar Shah of the forces now concentrated in that area.

(c) *Tehran-Kerej-Qazvin-Resht-Pahlevi.*—Kerej is reported as clear and Qazvin also, except for a rear party disposing of hirings and evacuating stores. Evacuation by sea from Pahlevi is proceeding.

(d) *Qazvin-Takestan.*—Takestan is reported as clear. Beyond this point the Democrat rebel forces have established road pickets and no Russian evacuation is believed to have begun.

(e) *Azerbaijan and Khamseh.*—In these two provinces there are no signs of evacuation but rather of fresh arrivals of a formation at least amounting to an armoured corps. The dispositions appear to be:—

- (i) A cavalry concentration near the Turkish frontier at Maku of about 4,000 with probably two batteries of heavy artillery and some infantry—total strength estimated by Turkish Consul at Rezaieh as 10,000.
- (ii) About half the total of the estimated armoured corps is believed to be in the region south of Lake Urmieh, Miandoab, Mahabad and on the

Iraq frontier at Khaneh in general, supporting the two "fronts," i.e., Kurdish Republican army versus Persian army around Saqqiz and Sardasht, and Democrat rebels versus Afshar partisans around Shahin Dej.

(iii) About a quarter of the corps is believed to be in Tabriz.

(iv) About a quarter is believed to be in and around Zenjan supporting the remaining "front," i.e., Democrat versus Zulfiqari partisans.

Until such time as the gendarmerie are firmly re-established it will not be possible to obtain information upon which to base an opinion of the Russians' future intentions, but it may be said that the main hindrance to the re-establishment of the Persian Government's authority in areas officially evacuated by the Russians will be the existence in each large town of a small number of ex-soldiers in civilian dress in the guise of transport, fisheries, oil distribution and other Russian activities. In Azerbaijan and Khamseh there appear to be three possibilities, viz.: (i) the Russians may clear out lock, stock and barrel and abandon Democrat and Kurd alike to their fate, (ii) they may evacuate their troops but leave a stiffening of officers and n.c.o.s. to assist the Kurdish republican and Azerbaijan people's armies with or without Russian military equipment, (iii) they may do the same thing more openly by prevailing upon the Azerbaijan National Government to ask for a Russian military mission.

Internal Security.

Khorasan.

3. His Majesty's Consul-General reports that insecurity on the roads is on the increase, two instances of highway robbery having occurred within a short distance of Meshed during the last week in March.

Kurdistan.

4. The situation at Sardasht, referred to in paragraph 9 of Intelligence Summary No. 11, and paragraph 6 of last Intelligence Summary, is still grave. The strength of the Persian army garrison besieged in the place is only 150 whereas the attackers are variously reported as numbering from 2,000 to 3,000. The Persian General Staff say they are mostly from the Pushtdari and Mangur tribes. His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah reports that, in the main, they are followers of Ghazi Muhammad from Mahabad with three or four hundred of Mulla Mustafa Barzani's men. The Shakkak and Herki tribes were invited to join in the fray, but imposed conditions which were not acceptable to Ghazi Muhammad. Persian casualties, up to the 3rd April, were, according to the Persian General Officer Commanding, Kurdistan, four killed and twenty-five wounded. He estimated the Kurdish casualties, mostly inflicted by Persian air action, as over sixty killed. The Kurdish Republican forces are armed with heavy and light machine-guns, rifles, tommy-guns and hand grenades, supplied by the Russians. Most of the surrounding country is in the hands of the Kurdish Republican army, and the Persian General Officer Commanding is not very hopeful of the garrison's ability to hold out until weather conditions permit the opening of the Senneh-Saqqiz road and the despatch of a relief column to Sardasht.

5. In the Democrat-Afshar "front," some 100 miles to the East near Shahin Dej, the Afshar tribal partisans of Government have achieved a minor success on the 26th March by beating off a night attack by the Democrats on their positions at Main Bulaq, 15 miles north of Tikab. The Democrats left seven dead, mostly Armenians and Assyrians.

Khamseh.

6. On the Democrat-Zulfiqari "front" the latter (Government partisans) have been repulsed and three of their strongholds have been captured by the Democrat rebel forces.

Persian Army.

7. The Persian army is being very cautious in following up the Russian withdrawal. Mindful of its ignominious ejection from Sharifabad, near Qazvin, in December last, it does not wish to court another such blow to its prestige by running up against a Russian rear guard. It has been warned to avoid, at all costs, any possibility of an armed clash which might serve the Russians for a pretext to delay their departure. Apart from these considerations, it has its hands full in Kurdistan and is loath to deplete the capital of troops lest a

Russian-inspired outbreak of the Tudeh party should occur. So far, the only move has been the despatch of a motorised column of about 250 men to Semnan via Garmsar. About 100 will remain to garrison this place (where the Tudeh have been in control under the large Russian garrison) and the remainder will return to Tehran via Firuzkuh. According to the Minister for War, a brigade is being assembled to proceed to Qazvin within the next few days. Later on it is hoped to send a column to Shahi, which will subsequently move on to Gorgan.

Persian Gendarmerie.

8. In contrast to the Persian army, the gendarmerie have been most active in reoccupying such places as have been evacuated by the Russians. Six companies in all have been despatched, one to Firuzkuh and Semnan, one to Kerej, two to Resht, one to Shahi and one to Qazvin. At the latter place, according to Colonel Schwarzkopf, Russian rear parties were still in the town, but co-operated effectively in establishing the gendarmerie in temporary billets. Both army and gendarmerie realise that, provided they do not tread on the heels of the withdrawing Russian troops, the reoccupation of the entire zone recently occupied by the Russians with the exception of Azerbaijan and Khamseh (Zenjan) will not present a difficult problem. The populace is either implacably hostile to the Russians, as it is on religious grounds in Meshed, only lukewarm in its Tudeh sympathies, as in Qazvin, or by nature cowardly, as in Gilan and Mazanderan. In Khamseh and Azerbaijan, however, the populace has been systematically worked upon by the Russians. A Democrat army, stiffened by Russian officers and men and aided with Russian military equipment, is actually in being and even the most optimistic among the senior Persian officers realise that armed conflict of which the outcome cannot be predicted will result from any attempt to reassert the Persian army's authority in those provinces.

Economic.

9. The Prime Minister has formed a Supreme Economic Council under his own chairmanship, the vice-chairman being the Minister for Commerce and Industry. Hazhir, A. H. Ibtehaj, Dr. Amini, Bader, Nikpur, Ali Vakili and some prominent merchants are the members. This is the second venture of its kind, the formation of a former Supreme Economic Council having been reported in Intelligence Summary No. 15 of April 1945. The main objects of the council are to raise the general standard of living and to ensure an equitable distribution of the country's produce. The specific measures, for which the council has been charged to draw up plans, include the following:—

- (a) Increase in exports, with particular attention to packing. Prices must conform to international levels and, if necessary, subsidies are to be granted.
- (b) Imports must, in principle, be subject to quota, primarily to avoid competition with national products.
- (c) The establishment of a plan for developing national industries.
- (d) The improvement of the relations between employers and employees. In this connexion it is proposed to seek guidance and technical assistance from the I.L.O.
- (e) A five-year plan is to be drawn up whereby municipalities can finance public services such as lighting, drainage, drinking water, telephone systems.
- (f) A minimum wage to be fixed for peasants.
- (g) Crown lands are to be sold to smallholders.
- (h) Irrigation schemes are to be developed.
- (i) Mining research and development to be carried out under national control.

In cases where legislation is required the Prime Minister states that the council's recommendations will be made effective by Cabinet decree, parliamentary sanction being sought later. The Economic Council will, in case of need, consult the Economic Committee of U.N.O. which will be requested, where necessary, to assist with expert advice.

The selection of members is on the whole a good one, the Secretary-General being Amini, a former Deputy Prime Minister who is competent and honest. Taken at its face value there is much in the programme to command support but to bolster up inefficient local industries and to protect them against imports is a thoroughly retrograde step. The cynically minded and those with previous experience of the fate and achievements of similar bodies in the past will see in

these pronouncements a piece of political window-dressing forced upon the Prime Minister by the pressure of outside events and primarily designed to steal the Tudeh thunder.

Communications.

10. The breaches in the I.S. Railway between Andimishk and Ahwaz caused by floods in the Karkheh River have been repaired and through running was resumed on the 25th March.

11. As was to be expected, a sharp deterioration in the condition of Persia's highways has set in since the British military authorities handed them back to the Ministry of Roads and Communications. On a recent trip to Meshed and back the British Military Attaché found this road in a shocking state. Practically no maintenance was being carried out, and along the entire length of over 600 miles not more than seventy labourers were seen. The section Firuzkuh-Semnan has been abandoned and after the spring rains it will disintegrate and become impassable. All traffic now proceeds via Garmsar.

Appointments.

- 12.—(i) Sarhang (Colonel) Dinbilli to be Military Public Prosecutor.
- (ii) Sarhang (Colonel) Vali Ansari to be chief of the General Staff secretariat.
- (iii) Sarhang (Colonel) Hasan Qadimi from the General Staff to be attached to the Ministry for War.
- (iv) Sartip (Brigadier) Saif (late Chief Prefect of Police) to be the liaison officer between the Prime Minister and Colonel Schwarzkopf, American adviser to the gendarmerie. Since the dismissal of Sartip Khosropanah (reported in Intelligence Summary No. 8, paragraph 8) no new chief of the gendarmerie has been appointed.
- (v) Shayan to be Governor of Semnan.
- (vi) Shahnawaz to be Governor of Qazvin.
- (vii) Burzo Kalhur to be Governor of Zabul.
- (viii) Muhammad Ali Raushan to be Governor of Shiraz and assistant to the Governor-General of Fars.
- (ix) Hashim Sabha, for a short time Minister of Commerce, has resumed his appointment as Governor of the Agricultural Bank.
- (x) Hasan Farzaneh, a former Governor-General of Gilan, to be Special Inspector in the Ministry of the Interior.
- (xi) Abbas Shahandeh, editor of the Russian-controlled paper *Farman*, to be a special inspector in the Prime Minister's office.
- (xii) Saidi, Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Roads and Communications, has resigned on account of ill health.
- (xiii) Colonel Muhammad Ali Saffari to be chief prefect of police vice Sartip Ibrahim Zarrabi, dismissed and transferred to the Ministry for War. Colonel Saffari is a brother-in-law of Ghulam Hussain and Abul Hasan Ibtehaj and was, for a time, employed on the Caspian Fisheries Board.
- (xiv) Majid Ahi, the Persian Ambassador in Moscow, though sick, is to retain his appointment for the time being, but Hamid Sayyah (F.O. 202—M.A. 258) is to go to Moscow to assist him with the rank of minister.
- (xv) Sadiqi, a former Majlis Deputy for Tabriz, to be Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Roads and Communications vice Saidi, resigned.

British Interests.

13. A parliamentary delegation consisting of Brigadier Head and Mr. Foot arrived in Tehran on the 29th March to study the situation in Persia. They made contacts with various politicians and political groups in Tehran, but failed to visit Azerbaijan as the Soviet authorities did not grant them the necessary passes to enter their zone.

14. His Majesty's Embassy have asked the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs for permission, on a temporary basis, to resume the B.O.A.C. passenger and freight service between Athens and Tehran via Beirut, Lydda and Bagdad. This will be an extension of the already existing service between London and Athens.

15. The Azerbaijan manager of the A.I.O.C., M. Faroughi, was arrested by the Soviet military authorities on trumped-up charges of espionage and

trespass. Representations by His Majesty's Acting Consul-General, Tabriz, secured his release, the Soviet commandant stating that, upon investigation, the charges were found to be baseless. He was, however, immediately rearrested on the orders of the Azerbaijan National Government, acting, of course, under orders from the Russians. He has been expelled from Azerbaijan, being given four days within which to arrange his departure. The National Government have long been displeased at M. Faroughi's refusal to pay to them excise duties on the company's products sold in Azerbaijan and the Russians will welcome the retirement from their zone of the representative of a rival concern.

Russian Interests.

16. The new Russian Ambassador presented his letters of credence to His Imperial Majesty the Shah on the 26th March.

17. A report, believed to be reliable, states that the Russians are still boring for oil at Haft tan, near Shahi.

18. The clerk in charge of the A.I.O.C. filling station at Semnan informed the British Military Attaché on the 1st April that the Russians were still boring for oil at a point some 10 miles south of the town.

[E 3681/315/34]

(3)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 14, Secret, for the Period 8th April to 14th April, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 118 of 15th April: Received 25th April.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

TELEGRAMS of congratulation on the signing of the Russo-Persian Agreement on Evacuation, Oil and Azerbaijan have been exchanged between the Persian Prime Minister and Generalissimo Stalin.

2. Letters have been exchanged between the Prime Minister and the Russian Ambassador confirming the previous communiqué concerning the evacuation and amplifying the statement about the formation of the Russo-Persian Oil Company. For the first twenty-five years the Persian Government's holdings are to be 49 per cent. as against the Soviet Government's 51 per cent. For the next twenty-five years they are to be equal. Profits are to be divided between the two Governments in proportion to their shares. The area of the company's operations is described as follows: Junction of the Russian-Turkish and Persian frontiers—Lake Urumiyeh—along the eastern shore of the lake to Miandoab—Gilyaban—the crest of the Elburz range to Kauk Kila (unidentified but on the Iranian State Railway north of Firuzkuh)—lat. 34°15': long. 55°00'—due east to lat. 34°15': long. 55°00'—north to Abersij (unidentified but near Gunbad-i-Qabus)—east to Quchan—south-east to junction of Russian, Persian and Afghan frontiers. The capital subscribed by the Persian Government shall be deemed to consist of the oil-bearing land conceded. The Soviet Government shall bear the entire cost of development, equipment and wages. After fifty years the Persian Government shall have the option of buying out the Russian share. The protection of the area, together with all wells and installations, shall be effected solely by the Persian security forces. A Bill to provide for the formation of a joint Russo-Persian Company on the above terms shall be submitted to the Majlis within seven months of the 24th March. The above terms could be criticised on many grounds, but one salient weakness, from the Persian Government's point of view, is in the system of share by profit and not, as in most modern oil concessions, by fixed royalty or on the basis of the volume of production. As it stands, there is every inducement for the company to produce oil as cheaply as possible, or even at a loss, for the benefit of the Soviet Government and to declare that no profit has been made.

3. Qawam-us-Saltaneh continues his policy of appeasement of the Russians. As stated in last week's Intelligence Summary, pressure was being brought to bear on him by the Russians, and by his Cabinet on the Minister for War, to arrest General Arfa, the late C.G.S. He was arrested on the night of the 8th/9th April on charges of endangering the safety of the realm by supplying arms and ammunition to subversive elements in Gilan and Mazanderan. The Minister

for War has so far resisted the demands of the four Russian tools in the Cabinet (General Firuz, Muwarrikh-ud-Dowleh, Bahar and Zuka-ud-Dowleh) to try General Arfa in a civil court, and has insisted on his trial by the military tribunal which alone has jurisdiction over officers of the Persian army. If the charges were limited to those stated above, General Arfa would stand a fair chance of acquittal as he could produce written authority for his acts signed by the then Minister for War, General Riazi. He could also argue logically enough that there was no difference in principle between arming "Jangalis" to fight Tudeh rebels in Gilan and arming Zulfiqari and Afshar partisans to fight Democrat rebels in Azerbaijan. Meanwhile Qawam's subservient attitude to Russian demands, the arrest, by his orders, of many of those prominent for their pro-British feelings; the suppression of nearly all of the newspapers hostile to Russia; his failure to arrest a single Tudeh rebel or agitator, and rumours of his intentions to ask the Security Council to remove the Perso-Russian dispute from the agenda have caused widespread alarm and despondency among the more stable elements in the country and have been claimed as an overwhelming defeat for the British in Persia.

Russian Evacuation.

4. Except from Azerbaijan, the scanty news received points to the evacuation, steady though in small numbers, of Russian troops from Bandar Shah, Naushahr and Pahlavi. Rear parties for evacuation of stores and liquidation of claims and assets of about 150 officers and men still remain in Meshed and Qazvin. Otherwise the areas between Tehran and Meshed and between Tehran and Resht appear to be almost clear of troops. His Majesty's Acting Consul-General, Tabriz, reports that Zenjan is believed to have been evacuated, and Mianeh nearly so, but that no movements of complete units from Tabriz have been observed.

Internal Security.

Mazandaran.

5. Some fighting is reported to have taken place near Chalus and Naushahr between the Tudeh and Jangali parties. A company of gendarmes has been despatched from Sari to maintain order.

Khamseh.

6. The Zulfiqari and Afshar partisans have suffered defeats at the hands of the Democrat rebels. Jealousy between the leaders, the superior armament (some of it supplied by the Russians) of their opponents and disappointment at the cessation of support by the Persian Government, also seasonal demands of agriculture, are the causes.

Kurdistan.

7. His Majesty's Consul, Kermanshah, on the authority of a report by a gendarmerie officer recently returned from Senneh, states that the Kurds have raised the siege of Sardasht and have dispersed. Persian military circles are of the opinion that this may imply a concentration of Kurds further north for the resumption of their struggle against the Iraqi Government. It is possible that the Russians' announcement of their evacuation of Persia and Kurdish fears of being left unaided may have something to do with the cessation of hostilities around Sardasht.

Azerbaijan.

8. His Majesty's Consul, Tabriz, reports that the Azerbaijan People's army now claims that it is on a war footing. Training under Russian instructors continues and a batch of forty cadets is said to have left Tabriz on the 9th April for Baku for training as officers.

9. The Cabinet of the Azerbaijan National Government is considering the selection of representatives to proceed to Tehran to negotiate with the Persian Government the terms of the agreement to be concluded.

10. The Azerbaijan National Government has installed a wireless transmitter which broadcasts in Turki and Persian nightly on 380 metres.

Persian Army.

11. The Ministry for War has accepted on behalf of the Persian Government the invitation of His Majesty's Government to receive a Persian army detachment at the forthcoming victory celebrations to be held in London in June.

The party will consist of three high ranking officers, three staff officers, a colour party of three officers and a detachment of twenty-four other ranks.

12. The "Personnel Department" (corresponding to the Military Secretary's branch at the War Office), hitherto under the exclusive control of the C.G.S., has been changed into a directorate responsible jointly to the Ministry of War and General Staff. Sartip Muzayyini, late G.O.C. 2nd Tehran Division, is to be its new chief.

13. The new divisional headquarters recently set up at Hamadan is to be transferred to Qazvin, where it will not only raise and train the new 3rd Division, but will receive and organise columns sent from Tehran for onward despatch to reoccupy areas to be evacuated by the Russians. In the meanwhile, hearing that a rear party of about 150 officers and men had been left behind in Qazvin by the Russians to evacuate stores and liquidate claims, &c., the Prime Minister has instructed the Minister for War to delay the despatch of the column to Qazvin lest any clash should occur.

Persian Air Force.

14. The Minister for War informed the B.M.A. that two more officers of the Persian Air Force deserted with their machines on the 13th April. They are believed to have joined the Azerbaijan People's army in Tabriz.

Appointments.

15. "A"—Civil.—(i) Ahmad Musaddiq to be director-general of the I.S. Railway vice Husain Nafisi. A previous announcement in the press stated that Ahmad Musaddiq was to officiate as director-general during the absence of Husain Nafisi on four months' leave, but the appointment is now believed to be permanent since Husain Nafisi was arrested on the 11th April on charges of embezzlement by General Muhammad Husein Firuz, the Minister of Roads and Communications. Husain Nafisi was honest by Persian standards and a capable official, well thought of by the British military railway personnel who worked with him throughout the war. His arrest is said to have annoyed the Prime Minister as it was done without his permission or knowledge, and also because it will make enemies of this wealthy and influential family which is connected to the Prime Minister by marriage through the Aminis.

(ii) Daud Pirnia to be director-general in the Inspectorate of the Prime Minister's office.

(iii) Reza Fahimi to be Governor of Bushire.

"B"—Military.—(i) Colonel Muinpur, an instructor in the Officers' Training College, to be Persian Military Attaché at Bagdad.

(ii) Sartip Ghulam Ali Ansari, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, to be an inspector in the Ministry of War. This upright and capable officer was a close associate of General Arfa's and, since the latter's arrest, has been the target for much abuse in the Russian-controlled section of the Persian press.

(iii) Sarhang (Colonel) Garzan, G.O.C. Isfahan Division, to be Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

(iv) Colonel Amini to be head of the 3rd Bureau of the General Staff.

Obituary.

16. Ismail Farzaneh, son of the late Hakim-ul-Mamalik.

Arrests.

17. Mahmud Khalili, a former chief of the Electrical Department, has been arrested on charges of embezzlement. He was violently anti-Tudeh, a staunch supporter of Seyyid Zia-ud-Din, and had long been an object of Russian hatred.

Economic.

18. A report has been received from more than one source that the Russians have recently made a deal with the Azerbaijan National Government for the purchase of 10,000 tons of wheat. A further contract was said to have been signed for another 15,000 tons.

Agricultural.

19. A recent Cabinet decree prohibits the cultivation of the opium poppy throughout Persia.

Communications.

20. During the past week a further breach in the southern section of the I.S. Railway was caused by the collapse of a tunnel near Safid Dasht. Transshipment of passengers and goods was carried out for two or three days. Through running was resumed on the 12th April.

21. The *Journal de Tehran* states that the passenger service between Tehran and Qazvin, which was interrupted by the seizure of the railway line between Kerej and Qazvin by the Democrat rebels, will be resumed with effect from the 17th April.

British Interests.

22. Air Commodore the Hon. W. L. Runciman left Tehran on the 10th April on relinquishing the appointment of air attaché to His Majesty's Embassy. He has been succeeded by Group Captain J. D. E. Hughes, D.F.C.

P.S.—It has just been learnt that the Persian Prime Minister has sent instructions to Persia's representative of the U.N.O. to ask that the Persian case may be withdrawn from the Security Council's agenda.

[E 3890/315/34]

(4)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 15, Secret, for the period the 15th April to the 21st April, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 124 of the 23rd April; Received 1st May.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

AS reported in a postscript to last week's Intelligence Summary, the Persian Government sent instructions to Husein Ala in Washington to withdraw Persia's case from the agenda of the Security Council. In a Government communiqué it was stated that this step had been taken as the result of a renewed assurance by the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran on the 14th April to the effect that Russian forces will evacuate Persian territory unconditionally before the 6th May. There is no doubt that renewed and considerable pressure was brought to bear on the Persian Prime Minister by the Soviet Ambassador to get this done. The Prime Minister informed both His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires and the American Chargé d'Affaires that he was told by the Soviet Ambassador that, if he did not do so, the Soviet Government would consider it as an insult. In the course of an audience with His Imperial Majesty the Shah, the British Military Attaché was informed that the Qawam had given the Shah a different version of the pressure brought to bear upon him, namely, that if he did not take this step, disorders might break out in Tehran, disorders for which the Russians would not be responsible and which they would not be able to control.

2. Reuter's correspondent in Tehran was informed in an interview by the Persian Prime Minister that conversations were expected to begin in the very near future at Kerej between the representatives of the Persian Government and the Azerbaijan National Government. The Russians are believed to be particularly anxious to see these conversations concluded before the 6th May.

3. An official proclamation issued by the Prime Minister regarding the preservation of security in the northern regions of Persia, calls upon all owners of firearms to deliver them to the nearest gendarmerie post within one month. The death penalty is prescribed for offenders. On Qawam's present form it is unlikely that this law will be enforced against any Democrat or Tudeh rebel who has been given arms by the Russians.

Russian Evacuation.

4. There is very little to add to the information given in paragraph 4 of last Intelligence Summary. His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed reports that the remainder of the Russian troops left Meshed on the 10th April. A Persian press report states that Resht has been evacuated, the Russian military headquarters having been moved to Pahlevi till the embarkation of Russian troops has been completed. His Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Tabriz reports some increased Russian military lorry traffic between the barracks and the railway station carrying men and stores. The impression gained, he states, is

one of a gradual removal of oddments rather than the move of any complete unit. There are no signs that the armoured formations at Zenjan and Miandoab have returned to Tabriz. On the 16th April a column of cavalry and infantry (strength unknown but sufficiently long to take an hour to pass a given point) actually arrived in Tabriz from the direction of Julfa.

5. There are many who believe that the Russians will not evacuate Azerbaijan by the 6th May. Knowing what little importance the Russians attach to their pledges, they predict that the Russians will find some pretext for evading them. Azerbaijan may suddenly vote for secession from Persia and hence will no longer be considered by the Russians as Persian territory. Clashes between Democrats and the advancing Persian gendarmerie or army may occur. Some Russian soldiers will certainly be reported as killed. A civil war will be deemed to have broken out. To stop this conflagration spreading to the frontiers of the Soviet Union and endangering its safety the Russians may again invoke the 1921 Treaty and "reluctantly" be forced to retain their troops in Azerbaijan. Again, there are others who predict that the Russians, while evacuating their uniformed forces, will retain the large number of Caucasian officers and men at present attached as instructors to the Azerbaijan People's army. Other military personnel, disguised as civilians, will be located in all the important towns in the guise of consular staffs, trade agents, employees of the Soviet Government oil distributing agency, the transport agency or the Caspian fisheries concession.

Internal Security.

Zenjan.

6. Reference was made in paragraph 6 of last Intelligence Summary to reverses suffered by the Zulfiqari and Afshar partisans of Government who were fighting the Democrat rebels. His Majesty's Vice-Consul, Hamadan, reports that the latter have now captured Zarinabad on the road from Zenjan to Razan and are rumoured to have taken Tuzlu also. This would bring them within 55 miles of Hamadan itself. The Minister for War is fully alive to this new threat but cannot secure Cabinet assent to the despatch of reinforcements to Hamadan, and was informed by them that he must avoid any military action which might displease the Russians!

Isfahan.

7. Disturbances broke out on the 10th April between the Tudeh and the Workers' Union. Casualties were numerous. The labour leader Fidakar is at present in Isfahan and refuses to obey a summons to return to Tehran sent to him by the Prime Minister. The Tudeh agitators were encouraged by the news of the recall of Varasteh the Governor-General, who has administered Isfahan firmly and impartially for the past two years, and of Colonel Garzan, the Divisional Commander, both of whom were consistently pilloried in the Tudeh newspapers as repressive and reactionary. An uneasy calm at present reigns in the town. The Governor-General has been instructed to remain at his post but he sees little use in doing so unless he is strongly supported by the Central Government. At the present moment this support is hardly likely to be forthcoming.

Censorship.

8. Two telegrams, dated the 14th and 15th April respectively, addressed by *The Times* correspondent to his paper have been suppressed by the Persian postal authorities. In an interview, demanded by all British and American newspaper correspondents in Tehran, with the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, the latter official defended his action by quoting article 26 of the International Telegraph Communication Convention of 1932, which allows contracting Governments to stop the transmission of any private telegram which may appear dangerous to the security of the State or contrary to public order or decency. He also informed the correspondents that no reason need be given for the stoppage of telegrams, nor would they be told if and when their messages were stopped in the future. He concluded by giving a categorical assurance that there was no censorship in Persia! The first of the two offending messages was critical of the Persian Prime Minister's policy and hinted that the Russians might be aiming at the eventual setting up a republic in Persia. Subsequently, all cables filed by British and American correspondents in Tehran to their respective newspapers reporting the above incident were held by up the Persian postal authorities. It is understandable that Qawam, having "sold the pass," does not wish to have the deal broadcast.

Finance.

9. The Cabinet has approved a 2/12ths budget Bill to cover the period the 21st March-20th May, 1946.

10. The following table shows the latest income tax scale drawn up by the Financial Laws Commission. It is to be enforced as from the 21st March, 1946:—

<i>Rials per annum.</i>		
Up to 12,001	...	Free of tax
From 12,001 to 20,000	...	3% of excess over 12,001 rials
" 20,001 to 40,000	...	6% " " " 20,000 "
" 40,001 to 100,000	...	10% " " " 40,000 "
" 100,001 to 200,000	...	15% " " " 100,000 "
" 200,001 to 300,000	...	20% " " " 200,000 "
" 300,001 to 400,000	...	25% " " " 300,000 "
" 400,001 to 500,000	...	28% " " " 400,000 "
On more than 500,000	...	30%

11. The Cabinet have approved a proposal of the Ministry of Finance that a tax should be collected on Bahrein oil products imported into Persia on the same basis on the same basis as the tax levied on A.I.O.C. products. The announcement goes on to explain that the Persian Government, considering, as it always has done, that Bahrein was an integral part of Persia, had not hitherto levied any royalty on its oil products brought into the Persian mainland and that, in consequence, its products were able to undersell those of the A.I.O.C. A desire to increase its revenues had now led the Persian Government to impose this duty.

Persian army.

12. The Ministry for War have announced that three of the officer deserters from Khorasan (implicated in the mutiny of last August) who were being brought to Tehran for trial managed to give their escort the slip and escaped in a motor car which had been held in readiness for them.

13. A Persian army column of infantry with some armoured cars and a battery of mountain artillery of a total strength of 2,000 of all ranks occupied Qazvin on the 18th April without any untoward incident.

14. Sarlashgar Aghevli, the Chief of the General Staff, tendered his resignation on the 18th April. The acceptance has not been officially announced. Ever since his assumption of the appointment General Aghevli has appeared lethargic, timid and bewildered by the rapidly changing scene. His constitution was never strong and he has recently been suffering from rheumatism. The crisis came when he was appointed President of the Military Tribunal which is being assembled to try General Hasan Arfa, his predecessor (see paragraph 3 of last Intelligence Summary). He is in no sense a Russian tool. Being a man of some principles he has a loathing for Qawam's mendacity and duplicity. Being a patriot he was unwilling to convict, under Russian pressure, General Arfa of an offence which consisted of resistance to Russian bullying and intervention.

*Appointments—Promotions, &c.*15. (a) *Civil.*—

- (i) Ahmad Mashayikhi (Mustashar-us-Saltaneh), to be Governor of Gurgan.
- (ii) Suleiman Kalhur to be Governor of Qazvin.
- (iii) Hadi Shahnawaz to be Governor of Semnan.
- (iv) Dr. Mehdi Hisabi to be Governor of Zenjan.

(b) *Diplomatic.*—

- (i) Abbas Furuhar (F.O. 69) to be Persian Minister at Belgrade.
- (ii) Muhammad Ali Humayunjah, Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has been decorated by His Imperial Majesty the Shah with the order of Humayan and has been promoted to the rank of ambassador.

(c) *Military.*—

- (i) Sartip Khosrovani has been dismissed from his appointment as Chief of the Persian Air Force and has been appointed an Inspector in the Ministry for War. This officer was universally disliked and the recent desertion to the Democrat rebels of two officer pilots with their machines (reported in last week's Intelligence Summary) was taken as an excuse for his removal.

(ii) Sartip Zarrabi, ex-Chief Prefect of Police, recently dismissed by General Firuz, the Minister of the Interior, at the request, it is believed, of the Russians, to command the Tehran Cavalry Division.

(iii) Sartip Mutazzadi from command of the Tehran Cavalry Division, to command of the Isfahan Division.

(iv) Sartip Amidi (a former General Officer Commanding 2nd Tehran Division and Military Governor of Tehran) to be Chief of the Persian Air Force.

(d) *Police.*—

- (i) Colonel Turuj Amin to be Director-General of Prisons.
- (ii) Colonel Rastgar to be Chief of Police in Khuzistan.

The Persian Press.

16. The Russian-controlled newspapers, which form about 75 per cent. of those still appearing have intensified their attacks on British policy and actions in Persia. Officials, civil or military, who refuse to play the Tudeh game—and their number is being steadily reduced by the Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior—are portrayed as British agents and any attempt on their part to maintain order is hailed as an act of savage repression performed by the orders of their reactionary and imperialistic masters.

17. The Tudeh organ, *Rahbar*, in a recent article, pointed out that article 29 of an agreement signed by the American Persian Gulf Command and by Hajir, the then Minister of Finance, provided for the handing back to the Persian Government by the 30th November, 1946, of the port and installations of Fahliyah Creek near Khorramshahr in order that the British might remove, within the stated interval, their railway and other equipment. This, said *Rahbar*, proved that the so-called evacuation of Persia by British troops was merely a piece of deception.

British Interests.

18. The Ministry of Health have expressed their gratitude for the gift of an ambulance by the British military authorities.

American Interests.

19. Mr. Wallace Murray, the American Ambassador to Persia, left Tehran on the 18th April having resigned on account of ill-health. The State Department has announced that Mr. G. V. Allen is to succeed him.

[E 4103/315/34]

(5)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 16, Secret, for the Period 22nd April to 28th April, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 129 of 30th April; Received 7th May.)

*Persian Affairs**Political.*

A "declaration" by the Persian Prime Minister regarding the conversations to be carried out with the representatives of the Azerbaijan National Government is published as an Appendix to this Summary. There is considerable doubt as to whether this declaration is a decree, or a proposal, or merely a list of "talking points." The Tudeh Deputy Ipekchian, who recently arrived in Tabriz, is reported to have told the Azerbaijan National Government that he was authorised by the Soviet Ambassador and the Persian Prime Minister to say that the seven points had been agreed to between them and must be accepted by the Azerbaijan National Government. On the 28th April the Azerbaijan "Prime Minister," Peshavari, arrived in Tehran to open the conversations. He was dressed in the uniform of the Azerbaijan People's army and was accompanied by an armed escort. Just before his arrival a scuffle occurred between a lorry load of workers from the tobacco factory who were going to the aerodrome to welcome him and some gendarmes on traffic duty. The latter were attacked and opened fire in self-defence killing one worker and wounding two or three more.

Elections.

2. The Persian Prime Minister has constituted a Supreme Council to supervise the elections for the 15th Majlis. Their duties are described as consisting of the following:—

- (i) Control of the preparations for the elections.
- (ii) Supervision of the duties of provincial officials in connexion with the elections.
- (iii) To prevent the exercising of any foreign influence.

The personnel of the Council do not inspire confidence and there are many who consider the setting up of this body to be another step by Qavam in the process of rigging the forthcoming elections.

Administration.

3. By a decree of the Council of Ministers the district of Bijar (North of Hamadan) has been placed under Ustan No. 5, the Governorate-General of Kermanshah.

4. The Department of the Military Governor of Highways and Railroads has been abolished. It was established about two years ago as the result of pressure by the Allies upon the Persian Government to raise special units of gendarmerie to guard railway and road communications over which aid to Russia material was passing. Actually the department achieved nothing as it had no money with which to pay for the necessary personnel. Its disappearance will pass unnoticed.

*Internal Security.**Khorasan.*

5. An anti-Jewish riot took place in Meshed on the 16th April on the occasion of a Jewish festival. The police and gendarmerie soon brought the situation under control. The Soviet Consul-General in conversation with the Governor-General is reported to have taken a serious view of the riot. He expressed the opinion that the Jews had been attacked because they had shown friendliness to the Russians during their occupation of the town.

Isfahan.

6. The situation seems to be much the same as last week, an uneasy calm prevailing. The labour leader Fidakar still refuses to obey the Prime Minister's summons to leave Isfahan and return to Tehran. No further action to enforce his order has been taken by the Prime Minister nor is he likely to take any lest he anger the Tudeh and their Russian masters.

Kermanshah.

7. Repeated orders have been sent to Abbas Qubadian, the Governor of Shahabad, to return to Tehran. He had, it seems, organised some kind of "tribal union of the west" which, aimed at barring the way to further Tudeh and Democrat penetration, was displeasing to the Tudeh and to the Russians. The Prime Minister ordered the Minister for War to despatch a column to round up Abbas Qubadian should he fail to come in. The contrast between the action taken against Qubadian and against Fidakar is significant and shows how completely subservient to Russian and Tudeh pressure Qavam and his Cabinet have become.

Russian Evacuation.

8. The Persian press reports that Pahlevi, Shabsavar, Sari and Bandar Gaz have been completely evacuated. Steps are being taken to verify this by personal reconnaissance. His Majesty's Acting Consul-General, Tabriz, reports that Maragheh, Miandoab, Ushnu and Rezaieh are being evacuated and that up to the 22nd April about 4,000 troops, four guns and eleven medium tanks had been seen passing through Tabriz towards Julfa. A local official reported Ardebil as clear of Russian troops. The Azerbaijan National Government was planning a farewell party for Russian troops on the 24th April. It is noteworthy that very little of the Russian armour known to have gone from Tabriz southwards to the Miandoab area and south-eastwards to Zenjan has returned to Tabriz. Movement of Russian troops and stores on a small scale from Tabriz northwards continues.

Economic.

9. The 1945-46 tea crop in Gilan is to be purchased by the Government at a fixed price of 52 rials per kilog.

10. Yet another Supreme Commission has been formed, this time for Labour. It will have as its duties: (a) determination of relations between employer and employee on the basis of the Labour Law; (b) determination of relations between land-owner and peasant on the basis of "special regulations"; (c) preparation of plans to provide work and thus eliminate unemployment; (d) inspection of ministerial budgets with a view to economy and the diversion of such credits as are possible for the creation of useful employment.

11. The Cabinet have approved of the statutes of the Industrial and Mining Bank which is to be constituted. A Supreme Council of seven members, a Supervisory Board of three and a directing body of three have been nominated.

The Press.

12. The Tudeh organ *Rahbar* demands the arrest and trial of nine prominent Deputies of the last Majlis on the grounds that "they are known to have offered opposition to the Tudeh."

British Interests.

13. Mr. J. H. Le Rougetel, C.M.G., M.C., arrived in Tehran on the 22nd April on appointment as His Majesty's Ambassador to Persia. He presented his letters of credence to His Imperial Majesty The Shah on the 27th April.

*Appendix.**Declaration by the Persian Prime Minister regarding Azerbaijan.*

EVER since the formation of the present Government, special attention has been paid to the affairs of Azerbaijan and improvements in that region. After examination and consideration of the intentions of those dear compatriots, the Cabinet has decided to meet the wishes of the inhabitants of Azerbaijan in so far as the executive power is permitted to do so within the Constitutional Law and other laws enacted, to welcome those dear fellow-countrymen and to call them to unity and solidarity. Therefore the decree which has been issued by the Cabinet is hereby published for the information of the public:—

For Azerbaijan the stipulations of the powers sanctioned in the law of Rabi us Sani 1325 (lunar year) by virtue of clauses 29, 90, 91, 92 and 93 of the supplement, any Constitutional Law in connexion with provincial and city councils will be interpreted as follows:—

(1) The Directors of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, Local Transport, Education, Health and Police, as well as judicial and financial departments will be nominated by the provincial and city councils and their official letters of appointment will be issued by the Government in Tehran in accordance with the regulations.

(2) The appointment of a Governor-General for the province will be made by the Government, taking into consideration the views of the Provincial Council. The officers commanding military forces and the gendarmerie will be appointed by the Central Government.

(3) The official language of Azerbaijan will, as in other parts of the country, be Persian, and office work in local departments as well as work in the departments of justice will be conducted in Persian and Azerbaijani (Turkish), but teaching in the five preliminary classes in schools will be done in the language of Azerbaijan (Turki).

(4) When tax revenues and the credits for the country's budget are determined, the Government will take into consideration the necessity for the development and prosperity of towns and the improvement of educational and public health facilities, &c., in Azerbaijan.

(5) The activities of democratic organisations, unions, &c., in Azerbaijan will be free as in other parts of the country.

(6) No action will be taken against the inhabitants and partisans of democracy in Azerbaijan for their participation in democratic movements in the past.

(7) The increase of the number of Deputies from Azerbaijan in proportion to the true population in that province has been agreed to, and on the election of the 15th legislative body, the necessary proposal will be submitted to the Majlis for approval, so that after approval the additional number of Deputies decided upon may be elected for the same legislative period (15th Majlis).

[E 4400/315/34]

(6)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 17, Secret, for the period 29th April to 5th May, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 136 of 7th May; Received 14th May.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

NO result of the conversations now taking place in Tehran between the Persian Government and the representatives of the Azerbaijan Government has been announced, and it is believed that a deadlock has been reached—probably over the question of the Azerbaijan People's Army. The Persian Government realise that as long as this force is in being their own army cannot force its way into Azerbaijan. Conversely, the Azerbaijan Government representatives realise that as long as this force exists their position *vis-à-vis* the Persian Government is strong. The Russians naturally wish the force to continue in being as an instrument with which to enforce their will on Azerbaijan and a means of infiltrating Soviet military personnel into Persia in the guise of instructors and advisers.

2. The Cabinet have approved a proposal of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that a sum of 160,000 dollars, being one year's contribution by the Persian Government to the expenses of U.N.O., be paid by the Treasury.

3. A Persian press bureau communiqué announces that Mirza Karim Khan Reshti has been arrested for "action against the Government." It is believed that Karim Khan was supporting the "jangalis" in their struggle with the Tudeh party in Gilan and Mazanderan, and was also connected with the "Western Tribal Union" referred to in paragraph 7 of last Intelligence Summary. He was a frequent visitor to the Shah and had also been a confidant of the late Reza Shah.

Russian Evacuation.

4. The position, based on information from His Majesty's Consul-Generals, Meshed and Tabriz, and a reconnaissance of the southern shore of the Caspian by the British military attaché, is as follows:—

Khorasan.

No Soviet military forces remain, but a small number of soldiers in mufti are reported by the Persian military to be living with Russian émigrés.

Mazanderan and Gorgan.

These provinces have been evacuated save for detachments of fifty soldiers each at Bandar Gaz and Bandar Shah guarding military dumps which are awaiting shipment.

Gilan.

This province has been evacuated. A Russian naval officer with a small staff resides at Astara and visits Pahlevi two or three times a week. The Governor-General of Gilan and the Governor of Mazanderan told the British military attaché that, apart from a large number (said to be over 1,000) of British military subjects from the Caucasus now in these provinces, there had been a large increase in the number of Russians employed in the Caspian Fisheries Concession (Iranryba), the Russian Transport Organisation (Iransovtrans), and the Russian Oil Distributing Agency (Persanaft), and in Russian consular staffs.

Azerbaijan.

This province appears to have been evacuated, the last party having left Tabriz in a ceremonial parade on the 5th May. The column consisted of 188 lorries, 18 guns, 8 armoured cars, 16 carriers, 20 trucks. Apart from drivers and crews the troops did not exceed 300 in number. Some Russian officers watched the departure and remained behind in Tabriz. They will, presumably, be a liquidation staff. Up to the 3rd May Russian railway personnel were still guarding the Tabriz goods yard and Russian military personnel the railway line. No Russian service aircraft have been seen in Tabriz for the past sixteen days.

Astara.

This place, visited by the British military attaché on the 1st May, is in complete control by the Azerbaijan army, over 100 of whom were seen in mufti. Eighty per cent. of them appeared to be Caucasian types, and some Trans-Caspian types of Mongol and Uzbek were noticed. They were all armed with new Brno rifles of Persian army manufacture, the numbers noticed being in the 90,000 series which were those supplied recently by the Persian army arsenal to the Russians under contract.

General.

The entire amount of armour (estimated at an armoured corps) brought into Azerbaijan has not been definitely accounted for, but some may have moved out by night and some may have returned to Russia from the Miandoab area by the west side of Lake Urmivah and thus have escaped the notice of His Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Tabriz. Similarly no satisfactory evidence is to hand to prove that the armour sent to Zenjan has returned. Only personal reconnaissance during the next few weeks can clear up these two points. In the meanwhile, in the light of information he has received from various sources, the acting consul-general does not think that any armour remains at Maragheb or Miandoab. That considerable numbers of Russians remain in mufti attached to the Democrat forces as instructors, advisers or merely as a stiffening is beyond doubt.

Internal Security.

Kurdistan.

5. General Amanullah Jehanbani, who has been on a tour of inspection in Kurdistan for the past month, stated to His Majesty's Consul, Kermanshah, that the road Saqqiz-Baneh-Sardasht had been opened by a column from Saqqiz. This column encountered slight opposition only and is now engaged in clearing the villages in the vicinity of Sardasht from the Kurdish insurgents. The rest of this "front" the general reported as quiet.

Kermanshah.

6. A clash occurred during the May Day celebrations between the police and the local supporters of the Tudeh party. According to a press report, a constable and a gendarme and four Tudeh members were killed and six Tudeh members wounded.

Bakhtiari.

7. A Persian press report states that Amir Husain Zafar and Abul Qasim Bakhtiari have been appointed joint governors of Bakhtiari and Chahar Mahal. The former is a son of the late Haji Khosro Khan, Sardar Zafar, and hence a member of the Ilyhani family, while Abul Qasim, a son of Amir Mufakham, belongs to the rival branch of the Haji Ilkhanis.

Azerbaijan.

8. Radio Tabriz, in its transmission of the 3rd May, stated that on the 23rd April a treaty of friendship was signed by the Azerbaijan National Government and the Kurdish National Government. For twenty years, it is stated in the preamble of the treaty, those two nations were persecuted by the General Government under the dictatorship of Reza Shah Pahlevi, but they had neither the means nor the opportunity to free themselves of this tyranny. World War II has given them the opportunity to secure their freedom. This treaty has been signed to preserve this freedom.

The treaty has seven articles—

- (1) Each nation will send a diplomatic representative to the other.
- (2) All Azerbaijanis in Kurdistan and all Kurds in Azerbaijan can hold Government positions.

- (3) Trade agreement.
- (4) Mutual military assistance in case of aggression.
- (5) In case of negotiations with Central Government, these negotiations should be carried out by both nations.
- (6) The nationals of one country living in the other will have all assistance from the latter's Government.
- (7) If an individual or a party has plotted against the safety of one of the two contracting Governments, the punishment to be meted out to the offender will be decided upon by both Governments.

Signatories of the treaty :—

Azerbaijan : Shabastari, head of Parliament; Pishevari, Prime Minister; Sadek Padekan, Assistant of Democrat Party; Dr. Javid, Minister of Interior; Mohd. Biria, Minister of Education.

Kurdistan : Ghazi Mohamed, Prime Minister; Sayid Abdullah Goilani, Assistant Prime Minister; Arabkhan Sharifi, Mohamed Hossein Seif Ghazi, Jahangir Bahaderi, Deputies.

Persian Army.

9. The Persian contingent for the Victory Celebrations in London left Tehran by rail on the 5th May. Delay of nearly two months on the part of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in replying to His Majesty's Government's invitation prevented the Ministry of War from selecting the party and the British military authorities from making arrangements in advance for their movement. Ten minutes before the time of departure the British military attaché was informed that the senior officer, General Yazdanpanah, was sick and intended to follow later with his young son, that a colonel had been kept back to accompany him, and that Major-General Razmara did not propose to start until such time as air passages for himself and his wife could be provided.

10. Two battalions left Qazvin for Resht on the 3rd May and two more are to be sent in a fortnight's time to the Gorgan area. These four battalions are from the central garrison. The brigade of two battalions at Qazvin is to be increased by another brigade of the same size. This force, presumably, will be held in readiness to advance on Zenjan and Azerbaijan if the present conversations between the Persian Government and the representatives of the Azerbaijan Government reach a conclusion permitting this step.

Economic.

11. Reference has been made in the past to the survey carried out by the British firm of Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners of the Lar valley irrigation and hydro-electric project. It now appears that the cost is more than the Persian Government can afford and, according to the Persian press, a company is to be floated. Of the 1,440 million rials required, the Ministry of Agriculture will borrow 300 million from the National Bank. 700 million will be taken up by shareholders, with the proviso that at least 51 per cent. of the shares are held by Persians. The balance of 440 million Rials represents the cost of imported materials required for the scheme.

Obituary.

12. (i) Dr. Ali Akbar Daftari, Counsellor at the Persian Embassy in Washington. He was a brother of Matin Daftari, the former Prime Minister (F.O. 131; M.A. 168). Another brother, Abdullah, is deputy manager of the Bank-i-Milli, and a fourth is a colonel in the army.
- (ii) Ghulam Husein Rahnema, a former Minister of Education in Hakimi's Cabinet.

Corrigendum.

13. Intelligence Summary No. 12, paragraph 3, for Jalal Imami read Jamal Imami. (1)

Arrivals.

14. On the 4th May Hasan Vossuq, Vossuq-ud-dowleh, a former Prime Minister and elder brother of the present Prime Minister, returned to Persia after an absence of several years. He has been under medical treatment in

(1) Text amended accordingly.

Switzerland. A Persian wit has said that Vossuq, having received the sum of £50,000 from the British at the close of World War I for services which he failed to render, had arrived in Tehran in time to see his brother receive a like sum from the Russians at the close of World War II for services which he dared not fail to render.

Russian Interests.

15. The following persons have been elected to the Committee of the Russo-Persian Cultural Relations Society for 1325 (1946): Sadiq Sadiqi, Mushtashar-ud-dowleh (F.O. 193; M.A. 248) Dr. Yazdi, a Tudeh Deputy of the late Majlis, Dr. Furutan, Miss Akhtar Kambaksh, Kalishyan, and Miss Maryam Firuz (a daughter of the late Farmanfarma).

P.S.—Russian Evacuation.

The air attaché to His Majesty's Embassy flew on the 6th May over Azerbaijan. The following alignment was thoroughly covered: Tehran-Qazvin-Zenjan-Mianeh-Maragheh-Marand-Julfa-Marand-Rezaieh-Mahabad-Miandoab-Zenjan-Tehran. The only Russian troop movements seen were between Marand and Julfa where various small columns and bivouac camps totalled 95 lorries, 16 guns, 25 tanks, 8 staff cars.

[E 4630/315/34]

(7)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 18, Secret, for the period 6th May to 12th May, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 145 of 14th May; Received 22nd May.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1. No settlement has as yet been reached in the conversations between the Persian Government and the representatives of the Azerbaijan National Government. The latter have made counter-proposals but, as far as is known, the Cabinet have stated that these are contrary to the Constitution and cannot be accepted and that they are not prepared to go beyond the seven points already published. In a conversation with His Majesty's Ambassador, the Persian Prime Minister said that he had suggested to the Soviet Ambassador that, in view of his undertaking to attempt to find a solution of the Azerbaijan problem by peaceful means and of his failure to do so, he should resign. To this proposal, according to Qavam-us-Saltaneh, the Soviet Ambassador had objected vehemently contending that, if Qavam had failed, he knew of no one who could succeed. He had urged Qavam to continue his efforts since, if force were used, a situation would arise in North Persia which would be detrimental to the country's interests.

2. It is understood that there is no intention of issuing the Royal Proclamation concerning the next elections until the Azerbaijan issue is settled.

Russian Evacuation.

3. There is very little to add to the information given in paragraph 4 of last Intelligence Summary. The Persian press reports the departure from Bandar Gaz and Bandar Shah of the detachments mentioned in paragraph 4 of last Intelligence Summary. American aerial reconnaissance by the assistant military attaché on the 9th May up to a point 10 miles north of Marand on the Tabriz-Julfa road showed no Russian troops and the various columns mentioned in the postscript to last Intelligence Summary have presumably crossed the frontier into Russia. While reports from consular sources at Meshed and Tabriz and reconnaissance by the British military attaché along the Caspian coast and the air attaché over Azerbaijan have failed to disclose the continued existence of Russian troops after the 6th May, there is no definite and incontrovertible proof that the evacuation is complete both in respect of men and material. Only a thorough search of the Zenjan area and the area south of Lake Urumiyeh can confirm this and such a search is at present impossible owing to the restrictions placed upon all foreigners' movements by the Democrats in these two provinces.

*Internal Security.**Kurdistan.*

4. The Minister for War informed the British Military Attaché on the 7th May that, a few days previously, a clash had occurred between the Kurds and the Persian army garrison of Saqqiz at a point only 7 miles north of that town. A battalion from the garrison had gone out on a reconnaissance in force and had been attacked suddenly by a strong force of Kurds in the nearby hills. The troops suffered casualties amounting to fourteen killed and an unspecified number of wounded. They claimed to have inflicted one hundred casualties on the Kurds but this number is almost certainly a gross exaggeration. A representative of the Shakkak tribe is now in Tehran and the Minister for War is confident of securing the adhesion of some other tribes in the event of an advance northwards by the Persian army into Azerbaijan. In this he would appear to be unduly optimistic as the Kurds, apart from their dislike and mistrust of the Persian army, must realise that any reoccupation of Azerbaijan and reassertion of the Persian Government's authority there must, inevitably, be followed by similar action in Kurdistan.

Kermanshah.

5. The Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs has had the impertinence to address a note to His Majesty's Embassy in which they state that His Majesty's Consul, Kermanshah, distributed 600 rifles to Abbas Qubadian (referred to in paragraph 7 of Intelligence Summary No. 16).

6. The Russian Consul recently intervened on behalf of one Alawi, arrested for his part in the recent May Day riots, by asking the chief of police to release him. This official replied that releases were the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice.

Azerbaijan.

7. His Majesty's acting consul-general reports that, during the absence of the Azerbaijan Government's delegates in Tehran, restrictions have been placed upon the movements of foreigners and that he is unable to obtain permission to travel about his consular district.

8. Radio Tabriz still maintains a defiant note in its broadcasts.

9. His Majesty's acting consul-general reports that 10 per cent. of the Russian railway personnel have remained after the 6th May.

Mazanderan.

10. A clash between Tudeh and anti-Tudeh elements occurred on the 5th May on the Firuzkuh-Shahi road in which Mashalleh, a local Tudeh notable, was killed. Allegations were made to the effect that the gendarmerie had supplied arms to the anti-Tudeh party.

Isfahan.

11. The Labour leader Fidakar, accompanied by ten Labour representatives, has arrived in Tehran to discuss the Isfahan mill workers situation with the Persian Government.

12. His Majesty's Consul reports that Varasteh, the Governor-General, has again tendered his resignation and that Daulatabadi, the mayor, has been dismissed.

Khorasan.

13. His Majesty's Consul-General reports, after personal reconnaissance, that the Persian army has not yet re-established the frontier post at Bajgiran. In the nearby hills the Russians have demarcated the frontier with a high wire fence impassable to man or beast, while in the more open country the demarcation is by a ploughed strip which is kept freshly raked and which is patrolled regularly. The village of Firuzeh and its adjacent lands have not been restored to the Persians according to Article 3 of the Russo-Persian Treaty of February 1921. They are still in Russian possession and now lie about eight miles on the Russian side of the frontier as demarcated by the Russians.

Fars.

14. According to consular reports from Shiraz there is some evidence to show that the recent changes in administrative posts and the removal of most of Qavam-ul-Mulk's supporters and relations from office were the work of the Qashgai and not, as was first supposed, effected by the Central Government

under Tudeh and Russian pressure. It was hardly to be hoped that Nasir Khan Qashgai could refrain from taking advantage of the Persian Government's pre-occupation with affairs in the north and of their weakness in the south resulting from their draining away military and gendarmerie for reinforcements. It remains to be seen whether Nasir Khan aims at establishing a paramount position for his clan under some form of provincial autonomy for Fars on the Azerbaijan model or whether he will be content to have his own nominees filling all Government posts and thus leaving him an open field in which to continue his nefarious activities of selling his tribesmen's share of tea, sugar and cloth on the black market.

Khuzistan.

15. A strike occurred during the week in the A.I.O.C. distillation plant at Abadan. About 200 workers were involved. At one time the situation appeared serious and it was expected that the strike would spread to other plants. The company held discussions with the workers and agreed to two out of three of their demands. The men then returned to work. Protection was asked for and obtained from the Persian army divisional commander at Ahwaz.

Persian Gendarmerie.

16. The Tabriz radio, in a recent broadcast of a defiant tone, protested against the return to Azerbaijan of "the corrupt" Persian gendarmerie. During the past week there have appeared in the Tudeh newspapers some violent attacks on Colonel Schwarzkopf and his American mission accusing them, as is usual in the case of any official who carries out his duties vigorously, of being "reactionary."

Persian Press.

17. The following table, compiled by the press attaché to His Majesty's Embassy, gives the comparative positions of the press on the 1st March and the 18th April, i.e., the period covered by Qavam-us-Sultaneh's premiership:—

Type of newspaper.	Numbers appearing as on	
	1st March.	18th April.
Tudeh and Extreme Left, dailies	6	7
Tudeh and Extreme Left, weeklies	3	3
Moderate Left, dailies	6	5
Moderate Left, weeklies	8	7
Neutral or Centre, dailies	4	4
Neutral or Centre, weeklies	10	8
Moderate Right, dailies	3	3
Moderate Right, weeklies	2	1
Right, dailies	6	nil
Right, weeklies	3	nil

It will be seen that out of fourteen dailies and weeklies of the Right or Moderate Right in existence on the 1st March only four are now appearing.

Appointments.

18.—(i) The Italian Government have announced their agreement to the appointment of Fathullah Pakrevan (F.O. 169; M.A. 208) as Persian Minister in Rome.

(ii) Azizullah Nikpay Ezaz-ud-dowleh, son of Ahmad Nikpay (F.O. 161; M.A. 199), to be Governor-General of the Vth Ustan (Kermanshah).

(iii) Colonel Saffari, Chief Prefect of Police, to be Brigadier.

British Interests.

19. The British firm of Metropolitan Vickers has failed to secure the contract for the supply of an electrical generating plant of 25,000 kw. for the Tehran municipality. The latter body have now agreed to purchase a second-hand plant by Westinghouse of America of 7,400 kw. The municipality state that the decision to carry out the Lar Valley project, which will ultimately provide 72,000 kw. for Tehran, has caused them to change their plans and purchase a smaller plant which will afford temporary relief from the present

overloading of the existing plant. As the Lar project will take at least seven years to carry out, it is suspected that other considerations may have induced the municipality to change their minds.

American Interests.

20. The new American Ambassador, Mr. George Allen, arrived in Tehran on the 5th May and presented his letters of credence to His Imperial Majesty The Shah on the 11th May.

[E 4873/315/34] (8)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 19, Secret, for the period 13th May to 19th May, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 157 of 22nd May; Received 28th May.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE Azerbaijan Government delegates returned to Tabriz by air on the 13th May as the conversations between them and the Persian Government had resulted in a deadlock. On the 14th May the Persian Prime Minister made the statement included as an appendix to this Summary. Qawam-us-Saltaneh's next move cannot be predicted. He must realise that the Persian army is in no fit state to undertake an all-out offensive against the Azerbaijan army, and that, if he were foolish enough to order it, the Russians would soon find a pretext for bringing back their troops to restore the situation. To give in to the Azerbaijan delegates' demands would result in the immediate loss of Azerbaijan and by degrees of the rest of Persia and possibly in his own impeachment as a traitor. To let the negotiations hang fire would probably be his natural inclination, but the Russians are hardly likely to allow him to do this since a failure to reach an agreement would delay the next elections and hence the summoning of the 15th Majlis and hence the presentation of the Bill for their oil concession. A rumour to the effect that the Prime Minister is considering the despatch of a delegation to Tabriz to continue the talks does not lend colour to the view that he intends or would be allowed by the Russians to let the deadlock continue. It may well be that he feels that in Tabriz certain concessions to the Democrats' demands can be made which could not be made in the tense political atmosphere of Tehran. A fourth course, that of an appeal to U.N.O., does not appear probable for the threefold reasons of Persian vanity, Russian displeasure and a disbelief in U.N.O.'s power to help.

2. The Persian Government have sent a commission to Azerbaijan to report on the completion of the Russian evacuation. The composition of this commission does not inspire confidence. It consists of an inspector in the Persian Prime Minister's office who is a jackal of Muzaffar Firuz, a politically-minded and dishonest colonel, an editor of the extreme leftist newspaper *Dad*, and another editor whose newspaper, originally of the moderate Right, now appears to be actively supporting Qawam's present policy. The commission has reached Julfa, on the Perso-Russian frontier, and is about to visit other important towns in Azerbaijan. On the basis of what they see, they will no doubt on their return submit a report to the effect that Russian evacuation of Azerbaijan is complete.

3. On the 19th May the press published the text of a lengthy broadcast by the Prime Minister on the present situation. Its tone was firm and, in places, threatening. Comparing his task to that of a gardener, he said that it was his duty to eradicate ruthlessly all pests and insects which attacked his garden. Dishonest intriguers who trafficked with foreign embassies and caused unwarranted interference in Persia's affairs were threatened with drastic action. While the broadcast is obviously intended to stifle all further criticism of his policy and actions by the Right, there are reasons for believing that His Imperial Majesty the Shah and his entourage are thereby warned that any interference by them with Qawam's plans or any attempt on their part to throw him out of office will meet with failure.

Internal Security.

General.

4. Whether Qawam-us-Saltaneh has or has not sold his country to the Russians is a matter of opinion incapable, as yet, of proof. That his Cabinet is susceptible to Tudeh pressure is a fact. This has had unfortunate repercussions throughout Persia, and officials charged with maintaining law and order are no longer willing to act firmly when they know that such action will not only not be supported by the Central Government, but will probably lead to their punishment or dismissal. From Isfahan, Kerman, Kermanshah, Khorasan and from Abadan reliable reports tell of the police standing idly by while Tudeh excesses are carried out in their presence. As was to be expected, the Persian army have not escaped this contagion, and several high-ranking Persian army officers whose loyalty and good sense are beyond question have expressed to the British Military Attaché their conviction that almost all Persian officers below field rank have been willing recipients of Tudeh propaganda and cannot be relied upon either in the major event of civil war against the Democrats or even in the minor tasks of assisting the civil power in maintaining law and order.

Azerbaijan.

5. His Majesty's Acting Consul-General reports that the training of the Azerbaijan People's army, which was intensive during April, has slackened off since the departure of the Russian army. The spare-time training of members of the Democrat party continues. The same source states that the standard weapon of the People's army is the tommy-gun. These were supplied by the Russians, probably from the 10,000 made for them under contract by the Persian army arsenal in 1944-45. The standard weapon of the "Fidais" (volunteers) is the Persian army B.R.N.O. rifle. Many of the numbers of these have been noted (nearly all in English figures in the 80,000 and 90,000 series), and they are known to be from the consignment of 41,000 also made in the Persian arsenal at the same time and under the same contract as the tommy-guns.

6. A new law published by the Azerbaijan Government prohibits the import into Azerbaijan of any goods which are normally manufactured in Azerbaijan. All Government employees must wear locally woven textiles under pain of fine or dismissal.

Kurdistan.

7. The casualties suffered by the Persian army in the clash with the Kurds near Saqqiz (reported in paragraph 4 of last Intelligence Summary) are now reported to have been heavier than at first believed. The killed amounted to twenty, the wounded to thirty-eight, while thirty-eight were taken prisoner by the Kurds. Two machine guns with 4,000 rounds of ammunition apiece and 100 rifles also fell into the hands of the Kurds. The morale of the Saqqiz garrison is, in consequence, at a low ebb. The Kurds now surround the town on three sides and are within rifle-shot range. General Jehanbani, the Inspector-General of the Forces of the West, has returned to Tehran and so have Generals Shaqqaji and Ansari who went there recently to enquire into the causes of the defeat.

8. General Ansari informed the British Military Attaché on the 18th May that, according to information received by the Saqqiz garrison from friendly Kurds, the direct track from Mahabad to Sardasht was being made fit for use by M.T. by the Kurds assisted by Russian engineers in civilian dress. A telegraph line was also being put up along this route by the Russian engineers.

Isfahan.

9. According to His Majesty's Consul, opposition to the appointment of Amir Husein Khan as joint Governor of Bakhtiari (see paragraph 7 of Intelligence Summary No. 17) has been expressed both by Abul Qasim, the other joint Governor, and by Jehanshah Khan, the son of the late Governor, Murteza Quli Khan. It is by no means certain that the appointments will stand.

Khorasan.

10. The Russian Consul-General is already taking a great interest in the next elections, according to His Majesty's Consul-General. He, accompanied by the Russian Vice-Consul, recently visited Turbat-i-Haidari, Kashmar and Khwaf. At Turbat-i-Haidari they proposed as a candidate one Noshin, a Tudeh agitator recently imported from Tehran into Meshed. At Kashmar they enquired about

the chances of Manuchihr Taimurtash, their nominee for the last Majlis who was elected at the request of the Russians by the efforts of Ali Mansur, the late Governor-General of Khorasan.

11. The Persian army Divisional Commander of Khorasan, Colonel Vossuq, informed His Majesty's Consul-General that a party of seven persons, Turkestan Russian officers in civilian clothes, and Persian *émigrés*, who had been residing in Ashkabad or Tashkent, had arrived in Meshed during the first week of May. Since their arrival the Tudeh party had made renewed efforts to establish contacts with junior Persian officers.

Khuzistan.

12. On the 10th May the entire Persian staff at the oil-field of Agha Jari went on strike. They demanded:—

- (a) 100 per cent. increase in wages.
- (b) Double pay for overtime.
- (c) One month's holiday per annum on full pay.
- (d) A holiday on Friday with pay.

The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company rejected these demands, whereupon the Tudeh leaders threatened to intern all British personnel and to take control of all essential services. The company's officials asked for military protection, which was despatched with commendable promptitude from Behbahan and Ahwaz by the orders of Colonel Afshar Oglu, the Persian army Divisional Commander at Ahwaz. So far no acts of violence to personnel or property have occurred. The strike continues. Lurid accounts of the strike have appeared in the Tudeh press in Tehran in which the company is stated to have deprived the poor defenceless strikers of bread and water and to have turned out pregnant women into the desert to die of starvation, thirst and exposure.

Persian Army.

13. It will be recalled that thirty-six officers of the Persian army who were suspected of complicity in the mutiny of last year were sent by General Arfa, the then Chief of the General Staff, to reside in Kerman under surveillance. (Paragraph 22 of Intelligence Summary No. 36 of 1945 refers.) Under Tudeh pressure the Cabinet recently ordered the Minister for War to release them and permit them to come to Tehran. On arrival they all received their arrears of pay and an out-station allowance. During the past week nineteen of the thirty-six deserted and have joined the Azerbaijan army.

14. A Persian army battalion has arrived in Pahlevi from Qazvin. According to the press it was warmly received. Another battalion has been sent to Gorgan.

Persian Navy.

15. Three out of the four small gunboats (the fourth was cannibalised to provide spares for the other three) have been handed back to the Persian navy at Khorramshahr. They were escorted by H.M.I.S. *Sonapati*, who took back the Indian crews.

16. The Persian navy's floating dock is now at Aden, where it must remain till the monsoon is over. At the request of the Persian Government a telegram was sent to cancel its departure from Alexandria, but the telegram arrived too late. The Persian Government realise that its capacity (of about 6,000 tons) is far in excess of their requirements and wish to exchange it for a smaller one or, alternatively, to sell it.

Appointments.

17.—(i) Dr. Seyyid Ali Shaigan, formerly a professor at Tehran University, to be Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Education.

(ii) Nadir Arasteh (F.O. 24; M.A. 32) to be Governor-General of Isfahan vice Varasteh resigned. The appointment to Isfahan of this degenerate and weak Qajar Prince with strong pro-Russian feelings will be a great encouragement to the Tudeh faction there.

Chinese Interests.

18. His Excellency Tieh Tseng-li, the Chinese Ambassador to Persia, has returned to Tehran after an absence of nearly seven months.

Czechoslovak Interests.

19. M. Joseph Kadloc, Czechoslovak Minister since April 1943, has left Tehran on transfer.

Appendix.

Statement by Persian Prime Minister.

At this moment when public opinion awaits with attention the outcome of the discussions between the Government and the representatives from Azerbaijan I consider it necessary to inform the public of the result of the discussions which have taken place during the last fifteen days by making clear the facts in the public mind. It is clear to the representatives of the people of Azerbaijan who came to Tehran that I made the necessary effort with the best intentions and a peaceful attitude to solve the problems under discussion, and that I endeavoured to meet the demands of the representatives from Azerbaijan within the limits of the existing laws of the country. After the declaration of the 1st Ordibehesht, 1325 (21st April, 1946), had been issued and the Government's seven-point decree published, certain circles protested against it and thought that my policy had exceeded the existing laws of the country. Although I trusted and still trust the good intentions of the representatives from Azerbaijan, as a result of the discussions which have taken place during the last fifteen days, I am sorry to say that some of their demands were outside the scope of the legal powers and the seven-point declaration of the Government, and for this reason the discussions have of necessity been postponed until a solution is found and the representatives from Azerbaijan have returned to Tabriz.

The demands of the representatives of the people of Azerbaijan which differed from the legal powers and the seven-point declaration of the Government are as follows:—

- (1) In accordance with article 2 of the Government's declaration dated the 1st Ordibehesht, 1325 (21st April, 1946), the appointment of a Governor-General for Azerbaijan will be made by the Government taking into consideration the views of the Provincial Council. The representatives from Azerbaijan insisted that the selection of a Governor-General should be made on the proposal of the Provincial Council and the appointment then made by the Government.
- (2) In accordance with article 2 of the Government's declaration dated the 1st Ordibehesht, 1325 (21st April, 1946), the appointment of officers commanding military and gendarmerie forces will be made by the Government. The representatives from Azerbaijan were of the opinion that the above-mentioned officers should be appointed on the proposal of the Provincial Council and the appointments then approved by the Government.
- (3) The distribution of public domains and ceded properties among the peasants which took place during the recent changes in Azerbaijan should be confirmed by the Majlis in accordance with the existing laws, and the adoption of decision of the Government on this subject is outside the scope of the legal powers of the Government. The above-mentioned questions and other problems were discussed, but since the Majlis should take the decision on most of these problems, therefore, without any decision being taken for the present, the representatives from Azerbaijan returned to Tabriz to submit a report and to receive further instructions.

Because with the best of peaceful intentions I desire to find a solution for these problems, it is obvious that I shall be prepared to continue the discussions and to find a solution for these difficulties through the adoption of a policy which does not differ from the laws of the country.

Since in accordance with the stipulations of the law and taking into consideration the Government's undertaking about oil in the north in accordance with the agreements exchanged with the Soviet Government the 15th Majlis should convene within seven months of the date of the signature of the above-mentioned agreements, the rescript for the general elections must be announced as soon as possible.

I expect that the representatives from Azerbaijan will provide the facilities necessary to enable the Government to announce the general elections in accordance with the stipulations of the law and to enable the people of Azerbaijan to elect their representatives freely and to send them to the capital.

I hope that the good intentions and patriotism which I felt among the representatives from Azerbaijan will prove sufficient to relieve the anxiety felt by the public, and that taking into consideration the legal duties of the Government the present difficulties will be resolved on all counts.

[E 5133/315/34]

(9)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 20, Secret, for the Period 20th-26th May, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 167 of 29th May; Received 5th June.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE letter addressed to the Security Council by Husein Ala, Persia's Ambassador to the United States and representative at U.N.O., has had sharp repercussions in Persia. Mr. Ala's letter, written, it must be admitted, without instructions from his Government, complained that Russian interference in Azerbaijan had not ceased and that it was therefore impossible to check the accuracy of reports which stated that Russian soldiers had been left behind in civilian dress and that Russian military material had been placed at the disposal of the rebel Democrat forces. On the strength of the report submitted by the Persian Government commission which went to Azerbaijan to investigate Russian military evacuation (see paragraph 4 below) the following statement was issued on the 24th May by the Prime Minister:—

"As a result of the investigation made by the officials sent to Azerbaijan, who have certified the evacuation of Azerbaijan by the Red army, a report based on this investigation has been cabled to the embassy in Washington for communication to the Security Council. I also publish hereunder a note from the Russian Embassy for the information of the public:—

"Your Excellency,

"Pursuant to my verbal statements made on the instructions of the Soviet Government on the 22nd May, I respectfully confirm hereby that the withdrawal of the Red army from Iran had been completed by the 9th May according to the plan for evacuation which had been announced by the Caucasian General Staff at the end of March. Please accept my sincerest respects.

(Signed) M. SADTCHIKOV."

2. In a series of interviews to the press Muzaffar Firuz, the Prime Minister's spokesman, made it clear that Mr. Ala had exceeded his instructions and stated that steps had been taken to ensure that, in future, he should communicate to the Security Council only what he was instructed to communicate. After this undignified repudiation of Persia's Ambassador, Muzaffar Firuz was condescending enough to say that Mr. Ala still enjoyed the confidence of the Persian Government. It has been known for a long time that the Russians regard Husein Ala as one of the sharpest thorns in their path and the Persian Prime Minister has admitted to the American Ambassador that M. Sadtchikov had, after accusing him of double-dealing, demanded, as proof of his good faith, the recall of Ala. The American Government, through their ambassador at Tehran, has intervened on Ala's behalf, urging that his recall at this juncture would be damaging to the prestige of U.N.O. For the present, therefore, Ala remains, but his tenure of office cannot be regarded as secure.

3. In an interview accorded to a United Press representative in Tabriz Pishevari is reported as saying that the conversations recently broken off at Tehran would be resumed shortly and that the Persian Prime Minister was about to despatch his delegation to Tabriz. Pishevari stated that, though he did not know the names of the Persian Government representatives, he "thought it very likely" that Sadiq Sadiqi Mustashar-ud-dowleh (F.O. 193; M.A. 248), General

Muhammad Husein Mirza Firuz (F.O. 72; M.A. 94) and Muhammad Wali Farmanfarmayan (full brother to General Firuz) (F.O. 73; M.A. 95) would be chosen. Moscow would approve of this selection.

4. The Government commission, referred to in paragraph 2 of last Intelligence Summary, has returned to Tehran and submitted its report, which was as predicted. It states that "during the period of one week they toured by motor car various parts of the province and made careful enquiries from reliable persons and despatched reports to the Government. Their reports indicate that in Tabriz and its environs and Marand, Julfa, Khoi, Salmas, Maku, Rezaieh, Miandoab, all of which are important centres of Azerbaijan and which were carefully inspected by the committee, no trace remains of the Red forces, their equipment or their transport. Information obtained from trustworthy persons shows that the evacuation was completed on the 6th May." The commission was not allowed to inspect barracks or any military installations. They did not leave the highway at any point. They did not reach any of the three "fronts," viz., the Democrat-Zulfiqari partisan front south of Zenjan, the Democrat-Afshar partisan front near Shahin Dej nor the Kurdish-Persian army front near Saqqiz. On the basis of what they saw in the places visited their report could not come to any other conclusion.

5. Two more newspapers (it is needless to say they did not belong to the Left) have been suppressed, *Paikar-i-Ruz* and *Khawar*. They ventured to criticise the present policy of the Government. The anti-British tone of the press has become so violent during the past month or two that His Majesty's Ambassador was obliged to make representations on the subject to the Persian Prime Minister. Qawam-us-Saltaneh expressed ignorance of this campaign of slander and asked for particulars.

6. Three more Right-wing politicians have been arrested. They were Ali Dashti and Jamal-ud-din Imami of the Adalat party and Deputies for Tehran in the late Majlis, and Sannandaji, a Deputy for Sannandaj and a close associate of Seyyid Zia-ud-din. Lari, a prominent merchant and a supporter of Seyyid-ud-din, has also been arrested.

The Elections.

7. The newspaper *Iran* came out with the following: "Following the publication of the Prime Minister's communiqué and the complete evacuation of the Red Army, the necessary steps are being taken for the election of the Fifteenth Parliament. The High Council for the Elections are studying the matter and, according to information received, the Prime Minister has given orders for the necessary papers, forms, &c., to be printed and distributed so that everything may be ready for the elections to begin throughout the country so soon as the Azerbaijan question has been settled." The prospect of early elections is causing dismay among the more stable elements in Persia. With the political leaders of the Right behind bars, the Right-wing press under suppression, and Tudeh influence supreme in all Ministries, they fear with justification that the Tudeh will come in with an overwhelming majority. They know their own inability to co-operate or organise and realise that if in the late Majlis a Tudeh minority of eight, speaking with one voice and efficiently organised from Moscow, could successfully impose their will upon a disorganised majority of 120, there will be no effective opposition to a Tudeh bloc of perhaps ten times its former size.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.

8. Three more clashes between Persian troops and the Kurds and Persian troops and Democrats have occurred since the skirmish reported in paragraph 4 of Intelligence Summary No. 18:—

- (i) On the 18th May the Persian garrison of one battalion at Main Bulagh (near Shahin Dej, 50 miles north-east of Saqqiz) was attacked by "Fidais" (volunteers of the Democrat rebel forces). They used both machine guns and mortars. Some twenty Afshar tribal partisans of Government arrived from Shahin Dej to assist the garrison and twenty villagers of Main Bulagh were also provided with arms. They beat off the Democrat forces, inflicting on them casualties of six killed. The Persian garrison's losses were nil.

- (ii) On the 20th May, at Saqqiz, the garrison was again attacked by the Kurds, among whom Mulla Mustafa Barzani's men were prominent. Six rounds of artillery fire by the Persian troops caused the Kurds to retreat, leaving six killed and nine wounded. The Persians lost one officer and four other ranks killed and five wounded.
- (iii) On the 23rd May, at Baneh, the garrison was attacked by the Kurds (Mangur and Herki) and lost one officer and four other ranks killed and four wounded.

These skirmishes have been magnified by Radio Tabriz into unprovoked and full-dress attacks on Azerbaijan by the Persian army. The Azerbaijan People's army, according to the broadcast, did not desire to engage in fratricidal strife and shed blood needlessly in a civil war, but, in the face of these deliberate onslaughts, it had no other choice but to defend its hard-won liberty to the last man. According to the Minister for War, who gave the British Military Attaché the above information, these events have caused high words between himself and the Persian Prime Minister at a recent Cabinet meeting. The Prime Minister complained that those armed clashes were impeding the progress of his negotiations with the Azerbaijan Government and peevishly asked the Minister for War why he was unable to restrain his forces from such ill-timed offensive action. The Minister for War replied, with some heat, that instructions to abstain from any aggressive action had already been sent at the Prime Minister's request to the G.O.C. Kurdistan that these instructions had been scrupulously carried out and that in none of the three instances mentioned above was the Persian army the aggressor. He also made the suggestion of sending a mixed commission to enquire into the responsibility for the recent clashes and to prevent their recurrence. This suggestion has now been adopted. Three representatives of the Azerbaijan Government, three Persian army officers and three Kurds have been selected. The Azerbaijan representatives (whose names are given in the press as Padgan, Habibullah and Ibrahim Alizadeh and in a Persian Government communiqué as Jandat, Alizadeh and Azerbadegan) have already arrived in Kurdistan after a meeting with the Persian Prime Minister in Tehran. The three Persian officers (Colonels Shahrughshahi, Pezechian and Maghruri) have also left for Kurdistan. The three Kurdish representatives will arrive there very soon. General Hajali Razmara (F.O. 189, M.A. 243) who has succeeded General Amanullah Jehanbani as Inspector-General of the Western army, will also assist the commission in its task. He is believed to favour the division of the "front" into three sectors, viz., Main Bulagh-Saqqiz: Saqqiz-Sardasht and Sardasht-Baneh and also the establishment of a no-man's land of 2 kilom. in depth.

Khorasan.

9. A report, from a trustworthy source but as yet unconfirmed by His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed, states that great anxiety is felt in the fertile area of Sarakhs (36° 30' N; 61° 4' E) over the cessation of the flow of water in the Tejend river which, entering Persian territory from Russia, forms the boundary for about 100 miles down to the point where the frontiers of Persia, Russia and Afghanistan meet. The drying-up of the river is due, the report states, to the construction of a canal by the Russians on the higher reaches which takes off all the water for the irrigation of a large area inside Russian territory. The Sarakhs district used to provide between 1,500 and 2,000 tons of wheat yearly and the loss of this will dislocate seriously the grain situation of Khorasan besides reducing to starvation the Baluch population of the area.

Khuzistan.

10. The strike in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's field at Agha Jari continues, and is being made much of in the Left-wing press. The Persian Prime Minister has despatched a commission to try and settle the differences between the company and the workers. It comprises the following:—

- Dr. Malik Ismail, Public Prosecutor of Ustans Nos. 1 and 2, representing the Ministry of Justice;
Mr. Thaqafi, Director-General of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry;
Mr. Hussain Amiz, the Inspector-General of the Ministry of Justice, and
Mr. Khunsari, representing the Prime Minister.

This commission has recommended (i) that labour should return to work at Agha Jari on the 25th May, (ii) that since the strike began before the passing of the new Labour Law (passed by the Council of Ministers on the 18th May—

its text is not yet available) the company should consider the strike as having occurred in exceptional circumstances and treat the strikers sympathetically by making an *ex gratia* payment to them for the period of the strike, (iii) that the proposals in (ii) above should be put to the workers two days after they have returned to work, (iv) the commission will investigate the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's complaints about the activities of certain agitators and, if considered necessary, the commission will recommend their expulsion, (v) after the strikers' return to work the company will examine the new Labour Law in conjunction with the commission and will consider ways and means of implementing it.

Persian Army.

11. General Yazdanpanah, one of the three high ranking officers selected to accompany the Persian army contingent to attend the Victory Celebrations in London, left Tehran by the B.O.A.C. service on the 23rd May. His departure was delayed by the insistence on taking with him to London, for medical treatment, his small son for whose passage special sanction had to be obtained from the Foreign Office. He was accompanied by a staff officer, Colonel Mahmud Amini. General Razmara, the third high ranking officer, whose departure had been delayed by his insistence that his wife should accompany him, did not, in the end, proceed, as on the day before he was due to start he was appointed to a new post in Kurdistan (see paragraph 8 above).

Appointments.

- 12.—(i) Ghulam Husein Miftah to be Assistant Governor-General of the 10th Ustan and Mayor of Isfahan;
(ii) Ali Akbar Assadi to be Assistant Governor-General of Khorasan. He is a brother of Salman Asadi (F.O. 33; M.A. 40).

Communications.

13. Further serious floods have occurred in Khuzistan and both the road and railway between Khorramshahr and Ahwaz are reported to be under water.

P.S.—Reference paragraph 10 above. The Agha Jari strikers returned to work on the 25th May, 1946.

Tehran, 26th May, 1946.

[E 5380/315/34]

(10)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 21, Secret, for the period 27th May to 2nd June, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 178 of 4th June; Received 13th June.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

AN official communiqué by the Persian Government states that Husein Ala, while remaining Persia's Ambassador at Washington, has been relieved of his duties as Persian representative on the Security Council of U.N.O.

2. The delegation which was to proceed to Tabriz to continue the negotiations between the Central Government and the Azerbaijan Government (see paragraph 3 of last Intelligence Summary) has not yet left. The Persian Prime Minister is reported to have said that he has detected of late a more conciliatory tone in Pishevari's utterances.

3. There are some rumours—they amount to nothing more for the moment—to the effect that Qawam-us-Saltaneh intends to make some changes in his Cabinet. It is well known that the Russians, and hence the Tudeh, were bitterly opposed to the selection of General Ahmedi as Minister for War and have never ceased to attack him ever since. Qawam-us-Saltaneh was forced to accept him when forming his Cabinet in order to allay the suspicions of the Extreme Right. With the arrest of most of the Right-wing politicians, and with the adoption of an openly Leftist policy by the Government, this reason no longer holds good

and many foresee the replacement of General Ahmedi by either General Hidayet or General Razmara, either of whom would be acceptable to the Russians. Dr. Iqbal, the Minister for Health, who has ventured to side with General Ahmedi in opposing the present policy, is another Minister likely to disappear. Bayat, the Minister of Finance, whose dull brain has just grasped the trend of Qawam's present policy, has been alarmed at the project for the Division of Crown Lands (referred to in paragraph 4 below) and sees in this the ultimate disappearance of such part of his once vast estates which remain after years of unsuccessful gambling. He has begun to side against Qawam and will therefore probably be discarded.

4. The Council of Ministers at their meeting on the 27th May published a decree ordering the Minister of Agriculture to prepare a plan for the division of Crown Lands among the peasantry. Many consider that this is only a piece of political window dressing designed to secure further support for Government by the Tudeh, and they point out the great difficulties which such a project must encounter—difficulties which the Cabinet, in true Persian style, either has not considered or has airily brushed aside. Such is the provision, in future, by an impoverished peasantry instead of, as hitherto, by a wealthy landlord of seed, animals, tools and water. The land-owning class are greatly perturbed by this decree for they gloomily predict that division of Crown Lands among the peasantry must inevitably lead to a similar division of private estates.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

5. An unconfirmed report states that anti-Democrat risings have occurred in Rezaiyeh. There is some evidence to show that the unpopularity of the Democrat régime in Azerbaijan is on the increase. The Azerbaijan Government is high handed in its methods. Under the former Persian Administration taxes could be evaded by the payment of a suitable bribe, but the present régime is reported to be savage in its methods of collecting a tax more severe than any previously levied. Conscription could usually be avoided under the Persian Administration by suitable payments, whereas the present Government is vigilant in its combing out of the villages and in inflicting severe punishment on those who fail to report or who desert after enrolment. These signs, however, in no way justify the optimistic view held by many Persians in the capital that Azerbaijan is seething with discontent, and that one forward step by the army in the direction of Azerbaijan will suffice to fan this revolt into open flame and drive the Democrats across the Aras River.

6. As the result of a request by the Persian Prime Minister to Pishevari the following officers have been liberated from prison (where they were serving sentences imposed by the Azerbaijan Government) and sent back to Tehran:—

Colonel Baharvand, formerly Chief of the Military Police of Azerbaijan.
Colonel Zanganeh, formerly Brigade Commander at Rezaiyeh.
Colonel Nurbaksh, formerly Chief of Staff at Rezaiyeh.

Kurdistan.

7. Yet another clash between the Kurds and the Persian army occurred on the 26th May near Sardasht, as a result of which the military lost an officer and four other ranks wounded. Again, according to the Minister for War, it was the Kurds who started the fight. According to General Ahmedi a comic element was introduced into the proceedings by the arrival on the scene during the skirmish of the three Kurdish representatives referred to in paragraph 8 of last Intelligence Summary. The lorry in which they were travelling was heavily fired upon by the Kurds themselves who mistook their representatives for the enemy. Only a well-aimed round of gun fire saved the situation by causing the Kurdish irregulars to scatter and enabling the Kurdish representatives to establish their identity.

Khorasan.

8. His Majesty's Consul-General, Meshed, reports that anti-British propaganda by the Tudeh party by means of the press and radio is on the increase in Meshed and in the surrounding villages. Tudeh activity in Kashmar and Turbat-i-Haidari, he reports as the result of a recent visit to these places, is practically nil. Many more Russians have been noticed in Meshed recently.

Gurgan.

9. Some clashes have occurred between the Persian army battalion recently sent to Gurgan and some Turcoman tribesmen who, profiting by the interval between the departure of the Russian troops and the arrival of the Persian battalion, had started to pillage the countryside.

Fars.

10. A report, which comes from the family of Qawam-ul-Mulk and which will require confirmation since they are the aggrieved party, states that Khosro Qashgai has prevailed upon the Persian Prime Minister, through Muzaffar Firuz, to appoint Nasir Khan as Security Officer for the districts of Lar, Fasa and Jahrum, districts in which hitherto the influence of Qawam-ul-Mulk has been paramount. The same source states that Khosro also attempted to have placed under Nasir Khan the Khamseh tribes of which Qawam-ul-Mulk is the hereditary chief, though not himself a member of those tribes. For himself Khosro attempted to have created the new appointment of "Special Inspector of the South" under which ill-defined title he would have a finger in every pie. The newspaper *Mihr-i-Iran* published the following:—

"As is well known during the former régime the property of the Qashgai family was unjustly confiscated and illegal interference took place in its transfer and distribution: we are, therefore, happy to learn that the Prime Minister has appointed a special committee to study this matter, and deal with the legitimate grievances of the family.

In this connexion we recall that the Qashgai brothers are among the first big landlords to modify substantially in favour of their tenants the landlords' shares in the cultivators' crops."

There would be plenty of Persians who would say that the "legitimate grievances" are on the other side and that Nasir Khan would find it difficult to justify his title to much of the land now in his possession. While in Tehran Khosro and his brother Muhammad Husein have been in close and almost daily contact with the Tudeh party and, through them, with the Russian Embassy. Nasir Khan has caused some excitement by the despatch of a telegram to the Persian Government in which he deplored the attacks made by the Persian army on his brothers the Democrats, and called for the condign punishment of the Minister responsible, by which, presumably, the Minister for War is intended.

Appointments.

11. Durri to be counsellor of the Persian Embassy in Moscow. He accompanied Qawam-us-Saltaneh on his mission to Moscow. He was a Deputy in the last Majlis, being re-elected by Tudeh insistence after his credentials had at first been rejected.

The Press.

12. Reference was made in last week's Intelligence Summary to the increasingly anti-British tone in the local press. Two specimens are given below:—

(i) Hundreds of times the B.B.C. has published false and provocative reports concerning Persia. This policy was taken up by other radios like the Angora and Delhi radio which were the instrument of London policy. It was regrettable that the politicians on the banks of the Thames did not want to alter their old policy and use means other than falsehood and intrigue to achieve their aim and suck the blood of the weak and oppressed Eastern countries. The former British Government had not hesitated to commit all sorts of cruelties on weak countries in order to secure its imperialist aims and the Labour Government followed the same policy. The Persian people and Government should be aware of the intrigues of foreigners to create civil war.

Rahbar—28th May, 1946.

(ii) Letter to the editor claims that a writer had once visited A.I.O.C. in Abadan and seen a British captain, whom he had seen formerly in Shaiba working in civilian clothes. On asking him whether there were other officers also with him, he had answered no. But the writer had enquired and at New Construction had seen three Indian

squadrons stationed in the newly-constructed houses. Editorial comment states that the hirelings of imperialism should be asked why they kept silence concerning the officers and soldiers who were in the A.I.O.C. in civilian clothes, and concerning the transfer of British ammunition from Basra and other places in Iraq to the A.I.O.C.

British Interests.

13. A parliamentary delegation of three is to arrive shortly in Abadan to study the situation which has arisen out of the recent strikes in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concessional area.

14. His Majesty's Ambassador visited Abadan and some of the oil-fields between the 31st May and the 3rd June.

Russian Interests.

15. According to the Protocol Department of the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Russians have forced the Persian Government to allow them to reopen their consulate at Shiraz, which has been closed for many years.

Lebanese Interests.

16. M. Selim Haidar has arrived in Tehran as Lebanese Chargé d'Affaires.

[E 5592/315/34]

(11)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 22, Secret, for the Period the 3rd June to the 9th June, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 190 of the 12th June; Received 19th June.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

The Persian Prime Minister is reliably reported as saying that he is confident of bringing the negotiations between his Government and the Government of Azerbaijan to a successful conclusion within a few days. There are grounds for believing that he proposes to include one or two of the Azerbaijan representatives in his Cabinet. To the fact that the Russians all the time have been working to this end Qawam turns a conveniently blind eye and blandly observes that a little responsibility will soon sober these Azerbaijani extremists. He will soon realise that he has caught a Tartar or, as the Persians would say, they will breakfast off him before he sups off them.

2. A curious official communiqué has been issued by the Propaganda Department, which is in the charge of Muzaffar Firuz. It states that recently in certain sections of the press certain reforms undertaken by the Persian Government have been attributed to certain Ministers or to certain political parties. The communiqué denies the truth of these allegations and informs the public that all these reforms have been undertaken on the orders of the Prime Minister. It goes on to state that the constructive activity and reforming zeal on the part of the Cabinet are due to the energy and perseverance of Qawam-us-Saltaneh. The idea of collective Cabinet responsibility has never been loudly proclaimed in Persia either before or after Reza Shah's régime, but the communiqué above is curious nevertheless. While Muzaffar Firuz's slavish adherence to Qawam-us-Saltaneh would naturally prompt him to glorify his chief as the leading reformer and the driving force in Persia to-day, one would have thought that Qawam's natural caution would have urged him to stress the collective responsibility of himself and his colleagues for acts and policies which may later be the subject of sharp criticism or which might conceivably be made the grounds for his impeachment.

3. At their meeting of the 5th June the Council of Ministers decreed that a sum of 6 million rials be placed at the disposal of the Ministry of the Interior for defraying expenses in connexion with the next elections.

4. The interrogation of Seyyid Zia-ud-Din began on the 1st June.

5. On the 3rd June a one-day strike among the employees of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Tehran occurred. The strike, it is said, was out of protest against disciplinary action taken against some mechanics. All depots

and filling stations were closed. A continuance of the strike would have paralysed the transport, lighting, bread supplies and public baths of the capital and the Persian Prime Minister is reliably reported as having told the Tudeh party to call off the strike.

Internal Security.

Kurdistan.

6. A further clash has been reported during the past week between the Kurds and the Persian army between Saqqiz and Sardasht. No details are as yet known. General Razmara and the tripartite commission referred to in paragraph 7 of last Intelligence Summary have not been successful, so far, in delimiting the neutral zone and in withdrawing the opposing forces to positions in rear of it. According to an officer on General Razmara's staff (who gave the information to His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah), the general is apprehensive over the recent movement into Persia of some 3,000 to 4,000 Suleiman Jaf horsemen. (This figure, especially in relation to tribal irregular cavalry in a mountainous region producing little in the way of supplies, would appear to be an exaggeration.) They are said, by the same source, to have crossed the frontier at Merivan, where they made contact with the Kani Senani and Avroman Takht tribes and with the Kurds from the Mahabad district. General Razmara fears that they may make a drive across to Tikab, on the eastern extremity of his "front," join up with the Democrat rebel forces and attack the Gulbaghi, with whom they have old scores to settle. Such a move would, of course, cut off the whole of the Persian army garrisons in the Saqqiz, Baneh and Sardasht areas, which number about 35,000 men.

Azerbaijan.

7. Tabriz Radio, on the 31st May, announced that a meeting of representatives of the Democrat party from all towns in Azerbaijan had adopted a twelve-point resolution which included the following:—

Full approval of the reforms undertaken by the party régime. Agreement to the resumption of negotiations with the Central Government. Co-operation with democratic movements in other parts of Persia to the end that democracy may be fully established throughout the country and that worthy representatives may be elected to the next Majlis.

8. Though the reports of anti-Democrat risings in Rezaiyeh (referred to in paragraph 5 of last Intelligence Summary) are believed to have been exaggerated, they were nevertheless sufficiently serious to cause the Azerbaijan Government some concern and to result in the despatch of Pishevari, Biriya and the Minister of Justice to investigate them.

9. Six officers and thirteen men of the People's army are said to have been arrested in Tabriz on suspicion of anti-Democrat activities.

10. His Majesty's Acting Consul-General reports that, since the 6th June, the Armenian Emigration Committee has been issuing daily lists of fifty names of selected immigrants into Soviet Armenia. Those named must report to the committee with their identity papers and photographs. It is understood that they will be provided with Soviet passports and leave immediately.

Khorasan.

11. His Majesty's Consul-General reports that the Berberis, who have hitherto shown little interest in politics, are forming a society with a religious and political background with a view to securing the election of a Berberi to the next Majlis. They are said to have approached the Persian Prime Minister in this connexion. The Tudeh party has, hitherto, always accused them of being servants of the British, but Tudeh emissaries sent recently to the Akhlamad area are said to have been given a favourable reception.

Khuzistan.

12. The situation in Abadan and Agha Jari, though quiet on the surface, is extremely precarious. The Tudeh party are in complete control of labour at the refinery and are gaining ground in the fields. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's management exists only on sufferance. At any moment, for any reason, a strike could be called which would bring production to a standstill. Hitherto the Tudeh leaders have used their power to maintain order. Although inciting to violence in theory they have discouraged it in

practice. The Tudeh party have constituted themselves the *de facto* representatives of labour in Persia and the management is discussing with them, in that capacity, the organisation of the trade unions contemplated under the new Labour Law (referred to in paragraph 10 of Intelligence Summary No. 20). By doing so the company can maintain some sort of contact with the representatives of labour and production in the fields, but few will believe that such a course of action will result in anything more than a short respite. In their present mood of subservience to the Tudeh it is extremely unlikely that the Persian Government will issue adequate instructions to their local officials to maintain order or that they will back them up if they act on their own.

Appointments.

13. Reza Hikmat, Sardar Fakhir (F.O. 86; M.A. 112), to be Governor-General of the 8th Ustan (Kerman).

The Court.

14. On the 3rd June the Chinese Ambassador presented to His Imperial Majesty the Shah, on behalf of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the order of the "Blessed Cloud," described in the Persian press as "the highest Chinese decoration."

The Persian Army.

15. Ever since the abdication of Reza Shah, the Persian army has had a bad press. Attacks have been made on its venality, inefficiency, low morale, high cost, maladministration, and the political tendencies of its officers. These attacks have grown more violent of late and have reached such a pitch that, in the opinion of the Minister of War, discipline has been completely undermined. Till recently the Persian Prime Minister and his Cabinet have been deaf to General Ahmedi's appeals to stop this campaign of slander. Last week, as the result of further representations by him, Qawam-us-Saltaneh issued the following official communiqué:—

"For some time it has been observed that certain undesirable statements about the current affairs of the army have appeared in certain newspapers, statements which I deplore. On repeated occasions I have warned the majority of newspaper owners that the pursuance of such a policy is bound not only to shake the morale of the army and discourage both officers and men, but to constitute a danger to the country whose peace and welfare depends upon the maintenance of discipline in the army and the preservation of the honour and prestige of the army's faithful and patriotic officers, and that such a policy will lead to highly undesirable and disastrous results. As I am paying special attention to the army and am taking a keen interest in reforms, and as I consider it necessary to encourage and promote loyal and patriotic officers, I am not prepared to tolerate the slightest insult to the army in the press.

"It is obvious that I shall not deprive journalists of their legitimate right to criticise and raise questions should mistakes occur in army affairs which justify criticism. I shall, however, carefully examine the contents of newspapers and by putting a stop to insults and slander I hope, and intend, to see that the prestige of the army is completely preserved. I am certain that with the reforms which I propose to put through the friendship and popularity of the army with the people of the nation will daily increase, and that officers and men will be encouraged to render ever-increasing services to the country." (Signed) QAWAM-US-SALTANEH.

Public Health.

16. In the course of an interview with the press, the Minister of Health stated that out of 1,300 doctors and health officers in Persia 600 resided in Tehran. On these figures it would appear that the ratio of doctors to population in the capital is 1-1,000 and for the rest of the country 1-20,000.

Italian Interests.

17. The new Italian Minister and his staff are reported in the Persian press as having arrived in Tehran on the 1st June. No reliable particulars as to the names of the Minister or of his staff have been published. A delay in the presentation of his letters of credence may occur as the result of the recent change of régime in Italy.

Chilean Interests.

18. According to a press report M. Manuel Paton Vaquerre has arrived in Tehran as Chilean Minister. His country has not hitherto been represented in Persia.

Postscript.

The following additional information regarding Kurdistan was given to the British Military Attaché by the Minister for War on the 10th June:—

- (i) The three Kurdish representatives on the tripartite commission have returned to their homes as the Kurdish insurgents refuse to recognise them.
- (ii) There seem to be two bodies each of which claims to represent the Kurds, *i.e.*, Ghazi Muhammad of Mahabad, styling himself "The Independent Government of Kurdistan," and Hama Rashid, who calls himself "Major-General commanding the Kurdish Forces."
- (iii) The latter has sent a letter couched in threatening terms to General Razmara, in which he demands the evacuation of Sardasht, Saqqiz and Baneh by the Persian army on the grounds that these places form part of an autonomous Kurdistan.

[E 5998/315/34]

(12)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 23, Secret, for the Period the 10th June to 16th June, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 201 of 18th June; Received 28th June.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE commission referred to in paragraph 2 of Intelligence Summary No. 21 finally left for Tabriz on the 11th June. It was headed by Muzaffar Firuz. A military delegation composed of General Abdullah Hidayet, Under-Secretary in the Ministry for War, and Colonel Alawi accompanied it. These two officers were nominated by Muzaffar Firuz as being "reliable." The Minister for War attempted to include General Kupal as his nominee, but was overruled. The selection of Muzaffar Firuz, as devoid of discretion as he is of principles, lends colour to the view that the despatch of the commission was merely a gesture, the terms of settlement having been arrived at beforehand in Tehran, doubtless with the disinterested help of the Soviet Ambassador. The commission returned to Tehran on the 15th June, where a great ovation was arranged to celebrate the settlement of the Azerbaijan question. Subsequently a Government communiqué was issued, of which a full translation will follow in next week's Intelligence Summary. The decision to incorporate regularly enlisted men of the Azerbaijan army into the Persian army is to be implemented by a joint commission which is to assemble later. The "Fidais" (Democrat volunteers) are to become the Azerbaijan gendarmerie, the strength and organisation of which are likewise to be settled by a subsequent commission. These two clauses, alone, show the unsatisfactory nature of the agreement. They are the vital issues and will determine whether the Persian Government's writ, backed up by forces under their control, is to run in Azerbaijan or not. The failure to settle these points, and the general air of haste which characterises the agreement, clearly prove that all Qawam intended was, firstly, to show U.N.O. that no Azerbaijan problem now remains, and, secondly, to claim that, as the Azerbaijan question has been settled, there was now no bar to the immediate start of the next elections.

2. His Majesty's Ambassador recently called on the Persian Prime Minister to discuss the situation created in the south by the recent strikes and by Tudeh activities. The only other person present at the meeting was the Oriental Counsellor, who acted as interpreter. On the 15th June the Russian paper *Pravda* came out with a grossly distorted version of this interview, at which His Majesty's Ambassador was accused of trying to intimidate Qawam-us-Saltaneh, of expressing disapproval of Qawam's rapprochement with the Tudeh, of declaring that if the Persian Government did not take the necessary measures in the south, a situation would arise which would cause the Persian Government to repent, of threatening Qawam that if the next Majlis elections took a turn unfavourable

to British interests, or if Tudeh candidates were elected, His Majesty's Ambassador would insist on Qawam's renewing the appeal to U.N.O. and asking that body to supervise the elections. It is thought that Muwarrikh-ud-Dowleh, to whom Qawam may have given the substance of the interview, passed on a distorted version to the Soviet Ambassador, for whom he acts as a political jackal. This embassy has for long regarded him as an unreliable go-between, and Husein Ala, when Minister of Court, was so disgusted with his activities that he actually forbade him access to His Imperial Majesty the Shah.

3. At 12 noon on the 15th June an aeroplane, reliably reported as a Russian machine, flew low over Tehran dropping leaflets. The three picked up in the grounds of His Majesty's Embassy read as follows:—

- (i) "Henceforward all freedom lovers will progress in unity towards the happiness and prosperity of Persia."
- (ii) "Long live the unbreakable front of the freedom lovers of Persia."
- (iii) "Azerbaijan is an indivisible part of Persia, and the good news of the settling of the Azerbaijan question delivers a final blow to the body of reaction."

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

4. A list of Soviet officials in Azerbaijan, which has been compiled by His Majesty's Acting Consul-General, shows some interesting figures. They are as follows:—

(1) Tabriz.

Soviet Consulate-General:—

Consul-general	1
Vice-consuls	2
First secretary	1
Third secretary	1
Soviet trade delegation	3
Russo-Iranian Bank	2
Intourist	2
Soviet Insurance Agency	1
Iransovneft (Soviet Oil Company)	2
V.O.K.S. (Irano-Soviet Cultural Society)	4
Iransovtrans (Soviet Transport Agency)	1
Soviet Hospital	2
Railway administration (para-military)	2
Soviet School	1
Tass Agency	2
Soviet Bookshop	1
Total	28

(2) Provincial Officials.

Ardebil—

Vice-consul	1
Political officer and trade agent	1

Maku—

Secretary i/c vice-consulate	1
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Rozaiyeh—

Vice-consul	1
Secretary and political officer	1

Shahpur—

Trade agent	1
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Total	6
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- (3) Branches of V.O.K.S. also exist at Marand, Rozaiyeh, Ushnu, Mahabad, Ardebil, Maragheh, and almost certainly at Khoi and in the other towns of the province to which access is not at present possible owing to the ban on travelling by foreigners which has been imposed by the Democrat authorities.

Kurdistan.

5. In paragraph 6 of last Intelligence Summary reference was made to an almost certainly exaggerated report of the entry into Persia of three to four thousand Suleiman Jaf horsemen. A later report from official sources in Bagdad places the number as under fifty.

6. Muhammad Haidari, son of Mahmud Khan Dizli, according to a report received through His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kermanshah, has joined the Komala and is in revolt against the Persian Government near Merivan.

7. According to the Minister for War, General Razmara is anxious not only at the increasing numbers of the Kurdish rebels facing him, but also at the universal nature of the movement which is proved by the varied assortment of the contingents comprising the Kurdish army. Tribes from Iraq, from practically all Persian Kurdistan, and even Jalalis from near Mount Ararat, have all been identified.

Khuzistan.

8. While there is little news from the oil fields or the actual refinery area, where an uneasy calm prevails, increased Tudeh activity in Abadan and Khorramshahr is reported. In Abadan the Tudeh recently threatened the tailors with forcible closure of their shops unless they became members of the party. In Khorramshahr the Tudeh summon private individuals to their headquarters and inflict fines on them for failing to obey orders. Their men, distinguished by arm bands, superintend the traffic of boats plying for hire and generally usurp the functions of the police.

Appointments.

9. (i) Abbas Iskandari to be Civil Governor of Tehran *vice* Isa Surush.
- (ii) Afrasiab Nawa to be second secretary at the Persian Embassy in Kabul.
- (iii) Muhammad Salahi to be attaché at the Persian Legation in Belgrade.
- (iv) Muhammad Buda to be second secretary at the Persian Consulate at Khaniqin.
- (v) Habibullah Nasiri to be third secretary at the Persian Consulate at Mosul.

Finance.

10. The Cabinet have approved a two-twelfths budget Bill to meet current expenditure for the months of Khurdad and Tir (the 20th May–20th July).

11. The Government have charged a special commission with the preparation of a general budget for the year 1325 (the 21st March, 1946–20th March, 1947) so that it may be ready for presentation to the Fifteenth Majlis when it is convened.

Persian Army.

12. One battalion from the Second (Tehran) Division has been despatched to reinforce the Fourth (Kurdistan) Division.

Health.

13. Doctors Qasim Ghani, Seyyid Ahmad Imami and Muhammad Husein Hafizi have been chosen to represent Persia at the International Health Conference due to open in New York on the 19th June. These three are all in America at present. Dr. Avery, adviser to the Ministry of Health, has been appointed technical adviser to the delegation.

Communications.

14. The Council of Ministers have sanctioned a sum of 2 million rials for the asphaltting of the roads Tehran–Qum and Tehran–Qazvin.

15. Some railway technicians accompanied the delegation to Azerbaijan (see paragraph 1 above). They are to take over from the Russians the railway line from Tabriz–Julfa.

16. The town of Khorramshahr is not yet out of danger from the flooding of the Shatt-el-Arab and Karun Rivers. Malaria is rife, and there is fear of an outbreak of typhus.

CHAPTER V.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON

[E 2498/2/89]

No. 12

Mr. Bevin to M. Massigli (French Embassy).

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, 2nd April, 1946.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have considered the plans, drawn up recently in Paris by French and British military representatives, for the withdrawal of French and British troops from the Levant States. Copies of these documents are enclosed as Appendix A and Appendix B to this note. Appendix A represents the agreed plan for the evacuation of Syria as was signed by both the French and British delegations. No agreed plan was drawn up for the evacuation of the Lebanon, but Appendix B herein contains a joint plan for the first phase of this evacuation, together with separate French and British plans for subsequent withdrawals.

2. His Majesty's Government have now approved the plan of evacuation for Syria, as set out in Appendix A, together with the plan for the evacuation of the Lebanon, as set out in paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of Appendix B.

3. It will be observed, however, from paragraph 4 (c) of Appendix B that the French delegation put forward certain requests in the course of these discussions. His Majesty's Government have considered these requests, and they would be prepared to agree that a British Naval Liaison Officer should remain until the 30th September, 1946, to assist in the operation of embarkation in the port of Beirut, in collaboration with the French authorities; His Majesty's Government consider that it would be appropriate for an official request to this effect to be received from the Lebanese Government, and they will be glad if this can be arranged. As regards the suggestion that a transit camp should be provided in the canal area for 1,000 French troops *en route* to Indo-China or Madagascar, it is regretted that the British authorities, so far as they are concerned, are not in a position to provide such facilities.

I have, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

Appendix A.

Subject: *Evacuation of Syria.**Plan agreed by the Anglo-French Military Delegation.*

1. The total evacuation of Syria by British and French military personnel will take place as soon as possible and will be completed by the 30th April, 1946. This evacuation will be carried out *pari passu* and completed at the same time by British and French troops.

2.—(a) The official date for the commencement of the evacuation of Syria shall be the 11th March, 1946.

(b) Orders to this effect will be issued to the respective British and French commanders in the Levant so as to reach them not later than the 5th March, 1946.

(c) It is agreed that instructions as under to this effect should be sent to the respective commanders:—

(i) Evacuation to begin on the 11th March, 1946, with the areas Deir Es Zor, Raqqa and Palmyra and to be completed by the 18th March, 1946.

(ii) Subsequent evacuation to take place in the following order:—areas Aleppo, Lattakia, Tartous, and Damascus including Mezze. Dates to be agreed by local commanders, but total evacuation to be effected by the 30th April, 1946.

3.—(a) Military personnel to be evacuated will include political officers, instructors, liaison officers and officers of training teams and missions.

(b) British officers of Mira may remain in Syria until the 31st May, 1946, but after the 30th April must wear civilian clothes.

(c) British administrative staff necessary for the final liquidation of British property, stores, &c., will reside in the Lebanon after the 30th April, 1946, but will be permitted to enter Syria on duty in civilian clothes. Administrative officers include those officers of headquarters staff, engineers, signals, hirings, claims and disposals, whose duty will necessitate their entry into Syria.

4.—(a) Detachments of British units, *e.g.*, engineers and signals, in Syria, may rejoin their parent units in the Lebanon.

(b) Certain British transport units required to assist in the evacuation may move into the Lebanon.

(c) British units being evacuated from Syria may pass through and if necessary stage in the Lebanon *en route*.

NOTE.—The strength of British military personnel in the Lebanon shall at no time exceed the strength of French military personnel stationed in that area. French troops withdrawn from Syria into the Lebanon will not be included in the French total.

5. The French and British authorities will render all mutual assistance to each other during the evacuation, and the British will assist the French by the provision of transport and the safeguarding of French lives and property at each place until it is evacuated.

*Général de Corps d'Armée,
Chief of French Military Delegation.*

*Major-General,
Chief of British Military Delegation.*

Paris, 2nd March, 1946.

Appendix B.

Plan for the Evacuation of the Lebanon proposed by the British and French Military Delegations.

1. *Joint Plan for First Phase.*

(a) The French authorities will evacuate approximately 1,000 men, consisting of two battalions of Senegalese of 3 Independent Brigade of the Levant, by the 31st March, 1946.

(b) At the same time the British authorities will evacuate not less than 1,000 men consisting of one Armoured Car Regiment stationed at Tripoli, and certain administrative units from Beirut, Tripoli and the Bekka.

The British and French Military Delegations agree that orders be sent out to implement the above forthwith.

*Général de Corps d'Armée,
Chief of French Military Delegation.*

*Major-General,
Chief of British Military Delegation.*

2. *French Plan for Subsequent Withdrawal. (See Appendix "B.")*

(a) *Second Phase to be completed by 1st September, 1946.*

(i) The French authorities will transfer to Tripoli all the troops from Rayak.

(ii) The headquarters of the French troops as well as the majority of the troops themselves from Beirut will be transferred to Tripoli.

(iii) Only those personnel required for the completion of the evacuation of material and for administrative purposes and sufficient combatant troops to ensure the security of French personnel will remain in Beirut.

(iv) The French forces will be reduced by the demobilisation or evacuation of Avenantaires as decided by the local French commander.

(b) *Third Phase to be completed by 1st April, 1947.*

- (i) Liquidation of French military installations at Beirut and the total evacuation of this area.
- (ii) Demobilisation or evacuation of the remaining Avenantaires to be completed by the 31st December, 1946.
- (iii) Progressive reduction of French troops as ordered by the local French commander.
- (iv) Final evacuation of Tripoli by French troops by the 1st April, 1947.

(e) The above dates are provisional, except for that of the 1st April, 1947, which is definitely fixed. The French commander will make every possible effort to advance these dates, but may be forced to delay them slightly for technical or other reasons which cannot at the moment be foreseen.

.....
Général de Corps d'Armée,
Chief of French Military Delegation.

3. *British Plan for Subsequent Withdrawal.*

- (a) Subject to minor alterations and to agreement by the local commander, British evacuation will take place in the five phases as shown in Appendix "A."
- (b) The final date for British evacuation, except for a small liquidation staff, will be the 30th June, 1946.
- (c) Control of the Port of Beirut will be retained by the British naval authorities until final evacuation by British troops (30th June, 1946).
- (d) Control of the aerodrome of Beirut will be retained by R.A.F. until final evacuation by British troops (30th June, 1946).

.....
Major-General,
Chief of British Military Delegation.

4. *Mutual Aid during Evacuation.*

(a) The French and British authorities will lend each other every assistance to facilitate the operation of evacuation. The British Delegation points out that such assistance will necessarily be limited after the 30th June, 1946, and that the supply of rations, fuel, engineer and ordnance stores by the British will cease as from the 31st May, 1946.

(b) The British and French Delegations agree that—

- (i) Additional shipping facilities will be provided by the British.
- (ii) Kleate Airfield, Tripoli, will be placed at the disposal of the French command.
- (iii) The British and French commanders in the Levant will agree to the mutual removal of any officer whose attitude or activities might be of a nature to compromise the smooth working of the operation.

(c) The British Delegation takes note of the following requests by the French Delegation:—

- (i) That a British naval liaison officer should remain until the 30th September, 1946, to assist in the operation of embarkation in the port of Beirut in collaboration with the French authorities.
- (ii) The provision of a transit camp in the canal area to accommodate and maintain 1,000 men and a certain quantity of material *en route* for either Indo-China or Madagascar.

5. The French and British plans contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 above will be submitted by the French and British Military Delegations to their respective Governments for approval.

.....
Général de Corps d'Armée,
Chief of French Military Delegation.

.....
Major-General,
Chief of British Military Delegation.

Paris, 5th March, 1946.

[E 3357/96/65]

No. 13

Mr. Young to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 15th April.)

(No. 61.)

Sir,

Beirut, 3rd April, 1946.

THE arrival in the Middle East of the Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry on Palestine, and particularly the recent visits of some of its members to the Levant States, has inevitably had the effect of intensifying public interest in the Palestine problem, and in the question of Zionism generally. The Nationalist press, especially in Syria, is devoting increasing space to polemics against Zionism, with the obvious object of stressing Arab solidarity in opposition to it, and has tended of late to utter more or less open warnings to Great Britain that she will forfeit Arab friendship if she fails to adopt a policy at least as favourable to the Arabs, and therefore unfavourable to the Zionists, as that enunciated in the 1939 White Paper; and an alleged statement by the Maronite Archbishop of Beirut, as recently reported in the *Palestine Post*, to the effect that his community welcome the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, was severely attacked in all the Nationalist papers, which maintained that his views were not shared even by the majority of Maronites.

2. The intention of both Governments to resist and oppose Zionist infiltration either into Palestine or into their territories is manifest. Jews resident in Palestine are now finding increasing difficulty in obtaining visas to visit either Syria or the Lebanon, and the Syrian Prime Minister has categorically refused to envisage the grant of travel visas to Syria to enable Jews from Europe to go through Syria *en route* for Palestine, even though in possession of immigration certificates. The boycott of "Zionist" trade decided upon by the Arab League is being applied by both Syrian and Lebanese Governments with more thoroughness than was anticipated, and a number of proposed imports of goods from Palestine have already been stopped. It may be, however, that this policy will gradually be attenuated as its effect on the internal economies of the two countries becomes clearer; large purchases of Palestine goods before the date on which the boycott became effective are still on the market, and certain organs of the Lebanese press are already expressing apprehension as to the effects of the boycott on Lebanese interests. One example cited is the refusal of the Tel Aviv Ski Club to visit the Lebanon for winter sports, from which it is argued that the tourist industry, to which the Lebanon attaches great importance, will be gravely prejudiced without corresponding benefit for Lebanese interests. It is, however, noticeable that these criticisms are made chiefly in French-controlled organs.

3. Alleged attempts by Zionist organisations to acquire lands in the Levant States, especially in Southern Lebanon, by the intermediary of Lebanese *prête-noms* have frequently formed the subject of polemics in the Lebanese press, but no actual instances have been brought to the notice of the legation. The Syrian Government's determination to avoid any such colonisation of its territory is illustrated by the difficulties which have been placed in the way of the Palestine Jewish Colonisation Association in obtaining visas for its representatives and in the unfavourable judgments so far given in its various land cases.

4. There remains the question of the resident Jewish colonies in the Levant States. The Damascus newspaper *Alef-Ba* on the 14th March published a strong leading article reporting a declaration alleged to have been made by a certain Abadi, described as the representative of Arabian Jews, before the committee of enquiry, in which he is said to have expressed the sympathy of the Arabian Jews with Zionist aspirations. The article states that this declaration has finally given the lie to the professions of anti-Zionism previously made by the Jewish colonies in Arab countries, and concludes that the political dispute is now shown to be one between Arabs and Jews, and not between Arabs and Zionists.

5. This article has not yet been followed by any campaign against the local Jewish community; but it seems worth considering whether any action against this community is likely to take place in the event of any developments of such a nature as to arouse the ire of the Arabs occurring in connexion with the Palestine situation.

6. The Jewish colony in the Lebanon is believed to amount to only about 6,000, nearly all concentrated in Beirut; that in Syria to about 25,000, mostly in Aleppo and Damascus. A few hold posts in the Administration, but the majority are merchants, commission agents, bankers, &c. The majority are Sephardic or Samaritan, as for many years there has been little immigration from Europe. Within living memory there has been no particular friction

between them and their Arab neighbours, as they have always endeavoured to live quietly and peaceably, and have been at pains to avoid any open support of Zionism; few have immigrated into Palestine. It was noteworthy that amongst the groups produced by the Syrian Government to present testimony to the members of the Palestine Committee who visited Damascus was one stated to represent the Damascus Jews, who are understood to have made declarations opposing Zionism. It is believed that the majority of these Jews are, in fact, in favour of the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, but are careful to conceal the fact, since they fear victimisation in times of stress. At the time of the disturbances in Syria in May 1945 a number of the Damascus Jews migrated to the Lebanon, and many others sent their children clandestinely to Palestine, obviously fearing that they would suffer in the same way as did their co-religionists in Bagdad after the collapse of the 1941 revolt there.

7. Neither the Syrian nor Lebanese Governments have yet issued any specific anti-Semitic legislation; the laws promulgated by the Vichy régime in 1940-41 were repealed by the Free French Administration when it took over and have not been reintroduced. So far the chief evidence of discrimination against the local Jewish community has been in connexion with the granting of exit permits from Syria for purposes of travel; a number of instances of refusal to grant these, without adequate reason, have been brought to the notice of His Majesty's Consul, Damascus, but the Syrian authorities have always maintained that these refusals were not the result of any definite policy.

8. So far, in fact, there are no indications that pogroms are to be apprehended in either of the Levant States. In the Lebanon, the general easy-going tolerance of the population and the diversity of the communities which compose the population must always militate against any such possibility. In Syria, however, it cannot be ruled out, especially if the deterioration in internal security which many competent observers believe will follow the evacuation of Allied troops were to coincide with an outburst of anti-Semitic feeling amongst the Arabs, such as apparently occurred in Tripolitania last November.

I have, &c.

(For the Chargé d'Affaires),
M. J. R. TALBOT.

[E 4144/2/89]

No. 14

Sir A. Cadogan to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 7th May.)

(No. 4.)

HIS Majesty's representative to United Nations at New York presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him, with reference to New York telegram No. 223, a copy of a letter to his Excellency Dr. Hafez Afifi Pasha from Sir A. Cadogan of the 1st May, 1946, concerning the Levant States.

*British Delegation to the United Nations,
New York, 1st May, 1946.*

Enclosure in No. 14

Sir A. Cadogan to his Excellency Dr. Hafez Afifi Pasha.

*United Kingdom Delegation
to the United Nations,
New York, 1st May, 1946.*

Your Excellency,

ON instructions from my Government I have the honour to request you to bring the following to the attention of the Security Council.

2. On the 16th February, at the close of the Security Council's discussion regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Levant States, a vote was taken on the following resolution which was presented by the United States representative: "The Security Council, taking note of statements made by the four parties and by other members of the Council, expresses its confidence that foreign troops in Syria and Lebanon will be withdrawn as soon as practicable and that negotiations to that end will be undertaken by the parties without delay; and requests the parties to inform it of the results of the negotiations."

3. Although the Council's vote in favour of this resolution had no legal validity the United Kingdom representative undertook to give effect to the majority decision of the Council as expressed in it. Accordingly His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, at the invitation of the French Government who had likewise agreed to act in accordance with the majority opinion of the Council, sent a military delegation to Paris to agree on the necessary arrangements.

4. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom now have the honour to inform the members of the Security Council that the following arrangements were then made for the withdrawal of British troops:—

- (1) All British troops to be withdrawn from Syria by the 30th April. The withdrawal was actually carried out in advance of this date and was completed by the 15th April.
- (2) The first thousand British troops to be withdrawn from the Lebanon with a similar number of French troops by the 31st March. This movement was carried out by the date mentioned.
- (3) The remainder of British troops, except for a small liquidation party, to be withdrawn from the Lebanon by the 30th June.
- (4) This plan was duly communicated to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, who have suggested no modifications.

I have, &c.

A. CADOGAN.

[E 4285/2/89]

No. 15

Mr. Shone to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 10th May.)

(No. 1.)

Sir,

Damascus, 2nd May, 1946.

I HAVE the honour to report that the final stage of the evacuation of Syria by British and French forces was completed on the 15th April when the British Commander of 85 Sub-Area, his staff and the officer commanding French troops at Mezzé aerodrome crossed the frontier into the Lebanon. The area commander and his personal staff left the Orient Palace Hotel after a short ceremony when the Syrian army mounted a guard of honour of about a hundred men. No members of the Government or Syrian officials, with the exception of army officers, were present, but a small crowd of about 400 people assembled. The band played the British and Syrian National Anthems and the area commander inspected the guard before leaving.

2. This small farewell ceremony was the climax to a week of almost uninterrupted hospitality and manifestations of cordiality on the part of the Syrians towards the British army. The Syrian Government supported the desire of the Municipality of Damascus to give the freedom of the city to the Commander-in-chief, M.E.F. and the General Officer Commanding British Troops, North Levant, and to present them at a public ceremony with ancient Damascus jewelled swords. It was only after repeated approaches had been made to the Prime Minister to explain that such action would embarrass His Majesty's Government in their relations with the French that this programme was modified. The Syrian army, on the 8th April, gave a party in the Syrian Officers' Club for their British "comrades." Two days later the General Officer Commanding British Troops, North Levant, myself and members of my staff were the guests of the Prime Minister at a small and entirely picnic luncheon given near Damascus. The general officer commanding was the guest of honour at a party given in the Municipal Gardens by the Mohafez who, in a speech, referred to the high standard of honour, tact and consideration which had been shown by the British forces in the course of their stay in Syria and announced that one of the principal streets of Damascus would be named "Great Britain Street" in recognition of the part played by Great Britain in the achievement by Syria of her aspirations. General Paget and his Chief of Staff visited Damascus on the 22nd April to take leave of the President of the Republic, lunched at the Presidency with members of the Government and was personally thanked by the President for all that the British troops had done during their stay in the country. The proceedings were, at our request, informal.

3. On the 17th and 18th April the Syrian Government officially celebrated the evacuation of foreign troops from Syrian territory. Invitations were issued to the Arab League and to the Governments of member States to participate in the celebrations at Damascus. All the countries concerned accepted and, with the exception of the Yemen, sent military contingents; Egypt and Iraq added units of their air force. The following was the composition of the Arab delegations:—

Saudi Arabia.—Emir Feisal, Emir Mansour, Sheikh Ibrahim el Suleiman, Sheikh Abd el Raouf el Sabban, Sheikh Abdullah el Shibibi, Sheikh Saleh Shatta, Sheikh Mohamed el Hazzaz, Sheikh Suleiman el Bassam, Sheikh Yussef Yassin.

Transjordan.—Musallem el Attar (Minister of Interior and Justice), Omar Bey Mattar, Colonel Abd el Qader el Jundi (Deputy), Sabri Pasha el Tabbas (Deputy), Awad Issa.

Iraq.—Nejib Bey el Rawi (Minister of Education), Dr. Fadel Jamali (Director-General for Foreign Affairs), and Munir Qadi (Chief Secretary to Ministerial Council).

Lebanon.—Nicola Bustrous (special emissary of the Lebanese President), Sami el Solh (Prime Minister), Hamid Frangieh (Foreign Minister), Ahmad el Assad (Minister for National Defence), Fuad Ammun (Director of the Foreign Office), Abd el Hamid Karami, Riad el Solh and Ibrahim Haidar.

Egypt.—Abdel Latif Talaat Pasha (special emissary of His Majesty King Farouk), Abd el Aziz Bey Badr, Mohamed Hilmi Bey, Abd el Rahman Haqqi Bey (Egyptian Minister).

Arab League.—Abd el Rahman Azzam Pasha (General Secretary), together with some under-secretaries.

Yemen.—Sayyid Ali el Muayyid (Director of Education) and Qadi Muhamed el Umari. The Yemen delegates failed to arrive in time for the official celebrations, having been delayed by inability to secure air transport.

No member of the Hashemite family attended. Although the official celebrations were scheduled to take only two days, the 15th and 16th April were devoted to the reception of the Arab delegates and the days immediately following to receptions given by the heads of the various delegations; the proceedings therefore occupied the whole of the week before Easter.

4. The official programme began with a march past of the Syrian armed forces and the Arab contingents on the morning of the 17th April in the presence of the President of the Republic, members of the Government, the visiting delegates, the Diplomatic Corps and many Syrian notables. This was followed by a visit by the President of the Republic, Syrian notables and the principal Arab delegates to Mezzé where two former French forts were named after Yusef el Azmei who lost his life at the battle of Meissaloun, and Soltan Pasha el Atrash, the hero of the 1925 revolt. The Diplomatic Corps did not attend this function. The afternoon was marked by a speech at the Serail by the President of the Republic who later received members of the Government, the Arab delegates, the Diplomatic Corps, &c. The Prime Minister gave a dinner party at the Orient Palace Hotel on the same evening. The following morning was devoted to speeches in the university by the Arab delegates and by Syrian notables who, in the presence of the President of the Republic, acclaimed the withdrawal of foreign troops. I did not go to the university, as I had heard that *some of the speeches might be offensive*, especially to the French. Some in fact were. The President then gave a large *al fresco* luncheon to delegates, diplomatic and consular representatives and Syrian personalities at his country estate at Bala, near Damascus. In the course of the afternoon a very successful gymkhana was organised by the Syrian army at the Damascus Hippodrome to mark the conclusion of the official celebrations.

5. Throughout the celebrations special attention was obviously paid to the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian delegations who were undoubtedly a centre of popular attraction. Nevertheless the Iraqi delegates, whose consciences were somewhat uneasy when they recalled the doubtful reception accorded to the Syrian President when he visited Iraq early last year and who consequently anticipated a rather frigid welcome, were, on the whole, pleased with the attention which they received although the Iraqi military mission, who were the guests of the Syrian army at the Syrian Officers' Club, felt that they were somewhat cold-shouldered in favour of the Egyptian officers. In an interview given to

an Iraqi press delegation the Syrian President is reported to have said, "Everything possible will be done to strengthen relations with every Arab country and those nearest should come first," and the Prime Minister, "If any Arab country seeks friendship we accept it; if union or the abolition of provincial independence is sought we also accept. Wherever they" (the Arabs) "wish to choose the capital of this unity, we accept." The Transjordan delegation did not fare quite so well; this was partly due to the fact that the Transjordan representatives were, in comparison with the Egyptian and Iraqi delegates, rather minor personalities, some of whom, such as Musallem el Attar Pasha and Sabri Pasha Tabbas, had once been minor fry in Syria, the former when he was a Kaimakam in Douma and the latter as a small merchant. They complained, however, that the Syrian Government had arranged for the party on arrival not to pass through the Midan quarter of Damascus where a demonstration in their favour had been organised by anti-Government elements, but to be brought in to the city by another route. They had offered to bring an impressive contingent of the Arab Legion together with their pipe band but this had been declined by the Syrian authorities.

6. On the whole the stay of the Arab delegates in Damascus is likely to have improved the relations of the Syrian Government with the Arab countries though the Syrian President when speaking at the Serail, and some of the delegates in their speeches at the Syrian University, made statements which may have ruffled some of the Arab delegates. Shukri Bey Quwatli said that he was expressing the feeling of his hearers when he said that no flag save that of Arab unity would be permitted to fly over the Syrian flag. Nejib el Rawi, head of the Iraqi delegation, spoke of the struggle which during a quarter of a century had united Syria and Iraq and concluded, "Faisal's throne has brought us together and Meissaloun has united us." Akram Zuaiter, representing the Palestine Arabs, reminded his hearers that Palestine was the southern part of Syria, which, when Syria declared its dependence in 1920, was included in the Syrian State by the Constituent Assembly.

7. Friendly references to Great Britain were not lacking, and I and members of my staff were, on several occasions, cheered by the crowds. Not only the Syrian President and Prime Minister but many other Syrians expressed to me personally their gratitude for all Great Britain had done for Syria and their admiration of the British forces, whose relations with the Syrians had been so cordial. The Syrian President in his speech at the Serail, after referring to the hated mandate which was forcibly imposed on the country, the struggle against the mandatory Power during the ensuing years and the French conspiracy to undermine the country's independence, spoke of the support given by the Allied Powers to the Syrians, particularly Great Britain, the United States and the U.S.S.R. who had supported the Syrian claim from the first. Britain, he said, had declared that her troops had come to Syria through the necessities of war and had expressed her intention of withdrawing them; she had fulfilled her promise and had withdrawn her army which, during its stay in Syria, had proved to be a factor for peace and security. The head of the Transjordan delegation is reported in a Beirut newspaper to have stated that the British forces were remaining in Transjordan with the full consent of the Transjordan people; there were tribes which did not agree to their leaving the country; moreover, the world situation made it necessary that these British forces should remain.

8. On the other hand there was an unpleasant undertone in some of the delegates' speeches. Azzam Pasha congratulated Syria on its decisive victory over Western colonisation and said that the forces of colonisation would soon be withdrawn from the sister Arab States and asked for unity among the Arabs in foreign policy, national defence and in the struggle against the coloniser. The Egyptian delegate followed this up by saying that the coloniser should evacuate of his own free will, in which case the Arabs would bid him farewell with gratitude before they were obliged to expel him with dishonour. Azzam Pasha was overheard by a member of my staff in conversation with Nejib el Rawi asking whether Egypt could count on Iraq's support in their negotiations for the evacuation of the British forces from Egypt. Nejib el Rawi gave no direct reply but charged Azzam Pasha with representing Egyptian interests in the Arab League and neglecting his duties as Secretary-General. On the days succeeding the official ceremonies, receptions were given by the heads of the Arab delegations in which they vied with each other in the lavishness of their hospitality and the number of the guests invited, the Saudi Arabian delegation, after a somewhat unsuccessful tea party earlier in the proceedings, getting its

blow in last with a dinner for 600 at the Orient Palace Hotel. It was noticeable that in almost every conversation the subject of Palestine cropped up sooner or later; the Arab delegates left no doubt that they were gravely concerned at the possibility of a continuation of Jewish immigration into Palestine, and that such a course would meet with the utmost resistance from the Arab States.

9. The Arab delegates were invited by the Lebanese Government to visit Beirut as guests of the Government on the conclusion of their programme in Damascus; a number of official receptions were given in their honour. The Emirs Faisal and Mansour during their stay were the guests of the Lebanese President. The Emir Faisal is reported in the Beirut press to have said to the President of the Republic that full independence of the Lebanon within its present borders was one of the radical points in the policy of his father. In an interview with the press, when asked what was His Highness's opinion of the project of Greater Syria, the Emir is reported to have replied that any change or modification in the present status of Arab countries would necessarily mean an infringement of the Arab League Covenant. To a further question as to whether there was any truth in the current rumours concerning relations between the Saudi and Hashemite families he answered that they themselves did not feel any lack of harmony but what the Hashemites felt in the matter was their own affair. Concerning the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty, he said that the details of the treaty were still unknown to him but, at any rate, the Arab League Council would have the last word in the matter.

10. The celebrations in Damascus were well organised, the orderly behaviour and good humour of the crowds being maintained throughout. It was noticeable, however, that no part was taken in the festivities by the Druzes, the tribal Sheikhs, or the Alawites, and that the arrival of the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister to take the salute at the march past aroused no great enthusiasm. This may probably be ascribed to the Syrians' apathy towards those who have led them for three years.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Paris, Cairo, Bagdad and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

[E 5078/2/89]

No. 16

Mr. Shone to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 4th June.)

(No. 85.)

Sir,

Beirut, 24th May, 1946.

TWO months ago the signature of the Franco-Lebanese agreement regarding the evacuation of French troops from the Lebanon closed a chapter in the story of the evolution of the Levant States. Since then, the internal scene has changed radically in Syria, and is in process of changing in the Lebanon. The Allied troops have gone from the one, and are gradually disappearing from the other. Franco-Syrian incidents, which for the previous ten months had constantly threatened a breach of peace between the two countries (and had been an equally constant cause of concern to this legation and the British military authorities) are a thing of the past; and the Syrians, although still deeply hostile to the French, are already contemplating the establishment of diplomatic relations with them, the grant of permission to the French schools to reopen, and the restoration of trade with France. In the Lebanon, where relations with the French are almost normal, if still cold, the fears of the nationalists, and the hopes of the pro-French Christian minority, that the French would somehow stage a come-back, seem to be receding and are no longer in the forefront of people's minds. In both countries, in fact, the present time marks a turning point. The problem of a special position for France, which has preoccupied both the Levant States for so long, has virtually ceased to exist. In its place comes another, that of how the States are to manage when left entirely to themselves without foreign interference, control, or guidance.

2. Both Governments are faced with the formidable problems, economic, social and political, referred to in paragraph 12 of my despatch No. 72 of the 1st May, and both are handicapped (the Lebanon even more so than Syria) by the shortcomings of their civil services and their system of parliamentary government. But the reactions of the two Governments and the problems confronting them are radically different.

3. Syria recently achieved a ministerial reshuffle with the minimum of upheaval. She faces most of the financial, economic, and social problems (except that of food) which are described in more detail below in the case of the Lebanon, but in a less pronounced form. There is still much opposition to the rule of the National *bloc*, and much Monarchist feeling; the Jebel Druze might always secede to Transjordan, and the Alawite chieftains and tribal leaders are liable to give trouble at any moment. But the potential opposition is as yet quite unorganised and no leader capable of rallying it is in sight; and pro-Abdullah talk has tended to die down of late, partly because the Amir has been somewhat discredited, partly because the publication of the Anglo-American Committee's report on Palestine has united all factions in opposition to it. The *bloc* appears, in fact, more firmly in the saddle; and the present Ministers give the impression that they are alive to the difficulties and the deficiencies and desire to remedy them. Their anxiety to obtain British advice and technical help in the fields is clearly genuine, as in their often-expressed recognition that the present is a testing-time for the régime and that unless they can make a showing Syria will not deserve her independence. How far they will be able to translate these laudable sentiments into practice is a matter for speculation; the past record of the *bloc* politicians as administrators is not impressive, and it may well be that the difficulties they will have to contend with will be too great, and the amount of competent assistance they will be able to obtain too small, to enable them to maintain an adequate standard of administration. But they are trying; and Syria already possesses some degree of homogeneity and stability.

4. In the Lebanon the picture is more sombre. The difficulties are far greater than in Syria. There is more serious unemployment, unofficially estimated at some 25,000, caused chiefly by the discharge of the many thousand workers formerly employed by the Allied forces; the Lebanese Government have so far made no attempt to institute schemes for the relief or re-employment of these unemployed. Again, the activities of the Communist party, and of the industrial workers who appear to be falling more and more under their influence, are beginning to constitute a serious embarrassment. Since the events recorded in my despatch No. 34 of the 21st February, 1946, a strike of tramway workers was only settled by the Sami Solh Government by means of what is considered in many quarters to have been an unjustified surrender of the rights of the concessionary companies; and it is evident that the comparatively small, but now well-organised, industrial workers' syndicates have demonstrated their power to impose their demands on the present Government. Communist activities, such as demonstrations and mass meetings, continue to increase in size and frequency; and it is doubtful whether the new Government will prove any more capable than its predecessor of facing up to the party and the workers.

5. In the economic and financial fields the situation in the Lebanon appears most disquieting. There is, firstly, the cereals question. So long as imports of cereals from overseas are ruled out by the world shortage, the Lebanon must be dependent on Syria for some two-thirds of her essential supplies. The previous Lebanese Government attempted to reach an agreement with the Syrians under which the latter would guarantee these supplies; but, even if the present Government succeeded, neither they nor the population (whom past experience has shown to be extremely sensitive on the subject) are likely to view with other than apprehension a situation in which the Lebanon is dependent for bread on the doubtful good will of Syria. One of the largest sources of revenue in the past, the expenditure of the British and French armies, has already almost disappeared; another important source, remittances from emigrants, dried up during the war and seems unlikely to revive, partly because of currency restrictions abroad, but also largely because the ties between the emigrants and their country of origin have weakened; and the grossly inflated internal price level must prevent the exiguous Lebanese exports from competing in the world market. In other words, a considerable shrinkage of revenue must be anticipated.

6. In these circumstances, it was obviously the duty of the Government to adopt a policy of controlled economy and vigorous retrenchment; but, so far, exactly the opposite has, in fact, been done. Public expenditure, uncontrolled by any proper system of inspection, appears to be too largely subject to the whims, or private interests, of individual Ministers, and most of the Departments remain over-stuffed, with inefficient personnel, many of whom owe their appointments to political pressure. Above all, the control of the import trade appears to be most defective. It is freely alleged, with what truth I am unable to say, that the grant of import licences and of rare foreign currencies, such as dollars and Belgian francs, has been, and is being, made on no organised

plan and with little or no regard to the suitability of the importers or of the goods which they propose to import. The customs warehouses are so stuffed with merchandise that shipping agents are publishing notices disclaiming responsibility for the safety of goods arriving in Beirut port; one story has it that these goods include 7 million toothbrushes—for a population of 1 million which by no means universally uses these articles. It seems, in fact, clear that the Lebanon is at present using up its reserves at a rate which, if not checked, must inevitably lead it into financial straits in no distant future. The British Goodwill Mission, during their recent visit, lost no opportunity of preaching the necessity of a controlled economy in present-day conditions; but, although their remarks have been listened to with attention and understanding, it remains to be seen whether the present or any other Lebanese Government will be able to translate the lessons into terms of action.

7. Worst of all, no Lebanese politician has yet displayed the powers of statesmanship required to lead the people towards self-improvement. The Sami Solh Ministry, which had been increasingly shaky for some time, finally collapsed on the 18th May as an immediate consequence of the decision of the "Independence" party to withdraw their Ministers from it. Such a development had long been inevitable, the reshuffle made after the resignation of Joseph Salem on his return from Europe had pleased nobody, and a series of public attacks on the Administration for its incapacity, notably by Salem himself, by the Phalange and Najjadé parties, and by a consortium of notables including Alfred Naccache, had evoked such evident public approval that no Government could have survived them. The President was himself the target of much of the criticism, on justifiable grounds. Since Sami Solh first assumed office in August 1945, the President has concerned himself closely with the details of Administration, and can, therefore, be held largely responsible for the Government's failure to remedy any of its numerous defects; and it is widely believed that his immediate entourage, including his elder son and his brothers, have been engaging in some of the doubtful practices, such as interference in the course of justice and irregularities in the grant of import licences and foreign currency, which are most frequently invoked by malcontents with the régime. He has not enhanced his prestige by giving the appearance of regarding the internal situation with a facile optimism which was entirely unjustified.

8. The manoeuvres which followed the fall of the Sami Solh ministry were unedifying. The leaders who at present command most parliamentary support are Riad Solh and Henri Pharaon, who are at loggerheads, largely for personal reasons. The President clearly hankered after the former as Prime Minister, but Riad Solh realised that Pharaon's bitter opposition would prevent his obtaining a majority and declined; he, however, was equally able to prevent the selection of any of Pharaon's faction as Prime Minister. The President was, therefore, obliged to fall back on the colourless and ignorant Saadi Munla as a *pis aller*; and after three days of incessant discussion and bargaining, during which all the prominent figures, such as Hamid Frangieh, Camille Chamoun, and Habib Abi Chahla withdrew for one reason or another, Munla succeeded in forming an unimpressive Cabinet which can only expect to remain in power through the mutual rivalries of the various factions in the Chamber, and which contains few Ministers with any claim to competence in administration. The worst feature in this development was the apparent inability of any politicians to recognise the vital necessity of getting down to the task of Administration or to rise above the level of personal intrigue.

9. In connexion with this despatch, I venture to draw attention to my despatch No. 63 of the 19th April, 1945, in which I endeavoured to answer a difficult question put to me by your predecessor—namely, to what extent Syria and the Lebanon could be regarded as "viable States, reasonably mature and capable of maintaining a healthy national existence on their own." For the most part, the considerations put forward in that despatch are no less applicable to-day than they were when it was written; and it provides, I believe, an appropriate and fairly detailed background for the present despatch. I may perhaps restate here certain conclusions which I then drew regarding the ability of the two Levant States to stand on their own legs. "If Syria," I said, "can overcome the main obstacles with which she is confronted, namely, French political interference amongst her minorities, the absence of cohesion in her outlying provinces and the lack of capable administrators (in which I would include efficient civil servants), she ought, with reasonable luck, to make a good enough showing, in comparison with other Middle Eastern countries, provided she will accept and properly use the foreign advice and technical assistance which she will clearly need for some time to come, and provided that advice and

assistance is given in a truly co-operative spirit and without ulterior motives. It is to be expected that in the difficult post-war period help of this kind will be particularly necessary; and it seems clear, from what has been written above, that either a French or some other guarantee of Syrian and Lebanese currency will be essential. I doubt whether the above degree of assistance would suffice in the case of the Lebanon, which is so much less a nation even than Syria and where conditions seem such as to call, in great measure, for support and guidance from outside sources."

10. The position has, however, changed to some extent—and, I fear, deteriorated—since then. Any prospect there might have been that the Levant States would look primarily to France for the advice and assistance which it was clear that both needed, has vanished—it would seem for ever—in Syria and has faded in the Lebanon. The proposals for a settlement of outstanding questions between France and the States, which General Beynet brought back with him from Paris just over a year ago, and for the reception of which we had done our utmost to bring about a favourable atmosphere here, would probably have sufficed in themselves to produce the above effect, even if they had not been accompanied by cruisers and troops and followed so soon afterwards by the "surgical operation" which—despite General Beynet's admission that it could have no lasting effect—the French attempted in Syria. Twelve months have gone, without the States being provided with the advice and assistance they require, and the problems of the difficult post-war period are now pressing upon them. Further factors which have complicated the situation are the attitude of the Soviet Union in world affairs, and the spread of Communist activities and propaganda in the Middle East—not least in and from the Lebanon. The position to-day may perhaps be summed up as follows: Syria, although beset with great difficulties (not least, amongst them the adequate equipment and instruction of her security forces)—still gives some ground for hope that she may cope with them, especially if provided with the foreign technical advice and help which she needs and which her present rulers desire; but the Lebanon seems only too likely to slide gradually into a state of economic and political chaos which would make the country even more of a breeding ground for infection than it now is.

11. At the end of my despatch No. 63 of last year I expressed the opinion that amongst the Great Powers, the Levant States would prefer to look to Great Britain or to the United States for advice and assistance; but that Syria at least would hotly resent any attempt to force help upon her or to impose any form of trusteeship. I believe this is still in the main true; and it may be that the Lebanon would now resent any such impositions as much as Syria. If, too, His Majesty's Government and the United States Government were to adopt in regard to Palestine a policy antagonistic to the Arabs, this could not fail to affect the readiness of the Levant States' Governments and, particularly, of the Syrian Government to accept British or American advisers and technicians and the ability of the latter to carry out their work. Even as things are, there is in both States considerable feeling in nationalist circles where the need for foreign assistance is not realised or is brushed aside, against the engagement of foreign advisers and technicians; and in the Lebanon the Government often proclaim their desire to avoid giving preferential treatment to any one of the Great Powers. The Lebanese Government have so far done less than the Syrian in the way of enlisting foreign advisers and technicians. From the point of view of efficiency there would be obvious advantage in a team of competent and disinterested advisers and technicians from a single country; but I doubt whether this would now be acceptable to either of the Levant States, although perhaps a year or so ago the Syrians would have welcomed such a team from Great Britain, had we been willing and able to supply them. While, then, it is not impossible that the Syrians may be able to make do with such advice and assistance as they may be able to obtain from other countries, whether European, American or Arab (though the maintenance of order and security raises special consideration which I must deal with separately), I fear that conditions in the Lebanon may become such—if, indeed, they are not so already—that a mixed collection of advisers and technicians, chosen as and where the Lebanese Government may be able to find them, will not suffice to enable the Administration to grapple with the problems which confront them. The time may therefore come when the acceptance of a team of advisers, working under some unified direction, however distasteful to the Lebanese, will not only be justified but essential, if the Lebanon is not merely to be preserved—or, perhaps, one should rather say integrated—as a national State, but also to be prevented from becoming a public

nuisance. Such a team and such direction would presumably have to be international in character.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo, Paris, Washington and Bagdad, the High Commissioner for Palestine at Jerusalem, His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, and to His Majesty's Consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.
TERENCE SHONE.

[E 3037/213/89]

No. 17

(1)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 206, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 19th March, 1946.—(Received 4th April.)

General.

THE news that British forces would evacuate the Lebanon by the end of June, and that the French withdrawal would not be completed before March 1947, caused considerable concern during the past week throughout both countries. Pro-French elements and Communists took the opportunity to criticise the British decision, emphasising that only three months ago His Majesty's Government gave a clear undertaking not to leave before the French.

On the 14th March, on instructions from His Majesty's Government, notes on the evacuation of the Allied troops from the Levant States were handed to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. These notes stated that the British and French military negotiators in Paris had agreed on a plan for the simultaneous evacuation of Syria by the 30th April, and for the simultaneous withdrawal of approximately 1,000 French and 1,000 British troops from the Lebanon by the 31st March; and that the remainder of the British troops would be withdrawn from the Lebanon by the 30th June, and the remainder of the French troops by a date which would not be later than, and might be earlier than, the 1st April, 1947. The note went on to refer to the mention of "further negotiations by the parties" in the text of the Security Council resolution, to which both the French and British delegates had adhered, and stated that it was open to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments to propose such negotiations if they so desired when they had received and studied the detailed military plan of withdrawal, which would be communicated to them when it had been approved by His Majesty's Government. The latter would be very willing to participate in such negotiations at any time and place which might be acceptable to the other three Governments concerned.

The detailed British plan, as foreshadowed in this note, was duly delivered to the Lebanese President on the 19th March. It stated that, as regards the Lebanon, the French would evacuate two Senegalese battalions, and the British an equivalent number of British troops, before the 31st March; that the final date of British evacuation, except for a small liquidation staff, would be the 30th June; and that the control of Beirut port and aerodrome would be retained by the British naval authorities and the R.A.F. respectively until the final evacuation.

No definite news seems to have been received by the Lebanese Government during the week regarding the progress of the conversations between their delegation in Paris and the French Government. On the 14th March the Lebanese Government are understood to have sent a telegram to their delegation instructing them to return to Beirut if they did not obtain a satisfactory solution within three days. The only reply seems to have been a private telegram despatched from Paris on the 19th March which stated that the French Government were that day considering a proposal by which French metropolitan troops would be withdrawn from the Lebanon by the 30th June and French colonial troops by the 31st August, after the French installations had been liquidated. The Lebanese President indicated that he would consider this solution satisfactory, but no official confirmation of it has yet been received.

Three members of the Anglo-American Palestine Commission, Judge Hucheson, Dr. Macdonald (Americans) and Lord Morrison (British), visited Damascus and Beirut during the week. They were entertained by the President and the Government in each capital; His Majesty's Minister gave an informal dinner for them in Damascus. For further details see sections 3 and 11 below.

Economic.

The total purchases of grain for the period the 13th March to 19th March amount to 1,515 tons, a daily average of 216 tons, which brings the total for the 1946-47 crop up to 191,277 tons.

On the 15th March the French Délégation Générale addressed an official note to the Lebanese Government stating that the French Government, with the full approval of His Majesty's Government, had considered it essential to modify the terms of the Anglo-French Financial Agreement of the 25th January, 1944, under which persons resident in the Levant States had the right freely to purchase sterling. The note explained that the circumstances under which this privilege had been granted no longer existed, in view of the progressive reduction of Allied military expenditure, and that the French Government therefore desired to consult the States' Governments with a view to setting up a new régime which would take the fullest account of their legitimate interests. On the same day His Majesty's Legation presented notes to both the Lebanese and Syrian Governments, enclosing copies of the French note and confirming that His Majesty's Government concurred in its terms. The Lebanese Government promptly issued a communiqué stating that in future all applicants for the purchase of sterling must in the first place apply for permission to the competent Government department. Similar measures are also being applied in Damascus.

On the 16th March a Damascus newspaper announced that the Syrian Council of Ministers had approved a contract between the Ministry of Public Works and Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners for a survey of the natural resources of Syria.

A decree has been published in the Syrian *Official Gazette* appointing a committee under the presidency of the Minister of Finance, Hassan Bey Jabbara, for the purchase of surplus American army stores in Egypt for the Syrian army (see Damascus, paragraph 2 of Weekly Political Summary No. 205).

The Damascus press on the 15th March quoted an Associated Press message from Georgia that Syria and the Lebanon have been accepted as members of the International Bank.

The withdrawal of troops from Syria and the impending withdrawal from the Lebanon is resulting in increasing unemployment, and reports have already been received of growing concern at the effect the withdrawal will have on economic conditions in the country, where something is already known of the hardships following the curtailment of military commitments.

Damascus.

The Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry on Palestine arrived in Damascus on the 16th March, and left for Beirut on the 18th March. The Syrian Government presented a written memorandum setting out the Arab case in reasoned and moderate terms, though the memorandum was prefaced by a paragraph disclaiming the right of the commission to decide upon the future of Palestine. Petitions were presented and statements made by Hashem El Atassi (ex-President of Syria), the Ulema, the Greek Orthodox Bishop of Homs (representing the Churches), Dr. Linyado and Daud Totah (representing Damascus Jews), the National Women's Union, a number of political parties, clubs, merchants' associations, the Syrian University, the Arab Academy, the Lawyers' Society and the press. During the session of the committee an orderly procession of some 2,000 students demonstrated in favour of the Arab case. The general tendency of the press, while not hostile to the committee, was to suggest that no good can be expected from its work, since there have been numberless committees and reports on Palestine during the last twenty-five years, that in every case the conclusions have been favourable to the Arabs, but Zionist pressure has always led to a progressive deviation in favour of Zionist objectives.

French and British troops withdrawn from Palmyra stayed at Mezzé on the 11th March and resumed their movement on the 12th March, when some eighty Senegalese troops due for demobilisation evacuated Mezzé with them. Some forty French air force technicians have been drafted into Mezzé in connexion with the evacuation of material, the speed of which has recently been accelerated from about thirty truckloads a week to eighty per day.

M. Xavier le Jeune de Schiervel, the Belgian expert engaged by the Syrian Government to advise on administrative reforms, arrived in Damascus on the 15th March.

Beshir Sa'adawi, described by a Damascus newspaper as one of King Ibn Saud's advisers, arrived in Damascus on the 15th March. According to the press he visited the President and Prime Minister, and declared to a correspondent that King Abdul Aziz felt strong ties of friendship with Syria, and

particularly with the President; he has been sent on a semi-official visit of courtesy and to follow the proceedings of the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine.

The Prime Minister stated at a press conference on the 12th March that Jamil Mardam would represent Syria at the next meeting of the Arab League, and that if the Prime Ministers of member States attended he himself would do so.

Jebel Druze.

There was a violent demonstration at Soueida on the 14th March, ostensibly as a protest against an attack made at Damascus on Aref Bek el Nakadi, a Lebanese Druze by origin, the seriousness of which was grossly exaggerated in a Damascus newspaper. There was considerable firing into the air, a number of bombs were thrown near the Sérail, and a group of rioters forced their way into the residence of the Mohafez and tore down the Syrian flag, which was subsequently stamped upon by the crowd. Neither the troops nor the gendarmerie intervened and the situation began to look ugly, but the Mohafez addressed the crowd and succeeded in restoring quiet, and on his orders the flag was replaced. The origin of the disturbance is obscure; the Mohafez attributes it to the Communists, seven of whom have since been arrested, but one report suggests that the Mohafez himself originally connived at the demonstration, though he probably did not expect it to be so violent.

Lebanon.

The Nationalist press has continued to stress the necessity for a simultaneous Anglo-French evacuation of the Lebanon. Public opinion has been somewhat disturbed by the realisation that British troops will in any case leave the Lebanon by the 30th June, but optimism that the French will leave at least soon after that date is growing, partly as a result of encouraging press reports from a Lebanese correspondent in Paris.

The Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry on Palestine arrived in Beirut from Damascus on the 18th March, and is due to leave for Palestine on the 20th March. The Lebanese President spoke in person, and the Government presented a memorandum supporting the Arab case. Written evidence was taken from a number of bodies representing Moslem and Christian communities, various political parties and the Old Boys of the American University in Beirut.

Criticism of the Administration is increasing, as is normal at about this period in the life of each Government. On the 16th March the Phalange and Najjadé parties published a manifesto which bitterly attacked the Government for the "anarchy" prevailing in Government departments, and for the delay in distributing the flour ration, and which the Government were compelled to take seriously. The Prime Minister gave a press conference on the following day, in which he endeavoured to convince journalists that all was for the best in this best of all possible worlds, an attitude which has merely further diminished his own prestige.

The Communists have again been active in the Bekaa, and a pamphlet has recently been distributed in Baalbek and Zahlé demanding complete and immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from the Lebanon, that all imperialistic conditions, French or British, should be rejected and that foreign economic restrictions, which are responsible for the high cost of living, should be removed. Vyshinski's veto at the Security Council is praised, and gratitude expressed to the Soviet Union for its "glorious defence of our independence and sovereignty." Mr. Bevin and M. Bidault are accused of being in league against the Levant States, and brotherly salutations are sent to the people of Egypt in their fight for withdrawal and independence.

The United States Agricultural Mission has reached the Lebanon.

[E 3229/213/89]

(2)

Extracts from *Weekly Political Summary No. 207, Secret, Syria and Lebanon*, 26th March, 1946.—(Received 10th April.)

General.

The Lebanese Government on the 21st March received a telegram from their delegation in Paris reporting receipt of a French aide-mémoire setting out the

latest proposal for the evacuation of French troops from the Lebanon. This aide-mémoire, after summarising the previous Franco-Lebanese discussions on the subject stated that, for the purposes of the evacuation of their troops the French authorities required certain technical assistance from the Lebanese Government, particularly in connexion with the guarding and removal of their stores. The French Government suggested the formation of a Franco-Lebanese Joint Staff to ensure liaison between the French and Lebanese military authorities during the process of evacuation. If the Lebanese Government agreed to these proposals the French Government could envisage a considerable shortening of the period suggested by their military authorities as being necessary for evacuation; they could, in fact, offer to withdraw all combatant troops by the 31st August, leaving only about 30 officers and 300 technicians, who would all be withdrawn before the end of 1946, to supervise the removal of the French military stores. Furthermore, in order to meet the desires of the Lebanese Government the French Government wished to withdraw the bulk of their combatant troops before the 30th June.

The Lebanese delegation strongly urged the acceptance of these proposals as they felt that the French were acting in good faith. The Council of Ministers was immediately summoned and soon despatched a telegram authorising the delegation to sign an agreement on the proposed lines: they suggested only one modification which in the event was not accepted. It was later learned that the agreement had been duly signed in the form of an exchange of letters between M. Bidault and Hamid Bey Frangieh on the 23rd March; the text of these letters was published in the press on the 26th March.

In general the press and public opinion have expressed satisfaction with the conclusion of this agreement, though the Communist organ *Saut-esh-Shaab* and some Nationalist papers in both countries consider that the Lebanese Government should have pressed for a simultaneous evacuation of the British and French troops. The Lebanese Minister in London has telegraphed to the Lebanese President, begging him to exert every effort to secure some modification of the evacuation plan, by which some British units at least would remain in the Lebanon until all the French had left. Fares Bey el Khoury, in a conversation with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, also made a plea that the final evacuation of the British troops should be delayed, arguing that if a request to stay was presented by the Lebanese Government it would not be "practicable" for British troops to withdraw.

Evacuation of British and French forces has been continued from Syria according to plan, and a start has already been made in the Lebanon. The French aircraft carrier *Diamant* visited Beirut and took away about 1,000 Senegalese troops. The French authorities gave a large reception in honour of the visit, and the Lebanese Government rendered honours to the departing troops—a gesture of courtesy which has been regarded as over-effusive in some Nationalist circles.

On the 22nd March, the anniversary of the foundation of the Arab League was celebrated throughout the principal towns of Syria and the Lebanon. Military reviews were held and in Beirut and Damascus members of the Cabinet, Diplomatic and Consular Corps were present.

Economic.

Total purchases of grain for the period the 20th March to 26th March amount to 1,244 tons, a daily average of 177 tons, which brings the total for the 1946-47 crop up to 192,521 tons.

The Lebanese and Syrian Finance Ministers met at Chtaura on the 22nd March to discuss the implication of the French and British notes regarding the future provision of sterling for the Levant States. Following this meeting, and as a result of a tendentious article which appeared in a French-controlled newspaper suggesting that the Levant States' currency was about to be devalued by 12 per cent., both Governments issued a communiqué denying this report and stating that the parity of the Lebanese pound with sterling would remain unchanged. The paper in question has been suspended for three days.

Damascus.

The Syrian President, in an interview with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, stated that in his opinion there would have to be a period of two or three months after the evacuation of French forces from the Lebanon to allow tempers to return to normal before there could be any question of negotiation between the Syrian and French Governments. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires pointed out that this seemed an unnecessarily long period to wait, as there were various matters such

as the future of French schools and establishments which required to be settled, and asked what the President's reaction would be if the British and Americans were to put forward for signature a formal treaty and the French simultaneously were to make the same proposition. Shukri Bey Quwatli replied that he would agree, and moreover the French could have most-favoured-nation treatment, but it was essential that treaties should be concluded with all three Powers at once—he made no mention of Russia—he added that he would negotiate in London and nowhere else.

The opening of the Sixth Ordinary Session of the Syrian Chamber, which had been fixed for the 17th March, was postponed by a presidential decree to the 19th April.

Many leading Syrian personalities continue to show mistrust and suspicion of French motives and good faith. The general attitude seems to be to accept nothing on trust, but to wait until all statements of intentions have been converted into facts. The President, the Prime Minister and Fares Bey are all tired and ill; there seems to be little direction and all seem to be vaguely playing for time without knowing what will happen afterwards.

Jamil Bey Mardam, the Syrian Minister in Cairo and delegate to the Arab League, returned to Damascus for a few days during the week. A large number of cars met him at Oneitra, and a crowd of supporters met him at his house and acclaimed him for his work in the Arab League. It was strongly rumoured that these manifestations were far from spontaneous. Fares Bey el Khoury also returned from London, and appeared to receive a much more genuine welcome.

The evacuation of military material from Mezzé is ahead of schedule. Colonel Poirier, representing Air France, arrived from Paris on the 21st March to deal with the affairs of the company, and two Syrian officials were nominated by the Prime Minister to go to Mezzé to make arrangements for taking over the aerodrome. They were given most definite instructions that there were to be no negotiations before evacuation, that all French employees of Air France must leave, there was to be no demolition or destruction of permanent structures, for the security of which the Syrian Government would take responsibility pending any necessary negotiations when Franco-Syrian relations had been resumed on a normal basis after evacuation, and that any movable French property could either be evacuated or inventoried and left in the safe custody of the Government on the basis of agreed lists.

Colonel Poirier endeavoured to persuade the Syrian representatives of the desirability and necessity of French personnel remaining, but in view of their instructions the Syrian representatives could not accept this point of view. At subsequent meetings, Colonel Poirier seems to have accepted that Air France must evacuate and would be allowed back only when normal relations have been established. The only question therefore remaining at issue is the disposal of Air France installations and machinery.

The following appointments have been announced:—

- (1) Dr. Douglas Cruickshank, a Canadian, formerly employed by the Government of Iraq, will be employed by the Syrian Government as Chief Surgeon and Surgical Expert for one year, the contract to be renewable for a further two years.
- (2) Omar el Adeas, transferred from the Department of Justice, as Mohafez of the Hauran.

Lebanon.

The Lebanese Prime Minister, according to the President, has received a telegram from Hamid Bey Frangieh and Joseph Salem, requesting that they may be considered as having resigned from the moment when they return to the Lebanon, in view of their resentment at the lack of appreciation of their efforts in London and Paris and at certain administrative acts carried out by the Ministers in charge of their departments during their absence. The President considers their attitude to be quite unjustified, since the Lebanese Government could hardly express overt appreciation of the agreement they had concluded with the French while they were still trying to better its terms; and the administration had to continue during their three months' absence.

The Lebanese Prime Minister and Director-General for Foreign Affairs left for Cairo on the 23rd March to attend the session of the Arab League. During the Prime Minister's absence Dr. Jamil Talhouk will be Acting Prime Minister and Emile Lahoud Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The French military and civil authorities have practically completed the evacuation of the Grand Sérail building, which now reverts to the Lebanese Government. The latter will not, however, install their services in it for some time to come. On the 22nd March a Protocol was signed between the French and Lebanese authorities providing for the transfer of Beirut Broadcasting Station and of the Lebanese telephone system, the long-drawn-out negotiations for this transfer having at last been satisfactorily concluded. Agreement has also been reached on the division of the profits of the Tripoli Topping Plant during the war years, when it was run by the French Délégalion Générale; 57 per cent. will revert to the States Governments, and 43 per cent. to the French.

Simultaneously with the announcement of the evacuation of French troops, sectarianism has raised its head in the Lebanon. Mgr. Moubarak, the Maronite Bishop of Beirut, gave an interview to the *Palestine Post* correspondent during the visit of the members of the Palestine Committee to Beirut, in which he affirmed that the Lebanese Christians welcomed the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine. When this article appeared in the *Palestine Post* the President sent a message to the archbishop requesting him to issue a *démenti*, but the archbishop refused, stating that the recent formation of a Supreme Moslem Council had induced the Christian prelates to form a solid block in defence of Christian interests; he also blamed the President for having insisted on the withdrawal of foreign troops, and stated that he was preparing a note to General Beynet declaring that the Christians did not wish the French troops to leave the Lebanon.

The same note was struck by the Maronite Patriarch in a speech delivered at the Jesuit College of Antoura on the 19th March, in which he expressed his opposition to the evacuation of the French troops and observed that 5,000 Lebanese families were living off them at present. General Beynet, who was present, replied to the effect that the withdrawal of French troops did not mean the withdrawal of French friendship.

Much publicity has also been given to the formation of a "Christian Socialist party," headed by three former pro-French politicians, the object of which is stated to be to defend Christian interests in the Lebanon.

The Nationalist press is unanimous in condemning these manifestations of inter-sectarian conflict (including the formation of the Moslem Council) and in stressing the absolute necessity at this juncture of solidarity between the different religious communities in the Lebanon. The Lebanese Government are understood to be disturbed by these developments and are endeavouring, though so far without success, to induce the Moslems to damp down their activities for fear of sustaining the present Christian reaction.

The political officer, Zahlé, was informed by a local Armenian, who has agreed to return to Soviet Armenia, that he had been promised a holding of equal size and value in territory under Russian control to that enjoyed by him here. He was asked, and agreed, should he leave, to transfer his holding in the Lebanon to the Russian authorities; he added that a similar approach has been made to all who hold title to land in the Lebanon and have expressed a wish to return to Soviet Armenia.

The Lebanese Government has voted £Syr. 25,000 for the relief of the victims of flood in Iraq.

[E 3674/213/89]

(3)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 208, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 2nd April, 1946.—(Received 24th April.)

General.

THE Franco-Lebanese agreement on withdrawal has been received, in general, with satisfaction by public opinion in both Syria and the Lebanon, and the press comment has on the whole been favourable, though widespread and deep-rooted suspicion that the French will not live up to their undertakings which the Communist organs are doing their best to fan still persists.

The Lebanese President informed His Majesty's Legation on the 27th March that he had received a cable from Camille Chamoun in London strongly urging that the Lebanese Government should again press His Majesty's Government to retain at least some troops in the Lebanon until the last French soldier had left. The President stated that he had spoken by telephone to the Syrian Prime Minister, who agreed with his view, and that he therefore wished to sound us

on the subject; could we not leave at least as many British troops as there were French, if necessary in civilian clothes and in the guise of liquidation parties? Otherwise nervousness that the French would attempt a come-back would continue to disturb public opinion. The President was informed that, while his suggestion could be put to His Majesty's Government if he insisted, it was felt that they were unlikely to modify the evacuation plan for British troops already laid down; the Lebanon was a full member of the United Nations, and if the French failed to carry out their agreements it was surely to the Security Council and not to Great Britain that she should have recourse. The President, while not convinced, agreed to defer the matter until he had met the Syrian President at Chtaurah on the 1st April.

After this meeting, the President informed His Majesty's Legation that the matter had been fully discussed, and that it had been reluctantly decided not to approach His Majesty's Government at this juncture, as it was realised that His Majesty's Government's policy was based on wider considerations than the internal situation of the Levant States; moreover, it was still nearly three months before the final British evacuation, and if before this time it became clear that the French were not acting in good faith, the matter could still be reconsidered.

Joseph Salem and Riad-es-Solh were also present at this meeting, and are understood to have maintained strongly that they had secured the best possible results for the Levant States, though the Syrians do not seem to have been entirely convinced.

There are signs, particularly amongst the Maronite community in the Lebanon and amongst the Christian and Jewish communities in Syria, of uneasiness about the future now that it appears certain that all foreign troops are to be withdrawn. During the last few months there has been a noticeable migration of the more well-to-do Christian and Jewish families from Syria to the Lebanon; it is difficult to give accurate estimates, but it seems likely during the past six months that between 5,000 and 10,000 have thus moved, though some of these may, of course, return when they see that there is no discrimination against the Christians who have remained behind.

During the week Count Ostrorog discussed with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires the protection of French interests in Syria, taking the line that it was essential that they should be protected by somebody, either the Americans, the Russians, or the Syrians. Later in the week the Syrian Prime Minister, in a conversation with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, stated that his Government would accept responsibility for the protection of all French interests, and would sign the necessary *procès-verbaux*. He specifically mentioned the délégué buildings in Damascus, Aleppo and Lattakia, as well as French cemeteries. He could not, however, agree with the French contention that the barracks and aerodromes which had been evacuated, were in fact French property; he proposed to take possession of these at once without prejudice to the question of ownership which could be discussed later.

Economic.

Total purchases of grain for the period the 26th March to the 2nd April amount to 2,541 tons, a daily average of 363 tons, which brings the total for the 1946-47 crop up to 195,062 tons.

At the Syro-Lebanese meeting at Chtaurah on the 1st April a proposal was made to set up a joint economic council which would have authority to deal with financial and economic matters, including foreign exchange and the grant of import and export licences, in the interests of the two countries. The Lebanese Government are now in process of appointing members to a committee to study this proposal, which will hold its first meeting on the 4th April.

As a further result of the Chtaurah meeting, the two Governments issued regulations for the control of sterling-area currencies, consequent on the French memorandum previously addressed to the two Governments on this subject. These regulations lay down that sterling-area currencies must henceforth be regarded as "rare exchange," and that all applications for such currencies, whether for the payment of imported goods or for capital transfers, must first be approved by the competent departments of the two Governments.

The Syrian Government's reply to the French memorandum, in the form of a note to His Majesty's Legation, was received on the 26th March. The Syrian Government were, however, informed by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that he could not accept a reply to a memorandum which had, in fact, been addressed to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments by the French. The Prime Minister

and the Minister of Finance argued at some length in favour of their sending a reply in the form originally drafted, but finally agreed to send a short note acknowledging the receipt of the memorandum and requesting elucidation on certain points which would form the subject of a separate memorandum.

A Syro-Lebanese conference was held in Beirut on the 27th March to discuss the implementation of the Arab League's decision to boycott "Zionist" goods. Both Governments apparently realise that they are bound by the terms of the Economic Agreement signed between Palestine and the Levant States on the 28th November, 1939, article 9 of which states that the contracting parties will not place any discriminatory restrictions on trade between them, and must therefore proceed cautiously in imposing restrictions on trade with Palestine. The Lebanese are, in addition, probably not uninfluenced by the veiled campaign against the boycott which has recently been conducted in certain French-inspired newspapers, seeking to prove that Lebanese interests are being sacrificed to a greater extent than those of any other member of the Arab League. These newspapers have made capital out of the fact that the Tel Aviv Ski Club has imposed a retaliatory boycott on the Lebanese winter resorts, and are now again stressing the theme that the Lebanon stands in a different position from the other and predominantly Moslem States which compose the Arab League, and should retain freedom of action *vis-à-vis* the League.

Conversations between the British military authorities and the Lebanese Government on the disposal of the Haifa-Beirut-Tripoli railway began on the 2nd April. The British authorities are suggesting that a price should be fixed for the line and its rolling stock based on the cost price, but taking into consideration the fact that the line was constructed in haste in war-time conditions, and that the Lebanese Government should agree to take over the British liabilities towards the owners of the line expropriated for the railway, the value of the total compensation to be paid to these landowners being deducted from the price agreed upon for the line and its material.

The Lebanese Government are becoming seriously perturbed at the growth of unemployment in the Lebanon, which they now somewhat belatedly realise is likely to become acute with the withdrawal of foreign troops. They also appear to be concerned at reports which have reached them of Communist approaches to these unemployed. So far, however, they have given no indication of what plans they are envisaging to absorb the unemployed.

The Syrian Ministry of National Economy has issued a communiqué to the press stating that the Belgian Legation, by a letter dated the 21st February, had notified the Ministry that the Belgian Chamber of Consultant Engineers are anxious to enter into relations with Syrian industrialists and economists. The Belgian engineers are prepared to give technical advice regarding economic enterprises, draw up industrial plans, make recommendations and industrial surveys, &c.

The manager of the S.P.C. has informed His Majesty's Consul, Damascus, that the prospects of striking oil in the Tou-al-Ababa district north of Raqqa are good. Drilling will also commence shortly at Daula south of Raqqa, and the necessary equipment is being concentrated at Homs.

Syria.

It is reported that in spite of persistent denials to the contrary the Syrian Prime Minister submitted his resignation, which was, however, refused by the President on the grounds that it was in the public interest that the formation of a new Government should be deferred for a while; it is said that Fares-el-Khoury, president of the Chamber of Deputies, was sounded regarding the formation of a new Ministry, but declined for reasons of ill-health. Dissatisfaction with the present Government and criticism of the Prime Minister is widespread, and it is reported from Lattakia that the Nationalists are becoming more and more apprehensive at the declining prestige of the Nationalist *bloc*, and the rising influence of the Monarchists on the one hand and the Communists on the other. Jamil Mardam and Khaled-el-Azm are freely mentioned as possible successors to Saadullah Jabri, but according to one report Jamil Mardam is prepared to accept office only on condition that the present Chamber is dissolved.

The military clauses of the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty have been considerably criticised in the Syrian press, which in general takes the line that it is not a treaty of independence but an agreement for British occupation of an Arab State. The Monarchists see in the military clauses a blow to their hopes for a Greater Syria under the Emir Abdullah, since he will no longer be able to offer complete independence to his people. While the President of the Republic has

sent a personal message of congratulation to the Emir Abdullah, the Syrian Government have made no statement in the matter.

The Mohafez of Lattakia has received instructions from Damascus that the Syrian Government will take over all French property in the Mohafazat, except for one building in which a M. Geoffroy, a French subject, who has been resident for many years in Lattakia may remain as caretaker. The Délégué-Adjoint visited Beirut with the idea of suggesting that the Soviet Legation should be asked to ensure the protection of French property in Lattakia, but now proposes to take all furniture and movable articles from the délégation, and to send to the Mohafez a list of French properties with a letter to the effect that the French Government will hold the Syrian Government responsible for any damage which may occur. The arrangements for the disposal of the Bouka property (see Weekly Political Summary No. 207, Alaouites, paragraph 1) have fallen through, and the fathers have therefore removed all their personal property except for the minimum needs of the orphans.

It is learnt that the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister have agreed to the proposals for an amnesty in the Suleiman-Murshid affair (see Weekly Political Summary No. 195, Alaouites, paragraph 3), and will shortly submit the plan to the Chamber for approval. Meanwhile, an attempt is being made by a nominee of Saadullah Jabri to arrange for a preliminary reconciliation between Murshid and the Nationalist leaders.

On the 26th March forces of gendarmerie, acting on information received, fired at two large lorries and two small vehicles said to contain contraband goods from Iraq, which refused to stop at a barricade in the neighbourhood of Daumo, near Damascus. Two Rualla tribesmen were killed, and later Lawrence Shaalan, a cousin of the Emir Fawwaz Shaalan, was arrested. It is reported that the Emir is highly indignant at the action taken by the Government.

The Prime Minister has enquired of His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires whether the Syrian Government would not be in order in agreeing to Italian diplomatic representation in Damascus.

The American Agriculture Commission (see Weekly Political Summary No. 206, section 11, paragraph 4) arrived in Damascus on the 29th March.

Lebanon.

The Lebanese Prime Minister returned from the Cairo Conference of the Arab League on the 28th March, and caused an elaborate (and expensive) reception to be staged for him at the aerodrome. Unfortunately, owing to a breakdown of his aircraft, he arrived some three hours late; by which time many of his hired supporters had melted away. The reception organised on the following day in honour of the return of his cousin and rival, Riad Solh and Joseph Salem, on their return from London and Paris, was a more impressive and spontaneous affair; they came by road and were fêted in succession at Tyre, Sidon and in the Moslem quarter of Beirut. Both these delegates appear to have returned in an intransigent mood; Joseph Salem has resisted strong pressure by the President to withdraw the resignation he had previously cabled from Paris, and it has now been accepted; while Riad Solh seems to be taking the line that the Lebanon can no longer afford to be entrusted to the volatile and unstable Sami Solh, or to any other Prime Minister than himself. Hamid Frangieh, who is at present in Rome and is expected to return shortly, will presumably take the same line, so that a change of Government now seems a virtual certainty within the next few days. The President is still anxious to maintain Sami Solh in office for some months longer, if necessary with a reshuffled Cabinet, because he feels that it is essential to have Riad Solh in power before next year's elections, but that if he were to take office now he could not maintain himself until then; he also considers that there are no other suitable Sunni Moslem candidates for the Premiership. The position is therefore still fluid.

The Lebanese National Council is reported in the press to have addressed a letter to the Prime Minister protesting against recent manifestations of sectarianism in the Lebanon (see Weekly Political Summary No. 207, Lebanon, paragraph 4), on the ground that at this moment nothing can be allowed to impair Lebanese unity.

[E 3988/213/89]

(4)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 209, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 9th April, 1946.—(Received 3rd May.)

General.

THE last phase of the evacuation of North Syria by the French and British forces was completed during the past week and the last contingent of French and British forces left Aleppo on the evening of the 5th April. Evacuation has also been continuing from the Damascus area and the last British troops left Homs on the 6th April. The Syrian Government appeared to be genuinely grateful for the assistance received from the British forces, and evacuation has been made the occasion for displays of apparently genuine cordiality.

Criticism of the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty continues in the press of both countries. In the Lebanon, however, some Christian circles are reported to be pleased that the British will remain in occupation of the adjacent territory, since they feel that their chances of obtaining British intervention on their behalf in the event of Moslem aggression, which they continue to fear, are thereby enhanced. Neither the Lebanese Government nor the Syrian Government have made any pronouncement on the matter, and press reports that the Lebanese Government have referred the question of Transjordan to the Arab League have been denied by Lebanese officials.

The Syrian Prime Minister informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that the Syrian Government accepted responsibility for the protection of all genuine French interests in Syria. The necessary *procès-verbaux* would be signed. He would not, however, agree to the French contention that the barracks and aerodromes which they were evacuating were indisputably French property and therefore proposed to take possession of them at once. The protection of the délégation buildings in Damascus, Aleppo and Lattakia, as well as French cemeteries, would be guaranteed by the Syrian Government.

The Lebanese Government announced on the 8th April the names of the officers appointed to the Franco-Lebanese Joint Staff which is to be set up under the terms of the evacuation agreement with the French to deal with the technical aspects of the withdrawal of French troops from the Lebanon.

Economic.

Total purchases of grain for the period the 3rd to the 9th April amount to 642 tons, a daily average of 91 tons, which brings the total for the 1946-47 crop up to 195,704.

A memorandum prepared by the Syrian Government in reply to the French memorandum on the Syrian currency (see Weekly Political Summary No. 208, "Economic," paragraph 4) has now been received. It states that the Syrian Government consider that the country's essential needs should be estimated by them, and seeks to draw a distinction between the purchase of sterling for the payment of imported goods and for capital investment. It also contends that three months' notice is required before any modification of the 1944 agreement could take place, and that the agreement should remain in force during the consultation period.

In response to a verbal request from the Syrian Prime Minister for technical assistance on the operation of Syrian aerodromes after the evacuation, a representative of the air attaché and of B.O.A.C. visited the Syrian Prime Minister, who agreed to make a formal request to B.O.A.C. Subsequently, Nureddin Kahhaleh, director of the Irrigation Department in the Ministry of Public Works, and at present dealing with air matters, informed the British representatives that the Syrian Government were prepared to accept the services of three technicians on condition that the contracts were made with them individually and not with B.O.A.C., a point of procedure which he made clear was necessary in order to give no offence to other foreign corporations.

A strike of transport workers in Beirut may take place in the near future. It was believed on the 8th April that the railways and tramway employees would strike on the following day, but the Government, after several conferences with the workers' representatives, granted them some concessions and so staved off the strike for the moment. In a communiqué issued on the 9th April the Government announced concessions made to the workers in various industries, including the Tobacco Régie and the oil companies, as well as the tramway company, and stated that, in the event of unauthorised strikes, they would (a) enforce the law against

agitators, (b) authorise the dismissal of workers absenting themselves for two consecutive days without reason, and (c) requisition workers in case of need. Despite this appearance of firmness, it is, as always, doubtful how far the Government would resist a determined strike threat, and probable that they will continue to seek a compromise solution.

The Lebanese Government have appointed M. Joseph Shadid of the Lebanese Legation in London as representative at the Primary Producers' Conference to be held in May. The Syrian Government have not yet come to a decision, but it is probable that they will send representatives from the Syrian Ministry of National Economy and the Chamber of Agriculture.

With reference to the press report of the acceptance of Syria and the Lebanon as members of the International Bank (see Weekly Political Summary No. 206, "Economic," paragraph 5), the Syrian Minister for Finance informed a member of the staff of His Majesty's Legation that no acceptance has yet been received from the International Bank.

Syria.

Rumours of impending ministerial changes continue, but there are no definite developments to report. It is known that neither of the two probable candidates for the premiership, Jamil Mardam and Khaled-el-Azm, is in favour with the President, who it is thought may be considering a Cabinet of young men under Sabri-el-Assali, or a reshuffle and broadening of the present Cabinet under Saadallah Jabri.

The Emir Fawwaz Shaalan was received by the Prime Minister following the clash between the Rualla tribesmen engaged in smuggling and the police (see Weekly Political Summary No. 208, "Syria," paragraph 5). It is significant that Lawrence Shaalan has been set free and investigations into the affair have stopped; further, it has been given out that the secretary of Fawwaz Shaalan has died of pneumonia, but it is freely rumoured that he was murdered by Lawrence Shaalan because he had given information to the Syrian authorities.

According to a press report, M. Abdul Ahad-el-Aqjan has been appointed Turkish Minister in Syria.

Lebanon.

Joseph Salem, the Lebanese Minister of the Interior, resisted all attempts on the part of the Lebanese President and Prime Minister to induce him to reconsider his decision to resign from the Government; his resignation was, therefore, finally accepted, and Philip Tacla, brother of the late Minister for Foreign Affairs, has accepted the portfolio. It is generally expected that Hamid Frangieh, Minister for Foreign Affairs, will also maintain his decision to resign, although the President is still anxious to keep the present Government in office as long as possible. In any case, the Prime Minister is at present determined to evoke a vote of confidence at the sitting of the Chamber scheduled for the 11th April, and it seems probable that Henri Pharaon and Riad Solh will support the Government with their followers, the former since he realises that he is unable to induce the President to accept his nominee, Abdullah Yafi, as Prime Minister, and the latter as he is doubtful of his chance of being able to form a Government in present conditions.

General Beynet left Beirut for Paris via Rome on the 9th April, accompanied by the Chief of the Sûreté aux Armées, Commandant Blondel, and his oriental adviser, Antoine Rozek. These two officials are locally regarded as personifying the "mandatory mentality," and their presence in General Beynet's train has led to uneasy speculation as to the intentions of this delegation. General Monclar has also left Beirut on posting to the French War Ministry, his previous appointment to Indo-China having apparently been cancelled.

A Lebanese Government communiqué issued on the 9th April, confirmed by press reports from Vatican City, announced that, as a result of the visit paid to the Pope by the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Holy See had decided to recognise Lebanese independence and to agree to exchange diplomatic representatives. It has also been announced that the Netherlands Government have communicated a similar decision to the Lebanese Minister in Paris. The former Brazilian Consul-General at Beirut is to present his letters of credence as first Brazilian Minister to the Lebanon on the 10th April, consequent on the elevation of his post to the status of a legation. The Turkish Consul-General at Beirut is leaving shortly, as a Turkish Minister to the Lebanon has been appointed and is expected to arrive in the near future.

The press announces that the Ministry of Justice have decided to hand back to the Soviet Government certain Russian orthodox properties in the Lebanon which the Soviet representative had been claiming.

Press reports that the United States Government have demanded a naval base at Beirut have been echoed by Moscow, and not yet authoritatively denied, though they are not believed to have any foundation in fact.

[E 4429/213/89]

(5)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 210, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 16th April, 1946.—(Received 15th May.)

General.

THE evacuation of Syria was completed on the 15th April when the commander of 85 Sub-Area and his staff and the officer commanding French troops at Mezzé crossed the frontier into the Lebanon. Colonel Morgan and his personal staff left the Orient Palace Hotel in Damascus after a short ceremony when the Syrians mounted a guard of honour of about 100 men; no members of the Government or Syrian officials, with the exception of army officers, were present, but a small crowd of about 400 assembled; the band played the British and Syrian national anthems and Colonel Morgan inspected the Syrian guard.

This small farewell ceremony was the climax to a week of almost uninterrupted hospitality and manifestations of cordiality towards the British army. The Syrian army gave a party in honour of their British comrades. His Majesty's Minister and the General Officer commanding British Troops, North Levant, were the guests of the Prime Minister at a picnic luncheon, and the Mohafez of the city of Damascus gave a farewell reception to Major-General Pilleau in the municipal gardens at which he announced that one of the principal streets of the town would be named Great Britain Street. In his speech, which was unexceptionable, the Mohafez referred to the high standard of honour, conduct and consideration which had been shown by the British forces in the course of their stay in Syria. The Syrian President, as well as the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies and Cabinet Ministers attended the reception to which over one thousand people had been invited. Comment in the press was uniformly friendly towards the British army.

Economic.

No figures yet received.

The Beirut tramway employees finally struck on the 12th April, as their employers were only prepared to grant their demands if allowed to raise fares; this the Government would not accept, in view of the inevitable popular outcry. The Communist-inspired Federation of Syndicates has been endeavouring to bring about sympathetic strikes in other transport industries, but has so far failed; the Taxi-drivers' Syndicate will not play because their members are profiting largely from the tram strike, and the railway workers, who know that the D.H.P. Company have recently been discharging numerous redundant personnel, also hesitate to stage a strike which might recoil upon themselves. The Government on the 12th April announced that the workers in the electricity, railway and port companies had been "requisitioned" in order to preserve essential services. The labour question, besides occupying much space in the press, was evoked in the Lebanese Chamber during its debates of the 11th, 13th and 15th April, when various Opposition Deputies criticised the Government for not paying sufficient attention to the workers' demands, while the Minister of the Interior explained his efforts to arrange a settlement and accused the workers of having acted in bad faith.

In the Lebanese Chamber on the 11th April the Government were closely questioned by Deputies as to the effect on the Lebanese currency of the recent French decision to cancel the free purchase of sterling. After the Minister of Finance had explained that this decision was intended to stop the flight of Lebanese capital, Habib Abi Chahla suggested that before the 1944 Agreement was modified, the Lebanese and Syrian Governments should have been given

three months' notice, during which the agreement should have remained in force. The Speaker at this point moved the debate out of order, but subsequent speakers continued to revert to it.

The Lebanese Council of Ministers are understood to have decided on the 13th April to award the contract for the construction of the new international airport, south of Beirut, to an American firm, the engineers of which are said to have already arrived to make a final survey. The aerodrome is expected to be ready in about a year.

The Lebanese Government have given permission to the British Overseas Airways Corporation to use Beirut Airport for the purpose of running a trunk line from the United Kingdom via Athens to Tehran, with Fifth Freedom rights between Beirut and Athens and points west of Athens, on the basis of reciprocity.

The American Agricultural Mission, which was recently in Beirut and Damascus visited Aleppo during the week and proceeded to the Jezireh. Among the questions which were brought to its notice was the project for irrigating the Aleppo district with water from the Euphrates.

Syria.

The meeting of the Syrian Parliament has been postponed for a further week owing to the Easter holidays; the Chamber will now meet on the 24th April.

In conversation with His Majesty's Consul, Damascus, the Syrian Prime Minister volunteered the information that, while under the mandatory régime appointments of Christians to official positions never exceeded the statistical percentage of Christians in the country, i.e., 9 per cent., at the present moment in Damascus Christians in official positions represented 36 per cent. of the Civil Service. Further, as regards schools, under the mandatory régime there were no Syrian Government schools which were exclusively Christian, while during the past year, some sixty schools had been opened throughout the country in Christian villages and quarters and the Christian priesthood was encouraged to give religious instruction.

The French military hospital at Mezzé has been evacuated and French-employed caretakers installed; the Syrian gendarmerie have taken over the care of civil installations at Mezzé airport. French-employed caretakers have been installed in French properties in the city of Damascus and it is understood that the Syrian police gave assurances to the British military authorities on the eve of their departure that the properties would be protected.

Twenty-four of the Méharistes who have been detained by the British military authorities since June last year (see Weekly Political Summary No. 167 (1945), section 3, paragraph 6), were released on the 14th April and the remaining five handed over to the Syrian authorities on the understanding that they would be brought to trial.

The newly accredited Brazilian Minister, M. Louis Pinheiro (formerly consul-general) has presented his Letters of Credence. M. Reshad Erhan, Turkish Consul-General in Aleppo, left for Angora on the 14th April, and has been succeeded by M. Jelal Karacapan, who was, until recently, Turkish Consul-General in Jerusalem.

Considerable interest has been aroused in Aleppo by a rumour that the Soviet Legation in Damascus proposes to issue to all Armenians who have registered as intending emigrants to Soviet Armenia, certificates describing them as such; holders of these certificates, so the rumour states, will become Russian protected persons and the Soviet authorities in Syria will claim to exercise the right to afford them protection.

Lebanon.

The Lebanese Government confronted the Chamber of Deputies on the 11th April but the question of confidence was not raised. The Minister for Foreign Affairs returned from Rome on the 14th April, and did not immediately resign as expected; latest indications are that he will consent to remain for the present provided that he is allowed a free hand to modify all decisions taken in his department during his absence. For the moment, therefore, the Government's existence seems to have been prolonged.

On the 13th April, the Prime Minister informed the Chamber, in response to enquiries, that the French Government had decided, in the face of representations from the Lebanese Government, to suspend certain measures of expulsion taken against Lebanese domiciled in Senegal.

The Lebanese Government are to be represented at the ceremonies in honour of the withdrawal of Allied troops from Syria by the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the head of the Lebanese army.

The Franco-Lebanese Joint Staff to discuss the evacuation of French troops from the Lebanon has already held its first meeting.

The proposal made at the recent Arab League meeting for a "common Arab nationality" has aroused vigorous polemics in the press, and has been denounced by Opposition Deputies in the Chamber. Nationalist circles show little enthusiasm for the project and the more extreme Christian and pro-French elements are vehement against it.

The press, in published reports from Cairo, state that the French Government had agreed in principle to the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem coming to the Lebanon, and add statements attributed to the Lebanese Foreign Office that the Lebanese Government had months ago expressed their willingness to receive the Mufti in the Lebanon and would do so unconditionally if he were to come. It is understood that this attitude is at most personal to the Prime Minister, and that the Lebanese Government would, in fact, hesitate to receive the Mufti in the face of strong British opposition.

The Communist party have now opened an office in Zahlé under the name of Naqaba el Amieh, its purpose being to organise labour in the area to deal with grievances and to advise on action against employers. Mustafa Ariss is said to be the organiser of this movement and it is rumoured that similar offices will be opened in all the principal Lebanese towns.

All workmen, particularly those employed now and in the past by the French and British, were invited to attend a meeting at Zahlé organised by the Communist party; approximately 500 were present. Mustafa Ariss addressed the meeting, attacking the Government and stressing the rights of workers; he urged all present to insist on indemnities being paid to discharged workers and to press for Government work and assistance.

[E 4430/213/89]

(6)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 211, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 23rd April, 1946.—(Received 15th May.)

General.

DURING the past week the celebrations in connexion with the evacuation of foreign troops, the entertainment of the delegates from the other Arab countries and the Easter festivities have largely occupied public attention in Syria and the Lebanon.

Although the official celebrations in Syria were scheduled to take only two days, the 15th and 16th April were devoted to the reception of the official Arab delegations, and the days immediately following to official functions and to receptions given by the heads of the various Arab delegations; these were as follows:—

Saudi Arabia.—Emir Feisal, Emir Mansour, Sheikh Ibrahim el Suleiman, Sheikh Yussef Yassin.

Transjordan.—Mussalem el Attar (Minister of Interior and Justice).

Iraq.—Nejjib Bey el Rawi (Minister of Education), Dr. Fadel Jamali (Director-General for Foreign Affairs).

Lebanon.—Nicola Bustrous (special emissary of the Lebanese President), Sami es Solh (Prime Minister), Hamid Frangieh (Foreign Minister), Ahmad el Assad (Minister for National Defence), Fuad Ammoun (Director of the Foreign Office).

Egypt.—Abdel Latif Talaat Pasha (special emissary of His Majesty King Farouk), Abd el Aziz Bey Badr, Mohamed Hilmi Bey, Abd el Rahman, Haqqi Bey (Egyptian Minister).

Arab League.—Abd el Rahman Azzam Pasha (general secretary).

Yemen.—Sayyid Ali el Muayyid (Director of Education). [The Yemen delegates failed to arrive in time for the official celebrations, having been delayed by inability to secure air transport.]

In addition to the official delegations contingents of the Arab national armies also arrived in Damascus and took part in the military parade, including units of the Egyptian and Iraqi air forces.

Although enormous crowds were in evidence throughout the week, the proceedings were marked by a high degree of organisation, which, coupled with the good temper of the crowds and a complete lack of incidents, greatly impressed impartial observers. For further details see "Syria" below.

A representative of the Soviet Armenian Government has visited Damascus in connexion with the scheme for the emigration of Armenians. According to this representative (who is an ex-Minister) arrangements have been made for the reception of 150,000 Armenians, and travelling facilities are to be provided by the Soviet Armenian Government. The authorities in Erivan are particularly anxious to encourage the immigration to Soviet Armenia of young Armenians, especially those with technical training (e.g., young men who have served in the Levant with the French and British armies). Armenian casualties during the late war amounted to some 80,000 killed, and it is hoped to make good these losses by the advent of young Armenian blood from abroad.

Economic.

No figures received.

Syria.

The official celebrations to mark the evacuation of foreign troops began with a march-past of the Syrian armed forces and the Arab contingents on the morning of the 17th April in the presence of the President of the Republic, members of the Government, the special delegations from the various Arab States, the Diplomatic Corps and a crowd variously estimated at from $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 million. This was followed by a visit of Shukri Bey Quwatli, Syrian notables and the principal Arab delegates to Mezzé, where two French forts were named after Yusuf el Azmeh, who lost his life at the battle of Meissaloun, and Soltan Pasha el Atrash, the Druze hero of the 1925 revolt. In the afternoon a speech was made at the Sérail by the President of the Republic, who later received members of the Government, the Arab delegates, the Diplomatic Corps, &c. The Prime Minister gave a dinner-party at the Orient Palace Hotel on the same evening. The following morning was devoted to speeches in the university by Arab delegates and Syrian notables. Later the President gave a large alfresco luncheon at his property at Bala, and in the course of the following days the Arab delegations gave receptions in which they vied with each other in the lavishness of their hospitality and the number of guests invited—the Saudi Arabian delegation being an easy winner on its second attempt (after a rather small and ill-organised tea-party) by inviting 600 guests to dinner at the Orient Palace.

The President, in his speech at the Sérail, after referring to the great sacrifices made by Syrians of every creed in the effort to win complete independence, mentioned the support given to Syria by the Allied Powers, particularly Great Britain, the United States and the U.S.S.R., who had supported the Syrian claim from the first. Britain, he said, had declared that her troops had come to Syria through the necessities of war and had expressed her intention of withdrawing them; she had fulfilled her promise and had withdrawn her army, which during its stay in Syria had proved to be a factor for peace and security. Speaking of the Arab League, the President said he was sure he was expressing the feelings of his hearers when he said that no flag save that of Arab unity would be permitted to fly over the Syrian flag.

The following are the principal points made by the speakers at the Syrian University on the 18th April. Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, in his address, which, in his absence owing to indisposition, was read by Nejib Rayyess, congratulated Syria on her decisive victory over western colonisation, and said that the forces of colonisation would soon be withdrawn from the sister Arab States. He appealed for unity among the Arabs in foreign policy, national defence and in the struggle against the coloniser. Abdul Rahman Haqqi Bey, Egyptian Minister to the Levant States, followed this up by saying that the coloniser should evacuate of his own free will, in which case the Arabs would bid him farewell with gratitude before they were obliged to expel him with dishonour. Nejib el Rawi, head of the Iraqi delegation, spoke of the struggle which, during a quarter of a century, had united Syria and Iraq, and concluded, "Faisal's throne has brought us together and Meissaloun has united us." Riad es Solh, principal Lebanese delegate, affirmed that the Lebanon would never accept to be "a place of residence for the foreigner or their bridgehead to the Arab world." Akram

Zuaiter, representing the Palestine Arabs, addressing the President of the Republic, reminded his Excellency that Palestine was the southern part of Syria, which, when Syria declared its independence in 1920, was included in the Syrian State by the Constituent Assembly. In a speech which was particularly well received, Mgr. Ignatius Horiaki, the Greek Orthodox Bishop, declared: "We are Syrians in our lesser homeland, we are Syrians Arabs in our greater Arab homeland." Other speakers included Sami Solh, Adel Arslan (whose speech was not particularly well received owing to a rather surprising attempt on his part to make excuses for French policy), Saleh Shatta (Saudi Arabia) and Sheikh Saleh el Ali, a Syrian Nationalist from the Alaouite area.

The following points are of interest in connexion with the festivities:—

- (1) Two Saudi Princes attended the ceremonies, but no member of the Hashemite family.
- (2) No Druzes, with the exception of Adel Arslan, a Lebanese Druze, attended in spite of efforts by the Minister of the Interior, who personally proceeded to Soueida on the 16th April with a message from the President, to try to persuade Soltan Pasha Atrash and other notables to put in an appearance.
- (3) Apart from the Emir Fawwaz Shaalan, tribal sheikhs were conspicuously absent.
- (4) The Alaouite chiefs, the Abbases and Kinjes, although some of them were present in Damascus at the time, did not attend.
- (5) Special attention was clearly paid throughout to the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian delegations.

The Arab delegates left for Beirut on the 21st April, with the exception of the Saudi Arabian delegation, which left on the following day.

Lebanon.

The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs has apparently still not made up his mind whether or not to resign from the Government. The press on the 23rd April published reports that he had given the Prime Minister an "ultimatum" in which he offered to remain in the Ministry provided that he received a "personal vote of confidence" in respect of his work at the United Nations Organisation and in Paris, and also that all appointments and promotions in the Lebanese Foreign Service made during his absence should be suspended. This report, though exaggerated, probably accurately reflects his state of mind, and it remains to be seen whether the President, who is anxious that he should remain in order to avoid a Cabinet crisis, can persuade him to do so.

The strike of Beirut tramway employees continues. The Prime Minister has seen both sides, but is unwilling to accept the company's stipulation that fares must be raised if the employees' demands are to be granted, whilst the employees have rejected as inadequate his suggestion that the minimum wage-scales laid down in 1943 shall be applied to them.

The Maronite Archbishop of Beirut and other Christian priests took the opportunity of Easter sermons to express disapproval of the alleged Arab League proposition for a common Arab nationality, which they claimed would be incompatible with the full independence of the Lebanon.

On the 20th April the Prime Minister, in response to a complaint from this legation that the Communist newspaper *Saut esh Shaab* had been publishing a series of offensive references to Great Britain, signed a decree suspending this newspaper *sine die*. He also suspended the newspaper *Beirut* for suggesting that a Minister had allocated 300,000 dollars to a protégé. Three days later he changed his mind and wished to cancel the suspensions, but was instructed not to do so by the President.

The Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the other Arab delegates to the Damascus evacuation celebrations have now arrived in Beirut and are being fêted by the Lebanese Government before returning to their countries.

[E 4471/213/89]

(7)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 212, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 30th April, 1946.—(Received 16th May.)

General.

THE past week has seemed something of an anti-climax after emotional atmosphere created by the Syrian evacuation celebrations and the visits of the Arab Delegations. In Syria and in the Lebanon public attention has been mainly concerned with internal matters, the formation of new Cabinets, the possibility of the dissolution of the two Chambers of Deputies and reform of the electoral laws. There have been preliminary rumbles in the press over the rumour that the Anglo-American Commission on Palestine would unanimously recommend the immediate immigration of 100,000 Jews.

M. Aharonoff (secretary in charge of consular affairs in the Russian Legation at Beirut), went to Aleppo for three days on the 18th April accompanied by Karnik Nazarian, one of the representatives of the Repatriation Committee sent to the Levant States by the Soviet authorities at Erivan. They visited the various Armenian quarters in Aleppo and held a large open-air meeting at which Armenians were informed that while the Soviet Armenian authorities were determined to facilitate the immigration of Armenians, it would be impossible to arrange for more than a few thousand persons from the Levant States to enter Soviet Armenia this year; these would be recruited from the poorest, preferably unmarried young men who were artisans, or skilled workers in the building trade.

The Mohafez of Aleppo later informed His Majesty's Consul that M. Aharonoff had told him that the number of Armenians in the Levant States to whom visas for Soviet Armenia would be given during 1946 would be about 8,000; they would be admitted in large groups between mid-June and mid-November. The Mohafez added that he doubted whether anything like the total number of persons registered would leave for Soviet Armenia at the first opportunity; he thought they would prefer to wait for reports regarding living conditions from the first batch of emigrants. It is reported that M. Aharonoff suggested to would-be emigrants that they should register details with the Soviet Legation of any land or buildings they owned in Syria, so that the legation could protect their interests when they had become Soviet Armenian citizens. (A number of Armenians at present resident in Syria retain a claim to property in the Hatay, but there is no indication as to whether they have been asked to include these as well.)

The American cruiser *Providence* arrived in Beirut on the 26th April and left on the 29th April. Admiral James, officers and other ranks attended a number of official and unofficial receptions and paid a courtesy visit to Damascus where they were the guests of the President at a picnic luncheon party. When some dissatisfaction was expressed by the Syrians that the warship would not be visiting a Syrian port, the American authorities agreed to the vessel visiting Lattakia before leaving the Levant. But the arrangements fell through at the last moment.

Economic.

Total purchases of grain for the period the 23rd April to the 30th April amount to 614 tons, a daily average of 87 tons, which brings the total for the 1946-47 crop up to 196,318 tons.

The Syrian and Lebanese Governments have decided to institute grain-collecting schemes to take the place of M.I.R.A. when it ceases to exist on the 31st May. They have agreed that each country will have its own organisation for collection and distribution. A joint committee with a Syrian President, one Syrian member and two Lebanese members will be set up to agree on policy matters common to the two countries. It is believed that the new prices will be the same as for this year; the Syrians have agreed to reduce overhead expenses from 11 to 6.6 per cent. on sales made to the Lebanon, but they will continue to charge the 15 per cent. Government tax.

In the northern part of Syria fine crops are threatened by a serious locust invasion. The swarms are reported to be several times larger than last year and are scattered over wider areas. There is a shortage of galvanised iron sheeting and poisoned bran to cope with the danger, and the Syrian authorities hold the Turks largely responsible for the danger on the grounds that they did not destroy egg deposits thoroughly, and are not being co-operative in lending the galvanised iron so urgently required in the affected area.

Syria.

The first sitting of the ordinary session of the Syrian Chamber, which had been twice postponed, took place on the 24th April. All members of the Cabinet were absent. Fares el Khouri, Speaker of the House, made a speech in which, after referring to the fact that the Chamber was meeting for the first time after the completion of the withdrawal of foreign troops, he congratulated the Deputies on the results that had been achieved, and stressed the valuable support which successive Governments had received from the Chamber in their struggle for the independence of the country. The Speaker concluded with a reference to the support given to Syria by the Allies, particularly Great Britain, America and Soviet Russia. At the end of his speech he informed the Chamber that an hour previously the President had informed him that the Prime Minister had resigned and that his resignation had been accepted.

After considerable speculation in the press, which clearly favoured not only the formation of a new Government but the dissolution of the Chamber and new elections, it was announced on Saturday, the 27th April, that Saadullah Jabri had succeeded in forming a new Government, as follows:—

Saadullah Bey Jabri: Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs (108).

Khaled Bey el Azm: Minister of Justice and National Economy (36).

Nabih Bey el Azmeh: Minister of National Defence (40).

Sabri Bey el Assali: Minister of the Interior (18).

Ahmed Bey Sharabati: Minister of Public Instruction ().

Edmond Bey Homs (Christian): Minister of Finance (93).

Michael Bey Elian (Christian): Minister of Public Works (62).

[Figures after above names refer to Numbers in Syrian Personality List.]

Ahmed Bey Sharabati has been Minister of Public Instruction before.

The first press reactions have on the whole been satisfactory though there has been an under-current of doubt as to whether the new Cabinet will be able to deal effectively with the many pressing internal affairs that confront the country. The majority of the members are comparatively young men. Aleppo is represented by two members in addition to the Prime Minister, and Damascus by four; no other parts of the country are represented. Both the President and the Prime Minister emphasised to His Majesty's Minister that the presence of Nabih el Azmeh, to whose inclusion in previous Cabinets the British authorities had raised objections, was indicative of the Government's determination to combat the spread of communism in Syria particularly among the students. Ahmed Bey Sharabati, who is often said to be particularly well-disposed to Americans, may also use his efforts in this direction. Theoretically the new Cabinet should be able to count on a satisfactory majority in the Chamber, but it is possible that owing to the conflict of personalities it may have some difficulty in settling down into a working team.

The Commander-in-chief, Middle East Forces, paid a farewell visit to Damascus on the 22nd April. He was met at Mezzé Airport by the Minister of the Interior and a representative of the President. He inspected a guard of honour provided by the Syrian army, and later lunched at the presidency, where His Majesty's Minister and members of his staff were present. The proceedings were made informal, at our request.

At 4.30 a.m. on the 28th April a Nairn pullman coach proceeding from Bagdad to Damascus was held up by seven armed Bedouins at Jebel Tenef, a few miles inside the Syrian frontier; shots were fired at the tyres of the vehicle. No injuries were sustained by the passengers, but one Iraqi travelling in a bus belonging to a Bagdad-owned company which refused to stop when challenged, was slightly wounded. On arrival in Damascus the Syrian police authorities interviewed Nairn Company officials and travellers and took the necessary depositions. Currency amounting to £1,200 sterling, as well as jewellery valued at £3,000 sterling belonging to a French lady, were taken by the bandits, together with a considerable quantity of personal effects. The Syrian Prime Minister expressed his regret to His Majesty's Minister and said he was taking all possible measures to prevent a recurrence of such incidents. He again emphasised the urgent need of supplying the Syrian security forces with more arms, ammunition and equipment.

On the 22nd April Fares el Khouri informed His Majesty's Minister that the Syrian Chamber would shortly pass a law providing for the transfer to the local courts of cases pending before the Mixed Courts. On the following day His Majesty's Minister and His Majesty's Consul discussed the problem with him

and pointed out that on the 30th March His Majesty's Legation had addressed a note to the Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs regarding cases in suspense in which British interests were involved in which it was suggested, as a temporary measure, that the Syrian Government should appoint neutral judges to settle all pending cases without prejudice to the final settlement of the general question of the Mixed Courts. His Majesty's Minister added that it would not be in accordance with international courtesy for the Syrian Government to allow the passage of the law without taking account of the British representations and replying to them. On the 24th April His Majesty's Minister saw the Prime Minister and, using similar language, urged him to postpone the proposed law pending a reply to the note. The Prime Minister agreed but both he and Fares el Khouri emphasised the urgent need of arriving at a settlement of outstanding cases without delay.

Reports of dissatisfaction in the Jebel Druze continue to be received and Yousef el Atrash, in reply to an enquiry by His Majesty's Consul regarding the causes of complaint in the Mohafazat, stated bluntly that it was the fault of the British, but was unable to substantiate his statement in any reasoned manner. Sitt Nazara Jumblat, a leading personality amongst the Lebanese Druzes, and her son, Kemal Jumblat, visited Soueida during the week ostensibly to see her daughter, who recently married the Emir Hassan Atrash. Kemal Jumblat took the opportunity of making a speech in which he stressed the importance of the Druze community and the necessity for them to hold together.

With the full knowledge and agreement of M. Gens, the Chancellor in charge of French interests in Aleppo, the Syrian military authorities have now posted small armed guards in the various barracks and military buildings, which were formerly occupied by the French military authorities, but were left in the custody of French-appointed unarmed caretakers.

A number of Alaouite personalities including representative members of the Abbas, Kinj and Hawash families, have presented a violently worded protest to the Syrian Government. Copies have been received by foreign legations and are also in public circulation. The document accuses the Syrian Government of aiming at the dismemberment of the Alaouite Mohafazat and allowing representatives of the central Government to exercise uncontrolled authority in the area; certain of them are directly accused of malpractices and of withholding constitutional rights from the Alaouite people.

Lebanon.

The uncertainty regarding the intentions of the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs continued throughout the week, and confident reports on the 29th April that he had resigned and would be replaced in the Ministry by Sheikh Yusuf Istfan turned out to be at least premature.

The strike of tramway employees also continues. The Prime Minister announced in the Chamber of Deputies on the 25th April that his Government had asked the Tramway Company to conform to the 1943 Lebanese law laying down minimum rates of wages for industrial employees, but that the company had declined to do so, alleging that it was only bound by a previous decree of the French High Commissioner laying down lower minimum rates. The Government were therefore introducing a law stating categorically that all companies operating in the Lebanon were bound by the 1943 law; this was passed unanimously at the same sitting.

The Emir Faisal of Saudi Arabia and his brother, the Emir Mansour, left Beirut on the 29th April, after having been entertained almost continuously during their stay. A statement attributed by the press to the Emir Faisal to the effect that his country recognised the independent existence of the Lebanon within its present frontiers was received with satisfaction in the pro-French section of the press.

The Prime Minister finally yielded to Communist pressure in the matter of the suspension of the *Saut esh Shaab*, which was allowed to reappear on the 28th April.

Camille Bey Chamoun, the Lebanese Minister in London, arrived back in Beirut on the 24th April and was given a tumultuous reception by his electoral supporters. He has since been spreading the gospel that the Lebanon is in the hands of an unworthy clique, who are showing themselves unmindful of the benefits the country has received from Great Britain. He has also been making no secret of his conviction that only he can "save the country" from its present state of administrative and political chaos, and although he professes to be about to return to his post, it seems probable that he has hopes of being asked to remain and accept a portfolio in a reorganised Ministry.

The political officer, Tripoli, reports that considerable concern is being shown by local notables over the growing influence of the Communist party in the

area; Russian interest in the Easter services of the Orthodox sect was noticeable and reproaches are being freely levelled against British and Lebanese authorities for making no attempt to curb Soviet activities.

The Sous-Délégué for the Bekaa and some of his staff have talked of the French intention to open a Consulate in Zahlé, where the political officer for the Bekaa reports that staff of the "Sûreté aux Armées" are maintaining close contact with the local Communist leaders. Many telegrams were sent from this area to the Lebanese Government during the week protesting against the suspension of *Saut esh Shaab*.

[E 4889/213/89]

(8)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 213, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 7th May, 1946.—(Received 28th May.)

General.

ATTENTION in both countries has been largely concentrated during the week on the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry on Palestine. Press reaction has been uniformly hostile, though there have been indications from private contacts that certain of the Christian elements in the Lebanon would be not displeased to see an increase of Jewish influence in Palestine at the expense of Islam.

The press in both countries has devoted much space to the committee's report, and the intention of giving physical support to the Arabs of Palestine in their struggle against Zionism has been freely discussed. It seems to be generally believed that the British members of the committee must have yielded to the American members, who are assumed to have been subject to Jewish pressure—a reason frequently advanced is that the British are above all concerned not to prejudice their chances of securing the United States loan. The more intelligent commentators recognise that His Majesty's Government are not committed to accept the findings of the committee, but the fear is widespread that they may be obliged to do so in the interests of Anglo-American relations, and not least for the reason mentioned above—namely, the United States loan. The report itself is condemned *in toto*, and it is freely stated that if His Majesty's Government adopt a policy based on the report Great Britain will have flagrantly broken her word to the Arabs and will deserve to lose their friendship and respect. There has been some comment, particularly in the Lebanon, to the effect that support against the commission's recommendations should be sought from the Russians.

All towns in Syria and the Lebanon closed on the morning of the 3rd May, it is understood in response to a telegraphic request received from the Arab Higher Committee in Palestine. Speeches were made in the mosques and demonstrators paraded the streets, though on the whole the numbers taking part were smaller than might have been expected; the speeches were not violently hostile to the British (although the Americans came in for some hard words), and order was maintained. No instances have been reported of attacks on Jews or Jewish property.

The Lebanese Chamber, on the 7th May, debated and voted a moderately-worded motion calling on the Government to inform His Majesty's Government of their opposition to the committee's report, and of the intention of the Lebanon to support the Palestine Arabs in resisting any attempt to implement it.

The Syrian Prime Minister stated, on the 4th May, in the Chamber of Deputies that the British and American Governments had been informed by the Syrian Ministers in London and Washington that the Syrian Government rejected the report of the Anglo-American Committee, and that the Syrian Government had suggested to the secretary-general of the Arab League that a special meeting should be held to discuss the question of Palestine.

Delegations representing Syrian feminist organisations called at His Majesty's Legation, Damascus, and submitted protests, and a telegram of protest was addressed to His Majesty's Minister by the leader of the Shebab Mohammed.

Economic.

No figures received.

The British Trade Goodwill Mission, under the leadership of the Right Honourable Viscount Davidson, arrived in Damascus by air from Iraq on the

1st May as guests of the Syrian Government. They spent three days in Damascus; visited Homs and Hama on the way to Aleppo, where they had one clear day before going on, via Lattakia, to Tripoli, where they spent a day; and they arrived in Beirut on the 7th May. During their stay in Damascus they visited the President, members of the Government, and various factories, and also had talks with leading business men and industrialists. They were cordially received and were entertained by the President, the Minister of National Economy and the Association of Merchants.

The dispute between the Beirut Tramway Company and its employees was brought before a special court on the 3rd May, and a judgment given condemning the company to pay two years' arrears of the differences between their minimum rates of pay and those fixed by the 1943 law. The strike was, therefore, called off, but the company hold that the decision is not only illegal (having been taken by a purely Lebanese and not a mixed court), but raises far-reaching principles which will prejudice the interests of the foreign concessionary companies in the future.

Very heavy rain has fallen during the past week in both countries, and in the Aleppo area a number of mud-brick houses collapsed. Harvest prospects in the north are even better than they were a fortnight ago, particularly with regard to wheat, though some damage has been done to the barley crops, and it is feared that pests of various kinds may attack the vegetable crops as a result of the late rains. Great efforts are being made to destroy the large swarms of locusts which are now in the hopper stage and are scattered over a number of areas east of Aleppo. Anxiety is still felt, but the latest reports from the area suggest that the measures being taken will avert the serious damage which was at one time expected.

Another delegation of representatives of the American T.W.A. arrived in Damascus on the 2nd May, and further efforts were made to secure the agreement of the Syrian Government to the formation of a Syrian aviation company with American assistance. Independent sources report that they were unsuccessful.

Syria.

All members of the new Government attended a sitting of the Chamber on the 1st May, when the Government's statement of policy was read. After some discussion it was agreed that the statement should be printed and circulated before debate, and the Chamber adjourned until the 4th May. The following are the main points in the statement:—

- (1) *Internal Administration.*—Radical changes would be effected without having recourse to extremes. Where necessary existing laws and decrees would be replaced by new legislation, and incompetent Government officials and those guilty of maladministration would be dismissed; new elements would be recruited, and use would be made of technical experts from all foreign countries without discrimination.
- (2) *Finance.*—Taxation would be readjusted; study of the currency question which had been begun would be continued and a report submitted to the Chamber.
- (3) *Public Works.*—New roads would be constructed and the possibility of new railways studied. A Department of Civil Aviation would be created, and special attention paid to internal communications.
- (4) *Agriculture and Industry.*—Agriculture and industry would be developed; it was the intention of the Government to maintain the Mira organisation, but to introduce a new policy to safeguard the interests of both the consumer and the producer.
- (5) *Commerce.*—A ten-year plan of economic reconstruction would be worked out. Efforts would be made to increase production, and legislation introduced to protect indigenous production. Government resources would be exploited either directly or in partnership with other companies. Legislation would be drawn up for the control of public companies, and a labour law would be drafted together with a scheme of social insurance.
- (6) *Education.*—Elementary education would be made universal.
- (7) *Justice.*—Two experts had been engaged in drafting new Civil and Penal Codes, which would shortly be submitted to the Chamber. It was the intention of the Government to unify the various courts and make them purely national.
- (8) *National Defence.*—The reorganisation and re-equipment of the army would be studied, and it was the opinion of the Government that in

technical matters the desert force, gendarmerie and police should be combined with the army. The Conscription Law and Army Law would be submitted to the Chamber when prepared, and military missions would be sent to foreign countries.

(9) *Foreign Policy.*—The Government would work in harmony with the United Nations Organisation, and endeavour to maintain the best relations with Great Britain, the United States and the U.S.S.R. No concessions nor privileges would be granted to any State. A policy of the closest collaboration with other Arab States and of strengthening the Arab League would be maintained. The Government would do its utmost to fight against Zionism, and to assist Palestine to maintain its Arab character.

A somewhat lengthy debate followed, in which some of the Deputies criticised the vagueness of the Government's statements. In his reply to the debate the Prime Minister stated that the country had now entered a "technical struggle" for the successful conclusion of which a world policy was necessary. The key posts in this struggle would be those of National Economy, Public Works and Education and not Foreign Affairs and the Interior. Modern travel facilities had made the world more of a unit than ever before, and it was in Syria's interests to adopt whatever was good but to avoid blind imitation. The Government's programme was inevitably only an outline, the details of which would have to be filled in by the experts. The American Agricultural Mission had already submitted its report and a Belgian expert was at work on administrative reform. A health expert had been sought from Switzerland and taxation problems would also be studied by an expert. Speaking of the Syrian currency, he said that the link with the franc was one which it was not in the power of the Government to break forthwith but he hoped that the international financial organisation would in due course bring a remedy. Irrigation schemes using the waters of the Euphrates, and the connexion of Syria and Iraq by railway, had been discussed during the recent visit of Nuri Pasha Said when, the Prime Minister emphasised, no political problems had been discussed. The civil service would be purged and officials would be sent abroad for training. An Egyptian jurist had been engaged to revise the Legal Code. Political organisations working for the good of the country and not inspired from abroad would be encouraged but the Government would resolutely combat foreign propaganda. Religious beliefs would be respected but it was not the duty of the Government to intervene in private matters in an effort to influence the morals of the public. As regards foreign affairs the Government's policy was not inspired by any Power and tribute to the services rendered by Great Britain was no sacrifice of Syria's rights nor did it entail British influence in Syrian policy.

Seventy-seven Deputies voted for the Government and eleven against; there were eight abstentions. During the debate the Hatay question was raised by several Deputies, the attention of the Government was drawn to the decline in public morals (the unveiling of women, &c.) and the Government were asked whether the Communist teachers who had been responsible for the telegram sent to the Egyptian Government last January (see Weekly Political Summary No. 199, "Syria," paragraph 2) were still in their posts.

M. Brunner, Swiss Minister in Cairo, arrived in Damascus during the week to present his credentials to the Syrian President.

According to the press the Netherlands Government have recognised Syrian independence.

Lebanon.

It was finally announced on the 3rd May that the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs had reconsidered his decision to resign from the Ministry, on condition that he was allowed to devote himself entirely to foreign affairs in the future. A reshuffle of the Ministry was arranged on this basis and the new allocation of portfolios was announced that evening as follows:—

Samie es Solh: Prime Minister, Justice, Posts and Telegraphs.
Gabriel Murr: Deputy Prime Minister and Public Works.
Hamid Frangieh: Foreign Affairs.
Emile Lahoud: Finance.
Saadi Munla: Interior.
Philippe Takla: National Economy, National Education.
Ahmed Assad: National Defence and Agriculture.
Dr. Jamil Talhouk: Health.

The new ministerial combination seems to have pleased nobody, and during the week public and press criticism of the administration has been openly voiced on all sides. Joseph Salem, who is particularly disgruntled that Hamid Frangieh should not have followed his example and carried out the decision to resign which they took jointly in Paris, on the 5th May, published in the Beirut newspaper *L'Orient* an article containing a bitter denunciation of the régime and a serious warning of the dangers likely to confront it in the near future, particularly in the fields of economy and finance; much of what he said was fully justified, but the effect on public opinion was lessened by the consideration that he himself, during his tenure of office as Minister of the Interior, had done little to mitigate the evils he was denouncing. Henri Pharaon has also published criticisms of the internal administration, and has declared his willingness to serve in a Coalition Government even containing Riad Solh, provided that the latter was not Prime Minister. On the 7th May a group of Deputies and notables, including Habib Trad and Alfred Naccache, presented to the President a petition calling for far-reaching administrative and constitutional reforms. It would appear that this crescendo of criticism is at last affecting the previous confidence and facile optimism of the President and Prime Minister, but there is as yet no indication that either is resolved to tackle the situation by taking any of the drastic measures which would be needed.

As a result of the findings of a committee of enquiry appointed to investigate the alleged scandals in the Lebanese gendarmerie, the Government have announced that the head of the gendarmerie, Colonel Rifai, has been transferred to another post and a successor appointed. This decision is generally considered adequate, since it is understood that the committee found some at least of the charges against Colonel Rifai were true.

The newly-created Armenian Catholic Cardinal, Agagianian, returned to Beirut on the 3rd May. He has been received by the President and several celebrations have been given in his honour.

The first Turkish Minister to the Lebanon presented his letters of credence on the 3rd May.

[E 4986/213/34]

(9)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 214, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 14th May, 1946.—(Received 31st May.)

General.

THE press campaign against the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry on Palestine has continued unabated during the week. The possibilities of a resort to force and an appeal to the U.S.S.R. and to the U.N.O. are being freely discussed. The decision of His Majesty's Government to evacuate Egypt has been generally welcomed, but there has been criticism of the British attitude, as reported in the press, with regard to the return of Libya to Italian control.

On the 14th May the Lebanese and Syrian Presidents received emissaries from King Farouk, bringing a proposal that the Arab rulers should meet in secret conclave, at a place and date to be fixed later, in order to discuss the common attitude to be adopted in regard to Palestine. The Presidents accepted the proposal. It is understood that the special meeting of the Arab League, which was to begin at Bludan, near Damascus, on the 18th May, has been postponed until after the meeting of the heads of Arab States.

Representatives of the Palestine Arabs, Rafiq Tamimi and Yusuf Sayoun, visited the Levant States to sound the Syrian and Lebanese Governments as to the desirability of the Arab States bringing the question of Palestine before U.N.O. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs states that he discouraged them, pointing out that to take such action before all hope in His Majesty's Government and the United States Government had been lost would inevitably have the effect of ranging the Arab States and the Soviet Union in opposition to Great Britain and the United States. He also warned them of the formidable pressure which the Zionists could exercise in the United Nations Assembly. The emissaries apparently gave him to understand that they agreed with his point of view. A reception was given in their honour by the Moslem Youth Association of Damascus.

The French Government have decided to transform their Délégation Générale at Beirut into normal diplomatic representation, and have asked for the *agrément* of the Lebanese Government to the appointment of Count Armand du Chayla as first French Minister to the Lebanon; this the Lebanese Government have accorded. It is intended that General Beynet shall leave for France at the end of June, that Count du Chayla will arrive early in July and that Count Ostrorog will remain for a few days after his arrival and will then also leave. M. Lucet, of the Quai d'Orsay, is to be Count du Chayla's principal assistant. It is noteworthy that the French, by appointing a Minister, have waived the claim which it was at one time thought they would put forward to perpetual precedence for their diplomatic representative in the Lebanon.

It has now been learned that when the Syrian Prime Minister visited Beirut on the 29th April, the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs took up with him the question of the French schools in Syria and induced him to allow these to be opened at the beginning of the next scholastic year. Hamid Bey Frangih conveyed this information to the French and states that he has now received the personal thanks of M. Bidault for his assistance in the matter. When Saadullah Jabri again visited Beirut on the 12th May, he confirmed his promise regarding the schools, though it is possible that as yet undisclosed conditions may be attached to their reopening, and also authorised the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to inform the French that his Government would be prepared to accord the *agrément* to a suitable French Minister to Syria if the French Government were to ask for it.

Economic.

No figures received.

The British Goodwill Trade Mission arrived in Beirut from Tripoli on the 8th May and left for Cyprus on the 13th May. The President gave a large party, and the Minister of National Economy a luncheon, in their honour, and they were entertained by His Majesty's Minister and by a number of local bodies and personalities; they also had opportunities of meeting all the leading Lebanese figures in the commercial and industrial fields. Their visit undoubtedly gave great pleasure in local circles and stimulated interest in commercial relations with the United Kingdom, though some disappointment was expressed at the rightly guarded tone of their pronouncements on the possibility of British goods being supplied to the Lebanon in the near future.

A conference of the Union of Syrian Labour Syndicates was attended in Damascus by about 1,000 people, including four Cabinet Ministers and also several Deputies. Mr. Wilkinson, the trade union representative on the British Goodwill Trade Mission, accepted an invitation to be present, and conveyed the good wishes of the British Trade Union Movement, promising any assistance that Syrian trade syndicates might require from British trade unions. He was warmly applauded. Mr. Wilkinson then had to withdraw in order to return to Beirut. The next speaker, Moustafa el Ariss, the delegate of the Lebanese Syndicates Union and a well-known Communist, then made a violent attack upon him. He denied that Mr. Wilkinson was a representative of the British Trade Union Movement, and stated that he had come on behalf of British industrialists, capitalists and Zionists; he, Moustafa Ariss, was the original representative at the International Federation of Trades Unions, and he knew that Mr. Wilkinson was not the delegate of the British Trades Union; as regards Anglo-Arab friendship, the recent report on Palestine was a good indication of its value. Moustafa el Ariss concluded that it was not sufficient to be rid of foreign troops; the country should also be rid of people like Mr. Wilkinson, who were trying to deceive the workers.

This speech was loudly applauded, and it is to be regretted that neither the chairman or secretary of the Damascus Union of Syndicates, nor any of the Ministers present, had the courage to call Moustafa el Ariss to order; as a result the Communist leaders were able to exploit the meeting to the full. No less than fifteen speakers took part and, while confidence was expressed in the country's leaders, an appeal was made for the fight against feudalism, the tyranny of the employers, poverty, disease and ignorance, and in particular a demand was made that labour legislation should be expedited. Nineteen resolutions were passed covering *inter alia* the following subjects: the strengthening of the Arab League (including the removal of customs barriers and travel restrictions), disapproval of the Palestine Report, reinforcement of the boycott of Zionist goods, revision of the Electoral Law, reopening of the Hejaz Railway, a 40-hour week, reduction of the cost of living, unemployment, public works (including the construction

of the Lattakia Port pending the return of Alexandretta), opening of night schools, hospitals, &c.

The Lebanese Ministers of Finance and National Economy left for Damascus on the 13th May for conversations with the Syrian Government on the establishment of a joint grain-collecting scheme and other commercial matters.

At a press interview the Syrian Minister for National Economy stated that the export of all articles would be free, with the exception of cereals and cereal products, rice, cotton thread and cotton piece goods, and that imports would be controlled and only necessary articles allowed into the country.

Syria.

The Syrian Chamber of Deputies met twice in the course of the week. At a sitting on the 9th May business before the House included two draft Bills, one providing for the transfer of the Control of Confessionary Companies from the Ministry of Public Works to the Ministry of National Economy and a second dealing with municipal elections. The former was withdrawn by the Government, and the debate on the latter was postponed till the next sitting, when, however, the Minister of the Interior informed the House that the Belgian expert on administrative affairs had requested that the debate should be postponed in order that his recommendations might be given consideration.

On "Martyrs' Day," the 6th May, a meeting was held at the Liberal Union Club, close to the Parliament building, at which speeches were made and reproduced by loudspeakers fixed outside the club violently attacking the policy of the Government and individual members. (The Liberal Union Club is a recent combination of three political groups, all of which are hostile to the National bloc. Its members are mainly lawyers and doctors.) On the instructions of the Minister of the Interior, the club was closed and sealed, and Fehmi Mahayri, the secretary, arrested. The arrest of Mahayri and the closing of the club created a considerable stir; the new newspaper, controlled by the Parliamentary Liberal group, *El Yaqar*, accused the Government of Hitlerian tactics; Fehmi Mahayri began a hunger strike and eighty-five lawyers offered to defend him in the courts.

At the sitting of the Chamber on the 11th May a question was asked regarding the closing of the Liberal Union Club and the arrest of its secretary. The Minister of the Interior replied that at the meeting held at the club on Martyrs' Day a number of speakers had made violent accusations against the Government and the régime. The Government, in accordance with article 63 of the Penal Code, had arrested Fehmi Mahayri and referred his case to the courts. The club had been closed in accordance with Articles 2, 3 and 12 of the Ottoman Law of Associations. In the course of subsequent discussion, when a charge of discrimination was brought against the Government, the Minister of the Interior stated that he would issue a decree to all Mohafazes instructing them to forbid all parties and associations which did not comply with the law. He added that in future such institutions would be permitted to function only after they had received permits from the Ministry of the Interior. Several speakers criticised this statement and Naim Antaki suggested that the Ministry of the Interior should be assisted in their examination of applications for permits by an advisory committee of independent standing.

It is possible that the closing of the Liberal Union Club will have further repercussions, since the club is known to be pro-Monarchist and in favour of a Greater Syria, and its organisers are in touch with the Druzes, regarding whose open dissatisfaction with the Central Government reports continue to be received, with Alaouites, and with the Parliamentary Liberal Group.

Hassan Bey Jabbara, former Minister of Finance and National Economy, has been appointed Director-General of Finance and the Syrian Government representative on the Supreme Council of Common Interests.

Lebanon.

The Beirut press has continued to fulminate on the subject of Palestine, and one anti-Zionist organisation has announced the opening of a recruiting office for volunteers anxious to defend the Arab cause in Palestine. On the 9th May a fire broke out in the offices of the United States Information Service, apparently due to sabotage, and on the following day two shops in Beirut, one Jewish, the other (Messrs. Spinneys) generally, though erroneously, believed to be Jewish, were damaged by bomb explosions.

The weakness of the Lebanese Government's position is causing grave concern to the President, who is now convinced that some radical change must be made, but cannot decide on the best way of making it, in view of the difficulty of finding a Sunni Moslem Prime Minister who would be acceptable to majority opinion.

He undoubtedly hankers after Riad Solh, but realises that Henri Pharaon's inveterate opposition to him would make it difficult for him to acquire a majority in the Chamber and almost impossible to remain in power until next year's elections; and he has objections to all other possible candidates. Consultations are proceeding, but may not come to a head for some time. In the meantime the Prime Minister declared his intention of asking for a vote of confidence at the sitting of the Chamber on the 14th May, but at the last minute postponed it until the sitting of the 16th May. The situation is extremely fluid and the course of events cannot be predicted.

The two rival Druze Deputies, the Amir Majid Arslan and Kamal Jumblatt, had an unseemly and violent altercation at the Chamber sitting of the 9th May, as a result of which the Speaker ordered Kamal Jumblatt to leave the Chamber. He went, shouting threats to return by force of arms. In view of the serious possibility that the partisans of the two would come to blows in the mountains, the President and prominent personalities like Riad Solh took immediate steps to effect a reconciliation, which was accomplished at a luncheon at the Normandy Hotel on the 11th May.

It is reported that about 50 per cent. of the residents of Anjar and other small Armenian settlements in the Bekaa, who registered their names for immigration to Soviet Armenia, were originally informed that the first party will leave Beirut early in May. They have now, however, been told that departure has been postponed, and that it may not be possible for the total number to leave. It has been explained that accommodation at the other end is not available, and the first parties will be required to organise and build houses for those who follow.

[E 5081/213/89]

(10)

Extract from *Weekly Political Summary No. 215, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 21st May, 1946.*—(Received 4th June.)

General.

THE report of the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine continues to be violently attacked in the press of both countries, and in the Lebanon, particularly, attention has been given to the possibility of an appeal to the U.S.S.R. From Aleppo come reports that the Arab Popular (National) party there is enrolling volunteers for active service against the Jews in Palestine, if and when necessary; that a strongly-worded pamphlet probably issued by the same organisation is in circulation, calling upon Arabs in Aleppo, in the event of a Holy War being declared against the Jews in Palestine, to be prepared to receive Arab women and children refugees from Palestine; and that a committee for the defence of Palestine has been formed amongst the leading personalities, including Ihsan Jabri, the brother of the Prime Minister, and Rushdi Kakhia, one of the Opposition leaders. The announcement of the meeting of the heads of Arab States on the 28th May has been warmly welcomed in all circles.

On the 20th May, on instructions from His Majesty's Government, a communication was addressed to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments recalling that His Majesty's Government had announced their intention of consulting all parties concerned before reaching a decision on the recommendations made by the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, and inviting the two Governments to state their views before the 20th June on each of the ten recommendations made by the Committee. Jamal Husseini and Dr. Tamous, the Palestine leaders, after visiting Damascus left on the 21st May for Beirut.

Economic.

In spite of the resignation of the Lebanese Government (see "Lebanon" below) the Communist Moustafa Ariss and the Trades Union Federation persisted in calling a general strike in Beirut on the 20th May in protest against the delay in the passing of the labour law. The strike was only partially successful owing to the opposition of the rival Labour Front under the influence of Henri Pharaon. It is noteworthy, however, that a pamphlet has been published by the Labour Front indicating that it would call for a general strike if the labour law were not passed in the course of the present session.

Between 6,000 and 7,000 hand-loom weavers went on strike in Aleppo on the 20th May to protest against the decision of their employers to reduce their wages

to the level which was in force four months ago, when a 20 per cent. increase of pay was granted to them.

According to the press, the Syrian Ministry of National Economy has decided to hold in Aleppo this year an agricultural and industrial exhibition. A special committee has been formed, including a number of Aleppo Deputies, for the realisation of this project.

After surveying and examining the Raqqa area in order to ascertain its oil-bearing possibilities, geologists of the Syrian Petroleum Company have in recent weeks been similarly examining the Azaz, Idlib and Jebel Samaan districts.

The threat to this year's excellent crops from locusts, which recently was thought to have receded, has again given cause for anxiety; the Syrian authorities have applied to His Majesty's Legation for assistance in the supply of locust-fighting material.

Damascus.

At the seventh meeting of the sixth ordinary session of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies held on the 13th May, a draft Bill was introduced to revise the electoral law; the main differences from the existing law are as follows:—

- (a) That Deputies be elected by one-degree suffrage instead of two-degree suffrage.
- (b) That there should be one Deputy for every 8,000 electors instead of for every 6,000.
- (c) That Deputies be elected to represent religious communities, i.e., Moslems, Christians, Jews, instead of religious sects or denominations such as Sunnis, Shias, Druze, Greek Orthodox, Catholics, Protestants, Armenians, &c.

The Speaker referred this draft Bill to the Constitutional Committee.

A decree has been issued by the Minister of the Interior dated the 14th May dissolving all political bodies and societies (see "Damascus," paragraph 2, Weekly Political Summary No. 214), and stating that no such society will in future be allowed to hold meetings without having previously obtained official authorisation and an official permit approving its constitution. Several papers have commented unfavourably on the decree, accusing the Government of dictatorial methods.

Twice during the past week Syrian Government circles have been disturbed by messages carried by Reuters. The first, date-lined Cairo, stated that the Druzes and Alaouites were in a state of revolt against the Syrian Government and were contemplating seceding to Transjordan and the Lebanon respectively. This called forth strong verbal protests to His Majesty's Minister against Reuters from both the President of the republic and the Prime Minister, and categorical denials and angry comment from the Damascus press. Statements from both Druze and Alaouite Deputies denying the report of any dissatisfaction with the Government have subsequently been published, and one Damascus newspaper demanded that the Government should insist that Reuters should publish a *démenti* through the same channels as the original news was disseminated. The same paper expressed the opinion that there was more in the matter than met the eye and suggested a "conspiracy," further aspects of which would come to light later. Later in the week a Reuters message from Beirut quoted Richard Wyndham, correspondent of the *News of the World*, as saying that the Arabs would take steps to sever all cultural and economic relations with Great Britain and the United States if the report were implemented. British and American schools would be asked to close down and assistance by force of arms to the Arabs of Palestine would be organised by Nebih el Azmi, Syrian Minister of Defence. Further verbal protests were made to His Majesty's Minister about this message on the lines that while an individual newspaper correspondent might have the right to say what he pleased, Reuters should not distribute such tendentious material throughout the world, more particularly as Reuters was generally believed to be sponsored by His Majesty's Government.

The trial of the murder of Sheikh Trad el Mulheim (see Weekly Political Summary No. 197, Section 3, paragraph 3) has been resumed on the receipt of a medical report stating that the age of the accused was between 18 and 19 years and that he had therefore attained his majority under Syrian law and could be held fully responsible for his actions.

Eight Bedouins suspected of participating in the recent desert hold-ups (see Weekly Political Summary No. 212, "Damascus," paragraph 5) were arrested on the 14th May but have since been released on the ground that there is no

evidence against them. It is possible that their release was due to the intervention of Sheikh Fuaz Shaalan, whom the Government appear to be particularly anxious to propitiate.

The Prime Minister has asked the Syrian Chamber of Deputies to reconsider the matter of Deputies nominated by the Government for diplomatic and other missions abroad (see Weekly Political Summary No. 201, "Damascus," paragraph 5) and to approve the prolongation of the appointments of the Deputies on diplomatic missions in Paris, Washington and Cairo for a period of six months in view of the many problems which demand their attention. One of the Deputies pointed out that the law was quite clear on this matter and that the Chamber did not wish to contravene it; he suggested that the Government should submit a draft Bill embodying their proposal.

Lebanon.

The Lebanese Prime Minister, Sami Solh, let it be known that he would ask for the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies on the 18th May, but on the eve of the meeting two members of his Government owing allegiance to the Independence party, Ahmed Assad and Saadi Munla, resigned. The Prime Minister therefore contented himself with a speech outlining the achievements of his administration (stressing particularly the withdrawal of foreign troops and the transfer of services under French control) and announced his resignation.

THE Presidents of Syria and the Lebanon left Damascus and Beirut Ministry, but the difficulty of finding a Sunni Moslem Prime Minister who would be acceptable to the majority of the Deputies became immediately apparent. The President clearly wished to see Riad Solh form the Ministry but realised that Henri Pharaon's opposition would make it difficult to obtain the necessary majority. An attempt was made by Abdul Hamid Kerame to form a Government but he was unable to persuade his supporters to accept his conditions, which included a modification of the electoral law. Saadi Munla was then invited to form a Government which was to include Riad Solh, Habib Abi Chahla and Camille Chamoun, but negotiations broke down owing to bitter internal rivalries between Riad Solh and Henri Pharaon, and on the 22nd May the new Government was announced as follows:—

Saadi Munla (Sunni Moslem): Prime Minister and National Economy.
Gabriel Murr (Greek Orthodox): Deputy Prime Minister and Public Works.
Sayed Ahmed Hussein (Shia Moslem): Justice.
Saib Salam (Sunni Moslem): Interior.
Emile Lahoud (Maronite): Finance.
Emir Majid Arslan (Druze): Public Health and Defence.
Joseph Hrawi (Maronite): Agriculture and Posts and Telegraphs.
Phillipe Tacia (Greek Catholic): Minister for Foreign Affairs and Education.

The new Ministry is weak and lack competent administrators. The Prime Minister is a colourless individual who was selected by the President as a compromise when it became clear that no other Sunni Moslem could hope to command the necessary support. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is well meaning and intelligent but lacks experience. The Ministry is therefore unlikely to accomplish much, and its only chance of survival lies in the probable inability of the leaders of the various factions in the Chamber to combine against it.

The newly appointed Swiss and Yugoslav Ministers, M. Brunner and M. Brudievic, presented their letters of credence to the President on the 20th May.

According to the press, Fouad Amoun, Secretary-General of the Lebanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs, will attend the coronation ceremonies at Amman as a special envoy.

[E 5377/213/89]

(11)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 216, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 25th May, 1946.—(Received 13th June.)

General.

The President immediately began consultation for the formation of a new respectively by air on the 28th May for the meeting in Egypt of the heads of Arab States. They were each accompanied only by the Secretary to the Presidency and one A.D.C.

Criticism of the Anglo-American Committee's report on Palestine continues to figure largely in the press of both countries, and reports continue to be received of the formation of organisations to assist the Arabs of Palestine should the committee's recommendations be put into effect. References to partition have appeared in the local newspapers, and there have been indications that in Monarchist-Greater Syria circles solution is favoured as being the least of the many possible evils. There appears to be no desire that the problem should be referred to the United Nations Organisation, as it is felt that either Jewish influence would lead to the success of Zionist claims, or at least that the Arab case would be sponsored by Russia. In responsible circles it appears to be considered that a debt of gratitude to Russia would, in the long run, bode ill for the independence of the Arab States.

The Damascus press has published the texts of telegrams exchanged between the President of Syria and His Majesty The King. The President's telegram stated that the report of the Anglo-American Committee had caused great anxiety and deep pain in all Arab countries, and that the carrying out of its recommendations would threaten world peace and foment disorder, which would necessarily trouble the tranquillity and friendship existing between the Arab and Anglo-Saxon peoples. The telegrams ended with a request to His Majesty to intervene to prevent the adoption of the recommendations in order to safeguard the friendship of the two peoples as well as the security and safety of the Near East. His Majesty The King replied to the effect that the matter was receiving the urgent attention of his Government, who had announced their intentions of consulting the Arabs before taking any decision. A telegram from President Truman, replying to one sent to him by Shukri Quwatli, has also been published. President Truman informed Shukri Bey that the ideas expressed in the latter's telegram in regard to the report of the Anglo-American Committee would receive earnest consideration and that no change in the fundamental status of Palestine would be made without previously consulting the Arab and Jewish leaders. A similar exchange of telegrams had taken place with the Lebanese President.

Economic.

No figures received.

Syria.

At the eighth sitting of the sixth ordinary session of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies held on the 21st May the Secretary read out a telegram from the Speaker of the Egyptian Chamber thanking the Syrian Chamber for their support of Egyptian national demands. A telegram from a number of Iraqi notables, including Nouri Pasha Said and Jamil Madfai, was also read, notifying the Syrian Chamber of the formation of a committee in Iraq to defend Palestine and calling for joint action. Naim Antaki, a former Minister for Foreign Affairs, referring to the latter telegram, said that it certainly deserved their close attention, but added that he had read that morning that His Majesty King Feisal II proposed to leave for England on a Turkish yacht via Alexandretta; he thought that the choice of Alexandretta as a point of departure might conceal many things. He asked whether there was any connexion between Nouri Pasha's visit to Iraq and the King's journey and whether Nouri Pasha had had any political conversations while in Turkey. The President of the Chamber interrupted the speaker, pointing out that the subject was not included in the agenda, but before he sat down Naim Bey said members should remember that their duty should not be confined to the defence of Palestine only, but should include also the defence of Alexandretta. The Syrian Prime Minister subsequently expressed his astonishment to His Majesty's Minister that King Feisal was to leave from Alexandretta; the Syrian Government should surely have received formal notification from the Iraqi Government; apart from the question of courtesy, there was a security aspect of obvious importance.

At the same sitting of the Chamber a draft Bill for the setting-up of machinery for the collection and distribution of cereals was referred to the competent committees after considerable criticism from many of the Deputies. Further sittings were held during the week at which the main business was the debate on the Labour Bill, which was finally passed on the 28th May without major modifications, except for the excision of an article which provided that foreigners could become members of Syrian labour unions.

The Prime Minister at a press conference stated that the Syrian Minister in Paris had asked for instructions as to what reply he should return to three questions put to him by the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs: (1) the question of French diplomatic representation in Syria, (2) the question of French schools,

and (3) the question of French property in Syria. Saadullah Bey Jabri said that the following reply had been sent: (1) the Syrian Government accepts the resumption of normal diplomatic relations on a basis of no pre-eminence or privilege, (2) French schools will be permitted to reopen if they comply with the laws and regulations in force, and (3) any question in suspense may be discussed in the normal way now that evacuation is complete. Subsequently, one of the Damascus newspapers criticised the last of these statements on the grounds that evacuation from the Lebanon was not yet complete.

Considerable press publicity was given to the coronation ceremonies in Amman and the speeches made by King Abdullah, but there was some criticism of the Syrian Government's refusal to issue exit permits for Syrians wishing to attend the coronation. The Syrian Government were not invited by King Abdullah to send representatives, but the Syrian Consul in Jerusalem was instructed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to attend.

M. Ashraf Badnjevic, the newly accredited Yugoslav Minister to Syria, presented his letters of credence to the President on Wednesday, the 22nd May. Subsequently the Minister gave an interview to the editor of *Al Ayyam* newspaper in which he stressed the desire of the 1 million Moslems in Bosnia and Herzegovina to make contact with the Moslems of Syria and said that Yugoslavia as a whole, which contains so many different denominations, feels a strong sympathy towards Syria, whose population also comprises many different denominations.

The Damascus press reports that Ihsan Bey Sherif (Syrian Personalities No. 197), at present Mohafez of Aleppo, has been appointed Syrian Minister at Angora.

A decree published in the Syrian *Official Journal* of the 16th May puts into force an agreement concluded between the Syrian Prime Minister and Dr. Abdul Razzak Sanhoury Pasha, who will act as "technical adviser" to the Syrian Government for a period of six months. It is not yet certain in what capacity he will act, though it is probable that he will be asked to advise on the revision of the legal codes.

Lebanon.

The situation in the Lebanon continues to slide slowly but surely downhill. The Government is popularly known as a "Gouvernement d'estivage" and no one expects any kind of action to avert the economic crisis which is generally recognised to be imminent. The members of the Chamber as a whole have their eyes fixed on the coming elections and cannot be induced to take any interest in the more immediate and vital problems confronting the country. The hiatus between the country as a whole and the Cabinet is becoming daily more marked; the legitimate grievances of the former are becoming increasingly articulate whereas the inaction of the latter is becoming increasingly more apparent.

The new Lebanese Cabinet faced the Chamber for the first time on the 25th May. The statement on the Government's policy, which was short and modest in scope, was not seriously debated and Saadi Munla secured the confidence of the Chamber with one abstention.

Further sittings were held during the week and on the 29th May a beginning was made with a debate on the new Labour Law. Adil Osseyram suggested that a foreign expert should be called in to advise the Government on the provisions of the law, and pointed out that it was essential that nothing should be done which would discourage foreign capital being invested in the Lebanon. It is known that the Prime Minister also favours securing the services of foreign experts in this connexion, and he has informed a member of the legation staff that he would, if possible, defer the voting of the law during the present session and arrange for an extraordinary session when the matter had been properly studied.

A further declaration has been published by the notables who were responsible for the petition on the subject of constitutional reform recently presented to the President (see Weekly Political Summary No. 213, section 4, paragraph 3). There is evidence that the attack on the President's position is being developed, a manoeuvre which the present strained relations between him and Riad Solh will make it more difficult for him to counter. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the President is either unable or unwilling to face the serious economic and political crisis with which he quite clearly will be confronted in the near future.

The Prime Minister has stated, in conversation with a member of the legation staff, that he is in favour of appointing foreign experts in all Government

Departments, and that as regards constitutional and electoral reform he proposes to strengthen the position of the Government by restricting the question of confidence to the budget session, and to resist any proposal for conducting elections on the basis of a caza (as opposed to the Mohafazat) as the former would lead to the election of Communist Deputies and elements hostile to Arab co-operation. He and the Minister of the Interior have made a good start by ordering the arrest of a number of the former's supporters who were responsible for a "feu de joie" during his visit to Tripoli. The latter has emphasised the importance he attaches to the maintenance of law and order and has also announced to the press that the Government would in future only order the suspension of the newspapers when articles liable to prejudice the good relations of the Lebanon with other countries were published; in other cases recourse would be had to the courts.

Before the Lebanese President left for Cairo His Majesty's Minister had an opportunity of drawing his attention to the conduct of Moustapha Ariss during the recent conference of syndicates in Damascus (Weekly Political Summary No. 214, Syria, paragraph 3). The President was clearly concerned about Communist activities, but was vague as to what action could be taken by the Government to curb them.

Ex-President Eddé left for Paris by the s.s. *André Lebou* on the 28th May. Reports have been received that he also intends to visit London and Rome. Count Ostrorog informed the press that French military personnel also left by the same ship, which would return for the last contingent in the middle of June. He also announced that Count du Chayla, the new French Minister, would arrive towards the end of July.

On the 19th May the Communists held a large meeting in Zahlé. It is estimated that 2,000 attended, many from outlying districts of the Bekaa in transport provided by the party. Speeches were made by a number of Lebanese Communists, and by Khaled Bagdash, which covered the usual ground with the addition on this occasion that a demand for complete independence of all Arab countries was made, though no mention was made of the political situation in Palestine. All speakers thanked the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for having secured the evacuation of foreign troops and the complete independence of the Levant States. The Political Officer in the Bekaa reports that he is informed that the speeches of all the more important leaders of the party are first vetted by the Soviet authorities in Beirut, and they are required to keep strictly to the approved text. The Communists are making a considerable impression in the area and their Moslem following is increasing.

At a sitting of the Chamber on the 27th May, after some lively discussion and the acceptance of certain amendments, a law prohibiting the growing of hashish was approved.

With one exception, a Shia newspaper, which devoted its front page to the event, the Beirut Arabic press gave little prominence to the enthronement ceremonies at Amman.

[E 5808/213/89]

(12)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 217, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 4th June, 1946.—(Received 25th June.)

General.

THE communiqué published after the meeting of the Arab rulers at Inshass has on the whole been well received in both countries. *An-Nahar*, the leading Beirut Arab newspaper, emphasised that the meeting indirectly eliminated the possibility of Russian intervention in the Palestine question, stating that it impressed, on the one hand, British and American statesmen, and, on the other hand, certain Arab circles, which, despairing of the Anglo-Saxons, were tempted to appeal to Russia.

His Majesty's Minister was received by the Lebanese President on the latter's return from Inshass, and formed the impression that the President had done what he could to induce a reasonable attitude, but that he had been unable to achieve much in view of the outright opposition of the Arab rulers to the report of the Anglo-American Committee. The President indicated that the conference was strongly opposed to Russian intervention, that an appeal to the United

Nations Organisation was not regarded with favour, and that the rulers had shown a real desire for friendship with Britain provided a solution to the Palestine problem satisfactory to the Arabs was found. His Majesty's Minister impressed upon the President that he had received instructions to request the Lebanese Government, when furnishing their comments on the recommendations of the committee, to make constructive proposals and not merely confine themselves to negative criticism.

The Syrian Government replied, on the 27th May, to the communication addressed to them on instructions from the Foreign Office by His Majesty's Minister asking for their views on the ten recommendations put forward by the Anglo-American Committee. The reply stated that the Syrian Government must reserve a detailed expression of opinion until an exchange of views between the Arab States had been made and a joint plan had been decided upon. At the same time they felt bound to express extreme astonishment at these recommendations, which, in their views, were the result of hasty and superficial study, inadequate in view of the far-reaching consequences which would ensue. These recommendations were ruinous to Arab rights, a threat to Arab existence, and liable to lead to disturbances of the peace and security in this part of the world. In conclusion, while disapproving of these recommendations as contrary to the rights and hopes of the Arab people in general, and the Palestinian people in particular, the Syrian Government expressed confidence that His Majesty's Government would, when deciding on Palestinian policy, not rely on the committee's recommendations.

A Damascus newspaper of the 26th May reported that a conference had been held in the house of Lutfi Haffar, an ex-Prime Minister and one of the leading members of the Committee for the Defence of Palestine at the time of the Bludan Conference in 1937, to discuss the question of Palestine; at the meeting the following committees were formed:—

Political Committee.—Lutfi el Haffar, Said el Ghazzi, Nessib el Bakri, Naim Antaki, Afif el Solh, Toufiq Chamiyeh, Farid Zein Eddin.

Financial Committee.—Mussalam Siyoufi, Badr Eddin Diab, Abdul Hamid Tabba, Beshir Ramadan, Nohad Ibrahim Pasha, Abdul Hamid Diab, Mussallam Diab.

Propaganda Committee.—Fakhri Baroodi, Nejib el Rayis, Wajih el Haffar, Mohammed el Mubarak, Youssef el Issa, Khaled el Sheluq, Habib Kahhali, Amin Said.

Emergency Committee.—Sheikh Mustafa el Sebai, Dr. Munir el Sadaat, Sobhi el Omari, Dr. Zaki el Jabi, Emir Ahmad el Shehabi, Dr. Beshir Qadamani, Munir el Malki, &c.

A Higher Committee for the Defence of Palestine was to be formed of the presidents and secretaries of the above committees. The name of Nebih el Azmi, the Syrian Minister of Defence and president of the Committee for the Defence of Palestine which convened the 1937 Bludan meeting, does not appear, but the members of the various committees represent a fair cross-section of Damascus politicians, and amongst them are a number of younger men, many of whom belong to one or other of the more extreme Moslem societies.

Economic.

The Mira services in Syria and the Lebanon were transferred to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments on the 1st June, and will be operating in both countries under the control of the respective Ministers of National Economy. The Syrian Government have passed a law granting a monopoly to the Mira organisation of the purchase, transport, &c., of wheat and barley up to a maximum of 75,000 tons and 275,000 tons, respectively, such monopoly to last until the end of October 1946. While it has not yet been possible to study the law in detail, it appears that a number of loopholes have been left which may make the collection of sufficient bread for the feeding of the two countries a matter of some difficulty. It is expected that a similar law will shortly be submitted to the Lebanese Chamber.

Mr. Tagg and Mr. Waugh, of the Imperial Bank of Iran, visited Damascus on the 30th May and had interviews with the Minister of Finance and the Director-General of National Economy, with a view to the possibility of opening branches of the Imperial Bank of Iran in Syria as soon as the current concession of the bank, which limits their activities to Persia and Iraq, expires and is replaced by a new concession.

Syria.

The Syrian President returned by air from Egypt on the 30th May. The Mohafez of Damascus gave a tea party to celebrate the President's return, to which some 850 people were invited. Speeches extolling Shukri Quwatli's qualities were made by the Mohafez and the presidents of the Merchants' Association, the Press Association, the Doctors' Syndicate and the Lawyers' Syndicate.

There would appear to be some indications that the Cabinet is manœuvring with a view to preparing for the dissolution of the existing Chamber and the election of a new one. Having obtained, against considerable opposition, powers of legislation by decree in connexion with the establishments of the various Ministries, ostensibly to facilitate the drawing up of next year's budget, there are indications that the Cabinet are already using these powers, in connexion with that part of their programme which recorded their intention to overhaul and purge the Administration, in such a way as to put their most ardent and influential supporters into key posts from which they will be able to control elections. Amongst a number of transfers and appointments which may be interpreted in this sense are those of the Emir Mustafa Shehabi, Secretary-General to the President of the Council of Ministers, as Mohafez of Aleppo (replacing Ihsan Sherif, who is going as Minister to Angora), and of Adel Azmeh, brother of the Minister of National Defence, as Mohafez of Lattakia.

A number of sittings of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies were held during the week; the following are the main points of interest:—

- (a) The creation of a Ministry of Health and Relief was approved on condition that no separate Minister would be appointed—the new Ministry will come under the Minister of the Interior, who will hold the new portfolio in addition to his existing one.
- (b) A Bill setting up the new Mira organisation was passed (see "Economic" above).
- (c) The Government were authorised to prolong the delegation of Deputies to Government posts for a further four months, and to draw up Government establishments by legislative decree.
- (d) A Bill was passed to the effect that persons imprisoned in connexion with cases pending before the Mixed Courts should be released on bail.
- (e) The final articles of the Labour Law were passed and the Bill was accepted as a whole.

In connexion with the release on bail of persons awaiting trial in the Mixed Courts (see (d) above) the Speaker of the Chamber declared that by its affirmative vote the Chamber authorised Native Courts, with similar competence to the Mixed Courts concerned, to release such persons on bail, and added that the Government were negotiating with the competent authorities on the question of the abolition of the Mixed Courts, but that some difficulties had arisen which made it impossible for the Government to proceed with the matter immediately.

The Oriental Secretary paid a visit during the week to Soueida and lunched with the Emir Hassan el Atrash, Mohafez of Jebel Druze, and his brother, Zaid el Atrash, Commandant of the Jebel Druze Gendarmerie. The Emir said that conditions in the Jebel were satisfactory, crops were good and security excellent. The Grouperment Druze, now reduced to 450 from more than 1,200 a year ago, and the gendarmerie, now numbering 250, were efficient and adequately armed with rifles and light machine guns. Apart from a brief reference to the fact that the republican régime was unsuitable in Syria, followed by a comment from Zaid el Atrash that Transjordan was a small country, no reference was made to the project of Greater Syria or to Monarchist intentions; it was, however, impossible to prevent the Emir going off into a long diatribe against the action of the Syrian Government in making no arrangements for the Druzes to take an official part in the evacuation celebrations in Damascus on the 17th April.

The Oriental Secretary gained the impression that, in fact, the Emir Hassan was satisfied for the moment with his situation. He and his family have complete control of the Jebel, the Syrian authorities do not intervene, there is a profitable contraband trade across the Transjordan frontier from which the Emir benefits financially, and he has recently married a young and attractive wife, daughter of Sitt Nazira of the Lebanese Druzes. It seems probable that he is using his contacts with Amman and the threat of secession from Syria in order to frighten the Syrian Government into leaving him a free hand in the Jebel. There does not seem any immediate probability of his putting his threat into operation,

and still less of inaugurating a Monarchist movement in Syria, and, should any such movement occur, the Emir would probably wait until he was certain which party would prove successful.

On the 31st May the Turkish Consul-General informed His Majesty's Minister that his post had been raised to the status of a legation, and that M. Abdulahad Aksin had been appointed minister and would be arriving to take up his position shortly. Meanwhile M. Galip Evcern, first secretary, will be chargé d'affaires *ad interim*. The legation, which will be quite separate from the Turkish diplomatic mission to the Lebanese Republic, is to have a considerable staff in addition to the minister and chargé d'affaires, which will include two additional first secretaries and a second secretary.

The Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs has asked the representative of the British Council to arrange that up to fifteen students who have passed their mathematical baccalaureate should go to England to train in technical schools as post office and telephone engineers. It is also the intention of the Postmaster General to send some postal mechanics to Palestine to be trained in the maintenance of automatic telephones, in preparation for the intended installation of an automatic system in Damascus and Aleppo.

Dr. Cruikshank (see Weekly Political Summary No. 207, "Syria") took over his duties as surgical adviser to the Department of Hygiene on the 2nd June.

A Damascus newspaper reported that twelve more Bedouin suspects had been arrested in connexion with the hold-up of the Nairn bus (see Weekly Political Summary No. 212, "Syria") and that the Nairn driver has already identified four of them.

His Majesty's Consul Aleppo reports that, as a result of the prominence given in the press to the coronation of King Abdullah, a revived interest has been shown in the "Greater Syria" question; comment upon the coronation in the press has been neither as unfriendly nor as hostile as might have been expected. A pamphlet headed "The Syrian Nation asks for Realisation of the Greater Syria Plan under King Abdullah" has been distributed in the Aleppo area urging the people of Syria to "act now, for now is the proper time for action."

King Feisal II of Iraq passed through Aleppo by train on his way to Iskanderun without incident; an article in one of the Aleppo newspapers welcomed him to Syria and described him as "The heir to the Syrian throne and the hope of the Arabs!"

Lebanon.

It has been officially announced that the Lebanese President will visit Turkey on or about the 19th June. Some criticism of the visit has been expressed, especially as regards the number and composition of the presidential party, which according to the present plan, will consist of some eight persons, including Mme. Khoury, the President of the Chamber, the Prime Minister, and the Minister for Defence. It is not yet known whether the Minister for Foreign Affairs will also be a member of the party: present indications are that he will not. The Soviet Minister is reported to have expressed surprise at the inclusion of the Minister for Defence. In order perhaps to pacify the Syrians, who are believed to be somewhat perturbed at the visit, the Lebanese President visited Damascus on the 7th and 8th June, when he was the guest of honour of Shukri Quwatli. He was accompanied by the Prime Minister, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the Interior and Habib Abi Chahla, who, on the conclusion of the visit, attended the meeting of the Arab League at Bludan.

The Lebanese Chamber met on the 29th and 31st May and seventeen articles of the Labour Law were passed. It was announced that the Chamber will meet in Extraordinary Session on the 5th June to continue consideration of the Labour Law. The President has returned to the Chamber the law recently passed for the abolition of the Special Criminal Court; it is noteworthy that this is the first occasion on which the President has made use of this prerogative.

There has been considerable activity in local political circles, and it is reported that the Phalangists have been holding almost daily meetings with Henri Pharaon in connexion with their plans for the coming elections. Hostility between Riad Solh and Henri Pharaon continues, and relations between the former and the President of the Republic are still strained owing to the alleged support of Pharaon by the President and members of his entourage.

Riad Solh was received by the President on the 27th May and again on the 1st June, and informed him that the Moslems of Beirut were not prepared

to tolerate the "Pharaon dictatorship" any longer, that the Youth Organisations were growing stronger day by day, and that the time had come for the Lebanese to follow Syria's example in connexion with political parties; if the Munla Cabinet were not prepared to take action he (Riad) would do so.

Considerable prominence has been given to the incidents which occurred in Tripoli on the 2nd and 3rd June which resulted in bloodshed following a clash between the supporters of Abdul Hamid Keramé and their opponents. The assailants have been referred for trial to the Special Criminal Court referred to in "Lebanon" of this Summary.

Moustapha Ariss and Nicolas Shawi, the Communist leaders, have left for Moscow, travelling in the same plane as Mme. Solod, wife of the Russian Minister. Farajallah Helou and a Communist delegation have been received by the President of the Republic.

The D.F.L. Office at Zahlé has been reorganised on a consular basis with the Sous-Délégué, M. André Naudy, as Consul. The French political officers have left the area and the S.A.A. headquarters at Zahlé and the branch office at Mushgara and Ras Baalbeck have been closed. The Mohafez of the Bekaa informed the political officer that no application has been made to the Lebanese Government for permission to establish a French Consulate in the Bekaa and, should such an application be made, it would be refused.

CORRECTION.

Weekly Political Summary No. 216, section 4, paragraph 2, should read: "Saadi Munla secured the confidence of the Chamber by 36 votes to 5 with one abstention."

CHAPTER VI.—GENERAL

[E 2962/797/65]

No. 18

Sir H. Stenechewer Bird to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 2nd April.)

(No. 103.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 21st March, 1946.

I HAVE read with great interest Mr. Shone's despatch No. 39 of the 27th February about Communist activity in the Lebanon and, with reference to the point raised in his last paragraph, have the honour to state that while there is some evidence that Communist literature in Armenian is reaching Iraq from the Levant, there is none that Arabic literature of this kind is entering the country through the same channels or, indeed, from any outside source except, of course, through Kurdistan where the frontier is wide open to penetration of this and other kinds. There is still no evidence of propagandist activity by the Soviet Legation, and external guidance to the Iraqi Communists seems for the time being to be confined to the emanations of Moscow radio.

2. In this connexion I have sought the views of the British Technical Expert in the Iraqi C.I.D., who has kindly furnished me with a copy of a review of the extent and activities of communism in Iraq which he has just compiled at the request of the new Minister of the Interior, and of my specialist staff. The resultant information enables me, in continuation of Mr. Thompson's despatches Nos. 398 and 403 of the 26th and 28th December last, to reply to your despatch No. 89 (E 797/797/65) of the 4th March.

3. The only new facts which have emerged from this enquiry are that there is strong evidence of an underground Communist party in this country, run on orthodox lines, and that the police have so far been unable to ascertain definitely either the location of its central headquarters (although the locations of some of the cells are known) or the names of the central committee. There is evidence that the army (but not as yet the police force) is slightly affected by "Communist" ideas, and a circular has just been issued by the Iraqi Ministry of War to all army commanders ordering that their officers should ensure that all ranks understand that it is forbidden to join political parties and instructing them to keep a watchful eye on any signs of such activities.

4. In this country, as in others, the terms "Communist," "bolshhevik," "reactionary," "Fascist," "Imperialist," and so on, have lost most of their original significance and have become mere terms of abuse to be directed against persons holding political views different from those of the user. For this reason, the head of the C.I.D. has divided the persons generally spoken of by the ruling class as "Communists" into four approximate categories:—

(a) Educated people of liberal outlook who wish to see an improvement in the standard of living of the poorer classes.

(b) A small group of people well versed in Communist literature and the language of international communism, several of whom have spent some years in Russia.

(c) Half-educated young men, with time on their hands, who have no clear understanding of the issues involved and who work off in leaflet distribution and similar activities the feeling of frustration and inferiority which their upbringing has engendered.

(d) Manual workers who are (justifiably) discontented with their wages and working conditions and who are, for the first time, becoming aware of the power which their number gives them.

4. The reasons why the progressively-minded and the discontented turn to communism are not far to seek. In the first place, they have seen the material success of the great Soviet experiment, which made possible the Russian victories of the late war; they are fully aware that the Government of their own country is in the hands of a selfish oligarchy, and to them Russia is what revolutionary France was to early 19th-century Liberals. Secondly, there is in this country an ineradicable belief that the British stand behind the ruling class, opposed to social progress and, through the British advisers and this embassy, are "running the country"; those who wish to see social changes tend, therefore, automatically to turn to the only Power which now appears likely to challenge the British position in the Middle East. Many of the Russophiles of to-day are the Germanophiles of the days before El Alamein.

5. "Communist activity" in this country is still legally an offence against the Crown, but it is the opinion of the C.I.D. that it has now reached a level at which it can no longer be either ignored or suppressed. The Government, however, do not yet seem to have formulated a policy for dealing with the situation, which they regard with increasing alarm. In governmental circles the main reaction against the growth of communism has been towards a desire for British support. This tendency is repeated in other quarters, and we have acquired some rather questionable friends among the wealthy and timorous. From these the cry goes up: Why are the British doing nothing? Another and more sinister reaction has been the emergence of a Nationalist party on familiar Fascist lines whose "leader," Dr. Sami Shawkat, inveighs in his daily paper, *Al Ba'ath al-Qawmi*, against communism, Russian and British imperialism, foreigners in general, and particularly, foreign (*i.e.*, British) employees of the Iraqi Government. Incidentally, the Left-wing press have seized on Dr. Shawkat's anti-Russian remarks and accuse this embassy of giving him financial support.

6. The adjustment of British policy and propaganda to these developments presents a difficult problem. Russia and Russian methods have caught the imagination of the "progressives," Britain and British methods in Iraq have become identified with the present Government. The answer, both from the Iraqi and the British point of view, would be simple enough if a Government could be found capable of reforming the obvious defects of the Administration and using to the full the aid which Great Britain offers to carry out a vigorous policy of social and economic development. But this is asking too much of the Orient. It is necessary to make the best of such political talent as is available, which is at least not inferior to that of other Middle East countries, and to stimulate by argument, cajolment and practical assistance every constructive undertaking. This is the constant endeavour of this embassy, and progress is being made in labour legislation, education, the technical training of Iraqis and the provision of British experts. In the long run, this policy offers good chances of success in theory at least, but in practice, the march of events may be so rapid that an ostrich-like Government may be caught bending, despite constant and vigorous advice from us.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Representatives at Beirut, Cairo, Moscow, Angora, Jedda and Tehran, and to the High Commissioner of Palestine and to the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER BIRD.

[E 3344/187/65]

No. 19

Mr. Bevin to Mr. Duff Cooper (Paris).

(No. 777.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, 13th April, 1946.

WHEN the French Ambassador came to see me this morning he mentioned the question of the Arab League. He said that, notwithstanding the fact that the French had withdrawn their troops from Syria and that they had agreed to withdraw from the Lebanon, they now found the activities of the Arab League disturbing them in North Africa. It was quite clear to the French Government that, while they had thought that this problem had been finally settled when they reached agreement with the Syrians and the Lebanese, they regretted that, in fact, this was not so. I undertook to look into the matter.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

[R 5880/52/44]

No. 20

Mr. Helm to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 16th April.)

(No. 134. Secret.)

Sir,

Angora, 21st March, 1946.

I HAVE the honour to receive your despatch No. 63 of the 4th March asking for the observations of His Majesty's Ambassador on Mr. Frank Roberts's despatch No. 30 of the 16th January about Soviet policy in the Middle East.

2. In Sir Maurice Peterson's absence I propose in what follows to confine my remarks essentially to the Soviet impact on Turkey, regarding which alone I feel I have any competence to speak, and to use as text Mr. Roberts's view, with which I see no reason to disagree, that, if Turkey should fall into the Soviet orbit, Russia would be in a strong position to penetrate and dominate the Arab world and the territories bordering on the Eastern Mediterranean. Is there likelihood of this happening and, if so, is it in our power to prevent it?

3. As Mr. Roberts has stated, Russia will find Turkey a hard nut to crack—short, of course, of direct military action, Soviet resort to which would put a very different complexion on things. Muscovite designs on Turkey are no new thing, and the experience of centuries has ingrained in all Turks an ever awake suspicion of every move from the north. This does not mean that the Turks do not want friendship with Russia. They do. But it must be friendship on equal terms and without embarrassing attachments. For nearly a year now Soviet tactics have made it abundantly clear that Moscow's ideas are otherwise. The Turks have been forewarned and in principle, therefore, the prospects for successful Soviet infiltration are not good.

4. With the example of Persia before them, many Turks, while critical of the line then taken by the Turkish Government, are speculating about what their position would have been to-day if in the winter of 1943-44 they had acceded to the Allied request then to become belligerent and particularly to admit Allied forces into Turkey. They are thankful that, as Mr. Roberts points out, the Russians are not established anywhere on Turkish soil, and their present firm decision is to oppose resolutely any attempt at such establishment. But factors, internal and external, might cause them to weaken on that decision.

5. Mr. Roberts referred in his despatch to the use which Moscow might make of the minorities. I feel that in the case of Turkey, which has had its own way of dealing with minorities, it is easy to exaggerate the importance of this factor as a medium for infiltration. The Greeks, the Armenians, and the Jews have suffered greatly at Turkish hands, and the iniquity of the tax on wealth is a fresh memory. But they nearly all live in Istanbul and such, as compared with the Turks, are still their thrift and their superior business acumen that on the whole they are once again prosperous. The Jews seem unlikely to lend themselves to Soviet exploitation; the 60,000 Armenians cannot influence Turkish internal or external policy, and the recent Soviet invitation to change their lot for the attractions of Soviet Armenia appealed (on the authority of the Soviet Ambassador) only to some hundreds. The Greeks are more important. But they are above all Greeks, and, to my mind, "the Great Idea" is by no means dead. The Istanbul Greeks would not, I think, become an important channel for Soviet infiltration unless the Greek Government were itself to fall under Soviet influence. With good reason Mr. Roberts referred to the Soviet attempts to gain control of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. These the Turkish Government sought to counter by unusual attention and consideration on the occasion of the recent death of Patriarch Benjamin and the election of his successor Maximos, who previously had been labelled as pro-Soviet. Now, however, Maximos is generally represented—and particularly in Greek circles—as quite otherwise, and to have been actuated only by personal ambition. I reserve my opinion about him, but feel that, even if the former estimate were correct, he, like his flock, will in practice be a Greek first. Certainly at present he seems to have the goodwill of the Turkish Government.

6. There remain the Georgians and the Kurds. The former I do not regard as a factor at all in the present connexion. The Kurds should be an important one but, as in the case of the Armenians, Turkey is to-day reaping a reward for past ruthlessness. As the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs put it to me some time ago, the Kurds are for present-day Turkey not an internal but only a frontier problem. The Turkish Kurds are so placed away from the Russo-Turkish frontier that it is not easy for Soviet agencies to get working among them, and their leaders so liquidated by death and deportation between the wars as to make any organisation of them difficult, even if, which is by no means the case, the Turkish authorities should remain blind to anything of the kind. Even so infiltration, particularly via Iraq, cannot be ruled out, and I should expect that measures to prevent this have been discussed with the Iraqi delegation under Nuri Pasha. In brief, my estimate is that, even if in the near future the Iraqi Kurds were to join their Persian brethren in an active movement for an autonomous Kurdistan, the Turkish Kurds would, so long as Turkey's frontier remained inviolate, probably cause the Turkish Government no real anxiety.

7. Nor, so far as Turkey is concerned, need we expect any weakening through Moscow espousing the cause of Islam, a tactic which has been tried with indifferent success by Italy and Japan, and twice by Germany. There are to-day many Turks, mostly of the older generation, who lament the eclipse which religion has undergone. But there could be no question of their being tempted to recover it from Russian hands.

8. Yet, unless the Soviet Government are to attain their ends by force alone, their object must be to weaken the Turkish political and national structure. For a time last year it looked as if the younger generation of Turks might be the most promising internal instrument for exploitation. It was not that, despite active Soviet propaganda, they were attracted by anything that Moscow had to offer. The Communist doctrine appeals to few Turks. The country was, and is, prosperous as never before—however temporary and unsound that prosperity may be—and there is no desire to exchange Turkish for Soviet economic conditions. Nor for the Turks is there any magnetism in the Soviet idea of democracy. But many of them are working for a better organised economy, for greater freedom of expression, and for real political liberty. They accuse the present Administration of failing on all three, and for some months last year it looked as if Moscow, with the aid of the numerically unimportant Communist element in Turkey, might successfully exploit the considerable resulting dissatisfaction and criticism. But Moscow itself blighted these prospects by the formulation of impossible territorial claims and by ill-advised press and radio propaganda in support of them. The country regained its unity—in appearance at least—and the pro-Soviet elements were discredited.

9. The discontent does, however, remain, and if Moscow were wise enough to be patient and to cease provocation Turkish internal developments might again suit the Soviet infiltration book. From this point of view the press and radio truce which the Turks imposed some time ago, but which Moscow has not reciprocated, might have played into the Russian hand. Continued mobilisation bears heavily on Turkey, and if the suspicions of the Turkish public could be lulled over a period of months—this need not necessarily involve the actual withdrawal of the Soviet demands—not only would renewed voice be given to criticism of the Government, but many Turks would be tempted, as they were a year ago, to seek a composition with Russia which among other things would contain the prospect of demobilisation. The Turkish Administration, however sure of its ground, might find it very difficult to resist the double attack.

10. This danger is one which has been present to the Turkish official mind. Measures are in hand for meeting to a considerable extent the demands of the critics in the field of internal politics, if not of economy. But, in spite of Moscow playing its hand so badly, the movement for a composition with Russia was again developing in January and February. This initially gained support from the feeling that at the December Moscow Conference the United States had sold us out in the Middle East. Turkey could, therefore, only look to Great Britain, and Turkish Deputies were beginning to doubt whether we were still wholeheartedly behind the alliance—significantly enough there was no calculation of the material assistance we could or should give if we were. The conviction began to spread that Turkey was isolated and that something must be done about it. Happily all that ended with your Commons statement of the 21st February and with the clarification of the American position by Mr. Byrnes and Senator Vandenberg. Even the most sceptical were satisfied, and, so far as Turkey internally is concerned, attempts at Soviet infiltration have been not only arrested but repelled. Doubtless, however, they will come again, and it is obviously desirable that the Turkish Government should do everything possible to strengthen its position, and that conditions should as soon as possible become such that demobilisation can be envisaged.

11. This last is impossible so long as the Soviet war of nerves on Turkey's frontiers is maintained. Moscow no doubt calculates that, if this is continued long enough, at least the strain of mobilisation will prove too great. I have noticed that even authoritative Turks are concerned if they contemplate the indefinite continuation of the present conditions. But fortunately there are signs that the Soviets are out for quick results, and one can perhaps hope that, if direct aggression is ruled out, the outside pressure will be eased after a few months. I see no internal reason why, unless unofficial Turks get lulled into a false sense of security, Turkey should not remain steady during that period.

12. Two external factors cannot, however, be ignored—Persia and Greece. Persian developments have been closely followed and have caused real concern. But there is a feeling that the presence of Russian forces, supplemented by

Soviet propaganda, had loaded the dice against Persia in advance and the Turks are applying the moral. They have no confidence in the present Persian Prime Minister who they felt might have committed himself at Moscow. They are, therefore, relieved to learn that Persia has submitted her case to the Security Council, and, provided the latter disposes of the question without any marked loss of prestige to itself, no untoward reaction need, I think, be anticipated so far as Turkey is concerned. Indeed, I hazard that Turkey would probably remain firm, though not with the same resolution, if Russia were to get her way in Northern Persia.

13. It would be quite another matter as regards Greece. Here the community of political interest is very great and I think that, barring unexpected internal developments, the outcome in Greece will be the outstanding factor in the determination of Turkey's future orientation. We shall be judged by our success or failure in the Aegean. If Russia should establish her influence in Greece and/or if we should allow Russia to get a foothold south of the Dardanelles—I assume that, in paragraph 23 of his despatch, Mr. Roberts has in mind nothing more than freedom of navigation in his use of the Straits as an example of legitimate Soviet aims—then I fear that Turkey would inevitably slide towards Russia. If, on the other hand, Russia's southward advance can be held at the present Bulgaro-Greek frontier then, so far as external factors are concerned, Turkey should remain steady.

14. I therefore reach the conclusion that the success or failure of Moscow to bend Turkey to her will by means other than war will be determined principally by the outcome in Greece and by the ability of the Turkish Government to keep the Turkish people contented and united. If Moscow does not change its propaganda tactics unity should be all the more easily attainable. If it does, then the Turkish Government will have to be all the more watchful. But they must also do more to satisfy their Turkish critics as regards internal political and economic matters. Even so, Turkey will need our constant encouragement. Particularly as regards economy I suggest that it is in our interest, if it is in our power, to do more to help the Turks—they now realise that they can no longer secure that help free or on bargain basement terms. With visible and continued signs of our earnest desire to assist in Turkey's development, and assured as she has been of our fidelity to the Anglo-Turkish Alliance and also, and very importantly, of America's lively interest (of which the Turks regard the impending visit of the U.S.S. *Missouri* as most welcome evidence). I think that Turkey should continue to present a firm front to Russia and so remain a bastion against Soviet penetration to the south. And in so doing she should set a standard to her south-eastern neighbours who, consciously or otherwise, seem to me to set a good deal of store by her example.

15. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Mr. Roberts at Moscow.

I have, &c.

A. K. HELM

[E 3713/818/97]

No. 21

Mr. Squire to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 25th April.)

(No. 22. Secret.)

Sir,

Kabul, 13th April, 1946.

IN your despatch No. 6 of the 4th March, 1946, you asked for my observations on Moscow secret despatch No. 30 of the 16th January, 1946. I have from time to time, and notably in my despatch No. 13 of the 1st March, commented on Russian policy *vis-à-vis* Afghanistan, and have touched briefly on most of the subjects dealt with in Mr. Roberts's despatch in so far as Afghanistan is concerned.

2. As Mr. Roberts has pointed out, there are a number of features in the Afghan situation which facilitate Russian subversive activities, and of which the Russians may at any time take advantage. In the first place there is the fact that as far as Northern Afghanistan is concerned the Afghan Government is an alien Government and has no spontaneous support from the people. Secondly, the complete cessation of trade with Russia when the latter country became involved in war was a great blow to the inhabitants, and the consequent difficulty of supplying them, especially with piece-goods, has given rise to a situation which, were the inhabitants less docile, might easily be explosive. There is also much discontent in the north over the Persian lamb-skin trade, which is

manipulated solely for the benefit of the ruling classes in Kabul. The difficulties of the Uzbek farmers have been aggravated by heavy losses of sheep during the last two years as a result of severe snowstorms. Russian propaganda and Russian agents find it easy to exploit this situation and, as I have already reported, are making some use of their opportunities. They can obviously do very much more in this direction whenever it suits them.

3. The invitation to Afghan and other representatives to the recent celebrations at the Tashkent University was certainly intended to show the foreign delegates the progress that has been made in this and neighbouring units of the Soviet Union. Although the Afghan delegates realised that they were only being allowed to see features which showed off Soviet life to the best advantage, they were certainly impressed by what they saw, and the Foreign Minister has recently told me that there are at present few signs of discontent with the Soviet régime in this area, that there are no longer any refugees escaping across the border from Bolshevik tyranny, and that there can be no doubt that the general standard of living is much higher on the northern than on the southern bank of the Oxus. The new Soviet policy of posing as a great Muslim Power and of facilitating the practice of Islam, and, in particular, the pilgrimage to Mecca, may also be intended as much to attract the sympathy of Muslim countries on their southern borders as to gain added popularity among their own Mohammedan subjects.

4. The recent arrest in Moscow, by the Soviet authorities, of Ghulam Siddiq, which Mr. Roberts has subsequently reported, is hardly likely to have been effected without some ulterior motive, though it is hard to understand exactly what this motive is. By himself Ghulam Siddiq does not appear to be any great menace to Afghanistan, and the Afghan Government do not seem to have been unduly alarmed at the news. It seems probable, however, that the Russians wish to have in their hands a pliable instrument for use should circumstances at any time make such a course desirable. His continuance in Russian hands would at least facilitate a war of nerves against Afghanistan.

5. In addition to their opportunities for underground subversive activities the Russians have many controversial questions which they can raise at any time and use as pretexts either for a war of nerves or for actual demands on the Afghan Government. Chief of these is the Oxus boundary dispute, a settlement of which, as I have already reported, Moscow is deliberately delaying. The negotiations for a renewal of Afghan-Russian trade and the known Russian desire to extend her courier air service, and perhaps to inaugurate a regular civil air service, provide further opportunities for unpleasantness. More important still is the question of oil. Judging from the lengths to which the Russians have been prepared to go to secure oil concessions in Northern Persia, the Afghans have good reason to fear that Russia will be prepared to use any excuse for making trouble in order to secure similar concessions in Afghanistan.

6. But if the debit side of the account presents a somewhat gloomy picture, Afghanistan has also a number of assets to set against it. First in the character of her people and Government. Nervous though they may be the Afghans are obstinate people and are more easily led than driven. Their reactions to Russian threats are likely to be those of Turkey rather than Persia. This does not mean that they are not doing all they can to remove possible causes of friction. They are prepared to settle the northern boundary on reasonable lines; and they are taking steps to replace their regular forces on the frontier by gendarmerie which they think may lessen the chances of friction. They are trying to improve conditions in the northern provinces, and are also organising counter-propaganda there against the Russians. The people, too, are themselves peaceful and not easily amenable to Communist doctrine.

7. Though the situation therefore has many unpleasant possibilities, there seems to be no reason for undue alarm, at least until there is evidence of more active Russian designs on the country. Mr. Roberts has mentioned that in so far as Persia is concerned the Russian Government would be at the moment glad to see the spirit of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 maintained. I think that the same applies to Afghanistan, in which country the Russians were in 1907 prepared to admit the preponderance of British interests. I fully agree that Russia has no desire for a head on clash with the British Empire, and this may account for the fact that, apart from showing interest in our activities in this country, the Russian Ambassador here seems to view even the supply of considerable quantities of British arms with comparative equanimity, and reserves his most trenchant criticisms for American doings, which he professes to consider as poaching on our preserves and which he obviously resents. Finally, it may be doubted whether an upheaval in this country would really serve Soviet interests.

The prospect of having to deal with the turbulent tribes of the North-West Frontier cannot be particularly attractive to them, though the ambassador is on occasions critical of the leniency with which they are treated by the Government of India, and says that the Russians in our place would know much better how to keep them in order. Possibly, also, Russia may think that, with the probable deterioration of the situation in India in the immediate future and the likelihood of chaos the moment that British control is withdrawn, it is better not to make any premature moves which might arouse British suspicions, and so make us more reluctant to relinquish our authority and, in particular, to abandon our responsibilities for the maintenance of order on the Indo-Afghan border. With India in confusion and ready to fall like a ripe apple into her lap, Russia knows full well that Afghanistan cannot for long be a serious obstacle in her progress to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.
G. F. SQUIRE.

[E 3924/797/65]

No. 22

Sir R. Campbell to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 1st May.)

(No. 561. Secret.)

Sir,

Cairo, 22nd April, 1946.

I HAVE the honour to offer the following observations on certain points raised in Mr. Roberts' Moscow despatch No. 30, Secret, of the 25th January, 1946, regarding Soviet policy in the Near and Middle East.

2. With reference to paragraph 4 of Mr. Roberts' despatch, it is no doubt possible that fear of "springboards for aggression against the Soviet Union" is partially responsible for Russia's policy in the Near and Middle East, but there seems to be little doubt that in the main it is a continuance of the expansionist policy of Russia which has been a continuous feature of Russian nationalism even before Peter the Great.

3. With reference to paragraph 5, I think that our commitments in the Middle East are beyond our unaided economic and military resources and that unless we get American economic and military support we shall be unable to maintain our present positions in the Middle East against Russian pressure and infiltration. It, therefore, seems advisable that we should make up our minds on the question whether we can secure American co-operation and on the price we can afford to pay for it.

4. There are references in Mr. Roberts' despatch to the material benefits and the raising of the standard of living in the Middle Eastern regions included in the Soviet Union, and to the necessity of our conferring similar benefits on Middle Eastern States within our zone of influence. I am not competent to express an opinion regarding the economic benefits conferred on Russian Middle Eastern territories, but such of the inhabitants of those regions as are able to escape therefrom do not convey the impression that the inhabitants are at all happy under Russian rule, with the exception of Soviet Armenia. The large number of Middle Eastern deserters from the Russian armies, and even their active co-operation with Germany, would seem to show that all is not so rosy as Soviet propaganda represents in Moslem Russia. However, even supposing that the Russian system of forcible inculcation of Soviet ideas into the youth of those regions is gradually making these peoples content with Russian rule, the difficulty is that we are not in a position to compete with the Russians on these lines. Russia actually rules these regions and can do what she likes in them. We do not rule the Middle Eastern States under our influence. All we can do is to make representations to their Governments in the direction of social reform. We have done this for some time with very little success. Unless we use forcible methods of intervention it seems likely that the governing classes in those countries will continue on their present conservative lines. Therefore, try as we will, it is not easy to "press ahead with plans for social and economic reform through the Arab world" (see ante-penultimate sentence of paragraph 24 of Mr. Roberts' despatch).

5. With reference to paragraph 15 of Mr. Roberts' despatch, the statement that "there have not been any signs as yet either in Egypt, Iraq or even in the

Levant States of local fishing in troubled waters " requires considerable qualification. Although we cannot provide concrete evidence, we have strong reason to suppose Russian encouragement of Communist elements in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East, mainly through Communist organisations in the Lebanon and Syria. The most dangerous tactics at present adopted by these Communist elements is to make trouble for us by promoting nationalist extremism and trying to identify it with communism.

6. There seems to be a suggestion in Mr. Roberts' despatch that the Anglo-Russian conflict in the Middle East to-day is not more dangerous than the Anglo-Russian conflict over the same region in the 19th century. Throughout the 19th century there was a European Concert, within which the grouping of opposing Powers was subject to variations. If at times Russia could count on the neutralisation of possible interference by certain European Powers, she could not handle the situation in Europe and Asia as though there was no other Power in those two continents who could stand up to her. Now with the destruction of Germany and Japan, there is no longer any military Power in those two continents which might make Russia hesitate to have quarrels with us.

7. The ante-penultimate sentence of paragraph 24 of Mr. Roberts' despatch refers to what we have often pointed out from here as being the essential requirement of British policy in view of the Russian danger, namely, the necessity of placating Egypto-Arab nationalism. We are not strong enough to hold the Middle East militarily and we can only hope to hold it at all if the independent countries between the Mediterranean and India are on our side, as they were during the 19th century under Ottoman Sultans and Kajar Shahs, however much Turkish and Persian Governments, owing to their weakness, had to pander to Russia.

8. With regard to the reference in paragraph 24 of Mr. Roberts' despatch to the American stake in maintaining British influence in the Middle East, I have already in paragraph 3 expressed the opinion that Anglo-American co-operation is essential to prevent Russian penetration. The question is whether we can hope for any steady Anglo-American co-operation in view of the irregularity of American foreign policy, due to the variety of influences and reactions of the elements which form the population of the United States. Anyhow an essential preliminary would be an agreed understanding of our respective interests in the Middle East, political, strategic and economic. If we wish to get American support and co-operation we cannot at the same time continue to regard the United States' interest in the Middle East with suspicion and fear and therefore to play the dog-in-the-manger with them. Is it not possible that if we frankly discuss the whole problem with them, they might come to a reasonable understanding with us by an adjustment of interests and an unwritten agreement on the lines of co-operation?

I have, &c.

RONALD CAMPBELL.

[E 3892/2088/88]

No. 23

Mr. Roberts to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 1st May.)

(No. 310.)
Sir,

Moscow, 26th April, 1946.

IN your despatch No. 597 of the 3rd April you asked for any observations which I might have to make from the point of view of this post on Mr. Shone's despatch No. 39 covering the increase of Communist activity in the Lebanon.

2. From such information as is available to me in Moscow I agree generally with Mr. Shone's report and conclusions. His account of the propaganda line followed locally by the Lebanese Communist party is fully in accord with the Soviet Government's propaganda line on the subjects concerned; and leaves no doubt about the source of its inspiration. The Lebanese Communist newspapers, and especially *Saut-esh-Shaab*, are in turn regularly quoted here as evidence of Lebanese opinion.

3. It is interesting to note that Lebanese Communists are saying that the Soviet Union is determined never again to allow the Middle East to be used against her, and must, therefore, liquidate British influence there. The Soviet doctrine of security, though doubtless born of very real fears (fully justified in the years between 1917-21, and to some extent justified by Anglo-French plans to bomb Baku in 1940) of hostile action against an important and exposed part

of the Soviet Union, nevertheless seems capable of indefinite extension, and to grow by what it feeds on. Indeed, the extent to which it has grown of recent months is shown by the contrast between Soviet and Communist attacks on Britain in the Middle East to-day, and the relatively quiescent Soviet attitude towards the Arab world reported in my despatch No. 30 of the 16th January.

4. If the Soviet Union continues her present attempts to weaken, so far as she can, the British hold on the Middle East, we must expect an increase in Communist activity, directed specifically against Britain, not only in the Lebanon but in other Middle Eastern States as well. It is, therefore, unlikely that these Communist parties will be allowed to confine themselves to the Christian and other elements which might most naturally be attracted. On the contrary they are likely then to make every effort to win over the Moslem majority in the area; and their appeal will doubtless be made in ways calculated not to offend Moslem susceptibilities, as explained in paragraph 17 of my despatch No. 30. Communist tactics in all countries where the Communists are not yet in a majority are in any case to work with and through other political elements and parties until the time is ripe for undisguised Communist control. Furthermore, the appeal of the Soviet Union is not necessarily or even primarily a Communist one, though as explained by Mr. Shone the two are frequently confused; and an effort will be made to exploit the dissatisfaction of all elements, whatever their sociological views, who for any reason resent British influence in the Middle East, or can be attracted to the banner of a rival in fact more expansionist and more ruthless but at present more distant than ourselves. It certainly looks at present as if the Lebanon has been selected as the centre of such activities in the Middle East and as though the Soviet Union may have designs to supplant France as the dominant influence there, although under very different forms and for the present at least without unduly offending French susceptibilities. This is a marked contrast to the Soviet attitude to British policy in the Levant. In so far as the Lebanon is traditionally and partly for religious reasons dependent upon some foreign "protection" and as the Lebanese are the most intelligent, but in many ways the most unstable and frustrated element in the Middle East, the choice of the Lebanon would seem a wise one from the Soviet point of view, at all events at the start.

5. Nevertheless, we may reasonably expect Soviet ignorance of the Arab world to lead to certain tactical mistakes in this new field. An example of this ignorance was afforded the other day by M. Dekanosov, a Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, in conversation with my wife recently, advised her against going to the Lebanon for the summer, since there was so much poverty and misery there, and, indeed, a potentially explosive social and economic situation. Realising that my wife had close personal knowledge of the Lebanon, he admitted that life there might be all right for the privileged classes, but he seemed genuinely astonished at the suggestion that the "broad masses" in the Lebanon are certainly better housed and fed, and probably as well read and as well dressed, as those of Moscow, not to mention less privileged sections of the Soviet Union; quite apart from the better conditions prevailing in the Lebanon than in other parts of the Middle East.

6. I have sent copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Beirut, His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo, Angora and Bagdad and to the High Commissioner at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

FRANK K. ROBERTS.

[E 4369/797/65]

No. 24

Mr. Shone to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 13th May.)

(No. 72.)
Sir,

Beirut, 1st May, 1946.

BEFORE I had seen your despatch No. 83 of the 4th March, I had read with great interest Mr. Roberts' despatch No. 30 of the 16th January, concerning Soviet policy in the Middle East, on which I now have the honour to offer the following observations.

2. If there are still no definite signs that the Soviet Government, in their relations with the Levant States, have embarked on a forward policy designed to secure for themselves a paramount position of influence, they have not been

slow to seek profit from the existing political situation. They played up to local Nationalist feelings by clearly indicating disapproval of the terms of the Anglo-French joint declaration on the Levant of the 13th December, 1945, and their delegate at the United Nations Organisation took the most positive line of any in support of the Levant States' appeal to the Security Council for the complete and immediate evacuation of British and French troops from their territories. The activity of the local Communist party, which is certainly in close touch with the Soviet Legation and seems to dispose of considerable funds, is markedly increasing in the Lebanon (see my despatch No. 39 of the 27th February), if so far to a lesser extent in Syria; and the organs and propagandists of this party are conducting a campaign of increasing virulence against British policy, not only in relation to the Levant States but throughout the world. But these moves, though their object is clearly to discredit Great Britain and undermine British influence in the Levant, appear rather to be part of the world-wide drive directed from Moscow than to indicate any special or positive Soviet preoccupation with the Levant States. There is no clear evidence of any direct subversive activities undertaken by the Soviet Legation, whose actual approaches to the local Governments, in such matters, for example, as the recovery of Russian orthodox properties and the increase of trade with Soviet Russia, do not yet seem to go beyond the normal.

3. But I would not agree that there is no Soviet fishing in troubled waters, if only by indirect methods. Soviet encouragement to the Armenian communities to register for eventual repatriation to Soviet Armenia (my despatch No. 50 of the 20th March) is certainly displeasing to the local Governments but seems to be at least as much part of a war of nerves against Turkey as a manoeuvre to increase Soviet influence here.

4. Although internal conditions in the Levant States leave much to be desired, they can hardly be said, as yet, to be favourable for Soviet penetration, if largely because of the existing political structure. And then there is Islam, which is so often said to be a barrier. I shall revert to this question at the end of this despatch. From the internal political angle, the classes which at present hold a virtual monopoly of power and influence in both Syria and the Lebanon in general regard both Soviet Russia and the Communist movement with feelings of dislike mingled with apprehension. Only now emerging from French domination, the Syrian and Lebanese leaders fear to fall under that of another, and probably more oppressive, alien rule; even more, they fear the implied threat to their own privileged position. It was significant that even when they most despaired of getting rid of the French and of securing British aid to that end, they showed no real tendency to appeal to the Soviets for support. Now that they see a good chance of the French quitting the Levant States for good, they no longer have even this incentive to turn to Russia.

5. On the other hand, developments in Persia, despite the proceedings in the Security Council—and despite the results of the Levant States' own recent appeal to the Council—have bred both a sense of disillusionment with the United Nations Organisation and a fear that world events may be shaping towards an Anglo-Soviet clash for which the Middle Eastern countries would be the battleground. The Syrian and Lebanese ruling classes, who cannot hope to influence the major current of events, are for the moment watching, with increasing anxiety, to see where the Soviet tide will find its high water mark. Few Syrians or Lebanese would now regard the United Nations Organisation or the Anglo-Soviet alliance as providing solid breakwaters.

6. Eventual subjection of the Levant States to Soviet influence would therefore require either a complete change of heart on the part of the present ruling classes, or the substitution for them of régimes drawn from elements more favourable to Soviet influence.

7. The former alternative cannot be excluded; but if it were to come about it would presumably do so either as a result of political developments in areas beyond the purview of this legation, such as a greater degree of Soviet penetration towards the frontiers of the Levant States, or in consequence of a marked loss of confidence in and goodwill towards Great Britain and the United States. In this connexion, the line which His Majesty's Government and the United States Government take in regard to the Palestine question may have far-reaching effects.

8. With the recognition by Turkey of the independence of the Levant States and the appointment of Turkish Ministers to each (Turkey being the first Power to make such separate appointments), the Hatay question may be regarded as shelved for the time being. But Soviet support for Syria's claims remains a card which Moscow could always use at an appropriate moment.

9. It is hard to say whether the assumption of control by elements more favourably disposed to the Soviet Union is more likely than a change of heart on the part of those now in power. It would be fair to describe the present Governments of both Syria and the Lebanon, in the words of Mr. Roberts, as "out of touch with the mass of the people and based upon a handful of prosperous land-owners and other reactionaries." Both Syria and the Lebanon are, in fact, still organised for the most part on feudal lines, and it must be admitted that in both countries the system of parliamentary government, to whatever extent it may be inspired by the democratic ideal, in practice falls lamentably short of western standards. But, on the other hand, while both countries have many rich, neither has many miserably poor, except to some extent in the towns; and the bulk of both populations consists of a relatively contented peasantry.

10. The elements which have so far displayed the greatest tendency to absorb Communist ideas and to express most sympathy with Soviet Russia are, broadly speaking, those mentioned in paragraph 4 of Sir Hugh Stonehewer-Bird's despatch No. 103 of the 21st March: a few Moscow-trained extremists, some liberal-minded intellectuals, some discontented and half-educated members of the middle classes, and a larger number of industrial workers (particularly Armenians) who are in revolt against their admittedly hard lot. To these may be added a considerable number of teachers, both men and women, in Government and private schools in Syria (often of Kurdish or Armenian extraction or married to French wives, but including some Egyptians); an indeterminate but not inconsiderable proportion of their pupils; a few Greek Orthodox clergy hopeful of support from the Russian Church; and (a new and probably passing phenomenon) a handful of formerly pro-French Christian Lebanese politicians who, having lost faith in the power of the French to protect the Christians against the Moslems, are now said to be openly preaching admiration of Soviet Russia. Some of these elements are reported to be in touch with the Soviet Legation. Of the above categories, the students have a considerable nuisance value; the industrial workers are potentially the most capable of acquiring political influence; the two together, in alliance, might become a force of some potency. Although the workers have improved their organisation of late, they are too few in numbers in the Lebanon, and even more so in Syria, to be able to make headway by themselves against the still conservative mass of the agricultural population. And they are handicapped by lack of education and of capable leaders. As regards the agricultural population, I have just learned on what I believe to be good authority, that trained Communist propagandists of Lebanese nationality are being despatched to Syrian villages to sow the seed of discontent with existing conditions.

11. The accusation that British policy in the Middle East has tended to support vested and reactionary interests against the new urge for betterment amongst the masses can hardly be made in the Levant States; for, in the conditions described above, it is difficult to see what other policy could be adopted unless and until the balance of power as between the privileged classes and the masses is altered to a greater degree than appears probable at present.

12. So much for the present picture. It may change, perhaps rapidly, either—as stated above—in consequence of the impact of events beyond the frontiers of the Levant States or as a result of internal political and economic developments. The next few months may well revolutionise the internal situation of the Levant States. If the Allied evacuation proceeds as planned, both peoples will, for the first time in their history, be free to control their affairs and shape their destiny, in so far as small States can do so in the world of to-day. In Syria, and to some extent in the Lebanon, the parties in power have derived their influence almost entirely from their pursuit of independence, in opposition to the French; once this goal has been achieved, their claim to be the sole arbiters of their countries' future will have gone, and in neither State have these parties shown much sign of competence, let alone merit, in administration. Other politicians, at present in eclipse, will be treading on their heels; in Syria the Monarchist party, could it but find a leader, might well sweep away not only the National *bloc* but the Republican régime. The departure of the Allied troops, and of their spending power, coming on top of the natural dislocation caused by the return to peace conditions, may well cause economic chaos; the food position is not too promising in view of the improbability that the States will be able to ensure an equitable distribution of their joint production; unemployment may soon reach serious proportions. The Administrations, in short, will be faced with a series of extremely difficult problems which, it is to be feared, their members, individually and collectively, have neither the capacity nor the experience to overcome. It is particularly unfortunate for the Levant States

that they never received during the mandatory period the same training for future responsibilities as did, for instance, Iraq. Their assumption of the full responsibilities of sovereign States has come, as it were, overnight, and that in circumstances which would tax the powers of highly-skilled administrators. In both States, personal rivalries amongst the leading politicians are acute and the will to unite for constructive purposes is sadly lacking. In the Lebanon recent reports go to show that differences between Christians and Moslems are growing.

13. A situation such as is foreshadowed in the preceding paragraph would provide both a danger to, and the opportunity for, British influence. On the one hand, such chaotic conditions, if they eventuated, would be admirably suited to the spread of Soviet-inspired propaganda, which could not only play on the economic and political discontent of the population, but could extol the Soviet system for its championship of the masses against oppressive and incompetent ruling classes. The latter would no doubt be represented as having been imposed on the people or maintained in power against the popular will by ourselves. (In this connexion reports have already been received of Communist approaches to unemployed workers recently discharged from Allied military service.) On the other hand, in both States there is at the moment a fund of goodwill towards ourselves and a real desire for our guidance and assistance in solving their problems. Intelligent Syrians and Lebanese, and not only those of the ruling classes, are alive to the difficulties which lie ahead and see the need for assistance in surmounting them. Despite the present rift in the Arab League, the desire for closer co-operation with its other member States is still strong amongst the Moslems and not a few Christians in both Syria and the Lebanon; and the fact that Great Britain is still considered as the closest friend of the Arabs, combined with the very real popularity which the British forces have won for themselves during their period of occupation and gratitude for what we have done to assist both countries to secure their independence, have created the desire, particularly in Syria, that this guidance and assistance should come from ourselves.

14. Meanwhile, the interest of the United States in both Levant States, with regard to trade, development schemes, agriculture, aviation, &c., is rapidly increasing. I am told that the Americans are also pressing advisers on the local governments; the Syrians have already taken on a Belgian to advise on administration, and the Lebanese are asking for a financial adviser from the Netherlands. I note the indication in your telegram No. 245 of the 29th March that some modification of our present policy as regards the provision of advisers to the Levant Governments is under consideration. From the general point of view this American interest is no doubt desirable, indeed, Anglo-American co-operation and the avoidance of cut-throat competition may be essential if we are to maintain our position in the Middle East. But if we are to play a part in providing the assistance which the Levant Governments so sorely need, we must act quickly. I was also glad to receive your telegram, No. 42, Brisco, of the 23rd April, about the future of the British Council, as I am sure the cultural field is one in which we can do much useful work here in co-operation with the Americans and which affords a means of countering Soviet infiltration. The attitude which His Majesty's Government and the United States Government adopt in the Palestine question may, however, affect the readiness of the Levant States Governments to employ British and American advisers and the ability of such employees to fulfil their tasks.

15. In conclusion, I should like to revert to the question of Islam as a potential barrier to Soviet and Communist penetration. It is one on which I believe the considered views of His Majesty's representatives in other Arab countries would be valuable. Statements to the effect that the tenets of Islam are incompatible with those of Communism and, indeed, of the Soviet system in general, are so frequent as to appear axiomatic. But does it follow, as is so often argued, that this incompatibility can be relied on, in the conditions prevailing to-day, to prevent ideas associated—often no doubt vaguely—with "communism" and Soviet Russia from spreading in the Arab countries—especially amongst the youth, whose minds are being opened by the wider education they now enjoy, and amongst the workers and peasants, who are becoming conscious of the disadvantages from which they suffer? If the hold which Islam exercises continued to be sufficiently strong to exclude antagonistic ideas, an affirmative answer would be justified. But is this hold in fact so strong in any of the countries concerned, outside the Arabian peninsula itself? Turkey affords the example of a Moslem country in which Islam was swiftly swept aside by the Nationalist and secularist tide. Conditions in the various Arab States may well be so different from those which prevailed in Turkey as to render so

rapid and complete a development improbable in any one of them. But in the case of people who are by nature so impressed by might and power as the Arabs, it would be surprising if the impact of the Soviet Union, its practical achievements, its propaganda and the theories associated with it—however loosely and imaginatively—were not considerable. May this not result in the co-existence in many minds of seemingly inconsistent ideas and tenets, which may even to some extent be blended? There must surely be Arabs who, while less strict than their forbears in the observance of their faith, yet considering themselves to devout Moslems, not only absorb all sorts of ideas from lectures, books, pamphlets, broadcasts and newspapers, but also seek—and perhaps convince themselves that they have found—support for such ideas as attract them in what they choose to accept of Islam.

I have, &c.
TERENCE SHONE.

[E 5215/515/31]

No. 25

Mr. Duff Cooper to Mr. Bevin. (Received 8th June)

(No. 298)

(Telegraphic)

Paris, 8th June, 1946

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informed me this evening, 8th June, that the Mufti had escaped. He expressed his deepest concern and said that if any French officials were responsible he would see they were punished.

2. I said I could hardly imagine a more unfortunate moment for such an event to have occurred. There had recently been certain coolness in Anglo-French relations and there had been complaints in the press that we were still trying to assume in the Levant the position France had abandoned. It was therefore certain that it would be thought, even if it were not said, that the French had deliberately let the Mufti go in order to embarrass us. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he was well aware that this was so and that he could only give me his personal assurance that such suspicions were unfounded.

3. I asked him whether there was any hope of recapturing the Mufti. He said that he was bound to admit that he thought there was very little chance of doing so. He said this in a way that gave me the impression that he knew more about the affair than he was prepared to disclose. He also said that the chief of police might be to blame.

[E 5515/515/31]

No. 26

Mr. Shone to Mr. Bevin. (Received 16th June)

(No. 540)

(Telegraphic)

Beirut, 15th June, 1946

FOLLOWING from Mr. Young:—

On His Majesty's Minister's instructions I asked the Syrian Prime Minister this evening whether he could confirm or—as I sincerely hoped—deny press reports that the Mufti was in Damascus and was even the guest of the Syrian President.

2. In reply the Syrian Prime Minister gave me his solemn word of honour—

- (a) that the Mufti was not in Syria,
- (b) that he was not in Damascus,
- (c) that he was not the guest of the Syrian President, and
- (d) that he was not the guest, as had been alleged, of the Prime Minister himself; and, finally, that despite all enquiries which had been made by the Syrian Government through both official and private channels they had been unable to arrive at any clue as to the Mufti's whereabouts.

3. The Syrian Prime Minister said that he had issued a *démenti* in this sense to the press. I explained to him that *démentis* to the press, His Majesty's Government, and foreign legations were in a different category; could he give me, as representing His Majesty's Minister, an equally categorical denial? He said with his hand on his heart that he could.

4. I asked him whether he had made an enquiry into the allegation that the Mufti had escaped on Syrian passport No. 90 issued on 28th November, 1946 [sic]. He said he had at once telegraphed to the Syrian Minister in Paris, but had not as yet received any reply. He would let us know as soon as this was received.

5. I confess I had the impression that the Syrian Prime Minister was telling the truth.

6. The Syrian Prime Minister said that the arrival of the Mufti in Syria would be nothing less than a disaster from the Syrian point of view. I told him that I could not agree more.

[E 5857/5857/93]

No. 27

Sir H. Stonehewer-Bird to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 26th June.)

(No. 224.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 15th June, 1946.

THE last paragraph of Mr. Shone's despatch No. 72 of the 1st May raises a most interesting problem, which is particularly pertinent to Iraq. The Arabs of this country are nearer to Russia, less well-educated in the mass and subjected to a feudalism probably not less oppressive than that of the Lebanon, Syria, Palestine or Egypt. The social fabric of Iraq is in unstable equilibrium, the tribal system is beginning to break up, a drift to the towns and the creation of a proletariat has begun, the country is in the greatest need of elementary measures of social reform, which successive Governments have been unable, owing to the weakness of the administration, or unwilling through selfish motives, to carry out. Though the urban proletariat is as yet small, there is a promising field in Iraq for Russian and Communist propaganda.

2. It is certainly true that the tenets of Islam are incompatible with Communist theory, which derides all religion as the opium of the people and preaches a purely materialist philosophy. If, therefore, Islam were a vigorous living force among all classes of Iraqis, as it is in Nejd, it would doubtless prove an effective barrier to the spread of Communist ideas. But, in spite of the existence in Iraq of five holy cities and a considerable body of professional divines, I am inclined to think that the hold of Islam is weakening even on the least enlightened sections of the population. This is no doubt due largely to the fact that Islam was originally designed as a code of ethics for a primitive pastoral people and that its lack of flexibility makes it impossible to combine adherence to its rigid precepts with a modern way of life. Neither a Cabinet Minister nor a factory hand can, for example, pray five times a day or keep the fast of Ramadhan without serious loss of efficiency.

3. However that may be, there are two considerations which make the task of the Communist propagandist easier in so far as it concerns the peasant. It is not necessary for him to present communism as a materialist philosophy, but merely as a kind of government which will assure the cultivator the fruits of his labour. Secondly, the large landowners are a particularly easy target for attack, since, having grown rich during the war years, they tend more and more to spend their time in Bagdad, merely visiting their lands to collect their share of the crops. They are, consequently, losing their influence over the tribesmen. The hold of Islam over the ignorant peasantry could not, I think, be counted upon to do more than slow up the organisation of a Communist State, were the Communists to succeed in gaining control of the centres of power by the conversion to communism of the educated class.

4. It is, I think, universally true that modern education has the effect of weakening belief in revealed religion. Islam is no exception to this rule. The young Iraqi, by the very fact of receiving an education, is to some extent separated from his uneducated Moslem brethren. The framework of his thoughts is disturbed and his basic assumptions are challenged. The education he receives is of necessity western, its roots are in Christianity not in Islam, and its existing tradition is secular and materialist. It is not, therefore, surprising that, in general, educated Iraqis have lost their faith in Islam, and that those who continue to perform the prescribed rites of their faith do so without fervour, as a social convention rather than as the expression of a firmly held belief. Islam among the educated youth cannot provide, I fear, an effective barrier to communism.

5. Among the educated it is, of course, the younger generation which responds to the attractions of Communist ideas. Members of the older generation are almost without exception violently hostile to communism. This may be due in part to the influence of religion, and is often so justified in conversation, though their views are more probably determined by fear for their wealth and influence. They are led, therefore, to describe as "Communists" and bad Moslems those who advocate even mild measures of social reform. The young, whose education has opened their minds to new ideas without providing them with an ordered framework of belief, think of communism as a means to their own advancement, as a new and hopeful principle which may revivify the country and perhaps again enable the east to overcome the humiliation it feels in the face of the moral and material dominance of the west. A tiny minority may understand and accept the arguments of Marxist dialectic, a few more may be genuinely concerned with the standard of life of the masses, still others are attracted by the glamour of connexion with what is still in Iraq an illegal party, but the vast majority who turn leftwards do so because of the respect they feel for Soviet strength and because they associate British influence with the maintenance in power of the existing ruling class. It is impossible as yet to determine the proportion of Shia to Sunni in the parties of the Left, but I believe that Shias would be found to predominate. Though Shias are in a majority in the country, the Sunni minority has always controlled the government of Iraq and the feeling of frustration thus engendered renders the Shias peculiarly susceptible to external propaganda.

6. Ignorance of the real meaning of communism and of true conditions of life in Soviet Russia is, I fear, likely to be the most potent influence in causing communism to spread. Neither "Communists" nor "anti-Communists" in Iraq think clearly enough or have sufficient knowledge to form a true appreciation of the meaning of communism. For instance, to the peasant (particularly in the north, where he is closer to the fount of propaganda) communism means the right to own his fields, use his rifle against anyone he likes and pay no attention to the orders of his agha; in fact, an anarchical and unrealisable heaven. To the more educated communism means only a measure of reform which we should probably designate as mild socialism. The peasant knows nothing of the oppressive side of communism in Russia; the effendi, if he is aware of it, prefers to close his mind to it, if only because communism is such a useful stick with which to beat the existing régime and ourselves, who are held to support it.

7. Some of the "Communists" are at least striving to be progressive, though I suspect that many are half-baked youths unwilling to turn their hands to a steady job. The "anti-Communists" are even less attractive, standing as they do for the maintenance of an oppressive form of social injustice. It is unfortunately easy for the former to ascribe their failure to produce personalities capable of controlling the administrative machine to the reactionary influence of Britain; and for the latter to misuse the name of Islam as a weapon in the armoury of social reaction. I and my staff find it particularly galling to be accused, on the one hand, of upholding the existing system and, on the other, of being unresponsive to the need of combating the spread of communistic propaganda, and there is no doubt that these misconceptions do much to weaken the effectiveness of both Britain and Islam as barriers against imperialist communism.

8. In conclusion, then, I hold the view that Islam is unlikely to form an effective barrier to Communist propaganda in Iraq. This need not by itself distress us. The hold of religion has weakened throughout the world, but in most countries something—not necessarily something evil—has taken its place. In the political sphere we have liberalism, socialism, nationalism and other -isms. In Turkey, for instance, the hold of Islam is almost nil, at any rate politically, and yet there is little sign of Communist penetration. The two countries are differently situated, since Turkey feels herself to be directly menaced by Russia, but the main factor is, of course, that Turkey has comparatively a progressive Government and that patriotism is more prevalent than in Iraq, where self-seeking individualism takes its place.

9. There can, I think, be no doubt whatever, from our point of view, as to the force which must fill the gap of retreating Islam. In the world-wide experience of Englishmen and, indeed, of many Iraqis, nothing has been found more suitable than the British ideal of moderation, toleration, social progress, and individual freedom. I am sure that ultimately the British ideal is the one most fitted for acceptance in the Middle East, as elsewhere; and I believe that everything possible must be done to secure its acceptance in Iraq. But, inherently, it is an ideal very difficult to "put over." To an undeveloped people a picture full of

half-tones is less understandable than one of brilliant contrasts, of shining highlights and black shadows, and in this important respect I fear that communism has the advantage of us.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER-BIRD

[E 3109/5/34]

No. 28

Mr. Farquhar to Mr. Bevin. (Received 5th April)

(No. 462)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 5th April, 1946

FOLLOWING is translation of joint communiqué signed by Persian Prime Minister and Soviet Ambassador which was broadcasted this morning by Tehran radio:—

"Negotiations begun in Moscow between Prime Minister of Persia and Soviet authorities were continued in Tehran after his return and arrival of Soviet Ambassador. These negotiations ended on 4th April and complete agreement was reached on all outstanding questions, viz.:—

"(1) All Soviet forces will have evacuated Persian territory within a period of one and a half months from 24th March.

"(2) An agreement for the formation of a joint Perso-Soviet oil company with the condition governing it will be submitted to the fifteenth Majlis for its approval within seven months after 24th March.

"(3) Concerning Azerbaijan, as it is an internal problem, Persian Government, taking into consideration necessity of reforms in accordance with existing laws, will make the necessary arrangements with the people of Azerbaijan for a solution of present difficulties in a benevolent spirit."

[E 3486/5/34]

No. 29

Translation of a note addressed by the Persian Prime Minister to the Soviet Ambassador on 4th April, 1946

(Text taken from newspaper *Iran* of 7th April)

M. l'Ambassadeur,

IN continuation of our oral discussions, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Imperial Persian Government agrees to the formation of a Perso-Russian joint company for the prospecting and exploitation of oil areas in the north of Persia on the following conditions:—

(1) During the first twenty-five years of the operations of the company, 49 per cent. of the shares shall belong to Persia and 51 per cent. to Russia, and in the second twenty-five years, 50 per cent. of the shares shall belong to Persia and 55 [sic] per cent. to Russia.

(2) The profits accruing to the company shall be divided in proportion to the number of shares held by the two parties.

(3) The boundaries of the initial areas to be prospected shall be the same as outlined in the plan which your Excellency handed to me during conversations held on 24th March, with the exception of that part of Western Azerbaijan to the west of the line beginning at the meeting point of the Russian, Turkish and Persian frontiers, passing along the eastern shores of the Lake of Rezaieh and reaching the town of Mianduab, as was outlined on 4th April, 1946. At the same time the Persian Government undertakes to concede no concession in the area to the west of this line to foreign companies or Persian companies in which there is foreign participation or which use foreign capital.

(4) The capital invested by Persia shall consist of the oil-bearing areas mentioned in article (3) which, after technical operations have been carried out, shall consist of oil wells of which the products shall be exploited by the company. The capital invested by Russia shall consist of all expenses, equipment and machinery, payment of experts and workers required for the extraction and refining of the oil.

(5) The company shall operate for a period of fifty years.

(6) At the end of this period the Persian Government shall have the right to buy the shares held by Russia or to prolong the period of operation of the company.

(7) The protection of the areas to be prospected and of the oil wells and all company installations shall be purely the responsibility of Persian security forces.

The agreement for the formation of the above-mentioned joint Perso-Russian oil company which shall be signed later in conformity with the text of this note, shall be submitted to the Majlis for approval when elections have been held and when the Majlis has begun legislation, in any case not later than seven months after 24th March, 1946.

I take, &c.

QAVAM ES SALTANEH.

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respecting

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[E 8124/613/07]

Mr. Squire to Mr. Harris—(Received 1st July)

[E 8124/613/07]

Kabul, 20th June, 1946.

M. ALI MUHAMMAD KHAN, the Afghan Minister for Foreign Affairs, has just given me a full account of the circumstances leading up to the unexpected signing of the Russo-Afghan agreement referred to in my despatch No. 40 of the 11th June, 1946. Apparently, Sultan Ahmad Khan, the former Afghan Ambassador to Moscow, at his farewell interview with Stalin, mentioned that he had failed to secure a settlement of the Russo-Afghan dispute during his stay in Moscow.

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING EASTERN AFFAIRS

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CHAPTER I.—AFGHANISTAN

[E 5919/818/97]

No. 1

Mr. Squire to Mr. Bevin. (Received 27th June)

(No. 40)
Sir,

Kabul, 15th June, 1946

ON 12th June, when I happened to meet the Afghan Minister for Foreign Affairs, he told me that he had a piece of good news which he was sure would interest me. He had just had a telegram from the Afghan Ambassador in Moscow to say that after all the Russians had suddenly agreed to settle the various questions outstanding in connexion with the Russo-Afghan border. In this connexion please see my despatch No. 47 of 1st June, 1945. Ali Muhammad was obviously delighted but at the same time a little anxious as to what this sudden change of policy on the part of Russia might portend. He appeared to be really hopeful that the Russians had after all decided to adopt a more conciliatory policy towards Afghanistan. This impression was confirmed the next day by the ex-Prime Minister Sardar Muhammad Hashim Khan, who, in accordance with his practice during recent years when Prime Minister, paid a separate call on me to offer his congratulations on the occasion of The King's birthday. He expressed optimism as to the future peace of the world saying that he was sure that Russia was realising that she could not remain alone with all the rest of the world against her and that she would of necessity eventually pursue a course of co-operation rather than of isolation. Such an expression of opinion from Hashim Khan, who is rabidly Russophobe, is indeed surprising.

2. Ali Muhammad did not of course go into details of the agreement which, as announced the next day by Moscow radio, has actually been signed and apparently involves a fairly comprehensive settlement of all outstanding questions on this frontier.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India, the Government of India and to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow.

I have, &c.

G. F. SQUIRE.

[E 6138/818/97]

No. 2

Mr. Squire to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 3rd July.)

(No. 43) Secret.
Sir,

Kabul, 20th June, 1946.

M. ALI MUHAMMAD KHAN, the Afghan Minister for Foreign Affairs, has just given me a full account of the circumstances leading up to the unexpected signing of the Russo-Afghan agreement referred to in my despatch No. 40 of the 15th June, 1946. Apparently, Sultan Ahmad Khan, the retiring Afghan Ambassador to Moscow, at his farewell interview with Stalin, mentioned regretfully his failure to secure a settlement of this vexed question during his

term of office in Moscow. Molotov sent for him the next day and said that his Government were ready to sign the proposed agreement and would send instructions to the ambassador to do this at Kabul. Sultan Ahmad, however, was anxious that he should himself sign it before leaving Moscow, and to this Molotov agreed. Sultan Ahmad therefore telegraphed to Kabul announcing the offer and asking that he should be empowered to sign the agreement on the terms already proposed by the Afghan Government. The Afghan Government authorised him to do so and at the same time informed the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul and asked him to telegraph to his Government to the same effect. The Russian Ambassador's telegram arrived first at Moscow and was acted on immediately, with the result that Sultan Ahmad was able to telegraph announcing the conclusion of the agreement, promising a fuller report on his return to Kabul.

2. Ali Muhammad went on to say that, though perhaps speaking as Foreign Minister he should not express to me suspicions of the Russian gesture, he would admit privately that, though the actual conclusion of this agreement was a source of great satisfaction to his Government, he himself was reserving judgment until he knew more of the motive for this sudden move. It might be, as *Pravda* has apparently announced, that the Russians were making this gesture in order to show the world that they had no aggressive designs on their weaker neighbours and that this was the reason for so much publicity being given by the Russians to an agreement which could hardly be of any real interest to the rest of the world. Ali Muhammad was strengthened in this opinion by the consideration that anybody who was at all *au fait* with the facts of the case knew that the Russians had shown no magnanimity whatever. By the agreement the Afghans had agreed to waive two important clauses of the 1921 treaty promising Russian economic assistance and a plebiscite in the Panjdeh area. In return, they had received only the acknowledgment that the Thalweg in the River Oxus was the true boundary and that certain islands in dispute belonged to Afghanistan. As any claims by the Russians to the contrary were quite untenable, they deserved no real credit for waiving them. The only concession they had made was that certain Afghan lands on the Kushk River which had continually been cultivated in contravention of the terms of the 1921 agreement should be allowed to continue under cultivation, provided that this should not be extended. They also surrender the right to build a dam on the Murghab River, a dam which would in any case have been useless.

3. Ali Muhammad could not help fearing that the Russians might now demand concessions from Afghanistan in return for this agreement. If they demand mineral, especially oil, concessions, the Afghan Government would definitely refuse. They would rather leave their minerals undeveloped than allow them to be worked by the Russians. He assured me that this would be the fixed policy of any Afghan Government. He thought it more likely, however, that the Russians would ask for trade concessions. They had already put forward certain proposals, but some of the conditions were definitely objectionable and could not be accepted by the Afghan Government. They would have to wait and see whether the Russians would now press these demands.

4. To me it appears possible that one of the reasons prompting this gesture on the part of Soviet Russia was the Russian desire to mark the change of Government in Afghanistan from that of the anti-Russian ex-Premier to one that they may hope may prove more pliable and perhaps more gullible. It is possible, indeed, that the proposal recently made to the Indian postal authorities by the Russians for an exchange of postal correspondence between Russia and India via Afghanistan may be an attempt to take advantage of the new situation.

5. I enclose a translation of the agreement⁽¹⁾ as it appeared recently in the Kabul press. This is probably an incomplete and inaccurate version. A full translation will follow when the official text is available.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India, the Government of India and His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow.

I have, &c.

G. F. SQUIRE.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 6405/6405/97]

No. 3

Mr. Squire to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 9th July.)

(No. 46. Confidential.)

Sir,

Kabul, 1st July, 1946.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a report on the heads of foreign missions in Kabul.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

G. F. SQUIRE.

Enclosure in No. 3

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Kabul.

[Passages marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports.]

China.

M. Tsou Shang Yu, Minister.

Presented his credentials on the 23rd September, 1945. Previously Chinese Minister at Ankara. Before that is believed to have been Director-General of the West Asia Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry and later Chinese Consul-General at Rome. Speaks fluent Russian as a result of having been partly educated in Manchuria. Makes no secret of his dislike of the Russians. A cheerful little man with a sense of humour who is friendly to Great Britain. Has just been joined by his wife, a pleasant person who was in Shanghai during the Japanese occupation, but is leaving shortly as the height of Kabul does not agree with him.

Iraq.

General Khalid Al Zahawi, Minister.

*Presented his credentials on the 4th February, 1943. Served with the Iraqi army and has received training at the Staff College at Camberley, where he enjoyed himself thoroughly and where he seems to have been very well treated. Before being posted to Kabul he was Director-General of Irrigation in his own country. (Written in 1944.) Has recently gone on two months' leave but hopes not to return. Speaks French, Persian and Turkish. His Turkish wife, who was in Kabul from 1943-44, returned to Istanbul in 1944 and is now with their son, a medical student in America.

Italy.

Signor M. Ungaro, Chargé d'Affaires.

*Since the departure of the previous minister, Signor Quarotti, for Moscow, the Italian Legation has remained in charge of former members of the staff. The present chargé d'affaires is the commercial attaché, Signor Ungaro, formerly in business in Bombay. Signor Ungaro was previously understood, though how far correctly I cannot say, to have been the only member of the Italian Legation who was a real Fascist. He is now, of course, frightfully anti-Fascist, and would like to be considered as a full-blown ally. In fact, he seems not a little hurt that he should still be viewed with some distrust. (Written in 1945.)

A born gossip but amusing conversationalist. Always on the hunt for information which might be of interest to others, particularly, it is said, the Russians. Was careful to remain strictly neutral until the monarchy/republican question was settled, but is, of course, now a staunch supporter of the republic.

Egypt.

M. Muhammad Sadek, Minister.

Arrived in Kabul on the 10th June, 1946, and presented his credentials on the 19th June, 1946. It is too early to give an estimate of his character as I have only met him once. Is a career diplomat educated in Egypt and France. Has served in many parts of the world but chiefly in the United States where he started his career in Washington in 1925. Throughout the war he was Consul-General in San Francisco from where he was transferred again to Washington before returning to the Foreign Ministry in Egypt. This is his first appointment as Minister. Was Egyptian Consul in Bombay in 1935. Speaks English and French fluently. Aged about 45. Like so many of his countrymen he seems genial and friendly and first impressions are distinctly favourable.

France.

M. Armand Henriot, Minister.

Presented his credentials on the 17th December, 1945. A career diplomat of no outstanding ability. Is due to retire in two years' time and consequently does no more than he need. Friendly enough to his equals but rude and overbearing to his inferiors. Both he and his wife, who is a Russian, are on very friendly terms with the Russian Embassy and are consequently somewhat suspect.

Persia.

M. Hassan Ali Kemal Hedayet, Ambassador.

Presented his credentials on the 16th March, 1946. Aged about 65. One of the senior Persian officials who appears to have held (and, according to himself, with great distinction) a number of posts abroad and also in the Cabinet, including those of Minister of Justice and Minister of State. An ineffective and garrulous old man ever ready to emphasise his pro-

British and anti-Russian sentiments. Is not well received by the Afghans. Speaks French reasonably and some English. Accompanied by a pleasant but somewhat colourless wife who speaks only Persian.

Soviet Union.

M. Ivan Nikolaevich Bakoulin, Ambassador.

*Presented his credentials on the 17th February, 1944. Aged about 37. The enfant terrible of the Diplomatic Corps in Kabul. Was apparently appointed to the diplomatic service from China in about 1938, and except for a period as consul-general in Sinkiang, has served mostly in Moscow. Burly, outspoken and entirely without polish, he boasts of his peasant origin. Like so many Russians, he considers the only test of a friend is the capacity to put away an unlimited number of drinks with no heel taps. (Written in 1945.)

As his country becomes increasingly unpopular so do his manners deteriorate. He is nothing like so friendly even outwardly as before. His wife is the embassy surgeon and has a hard time looking after the ever increasing colony in addition to keeping her husband in order. She is a simple and friendly soul who we all like, but is completely at sea in the world of politics.

Turkey.

M. Ahmet Cevat Ustun, Ambassador.

*Presented his credentials on the 9th April, 1945. Was previously Turkish Minister in Bagdad, where

he seems to have attracted attention chiefly by his nervousness about his own health and his defeatism in the early years of the war. He is a decided improvement on his predecessor and first impressions are of a shrewd and cultured little man who is anxious to be friendly, though of course he finds Kabul backward and unhygienic. With so many Turkish women in Kabul unable to say a word except in their own language it is a great relief to have an ambassador's wife who speaks English excellently and has considerable charm. They have two children in Kabul and appear to spend a good deal of their time over their education. (Written in 1945.)

United States.

Mr. Ely E. Palmer, Minister.

Presented his credentials on the 6th December, 1945. A consular officer *de carrière*, he has spent a large part of his service in South America. Recently Consul-General in Sydney and previously at Beirut.

Although very friendly and easy to get on with he is nothing like so forthcoming as his predecessor and we are left guessing as to American objectives in Afghanistan. A united Anglo-American front is not so easy to maintain as formerly.

Both he and his wife, who is a Canadian, have independent means and have a reputation for charm and hospitality which they fully maintain. Both are keen bridge players.

[E 6909/66/97]

No. 4

Mr. Bevin to Mr. Squire (Kabul).

(No. 24.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, 19th July, 1946.

WHEN I received the new Afghan Minister to-day he told me that he wanted to see relations between our two countries put on a better footing.

2. I told him that I shared his wish for closer relations between our countries and that I would arrange for someone in the Department to see him and find out what could be done to overcome existing differences between us.

3. I hoped that we might draw up an agreed memorandum of the points at issue between us. I ended by saying that I would be very willing to discuss these with him on my return from the Paris Conference.

4. The Minister gave me the impression that he has something on his mind. I intend finding out what this is.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

[E 7730/66/97]

No. 5

Memorandum

THE new Afghan Minister called here to-day at my request. The Secretary of State had said that the Minister "had something on his mind" and I wanted to find out what it was. After some polite oriental exchanges the Minister launched out into what was clearly a previously prepared statement to the following effect.

For a hundred years the relations between Afghan and this country had been conducted at a great distance. Sometimes they had not been very pleasant. The Afghan Government wanted these relations to be close and cordial and they did not want them to be conducted through the medium of India, as had been done in the past. There were certain political questions which wanted straightening out, but it was particularly in the economic field that the Afghan Government wished to lay the foundations of close co-operation with the United Kingdom.

I asked the Minister what the political questions were which he had in mind. He mentioned an outlet to the sea. There was also the question of the Pathans which formed an ethnic Afghan group along a good part of the frontier of India. If the future of India was to be radically changed as appeared to be the case, the Afghan Government wanted to be assured that the wishes of this minority

would be consulted in the future political status of India. Among other political questions was the whole question of the tribal areas on the Indian frontier. Almost every time that the Afghans had tried to get this question settled something had cropped up to upset the whole business.

The Minister went on to say that his Government realised that if they were to keep up in any way at all with the march of progress, they had got to raise the economic and social and cultural standards of their people a very great deal and they had got to do it quickly. For some time past now they had been trying to get closer economic and commercial relations with the United Kingdom. He mentioned that just before the war they had sent their Minister of National Economy to the United Kingdom to try to establish a credit system with this country for the exchange of goods. Nothing, however, had come of the visit. They were anxious to acquire our machinery, particularly agricultural and textile machinery, either for cash or for raw materials. Before the war most of their commercial exchanges had been with India, Japan and Russia, but practically none with the United Kingdom. They wanted to change this and to do the bulk of their commercial exchanges with this country. Finally, he said that his special mission here was to have a clear horizon with Great Britain and to establish the closest economic, financial and cultural relations with us and he hoped that he would have all possible help from the British Government in his task. After his conversation with the Secretary of State he was quite sure that this would be approved by the British Government.

I assured the Minister that we would do all in our power to enable him to achieve his object here. At my request he undertook to let us have in writing a plan of the objectives which he has been sent here to pursue. I said that on receipt of this we would see how best we could help him to implement them.

R. G. HOWE.

Foreign Office,

1st August, 1946.

[E 7783/66/97]

No. 6

Mr. Squire to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 12th August.)

(No. 53.)

Sir,

Kabul, 25th July, 1946.

THE political review for the last half of 1945, forwarded with my despatch No. 7 of the 1st February, was taken up almost entirely with events in the Eastern and Southern Provinces and concluded with forebodings of possible trouble in the spring of the present year. Anxiety on this score continued throughout the spring, but fortunately in neither province were recalcitrants able to raise sufficient support for a further trial of strength with the Afghan Government. In the Eastern Province Ghulam Faruq Khan was appointed Governor with the specific task of coming to an understanding with the Safis. In this he appears to have been entirely successful and the leading malcontents have been persuaded to come into Kabul and make their peace with the King. The Government have released almost all their prisoners and have made concessions all along the line, but have secured themselves to a certain extent against further trouble by taking the sons of the leading maliks into the Kabul Military College, where they are useful hostages in the hands of the Government in the event of a sudden recrudescence of trouble. In the Southern Province the efforts of Mazrak and Sultan Ahmad to stir up trouble have been ineffective, largely because the tribesmen of Waziristan have been occupied with local affairs and because the Faqir of Ipi, in order to concentrate the greatest possible strength in opposition to the Government of India, has deprecated any diversion of forces against Afghanistan.

2. The result of all this has been that early in May the Afghan Government felt the future sufficiently secure to permit of the long-projected resignation of Sardar Muhammad Hashim Khan, Prime Minister since 1929, and the setting up of a new Government under his brother, Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan. The timing of this move was probably influenced by the economic almost as much as by the political situation. Piece goods and petrol were scarce and prices even of food-stuffs were tending to rise. The former Prime Minister was held largely to blame for the country's economic policy and the change of Premiers acted to some extent as the opening of a safety valve, for the new Prime Minister is popular with the tribes and in the country generally. It is, however, too early to say what the results of the change will be. The new Prime Minister is no administrator, but this will not matter so much if he is able to choose a good team

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of Ministers and leave them to work with the minimum of interference. This, however, he is unlikely to be able to do and differences of opinion with his nephew Muhammad Daud Khan, who has succeeded him as War Minister, have already led to quarrels and the threatened resignation of the latter. The position of the King is also still somewhat uncertain. His Majesty is already taking a greater personal interest in the army and may insist on taking a more active part in politics also.

3. The new Cabinet, though involving many changes of Ministers, has not introduced much new blood and the general policy of the Government is not likely to change considerably—except perhaps in the economic sphere, where Abdul Majid Khan, Minister of National Economy, now returned after seven years in Europe, principally Switzerland, is trying to curtail the monopoly system, for the introduction of which he was himself responsible, in favour of a return to freer trade within the framework of a planned economy. In particular, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ali Muhammad, remains at his post, though a complete reshuffle of the subordinate Foreign Office and diplomatic appointments abroad is in process of accomplishment. These include a new ambassador in Moscow and new ministers in London, Rome and Nanking. Ali Muhammad is perhaps a little less sure of himself and of his position than under the former Prime Minister. The chief change in foreign policy, of which there are already signs, is likely to be some rapprochement with Soviet Russia involving, of necessity, a swing away from the increasingly open policy of reliance on and friendship with Great Britain and India pursued during the last two years by the strongly Russophobic Hashim Khan. Russia's sudden and unexpected acceptance of the revised frontier agreement, which has been hanging fire for the last six years, may be nothing more than a gesture to the new Prime Minister, but it may equally well be a cloak for more sinister designs. Certainly Russian policy in Persia has given the Afghan Government ample cause for anxiety and the sudden arrest of Ghulam Sadiq in Moscow, the reasons for which are obscure, has only made the Afghans more suspicious. The last six months have also witnessed a considerable increase of Russian activities in Afghanistan itself. The numbers in the Soviet Embassy seem to grow each month and several houses in the town have been taken for the embassy staff, from which active propaganda is believed to be carried on on the lines of a recent article in the *New Times* severely criticising the present Afghan régime. Russian agents in the northern provinces have also been reported to be very active, in spite of numerous arrests by the Afghan authorities. Russian interest in the provinces bordering on India and in Indian problems has not been very noticeable, though quite a number of the embassy staff seem to be learning or to be already fluent in Pushtu, no doubt in readiness for active interference whenever this may suit Russian policy.

4. That Indian problems should arouse interest in Afghanistan is inevitable, but it is surprising that they have not caused greater anxiety. The Afghans seem to think that somehow or the other His Majesty's Government will not abandon her responsibilities and that, as the maintenance of administration, especially in the frontier districts with which Afghanistan is principally concerned, without the British is, in their view, unthinkable, therefore the British will remain. They have indeed put forward proposals that the Pushtu-speaking areas of India should, in the event of political changes, be given the option of uniting themselves with Afghanistan, but in so doing they have made it quite clear that they are more than content with the present position. In fact, the most pleasing feature of the past six months in Afghanistan has been the steady growth of trust in His Majesty's Government and the Government of India and the openly expressed gratitude for the many ways in which the Government of India have assisted this country. Expressions of goodwill are no longer confined almost exclusively to the more enlightened members of the Government, but are now commonly to be heard from all classes and more especially the military, formerly our most bitter critics, who fully realise the assistance that is being given to their country by the training of so many officers and non-commissioned officers in India and the supply on generous terms of arms and equipment to their army. The Ministry of Defence, in fact, now almost exclusively look to His Majesty's Government and the Government of India for assistance in connexion with both the army and the air force. The supply of arms and equipment offered as a result of the military mission to India continues satisfactorily, and in this connexion two British instructors have recently arrived in Kabul to give short training courses. For the air force eight Tiger Moths have been acquired for training purposes, twelve Avro XIX's

are being ordered and a sample Spitfire is due to arrive shortly. Increasing help will also be required from India in the training of Afghan air force personnel. Afghan gratitude for all this assistance has not been confined to words. The recent gift of 500 tons of wheat to India was a small but genuine gesture of goodwill to India and this has been further emphasised on the Baluchistan border by the smart capture of the ringleaders of a hostile gang and the rescue of two Indian captives. Proposals, however, for closer co-operation with the North-West Frontier Province, particularly in the matter of joint jirgas, have made little progress, and it remains to be seen whether the same spirit of friendly co-operation will continue under the new Government.

5. The position of Afghanistan, as of so many other small States, is one of particular anxiety at the present time and it is natural that she should seek to strengthen it by every possible means. After some hesitation, she has now applied for membership of the United Nations Organisation, hoping thereby to secure her continued existence as a country even should British support be withdrawn as a result of the grant of independence to India. For the same reason the Afghan Government have recently tried to interest the United States in their country, and with some apparent success. Both they and the American Legation have been uncommunicative about the exact scope of the agreement that has been made with the Knudsen-Morrison Engineering Company, but the completion of the Torkham-Jalalabad-Kabul and the Chaman-Kandahar roads seem to have been definitely allotted to them in addition to the Boghra Canal and colonisation scheme, which is already in hand, and some twenty American engineers have already arrived. The total number of Americans, which rumour reports to be expected, amounts to as many as 300. It is in some ways a pity that British firms were not able to secure the contract for this work, but in view of the political uncertainty in the world there are countervailing advantages for us in having Americans as well as ourselves interested in the stability of Afghanistan.

6. And America is not our only rival in the field. In the cultural sphere France is undoubtedly making great efforts to re-establish her former ascendancy. At least six French professors for the Istiqlal College have arrived in recent months and are doing what they can to restore the French language to the position from which in latter years it has been ousted by English. Unfortunately, the British Council, having made an excellent start in the country, are not able, for financial reasons, to take advantage of the further openings that are now presenting themselves. The French Archaeological Mission has been re-established and fresh recruits to restart operations are shortly expected. French doctors and nurses are also on their way to take the place of a number of Turks who have left on the completion of their contract.

7. Turkish popularity, in fact, appears to be on the wane. Their military mission is decreasing in numbers and there have even been hints that the Afghans would like to employ British instructors in their place. They realise, however, that the political difficulties of effecting any such change are well nigh insuperable. In any case, the world is in too uncertain a state for it to be wise for any country to embark on any radical change in policy. Afghanistan is no exception and will be well advised to mark time until the political horizon is somewhat clearer.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India, the Government of India, the Government of the North-West Frontier Province, the Baluchistan Administration and His Majesty's Consuls in Kandahar and Jalalabad.

I have, &c.

G. F. SQUIRE.

[E 7973/66/97]

No. 7

Mr. Squire to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 15th August.)

(No. 58.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a translation of an important speech delivered by His Majesty the King of Afghanistan on the 20th July, 1946, on the occasion of the opening of the sixth session of the National Council.

2. The latter part of the speech beginning from paragraph 9 is of particular interest, as this is probably the first time that so clear a public exposition of

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Afghan foreign policy has ever been made. The references to His Majesty's Government and the Government of India and to the Government of the United States are particularly cordial. I am informed that the Soviet Ambassador was not too pleased with the section dealing with Russo-Afghan relations, feeling that while there was nothing to which objection could be taken the difference in cordiality between the references to Russia and those to Great Britain and America was unnecessarily marked.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.
G. F. SQUIRE.

Enclosure in No. 7

Translation of King Zahir Shah's Speech.

I OPEN the sixth session of the National Assembly in the name of Almighty God, and thank Him that He has kept our country safe from the disasters of war and enabled her to remain at peace in a disturbed world. The world war is now fortunately over, and peace and order prevail everywhere once again. Until recently all our efforts have been directed at protecting the honour of our country and the rights of our people, but henceforth our efforts will be concentrated on the betterment and uplift of our land and the creation of a new life for our people.

2. Before I proceed to talk of the affairs of to-day and our plans for to-morrow, I must mention one important point: His Royal Highness Sardar Muhammad Hashim Khan, who has been for the last seventeen years our Prime Minister, and who has carried out his duties to the entire satisfaction both of my father and of myself, has for a long time past been requesting me to permit him to retire from political life on grounds of ill health. Because I did not wish to lose the services of a man of such renowned personality I was for some time unable to grant his wish. But his requests have been repeated, and knowing of his state of health I have been constrained to accede to them. He is one of the oldest, most loyal and most devoted servants of this country, and the great services which he has rendered in the past, especially during the time of my late father and during my own reign, can never be forgotten. He has laid the foundations of a sound economy in Afghanistan, and safeguarded the political interests of this country at a time when the whole world was in a state of unrest. These services will always be appreciated, and I trust that they will always have a permanent place in the annals of this country.

3. When I granted the request of His Royal Highness Sardar Muhammad Hashim Khan I asked His Royal Highness Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan, Commander-in-chief and War Minister, to assume the office of Prime Minister and to form his Cabinet. Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan is a brave soldier who figured prominently in the struggle for Afghan independence and a man whom the people love and trust. His Royal Highness submitted the names of his colleagues to me, and I gave my assent to the formation of a new Council of Ministers. I trust that, like the former Government, the new Government will, with the help of God, keep the welfare and prosperity of the nation and the uplift of the people always before its eyes, and will strive its utmost to achieve these ends.

4. In its previous sessions the National Assembly rendered valuable service in the development of this country and the safeguarding of its political integrity. The Assembly enjoys the confidence of the Government and the nation. It is hoped that this session of the Assembly will also efficiently discharge the duties that are entrusted to it, in pursuance of the Afghan constitution, and will represent to me the wishes of my patriotic nation, and to my people the plans and policy of my Government and myself.

5. Now that I am opening the sixth session of the National Assembly it is important that I should explain the aspirations and wishes of the Government with regard to the plans that it has under consideration both for internal and external policy. It is my wish that my people should live in peace and comfort, and that their material and intellectual lives should be uplifted. To this end the Government has prepared a series of economic and financial plans. The object of these plans is that, by the development and extension of industry and agriculture and the completion of our building programme, every one, not excluding farmers and manual workers, may be benefited. To this end it is

essential that economic development should go hand in hand with cultural and educational development, and that our country's material aspect should develop with her intellectual, so that the future life of our country and its political development may be more broadly based to enable our nation to take its rightful place in the civilised world. It is, therefore, essential that education should be more widespread and the Kabul University developed. Our administrative aim is to maintain absolute equality among the people, to secure the freedom of the individual within the orbit of law and order, and to improve the quality of our administration. On our governors and administrators there rests a heavy responsibility. It is necessary that each one of them should zealously guard the lives of those living within their jurisdiction, remove their difficulties as far as possible, keep the Government informed of these difficulties, and the people of the views of the Government. It is the duty of these governors to prove by their works that they are not merely tax-collecting officials, but that their intention is to implement the aims and objects of the Central Government as set forth above; and in this they should follow my example and that of the Government.

6. On the military side, my Government believes that to maintain peace and order in the country the Afghan army should be well equipped with modern weapons and be prepared to defend the rights of the people. To achieve this object we must have officers who are educated and proficient in the art of war. Our military barracks should be not only a place of residence for our soldiers but schools and training centres for them.

7. In addition, we have put in hand various plans calculated to reduce immediately and finally the prices of food-stuffs and cloth which have risen as a result of six years' of world war, and to achieve thereby the comfort and welfare of the people. The difficulties that we have faced have been a matter of grave concern both to me and to my people. Although we know that the people of Afghanistan have during the late war undergone many trials, it should not be forgotten that these tribulations were not confined to Afghanistan alone. Every country in the world has had its difficulties, and we can safely say that the difficulties of others were greater than those of Afghanistan. To-day, for better or for worse, the countries of the world are interdependent to such an extent that no one country can, by remaining in a state of isolation, avoid the consequences of trouble in any other country, nor can it consider that any other country will be unaffected by its own policy, good or bad. But truly fortunate is that country whose policy is based on the respect of the rights and freedom of others and of itself, and which, when faced with trials, conducts itself in a manner praiseworthy before God and man.

8. We are fortunate that up to date the foreign policy of our Government has been based upon the respect of the freedom and rights of others and of ourselves, and to this policy the people of Afghanistan have always adhered. The honourable Deputies are aware that during the recent war our Government faithfully and loyally adhered to the policy of neutrality and peace approved by the Grand National Jirga. This policy has, by good fortune, enabled us to preserve our rights and to maintain good relations with our neighbouring countries. It has, at the same time, enabled us to extend our friendly relations with other Governments.

9. Fortunately Afghanistan's foreign relations are satisfactory in every respect. We have been successful in maintaining our traditional friendship with our great northern neighbour, Russia, with whom we have been on friendly terms since the establishment of the independence of Afghanistan and the foundation of the Soviet Government. We hope that in the near future our commercial and economic ties will tend to strengthen all the more these traditional bonds of friendship. It is a matter of pleasure to us that the Soviet Government have agreed to delimit afresh the Soviet-Afghan border on the basis of previous documents and agreements, and have recognised the rights of Afghanistan on that frontier. On the basis of the agreement concluded, our borders, whether by land or by the common rivers, the Oxus and the Punj, will now be clearly defined. Apart from this point there was nothing at issue between the two countries contrary to the spirit of friendship, and even this point cannot be held to have been controversial. We hope that our relations with Soviet Russia will last for ever on the basis of mutual respect, neutrality, non-aggression and the spirit of the treaty of friendship.

10. Our friendly and economic relations with the Government of Great Britain and India are increasing, and fortunately complete trust and confidence prevails in our mutual relations. Our Government is endeavouring to see that, on the one hand, the interests of both countries are safeguarded by the extension

of our economic ties, and that, on the other, there should be nothing between Afghanistan, Great Britain and India as may be the cause of misunderstanding or difficulty either now or in the future. It may be mentioned that we appreciate the assistance rendered by India in meeting our demands by selling us goods during the war, and by the Government of Great Britain in the offer of military equipment on reasonable terms. This is likely to prove effective in establishing mutual confidence and friendly feelings.

11. Friendly relations exist with the Imperial Persian Government, the Turkish Republic, the kingdom of Iraq and the royal Governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. We hope that Afghanistan's connexions with these countries will be extended from the economic and educational angles, and that our material and cultural ties will be strengthened.

12. It should not be left unmentioned that Afghanistan is greatly interested in the Muslim brotherhood, and in the question of good understanding among Muslim nations. I am happy to learn that three more independent countries have recently been established in the Arab and Islamic world, and that our brethren in Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan have achieved their objects. We have formally recognised the Governments of Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan, and we hope that at a favourable opportunity we will be able to establish firm diplomatic and economic relations with these countries.

13. We have re-established our diplomatic and cultural relations with the newly-formed Provisional Government of France. We have maintained our former relations with the Italian Government. We hope that we shall be able to establish grounds of common interest from the commercial point of view with these two Governments.

14. Our diplomatic and economic relations with the Government of the United States are increasing satisfactorily in a spirit of sincerity and mutual trust, and we hope that these ties will become stronger and stronger every day. Our Government and the Government of the United States, understanding each other's good intentions, hope that each will assist and co-operate with the other in the economic and educational fields. Like India, the United States has rendered valuable assistance by selling us American commodities, and we hope that our trade with the United States will flourish in the future. It is a result of this co-operation that one of the famous American constructional companies has started a series of works in this country on the basis of an agreement recently concluded.

15. The conclusion of a friendly pact and the exchange of diplomatic representation with our neighbour China is a matter of great pleasure to us and to our country. We hope that in the coming years both countries will benefit by the establishment of practical, commercial and cultural relations.

16. Similarly, Afghanistan's friendly relations with other Governments are a source of happiness and satisfaction to us.

17. Before concluding my address on the foreign policy of Afghanistan, I consider it necessary to make it clear that our Government, while pursuing a policy of the preservation of peace and the safeguarding of the national honour of our own people, wishes that peace, freedom and the equality of nations should prevail throughout the world.

18. Afghanistan has never favoured the policy of secret diplomacy, nor will it ever do so. Its geographical position and the natural characteristics of its people demand that friendly and impartial relations should be maintained with all neighbouring and friendly countries, and that it should participate in such international organisations as may be considered beneficial for the peace of the world.

19. I must not omit to mention that the Afghan Ministry for Foreign Affairs has already taken the preliminary steps to secure for Afghanistan membership of the United Nations Organisation, and it is expected that Afghanistan will in the near future become a member.

20. Afghanistan has always wished, and still desires, that her rights, freedom and integrity should be respected, and she cannot afford to tolerate even the slightest thing likely to affect or restrict her freedom or rights.

21. In conclusion, I pray that God will grant our Government and people the power to improve the condition of the people and raise the status of Afghanistan. I pray that He will grant my heartfelt wishes for the prosperity of this land, so that this historic kingdom may assume its rightful place in the world to-day and remain for ever a useful member of the Society of Nations.

[E 8171/1712/97]

No. 8

Mr. Squire to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 20th August.)

(No. 63.)

Sir,

Kabul, 10th August, 1946.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your circular despatch No. L. 3603/405 dated the 9th June, 1938, I have the honour to enclose a copy of the records of leading personalities in Afghanistan amended up to June 1946.

2. In the present revision an attempt has been made to compress as many of the entries as possible and to insert at the end of each entry remarks on the individual's character in place of the disjointed comments appearing in various parts of the entry.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch without enclosure to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

G. F. SQUIRE.

Enclosure in No. 8

Records of Leading Personalities in Afghanistan.

(References where preceded by W.W. relate to "Who's Who in Afghanistan, 1936" issued by the General Staff in India and where preceded by L.P. relate to List of Leading Personalities.)

1. *Abdul Ahad* (W.W. 4).

Born about 1880. Son of Qazi Ghulam. Brother of W.W. 63. Ismail Khel Ghilzal; owing to long residence in Wardak, is known as "Wardaki." From 1909 to 1916 was Chief Usher (Arzbe) to the Ameer. Appointed Hakim (Governor) of Kataghan. Was arrested with his brother for complicity in the murder of Ameer Habibullah Khan (1919) and banished, but was later acquitted. In 1922 was appointed A.D.C. to King Amanullah and was a great favourite of his. Sent to Wardak valley during the Mangal rebellion in 1924-25 to maintain loyalty amongst the Wardakis. During Amanullah's absence in Europe was for four months Governor of the Eastern Province, but was relieved and sent to Moscow to meet King Amanullah, it being realised that he was incapable of administering the province. Returned to Kabul July 1928. Officiating Minister of Interior November 1928. Supported Amanullah in his efforts, from Kandahar. Fled with Amanullah to India May 1929 and went to Persia. Returned to Afghanistan December 1929. Elected President of the National Council (Rais-i-Shura) 1930. In November 1931 proceeded to Farah as Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator), Farah and Chakhansur. Returned to Kabul in spring of 1932 and re-elected President, National Council. Re-elected President of the National Council 1933. Visited Wardak country March 1933 to check pro-Amanullah propaganda. Served on a commission on the Helmand water dispute June 1933. In October 1933 visited North Afghanistan with Prime Minister and others. Re-elected President of National Council 1934, 1935, 1936 and 1937. In 1937 visited Europe for medical treatment. Still President of National Council (1946). A friend of the ex-Prime Minister (L.P. 48). His son-in-law is the Wali of Kabul.

Is apparently friendly to members of the British Legation, but does not convey an impression of sincerity. Is said to belong to the "Charkhi" family party. He suffers from diabetes and on account of his ill-health is unlikely to take a more active part in the Government. Nevertheless he continues to carry out his duties and is expected to retain his post.

2. *Abdul Ahad* (W.W. 5).

Son of Abdul Ahad Khan of Ghazni and brother of L.P. 36. Born 1902 in Kabul. Tajik. He owns property in Kabul and Ghazni. An infantry officer. Was sent to Turkey about 1925 for military training and studied in Military Academy, Istanbul. Returned to Afghanistan via Herat early in 1929; reached Kandahar just after Amanullah fled to India. Returned to Herat. Later joined late King Nadir Khan in Southern Province and took part in fighting there. Appointed Officer Commanding, Arg, after Nadir's succession. Appointed General Officer Commanding, Kandahar, in 1930. Was more than once congratulated by the King on his good work as General Officer Commanding, Kandahar. Attended manoeuvres in Delhi, January 1935. After his return held frequent field parades of Kandahar garrison and started seriously to learn English, of which he spoke little. Appointed General Officer Commanding, Herat, in June 1935. In 1936 he visited Musabad on the Persian frontier to select a site for a post in area given to Afghanistan by the Boundary Commission. Appointed commander in Farah Province during Helmand water dispute. Sister married to W.W. 553 in 1936. Royal appreciation presumably in connexion with services in Helmand water dispute. Reported that he exercised more influence than the Governor of Herat. In absence of the Governor of Herat, he and Mohammad Ali Khan officiated as Governors jointly. He opened a

school in Robat-i-Ghurian where officers learn English. Formed a local intelligence corps in Ghurian. Transferred from command of Herat forces, appointed Governor of Ghazni 1937. Accused Indian Government of intrigue with the Ghilzais. Detailed men in Katawaz for pro-Government propaganda. Bribed Suleiman Khel visitors to keep away from rebels. Warned Suleiman Khel against Fakir of Ipi, whom he called a "British agent" working against Afghan interests. Visited Turkey in 1942 for medical treatment and returned in 1943. His visit to Turkey is thought to have had some political motive. Commandant of an infantry division in the Kabul army corps. Visited Bombay in 1945 for medical treatment.

He is an intelligent little man with a great sense of humour. He is an enlightened conversationalist but not communicative on military matters though he is reputed to be a keen student of his profession and a capable commander. Popular and loyal he was impressed by his visit to Indian manoeuvres in 1935. Although he tends at present to consider himself an invalid he is a possible choice for an important military or diplomatic post. Speaks Turkish well.

3. Abdul Aziz Khan (W.W. 13).

Son of the late Ghulam Haidar Charki. Born 1891. Brother of Ghulam Siddiq (W.W. 309). Was a lieutenant-colonel (Kandak Mishar) of artillery. Was on the Asmar front in 1919. Commanding Arandu October 1919. Promoted Ghund Mishar (brigadier) and proceeded to Mazar-i-Sharif June 1920. General Officer Commanding, Kunar Valley, 1922. Hakim (Governor) of Laghman 1923-24. Under-Secretary to the Minister of the Interior 1926. Officiated as Home Minister 1927. Governor of Mazar November 1928. Wounded and imprisoned in Mazar-i-Sharif by Saqavis February 1929. Sent to Kabul March 1929 but escaped. Arrived Quetta and left for Meshed July 1929. Returned to Kabul via India, April 1930. Left Kabul by air on the 20th July, 1930, to visit his brother Ghulam Nabi (deceased) in Angora. Accompanied ex-King Amanullah to Mecca in 1931. One of the Amanullah party in Europe. Lived some time in Constantinople at No. 110, Grande Rue de Sisti, but left for Berlin when Amanullah was in Mecca in 1935. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. In September 1935 was at Constantinople, but was expelled from Turkey that month and left for Germany.

4. Abdul Hadi Khan (W.W. 38).

Dawī Kakar of Kandahar. Son of Abdul Ahad, a Hakim (Governor) of Kandahar. Member of the Afghan Peace Delegation June 1919. Formerly editor of the *Aman-i-Afghan*. Assistant to the Foreign Minister as Mustashar (counsellor) in charge of Indian Affairs. Member of the Afghan delegation, Mussoorie Conference 1920. Arrived Kushk November 1920 with a mission to enquire into the position of the Afghan Consul. Appointed Afghan representative at Bokhara. Returned to Kabul July 1921 and resumed his duties in the Foreign Office. Appointed Minister in London January 1922. Relieved August 1924. On return was appointed Minister of Commerce. Was suspected of "Republican" intrigues during Amanullah's absence in Europe 1928. Went to Russia for three months in 1928 in connexion with Russo-Afghan trade. Retired from Ministry of Commerce in October 1928 to become a candidate for the National Assembly. Joined Amanullah in Kandahar and fled with him to India May 1929. Resided in Karachi and returned to Kabul in November 1929. Appointed Afghan Minister in Berlin December 1929. Resigned in March 1931, as he considered the attitude of the Afghan Government was too friendly to His Majesty's Government. Went to Mecca in 1931. Reported to have met ex-King Amanullah in

Venice March 1932. In May 1932 returned to Kabul after performing pilgrimage to Mecca. Was closely watched by Afghan Government, who doubted his loyalty. In 1933 (December) was arrested and imprisoned on suspicion of pro-Amanullah activities. Still (1946) in jail in Kabul. Has the reputation of being an ardent Nationalist and particularly anti-British, but financially honest. Has also been reported to be pro-Russian.

5. Abdul Hakim Khan (W.W. 43).

Was a junior Under-Secretary at the Afghan Foreign Office; transferred as a junior Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Education in 1923. Appointed Secretary to Afghan Legation in Rome, February 1927. Appointed Second Secretary, Afghan Legation, Berlin, May 1931. Assistant Secretary in western branch of Afghan Foreign Office in 1934 and 1935. Was Rais of the Afghan representatives at Joint Commission at Chaman in April/July 1936. Governor of Eastern Province in September 1939.

1943-46 Director of Agriculture. February 1946 appointed Governor of Northern Province in place of Ghulam Faruq Khan. Is intelligent and reported honest. Does not belong to any important family.

6. Abdul Hamid Khan (W.W. 45).

Muhammazai. Born about 1898. Son of the late Abdul Aziz Khan. Brother of Abdul Hussain Khan (Mirza). Educated in France. In Tehran in 1929 with his father, with whom he returned to Kabul in December 1929. Secretary to the Afghan Legation in Rome, February 1931-34. First Secretary, Afghan Embassy, Moscow, 1934. In the Protocol Branch of the Foreign Ministry in 1936. Chef du Protocol in 1937. Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1937. Appointed Afghan Representative in Geneva 1939. Returned to Kabul in November 1939 and re-appointed Secretary in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1940. Until recently was distrusted by the Royal Family but now appears to have been restored to favour. A possible choice as an Afghan Minister abroad in one of the less important centres.

7. Abdul Husain Khan (W.W. 47).

Mirza. Son of the late Abdul Aziz. Born about 1896 and educated in Persia. Accompanied his father to Tehran in 1920. Was Under-Secretary in Charge of Reception and Visa Branch of Afghan Foreign Office January 1924. Dismissed in August 1925, partly for taking heavy commission on goods purchased in India for Afghan Government. Director of Afghan Transport Company, Kabul, 1926. Appointed Consul-General, Delhi. In business in Karachi 1929. Returned to Kabul November 1929. Appointed Afghan Minister in Rome and presented credentials the 17th May, 1930. Afghan delegate to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva 1931-32. Attended Disarmament Conference, Geneva, during 1933, and seemed very friendly with Litvinov.

Transferred as Ambassador to Moscow during 1933. Brought the body of the late Sardar Muhammad Aziz Khan to Kabul in June 1933 and returned to Moscow in December.

Visited Kabul September 1935, then returned to Moscow.

Returned to Kabul July 1938. Appointed Minister of Public Works, October 1938. Appointed Minister of Posts and Telegraphs 1940. Suspected of intrigues with enemy 1942-43. Left for Washington in April 1943 to take up newly created post of Afghan Minister there. It is believed that he was selected for the appointment in order to get him out of Kabul. Not trusted by the Yayha Khel dynasty, and believed to be anti-British in his political sympathies. Said to have pro-Amanullah leanings. Speaks quite good English and has many friends in India where he spent some time during the 1914-18 war.

8. Abdulla Khan.

Tajik. Son of Ahmad Khan of Ghazni and brother of Gul Ahmad Khan Tajik (L.P. 36) and Abdul Ahad (L.P. 2). He was formerly an official in the Government Purchasing Department, and afterwards their agent in Berlin in 1938-39. Appointed as Third Secretary (Mun) in the Ministry of National Economy in 1940. Appointed officiating Governor of Herat in 1941. Became unpopular in Herat owing to food shortage and subsequent riot resulting in the murder of two Afghan officials.

During the war (1939-45) was thought to be pro-German and to have made a fortune smuggling goods to Russia and Iran. A favourite of ex-Prime Minister (L.P. 48), he is regarded as one of the most energetic junior men.

9. Abdul Majid, alias Abdul Majidoff or Hakimoff (W.W. 73).

Tarak of Herat. Born about 1902. Son of Abdul Hakim. A man of no important family. Was at one time an official in the customs office in Herat, from where in 1920 he went to Moscow and was at one time attached to the Afghan Embassy there. Started business in Moscow, and made a considerable amount of money by exporting and importing contraband goods with the connivance of the customs officials. In about 1930 he settled in Berlin. Was recalled to Kabul in 1933 by the Afghan Government to organise and manage the Ashami Company. Prior to proceeding to Berlin he is believed to have had a considerable amount of his property confiscated by the Soviet Government.

In spring 1935 carried out an extensive business tour in Northern Afghanistan.

In January 1936 managing director of the Afghan National Bank and Ashami Company. In 1936 went to Europe to arrange for trade credits and contacts. Attended Nazi Congress meeting in Nuremberg in 1937.

Returned to Kabul, March 1938. Appointed Minister of Trade, September 1938. Proceeded to Delhi December 1938 for trade discussions with the Government of India. Appointment changed to Minister for National Economy, April 1939. Left Kabul January 1941 for United States but changed plans at Karachi and went to Germany for medical treatment. Ill and in Switzerland 1943. Returned to Afghanistan in 1946.

Is a tactful and capable business man, the most important in the country. Although he is said by some to be pro-Russian he is primarily an ardent Nationalist. He was largely responsible for the introduction of the monopoly system and the formation of various trading companies. After his return from abroad in 1946 he set to work energetically to reorganise the economic structure of the country, reversing his previous policy of monopolies in favour of free trade.

Speaks Russian and German and has a wife and four children in New York.

10. Abdul Tawab Khan (W.W. 124).

Muhammazai. Son of late Mahmud Tarzi. Born 1902. Went to Europe for education October 1921. Admitted Saint-Cyr early in 1924 and completed a course of nearly three years' duration there. Spent one year with a French cavalry regiment. Head of Cavalry School, Kabul, 1928. Accompanied King Amanullah to Europe 1928. Escaped from Kabul to Peshawar with Inayatullah (W.W. 366) by British aeroplane January 1929 and went to Europe. Married (1931) in Istanbul Zakiri Khanum, daughter of a retired Turkish naval captain. Still (1946) in Europe and a member of Amanullah's party. Speaks French fluently and is a smart-mannered man, of whom more may be heard in the future. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933.

11. Abdul Wahab (W.W. 126).

Muhammazai. Son of the late Mahmud Tarzi. Born about 1900. Accompanied his father to the Afghan Mussoorie Conference 1920. Left Kabul for London with despatches August 1921. Educated at Exeter College, Oxford. On return to Kabul was appointed to a branch of the Foreign Office. Went to Kandahar at the time of Amanullah's abdication and acted as Foreign Minister there. Accompanied Amanullah on his flight to India and left India with him. Has since lived in Europe. In Rome September 1934 and in close attendance on the ex-King. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. In October 1935 was living in Istanbul. In Rome December 1936.

12. Abdur Rahim Khan (W.W. 89).

Naib Salar (general). Safi of Reza, Kohistan. Son of Abdul Qadir Khan. Born about 1886 in Kohistan. Brother-in-law of Muhammad Husain, accountant under Ameer Habibullah Khan, who was executed by King Amanullah Khan.

Appointed to Sar-i-Us (commander of the Royal bodyguard) by Ameer Habibullah at age of 16. Served for five years in Kabul. Afterwards was for ten years supervisor of bridge construction in the Eastern Province. Promoted Ghund Mishar (brigadier) (1921) and posted to the Cavalry Kandak of the Herat army. Recalled to Kabul about 1927. Later transferred to Mazar-i-Sharif as Ghund Mishar of the Cavalry Ghund. On outbreak of the 1928 revolution returned to Kabul and joined Bacha-i-Saqao in Charikar during the latter's second attempt to capture Kabul January 1929. Sent by Bach-i-Saqao to Mazar-i-Sharif to organise a revolution. He deposed the Governor and left for Maimana, and thence for Herat, which he reached on the 4th May, 1929, after defeating some Herati forces under Muhammad Ghaus (W.W. 262). In May appointed Civil and Military Governor by Bacha-i-Saqao and reappointed later by Nadir Shah October 1929. After the success of Shah Mahmud (W.W. 414) in the spring of 1931 in Kataghan and Badakhshan, he decided to submit to Nadir Shah. In August 1932 visited Kabul, and in September was confirmed in appointment of Naib-ul-Hukmah (Governor, Herat).

Dealt firmly with an attempt to incite the Herat garrison to mutiny in 1933. Met the Prime Minister at Maimana at time of Nadir Shah's assassination and gave his allegiance to King Zahir Shah. Appointed head of Perso-Afghan Boundary Commission September 1934.

Arrived in Kabul in June 1935 and appointed Minister of Public Works.

Appointed Assistant to the Prime Minister with status of a Cabinet Minister (1938). Arrested on the 31st January, 1946, by ex-Prime Minister (L.P. 48) together with his son-in-law Khalil-Ullah Khan, a Mudir in the Prime Ministry, for suspected complicity in the Safi disturbances of 1945. Is still in jail.

Although he is a man of great personality who governed his province well he has always been suspect by the present régime of some form of disloyalty though the rumours about him have varied from time to time, that he was pro-Amanullah, pro-Russian, pro-Republican, pro-Axis, separatist, &c.

13. Abdur Rahman Khan.

Appointed Afghan Minister at Bagdad early in January 1941, and was on his way to Bagdad when he was recalled from Karachi owing to outspoken criticism of commercial policy of Abdul Majid Khan, Minister of National Economy, in which he had indulged just before his departure. Later reported to Bagdad and presented his credentials to the Regent of Iraq on the 21st October, 1941. Escorted the remains of Sayed Jamaluddin to Kabul in December 1944.

14. *Abdus Samad Khan* (W.W. 118).

Tajik.
Secretary of Afghan Legation in London; returned to Kabul May 1925, visiting Mecca en route, and appointed a junior Under-Secretary in the Afghan Foreign Office. His post was abolished, owing to economy of budget of April 1926, and he was thrown out of employment. Appointed a member of Afghan deputation to Ibn Saud's All-Muslim Conference, May 1926. Appointed First Secretary to Afghan Legation, Paris, October 1926, and left in that month for Paris. Appointed to the Foreign Office as Assistant Secretary, November 1928; transferred to the Protocol Branch, Foreign Office, Kabul, February 1931. Appointed Minister at Rome, and left to take up appointment in February 1930. Represented King Zahir Shah at coronation in London, 1937. Is shortly to be relieved by Muhammad Akram Khan (L.P. 42). His new appointment has as yet not been announced.

An intelligent man possessing good manners. Speaks English, and believed to be well disposed to us.

15. *Ahmad Ali Jan (or Khan)* (W.W. 140).

Sardar, Muhammadzai. Born 1899. Son of Suleiman Khan and cousin of the late King Nadir Shah. Brother of Ali Shah Khan. Appointed A.D.C. to King Amanullah 1923, but incurred his displeasure by marrying, without his approval, a daughter of Prince Musa Khan (W.W. 461A), Governor of Jalalabad in 1923-24. Imprisoned by Bacha-i-Saqao in April 1929, but was released in October. Appointed Minister in Paris, November 1929, and transferred to London, June 1931. Represented Afghanistan at the Economic Conference, London, 1933. Relieved in July 1933 and appointed Minister of Education. 1937, appointed Ambassador at Teheran. 1939, transferred to London as Minister. Returned to Kabul 1946 on relief by Muhammad Naim Khan (L.P. 53).

Is a pleasant man, a keen sportsman, but not very capable. Seems lazy. Is pro-British and very friendly to members of the British Legation, Kabul. His wife was educated in England and speaks and writes English perfectly. He himself speaks English, French and Urdu. His eldest son, Abdul Ali, born about 1926, is studying at London University. His wife and youngest son Muhammad Ali (born about 1936) are also in London.

16. *Ahmad Shah Khan* (W.W. 149).

Sardar, Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Muhammad Asaf Khan. Born at Dehra Dun 1889. Returned to Afghanistan 1901. Accompanied Ameer Habibullah Khan to India in 1907. On the night of the murder of Ameer Habibullah Khan (1919) was in command of the guard. The sepoys of the Ghundi-Ardalan (an infantry unit), whose colonel, Ali Shah Reza, was executed as the actual murderer, believed that Ahmad Shah Khan was the real murderer and that their colonel had been made a scapegoat. It is stated, however, on excellent authority that the actual murderer was not Ahmad Shah Khan. Married a sister of the late Shaghassai Ali Ahmad Khan, one time Wali of Kabul. Was an A.D.C. of ex-King Amanullah. Went to Europe via India in 1929 with a message from Bacha-i-Saqao to Nadir Khan. Returned to Kabul early 1930. Appointed Wazir-i-Darbar (Minister of Court) April 1930. In March 1932 went on pilgrimage to Mecca as representative of the King and negotiated a "Treaty of Friendship" with Saudi Arabia. Visited India in the spring of 1933 for medical treatment, where he married a second wife. His eldest daughter was married to King Zahir Shah in November 1931. Visited India in November 1936.

His four sisters were married to—

- (a) Late King Nadir Shah.
- (b) Late Muhammad Aziz Khan, brother of (a).
- (c) N. S. Abdul Ghani Khan (W.W. 34).
- (d) Muhammad Akbar Khan (L.P. 43).

Went to Tehran for the wedding celebrations of the Crown Prince of Iran (1939). Still Wazir-i-Darbar.

Fond of shooting, fishing and gardening, but suffers from a heart complaint and not therefore very active. Does not take any active interest in politics. Speaks Urdu and a little English and is a pleasant, friendly and easy going man.

17. *Ali Muhammad Khan Mirza* (W.W. 179).

Born about 1894. A brother-in-law of the Ameer Habibullah. Travelled in Europe, and on return (1923) was appointed as assistant in the Ministry of Education. In 1925 promoted Under-Secretary, Ministry of Education. Appointed Minister at Rome, February 1927. Was with Amanullah in London March 1928. Minister of Commerce November 1928. A member of Bacha-i-Saqao's "Council for the Maintenance of Order" February 1929. Appointed Minister of Education November 1929. In June 1933 was appointed Afghan representative at the Economic Conference, London, and in July was appointed Afghan Minister, London. Appointed Minister in Switzerland and representative of Afghanistan to the League of Nations February 1935. Selected to represent Afghanistan at the Fourth International Hospital Conference in Rome in May 1935. Summoned to Kabul July 1935, and arrived there the same month via Moscow and Tirmex. Returned to London via India in October.

Represented King Zahir Shah at funeral of King George V in London January 1936.

Returned to Kabul (1938) and appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. Visited Tehran (1939) for the wedding celebrations of the Crown Prince of Iran and to attend the meeting of the Council of the Saadabad Pact. Is still Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sardar-i-Ala, 1946.

Speaks English well but no French; is a keen student of English literature and interested particularly in education. Enlightened, capable and genuinely friendly to Britain, but not a strong character and lacks energy. Not being related to the ruling family, he has no great influence with the Government.

18. *Ali Shah Khan* (W.W. 180).

Mohammadzai. Born about 1900. Naib Salar, son of Mohammad Sulaiman Khan, first cousin of late King Nadir Shah. Son-in-law of S. Musa Khan (W.W. 461A) and brother of Ahmad Ali Khan (L.P. 15). Was commandant of military schools and the military college from 1932 to 1939. Appointed Governor and General Officer Commanding, Kandahar, in 1939. In August 1941 he was transferred to the Southern Province as Governor (Rais-i-Tanzim) and General Officer Commanding Southern Province army corps and promoted to the rank of Naib Salar (general). Relieved of his post in April 1944 and is still (June 1946) unemployed. Recently left for medical treatment in India.

He is a pleasant, rather easy-going individual, but has not been very successful as an administrator.

19. *Allah Nawaz* (W.W. 182).

Indian of Multan. Son of Khan Bahadur Rab Nawaz Khan, honorary magistrate, Multan. As a student in Lahore ran away to Afghanistan. In Jalalabad (1920) was an assistant editor of the *Ittihad-i-Mashriqi*. A superintendent of schools.

Jalalabad Circle. Was agent of the Indian Revolutionary party in Afghanistan and Tashkent and channel of communication between them and the Hindustani Fanatics. In 1927 was employed by the Deutsch-Afghanische Company as an interpreter. Helped Nadir Shah in his advance on Kabul 1929. Appointed Minister of Court October 1929, and equerry November 1929. Was appointed to supervise the work on Dar-ul-Aman May 1930. In July 1930 accompanied the Minister of Justice (W.W. 256) to Ghazni for negotiations with the Suleiman Khel. Left Kabul for Europe via India in April 1931, ostensibly for medical treatment, returning to Kabul in November 1931. In March 1932 again went to Europe for the same reason, and returned in January 1933. In June 1933 was appointed Minister of Public Works, but spent most of the year in the Southern Province in connexion with the disturbances there. Left Kabul on visit to Europe, ostensibly for medical treatment December 1933, but in reality, it is believed, to enquire about the trial of Said Kemal, the murderer of Sardar Muhammad Aziz, and to discuss affairs of State with Sardar Shah Wali Khan (L.P. 72). Popular rumour in Kabul said he had been sent to assassinate ex-King Amanullah. Appointed Minister, Berlin, 1935, but was not at first accepted by the German Government owing to his being the representative at the trial of Said Kemal. Travelled to Kabul by German plane (August 1937). Returned to Germany with his family (October 1937).

Again visited Kabul (1938) and returned to Germany. Played an important part in the Government's efforts to quell the Suleiman Khel rising of 1938. Visited Kabul in 1940 via Russia. Remained as Minister at Berlin until the collapse of Germany.

Devoted to late King Nadir Shah, his life has been threatened by the Amanullah Party. Trusted by ex-Prime Minister (L.P. 48) who considered him very capable. Said to be anti-British.

20. *Amanullah Khan* (W.W. 183).

Ex-King of Afghanistan, third son of the Ameer Habibullah Khan by the Ulya Hazrat (W.W. 346). Born the 1st June, 1892. In 1914 married Souriya, daughter of the later Sardar Mahmud Tarzi. In 1916 was reported to be friendly with the German mission in Kabul and in favour of intervention in the war against Britain. When the Court moved to Jalalabad in the winter of 1918-19 he remained behind as Governor of Kabul, and was in a very strong position, with control of the arsenal, treasury and stores, when the Ameer was murdered in February 1919. He proclaimed himself Ameer, declared his uncle Nasrullah a usurper, and accused him of complicity in the murder. The troops in Jalalabad and Kabul sided with him and Nasrullah was compelled to submit. On the 27th February was formally crowned by the Tagao Mullah, and in a speech stated that Inayatullah (W.W. 366) had by his recognition of Nasrullah's usurpation forfeited his claim to the throne. On the 18th April held a special durbar in Kabul for the trial of those accused of the Ameer's murder, and at its conclusion a colonel, named Ali Shah Reza, generally regarded as a mere scapegoat, was sentenced to death and was executed. Sardar Nasrullah and others were sentenced to imprisonment for life. Amanullah soon found his position threatened by intrigue on behalf of Inayatullah and the restiveness of the army, who were not satisfied with the enquiry made into the murder of Habibullah. The army was therefore despatched to the Indian frontier, in order to divert its attention and to take advantage of the disturbances in India should these develop into open rebellion. The commander-in-chief apparently exceeded his instructions and precipitated hostilities, which resulted in the Third Afghan War. A variety of considerations led to the grant of lenient terms to Afghanistan, including the recognition of her com-

plete independence. As a result Amanullah Khan was able to claim that he had won the freedom of his country by the sword, and, by the conclusion of treaties with a number of European countries, that he had brought about the recognition of Afghanistan on a basis of equality by the Great Powers. These tactics gains him considerable prestige, both in his country and throughout the East. This prestige tended to increase his natural vanity and render him impatient of advice. Through his wife he had been brought under "Young Turk" influence, and he proceeded to carry out a fantastically rapid programme of reform without regard for the backwardness and prejudice of his people, particularly the mullahs. He failed to profit by the warning sounded by several rebellions, the most serious of which was the Khost rising of 1924, and continued to spend his revenues on schemes for social or educational progress, whilst neglecting his army. These tendencies were exaggerated as a result of his European tour of 1927-28, and particularly, it is believed, as a result of his visit to Mustafa Kemal at Angora. In the autumn of 1928 the Shinwaris rose in revolt and were soon followed by other tribes. Bacha-i-Saqao, a brigand of low birth, attacked Kabul in December 1928 and again in January 1929. Amanullah announced his abdication in favour of Inayatullah on the 14th January and fled to Kandahar a day or two later. At Kandahar attempted to rally support for Durrani dynasty and formally rescinded his abdication. In April he advanced on Kabul but owing to the hostility of the Ghilzais was repulsed near Ghazni and defeated at Mukur. Arrived at Chaman with his family on the 23rd May, and sailed from Bombay for Italy on the 22nd June, 1929. Visited Mustafa Kemal in Angora in February 1930, returning to Italy. Revisited Turkey again for three months in June. Left Constantinople hurriedly for Italy. Returned to Turkey in September, but went back and spent the winter in Italy. Left Naples for Jeddah to perform pilgrimage on the 5th April, 1931, with the object of either rehabilitating himself in Moslem eyes, or concerting measures for the recovery of his throne. Published a letter decrying King Nadir and his régime. Left Jeddah for Suez, the 9th May, 1931. His Mecca party included Muhammad Adib (W.W. 137), brother of Souriya, Abdul Fateh Tarzi (W.W. 20a), the late Ghulam Nabi, Shuja-ud-Daulah (W.W. 612), and two officials of the Angora Embassy, Fazal Ahmad and Abdul Aziz. Returned to Italy, via Alexandria, the 21st May. Left Rome for Switzerland, the 20th June, 1931, stayed at Montreux. Visited Rome in July and returned to Switzerland. Visited Montecatini in September, and was back in Rome by the beginning of November. Left Rome on short visits to Naples in December 1931 and Venice in March 1932. At Venice reported to have met Afghan Minister from Berlin; more likely it was Abdul Hadi Khan (W.W. 38). Said to have definite understandings with Soviet and Persia and to have many friends in Germany. Constant rumours of his whereabouts and intentions were circulated among the tribes on both sides of the border during 1932, culminating in one, which was put about during the Dare Khel revolt in November, to the effect that he was in Gardez. The ex-King was, however, in Italy or Switzerland throughout the year. He was reported to be writing his autobiography, and to be going to Russia when he had finished it to have it published by the Soviet. This has never materialised. In Europe he has constantly intrigued against the present Afghan régime with a view to regaining his throne. In July 1933 he visited Constantinople and held a meeting of his principal supporters there. Reported to have tried, unsuccessfully, to obtain Soviet support to his efforts. The execution of the late Ghulam Nabi, one of his chief adherents, intensified his hostility against the Yahya Khel. Members of his party were responsible for the assassinations of King Nadir

Shah (Kabul 1933) and his brother Muhammad Aziz (Berlin 1933) and are active in intriguing on Amanullah's behalf. His chief supporter in Europe is Ghulam Siddiq (W.W. 300), a brother of the late Ghulam Nabi. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Receives an annual allowance of about £150 a month from the Italian Government. In March 1935 again performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, where he met a number of sympathisers, especially Indians, but appears to have effected little. Returned to Rome, where he normally lives. Since then his adherents in Europe and Asia have been active in spreading propaganda against the present Afghan régime amongst the North-West Frontier tribes. He owns property in Switzerland, which he occasionally visits. Has three sons and four daughters. Different opinions are held as to the possibility of his return, but this seems unlikely unless the situation in Afghanistan seriously deteriorates, possibly as the result of further assassinations of members of the present ruling family, or feeling on the Indian side of the border definitely turns in favour of initiating an incursion into Afghanistan on his behalf. Since he has been living in Italy he invariably leaves for Switzerland during the summer months, but, in 1935, instead of going to Switzerland he rented a large house in Stressa in Northern Italy, and took with him his family and Hasan Jan Muhammad, his brother-in-law. Returned to Rome after a short visit to Montreux on the 17th August, and believed to be in Rome (1937). Visited Mecca again in 1935. Rumoured to draw an allowance from Russia. Still in Italy (1943). Reported to have visited Switzerland (1943). After staying at Gstaad and at Villars he returned to Rome. He was accompanied by an Italian mistress. Was in Rome with his family when it was liberated by the Allies.

21. Asadullah Khan (W.W. 199).

Sardar, Muhammadzai, Firqa Mishar (major-general). Born 1911. Is a son of the late Ameer Habibullah by the Ulya Janab, sister of the late King Nadir Shah. Is thus a half-brother of ex-King Amanullah and a cousin of King Zahir Shah. Educated at the French school, Kabul, and speaks French fluently. Imprisoned in Kabul by Bacha-i-Saqao in 1929 and grossly ill-treated. In November 1929 visited Lahore for medical treatment. On return was appointed Sar-i-Oa (Commander of the Royal Bodyguard) and A.D.C. to the Minister of War. Appointed to officiate as second secretary (equivalent to quartermaster-general) War Office, in addition to his other duties, in December 1930. In 1931 qualified at the Infantry Officers' School, Kabul. Promoted Firqa Mishar and appointed General Officer Commanding, Guards Division, 1933. In 1934 acted as Officer Commanding Infantry Officers' School, in the absence of the German instructor, Major Christenn.

Went to Persia to attend the millenary celebrations of the poet Firdausi, October 1934, and returned to Kabul in the same month, having met Reza Shah.

Left Kabul for Europe (March 1937) and represented King Zahir Shah at the Coronation of King George VI. Attended Turkish manoeuvres (August 1937) and returned to Kabul (September 1937).

He visited India again in 1939 for medical treatment. On the reorganisation of the Kabul Army Corps in 1939 he was relieved of his appointment as General Officer Commanding, Guards Division, and became Inspector-General of the Afghan Army. Appointed Chief of General Staff, May 1946. He occasionally officiates as Minister of Defence.

Is important as the lineal representative of both the "Kabul" and "Peshawar" Sardars. He is not a particularly strong character and is therefore not likely to be any danger to the present régime. Is a great favourite of the present Prime Minister who is married to his half-sister. Though nervous

in manner he is intelligent and takes his profession seriously. Is very well disposed to the British. Has one son born in 1934.

22. Ata Muhammad Khan (W.W. 207).

Haji, Tokhi. Son of the late Sardar Abdullah Khan, who was Governor of Mazar in the time of Ameer Habibullah. Quarrelled with Hashim Khan in the time of Ameer Habibullah. Was in Jalalabad when Ameer Habibullah was murdered; was arrested and condemned to death, but was reprieved at the last moment. Again arrested on suspicion of complicity in unsuccessful attempt on Amanullah's life at Paghman in 1920, but released at Mahmud Tarzi's request. Appointed diplomatic representative, Bokhara, but his arrival coincided with the Bolshevik revolt (1920) and he returned to Mazar. Was one of Afghan officials ordered to render secret assistance to Enver Pasha in Central Asia (1922). Unemployed for four years. Appointed Governor of Balkh at time of Amanullah's visit to Mazar (1928) just prior to latter's visit to Europe, and awarded the Order of Astor. During the revolution fought against the Saqavi forces of Abdur Rahim (W.W. 89), was defeated and fled to Tashkent. Accompanied the late Ghulam Nabi in his unsuccessful effort to recapture Northern Afghanistan in April 1929, and again retired to Russian territory. Returned to Afghanistan soon after Nadir Shah's accession. Was a member of the Commission of Reconstruction sent under Yakub Khan (W.W. 675) to Mazar-i-Sharif in March 1930. Commanded a flying column during operations against Ibrahim Beg 1931. Promoted Firqa Mishar (major-general) and awarded the Order of Astor, 2nd Class, 1931. Appointed a member of the Council of Nobles December 1931. Visited Mecca in 1932. 1943 President of the Council of Nobles. May 1946, appointed Minister of Justice and given the title of Sardar-i-Ali.

23. Ata-ul-Haq (W.W. 209).

Born about 1885. Eldest son of the late Khwaja Jan of Serai Khwaja, Koh-i-Daman. Brother of the late Sher Jan and the late Muhammad Sadiq Khan, two of the Bacha-i-Saqao's officials. Lived in India until he was 16. Accompanied Ameer Habibullah on his tour in India 1907. In July 1920 appointed to command at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and was suspended in March 1923 for inefficient handling of the Wazirs. Took over command of Kandahar Infantry Brigade April 1923. Spent two years in Moscow in charge of Afghan students. Appointed Foreign Minister by Bacha-i-Saqao June 1929. Arrested with Bacha-i-Saqao November 1929 on capture of Kabul by Nadir Shah. Is well educated and possesses pleasant manners.

Was released from jail in 1938.

24. Faiz Muhammad Khan (W.W. 243).

Sardar, Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan (W.W. 317). Born about 1899. Was secretary to the late Muhammad Aslam Khan, Afghan Envoy, Tashkent. Returned to Kabul March 1920. Adviser to the late Muhammad Wali Khan, Afghan Envoy to Moscow 1920. Returned from Moscow and in charge of arrangements for the Suritz party September 1920. Arrived Tashkent the 5th January, 1921, en route to Moscow. Appointed first counsellor to Muhammad Wali's mission to Europe 1921 which visited London, America, Paris and Rome. First Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office 1922. In addition acted as Minister of Education 1923. Appointed Minister of Education March 1924. A member of Bacha-i-Saqao's "Council for the Maintenance of Order" April 1929, although at one time the Bacha had condemned him to death. Appointed Foreign Minister by King Nadir Shah November 1929. Went on pilgrimage to Mecca in 1933. Was sent to Eastern Province in September 1935 to dissuade Afghans from joining Mohmand

Lashkars. Held a jirga at Dakka, and appears to have achieved some success in his object. Returned to Kabul the 23rd September, taking Badshah Gul I (W.W. 224) with him. Left Kabul December 1935 for an extended European tour.

Visited Iraq and Turkey, where he was well received. Later went to Paris, where he saw M. Flandin, and Geneva. In London was received in audience by The King and had conversations with the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and India, Mr. Eden and Lord Zetland. Saw Hitler in Berlin and finally reached Kabul in April 1936 via Moscow. Again visited Europe in 1936, and returned in January 1937. Relinquished post of Foreign Minister in 1938 on appointment as Ambassador to Turkey. Returned to Kabul May 1945 on leave. October 1945, left for Angola.

Well educated and intelligent, he has a good name for financial honesty. Is friendly but superficial, insincere and self-indulgent, particularly as regards drugs the use of which makes him incapable of sustained mental effort.

25. Fazl Ahmad Khan (W.W. 250).

Hazrat Sahib of Chughatan, Herat. Son of Abdul Wahab and grandson of Hazrat Muhammad Umar Jan of the family of Sirhind Pirs. Born 1892 at Bakhara in East Persia, where his father was in exile. The family returned to Afghanistan in 1902. Qualified as a judge in religious matters. Visited Nadir Shah on his accession in 1929, and was appointed Assistant Minister of Justice 1930, and officiating Minister of Justice vice Sher Agha (W.W. 256) in 1932. After Nadir Shah's assassination visited Kandahar to spread propaganda in favour of King Zahir Shah. Appointed Minister of Justice 1934. Member of the joint Perso-Afghan Commission to enquire into the Zorabad (Iran) incident December 1934. May 1946, appointed President of the Senate.

His family is influential and receives an allowance from the Afghan Government, but he himself lacks influence and character. He has pleasant manners and is friendly. Married in 1930 a daughter of Sher Agha (L.P. 26).

26. Fazal-i-Umar (Sher Agha) (W.W. 256).

A member of the family of Sirhind Pirs established in Kabul. Son of Qayum Khan, deceased, Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar. Assumed the title of Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar on the death of his elder brother, Sher Agha in 1925, the latter having succeeded to the title on his father's death. In 1926 went on pilgrimage to Mecca and did not return to Kabul, but eventually went to Dera Ismail Khan, where in 1928 he was intriguing against Amanullah. Was expelled from the North-West Frontier Province in March 1928 under Frontier Security Regulations for preaching against the Afghan Government. In September 1928 Amanullah asked him to return to Afghanistan but he refused. After the abdication of King Amanullah he went to the Southern Province where he assisted Nadir Shah. Appointed Minister of Justice November 1929. In July 1930 was sent as Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator) of the Ghazni area and returned to Kabul at the end of August. In June his daughter married Fazal Ahmad Khan (L.P. 25). In December 1931 tendered his resignation and ceased working as Minister. He was reported at this time to be spreading anti-Nadir propaganda. His resignation, however, was not accepted until December 1932. Was granted a visa in December 1932 to proceed to India, from whence he was to have proceeded on pilgrimage to Mecca, but owing to the death of his mother he returned to Kabul. Visited Sirhind, India, in February 1935, and was instructed by the Afghan Government to persuade the Hazrat of Chaharbagh to return to Afghanistan. He

appears to have been in favour of "jihad" on behalf of the Mohmands September 1935, when he visited the Southern Province and brought back to Kabul the principal religious leaders, who, after holding meetings in his house, tried to induce the Prime Minister to declare "jihad." Wields great influence amongst the Suleiman Khel Ghilzais. Visited Sirhind (Punjab) on pilgrimage in March 1940.

Given a fort and 70 acres of land in Chahardeh by King Zahir Shah (March 1936). Visited Mecca, 1938. In 1942 expressed a desire for an Allied victory and according to one report asked his followers to pray for such a victory, but was also reported to be in close contact with the Italian Legation at this time. Visited India in 1944, and again in 1945.

Reactionary and opposed to progressive reforms, he cannot be regarded as a whole-hearted supporter of present régime and for that reason is not trusted by the Government, though he cannot be said to be pro-Amanullah.

27. Ghaus-ud-Din (W.W. 264).

Patulla, Ahmadzai, Ghilzai. Son of the late Jehandad Khan, who was implicated in the Ahmadzai Mangal revolt of 1912, and executed for insolence in 1914. In 1915 was concerned in a conspiracy against Ameer Habibullah with Akram Khan and Azam Khan, sons of the late Ayub Khan. Was confined in Jubbulpore jail. Given permission to return to Afghanistan by ex-King Amanullah. His father's family lands and property were restored to him in November 1920. Arrested March 1924 and detained in the Arq whilst there was trouble in Khost, but later released and proceeded to Khost, where his handling of the Ahmadzai Ghilzais in the Ameer's favour gained him the title of "Mir Afghan." Awarded 1½ lakhs of rupees for his services. Made overtures to the British Government after the flight of Amanullah to Kandahar January 1929. Lent his support to Nadir Khan in the Southern Province and raised a lashkar of Ahmadzais. His treachery, on account of a bribe from Bacha-i-Saqao, was the cause of Nadir Khan's defeat in the Logar Valley in April 1929. Again made overtures to the British Government for support of his claim to the throne. Fled from Hariob to Parachinar at the beginning of October 1929 as a result of the discovery by Nadir Khan that he was in communication with Bacha-i-Saqao. In Delhi under surveillance January 1930, from whence he was removed to Jubbulpore. Deported to Burma in May 1930. Transferred to Kodai Kanal, Madras Presidency, from Burma (1936). Requested permission for his family to return to Afghanistan in 1936, on which the Afghan Government offered to allow him to return also, but on conditions which were unacceptable to him. Offered his assistance to the Afghan Government against Germany and Russia but this was believed to be merely a cloak to cover his real intentions of establishing himself with the Ghilzais.

A deceitful, treacherous and untrustworthy man, always intriguing for his own ends.

28. Ghulam Ahmad Khan (W.W. 292).

Son of the late Shahghassi Ali Ahmad Jan, and grandson of the late Luinab Khushdil Khan. Married to a niece of Sardar Faiz Muhammad Khan (W.W. 243) in 1927. Appointed aide-de-camp to his father when the latter was Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator) of the Eastern Province in 1924. Left Kabul for Kandahar via Peshawar and Quetta, the 10th March, 1929. Returned to Quetta on his father's arrest by Bacha-i-Saqao and proceeded to Peshawar, September 1929. Returned to Kabul on the accession of Nadir Khan. Accompanied Shah Wali (W.W. 585) to Bombay, December 1929. Returned to Kabul 1930 (April). In January 1932 visited Lahore for medical treat-

ment, returning to Kabul in March. Went into partnership with Chandan Khan, agent for Burma Shell Company, and managed the petrol business in Kabul. Visited India five times during the period April-December 1932. Assistant manager of the Petrol Company of Afghanistan 1933. In March 1935 appointed Deputy Minister of Court. His step-mother, Suraj-ul-Banat, is a sister of ex-King Amanullah. Assistant manager of the new petrol company in 1936. Relieved of his appointment in the Petrol Company in 1938 and appointed Deputy Court Minister, of which appointment he was relieved in July 1938. Flew to Tirah in September 1939, after discovery of a pro-Amanullah plot, in which he was found to be the ringleader. In November 1939 he was surrendered by a Chamkanni jirga to the political agent, Kurram, and lodged with other leaders in Jamrud Fort. Has since (1940) been transferred to Poona and is still there.

29. Ghulam Faruq Khan (W.W. 273).

Muhammadzai. Born 1902. Son of the late Sardar Muhammad Usman Khan. Employed in the Afghan Cypher Department 1926. Assistant manager Motorani Company. Arrested with his father at the same time as ex-King Amanullah arrested the Hazrat Sahiba of Shor Bazar, September 1928. Released October 1928. Arrived in Peshawar from Kabul by air February 1929 accompanied by one of the younger Hazrat Sahiba, Sanai Maksum. Returned to Afghanistan with Sardar Hashim Khan March 1929. Later was employed on propaganda work for Hashim Khan in Mohmand country. Arrived Peshawar via Shabkadr, September. Left for Ali Khel via Parachinar October 1929. Appointed Under-Secretary to the Minister of the Interior December 1929. Appointed Governor of the Eastern Province December 1930. In January 1932 married the daughter of Ghulam Muhammad (W.W. 289). His first wife, daughter of the late Sardar Muhammad Aziz Khan, died some time before. In April 1932 was in touch with Afridi and Mohmands, including Badshah Gul (W.W. 224). In July the Safis of Kunar complained of his harsh treatment. Left Jalalabad on the 1st December 1932, on relief by Muhammad Qasim Khan (L.P. 57) and took over the Governorship of Kandahar. Returned temporarily to Jalalabad in December 1932 to deal with Hassan Khan (W.W. 344), in which he was successful. Did well as Governor of Kandahar and displayed considerable energy. Was awarded the Sardar-i-Ala in January 1933. In July 1935 appointed Governor of Herat in succession to Abdur Rahim. Appointed Governor of Kandahar (1938). Relieved of his post of Governor of Kandahar (1939) owing to poor health and appointed officiating Home Minister. In 1941 appointed Governor (Rais-i-Tanzimiah), Kataghan and Badakshan Provinces, and in 1942 returned to Kabul to officiate as Home Minister. Relieved of the appointment of Home Minister later in the year, but retained his appointment as Governor of the Kataghan and Badakshan Provinces. Transferred in February 1946 as head of the civil and military administration in the Eastern Province where he was successful in securing the submission of the Saffi rebels. May 1946, appointed Minister of the Interior and given the title of "Sardar-i-Ala." Incurred the displeasure of the Prime Minister in 1942 owing to a liaison with the wife of his brother-in-law (a son of W.W. 288). He divorced his wife and much against the wish of the Royal Family, married the wife of his brother-in-law.

Is capable and hard working and is believed to be loyal to the present régime.

30. Ghulam Muhammad Khan.

Muhammadzai. A younger brother of Ahmad Ali Khan (L.P. 15) and Ali Shah Khan (L.P. 19). Born about 1907. Educated at the French School, Kabul

Employed as clerk in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs prior to his appointment as Director, Protocol Section, of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1939. Visited India in January 1943. May 1946, appointed Afghan Consul-General in Delhi.

Friendly and pleasant, but has an exaggerated idea of his own importance. Speaks French and a little English.

30A. Ghulam Muhammad Khan (W.W. 293).

Son of Sher Ahmad Khan (L.P. 74); born about 1902. Studied in the Harbiya College. October 1921 proceeded to Europe for education. Married a daughter of the late Mohd. Aziz Khan, brother of the late King Nadir Shah. Shareholder in the Shirkat-i-Ashami. Started service as a clerk in the Trade Ministry and later promoted Modir-i-Amumi Fabrikat. Visited India in 1933. In 1939 appointed Director of Government stores but appointment was cancelled. In July 1941 appointed Secretary of the Ministry of Mines. Flew to England in October 1945 for a serious operation and returned in April 1946. In May 1946 appointed Acting Minister of Mines. Is a brother-in-law of Mohd. Umar Khan (L.P. 61). A pleasant and friendly, if somewhat colourless, individual. Speaks English.

31. Ghulam Siddiq Khan (W.W. 309).

Sardar-i-Ala. Son of the late Sipah Salar (commander-in-chief) Ghulam Haider, Charkhi. Brother of the late Ghulam Jilani Khan, late Ghulam Nabi and Abdul Aziz (W.W. 13). Born 1894. Assistant to Gul Muhammad Khan, Afghan Envoy in India, October 1919, and a junior member of the Afghan delegation at the Mussoorie Conference. Left Mussoorie with despatches for Kabul June 1920, and was refused readmittance into India owing to his improper behaviour at Mussoorie and intrigues with secessionists. Appointed assistant president to the Muhajarin Committee, Kabul, August 1920. Second Counsellor to the Afghan Mission under Wali Muhammad Khan which visited Europe in 1920. Returned from London to Kabul with despatches September 1921. Left again for Europe, via Peshawar, October 1921. Appointed Afghan Minister at Berlin 1922, where he remained until April 1926, when he was relieved by Ahmad Ali (W.W. 141). Visited Angora whilst en route to Kabul from Berlin. Appointed first personal secretary to the King and Minister of Court January 1927. Appointed to officiate as Foreign Minister January 1927 during absence of the late Mahmud Tarzi in Europe. With King Amanullah in Europe in 1928. Appointed Foreign Minister November 1928. Sent to Jalalabad to bargain with rebels December 1928. Flew with Amanullah to Kandahar January 1929. Despatched to Russia by Amanullah on a special mission March 1929. Assumed the duties of Afghan Minister, Moscow, April 1929. Returned Kabul December 1929. In Mecca June 1930. In Berlin 1930 engaged in anti-Nadir activities. Set out for Afghanistan under promise of free pardon from the King. Arrived in Kabul the 7th March, 1931. Suspected distributing agent of Amanullah's letters in Kabul April 1931. Arrived Berlin the 18th July, 1931, to take up the appointment of Afghan Minister. Worked almost openly against his own Government and Britain during his tenure in Berlin, encouraging anti-British propaganda over the Dokalim Boundary question at the beginning of 1932 and granting a visa to Ishar Singh Ghadrte against the wishes of the Afghan Government. Wrote to Nadir professing his loyalty in July 1932. His brother, the late Ghulam Nabi, was staying with him in July 1932 when he was invited to return to Afghanistan by the King. As a result of the plot discovered when Ghulam Nabi was executed in November 1932, Ghulam Siddiq was dismissed from

his appointment. Visited Mecca during spring 1933 and in touch with pro-Amanullah Afghan element amongst the pilgrims. Visited Constantinople in early summer and was in touch with Soviet representative, Bovorol, through his brother Abdul Aziz Khan (W.W. 13). Engaged in active pro-Amanullah work in Europe. Visited Berlin in November 1933. Visited Rome in January 1934. In 1934 married Bibi Khurd (W.W. 230), sister of ex-Queen Souriya (W.W. 628). Lived in Berlin (1936), and frequently visited Rome, where he was believed to be in close touch with Amanullah and working hard on his behalf. Receives an annual allowance from the Italian Government. A close personal friend of ex-King Amanullah and greatly trusted by him. Speaks French, German and a little English. Bitterly opposed to present Afghan régime, and now ex-King Amanullah's principal adherent in Europe. Stated to be wealthy and to have money invested with Haji Ghulam Haider (W.W. 278). Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Believed willing to work for Italian interests in Asia. Believed to have been involved in spring 1940 in a plot to restore Amanullah with German and Russian assistance. Plans said to have miscarried owing to disagreement between Germany and Soviet. Was reported in April 1940 to have arrived in Stalinabad. In 1941 he arrived in Istanbul, but the Turkish Government refused him permission to stay there and he returned to Germany. Taken from Berlin to Moscow by the Russians in 1945 and at first well treated but later imprisoned. Has been offered an annuity by the Afghan Government on condition he returns to Afghanistan.

32. Ghulam Yahya Khan (W.W. 311).

Muhammadzai. Born 1898. Son of Habibullah Naib Tarzi, deceased, and nephew of the late Mahmud Tarzi. Brother of W.W. 109, and cousin of W.W. 325. Formerly secretary of Afghan Legation, Berlin. Appointed Under-Secretary, Visa and Passport Branch of Foreign Office, June 1926. Transferred to charge of Persia and Turkey section of Foreign Office, November 1926. Received Order of Astor, 1st class, February 1927. Accompanied Amanullah to Europe 1927-28. Roughly handled by Bacha-i-Saqao's men, but still in the Foreign Office, January 1929. Appointed Afghan Minister, Rome, December 1929. Assistant Secretary, Political Department of Foreign Office. Promoted First Secretary, Afghan Foreign Office, 1930. Visited Chakhansur, November 1931, in connexion with Helmand water disputes with Persia. Officiated for the Foreign Minister in the autumn of 1933. Appointed Director (Rais) of Department of Public Health February 1935. Appointment raised to that of Minister in June. Was relieved of his post of Minister of Health in November 1939, and appointed Minister of Posts and Telegraphs. Reappointed Minister of Health 1940. Again appointed Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in June 1946.

A pleasant, well-mannered man but corrupt and of no outstanding ability who has been reported to be pro-Amanullah and also a member of the Republican party. Speaks German and Turkish.

33. Gul Agha (see Siddiq Agha Muhammad).

34. Gul Ahmad Khan (W.W. 315).

Tajik. Son of Mirza Abdul Ahmad Khan. Brother of F. M. Abdul Ahad Khan (W.W. 5) and Abdullah Khan, Governor of Herat. Born about 1897.

Was in charge of Government buildings at the beginning of Amanullah's reign. Later on became Superintendent of Roads and Ways. Afterwards appointed Assistant Chief Judge. Some time later

was placed at the head of the Intelligence Department. During Amanullah's march to Ghazni from Kandahar, Gul Ahmad fled with his family from Kabul and joined the ex-King on the way. In 1929 said to be in Karachi. A member on the committee for reform led by Muhammad Yakub Khan (W.W. 575) to Mazar-i-Sharif, June 1930. Believed to be Governor of Mazar-i-Sharif 1931. Arrived in Kabul June 1931. Appointed President of the Kabul Municipality in 1932. Appointed Governor of Mazar-i-Sharif vice Abdul Jamil Khan (W.W. 49) in November 1934, which post he still holds. Appointed Minister of Health in 1939, but appointment later cancelled.

Believed to be capable and intelligent. Supporter of the present Afghan régime. Speaks some English.

35. Habibullah Khan Tarzi (W.W. 325).

Muhammadzai. Born 1896. Son of the late Muhammad Zaman and nephew of the late Mahmud Tarzi. Cousins, W.W. 100 and W.W. 311. Was a junior Under-Secretary in Indo-European branch of the Foreign Office 1922-23. Proceeded to Paris as secretary to Mahmud Tarzi when latter was Minister at Paris. On his return to Kabul was appointed Under-Secretary in charge of the branch of the Foreign Office dealing with India and Europe. Appointed Afghan Minister in Paris, November 1928. Relieved by Ahmad Ali Jan (L.P. 15) December 1929 and returned to Kabul. Third secretary in Foreign Office, May 1931. Chief delegate to the Dokalim Boundary Commission, June 1932. Chief delegate on the Persian Boundary and Helmand Water Commission, October 1932. Visited Herat and Islam Kala, thence to Zulfikar and Chakhansur in this connexion. Completed his work on the Persian boundary survey in June 1933 and returned to Kabul. Appointed Minister at Tokyo in July 1933 and presented his credentials there in October 1933. Returned to Kabul June 1939, and appointed first secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. June 1946, appointed Afghan Minister in China, represented Afghan Government at Philippines Independence Day celebrations on his way to take up his appointment.

He owns property in Shahr-i-Bau, is an exacting landlord who always wishes to raise rents and make money. He speaks English fluently and is pleasant and well-mannered. Has been retained at headquarters for the past seven years because he has not been entirely trusted by the present régime.

36. Hazrat of Shor Bazar (see Fazl-i-Umar).

37. Inayatullah Khan (W.W. 366).

Sardar, Muhammadzai. Eldest son of Ameer Habibullah Khan. His mother is the Ulya Jan Badr-ul-Haram. Born the 20th October, 1889. Visited India in December 1904. Held the appointment of Muin-us-Saltanah ("Helper of the State") under Ameer Habibullah Khan. Created Sardar-i-Ala in 1905. Appointed Minister for Education in 1916. Was the recognised heir to the throne up to the time of Ameer Habibullah Khan's death. Married a daughter of the late Mahmud Khan, Tarzi, and was at one time said to be under the latter's influence. During Ameer Habibullah Khan's reign he received an allowance of 1,30,000 rupees per annum. After the murder of Habibullah Khan, Sardar Nasrullah went through the form of offering him the throne. He, however, refused it, probably well knowing that the decision had already been made in Nasrullah's favour, and that no other course was open to him. When Nasrullah, in turn, was compelled to yield to the claims of Amanullah, he had to accompany the former to Kabul. On arrival at Kabul, though not compelled to share Nasrullah's imprisonment, he was kept under strict surveillance. At the darbar at

which those accused of the murder of Ameer Habibullah were tried, Amanullah decreed that Inayatullah had forfeited all his claims by his cowardly acquiescence in Nasrullah's usurpation of the throne and by his failure to take any steps to discover the authors of the crime. He was told that it would be advisable that he should retire into private life and take no further part in public affairs. Although occasionally seen in public, he undertook no Government work, and was presumably deprived of his appointment of Muin-us-Saltanah, &c. In October 1919 he was reported to have been arrested by the Ameer, and to be practically confined to his house until 1922. There was an abortive rising by the Safi regiment in his favour in June 1920. This regiment was raised in Tagao by Inayatullah. Sanctioned a yearly allowance of 1½ lakhs of rupees and an escort of twenty men, March 1921. He consistently refused to take up any Government appointment. In July 1922 was allowed a certain measure of freedom, which was increased until he moved about apparently without restriction. When Bacha-i-Saqao attacked Kabul on the 14th December, 1928, was summoned by the King and confined in the Arq. Forced to accept the throne on Amanullah's abdication, the 14th January, 1929, but on being besieged in the Arq by Bacha-i-Saqao, abdicated on the 17th January, 1929, on condition that he and his family were sent to Kandahar by air. Evacuated to Peshawar with his family in the Royal Air Force planes, the 18th January, 1929, and proceeded to join Amanullah in Kandahar. Flew with Amanullah to Bombay, the 23rd May, 1929. Sailed from Bombay for Persia, via Basra, the 6th July, 1929. Arrived in Tehran, the 27th July, 1929. Left Tehran for Europe, May 1930, and was in Berlin believed plotting against Nadir Khan. Applied for permission to reside in England for six months (June 1931). Visited England, August 1931, and stayed three weeks in London with his wife and eldest son Khalilullah (W.W. 399). Then joined Amanullah in Rome. Visited Constantinople for his nephew's wedding, December 1931, and then went on to Tehran where his sister joined him from Kabul. In receipt of 800 tomans per month from Persian Government in February 1932. In August the Persian Government were said to be intending to discontinue this allowance, his sole means. Since then has remained in Tehran, where he now resides. Probable that the allowance made him by the Persian Government has been stopped, and that he is living in comparative penury. His sister, who had been with Amanullah in Rome, joined him in the autumn of 1933. Is periodically the subject of rumours in Afghanistan, generally to the effect that he has arrived, or is expected to arrive, in some part of the country. Lacks initiative, intellect and energy, but combines dignity with pleasant manners, and had a reputation for being honourable and straightforward. An agent of Inayatullah was reported to have visited Afghanistan in May 1935. Stated to have been granted a monthly allowance of about 5,000 rupees (Afghani) by the Afghan Government (1939). Is reported (1940) to be in touch with German agents in Iran, and probably receiving money from Germany to stir up trouble in Afghanistan. Still reported to be in Iran.

38. Mahmud Jan (W.W. 415).

Sardar-i-Ala, Shahaasi, Barakzai. Born 1885. Son of Shah Muhammad Khan, and a distant cousin of Abdul Aziz Khan, and the Ulya Hazrat. Officiated as Minister of Public Security in 1922 and as Governor of Kabul in 1925. Was in charge of the Public Works and Secret Service. Also in charge of the Frontier Tribes Department, of which Haji Muhammad Akbar was Under-Secretary. Was in partnership with Herr Harten, German engineer in charge of Dar-ul Aman works, and made a lot of money out of public works. Created Sardar-i-Ala,

January 1927. Appointed Wali of Kabul, December 1927. Captured by rebels near Jalalabad, December 1928, where he had been sent to restore order. Arrested by Bacha-i-Saqao, February 1929. Released during the Independence celebrations, August 1929. Was appointed officer in charge State Workshops, November 1929, but was deprived of his appointment the following month. Imprisoned in the Arq on a charge of theft of Government funds and jewels, January 1930. Under trial for being concerned in the Koh-i-Daman revolt of 1930. Released in January 1931, but rearrested with other members of the Shahgassi family in connexion with the Ghulam Nabi and Dare Khel plots in November 1932. His brother Zobain also arrested. His ears are said to have been trimmed as a punishment. Was released in November 1933 and kept under surveillance. A stout, pleasant gentleman; was friendly to foreigners. A great personal friend of ex-King Amanullah. Speaks Pushtu.

Reported to have been arrested in March 1936 for the murder of his own son. Reported to be still in Kabul jail.

39. Mohendra Pratap Singh (alias Raja) (W.W. 437).

Indian agitator, son of Raja Ghanshyam Singh, Jat, of Mursan, Aligarh, United Provinces, and brother of the Maharani of Jhind. Founder of the Prem Vidyalaya (the Free Industrial and National Arts College) of Brindaban. Went to England at the end of 1914, and to Berlin in the autumn of 1915 where he posed as an Indian prince. Had an interview with the Kaiser and accompanied the German mission to Kabul in 1916. Arrived at Mazar-i-Sharif in 1917. Endeavoured to come to India, but returned owing to our precautions. In 1918 with a party of Afghans left Mazar-i-Sharif for Russian Turkestan, and proceeded to Tashkent. In March 1918 was in Berlin, and later went to Petrograd, where he received a warm welcome from Trotsky and Joffe. Same year visited Constantinople, where he delivered Ameer's reply to the Sultan. No reliable news in early 1919 as to his whereabouts, but supposed to have gone to Tashkent via Bokhara. Came to Kabul with the Suritz Mission December 1919. Regarded as an imbecile of no importance by the Bolsheviks in Kabul, but Obaidullah (W.W. 491) found him useful as a figurehead and to attract Hindus to his party. Left Kabul and arrived at Wakhan, the 14th June, 1920, en route for China. Sent a letter to the Governor of Tashkurghan saying that he had been appointed Afghan Envoy to China by the Ameer. He soon returned, as passage to China was refused by the Chinese authorities. In September 1920 he was in the Pamirs. Did a tour in China and Japan and returned to Kabul in autumn of 1923. Left Kabul the 16th September, 1924; visited California, China, attempted to enter Tibet, then went to Japan, whence he was deported. Returned to Afghanistan in October 1926. His reception in Kabul was remarkably frigid and although he held a number of receptions very few people of importance attended. This was mainly due to the displeasure of the King at Mohendra having styled himself Afghan representative at a Pan-Islamic conference in Japan, photographs describing him as such and showing his unceremonious arrest and deportation having been seen by the King in English illustrated papers. Left Kabul for the north, the 31st January, 1927, and arrived Moscow, February 1927. Returned to China, but back in Moscow November 1928 preparing to hold "Pan-Asiatic" Conference in Kabul. Owing to outbreak of rebellion was prevented from leaving Tashkent to come to Kabul by King Amanullah. Went to Tehran January 1929 and returned to Moscow in April 1929. Returned to Kabul from Moscow by air December 1929. Was in close touch with Allah Nawaz (W.W. 182). He was deported by

air to Termez in March 1930. Visited Berlin and reached New York on the 27th May, 1930. Is believed to be of some use to the Ogpu. Was in China in 1931 and 1932. (His address there was P.O. Box 20, Peking, China). Published two books: *Afghanistan, the Herat of Arjan*, and *Long Live India!* Moved to Japan at the end of 1933 or beginning of 1934, where he was in touch with the Japanese Government. Continued to spread anti-British propaganda. Left Japan secretly for Siam in June 1934, believed at Japanese instigation to further their pan-Asiatic policy. Forbidden to lecture in Siam. Turned out of Siam, arrived Tokyo, August 1934, having been deported from Canton.

Was in Manila in February 1935, back in Japan in April 1935 and left for America in July 1935. Has agitated for his own return to India through the Indian Legislatures. Has been regarded as an Afghan subject since 1934.

In the Far East in 1937. Reported to be in Japan (1942).

40. Muhammad Agha Sami (W.W. 555).

Brother of Shahgassi Muhammad Yakub Khan (W.W. 675). Son of Muhammad Yusuf Khan, a Munshi to Ameer Habibullah. A Mohmand by birth, but the family have settled in Ghazni for some generations. Was Mehmandar to the British mission in Kabul, 1921. Appointed Commandant of Police, Kabul, but was dismissed in 1923, partly due to escape of Ardali and Daud Shah (W.W. 237) from Kabul gaol and partly due to reports of his complicity in murder of one Abdul Ali. Appointed Political Officer during Mangal rebellion 1924, and sent to the front, where his services earned appreciation of the Ameer. Appointed Mehmandar to Wakils of Eastern Provinces during Ameer's visit of April 1925. Reappointed Commandant of Police, Kabul, August 1926. Was a trusted personal informer to the Ameer. Efficient, controlled a mob with great skill during the fire which gutted the British Legation at Kabul December 1926. Appointed officiating Governor of Kabul November 1928. Arrested by Bacha-i-Saqao February 1929, but escaped and joined Amanullah in Kandahar. Sent to Tashkent as courier by Amanullah, returning again to Kandahar via Duzdap, April 1929. Accompanied Amanullah in his flight as far as Quetta, where he remained. Left for Meshed in August 1929. Later returned to Kabul. Arrested and sentenced to banishment for implication in Koh-i-Daman revolt, July 1930, but subsequently released. Said to be doing propaganda work in favour of Amanullah. On pilgrimage to Mecca, March 1931. Arrived Tehran with W.W. 675 in December 1931. Applied for permission to visit India, but was refused. Still in Tehran, where his brother Yakub Khan (W.W. 675) has joined him; also his nephew and niece from Quetta. He and his son, Muhammad Bashir, deprived of Afghan nationality, November 1933. His property in Afghanistan is said to have been confiscated in 1934 and his family deported to Iran.

Is reported (1940) to be in touch with German agents in Iran, and probably receiving money from Germany to stir up trouble in Afghanistan. Still reported to be in Iran.

41. Muhammad Akbar Khan (W.W. 161).

Muhammadzai. Brother of W.W. 113, Minister of Health 1930. Cousin of the late King Nadir Shah, to whom he was Surgeon-General. Director of Medical Services October 1932. Appointed Minister at Rome 1935 and presented his credentials in May 1935.

Relieved of appointment as Minister at Rome, March 1936, and returned to Kabul. Is married to a sister of L.P. 17.

Civil A.D.C. to the King, 1942. Visited India in 1945. Lives a somewhat retired life.

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42. Muhammad Akram Khan (W.W. 162A).

Born approximately 1909. Director of the Reception Branch of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1937-39. Appointed Muin I in the Ministry of National Economy 1939, and acted, in addition, as Private Secretary to the King. 1946, appointed Minister at Rome. He is related to the ruling family and enjoys the affection and confidence of the King. A pleasant, well-mannered individual, apparently friendly with the British Legation, but was suspected of having been involved in pro-Axis intrigue in 1942-43.

43. Muhammad Aminullah Jan (or Amin Khan) (W.W. 186).

Sardar, Muhammadzai. Born the 12th October, 1885. Third surviving son of Amir Abdul Rahman. His mother was a slave girl belonging to the late Bibi Halima, who was said to have adopted him before her own son was born. Was formerly in charge of the Shara (Muhammadan Law) Department at Kabul, and was also in charge of the Jabba Khana (magazine). In 1917 he held the appointment of Sardar-i-Madafia (director of military defence). Has one son born about 1903, and a daughter said to have been married to Sardar Abdul Qudus August 1919 at Kandahar. Appointed A.D.C. to the King 1926. Arrested by Bacha-i-Saqao in January 1929. Arrived Quetta and left for Lahore the 4th November, 1929. Residing in Tehran 1930 in straitened circumstances. Appealed for an allowance from the Government of India in 1930. Is said to be very eccentric. In Iran 1943.

44. Muhammad Atiq Khan (W.W. 209A).

Born approximately 1894. Muhammadzai. Sardar. Son of Rafiq Khan and son-in-law of Sardar Ahmad Shah Khan, Court Minister (L.P. 17). Brother of Babo Jan alias Zulikha, widow of late Sardar Hayatullah Khan, step-brother of ex-King Amanullah. Visited Moscow in 1935. Is an economic expert trained in Germany and holds the post of director of the Industrial Section of the Afghan National Bank. Was kept under surveillance in 1939 for his alleged pro-Amanullah sympathies. 1946, appointed head of the Agricultural Department.

Speaks Russian and German fluently and was formerly reputed to be strongly Germanophile and to be responsible for the increased German influence in the Royal Family. Shows no outward signs now (1944) of being pro-German, but is an enlightened Nationalist who works hard and with great ability for the industrial development of his country. A pleasant and intelligent man, friendly to the British Legation and appreciative of the assistance rendered to his country by the British and Indian Governments in industrial matters, particularly the textile industry, during the war. He professes to be anxious that trade connexions thus formed should be maintained and developed after the war.

His brothers are Muhammad Umar Khan (L.P. 62) and Muhammad Rahim Khan, assistant to the president of Kabul Municipality.

45. Muhammad Daud Khan (W.W. 238).

Elder son of the late Sardar Muhammad Aziz Khan (brother of King Nadir Shah). Born 1909 in Kabul. Educated at the Amania College, Kabul. Spent nine years in France and returned to Kabul in October 1930. 1931 attended a year's course at the Infantry Officers' School, where he worked hard and was well reported on by the senior German instructor. November 1932 promoted Firqa Mishar (major-general) and appointed General Officer Commanding, Eastern Province. In February 1934 assumed the duties of Governor of the province in addition to his

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duties as General Officer Commanding. His strictness made him unpopular and he was inclined to be headstrong and hasty. Took a great interest in the training of his troops and the Eastern Province detachment at the Independence celebrations in 1934 was conspicuous for its smartness. In July 1935 was transferred as Governor and General Officer Commanding, Kandahar, and General Officer Commanding of the Farah and Chakhansur Division. In 1934 married a sister of King Zahir Shah. Governor and General Officer Commanding, Kandahar, in 1936 and 1937. Appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator) of the Eastern Province (1938).

Appointed General Officer Commanding Kabul Central Army Corps and Commandant of the Military Schools in Kabul in August 1939. 1946 May, appointed Minister of Defence and given the decoration of "Almarra-i-Ali".

A keen and energetic soldier with a vigorous personality. Speaks French well and is a favourite of ex-Prime Minister (L.P. 48). He did a great deal to improve the efficiency of the Kabul Army Corps acting at times independently of the Minister of Defence. Is determined to improve the standard of the army and to get rid of inefficient officers, a policy which has already (June 1946) led to serious differences between him and the Prime Minister (L.P. 71). In 1942, when the prospects of the Allied nations appeared not too favourable, he was believed to be advocating an approach to Germany by the Afghan Government. He is stated to be a strong Afghan Nationalist, who is inclined to resent the employment of foreign advisers, but favours seeking the assistance of Great Britain and the United States in training and equipping the Afghan army, though he is a difficult person to deal with, as he always suspects ulterior motives.

46. Muhammad Gul Khan (W.W. 315A).

Son of Muhammad Khurshid Khan (W.W. 408). Kuchi Mohmand of village Baru (on the Hisarak Rud, about 7 miles west of Batikot). Educated in Turkey. Was a Glund Mishar (brigadier) in Amanullah's army in 1927. Promoted Firqa Mishar (major-general) and appointed General Officer Commanding, Eastern Province, in 1928. In Jalalabad during the Saqavi régime until the burning of Jalalabad, when he returned to his home at Bara. He joined H.R.H. Sardar Hashim Khan (L.P. 50) in Khugiani country about March 1929. Was Minister of the Interior in Nadir Shah's first Government October 1929. Promoted Naib Salar (general) and appointed to officiate as Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator), Eastern Province. He held this post until the summer of 1930. During this time he did much to restore order in the province and dealt with the Shinwari attempt on Torkham in February 1930. After the Kohistan rising in 1930 he was appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh of that district and apparently succeeded in pacifying the people. Assumed duties of Minister of Interior in October 1930. Appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh of Kandahar in February 1931, and left for Kandahar via India. Administered the province with firmness and efficiency. Congratulated by the Government on his work January 1932. Visited Kabul for Independence celebrations August 1932; was awarded the Sardar-i-Ala, first class, and a grant of 25,000 Kabuli rupees. Was offered Governorship of Herat in September 1932, but refused owing to his friendship for Abdur Rahim (L.P. 72). Appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh, Mazar, Kataghan and Badakhshan and Maimana, November 1932. Relieved at Kandahar by Ghulam Faruq (L.P. 81) in January 1933, and left for Mazar. Visited Kabul September 1935. Believed to have asked the Prime Minister to help the Mohmands against the British. Refused to visit Eastern Province to explain

Mohmand situation to Afghans, and believed to have quarrelled with Prime Minister (L.P. 50) on this subject. Returned to Mazar about the 1st October. Reported to be on bad terms with W.W. 315. Resigned Governorship of Northern Provinces 1940 and appointed Minister of State 1941, a post he still holds though he has withdrawn to his estate at Haibak and remains there in spite of the Prime Minister's attempts to induce him to take a more active part in the Administration. His resignation of the Governorship of the Northern Province is thought to have been due to his dislike of Abdul Majid's (L.P. 9) trade development schemes.

A quiet, well mannered man, but ruthless. A vigorous and ambitious personality loyal to the present régime though there have been vague rumours as to his connexions with the Republican Party. An efficient administrator, he speaks Urdu, Persian, Pushtu, Russian and Turkish.

47. Muhammad Haider Khan (W.W. 329A).

Born about 1904. Son of Ata Muhammad Khan (Mir, Qazi of Herat). Formerly Afghan representative at the League of Nations and subsequently private secretary to the King. Appointed Afghan Ambassador at Tehran vice Muhammad Nauros Khan in January 1944.

48. H.R.H. Muhammad Hashim Khan (W.W. 337).

Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Yusuf Khan (junior) and uncle of King Zahir Shah. Half-brother of the late King Nadir and of L.P. 71 and L.P. 72. Born 1886. Commanded the Sar-i-Os bodyguard at Kabul and accompanied Ameer Habibullah to India in 1907. Appointed Naib Salar (general) of Herat and left Kabul in 1916. Keen on instituting reforms, but checked in this direction by threat of mutiny on the part of the troops. Arrested and sent to Kabul after the murder of Habibullah, but subsequently released. People of Herat refused to have him back after his release and he was relieved. Appointed Governor of Jalalabad December 1919. Governor, Eastern Province, 1920. Went on tour in July 1921 and distributed rewards to the Mohmands and some Bajauri tribesmen, at the same time doing his best to create an atmosphere of hostility to the British; the next month he warned the tribesmen to be ready for "jihad." Summoned jirgas of the Malikdin Khel and Kambar Khel Afridis to Jalalabad in September 1921. Rewards in the shape of money were doled out to the tribesmen, who were informed that Nadir Khan had promised to arrange permanent allowances and the distribution of rifles for them from the Afghan Government. Reported in August 1921 to have engineered, in conjunction with Nadir Khan, the robbery of one of the British mission mail bags en route from Kabul to India. Went to Kabul from Jalalabad on the 10th November, 1921. Officiating as Minister of War, Kabul, January 1922, vice Nadir Khan, who proceeded on tour. Went to Europe with his father in 1923. Appointed Minister at Moscow March 1924, when he was unpopular owing to his constant suspicions of Soviet policy. Opposed the military training of Afghans in Russia, and on his views being disclosed by the Afghan Government to the Soviet authorities he resigned and left Moscow 3rd July, 1926, to join his brother Nadir Khan at Grasse. Offered position of Minister at Tehran, which he refused, October 1926. Nur-us-Siraj, the sister of the King, whom he wished to marry, was betrothed to Amanullah's cousin, Muhammad Hasan Jan (W.W. 342) in October 1926. This was looked upon as an insult by Hashim Khan and his brothers. At Grasse December 1928. Granted diplomatic visa for India en route to Afghanistan January 1929, and left Marseilles with Nadir Khan and Shah Wali (L.P. 72) on the

8th February, 1929. Left Peshawar for the Eastern Province 6th March, 1929, where he tried to obtain support for Nadir, but met with little success. Was defeated by Bacha-i-Saqao and arrived Parachinar 19th September, 1929. Arrived Quetta 1st October, 1929, where he remained under surveillance until 27th October, 1929, when he was permitted by the Indian Government to proceed to Kandahar. Proceeded to Kabul, 9th November, 1929, on his appointment as Premier and Minister of Interior. Was on tour in the Northern Provinces when Nadir Shah was assassinated and returned immediately to Kabul. Swore allegiance to Zahir Shah, since whose accession, and until his resignation in May 1946, he was the real ruler of Afghanistan. Visited Berlin, October 1936 for a tumour operation which was successful. Visited London in January and February 1937 and returned to Kabul in March via India. Had a serious heart attack in November 1943 but recovered and in the spring of 1944 gradually resumed control of important affairs, leaving routine matters to his nephew (L.P. 53).

A real patriot and a tremendous worker, he laboured to improve the stability of the country. Insisted on a high standard of efficiency and was high-handed with officials who respected and feared him. Trusted very few of his fellow countrymen which made him even more unpopular. Will still continue to be a force behind the scenes despite his retirement. Is personally quiet and dignified though his temper is short and he can be outspoken and ruthless when roused. His manners are charming—he has a keen sense of humour and an ability to come to quick decisions. Always violently anti-Russian he turned from 1944 onwards more and more to the British. Is very friendly to members of the British Legation in Kabul. Understands English well and speaks it fairly.

49. Muhammad Hassan Jan (W.W. 342).

Muhammadzai. Born 1902. Son of Sardar Muhammad Umar Khan (W.W. 648). A.D.C. to King Amanullah 1926. Created Sardar-i-Ala February 1926. Married to Nur-us-Siraj, Amanullah's sister, October 1927. Was well known to the British Legation at Kabul. Accompanied King Amanullah to Europe 1927-28 as Chamberlain. Also went with Amanullah to Kandahar after his abdication January 1929 and to Bombay May 1929. Sailed for Italy June 1929. Was in Rome from October 1931 to July 1932. Not definitely located between summer 1932 and December 1933, but said to be in Rome with Amanullah and to be verging on lunacy. Deprived of Afghan nationality November 1933. Accompanied Amanullah Khan to the Hejaz in 1935. In Rome with Amanullah during summer of 1935.

50. Muhammad Ismail Khan (W.W. 377A).

Wardaki, Totu Khel, Ghilzai. Son of Abdullah Khan (W.W. 63) and nephew of W.W. 4. At one time Director of the Eastern Branch, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Governor (Hakim-i-Kalan) of the Northern District, Kabul Province. Officiating Governor, Kataghan and Badakhshan. Wali of Kabul 1939. Has pleasant manners and is friendly in his attitude towards British Legation. Not on good terms with His Royal Highness Shah Mahmud (L.P. 72). Believed to be corrupt.

51. Muhammad Kabir Khan Ludin.

Born 1903. Educated in America where he studied engineering. Since his return he has been working in the Public Works Department and in 1944 was appointed acting Minister of Public Works. Visited India in 1945, to make purchases of stores. Responsible for the start of the Bogra canal. Acted as adviser to the Mangals and Sabiris in the Kurram Water dispute. May 1946 appointed Minister of Public Works. Speaks

English very well. Has a reputation for being anti-British, but it is perhaps natural that with his background he should look rather to America for assistance.

52. Muhammad Khan, Mirza (W.W. 450).

Sent to Merv on a special mission October 1919. Still in Merv June 1920. Later said to be in Tashkent. Left for Moscow July 1920. Afghan Minister at Moscow 1921 until relieved by the late Ghulam Nabi Khan. On return from Russia he was for a short time an Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce. In 1924 was sent to Europe to negotiate the sale of certain Crown jewels. Appointed First Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office on return from Europe. Chief Afghan member of the Urta Tagai Boundary Commission, and proceeded to Badakhshan January 1926, returning in June 1926. Appointed Minister at Moscow October 1926, having first refused appointment of Minister at Rome. As Minister at Moscow he preserved a broad outlook and was not noticeably pro-Soviet. Under-Secretary in Foreign Office 1928. Remained at Foreign Office under Bacha-i-Saqao January 1929. Appointed Under-Secretary Foreign Office by King Nadir Shah November 1929. Appointed Minister of Trade September 1930. In May 1932 was complimented by the King for his work. Was put under secret surveillance as a result of the plot discovered in September 1933. Left Kabul in October, with the Prime Minister, to visit the north. Returned to Kabul in November and swore allegiance to Zahir Shah. Appointed Minister of Trade in 1937. 1938, appointed Minister of Revenue. Relieved of his post May 1946 and appointed Minister of State without portfolio and given the title of Sardar-i-Ala. A man of no great standing or marked ability. Is said to enjoy the confidence of the ex-Prime Minister, but to be on bad terms with the present Prime Minister. While he was Trade Minister, the customs revenue of the country increased considerably. Was one of the prime movers in the formation of the Ashami Company. Is believed to be a heavy bribe taker. His sister, who was a widow of the late Ameer Habibullah, was given in marriage to Abdul Qadir, Bacha-i-Saqao's Governor of Kandahar. Is inclined to be anti-British, but is lately believed to be less so than formerly. His son, Abdullah Khan, was one of six students who were sent to Japan January 1935.

53. Muhammad Naim Khan (W.W. 464A).

Son of the late Muhammad Aziz Khan, Muhammadzai. Born 1911. Visited India in November 1929 with Asadullah Khan (W.W. 199). Appointed Under-Secretary, Foreign Office, October 1930. Appointed Minister, Rome, December 1932; recalled in 1934 and appointed extra secretary in the Foreign Office, Kabul. Appointed First Secretary 1935. Married in 1934 the eldest sister of King Zahir Shah. His wife gave birth to a son in August 1935.

Officiating Foreign Minister December 1935 and again in 1936 during the absence of Faiz Muhammad in Europe.

Also acting managing director, Afghan National Bank, during absence of Abdul Masjid (W.W. 78) in Europe 1936-37. Appointed Minister of Education in 1937.

Appointed president of Kabul Literary Society June 1937.

Appointed Acting Foreign Minister during the Foreign Minister's absence in Tehran June 1937 and Jalalabad in January 1938. Visited Khanabad as head of an investigation committee (1939).

Appointed assistant to the Prime Minister (September 1939), in addition to his duties as Minister of Education. In 1941 appointed officiating Minister of National Economy during absence c. W.W. 73 in Europe in addition to his own duties. Officiated as Prime Minister in the winter of 1942.

during the illness of his uncle, Muhammad Hashim Khan (No. 50), with whom he is a great favourite. 1946, appointed Minister at London.

Easy-going and pleasant mannered and friendly to British Legation, but somewhat reserved, perhaps as a result of a tendency to deafness. Speaks French fluently and English tolerably. It is generally believed that he is destined to succeed his uncle as Prime Minister, but it is doubtful if he has either the brains, physical fitness or strength of character for the task.

54. Muhammad Nauroz Khan (W.W. 470).

Mirza of Logar. Appointed Chief Secretary to King Nadir, November 1929. Was on bad terms with Muhammad Yakub (W.W. 675). More inclined to friendship with Germany than with England and Russia. Accompanied late S. Muhammad Azim to Europe in January 1933 for medical treatment. Returned from Germany May 1933 and resumed appointment of Chief Secretary to King. Was appointed officiating Court Minister in 1936. Appointed Ambassador, Tehran, in 1939. Relieved of appointment of Ambassador at Tehran in 1942. Appointed Minister of Interior 1943. May 1946, appointed Minister of Revenue but has since been nominated as Ambassador in Moscow.

Has influence in the Logar valley. Loyalty to present régime doubtful. Entertains Republican tendencies. Has ability and capacity and speaks a little English. During his term of office as Minister of the Interior became more influential and popular, the latter said to be due to his patience when investigating complaints.

55. Muhammad Qasim Khan (W.W. 506).

Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Muhammad Sarwar Khan Raka. Nephew of the late Sardar Abdul Aziz. First cousin of Ghulam Faruk (L.P. 31). Born at Lahore about 1900. Served in various minor appointments in Afghan Foreign Office 1921-25. Was a secretary in the Afghan Legation, Rome, in 1926, and also served in a similar capacity in the Afghan Embassy, Tehran, during 1927 and 1928. In 1930 was mudir (assistant secretary) in the Prime Minister's office. Appointed officiating Hakim-i-Ala (Governor), Eastern Province, November 1932, where he found it difficult to get on with the General Officer Commanding, Daud Khan (L.P. 45). Appointed Minister in Rome in February 1934, and left to take up his appointment in March. Recalled in spring 1935 and in June again appointed Governor of the Eastern Province.

His father died January 1936.

Appointed Governor of Herat (1938). Appointed Governor of Kandahar 1941, a post he still holds. Said to be efficient and capable but lacks presence and personality.

In spite of his reputation of being capable he seems to take little interest in the provincial administration which is almost non-existent. He is said to be very corrupt but to stifle complaints by entertaining lavishly. Speaks English, Urdu, Persian and good Pashtu.

56. Muhammad Qasim Khan (W.W. 507A) (F.M. Muhammadzai).

Born approximately 1904. Director of Intelligence in the War Ministry 1935. Chief of Staff, Guards Division, 1936. Officiating General Officer Commanding, Kataghan and Badakhshan Division, 1936. Promoted Firka Mishar 1937. Officiating General Officer Commanding, Guards Division, 1937-40. Appointed Governor and General Officer Commanding of the Southern Province in May 1944 at the time of the Zadran disturbances. A tactful, popular and efficient officer who has pleasant manners, is intelligent and speaks little English. A staunch supporter of Shah Mahmud (L.P. 71).

57. Muhammad Sadiq Khan (Mir).

Son of Mir Sikandar Khan. Born about 1893. His father was a Court official with the honorary rank of general in the reign of Amir Sher Ali Khan and left Afghanistan during the Second Afghan War and lived first in Bagdad, where Muhammad Sadiq was born, and later in India, where the boy was educated. Mir Muhammad Sadiq returned to Afghanistan during the reign of ex-King Amanullah, and held minor appointments in the Educational and Agricultural Departments of the Southern Province and in Northern Afghanistan. During the reign of the late King Nadir Shah, he became First Secretary of the Afghan Embassy in Moscow, an appointment he held for three years. When he returned to Kabul, he was appointed Director-General of International Affairs in the Foreign Office. In March 1943 he was appointed Afghan Consul-General at Meshed. Returned to Kabul in June 1946 and was appointed "chef du Protocol." He is patient and cautious; speaks English, Urdu and a little Russian; is reasonably well disposed towards the British.

58. Muhammad Sarwar Khan (W.W. 560).

Barakzai, Naib Salar (general). Son of Muhammad Sidiq Khan. Brothers Ghulam Haidar (W.W. 276), Muhammad Shuaib (W.W. 611) and Juma Khan. First secretary in the Afghan Embassy in Tehran. Formerly a Ghulam Bacha. Was highly esteemed by Ameer Habibullah Khan. Promoted brigadier in 1906, owing to his success in the manufacture of guns, and appointed superintendent, Kabul Arsenal. Promoted major-general 1913. In March 1919 appointed Naib Salar by Ameer Amanullah Khan, and later in the same month left for Mazar-i-Sharif to take up the appointment of Naib-ul-Hukmah (Governor), Turkestan. Granted both civil and military powers in his province. Relieved of appointment and proceeded to Kabul in January 1922, where he officiated as Minister of the Interior. Governor of Kandahar 1923, but the real power in the province was wielded by the Minister of the Interior, who, originally officiating as Governor of Kandahar, remained there on relief to deal with the disorders that were rife in the province during 1923. Muhammad Sarwar's jurisdiction seems to have been limited. Still Governor of Kandahar at the beginning of 1927. Described by the Ameer, during a visit of inspection to Kandahar, November 1925, as "honest and respectable, but slow and negligent." Summoned to Kabul June 1926, and well received by the King. Created Sardar-i-Ala November 1926. Appointed Governor of Badakhshan and Kataghan, 1928, but did not take up appointment. In Kandahar 1929. Appointed Governor of Kabul, February 1930, but relieved in 1931 and went on pilgrimage to Mecca. Returned via Meshed and Kandahar. Appointed a member of the Majlis-i-Aiyan (Council of Nobles) December 1931. Reported to be pro-Amanullah. Visited his brother Ghulam Haidar (W.W. 276) at Maruf, Kandahar Province, in February 1932, but was recalled to Kabul in July. Has been unemployed since 1931. Still believed to be pro-Amanullah. Courteous and friendly, but Amanullah's description (above) fits him. Still a member of the Council of Nobles.

59. Muhammad Shafi Khan (W.W. 569) (Sultan Muhammad Khel).

Born approximately 1900. Son of Muhammad Isa Khan. A relative of S. Faiz Muhammad Khan (W.W. 243). Was a Mudir in the Afghan Foreign Office 1934-35. Appointed Afghan Consul, Karachi, 1935. Afghan Consul-General in India vice Salah-ud-Din (No. 70) 1939. Returned to Kabul June 1946. A pleasant official who speaks English and is always friendly towards the British Legation. Believed to be loyal to the present régime.

60. Muhammad Shuaib Khan (W.W. 611).

Born approximately 1904. Younger brother of Muhammad Sarwar Khan (No. 58) and of Ghulam Haidar (W.W. 276). Appointed Yawar to the Governor of Kandahar and Mudir of Agriculture 1934. The Amir dismissed him during a visit of inspection to Kandahar, October 1935. Employed as third assistant to the Minister of Court in 1931. Resigned in August 1932 and became Kandahar manager to Chandan Khan, agent for Burma Shell Oil Company in Afghanistan. Agent for the Shirkat in Kandahar for importing Japanese goods. Appointed Afghan Consul at Karachi 1940. Still Afghan Consul at Karachi. Said to be incompetent and lazy.

61. Muhammad Umar Khan (W.W. 652).

Firqa Mishar (major-general). Yusafzai of the "Topchi" family. Born 1898. Appointed Chief of Staff 1924. Visited Delhi manoeuvres December 1924 at the invitation of the commander-in-chief in India. Appointed head of Afghan Military Mission to Russia to select artillery for the Afghan army and study Soviet military methods October 1926. Left Kabul by air for Termez en route to Moscow the 3rd November, 1926. Visited Russia and Italy 1928. Was at one time military attaché in Berlin. Appointed chief of Afghan General Staff early in 1930. In 1932 proceeded to Europe to attend the Disarmament Conference, Geneva. Visited Paris December 1933. Returned to Kabul via India in January 1934; was a spectator of the 1st January parade at Peshawar. Lunched with the officers of the Gordon Highlanders in the Khyber on his way back. Resumed his duties as Chief of Staff, but left once more for Geneva in May 1934. Afghan representative to the League of Nations Disarmament Committee June 1935. Recalled to Kabul (1936). Chief of Staff till June 1940 when he was appointed Chief Private Secretary to the King—a post which carries Cabinet rank.

A keen and intelligent officer, but said to have had little experience in the field or handling troops. Has been much in Europe and speaks English, Russian and German fluently. Is also said to speak French and Italian. Since his reappointment as Chief of General Staff in 1936 his influence has increased in both the Royal Family and army circles. During the early part of the Second World War he was strictly nationalist and neutral in his attitude, but towards the end of 1944 he began to show a distrust of Russia and a decided leaning towards Great Britain and America. He proceeded to India at the head of an Afghan military mission in 1945. What he saw there convinced him of the desirability of securing the help of India, Great Britain or America in the supply of war material to Afghanistan and in training matters. Is on the closest possible terms with the British military attaché and prepared to accept his advice on all Afghan army and air force problems. He has the complete confidence of King Zahir Shah and the Afghan Government. He was the sole agent for the placing of large orders for the supply of war material from India and for arranging for the despatch of Afghan officers to India for training. His advice is still sought and taken in regard to army and air force affairs and his influence always a moderating one is likely to prove of great value to the Afghan Government in the future.

62. Muhammad Usman Khan (W.W. 661).

Sardar. In 1915 appointed to command at Asmar, where he adopted a friendly attitude towards the British and was taking security from "badmashes" to prevent raids into Chitral. In 1916 was appointed Brigadier and in 1919 was still Commandant at Asmar. Recalled to Jalalabad in August 1920, reason unknown. He, however, again returned to Asmar and went to Kabul in September 1920. Chief Staff Officer to Naib Salar Hashim Khan

(W.W. 337). Commanding the Ningrahar Corps in December, 1921. Served as Afghan Consul in Bombay in 1927 and as Consul-General, India, in 1928. In Kabul 1929. Counsellor to Afghan Embassy, Tehran, in 1930. Appointed Muin II in the Foreign Ministry in 1931. Was a member of the Musabid Perso-Afghan Commission 1934-35. Pensioned and unemployed 1935. Member of the Republican party. Was suspected of complicity in Afridi Amanish plot in 1939. President of the Municipal Committee, Kabul, since 1937. Relieved of this post, July 1942, for alleged malpractice in the distribution of food supplies to the public. 1944, took up directorship of several public trading concerns.

A capable man, with pleasant manners, who is somewhat disgruntled because he has not been given more important appointments. Believed to be addicted to drink; and to be showing signs of disloyalty to the Yahya Khel.

63. Muhammad Yunus Khan (W.W. 685).

Comes from Jalalabad and is of Pathan stock. Secretary of Afghan Legation, London, from 1922-30. Always showed himself helpful and well disposed and was profuse with pro-British sentiments, which were probably sincere. Chargé d'Affaires from February 1929 to January 1930. Energetically opposed Shuja-ud-Daulah's (W.W. 612) attempts to dispose of Legation property July-September 1929. Left London for United States on Shah Wali's (W.W. 585) arrival as Minister in January 1930 owing to disappointment of non-recognition of his work and refusal of Shah Wali to appoint him counsellor. Reported to be in touch with Ghadr party in San Francisco. In June 1933 tried to obtain the assistance of British Foreign Office to return to Afghanistan. Believed to be (1936) in United States. Founded and became Director of the Afghan National Association in the United States.

64. Muhammad Zahir Shah (W.W. 688A).

Muhammadzai. Only surviving son of the late King Nadir Shah. Born 1914. Accompanied his father to France in 1924 and was educated in that country. Returned to Afghanistan in October 1930. In 1931 attended a year's course at the Infantry Officers' School, Kabul. Married (1931) a daughter of Ahmad Shah (W.W. 149). Appointed Assistant War Minister 1932. In September 1933 officiated as Education Minister in addition to his other duties. Was proclaimed King on the 8th November, 1933, immediately after his father's assassination. Quiet and unassuming with pleasant manners and a fair presence, he has so far had little share in the government of the country, the real power being wielded by his uncle H.R.H. Hashim Khan (W.W. 337), the ex-Prime Minister. He is keen on shooting, tennis, riding and swimming. Up to 1938 he rarely left Kabul. Since 1938 he has made a few excursions into the country for a day or two, but is usually accompanied by a large number of officials. He spends two or three months each year at Paghman, the summer capital, to which the Government does not move. His birthday is celebrated on the 15th October each year. Has had three sons, Muhammad Akbar, born 1933, died 1942; Ahmad Shah, born 1934; Muhammad Nadir, born 1941; and two daughters born in 1932 and 1936. He is taking an increased interest in affairs, including the development of the army and air force, and has been known to express a desire to take a more active part in the direction of State business.

65. Najibullah Khan (W.W. 465B).

Born approximately 1906. Related to the late Amir Abdul Rahman through his mother. Educated at the French School, Kabul. Director General of the Political Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs until his appointment in May 1946 as acting Minister of Education.

Speaks French fluently and is now able also to converse intelligently in English. Has considerable ability and influence. Ambitious and somewhat conceited, but unfailingly courteous. Had the reputation of being strongly anti-British, but, largely as a result of the kindness and courtesy shown to him on his visit to India in April 1944, is now extremely well disposed towards us. He could be more fairly described as a strong Nationalist. Dabbles in cultural matters and is a keen student of literature. If the present régime remains in power is likely to become a most important personage.

66. Obeidullah Khan (W.W. 492).

Son of Ameer Habibullah Khan by the Ulya Hazrat; younger brother of ex-King Amanullah. Born 1915. Called Shah Agha. Carefully looked after by the Ulya Hazrat (W.W. 646), who employed a German tutor for him. Sent by Amanullah to Kandahar December 1928 with his family. Accompanied Amanullah to Bombay May 1929. Sailed for Italy with Amanullah June 1929. In Berlin with his mother 1930. Still in Berlin, living at the Afghan Legation November 1932. With Amanullah in Rome in December 1933. In October 1935 was living with his mother (W.W. 646) in Ghulam Siddiq's (W.W. 309) villa in Berlin. Deprived of Afghan nationality November 1933.

67. Rahimullah Khan (W.W. 518).

Tajik. Son of Ataullah. Native of Kabul. Was head clerk in the Russian section of the Foreign Ministry. Became Foreign Agent in Mazar. Afterwards transferred to Moscow as secretary to the Afghan Legation, and later on in the same capacity to Berlin. Appointed assistant in charge Visa Section, Afghan Foreign Office, December 1930. Relieved July 1931. In July 1932 transferred to the Home Ministry as Director, Posts and Telegraphs. Appointment raised to a Ministry in June 1935.

His father died in 1936. Appointed Minister of Mines November 1939. Relieved of appointment of Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in 1940, and appointed Minister of Public Works in addition to Minister of Mines, but this is probably due to the help he obtained from German engineers up to 1941, in developing communications, &c. Relieved of the appointment of Minister for Public Works in May 1944 owing to ill-health, but retained portfolio of the Ministry of Mines, until May 1946.

Originally efficient, became later slack and indifferent in carrying out his duties. Has always been friendly to the British Legation, though at one time he was thought to have had pro-German sympathies.

68. Rahmatullah Jan (W.W. 519).

Muhammadzai. Eldest son of ex-King Amanullah and Queen Souriya. Born 1922. Proceeded to Europe with King 1928. Declared heir apparent 1928. Accompanied Amanullah to Chaman and Bombay the 23rd May, 1929. Sailed for Italy with ex-King the 22nd June, 1929. Was still with Amanullah in Italy 1931, and is believed to be there now (1943).

Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933.

69. Saiyid Qasim (W.W. 548).

Son of Ahmad Shah Khan, Saiyid of Kabul. Proceeded to Peshawar through the Khyber, December 1921, on his way to London as messenger from the Foreign Office. Married the third daughter of the late Mahmud Beg Tarzi. Member of the Afghan Legation in London 1924. Acted as Chargé d'Affaires in 1924 between departure of Abdul Hadi (W.W. 38) and arrival of Shuja-ud-Daulah (W.W. 612). Returned to Kabul May 1925, and appointed Under-Secretary in charge of Russia and Turkistan

branch of Foreign Office to succeed Hafizullah (W.W. 327) February 1926. Appointed Afghan Consul-General, Delhi, October 1926, *vice* Haji Muhammad Akbar (W.W. 153) and left Kabul for Delhi, the 20th November, 1926. Awarded Order of Astor, January 1927. Appointed Afghan Minister in Rome, 1928. Returned to India and left for Constantinople, June 1929. Said to be working as a translator in the Foreign Office, Kabul, the 7th January, 1930. In December 1933 was believed to be with Amanullah in Rome. Speaks excellent English, well educated. Used to be friendly to members of British Legation, Kabul. His sister is the wife of W.W. 686A.

70. Salah-ud-Din Khan (W.W. 553).

Born about 1893. Son of Mufti Siraj-ud-Din of Herat; native of Herat.

Used to be the editor of *Ittihad-i-Islam*. Shuja-ud-Daulah (W.W. 612) brought him to Kabul and gave him the editorship of the paper *Tijarat* (*Commerce*). Afterwards became personal diarist to Amanullah. Appointed Consul in Bombay 1939. In March 1933 acted as consul, Jeddah, in addition to his Bombay duties. Appointed Consul-General in India August 1933. Visited Dera Ismail Khan and Peshawar during the autumn of 1933, spreading pro-Nadir propaganda amongst the Ghilzais. His father, Mufti Siraj-ud-Din, left Delhi for Herat in February 1934. Maintained one Nur Ahmad Khan in Lahore as propaganda and publicity agent. Took care to maintain his contact and popularity with editors and proprietors of Indian vernacular papers. In 1939 returned to Afghanistan. Appointed Controller of Broadcasting and Propaganda November 1939. Appointed Director of Press and Publicity in 1940, which post he still (1946) holds. Has at various times stated that, when Consul and Consul-General in India, he was neglected socially by British officials at Simla, Delhi and Bombay. Is believed to have attempted to introduce news on the Kabul Radio and in the press with an anti-British tone, but the strict censorship maintained by the Afghan Government prevented publication on most occasions.

Is a philosopher and poet. Speaks English intelligibly but not very well. Was once reported to be pro-Russian and pro-Republican, but appears to be trusted by Afghan Government. Has the reputation of entertaining anti-British sentiments.

71. H.R.H. Shah Mahmud (Mahmud Jan) (W.W. 414).

Sardar Muhammadzai. Born 1894. Youngest son of Muhammad Yusuf and uncle of King Zahir Shah. Half-brother of L.P. 48 and brother of L.P. 72. Appointed Sar Sar-i-Os, ranking as general, in 1917. Commanded the troops on the Peiwar front 1919. Was in great favour with the Ameer for never having suffered a defeat (he was never attacked). Appointed Civil and Military Governor of the Simat-i-Janubi (Southern Provinces) September 1919. In Khost February 1920. Arrived in Kabul from Gardez December 1920. Was married in Kabul during the same month to a step-sister of the Ameer. Returned to Gardez soon after. Shah Mahmud was in touch with Muhammad Hasan, B.A., at Makin and Haji Abdur Razaq at Shakin in 1920 and early 1921, and undoubtedly supplied them with frequent convoys of ammunition, rations and money for distribution to the hostile sections of the Wana Wazirs and Mahsuds. Arrived in Kabul in October 1921, accompanied by his family. General Officer Commanding, Badakhshan and Kataghan, from 1922 to 1925. Appointed Governor of Eastern Province April 1926. Interviewed Afridis at Jalalabad April 1926, and promised them similar treatment to that given by his brother, Nadir Khan. Toured Jalalabad Province and interviewed Afridis at Morgha July 1926. Visited Kabul to discuss

Mohmand unrest with King November 1926. Interviewed Mohmands at Jalalabad January 1927; visited Pesh Belak and distributed money amongst Shinwaris. Transferred from Jalalabad to Kabul February 1928. Appointed second secretary in the Ministry of Interior March 1928. In Kabul February 1929. Commissioned by Bacha-i-Saqao to go as his emissary to the tribes of the Eastern and Southern Provinces. Joined Nadir Khan on his arrival in Khost March 1929. Assisted Nadir Khan in his campaign against Bacha-i-Saqao. Appointed War Minister by Nadir Shah November 1929. Left Kabul for Northern Provinces and in January 1931 was appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator) of Northern Afghanistan. Succeeded in driving Ibrahim Beg across the Russian frontier and pacified the country sufficiently for him to be able to return to Kabul in August 1931. Awarded the Almar-i-Ala September 1931 and appointed a member of the Majlis-i-Aliyan (Council of Nobles). He suffered from goitre and hoped to take a cure for it in Germany in the autumn of 1932, but his visit to Europe was postponed owing to the Dare Khel outbreak in November 1932, during which he commanded a force of about two divisions in addition to tribal levies. His success in this affair was perhaps due as much to money as to fighting. Up to December 1932 he was still engaged in settling affairs in the Southern Province and handing over control to Nasrullah (W.W. 469A), the new Governor. Spent the spring and summer of 1933 in the Southern Province, visiting Kabul on one occasion. On Nadir Shah's murder displayed great presence of mind dealing with the situation in Kabul. Proclaimed Zahir Shah King and swore allegiance to him. Appointed Commander-in-chief and Minister of War. In addition to his military duties, was in charge of the Southern Province.

Betrothed his two daughters to the two sons of the late Hayatullah, brother of ex-King Amanullah, December 1935. Sons were born to him in 1922, 1924, 1932, 1936 and 1939. Left for Europe March 1936 for medical treatment and has since been successfully operated upon for goitre in Berlin. Visited England, France, Italy, Germany, Russia, Turkey and Iran. Returned to Kabul December 1936. Developed heart trouble in 1943 and was unable to carry out his duties for some time, but his health is said to be improving. Was in Gardez from April to June 1944, where he succeeded in isolating Mazarak (W.W. 423) and obtained support for the Government of the majority of the tribal leaders. Succeeded his half-brother (L.P. 48) as Prime Minister in May 1946, retaining position as commander-in-chief.

Is popular with the army and throughout the country, especially with the tribes. An opportunist rather than a man with a consistent policy and not likely to prove a good administrator especially as he is given to favouritism and susceptible to flattery. Is inclined to be vain but has good manners, and considerable charm. Friendly to the British Legation. Fond of games but a bad loser.

72. H.R.H. Shah Wali Khan (W.W. 585).

Sardar, Muhammadzai. Born 1885. Son of Sardar Muhammad Yusuf Khan and brother of the late King Nadir Shah. Brother of L.P. 71 and half-brother of L.P. 48. Was Rikab Bashi (equerry) to Ameer Habibullah. Accompanied him to India in 1907. After the Ameer's murder in February 1919 was arrested and sent to Kabul, but was acquitted and released. Commanded troops on Kharlachi front July-October 1919. Promoted general for good services on the Tobi border. Married a sister of ex-King Amanullah in May 1920. Appointed to command 1st Division in Kabul April 1921. Was on intimate terms with ex-King Amanullah and seemed to be his greatest personal friend. Was one of the

delegates at the British-Afghan Conference in Kabul 1921. Commanded 1st Cavalry Corps December 1921. Appointed to command the Kabul Corps 1923. Appointed Yawar Hazuri (equerry to the King) December 1924. Visited India in May 1925 and again in December 1925, when he persuaded Muhammad Umar (W.W. 648) to return to Afghanistan from Hyderabad. Commanded troops Logar during the Mangal rebellion 1924-25, and for his services was created "Taj-i-Afghan." Left Kabul for Paris September 1926, accompanying Afghan students returning from vacation. Was with his brother Nadir Khan at Grasse. Left Marseilles with Nadir Khan and Hashim Khan (L.P. 48) February 1929, and proceeded with Nadir Khan to Khost March 1929. Captured Kabul the 13th October, 1929. Appointed Regent October 1929. Appointed Minister at London November 1929. Reached England the 10th January, 1930. Transferred to Paris June 1931. Came to Kabul on leave September 1932, bringing with him, under safe conduct, the late Ghulam Nabi. Returned to Paris and resumed his appointment February 1933. Returned to Kabul February 1935, and appointed Acting Minister of Defence during absence of Shah Mahmud in Europe. His wife refused to accompany him and remained in Paris. Objected to the monopoly system of the Ashami Company. Acting Prime Minister in the absence of Hashim Khan in Europe (1936). Left Kabul in March 1937 to resume his appointment of Minister at Paris. Represented King Zahir Shah at the Coronation of King George VI.

Visited Kabul March 1939, and returned to Paris June 1939. Left Vichy for Switzerland in August 1944. Returned to Paris early in 1945 on reappointment as Afghan Minister to France. In 1945 his eldest son Ahmed Wali returned to Afghanistan and married, in February 1946 the daughter of Shah Mahmud (L.P. 71). His second and third sons went to England in 1945, Abdul Wali for attachment to the Brigade of Guards, and Wali Shah to go to Harrow. Shah Wali is believed to be still unwilling to return to Afghanistan.

Able and quick witted he is a pleasant and friendly person.

73. Sher Agha (see Fazal-i-Umar).

74. Sher Ahmad Khan (W.W. 598).

Sardar, Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Fateh Muhammad Khan. Born 1885. Acted in the appointment of Ishaq-Aghassi Nizami (Military Chamberlain) 1917. Appointed Hakim (Governor) of Andkhui 1920. Suspended and arrived Kabul May 1921. Appointed Afghan Envoy to Italy 1921, and arrived in Peshawar on the 10th October en route with a large party of Afghan students who were proceeding to be educated in Europe. Afghan Minister at Rome during 1922, and was engaged in negotiations for the purchase of arms until the summer of 1923, when he returned to Kabul with an expressed distaste for his own country. Appointed President of the Shaura (National Council) 1924. Leader of the party in favour of peaceful tactics during Urta Tagai crisis January 1926. Cordially detested the late Mahmud Tarzi. With King Amanullah in Europe 1928. Appointed to still-born post of Prime Minister September 1928, and subsequently to be head of the Public Service Bureau. Held Jalalabad for Amanullah November 1928. Was given full powers to settle the Shinwari rising, but failed and returned to Kabul December 1928. Fled with Amanullah to India May 1929. Returned to Kabul later and was appointed Privy Counsellor by Nadir Shah December 1929. Appointed Ambassador at Tehran December 1930. Said to have entertained a profound contempt and dislike for the Persians, and to have been very outspoken on the subject. Arrived in Kabul the 18th September, 1935, on a

visit. Returned Tehran December 1935. Visited Kabul 1936, using a German aeroplane. Betrothed his nephew Muhammad Umar to Sultan, fourth sister of King Zahir Shah, October 1935.

Relieved by W.W. 140 as Ambassador at Tehran in April 1937. Appointed Minister of State October 1937.

A man of some ability, but indolent and corrupt.

75. *Shuja-ud-Daulah* (W.W. 612) of Ghorband.

Cornes of a Trans-Oxus family. Born 1896. Was Ghulam Bacha (page) in 1916, and was employed looking after the German mission in Herat. Appointed Farash Bashi Hazuri (Head Chamberlain to the King) to Ameer Habibullah Khan January 1917. Appointed Kotwal of Kabul and Amin-i-Asas (chief of police) by Amanullah. Commanded 2nd Division in Kabul January 1921. One of the delegates at the British-Afghan Conference in Kabul 1921. Appointed Minister of Security, and appeared to be a man of considerable ability. In close confidence of the Ameer. Officiated as Governor of Herat January 1921. Relieved and returned to Kabul at the end of 1924. Was deputed to maintain order in the Southern Province during the Mangal rebellion (1924). Appointed Minister at London August 1924, and arrived in London April 1925. Carried through many rifle deals, out of which he is believed to have made a considerable fortune. Gave trouble by failing to settle debts due by the Afghan Legation for rent, &c. Summoned to Kandahar by Amanullah February 1929. Arrived Herat the 28th March, 1929, and assumed duties as Governor on behalf of Amanullah. Flew to Meshed on arrival of Abdur Rahim (W.W. 80), Bacha-i-Saqao's nominee, May 1929. Returned to London via Tashkent-Moscow, and arrived the 11th July, 1929. Attempted to dispose of Afghan Government property, and on this account was asked to leave the country. In Berlin September 1929. In Moscow November 1929. Accompanied Amanullah to Mecca in 1931, returning to Europe via Beirut. Was in Germany in 1933. One of Amanullah's most active supporters. Is believed to be the actual murderer of the late Ameer Habibullah. Proved himself on all occasions ill-mannered and anti-British. Deprived of Afghan nationality November 1933. Believed to be in pay of the Soviet. His wife is a sister of W.W. 289. In Russia February 1935.

76. *Siddiq Agha Muhammad* (Gul Agha) (W.W. 613).

Son of Qaiyum Jan Agha, the Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar (W.W. 347), and half-brother of Fazl-i-Umar (Sher Agha (W.W. 256)). On the death of Qaiyum Jan Agha the title was assumed by the eldest son, Sher Agha. On the latter's death in June 1925 the title was assumed by Muhammad Siddiq Agha, in the absence of his half-brother, Sher Agha, then a political refugee in India. Was arrested, with Rasul Jan Agha (W.W. 522), for trying to stir up trouble in Khost, September 1928. Later released and in February 1929 was reported to have accepted Bacha-i-Saqao's rule. In June 1929 was placed under surveillance in Kabul on account of his intrigues with Sher Agha in the Southern Province. Confined in the Arq, June 1929. Released, and joined Nadir Khan on his entry into Kabul, October 1929. Appointed Minister to Egypt, and passed through Peahawar, en route, February 1931. Proceeded to Mecca, April, 1931, to watch Amanullah. In July 1932 visited Kabul on leave, and was received in a friendly manner by the King and the Prime Minister. Sher Agha (W.W. 256) was reported to be trying to persuade him to resign, but he returned to Egypt in September 1932. Visited Mecca for the Haj 1933. Appointed Minister, Hejaz, in addition to duties as Minister, Egypt, April 1935. Visited Mecca during pilgrimage (1935), but evinced no

sympathy for Amanullah. Reappointed (1939), in addition, Minister to Egypt. Visited Kabul in July 1942. Returned to Cairo in 1942. Expressed anti-British views in connexion with the war situation and British attitude towards Egypt in 1942. Still Minister in Cairo.

77. *Sultan Ahmad Khan* (W.W. 624).

Son of Colonel Sher Ahmad Khan (W.W. 600). Assistant to Mirza Muhammad Khan (W.W. 450). Ambassador at Moscow, August 1920. Head of the Afghan mission to Angora 1921. Arrived in Baku, March 1921. Arrived in Angora in April. Addressed a large crowd, including many prominent Turkish Nationalist Deputies, at the mosque of Namazie, Angora, in August 1921. The subject of the address was the necessity for unity through the whole Moslem world, in order that the encroachments and intrigues of European Powers might be successfully resisted. Prayers were offered for the victory of the Turkish arms, and Sultan Ahmad Khan gave a donation of 2,000 liras to the Red Crescent. The Bolshevik Envoy in Kabul, Raskolnikov, instructed his Government early in September 1921, at the request of the Afghan Government, to provide Sultan Ahmad Khan with 40,000 roubles in gold, payment to be adjusted in Kabul. Returned to Kabul, April 1926, and was appointed third secretary in Foreign Office. Officiated as first secretary during absence of Mirza Muhammad Khan (W.W. 450) on Urta Tagai Boundary Commission. Appointed second secretary, Foreign Office, June 1926, and first secretary, October 1926. Granted title of "Sardar-i-Ala" February 1927. Appointed Ambassador at Tehran, October 1928. Relieved November 1929 and returned to Kabul. Appointed to be in charge of State guests Kabul, January 1930. Went to Turkey as Ambassador, *vice* the late Ghulam Nabi, in December 1930. Took with him as secretary Faiz Muhammad Khan (W.W. 243). Suspected of pro-Amanullah tendencies. Was on intimate terms with the late Ghulam Nabi during his visit to Constantinople in December 1931. Visited Europe in 1933, and, as Afghan representative, concluded a Treaty of Friendship with Brazil through their Embassy 1933. Appointed as an Afghan delegate to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva in 1933. Visited Kabul, August 1935. Represented King of Afghanistan at the funeral of King George V, January 1936. Visited Afghanistan April 1937 and returned to Angora June 1937. Appointed Ambassador at Moscow (1938). During 1941-42 stated to have shown some concern for his personal safety, and to have given depressing accounts of Russian ability to resist the Germans. Visited Kabul in 1945 and returned with great reluctance. May 1946 appointed Minister of Health but has as yet not returned to take up his duties.

77A. *Tura Baz Khan Safi of Chardeh* (W.W. 641).

Born about 1890. 1922 commanded Afridi battalion. 1923-25 and March to May 1926 Sarhaddar of Dakka. Represented the Afghan Government in December 1923 in consultations with Indian Government concerning Ajib Khan, outlaw. Promoted Ghund Mishar (colonel) 1930. April 1931 appointed commandant of police in Kabul. 1938 appointed member of the Prisons Committee. 1939 promoted Firqa Mishar II (major-general). 1939 August appointed Hakim-i-Ala (Governor) Eastern Province. 1941 promoted Firqa Mishar I (lieut.-general) and posted to Kabul as Raisi Amnia (Administrative commandant). Appears to be active and capable but is said to take bribes. Complaints were made against him while he was Commandant of Police, Kabul, for his high-handedness. Does not speak any European language. Is a favourite of the new Prime Minister, H.R.H. Shah Mahmud Khan (L.P. 71) and is thought to be a likely future Governor.

78. *Ulya Hazrat* (W.W. 646).

Siraj-ul-Khawatin (Her Majesty the Sun of the Ladies). Step-sister of Luinab Khushdil Khan, daughter of the late Luinab Sherdil Khan, and step-daughter of Ishaq Aghassi Muhammad Sarwar Khan. Her name is Sarwar Sultan. Chief wife of Ameer Habibullah and mother of ex-King Amanullah Khan (W.W. 188). In 1915 said to be strongly in favour of neutrality. Very strong character and dabbled in politics. Said to have refused to help Turco-German mission in 1916. In 1917 and 1918 had numerous quarrels with Ameer Habibullah owing to her interference in political matters, and was eventually said to have been expelled from the Arq. After the murder of Habibullah, left for Kabul to negotiate with her son, Amanullah. Is believed by many to have been, with Amanullah, the organiser of the plot which resulted in the murder of Habibullah. Was said to have been of Tarzi's party, and in favour of a treaty of friendship with the British. Has one other son, Obeidullah, known as Sher Agha (W.W. 492), born 1915. Left for Kandahar with Queen Souriya, December 1928, and proceeded with energy to raise support for the Durrani Dynasty. Was not on good terms with Queen Souriya. Accompanied Amanullah to Bombay, May 1929. Sailed for Italy with Amanullah, June 1929. In Berlin 1930 intriguing against Nadir Khan in favour of Obeidullah. Remained in Europe 1929-35, mostly at Amanullah's residence at Rome, but occasionally visited Montreux in Switzerland, and Berlin. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Visited Mecca with ex-King Amanullah for 1935 pilgrimage.

In October 1935 was living with Obeidullah Khan (W.W. 492) in Ghulam Siddiq's (W.W. 309) villa in Berlin.

Still (1946), so far as is known, in Europe.

79. *Yakub Khan* (W.W. 675).

Mohmand. Son of Muhammad Yusuf Khan and brother of Agha Sami (W.W. 555). Born 1889. Was page to Ameer Habibullah. Numerous favours were conferred on him by Amanullah. Appointed a

Musahib-i-Khas (Privy Councillor) in 1920, and Shahgassi Huzuri 1927. Created Sardar-i-Ala, January 1927, and appointed Minister of Court. Accompanied Amanullah to Europe 1927-28. Accompanied Amanullah to Kandahar, January 1929, and to Bombay, May 1929. Left Bombay, June 1929, for Dushap. Arrived Meshed, August 1929. Returned to Kabul 1929. Ordered to be deported for complicity in the Koh-i-Daman revolt 1930, but was detained in Jalalabad and later released. Said to be propagandising in favour of Amanullah. Went to Mecca on pilgrimage, April 1931. Arrived at Tehran with his brother W.W. 555, December 1931. Has a son, Musa Jan, born in 1916, and a daughter, who joined him in Tehran in 1933. Probably still in Persia, May 1935. His property in Afghanistan was confiscated in 1933. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Family deported from Kabul to Tehran, August 1935.

80. *Zulfiqar Khan, Muhammad* (W.W. 697).

Muhammadzai. Of no important family. Educated at Habibia College, Kabul. Went to France with Afghan students to look after them, and became guardian to Hidayatullah Khan (W.W. 348), son of Amanullah Khan. Was recalled to Kabul by Amanullah, and for some time was unemployed. During the revolution joined Hashim Khan (W.W. 337) in the Eastern Province and became his private secretary. Went to Parachinar where he joined Nadir Khan and Shah Was (W.W. 585). Counsellor to the Afghan Legation in London 1931. Left London for Paris, with Shah Wali, in June 1931. Returned to Kabul, September 1931, and was appointed assistant to the Prime Minister. Visited Lahore in January and returned to Kabul, April 1936.

Appointed Minister at Tokyo, 1939. Returned to Kabul, June 1946.

A talkative little man who speaks English fluently and is very friendly towards the members of the British Legation.

[E 9373/66/97]

No. 9

Mr. Bevin to Mr. Squire (Kabul).

(No. 35.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, 19th September, 1946.

THE Afghan Minister came to see me on the 19th September. He reiterated his Government's desire for closer relations with His Majesty's Government and added that his Government were anxious to receive the reply to the four memoranda which he had left with Mr. Baxter on the 23rd August, three of which related to the question of the frontier between Afghanistan and India, and the fourth to the Afghan Government's plan for economic development.

2. I replied that the first three memoranda were being actively studied in consultation with the India Office. The questions which they raised, however, closely affected the Government of India and would require very careful consideration. I would, however, communicate further with his Excellency as soon as I was in a position to do so.

3. As regards the fourth document, I said that the Afghan Government's plan had been carefully studied and that it was thought that a great deal of the equipment and plant required by the Afghan Government could be supplied from this country. It would be necessary, however, to have more detailed information regarding the Afghan Government's requirements and I suggested that the position could be discussed in detail between the appropriate Departments and the Afghan Economic Mission which was on its way to this country. The competent Departments could also discuss with the Afghan Mission the question of the supply of textiles for which the Afghan Minister had also asked. This was a difficult question, in view of the world shortage of textiles, but we were anxious to do anything we could to help the Afghan Government to obtain their

requirements. It was necessary to plan ahead, both short term and long term, and discussions with the Afghan Trade Mission should contribute to this end.

4. The Afghan Minister said that he was not sure whether the trade mission would be competent to discuss questions relating to the economic plan, but that he had no doubt that his Government would be ready to send other representatives for this purpose. He then enquired what prospects there were of his Government receiving a loan of £10 million to £20 million, as envisaged in the plan. I replied that this presented a very difficult problem, at which the Minister looked crestfallen. I added that I would let him have a more definite reply on this point in the near future.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

[E 9513/13/97]

No. 10

Extract from Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 36, Secret, for the week ending 6th September, 1946.—(Communicated in Kabul Despatch No. 74 of 12th September; Received 25th September.)

1. Political and General.

(a) Elaborate arrangements are being made for the tour of His Majesty King Zahir Shah in northern Afghanistan in October. His Majesty is expected to leave Kabul on or about the 3rd October, the actual date being dependent on an imminent addition to his family. The tour is to last two months and the places visited will include Mazar-i-Sharif, Baghlan, Khanabad, the Khost, Farang, Farkhar and Kishm valleys, and possibly Faizabad in Badakhshan. Cabinet Ministers and other senior officials who are expected to accompany His Majesty during portions of the tour include: the Minister of Court, the Minister of National Economy, the Minister of Interior, Lieut.-General Muhd Umar Khan, Chief Secretary and N.S. Muhd Anwar Khan, the Deputy Commander-in-chief. The Kabul Army Corps is to provide an escort for the tour and a few wheeled carriers fitted with W/T sets are to be taken.

(b) It is reported that H.R.H. Muhd Hashim Khan has decided to cancel his visit to Mecca on pilgrimage this year as he wishes to supervise the construction of his new residence at Shahrara, Kabul. Lieut.-General Muhd Daud Khan is still being obstinate and refuses to patch up his differences with his uncle, the Prime Minister. There have been rumours to the effect that Lieut.-General Muhd Daud Khan will accompany His Majesty King Zahir Shah on his tour in northern Afghanistan or that he will proceed to Europe or the United States for a holiday.

(c) Senior Afghan officials continue to stress the seriousness of the piece-goods position in northern Afghanistan and have stated that the Government's coupon system of distributing piece-goods may fail completely unless the Afghan Government can secure their minimum requirements in piece-goods from India. While it is realised that the position may be difficult for the new Government who naturally desire to produce quick results, there is a fairly large output of cloth from the textile factories at Pul-i-Khumri and Jabal-us-Siraj as well as from village handlooms which should assist the Afghan Government considerably in overcoming their difficulties.

(d) Afghan officials in Kabul have been loud in their praise of everything American recently. The American Government, the American Legation, American engineers and American methods of conducting business had all received attention and their share of Afghan appreciation. It is possible that the Afghan Government are preparing the way for the entry into the country of large numbers of engineers and other technicians and wish to popularise them with the Afghan people by means of this propaganda.

CHAPTER II.—IRAQ

[E 7580/19/93]

No. 11

THE KURDISH PROBLEM.

(With Maps.)

SUMMARY.

Part I.

'Iraq.

The idea of an independent Kurdish State was contained in the Treaty of Sévres (signed in 1920, but never ratified), but was abandoned three years later with the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne. Kurds of the Mosul and Arbil liwas accepted 'Iraqi citizenship, although those of Sulaimani rejected it. Genuine Kurdish nationalism and the selfish aims of the tribal leaders exist side by side. The problem before the Government has all along been that of reconciling the needs of a liberal policy towards the Kurds with the necessity of quelling the revolts of their lawless chieftains. 'Iraqi politicians failed to cope with this difficulty. (Para. 1.)

The League of Nations Frontier Commission, in 1925, recommended the appointment of Kurds to the administration of their country, the dispensation of justice, and for teaching in the schools; also the use of Kurdish as the official language for these services. The British Government, as the Mandatory Power, was invited by the Council of the League to submit the measures they proposed to take to put these recommendations into effect. In 1923 the 'Iraqi Government had issued instructions that in Kurdish areas officials were to be Kurdish, and that Kurdish should be the official language and be taught in the schools. (Paras. 2-4.)

To allay Kurdish fears that the privileges recommended by the League would be withdrawn on the termination of the mandate, a declaration regarding minorities was made by the 'Iraqi Government to the Council of the League in 1932. (Para. 5 and Appx. "A.")

Numerous petitions were addressed to the League of Nations and the Mandates Commission in 1930 and 1931 demanding the formation of a Kurdish Government, but the Commission went no further than a recommendation that the 'Iraqi Government should exercise a spirit of broad toleration towards its Kurdish subjects. (Para. 6.)

In commenting on the Kurdish petition of July, 1930, His Majesty's Government defended the 'Iraqi Government, although admitting that in districts other than Sulaimaniya the proportion of Kurdish officials was low, and there had been a delay in establishing Kurdish as the official language. It is unquestionable, however, that measures designed to meet Kurdish desires have been successfully sabotaged, with the result that little progress towards solution of the Kurdish problem had been made when war broke out in 1939. Kurdish nationalism seemed to be waning except when the Government showed especial loyalty to the Arab cause. (Paras. 7-11.)

Economic difficulties, rather than thwarted nationalism, have been the underlying cause of complaint of the Kurds during the war. In the settlement made with Mulla Mustafa in January, 1944, it was stipulated that grain should be sent to Barzan and relief would be organised; Mulla Mustafa's truculence and the 'Iraqi Government's inefficiency precipitated a revolt which broke out in August, 1945. With the help of heavily-subsidised Kurdish chiefs the revolt was quelled and the Mulla fled to Persia, where he still remains a potential threat. (Paras. 12-13.)

The 'Iraqi Government cannot be absolved from blame. When peace was undisturbed they were neglectful: when trouble arose they were vindictive. They paid lip-service to a policy the execution of which they did their best to obstruct. British and League of Nations influence has probably prevented their resort to massacres. But it is difficult for them to sympathise with a community which loses no opportunity of expressing its contempt for them. (Para. 14.)

Persia.

Kurds of Persia are "hopelessly divided among themselves." The return of the tribal chiefs after the abdication of Riza Shah soon made conditions as bad as before their removal. Nationalistic aspirations, as distinct from tribal, have not been in evidence outside Azerbaijan. (Para. 15.)

In the months immediately following the entry of British and Russian troops into Persia the policy of both Governments was conditioned by the presence of Kurds on either side of the Turkish frontier. His Majesty's Government avoided any action which might have excited the suspicions of the Turks: the Russians, on the other hand, alarmed them by the encouragement they gave to the Persian Kurds owing to their anxiety to have friendly tribes on the Azerbaijan-Turkey frontier. A change later took place in the Russian attitude, and, in 1942, they were endeavouring to hold the balance between the Kurds and the Persian authorities. In 1944 signs again appeared of Kurdish nationalism being encouraged. (Paras. 16-17.)

The Tudeh Party endeavoured to influence the Kurds against the Tehran Government generally, rather than in favour of national separatism, but was unpopular with the Kurds who had little sympathy with its aims. (Para. 17.)

During 1944 Mahabad became the centre of Kurdish nationalism in Persia, where Qazi Muhammed, a local notable, emerged as the leader. There was, at the same time, an unaided move to unite three Kurdish nationalist societies. (Para. 18.)

In February, 1945, the Russians prevented the passage of Persian troops to put down a disturbance at Mahabad, and were hailed by the Kurds as deliverers, a view which was not unreasonably connected with the opening of a branch of the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society in Mahabad in April. Komala Kurd (a nationalist society) began to be considered as successor to the Jian-i-Kurd. Deterioration of the situation among the 'Iraqi Kurds was vaguely attributed to Russian and Komala activities, but had no effect on Persian Kurds. Meanwhile Qazi Muhammed and other Kurdish chiefs had been taken to Baku and advised to join the new Democrat Party of Azerbaijan in return for Soviet support for their independence movement. The recent agreement reported between Mahabad and Tabriz is evidence that Russian policy is unchanged, as it is unlikely to have been made without Soviet approval. The boundaries of the Kurdish zone have not been authoritatively reported, but a rough definition has been given of the southern limit. (Paras. 19-21.)

The Russians and the Pan-Kurd Movement.

There is no evidence of Russian support for any wide movement for Kurdish independence, but only reports of attempts to persuade Persian Kurds to help Mulla Mustafa. This may indicate only a pause in a policy designed to create first a united effort in Azerbaijan. The successes of Qazi Muhammed, and the fact that Mulla Mustafa remained at large in Persia in spite of 'Iraqi requests for his capture, crystallised vague ideas of emancipation into the expectation that, under Soviet guidance, the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish State could be extended to include the Kurdish districts of 'Iraq and Turkey. Except in Persia the Russians do not seem to be making any serious effort to direct the Kurdish movement; they must appreciate that, where the appeal of nationalism has failed to unite rival chieftains, Communist ideology, which is repugnant to most of them, will not succeed, except under direct Soviet control. Meanwhile propaganda prepares the way for a possible future change of policy, which is a bogey which can be produced at need; and the present limited support for Kurdish nationalism assists in undermining British influence in the Middle East. (Paras. 22-24.)

Levant States.

The Kurdish community is believed to number about 50-60,000, mostly living in tribal groups along the Syro-Turkish frontier. In Damascus there is a community of over 20,000. The tribal groups are mostly illiterate and are engaged in agriculture. They are apt to grumble about discrimination by the Syrian authorities, but show no separatist tendencies, and there is no evidence of any close connection with Kurds in 'Iraq or Persia.

Amongst the Kurdish community in Damascus (who carry little weight with those in the north) there are two factions—the "Kurdish League," and the "Society of Salah ed Din." The former favour the formation of an autonomous Kurdish State and have produced pamphlets which have been sent

to the United Nations Organisation, etc.; the latter are concerned with raising the status of Kurds and reviving their language. Their leaders are not at present attracted towards Russia, though the "Kurdish League" might turn to her for support if they become convinced that none was forthcoming from His Majesty's Government. Although the leader of the Lebanese Communist Party is of Kurdish origin, there is no evidence of his having any special interest in his own community. (Paras. 26-27.)

Part II.—The Kurds of Turkey.

Of the (approximately) 3,000,000 Kurds in the world, 1,500,000 live in Turkey, where they remain the chief thorn in the Turkish flesh, never having been completely subdued by any Power. (Para. 28.)

Recent history.

Turkish Kurdistan is mountain country, and the life of its inhabitants tribal and feudal. Ever since the Turks conquered the country in 1534 the Kurdish desire to remain independent has led to intermittent rebellion, the latest attempt being in 1937. By employing modern methods of warfare on a large enough scale, the Turks have had little difficulty in suppressing these later risings, but the severity of their methods has sown the seeds of further revolts. (Paras. 29-30.)

It is difficult to assess the present position, but the Turkish Government refuses to recognise the Kurds as a minority, and their drastic efforts at assimilation have failed, although this Government has a tighter hold than any of its predecessors. Attempts to open up communications in this part of the country and to spread Turkish culture have been half-hearted and ineffectual. Security prevails, on the whole, only because of the presence of Turkish troops. There is, too, a growth of Kurdish nationalism (as distinct from mere discontent) stimulated by more intellectual Kurdish elements in Syria and 'Iraq. (Para. 31.)

Population.

The latest detailed figures available—those for 1935—giving the numbers of Turkish and Kurdish-speakers in what may be considered the Kurdish vilayets are shown in a table. Details of the 1944 census have never yet been published, but it is certain that the proportion of Kurdish-speakers was not lower than the 37 per cent. of 1935. As a race the Kurds are more prolific than the Turks. Distribution is not even throughout the whole area, and in some vilayets the proportion of Kurdish-speakers was as high as from 64-79 per cent. (Para. 32.)

The Kurdish vilayets have been much depopulated through drastic punitive action and recruitment for the 1914-18 war, from which there were few survivors, and there is reason to doubt Turkish population statistics. According to these, by 1944 the population of Turkey had almost doubled itself since 1914, in spite of the terrible toll taken during the war and the notorious infertility of the Turks. Should a claim on eastern Turkey be made in the name of the Kurds, these statistics might be challenged. (Para. 33.)

Autonomy and Russia.

Under the Treaty of Sèvres, 1920, Great Britain, France and Italy were to produce a scheme of local autonomy for specified Kurdish areas, and an independent Kurdish State was to be created at the discretion of the League of Nations if it were demanded. A scheme for a Kurdo-Armenian State was also mooted. That none of these schemes matured was due to Turkish resistance under Mustafa Kemal. The Kurds hold Turkey first, and Great Britain secondly, responsible and incline towards Russia for support. (Paras. 34-36.)

Turkish policy towards the Kurds has always been Turkification, whereas the Soviet has adopted its usual policy of encouraging the culture of a minority—albeit with an ulterior motive. (Para. 37.)

There is no evidence that the Turks recognise the possibilities of an economic solution of the problem; they have broken up the old economy, but have done little to introduce modern prosperity in its place. Fairly good medical and veterinary services are among the things for which Turkey can claim most credit. (Paras. 38-39.)

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Kurds might cause Turkey no anxiety as long as she could hold her frontiers. However, the case which Russia could present to the world on behalf of an autonomous Kurdistan is a strong one. There are two reasons why Russia might be specially interested in Turkish Kurdistan: first, it is in the Kurdish vilayets that there is most hope of finding oil; secondly, the existence of Kurds in Cilicia and on the Turco-Syrian frontier 35 miles inland from Alexandretta, might give a pretext for extending Kurdistan to embrace that port, and/or for claiming Cilicia for the Armenians. (Paras. 40-43.)

Even were the Turks likely to adopt a liberal attitude towards Kurdish freedom, the present Russian menace makes such a policy impossible. The fear of minority status developing into autonomy and ultimately into independence is likely to make Turkey stick even more obstinately to a policy of Turkification. (Para. 44.)

THE KURDISH PROBLEM.

PART I.

Iraq.

1. The idea of an independent Kurdish State comprising the predominantly Kurdish areas of Turkey and Iraq (but excluding that of Persia) was contained in the Treaty of Sèvres signed on 29th August, 1920, but never ratified. This project was finally abandoned three years later with the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne (24th July, 1923). But the result of it was that during this period the policy of His Majesty's Government and of the Iraqi Government had to be framed with a view to the possible implementation of the relevant articles of the Treaty of Sèvres. In spite of this situation the Kurds of the Mosul and Arbil liwas of Iraq accepted Iraqi citizenship before 1921, although those of Sulaimani rejected it, refused to be incorporated under the Iraqi Government under any conditions and abstained from voting for King Faisal in the referendum of that year. The sequel and the activities of Shaikh Mahmud in Sulaimani and of Shaikh Ahmad and his brother, Mulla Mustafa, in the Barzan district are briefly recorded in the earlier paper on the "Kurdish Problem" (Research Department Handbook, Paper No. RR X/9/ii), where it is implied that the persistent unrest of these three leaders has been due to the failure of the Iraqi Government to fulfil its obligations. This is only partially true. Their hostility to the "Arab" government of Baghdad is fundamental and, in that sense, they may be regarded as champions of Kurdish nationalism; but it is a nationalism limited to achieving their personal ambitions rather than one inspired by a wider patriotism. Their primary aim is to be left alone to exercise their feudal tyranny over as many of their countrymen as they can contrive to control.⁽¹⁾ That is not to say that national sentiment and the desire for Kurdish institutions are non-existent amongst the rank and file. The numerous petitions which have been presented asking for recognition of inherent and acquired rights are evidence to the contrary, and since 1924 nationalism has spread from its original hearth in Sulaimani to Arbil and the Kurdish district of Mosul. A large proportion of the students and young lawyers is imbued with a brand of it much more fiery than the parochial and rather selfish patriotism of Sulaimani in its early days. But though the language of both demands is the same the meaning is not. Thus the British and Iraqi Governments have been faced with the dilemma of reconciling the needs of a liberal policy towards the people of the Kurdish districts with the necessity of quelling the revolts of their lawless chieftains. Iraqi politicians, many of them ex-soldiers of the old Turkish school, lacked the subtlety to cope with such a situation.

2. Formal obligations were placed upon the Iraqi Government and the Mandatory Power by the recommendation of the League of Nations Frontier Commission which visited the Kurdish areas of Iraq in February, 1925. In their final conclusions they said:—

"Regard must be paid to the desires expressed by the Kurds that officials of Kurdish race should be appointed for the administration of their country, the dispensation of justice, and teaching in the schools, and that Kurdish should be the official language of all these services."

⁽¹⁾ The support which they receive from the more moderate and law-abiding Kurds may be gauged from the fact that, during Shaikh Mahmud's rule in Sulaimani between 1922-24, the population of the town fell to 700; it rose to 12,000 in 1925.

3. The Council of the League, in their decision regarding the northern frontier of Iraq, made the following reference to the Kurdish question:—

"The British Government, as Mandatory Power, is invited to lay before the Council the administrative measures which will be taken with a view to securing for the Kurdish populations mentioned in the report of the Commission of Enquiry, the guarantees regarding local administration recommended by the Commission in its final conclusions."

4. A resolution of the Council of Ministers passed in 1923 was accordingly confirmed and amplified in a speech by the Prime Minister in the Chamber of Deputies, and instructions were issued to the members of the Cabinet to the effect that, in the Kurdish areas, officials were to be Kurdish and the official language Kurdish, which was also to be taught in the schools.

5. The intention of the British Government to work for the liquidation of the mandatory régime by the year 1932 gave rise to Kurdish anxiety that after the withdrawal of British influence the Kurds would no longer enjoy the privileges recommended for them by the League. They wanted guarantees for the future. The terms of the Treaty of the 30th June, 1930, accentuated their fears since there was no reference in it to safeguards which might have allayed their apprehension, since the imposition of such conditions was regarded as inappropriate in an alliance between independent states. A formal declaration regarding minorities was, however, made by the Iraqi Government to the Council of the League of Nations in May, 1932, the relevant paragraphs of which are reproduced as Appendix "A."

6. Ten notables of Sulaimaniya addressed a petition to the League of Nations in July, 1930, demanding the formation of a Kurdish Government under supervision of the League of Nations, and eight further petitions between August, 1930, and April, 1931, came under the consideration of the Mandates Commission in June of that year, but the Commission in its recommendations to the League Council went no further than to suggest that the Mandatory Power should be requested to impress upon the Government of Iraq that it should be guided in its dealings with its Kurdish subjects by a spirit of broad toleration.

7. His Majesty's Government in observations on the Kurdish petition of July, 1930, defended the Iraqi Government and contested a statement that the majority of the administrative and executive officials of the Kurdish district were Arabs, by quoting figures for the Sulaimaniya district, in which, of 157 officials, 109 were Kurds and only 12 Arabs; it was, however, admitted that in other Kurdish districts the proportion of Kurdish officials was lower. The difficulty of finding suitable and qualified Kurds to fill executive and technical positions was referred to. It was admitted that there had been delay in enacting a law to establish Kurdish as the official language for governmental correspondence and for the law courts and schools in the Kurdish areas, but this was excused because Kurdish as a written language was unknown "until recent years." Reference was made in the same communication to a letter from the Acting Prime Minister of Iraq of the 19th August, 1930, outlining the Government's policy which they maintained was in the best interests of the Kurds themselves and not in conflict with the stipulations of the League. Briefly they contended that to appoint only Kurds in the Kurdish liwas would bar them from employment in other parts of Iraq which was detrimental to the general interests of the administration. At the same time Kurdish would be preserved as their language in their primary education, in the dispensation of justice and in all their relations with the administration.

8. This letter referred to a law which was eventually passed on the 23rd May, 1931. Under this law a circular was sent to all Ministries (excepting the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs) instructing them to replace such of their officials in the Kurdish areas as did not know Kurdish or, where this was not possible, to arrange for them to learn Kurdish. At the same time committees were set up which decided the form of Kurdish to be used.

9. Provision had already been made for a Translation Bureau in Baghdad to undertake the translation into Kurdish of legislation, regulations and departmental circulars; a Kurdish inspector for the Kurdish schools and a Kurdish Assistant Director-General of Administration in the Ministry of the Interior were to be appointed. Of these measures only the appointment of the Kurdish Assistant Director-General was immediately carried out and maintained. A Kurdish Inspector of Schools was not appointed until 1945, and although there has been some sporadic translating of books into Kurdish under pressure, no permanent translation bureau has ever taken shape.

10. Reference has been made above to the defence of the 'Iraq Government put forward by His Majesty's Government before the League of Nations Council and to the admission of their failure to carry out their obligations in all respects. It is unquestionable that, up to the present day, measures designed to meet Kurdish desires have been fairly successfully sabotaged. This may have been due in part to lack of energy in tackling natural difficulties but, on the whole, it must be regarded as the result of deliberate reluctance to take steps believed to tend towards the separation rather than the unity of the community of 'Iraq (such, for example, as the creation of a special Kurdish administrative unit).

11. As a result of this negative attitude to the Kurdish question which was taken up by successive Cabinets little progress was made towards its solution in the period between the admission of 'Iraq as a member of the League of Nations and the outbreak of war in 1939. On the whole Kurdish nationalism seemed to be on the wane, although at any time of national sensitiveness or agitation it was revived, and it received a natural stimulus from time to time from manifestations by the Government of especial loyalty to the Arab cause.

12. Economic difficulties, rather than thwarted nationalism, have been underlying complaints of the Kurdish population during the war years. The high cost of living and the shortage of textiles have caused grumbling throughout 'Iraq, but the situation has not been serious. Compensation has been found in the plains from the presence of British troops, which has been denied to the people of Kurdistan. In the settlement made with Mulla Mustafa in January, 1944, it was stipulated that grain should be sent to Barzan and relief work be organised on the roads. In spite of this settlement Mulla Mustafa became truculent, and the 'Iraq Government dilatory and inefficient.⁽²⁾

13. Movements of 'Iraqi troops and of Mulla Mustafa momentarily increased the tension, but in June, 1945, the news from Barzan was "extremely encouraging." By the 2nd August things had taken a turn for the worse, and by the middle of the month Mulla Mustafa was in open revolt. This was put down by the 'Iraq army with the help of heavily-subsidised Kurdish chiefs hostile to Mulla Mustafa.⁽³⁾ The Mulla himself fled to Persia, where he remains a potential threat to the peace of his own country.

14. It is impossible to absolve the 'Iraq Government from blame for the past and present situation.⁽⁴⁾ When the peace was undisturbed they were neglectful; when trouble appeared they became vindictive. They give lip-service to a policy with which they disagree and obstruct its execution whenever they are able to do so. On the other hand it is difficult for them to have any great sympathy for a community whose leaders, with few exceptions, lose no opportunity of expressing their contempt for the "Baghdad Government" and all its works. Left to themselves they would no doubt attempt to resolve the difficulty as Riza Shah resolved his problem, by removal of the powerful chiefs, and, as in an earlier day, Muhammed Ali of Egypt did, by the massacre of the Mamelukes. The moderating counsels of British advisers and the interest of the League of Nations in minority affairs have kept them off this course. The frustration of their natural instincts and the knowledge that Kurdish leaders have traded on this situation are irritants which give a reaction unfavourable to a genuine change of heart.

Persia.

15. Events in Western Persia during the past four years fully confirm the opinion expressed in the former paper that the Kurds of Persia are "hopelessly divided among themselves." The return of the tribal leaders after the abdication of Riza Shah led within a very few months to a revival of the conditions of lawlessness which had preceded their removal, and, in so far as Persian forces

⁽²⁾ In January, 1945, Majid Mustafa, the Kurdish Deputy for Sulaimaniya and former Minister without Portfolio who negotiated the settlement with Mulla Mustafa the previous year, attacked the Ministry of the Interior saying in effect, that what the Kurds wanted was not independence, but their issues of sugar and tea.

⁽³⁾ An interesting sidelight on the relations between Kurdish leaders is given by the fact that, at the end of August, 1945, when the Barzan revolt was in full swing, Shaikh Mahmud of Sulaimaniya and Babekr Selim Agha of the Pizhder (themselves long-standing rivals) headed a petition to the Government against a decree regarding the purchase-price of tobacco and the method of classification of the leaf.

⁽⁴⁾ In May, 1944, the following figures relating to education in Sulaimaniya were reported: "Although the number of pupils receiving primary education is more than double their number at the termination of the Mandate, out of a total population of 180,000 souls there are only some 3,500 children receiving education. There are 43 primary schools (of which 12 are in Sulaimani town) with 165 teachers between them, and two intermediate schools (respectively for boys and for girls) with a total of 28 teachers. Of the 165 primary teachers 43 speak no Kurdish, and in one or two cases a single non-Kurdish speaker is the only teacher in the school. The teaching in the intermediate schools is in Arabic."

were free to operate (that is mainly outside the Russian zone of occupation), measures for their subjugation and control were undertaken with varying successes.⁽⁵⁾ The history of events, therefore, in the Kurdish area outside the province of Azerbaijan follows the traditional pattern. Except that it is necessary to record that nationalistic, as distinct from tribal, aspirations have not been in evidence, the period calls for no special comment.

16. In the months immediately following the entry of British and Russian troops the policy of both Governments towards the Kurds was conditioned by the presence of Kurds on both sides of the Turkish frontier. We have always been fully conscious of Turkish susceptibilities on the Kurdish question, and deliberately refrained from any interference in the affairs of Persia which might have been interpreted as an encouragement to pan-Kurdism or as an incitement to the Kurds of Turkey. The Russians, on the other hand, for some time were obsessed with the anxiety to have friendly tribes on the frontier between Azerbaijan and Turkey in the event of the military situation in the Caucasus deteriorating, although their motives seem to have been somewhat confused and their policy gave the impression of being an improvisation. The encouragement which they gave to the Persian Kurds alarmed the Turkish Government but had no effect upon their Kurdish subjects. The improvement in the military situation and a clearer perception of the facts (which led the Russians to realise the danger from turbulent tribes to the supply line across Persia) resulted in a change of attitude, and by the end of 1942 they were trying to keep the Kurdish tribes quiet and holding the balance between them and the Persian authorities. The Kurds were correspondingly disappointed; they had felt that the Russians had acquiesced up to a point in sponsoring the movement towards Kurdish unity (implying freedom from Persian Government interference), and had then drawn back.

17. This policy was consistently maintained until some time in 1943. Early in the following year there were signs that Kurdish nationalism was again being encouraged, although the position may have been somewhat complicated by the rise of the Tudeh Party who were independently in touch with the Kurds, influencing them, presumably, against the Tehran Government in general terms rather than in favour of national separatism. But the Tudeh was unpopular with the Kurds in general, who had no interest in Tudeh agitations for industrial reform, and with the Aghas in particular, who viewed with the greatest concern Tudeh plans for agrarian reform. The Russians seem to have had some difficulty in reconciling the competition for membership between the Tudeh Party and the Jian-i-Kurd (Kurdish Life) Society (q.v.).

18. During 1944 Mahabad became the centre of Kurdish nationalism in Persia, where Qazi Muhammed, a local notable, emerged as the leader of the movement. His original aims appear to have been to obtain local autonomy on lines similar to those demanded by the 'Iraqi Kurdish spokesmen. By the end of the summer he had established his authority in Mahabad and the presence of the local farmandar was hardly noticed. In November he visited Tehran with several tribal leaders and attempted, with incomplete success, to convince the Persian authorities of his loyalty, although independent reports credited him with the admission that many Kurds did not want independence, but would be content with a fair administration, schools in which Kurdish was allowed, health services and improved communications. Russian policy had not yet swung over completely, and a move reported at this time for the fusion of the Khoybun, the Hewa⁽⁶⁾ and the Jian-i-Kurd Societies owed nothing to Russian inspiration. It may be remarked in parenthesis that there is no evidence of direct Russian support for any larger schemes for Kurdish independence.

19. Before the visit of Qazi Muhammed to Tehran it was generally believed that the Russians were actively supporting the Kurdish movement in various ways, including the printing of the organ of the Jian-i-Kurd, *Nishtman*. In February, 1945, a disturbance occurred at Mahabad and the Persian Government ordered the despatch of a column of troops there. The Russians intervened and stopped the column. This incident was followed by an intensification of Kurdish

⁽⁵⁾ During the period 1941-44 Southern Kurdistan had reverted almost to its uncontrolled state before Riza Shah. During those years the frontier areas around Sardasht, Baneh, Merivan and Avroman were virtually independent of Government control and were under tribal rule. Persian army garrisons, withdrawn or driven out by Kurds at the time of the Anglo-Soviet invasion of 1941, were not re-established in any of these areas until the autumn of 1944. They are still there preserving a precarious existence, but their position is far from secure and Government influence is slight.

⁽⁶⁾ The Khoybun has been comparatively inactive of late. The Hewa is a secret society of Sulaimani.

nationalist propaganda in which the Russians were represented as deliverers, a view which was not unreasonably connected with the opening of a branch of the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society in Mahabad in April. At the same time the Komala Kurd began to be spoken of as the successor to the Jian-i-Kurd, and as a party independent of the unpopular Tudeh Party which, however, rather than the Komala, seemed at this time to enjoy Russian support.

20. The gradual deterioration of the situation in the Barzan area of Iraq, culminating in the revolt of September, 1945, was vaguely attributed, without any solid foundation of evidence, to encouragement from the Komala and the Russians. There was an unconfirmed report that the Russians tried to get Qazi Muhammed to send help to Mulla Mustafa in September, but that he bargained for a cessation of Tudeh activities. Mulla Mustafa himself was also reported to have gone to Persia to seek reinforcements, but without success. Whatever may be the truth on these matters, it is indisputable that the revolt had no effect upon the course of events in Persia. In spite of some information tending to glorify Mulla Mustafa's position as a nationalist leader, even since his flight over the frontier, the bulk of evidence shows that neither he nor his indigent followers were welcome there.

21. Before the defeat of Mulla Mustafa by the Iraq army Qazi Muhammed had been taken with other Kurdish chiefs to Baku where they were advised to join the new Democratic Party of Azerbaijan. In return they were promised Soviet support for their independence movement. After the "Democratic" revolt of Azerbaijan in December a delegation of five Kurds, representing "the Democratic Party of Kurdistan and its leader Qazi Muhammed," offered their congratulations and all cultural and economic co-operation. But they announced at the same time that their own National Assembly of Kurdistan would shortly be opening, and referred to the People of Autonomous Iranian Kurdistan (Khud Mukhtari Kurdistan Iran). Qazi Muhammed was summoned to Tabriz and exhorted by Pishavari, the head of the Azerbaijan Government, to co-operate fully with them, and although the evidence is somewhat conflicting, the Russians appeared to be supporting the Azerbaijan Democrats; that is to say that their policy had not changed since the visit of the Kurdish leaders to Baku. The agreement recently reported to have been concluded between Mahabad and Tabriz is evidence of the continuance of this policy. Recognition of the right to use of their language by Kurds and Turki-speaking people in each other's territory is mutually guaranteed, provision is made for military assistance to one another, and this rather vague document published at Mahabad (a Tabriz version has not been seen) includes an expression of the sincerity of this declaration; all that can be said is that it is unlikely to have been made without Soviet approval. The boundaries of the Kurdish zone have not been authoritatively reported, but the southern limit has been roughly defined as a line from Tabbaghach to "a few miles south of Bukan," and thence to the Iraqi frontier near Sardasht.

The Russians and the Pan-Kurd Movement.

22. Russian policy towards the Kurds has necessarily been dealt with fairly fully in the paragraphs dealing with Persian Kurdistan, and it has already been noted that there is no evidence of Russian support for any wide movement for Kurdish independence. Such evidence as exists of interest in Kurdish affairs outside Persia is confined to reports of an attempt to persuade Persian Kurds to help Mulla Mustafa in September, 1945, and to stories (of doubtful reliability) that they supplied arms at the same time to the Barzanis. (There is little doubt that they have done so since Mulla Mustafa took refuge in Persia.) The fact that they had made, and even now seem to be making, little or no attempt to influence the Kurds outside their zone of occupation in Persia to join in the movement for Kurdish autonomy, may indicate no more than a pause in the evolution of a policy designed in the first place to create a united effort in Azerbaijan.

23. But without any deliberate effort on their part it was natural that their military exploits and their political relations with neighbouring Kurds should excite the interest of the Kurds of Iraq. This interest was noted many months before the revolt of Mulla Mustafa in the autumn of 1945, and even the fact that the revolt was suppressed largely by the assistance of other Kurdish tribesmen does not appear to have damped the hope of achieving unity. The successes of Qazi Muhammed and the fact that Mulla Mustafa remained at large in Persia, in spite of the request of the Iraqi Government for him to be arrested and handed over, and the presence with him of Iraqi ex-officers who maintained contact with their own countrymen over the border, had the effect of crystallising vague ideas

of emancipation into an expectation that the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish State in Persia, under Soviet guidance, could be extended to include the Kurdish districts of Iraq and Turkey without great difficulty. Thus an earlier tendency to see in Russian help a hope for the fulfilment of aspirations which we had been unable or unwilling to assist them to achieve, assumed a more definite shape in the minds of the minor shaiyks and officials and of the students, and their interest was stimulated by propagandist literature of both nationalist and Communist character.

24. The impression given by all reports is that, except in Persia, the Soviet authorities are not at present making any serious effort to direct the Kurdish movement, and even there they are still pursuing a limited objective. They must appreciate that where the appeal of Kurdish nationalism has failed to overcome rivalries between Kurdish chiefs, the propagation of Communist ideology, which is repugnant to most of the chiefs and, except in its cruder manifestations, meaningless to their followers, could hardly be expected spontaneously to create a united Kurdistan. Such a result can be achieved only under full Soviet control, and the most recently-expressed desires of the Persian Kurds to retain, however loosely, their Iranian nationality, justify the belief that the Soviet authorities have no immediate intention of attempting to assume such control. Meanwhile, in the absence of any effective counter action, propaganda, whether directed by them or inspired by their actions, prepares the way for a possible change to a policy of unification of the Kurds and their absorption in the U.S.S.R. Even if the Soviet Government has no intention of adopting this policy, it is a bogey which can be produced at need, and the present limited support for Kurdish autonomy helps the process of undermining British influence and prestige in the Middle East.

Levant States.

25. The Kurdish community in the Levant States is believed to number about 50-60,000 (no accurate figures are available), many of whom are now more or less assimilated into the local population. There are very few in the Lebanon and the majority live in tribal groups in the area along the Syro-Turkish frontier. In Damascus there is a community of rather more than 20,000. The tribal groups who are engaged in agriculture and kindred pursuits are backward and mostly illiterate, and largely dominated by their tribal chiefs and the Mureddin (the religious and learned class). While their leaders are apt to complain on occasion (as do most other minorities) that the Syrian authorities discriminate against them, they have not so far shown any tendency to develop a separatist movement; and although they have of late been taking increased interest in the affairs of the Kurdish communities on the other side of the frontier, there is no evidence that they have any close connection with the Kurds in Iraq or Iran.

26. Amongst the more politically-minded Kurdish community in Damascus, who at present carry very little weight with the Kurdish communities in the north, there are two factions entitled respectively the "Kurdish League" and the "Society of Salah ed Din." The former, led by Dr. Nafiz and the brothers Jeladat and Kamaran Badr Khan, are professed partisans of the formation of an autonomous Kurdish state and have produced various pamphlets during the year which have been sent to the San Francisco Conference, the United Nations' Organisation, etc. The latter faction are concerned with reviving the Kurdish language and with raising the status of Kurds in the countries of their domicile, but do not appear inclined to exchange their present situation for a problematical Kurdistan. It is clear that the Kurdish leaders in Syria are not at present attracted towards the Soviet Union, though it is possible that some of the younger and more progressive Kurds tend to be susceptible to Russian propaganda, and the supporters of the "Kurdish League" may turn to Russia for support if they become convinced that they have nothing to hope for from His Majesty's Government.

27. The leader of the Lebanese Communist Party, Khalid Bagdash, is of Kurdish origin, but there is no evidence that he has any special interest in his own community or influence amongst them.

Kurdish Publications.

A brief summary of Kurdish publications is given in Appendix "B."

Kurdish Societies.

A Note on Kurdish political societies is given in Appendix "C."

PART II.—THE KURDS OF TURKEY.

28. On a conservative estimate there are 3,000,000 Kurds in the world and 1,500,000 of them live in Turkey. The Turkish territory where they live is roughly the same eastern provinces which were largely inhabited also by Armenians until the Turks massacred or deported the latter in 1915 and 1916. The Kurds can still boast that in the course of its long history their race has never been completely subdued by Turkey or any other Power, and they remain to-day the chief thorn in the Turkish flesh.

Recent History.

29. Turkish Kurdistan—a geographical expression which is taboo to the Turks—is mountain country, and the Kurdish way of life is tribal and feudal. Ever since the Turks conquered the country in 1534 the Kurdish chieftains' desire to maintain their independence has led to intermittent rebellion and warfare. The Porte's attempt to extend administrative reform to the eastern provinces of Turkey entailed a general Kurdish rebellion and a punitive campaign in 1830. There were further risings in 1843, during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8, and again in 1880. Abdul Hamid II's reign (1876-1909) was an interlude during which the Kurds were kept quiet by a policy of conciliation—often at the expense of their Armenian neighbours. But the new Turkish Republic's policy of laicisation and westernisation produced two revolts in 1925-6, another in the Mt. Ararat region in 1930, and yet another in the mountains of Dersim (now re-named Tunceli) in 1937-8.

30. The motive for the 1925-6 revolt was mainly religious: the Kurds, who are mostly Sunnis, were shocked by the new anti-religious policy of Angora. The Turks had not much difficulty in suppressing that revolt and each of the subsequent risings, once they made up their minds to take action on a big enough scale, employing several divisions with guns and aircraft, over a period of six months or more. But the fighting was apt to be savage and Turkish losses heavy, and the utter ruthlessness with which the army treated the Kurdish population when putting down a rising left bitter feelings which tended to produce a subsequent rebellion. The general policy was to maintain order by keeping an ample force—sometimes as much as half the whole army—in the region; to repress any rising with the utmost severity; to break up the tribal and feudal system by deporting or otherwise liquidating the more influential chieftains (Beys and Ağas) and splitting up their estates; and at the same time to try to assimilate the Kurds by extending the railways eastwards and making roads into the many inaccessible districts, opening schools to teach Turkish, and improving the primitive methods of agriculture in order to attract the nomads among the Kurds to sedentary life.

31. The Turkish authorities refuse to recognise the Kurds as a minority or as raising anything more than a mere frontier problem. For obvious reasons the Turkish Government has kept the eastern provinces closed to foreigners, so that it is difficult to assess the present position. But it can safely be said that the policy outlined in the preceding paragraph has not yet enabled the Turkish Government to assimilate its Kurds, though it has a tighter hold over them than any of its predecessors ever had. The families of troublesome Kurds (who may themselves have been executed) have been planted out in western Anatolia on only a small scale. The settlement of Turkish immigrants from the Balkans in districts from which Kurds have been evicted—a task which would tax a much more competent administration—has been tackled in only a half-hearted way. As the result of the Government's forcible disruption of the old serf economy and its obstruction of seasonal migration between plain and mountain (a practice applied by the Soviet authorities to the Kirghiz and other Asiatic nomads) there has, it is true, been a noticeable infiltration of Kurds seeking employment in the growing industries of Sivas, Kayseri, Malatya and Cilicia. But this westward drift does not seem to have been on a scale to affect the root of the matter. The railways have hardly reached the middle of the Kurdish area as yet and construction proceeds very slowly. Road-building is still so neglected that in the winter wheeled traffic in the southern districts can hardly go east of Diyarbakir. Lack of funds and teachers has prevented the opening of enough schools, and the teaching of Turkish has made little progress. Conscribed Kurds, if they manage to reach home again after military service, do not seem generally to return as good Turks. The Turkish officials are on the whole ill-paid and disgruntled and take few pains to spread Turkish culture. In general, security no doubt prevails, but that is because Turkish forces are on the spot or known to be available. Angora does not govern the Kurds by

consent, and if the army were withdrawn the Kurds would soon shake off Turkish authority. The brutality employed in repression and disruption has caused a resentment which militates against conciliation. Moreover Kurdish nationalism is growing. Hitherto the leaders' motive for rebellion has never been pure nationalism, but sometimes religion, sometimes mere economic need and more often concern for their individual feudal rights, while the lack of cohesion among the chieftains has been notorious. Now, however, although the poppy heads have been cut off by death and deportation, the feeling of kinship which has always existed is developing into nationalism, stimulated by more intellectual Kurdish elements in Syria and Iraq and by the recent exploits of rebel leaders who, whether dead or alive, are regarded as national heroes. Plainly a race is on between Kurdish nationalism and Turkish assimilation.

Population.

32. According to the Turkish census of 1935, the last detailed figures available, the numbers of Turkish-speakers and Kurdish-speakers in the total population of what may be considered the Kurdish vilayets, were as follows:—

Vilayet.	Turks.	Kurds.	Total Population.	Percentage of Kurds.
Siirt	7,904	101,311	127,518	79
Diyarbakir	55,993	155,846	214,142	72
Van	38,960	103,786	143,434	72
Agri (Ararat)	29,650	77,271	107,206	72
Muş	38,032	99,433	143,899	69
Mardin	15,836	146,704	229,921	64
Urfa	83,808	111,579	229,614	48
Elâzığ	144,251	105,101	256,189	41
Erzincan	92,972	64,048	157,344	40
Malatya	247,001	161,259	410,162	39
Kars	232,384	70,876	305,536	23
Erzurum	326,777	57,627	385,387	15
Gaziantep	244,740	34,439	283,506	12
Maras	160,857	21,159	188,877	12
Sivas	372,044	50,730	432,996	11
	2,091,209	1,361,169	3,615,731	37

The subsequent census of 1944 records an increase of the total population in these vilayets to almost 4,000,000, but details have not yet been published to show whether the proportion of Kurdish-speakers still works out at 37 per cent. Whatever reliance may be placed on Turkish statistics, it may be taken as certain that those returned at Turkish-speakers include Turkomans and others who are not strictly Turks, and that the proportion of Kurdish-speakers was at the very least as high as the 37 per cent. revealed by the 1935 census. Further, it is interesting that even according to Turkish statistics the Kurds in the southern vilayets (Bitlis, Van, Muş, Diyarbakir, Siirt, Mardin and Urfa) increased between 1927 and 1935 by 250,000 and the Turks by only 20,000. There seems to be no reason to suppose that in the northern vilayets there has not been a corresponding increase in the numbers and proportion of the Kurds, who as a race are more prolific than the Turks. Roughly speaking, the Kurdish population is, as the percentages in the tables above suggest, thickest in the vilayets near the Persian and Iraqi frontiers and Lake Van, but beyond the Araxes (Aras Su) and Murat Su it thins out gradually towards the north and west. The vilayets of Kars, Erzurum, Sivas, Maras and Gaziantep form a fringe where the proportion of Kurds is lower. Whether the proportion for the whole area is really more than 37 per cent. or not, the fact that on the basis of Turkish statistics the proportion in the six vilayets of Siirt, Diyarbakir, Van, Agri (Ararat), Muş and Mardin is as high as 64-79 per cent., may prove an awkward point for the Turks.

33. In common with the rest of Turkey the accessible parts of the Kurdish vilayets were combed for recruits in 1914-18, and few survivors returned. The rebellions of the 1920's and 1930's entailed massacre, emigration, deportation and devastation, and the consequent depopulation has struck the few foreigners permitted to see it. The interest of the Turks in discouraging the idea that the area is a desirable vacant *Lebensraum* is so obvious as to create a *prima facie* suspicion of Turkish population statistics. Meticulous though these statistics are, they may arouse scepticism owing to the remarkable leaps and bounds by

which they show the total population of Turkey to have increased of late. In 1914 it was generally put at under 10,000,000 for all present-day Turkey, but in spite of the terrible toll taken by war in 1914-18 and of the notorious infertility of the Turks, it was returned in 1927 as nearly 14,000,000, in 1935 as more than 16,000,000, and in 1944 as nearly 19,000,000. Although since 1922 the Turks have avoided the ravages of war and have improved public hygiene to an extent which must have favoured the growth of the population, it is nevertheless a matter for astonishment if they have doubled their population in less than a quarter of a century. In the event therefore of a claim being made on eastern Turkey in the name of the Kurds it is possible that Turkish population statistics will be challenged. But as no alternative figures exist, the accuracy of the Turkish census is unlikely to be either proved or disproved.

Autonomy and Russia.

34. An Anglo-French declaration of the 7th November, 1918, defined the Eastern war aim of the British and French Governments as "the complete and final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations." Although neither the Kurds nor any other people was specifically mentioned, this declaration plainly covered the Kurds. Accordingly, under Arts. 62-64 of the Treaty of Sévres of 1920, Great Britain, France and Italy were to produce a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of Wilson's Armenia and north of Syria and Iraq. There were to be full safeguards for the Assyro-Chaldeans and other racial or religious minorities. Further, if demanded by a majority of the population within a year, an independent Kurdish State was to be created at the discretion of the League, and the Kurds of the Mosul vilayet were to be allowed to adhere to it.

35. Another scheme mooted after 1918 was for a Kurdo-Armenian State. There is no inveterate antipathy between the two races, although it was Ottoman policy to turn the Kurds on to the Armenians. Kurdish and Armenian leaders agreed in Paris on a joint policy in 1919 but nothing came of it.

36. That none of these schemes was carried out was due to the resistance of the Turks under Mustafa Kemal who prevented ratification of the Treaty of Sévres and refused to have any mention of Kurds or Armenians in the treaty of Lausanne which replaced it in 1923. The Kurds therefore rightly hold Turkey primarily responsible for thwarting their aspirations, though, forgetting that this was largely due to the diplomatic and material support of the U.S.S.R., they tend to throw a secondary responsibility on to Great Britain. Indeed there is some evidence that in Turkey as elsewhere the Kurds now tend to look to Russia rather than to us whom they consider unable, however willing, to do anything for them. Such an impression can only have been deepened by the deplorable fate of the Assyrians in whom the British Government took a traditional interest and whom they were unable to induce the Turks at the Lausanne conference in 1923 to readmit to their home in the Hakkâri mountains of Turkey.

37. Whereas Turkish policy towards the Kurds has simply been Turkification, the Soviet Government has applied to them its usual policy of encouraging the culture of a minority. As against the opening of Kurdish schools in the Armenian Soviet Republic, the admission of Kurds to the Erivan university, the devising of a Kurdish alphabet there and the general encouragement given—albeit with obvious ulterior motives—by the Soviet authorities to the development of the language and the study of "Kurdology," the Turkish Government can set little except the fact that it is doing what it can to give its Kurds—divided as they are by differences of dialect which make some almost incomprehensible to others—a Turkish education.

38. Although, as the Soviet Government seems to have done, the Turkish Government may realise the possibilities of an economic solution of the Kurdish problem, it has in fact little to show in the economic sphere. The disruption of the Kurdish feudal system has meant the break-up of the primitive Kurdish economy. The successive punitive campaigns have involved widespread depopulation and devastation. Those tribes which have always been nomad are unlikely as yet to have been made sedentary on any large scale. Modern methods of farming must take a long time to oust the old primitive way. There is in short no evidence that after destroying the old economic system the Turkish Government has had more than sporadic success in introducing a modern form of prosperity in its place. While some towns are recovering, most of the countryside seems still to be in a state of economic decline.

39. Among the best things for which the Turks can claim credit are fairly good and fairly extensive medical and veterinary services, and a considerable number of village institutes where Western ideas are inculcated.

40. There is little doubt that the Soviet Government keeps in touch with the situation of the Kurds in Turkey, but there is no evidence so far of active Soviet steps to stir them up. Yet in view of the nature of the frontiers it would be comparatively easy for the Russians to play on the Turkish Kurds through the Kurds of north-west Persia and in particular through the thousands of Kurdish refugees at Kamishli and other places in north Syria. Even if the Kurds were more sophisticated than they yet are, an appeal on Communist anti-feudal lines would be more likely to serve Angora than Moscow. But if the Soviet Government started a movement on nationalist lines, in all probability the response of the Kurds, who have many old scores against the Turks, would be limited only by the ability of the Turks to suppress agitation. At present Turkish counter-espionage and police control seem to be efficient. Even therefore if Persian and Iraqi Kurds were to join in an autonomy movement, the Turkish Government would probably feel no real anxiety so long as it could hold its frontiers.

41. However, the case which the Soviet Government could present to the world on behalf of an autonomous or independent Kurdistan is strong. It might embrace the following:—

- (i) The immemorial title of the Kurds. In the south at least it is believed to date from about 2,000 B.C.
- (ii) The Anglo-French declaration of the 7th November, 1918 (para. 34 above).
- (iii) The Allies' recognition in 1920 of the Kurds' right to autonomy and even independence (para. 34) and the Allies' failure to ensure either.
- (iv) The Turks' record of ruthlessness and their refusal to do anything for the Kurdish race as such (paras. 30 and 31).
- (v) The feasibility of creating a Kurdo-Armenian State (para. 35) if the number of Kurds alone should be considered too small to justify detaching the Kurdish vilayets from Turkey. This would fit in admirably with the Armenian claim to Turkish territory, a great weakness of which is the absence of Armenians. Moreover, the northern part of the Kurdish area coincides with the south of Wilson's Armenia, and the southern part of the Kurdish area was until 1915 the home of a substantial number of Armenians.
- (vi) The possibility of providing in the new State for the re-establishment of the Assyrians in their home (para. 34).
- (vii) The sparseness of the Turkish population. This might lead to inconclusive argument and the question "What is a Turk?" (paras. 32 and 33).

42. There are two points which may give the question of Turkish Kurdistan a special interest for the Soviet Government. Firstly, it is roughly in the Kurdish vilayets that there is most hope of finding oil. The Standard Oil Co. is understood to possess, and be exercising, the right of prospecting there.

43. Secondly, the existence of Kurds in Cilicia and in the Kürt Dağ (Kurdish Mountain) on the Turco-Syrian frontier 35 miles inland from Iskenderon (Alexandretta) might be used by the Russians as a pretext for extending Kurdistan to embrace that port. Such a claim might be put forward together with an Armenian claim to Cilicia for which there would be some justification, and even with a Georgian claim to the Taurus Mountains for which there would seem to be none.

44. It is difficult to imagine any effective compromise by which Turkey might meet a demand for Kurdish freedom. Even if the Turks had been by nature or tradition the sort of people who might make a success of a liberal attitude to the Kurds, such a policy is impossible in the face of the present Russian menace. It is inconceivable that even if the Turkish Government went so far as to agree on paper to giving the Kurds minority rights, it would grant them in practice. The fear of minority status developing into autonomy and of autonomy becoming independence is likely to make the Turks stick doggedly to their policy of Turkification and fight, rather than risk the loss of so great a part of their territory and population.

Appendix "A."

EXTRACT FROM THE OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Annex to the Report of the Council Committee, dated 9th May, 1932.

DRAFT DECLARATION BY THE 'IRAQI GOVERNMENT.

CHAPTER I.

Article 1.

Protection of Minorities. The stipulations contained in the present chapter are recognised as fundamental laws of 'Iraq, and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action now or in the future prevail over them.

Article 4.

1. All 'Iraqi nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion.

2. The electoral system shall guarantee equitable representation to racial, religious and linguistic minorities in 'Iraq.

3. Differences of race, language or religion shall not prejudice any 'Iraqi national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights—as, for instance, admission to public employment, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions or industries.

4. No restriction will be imposed on the free use by any 'Iraqi national of any language, in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

5. Notwithstanding the establishment by the 'Iraqi Government of Arabic as the official language, and notwithstanding the special arrangements to be made by the 'Iraqi Government, under Article 9 of the present Declaration, regarding the use of the Kurdish and Turkish languages, adequate facilities will be given to all 'Iraqi nationals whose mother tongue is not the official language for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts.

Article 5.

'Iraqi nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities will enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other 'Iraqi nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to maintain, manage and control at their own expense, or to establish in the future, charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

Article 8.

1. In the public educational system in towns and districts in which are resident a considerable proportion of 'Iraqi nationals whose mother tongue is not the official language, the 'Iraqi Government will make provision for adequate facilities for ensuring that, in the primary schools, instruction shall be given to the children of such nationals through the medium of their own language; it being understood that this provision does not prevent the 'Iraqi Government from making the teaching of Arabic obligatory in the said schools.

2. In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of 'Iraqi nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities will be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, Municipal or other budgets for educational, religious or charitable purposes.

Article 9.

1. 'Iraq undertakes that, in the liwas of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya, the official language, side by side with Arabic, shall be Kurdish in the qadhas in which the population is predominantly of Kurdish race.

In the qadhas of Kifri and Kirkuk, however, in the liwa of Kirkuk, where a considerable part of the population is of Turcoman race, the official language, side by side with Arabic, shall be either Kurdish or Turkish.

2. 'Iraq undertakes that, in the said qadhas, the officials shall, subject to justifiable exceptions, have a competent knowledge of Kurdish or Turkish, as the case may be.

3. Although in these qadhas the criterion for the choice of officials will be, as in the rest of 'Iraq, efficiency and knowledge of the language, rather than race, 'Iraq undertakes that the officials shall, as hitherto, be selected, so far as possible, from among 'Iraqis from one or other of these qadhas.

Article 10.

The stipulations of the foregoing articles of this Declaration, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, are declared to constitute obligations of international concern and will be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. No modification will be made in them without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

This was duly signed and ratified on 13th July, 1932.

Appendix "B."

KURDISH PUBLICATIONS.

The following printed Kurdish publications are at present appearing at regular or irregular intervals:—

- (i) *Zhiyn* (Life).—Published in Sulaimani by Haji Tewfiq Piramard. Kurdish newspaper, appearing at, roughly, weekly intervals.
- (ii) *Gelaweyzh* (Sirius).—Published monthly in Baghdad by Ibrahim Ahmad. Has been described as "the best literary review in the Middle East."
- (iii) *Azadi* (Freedom).—Published at irregular intervals as the organ of the Kurdish Branch of the 'Iraqi Communist Party and is the Kurdish counterpart of the illegal Arabic *Al Qaida*. Has now absorbed an early Communist Kurdish production, *Yekiyati Tekushin*. Well informed on local events and news in Kurdish districts of 'Iraq. Preaches the unity of Kurds and Arabs against the "Imperialist" and "Colonising" Powers.
- (iv) *Dang-i-Geyt-i-Taza* (Voice of the new World).—First published in Baghdad by Public Relations Section of British Embassy. Now run independently by Tewfiq Wahbi and Sayid Hussain Huzni Mukriyani.
- (v) *Hawar* (The Call).—Edited by Jeladat Badr Khan and published in Damascus. Uses Latin characters.
- (vi) *Ronahi* (The Light).—Edited by Jeladat Badr Khan and published in Damascus. An illustrated supplement to *Hawar* printed in Latin characters.
- (vii) *Roja Nu* (The New Day).—Daily newspaper edited by Dr. Kameran Badr Khan in Beirut. Printed in Latin characters.
- (viii) *Ster* (The Star).—A monthly, edited by Dr. Kameran Badr Khan in Beirut. Printed in Latin characters.
- (ix) *Riya Taza* (The New Day).—Published in Erivan in Soviet Armenia. Latin or Russian(?) characters.
- (x) *Nishtman* (The Homeland).—The organ of the Kurdish J.K. (Jian-i-Kurd) Society. Believed to come from Mahabad or Tabriz. Strongly Nationalist and takes the lines that the tribal chiefs and aghas are mainly responsible for Kurdish backwardness. Appears at irregular intervals.
- (xi) *Kurdistan*.—A new daily printed in Mahabad and the voice of the newly established Independent Democratic Kurdish Republic.
- (xii) *Hawar-i-Kurd* (The Kurdish Call).—Another new publication from Mahabad.
- (xiii) *Ala Kuk*.—A new publication which describes itself as a product of the "Home of Soviet Civilisation, Tabriz."

N.B.—Except where otherwise stated, the above publications use Arabic script.

Appendix "C.M.I. and the Kurds"

KURDISH SOCIETIES.

Khoybun (Independence).

The original Kurdish Independence Party. Strongly anti-Turk in origin. Headquarters in Syria with links in Cairo and Iraq. Was formed soon after first World War and later joined forces with the Armenian Dashnaks. The partnership was dissolved, it is alleged, because the Dashnaks being anti-Soviet, association with them precluded Soviet interest in Khoybun Kurdish activities. The party remained deliberately inactive during the last war in order, it is believed, to avoid embarrassing Turkey. It has recently shewn some signs of revival and its periodicals, after an interval of a year or two, are being republished.

Komal-e-Kurd (Komala) (Kurdish Group).

Appeared in Persian Azerbaijan in the early part of 1945. Headquarters at Mahabad. Led by Qazi Muhammed Ilkhani Zadeh of Mahabad. Believed to be the successor of Jian-i-Kurd and may now have dissolved into Kurdish Democratic Party. Has had some contact with the Pizhder and other Iraqi Kurds, but wields no great influence outside Persia.

Jian-i-Kurd (Kurdish Life).

Believed to have been founded in 1943. According to its organ, the *Nishtman* (second issue, early 1944), its programme included an appeal for Kurdish unity and opposition to the Aghas, but it was not Communist. Some secrecy, however, was allowed to surround its activities, and especially the printing of the *Nishtman*. Had some influence, through the *Nishtman*, in Sulaimani, and a report of August 1944 spoke of "an attempt" to join up with the Hewa of Sulaimani and the Khoybun. Zero Beg Herki named as its most prominent member. Anti-Tudeh but pro-Russian. Supplanted by Komal-e-Kurd towards end of 1945.

Hizb-i-Demokrati-e-Kurdistan.

Founded after visit of Qazi Muhammed and other Kurds to Baku in September 1945. A manifesto in Kurdish and Persian issued in October 1945 made the following demands:—

- An autonomous Kurdistan within the frontiers of the Persian State.
- The use of the Kurdish language in schools and the administration of Kurdistan.
- The immediate election of a provincial council for Kurdistan to supervise all social and Government affairs.
- Selection of Government officials exclusively from the people of Kurdistan.
- Promulgation of a law to regulate relations between peasants and landlords.
- Co-operation with the other races of Azerbaijan (Armenians, Assyrians, &c.) to establish unity and brotherhood in the country.
- Exploitation of the natural resources of Kurdistan for the benefit of its people.

Seems to have taken the place of the Komal-e-Kurd and to be the ruling party in the Azerbaijan Kurdish district.

Hewa Kurd (Hope).

A secret society of Sulaimani; little is known of it or its activities.

Razgar-e-Kurd (Kurdish Rescue).


Recently appeared in Bagdad as the sponsor of memoranda supporting the Persian Kurds and demanding the rights of those of Iraq. These memoranda, which were sent to the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow in December 1945 and to the United Nations Conference in London, closely resemble the *Azadi* articles. The identity and membership of the party are not yet known. K.K.K.

In a February number of the Beirut *Roja Nu*, there was mention of the K.K.K.—the Komal-i-Kommunist-i-Kurdistan—whose political aims were listed. It was claimed that this news item was taken from a Persian newspaper, *Elburz*, published in Resht(?).



"ARMENIA" & "THE



Map to accompany memoranda on
"ARMENIAN & GEORGIAN CLAIMS TO TURKISH TERRITORY" & "THE KURDS OF TURKEY"



Map showing
DISTRIBUTION OF KURDS



[E 7901/654/93]

No. 12

Sir H. Stonehewer Bird to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 14th August.)

(No. 282.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 31st July, 1946.

WITH reference to Mr. Thompson's despatch No. 378 of the 15th September, 1945, I have the honour to transmit herewith my annual report on the heads of foreign missions in Iraq for 1946.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 12

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Bagdad 1946.

(Paragraphs marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports.)

Afghanistan.

*Abdur Rahman Khan, Minister (21st October, 1941).

A friendly and amiable colleague. Has served in Bombay and Paris and has travelled extensively in Europe and Russia. He has now established a fairly wide circle of friends in Iraq. He speaks English. Is married to a very good-looking wife who makes infrequent appearances in society. Can be very interesting when he chooses. (Written in 1945.)

Egypt.

Mohammed Yasin Beg, Minister (11th October, 1945).

Mohammed Yasin Beg spent the winter in Bagdad. He is not accredited to Saudi Arabia. I find him an agreeable and more than usually hospitable colleague. He appears to be genuinely well disposed towards us. He and all his secretaries are members of the chief British club and are often seen there.

Holy See.

M. de Jonghe d'Ardoye.

A charming and dignified prelate with a twinkle in his eye. An acute observer of politics and personalities. He is a Belgian. Although not officially recognised by the Iraqi Government, a point on which he is somewhat sensitive, he is invited to and attends all diplomatic functions. He has served for many years in the Far East and has travelled extensively in China and Burma.

Persia.

*M. Mohsen Rais, Minister (28th July, 1943).

M. Rais was formerly Persian representative to the Vichy Government and later held a ministerial post for a short time under the Qavam-es-Sultaneh. He and his wife are pleasant, intelligent and travelled well above the average of the Bagdad diplomatic corps. They are good hosts and deservedly popular. (Written in 1945.)

Saudi Arabia.

Abdullah al Khaiyal, Chargé d'Affaires.

Assad Beg al Faqih did not return to Bagdad

after his trip to San Francisco but went back to America as first Saudi Minister to Washington. Since then the Saudi Legation has been in charge of a young secretary, Abdullah al Khaiyal. He is friendly and intelligent, a genuine Saudi from Riyadh and since being in Bagdad has taken the trouble to learn to speak some English. He frequently consults me on Saudi-Iraqi relations.

Soviet Union.

Grigori Titovitch Zaitzev, Minister (14th February, 1945).

M. Zaitzev is still here and his staff gets larger rather than smaller, but neither he nor they appear much in society. I suspect that the Iraqis already regret having let him come here and prefer to see as little of him as possible. He is very affable when we meet but as we have no common interests and he is obviously forbidden to talk on any subject but the weather I cannot say that our relations are really intimate.

*Syria.**Baha ud Din al Bakri, Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*.

Diplomatic relations were opened with Syria for the first time in 1945 by the establishment of a Syrian Legation at Bagdad and the appointment of Baha ud Din al Bakri as First Secretary and Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*. He took up his post on the 11th February. Baha ud Din is a pleasant and cheerful young man with more energy than most of his fellow countrymen. He graduated from Kansas University as a Bachelor of Science and speaks good English. He has assumed charge of Syrian and Lebanese consular interests in Iraq. (Written in 1945.)

Turkey.

M. Nabil Baty, Minister (17th March, 1945).

M. Baty has proved a friendly and intelligent colleague. He handled with tact and dignity the difficult situation arising from Nuri Pasha's unauthorised signing of the Iraqi-Turkish Agreement in April this year.

United States of America.

Mr. James Moose, Chargé d'Affaires, *ad interim*. Mr. Moose is still here though the United States Government have taken the plunge and appointed a new Minister, Mr. Pinkerton, at present Consul-General in Jerusalem. But they are in no hurry to carry out the move in practice and I suspect are

waiting for the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty letter to be amended so that they can send an Ambassador here. Mr. Moose is an old friend of mine and our relations are excellent. The Americans still resent our privileged position here but under Mr. Moose's influence do not parade it so openly as in 1945.

Representatives Accredited to Iraq but Resident Elsewhere.

Belgium.

M. Laurent Janssen, Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*. The glib and garrulous M. Graeffe has left for home and M. Janssen is in charge. He paid a short visit here in June, but I have no special impression of him except that he spoke good English and seemed friendly.

China.

Mr. Li Tsch-Tsang, Minister (8th April, 1944). I have not seen Mr. Li this year though he passed through Bagdad. The Yus have left for Berne and Mr. Lee Ginfa, First Secretary, has come to be Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* in Bagdad. He speaks some English and gives the impression of being a more than ordinarily bland Chinese.

Czechoslovakia.

The Ibsenian M. Kadlec came through Bagdad recently on his departure from the post of Minister to Iran and Iraq. He was as *empressé* as ever. I do not know who, if anyone, has taken his place or who is acting as Chargé d'Affaires.

Denmark.

*Dr. M. A. E. C. Fensmark, Chargé d'Affaires (17th June, 1939).

Dr. Fensmark resides at Tehran and seldom visits Bagdad. He is friendly, garrulous and a little tiresome. (Written in 1945.)

Netherlands.

So far as I know there is still no Netherlands Minister to Iran and Iraq and no Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* has been notified to me or come my way.

Poland.

M. Eugeniusz Jan Milnikiel, Chargé d'Affaires. The Polish Legation in Bagdad closed down in July last year. The group which became the Polish Refugee Section of this Embassy was closed last March and all the Poles, who were "London Poles," were transferred to the Lebanon. I did not think the Iraqi Government were proposing to have any official relations with the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity but suddenly in July, out of the blue, M. Milnikiel announced himself and came to call. He was very correctly dressed and spoke moderate English. He resides at Tehran.

Sweden.

M. S. H. Pousette, Minister (28th February, 1946).

M. Pousette has come back to this part of the world promoted to be Minister to Iran and Iraq. He was here for several weeks in February and March when I often met him at social functions. A pleasant and intelligent man.

Switzerland.

M. A. Brunner, Minister (1st May, 1946).

In May last M. Brunner, the Swiss Minister in Cairo, visited Bagdad and presented his letters of credence as Swiss Minister in Iraq. He was not here long and went off to drop further cards at Beirut and Damascus. From what I saw of him he seemed a solid, worthy man. But the Swiss have very little to do here now and I do not know why they bother to keep a full time career Consul, M. Steiner, in Bagdad.

remove some dead wood. This, then, was the situation as far as we knew it when His Majesty's Ambassador left on leave of absence.

2. Almost immediately after his return His Royal Highness proceeded to his summer camp in the mountains of Kurdistan. As he had only just returned from two months in the United Kingdom this absence from Bagdad is unfortunate, but in his defence it must be admitted that he is said to keep Ramadhan with its full strictness and this would be an almost intolerable imposition during August in Bagdad, with the temperature reaching 110 degrees or over every day. Fortunately the Oriental Counsellor will be able to visit the Regent within the next day or two and he will endeavour to ascertain from him whether in fact he is pressing for steps to be taken to hold the elections. I fear that unless the Regent takes a hand in this matter the Prime Minister will endeavour to postpone the issue. Needless to say, I will report fully on Mr. Perowne's return.

3. Meanwhile the Prime Minister shows signs of becoming even more dictatorial. Since he has been in office he has interfered in all departments. It has been impossible to settle even minor points without his being consulted and in some matters he has at the last minute reversed decisions come to by his Cabinet (see, for instance, the ambassador's telegram No. 39, Remac, of the 24th July). To make matters worse he is now Acting Minister of the Interior (the incumbent being absent on a month's sick leave) and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr. Jamali is away in Alexandria and will presumably later go to London). To this he adds in practice the position of Lord Mayor of Bagdad, in which he has such a strong personal interest that he has refrained from filling the vacancy, and president of the Red Crescent Society. In fact, the position is similar to that in 1941 when, after the Rashid Ali revolt, Arshad Beg enjoyed himself thoroughly by forming a temporary Government in which he held every single portfolio.

4. In any of his capacities the Prime Minister is ruthless, and, I understand, even offensive to his colleagues and subordinates. His colleagues are terrified of him and have on occasion actually asked us to speak for them in matters concerning their departments. It is doubtful if any of them, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs, dare to pass on our remarks to the Prime Minister, though they say, apparently with the utmost sincerity, that they agree with them. His Majesty's Ambassador will have been able to tell you personally how difficult and unsatisfactory is any interview with Arshad Beg. There is a linguistic complexity as his English is rudimentary, his French vile, and, I am told, his Arabic poor. Turkish is his tongue, but as my knowledge of that language is confined to social banalities of the most trivial kind, I have refrained from adding to the confusion by airing it. To get over the linguistic difficulty the ambassador has recently made a practice of asking the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose English is well-nigh perfect, to be present at interviews, but, even so, the peculiarities of the Prime Minister's temperament present an insoluble problem. He is no doubt less abrupt with the ambassador than with his colleagues, but he switches the subject of conversation before one can get down to it, and is inclined to weird outbursts. It is impossible to get a word in edgewise, and he has a habit of declaring an interview at an end without the business in hand having been properly settled. On one occasion, when the commercial secretary and I were having a meeting with him and several of his colleagues, we were compelled to resist our ejection and carried on the discussion, shaking hands vigorously all the time, down the corridor until we were able to achieve the result we wanted at the front door. I am sure that the ambassador will agree with me that it is rare for one to leave an interview with the Prime Minister without a feeling of frustration.

5. It is against this personal background that Sir Hugh's telegram No. 566 of the 18th July must be read. As stated, the atmosphere was frigid, but for some time after it appeared that the Prime Minister had taken the advice to prefer medicine to surgery. On his return the Regent, as he told the ambassador and myself, favoured this course, and so did members of the Cabinet and those other politicians he was able to consult. In fact, over the Iraq Petroleum Company strike at Kirkuk, the Prime Minister swung if anything too far. He neither practised surgery nor applied medicaments. The arrested agitators were at one moment released, no remedial measures were taken and inadequate support was given to the Mutasarrif. In consequence the ambassador felt it necessary, as reported in his telegram No. 608 of the 2nd August, to bring the situation forcibly to the notice of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. I again reverted to the matter in the interview with the Minister of Social Affairs reported in my telegram No. 637 of the 10th August. As a result I now feel happier about the

[E 8328/226/93]

No. 13

Mr. Busk to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 23rd August.)

(No. 307.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 16th August, 1946.

IN his telegram No. 566 of the 18th July His Majesty's Ambassador reported that he had good reason to believe that the Government would resign on the return of the Regent. It turned out, however, that His Royal Highness felt it was undesirable that too rapid changes should be made in Governments and he also favoured the holding of elections. The Prime Minister had tended to be opposed to elections this year, but Sir Hugh and I gathered that the Regent had talked him round. His Royal Highness found it difficult to consult other politicians as almost all of them are absent, but those whom he did see supported his views. In particular Saleh Jabr expressed the view that it was highly desirable to hold the elections, because he was convinced that few, if any, candidates supported by the leftist parties would be successful. It would then be possible to laugh them out of existence or even suppress them on the ground that they had no popular support and were merely indulging in political agitation. This, in his view, would be preferable to suppressing them now, which could only result in their becoming martyrs. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has been telling me for some weeks that the Government have decided to hold the elections but that there would be a small reshuffle in the Cabinet now to

situation, but I will report further when the Oriental Counsellor returns from his trip to the north, in the course of which he is visiting Kirkuk.

6. Meanwhile the Prime Minister has started surgical operations in other theatres. We have had, during the last month, a good example of the "wavering irresolutely between reform and repression" quoted in paragraph 4 of my despatch No. 301 of the 13th August. I would only add that "irresolutely" is the wrong word, for the Prime Minister goes for his objectives like a bull at a gate. In fact, he appears to have chosen as his most suitable remedy for all ills the amputation deprecated in paragraph 11 of that despatch. This tendency is most noticeable as regards the press, on which I have reported in my telegram No. 655 of the 16th August, and my despatch No. 308 of the 16th August.

7. It is difficult to see where all this is leading, but it cannot, I think, be long before there is a new Prime Minister. It will be easier to form conclusions when the Oriental Counsellor has reported on his visit to the Regent and when His Royal Highness is more accessible to me in Bagdad.

8. The major controlling influence here should of course be the Regent. You will have formed your own impressions of him and will be glad to hear that on his return he expressed great satisfaction with his interview with you. A strong man could exercise enormous influence; the Regent is not strong, but even so behind the scenes he does no doubt work hard. Certainly I believe him to be conscious of the vital importance of the British connexion and I think he endeavours to be conscientious. He suffers from painful shyness not only with foreigners but with Iraqis. An even more difficult element is his very proper realisation that he is only "acting." He has to watch his step very carefully lest he be accused of stealing the King's show. This, added to his natural timidity of character, makes him appear weaker than he actually is and certainly with the present Prime Minister anyone has a tough row to hoe.

9. Finally I doubt whether His Royal Highness realises to the full the evil effect on the chances of survival of the Royal House of his prolonged absences from Bagdad. (In 1945 he was absent for four months and in 1946 to date for two and a half months.) At least if he does absent himself he should tour the provinces and show himself, instead of remaining in his camp in Kurdistan. Nuri Pasha was very outspoken about this when I saw him on the 14th August. He said the Emir Zeid had spoken to him in Istanbul and had deplored the Regent's lack of sense of duty. Nuri said that what Iraq needed most of all was stability and that his countrymen were so immature politically that this could only be attained by a strong man at the top. I told him I agreed and expressed the hope that he would rub this in to His Royal Highness, which he promised to do. Whenever opportunity offers I shall do my best to support this thesis but the Regent's shyness does not make the task easy. If he can be induced to take a more personal and (almost more important) a more public interest in affairs while also keeping the King in the foreground, he will not only be able to ensure the future of the dynasty but also play a vital rôle in Iraq, and later perhaps in the Middle East.

10. I apologise for the length of this despatch; I trust it will serve as a back-drop to the present Iraqi stage. This may be changed with as much ease and rapidity as in a theatre, and often for no obvious reason to the European mind. Iraq has had twenty-five Cabinets in the fourteen years since the mandate was terminated. However, whether a change of Government occurs or not, there will remain the sombre cloud of Palestine. Governments of Iraq may come and go, but while that threat obscures the Western sky little else will matter. It is true that by some Iraqis the importance of the Palestine question to Iraq is grossly overrated. I would instance the present Minister for Foreign Affairs and the late Prime Minister, Hamdi al Pachachi. (These two, if wrong headed, are at least completely honest in their views.) Others, and they are becoming more numerous, gleefully use Palestine as a stick with which to beat us. So far this stick has been a light one and our shoulders are strong enough to endure it. By many, if only in private conversation, it is recognised that there are many factors—notably the firm maintenance of the British alliance and all that that implies—which are of infinitely greater importance to Iraq. The ambassador and I have made every effort, I fear so far to little avail, to combat the narrow view of those who see only the Zionist menace. The Arab case is, of course, to a large extent based on religion and sentiment, but so almost exclusively is the Zionist case, with the additional poison of inspiration from wells that are definitely anti-British. We have seen the devastating results of this in hard cash and worst of all in human lives in Palestine. If we drive the Arabs into accepting inspiration and assistance from the same pernicious sources we must only do so in the knowledge that we are committing ourselves not only to greater

losses of blood and treasure but that we are abandoning—until the Arab world wakes up, probably too late, to the dangers that threaten it—our strategic and economic position in the Middle East.

11. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the British Middle East Office, Cairo.

I have, &c.

DOUGLAS L. BUSK.

[E 8794/226/93]

No. 14

Mr. Busk to Mr. Bevin. (Received 3rd September)

(No. 713)

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, 3rd September, 1946

ON 30th August a meeting was held at the headquarters of the National Unity Party, representing the three Left-wing Opposition parties. The building was full to its capacity of 1,500, and large crowds filled the streets outside. The proceedings throughout were orderly, but uniformly anti-Government, largely anti-British. A number of speakers called for the resignation of the present Government and evacuation of British troops.

2. This coalition is disturbing. If it lasts, it may well lead to plotting of serious trouble, such as a general strike. In part it is reaction to the present Government's efforts to restore discipline, but the situation has been exploited by malignant elements, and also, there is reason to believe, by Russians working through Tass correspondent here.

3. Dictatorial behaviour of the Prime Minister (see my despatches Nos. 307 and 308) is causing more and more discontent. Yesterday he suspended three newspapers for a year by order of the Cabinet without recourse to the courts. Meanwhile, steps to restore order were well meant. But he has gone too far.

4. When I saw the Regent on 31st August he expressed the view that the election should be held without delay, and I told him that I entirely agreed. I added I thought that the Prime Minister was thoroughly enjoying his tenure of office and that unless His Royal Highness took a firm line the Prime Minister would postpone the election. In view of the developments recorded above, I shall press the Regent strongly not only to dissolve Parliament but to make it plain to the public that the election will be free.

[E 8881/226/93]

No. 15

Mr. Busk to Mr. Bevin. (Received 5th September)

(No. 720)

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, 5th September, 1946

MY telegram No. 713

The Prime Minister continues to enjoy his power and is becoming even more "exalted." He maintains that before the elections can be held all opposition must be suppressed.

2. His efforts in this direction have so far been the reverse of successful. Convictions of newspaper editors are not within the scope of the Supreme Caisse Courts, which refer cases back for retrial. Only result, therefore, is publicity for Opposition on scale which they could not have achieved unaided.

3. I saw the Regent on 31st August, and as my official calls are always given publicly, and as we cannot allow him to be accused of being run by us, I asked him to dine privately to discuss the situation. He replied that on 4th September that he was again leaving for his camp in the north. This looked remarkably like running away, so I instructed the oriental counsellor to visit him privately immediately.

4. The oriental counsellor expressed my disquiet (a) at the increasing dictatorial behaviour of the Prime Minister, and bad effect this was having by creating elements which are not only anti-British but hostile to the Regent personally, (b) at failure to fix date of elections, and (c) that despite the strong view I had expressed to the Regent (which at the time he seemed to share), that his parish lay in Bagdad, he was leaving again.

[33728]

E 2

5. As regards (a), the Regent repeated what he had said to me earlier, that he was reluctant to change Prime Ministers during the interim period before the elections, and, in any case, there was no alternative available. He admitted that Arshad was over enthusiastic, but he was honest (I agree with this appreciation of the position, subject to the proviso that the elections should be announced without delay so that the country realises that there is termination to the Prime Minister's tenure of power).

6. As regards (b), the Regent was evasive. I am sure he realises the necessity but is reluctant to face the Prime Minister squarely.

7. As regards (c), the Regent said that King Abdullah was arriving on 10th September for one week. He wished to visit Kurdistan and would fly there directly [*sic*: direct]. The Regent must go a few days ahead to make preparations. He said he would take the Prime Minister with him.

8. The Regent can be in no doubt of my views, and while it is regrettable that he is delaying show-down with the Prime Minister over election question, I think he hopes to find him easier to handle away from Bagdad. This may be sound tactics, and I feel he must be allowed to play the hand.

9. Arshad (who is acting Minister of the Interior) has so quered his pitch that he will certainly be accused of rigging the elections, so I have urged on the Regent the need of declaration by him when he dissolves Parliament that he attaches great importance to the elections being free. To support this I have suggested that new Minister of the Interior be appointed. (Abdullah al Qassab, see my telegram No. 439, has now resigned). The Regent received both these ideas favourably, but it would, I fear, be over-optimistic to count on his imposing them on a reluctant Prime Minister whom, despite his obvious faults, he regards as the only rock to which he can for the moment cling.

[E 9318/226/93]

No. 16

Mr Busk to Mr. Bevin. (Received 19th September)

(No. 353)

Sir,

Bagdad, 6th September, 1946

AS reported in correspondence ending with my telegram No. 720 of 5th September, the internal political situation in Iraq is somewhat disquieting.

2. The Prime Minister has taken the bit between his teeth and is proceeding with his schemes of suppressing all opposition, particularly in the press. I have always warned him that in my view he would be unwise to give free advertisement to the Opposition by persecuting them. I know he has received similar advice from other quarters, notably from Saleh Jabr, who has maintained that it is always undesirable to make martyrs and heroes out of the persons he calls "the rubbishes." As usual, the Prime Minister's only reaction to criticism has been on each occasion a petulant outburst to the effect that he knows his countrymen better than his critics. Recently he has combined these outbursts with behaviour on social occasions so eccentric that it almost amounts to megalomania.

3. In fact the main result of the Prime Minister's policy has been to achieve for the Opposition advertisement a professional publicity agent might envy. Arshad has not got the Law Courts behind him and, as is only to be expected in this country, judges are most reluctant to deal severely and finally with an ex-Minister and a rich man like Kamil Chadirchi, whose various appearances before different courts have provided something like a serial story in the newspapers. (To date he has appeared six times in three weeks.) To this has been added a whole flock of other trials of newspaper editors, all of which will be taken to the Court of Appeal probably with entirely inconclusive results.

4. I have reported briefly by telegram the Prime Minister's suppression of newspapers. The latest victim provides a good example of his intolerance. The strongly anti-Communist *Al Nahda*, which was partly founded by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has written several articles for it, ventured a mild criticism of the Government and was immediately suspended for ten days.

5. A humorous effect of the wholesale massacre of newspaper editors has been that I have had to telegraph to your department suggesting the postponement of the proposed visit of editors to the United Kingdom. The candidates we selected are either in jail, on bail, or have fled the country and are watching events from the cool and safe heights of the Lebanon. The unfortunate first secretary (Information) of this embassy is gravely embarrassed by having to cut his journalistic acquaintances who have been turned overnight into criminals he cannot associate with.

6. Less humorous is the fact, reported in my telegram No. 713 of 3rd September, that the Prime Minister's campaign has frightened three Left-wing parties, who have hitherto been in violent disagreement, into something like unity. Moreover, I have good reason to suppose that the various prosecutions have aroused sympathy for the victims even among those who do not share their political views. The Left-wing parties will thus certainly gain further adherents, and the Government's position is being weakened by the widespread impression that they are so busy attempting to crush opposition that they have no time for the constructive measures of which the country stands in crying need.

7. The situation is rendered even more deplorable from our point of view by the fact that it is generally held that we are supporting the Prime Minister in his campaign of repression. This may soon result in Russian propaganda on the lines of Moscow's attacks on our policy in Greece. Until recently there have been no signs in Iraq of communism properly speaking and few of Soviet attempts to influence the situation. Indeed, the Prime Minister's methods are such that the Russian Legation can almost rely on him to do their work for them. They are, however, not standing idle, and there is no doubt that the newly arrived Tass correspondent is an extremely busy man. Zealous though he is, I doubt, however, whether any of the present trouble should be attributed to his machinations. The Prime Minister certainly does not share this view; he sees the hand of the Kremlin everywhere, and has to some extent infected His Royal Highness with his views. I shall continue to preach that the germs of Soviet propaganda can only enter the body politic if there are sore spots already existing and that the elimination of such areas of infection, *e.g.*, by social and agricultural progress, is preferable to spectacular and futile attempts at repression. I fear that there is no chance of success in this line with the Prime Minister, but the Regent may prove more receptive.

8. For the moment I am concentrating with the Regent on two matters:—

- (a) The urgent need of setting going the machinery of the elections; and
- (b) The importance of his playing a more active rôle, and, in particular, of remaining in Bagdad.

I have reported results in my telegram under reference.

9. His Royal Highness's position is difficult, as there are few to whom he can turn for advice. The only elder statesman whom he trusts is Nuri al Said, and he is in Istanbul. Jamil Madfai he dislikes, Hamdi Pachachi, he says, is too pliant, and Tawfiq Sumaidi too crooked. The two latter are also absent from the country. Of the younger men who have attained Cabinet rank but have not been Prime Ministers, Saleh Jabr is outstanding. He still feels, I think, that he should have become the first Shia Prime Minister last January instead of Tawfiq Suwaidi. He has two disadvantages: first, he is a Shia; secondly, in domestic affairs he is ruled by his wife, who forces him into intrigues of the most disreputable sort in the interests of her rapacious family. Nevertheless, Saleh Jebr is a capable patriot and a good friend of ours. He is trying to form a party to enter the coming elections, and he will probably try to win over some of the more moderate and intelligent Leftists. But he is keeping the details of his plan dark even from the Regent for the present. I am keeping in close touch with him.

10. The Regent admits that he is in a quandary, with no one near him, apart from his English friends, whom he can trust. Nevertheless, he is in good heart, and seems confident that the situation will be satisfactorily resolved. He left this morning in his new aircraft for the north, whither the Prime Minister is to follow him in two days' time.

I have, &c.

D. L. BUSK.

CHAPTER III.—PERSIA

[E 6341/401/34]

No. 17

(1)

Mr. Le Rougetel to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 8th July.)

(No. 228.)

Sir,

Tehran, 1st July, 1946.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 621 of the 14th June last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a general appreciation of the present situation and trends in Persia, together with recommendations for implementing the policy indicated in the above telegram.

I have, &c.

J. H. LE ROUGETEL.

Enclosure in No. 17

General Appreciation.

THROUGH the agency of the Communist Party, Russian influence is being rapidly extended to every corner of Persia. This process is the reverse of spontaneous. It is a deliberately planned political offensive, inspired and directed from abroad, and is being driven home by ruthless pressure upon all the weak spots, economic, social and political, of this backward country. Local political leaders are compelled to adhere to a rigid party line laid down in Moscow, but have discretion in the application of that line to conditions on the spot. The process is one of infiltration and will continue until it is brought to a standstill by determined and well-organised opposition on the spot, or by instructions from Communist headquarters. The purpose of the offensive is to replace the existing social and economic order by a "democratic" régime, vowed to the introduction of communism as soon as it becomes practicable. From evidence so far available here, it is not possible to determine whether the ultimate aim of this offensive is strategic, economic or ideological, but it may well be a combination of the three.

2. For the execution of such a programme on a national scale, it is clearly indispensable that Western, and in particular British, influence should be completely eliminated from Persia. The centre of British influence in the country is the province of Khuzistan, where the property and installations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company are situated. For many years the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has been the real authority throughout that province, and it is the purpose of the Communist Party to destroy British influence in Persia by severing it at its roots. On this basis the activities of the Tudeh are perfectly intelligible. It does not appear to be their present purpose to put the company out of business but, on the basis of information obtained from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Persia, it seems reasonably certain that Khuzistan oil could be delivered to the Caspian in large quantities by pipeline or rail, or a combination of both. The possibility of a drive at some later date to take over the company's properties cannot therefore be entirely excluded.

3. Meanwhile, by misrepresentation, chicanerie and open defiance, the party are working to undermine the company's authority and to demonstrate even to the meanest intelligence the fact that it has been undermined. In this they have so far succeeded that the company is at present operating on sufferance and is losing authority over its own employees. It is unnecessary to elaborate the effect which this state of things is bound to have upon the company's standing in the outside world and more particularly upon British prestige and influence in this country. Substantial progress has been made towards this initial objective. Moreover, it is probably hoped to achieve more spectacular results as this war of nerves continues. Any false move on the part of the company at this stage will be exploited to create a deadlock between the management and labour, which would interrupt production wholly or in part and might have the effect of stampeding His Majesty's Government into some precipitate act of military

intervention. If, as a result of an appeal to the United Nations Organisation, our forces were compelled to withdraw from South Persia, British prestige in the Middle East would be reduced to vanishing point, Anglo-American relations would be prejudiced and the way would be open for the extension of Soviet influence to the Persian Gulf. All this under the auspices of the United Nations Organisation. In addition, a suspension of oil shipments from Abadan would retard the process of economic recovery throughout the world, and for this Great Britain would be held entirely responsible.

4. There are, in fact, two distinct requirements: the neutralisation of Communist activities throughout the country and the prevention of political sabotage in the oil-field area. It has been suggested that for the first purpose an attempt should be made to "split" the Tudeh Party, but the Communists' organisation and methods are such that it would almost certainly be impossible to do so. The Tudeh Party was originally composed of progressive Left-wing elements without any definite ideological affiliation, but it is now closely associated with the Communist Party. A direct attack upon it would be immediately detected, denounced and nipped in the bud. In fact, it might prove a boomerang to those who had launched it. The attack on Tudeh integrity should therefore be indirect and aimed at detaching individual members as opportunity offers. Any such attempt should be accompanied by a carefully planned and directed propaganda drive designed to rally opinion in favour of individualism and free institutions and against the reactionary principles and methods of communism.

5. It is important that such propaganda should be strongly positive and should deal only incidentally and even lightly with the deliberate and monotonous misrepresentations of the Communist publicity machine. But publicity alone, even if extended to include every kind of modern technique, will not suffice to stem the Communist tide. So long as Tudeh propaganda is inspired and directed from Moscow, the dice will be loaded against us, and our counter-propaganda can at best have no more than a limited measure of success. Every attempt must therefore be made to secure political weapons and, if necessary, to forge them. The Prime Minister's present attitude is not clear. His opponents maintain that he is irrevocably committed to full co-operation with the Communists, but, since the conclusion of the Azerbaijan negotiations, he has shown signs of a desire—and it may be no more than a desire—to kick over the traces. It is of cardinal importance that no opportunity should be missed of winning him over. He is a man of great experience and ability, and his support, even if it were not open, or were subject to occasional back-sliding, would be far more valuable to us than any other we can hope to secure at the present time. If, in the end, it turns out that he is in no sense a free agent, we shall be obliged to look elsewhere. But, under existing conditions, our traditional friends in this country will almost certainly prove to be broken reeds, and the success of our efforts would therefore depend upon whom we succeeded in detaching from the more progressive elements who, at present, are either neutral or ranged against us.

6. In view of the Prime Minister's undertaking to introduce legislation for implementing the Persian-Soviet oil agreement by the end of October, there will, however, be strong Soviet objection to a postponement of the elections, and if the elections take place in August or September as originally contemplated, we must pin our faith to the Prime Minister. Our main purpose should be to ensure that the Government do not put their full weight behind the Tudeh party machine and that they allow reasonable scope to our propaganda.

7. In the event of a decline in Tudeh influence, whether it is accompanied by a postponement of the elections or not, we shall probably find that the Soviet Government will become more tractable. They may even be disposed to discuss the possibility of an ideological truce, not only in Persia, but throughout the world, for it will have been demonstrated to them that their system of political penetration is not irresistible. Then, and only then, we might seriously consider negotiating a multi-lateral agreement, with the full approval of the United States Government. Such a general settlement would, naturally, include Persia as one of the principal fields of ideological dispute, but it would have none of the obvious disadvantages of a tripartite or bilateral settlement on the 1907 model, such as was recently suggested by M. Qavam.

8. The action needed to ensure the uninterrupted working of the Khuzistan oilfields and the Abadan refineries is in one sense similar to that required in the wider field, but it has certain particular aspects, some of a military and some of a political nature, which require separate study. Whatever the present intentions of the Tudeh party may be with regard to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, there is little doubt that if they are returned to power at the polls, they will have no

difficulty in making it impossible for the company as at present constituted to operate on a sound commercial basis. There can be no doubt that the present situation in South Persia is extremely precarious. The authority of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and of the Persian provincial authorities has been openly defied and there is, as yet, no regular machinery of negotiation between the management of the company and labour. Although far ahead of Persian standards, labour conditions have, in some instances, been sacrificed to the need for rapidly increasing output, particularly at the Agha Jari field. Every effort is being made to remedy these defects, but some time must elapse before the company is able to challenge all criticism. There have hitherto been no serious disorders, but there is nothing to prevent a sudden deterioration and should this occur, the Persian provincial authorities may be unable or unwilling to provide adequate protection. If it becomes necessary to intervene with force, the military elements provided must obviously be adequate for their task, if bloodshed on a large scale is to be precluded.

General Recommendations.

1. Publicity.

- (a) We should develop our campaign with gathering momentum.
- (b) The line adopted should be clear, direct and positive. We should at all costs avoid becoming involved in futile controversy.
- (c) We should lend cohesion and support to all genuinely democratic Persian elements.
- (d) No party or individual should be attacked as such but no one who is working directly or indirectly for the establishment of a totalitarian or foreign-inspired régime, of whatever colour, should be spared.
- (e) Maximum publicity should be given to the essentially humane and progressive nature of British policy and institutions and to our readiness to assist others if we are asked to do so.
- (f) We should not remind the Persians of past benefits or hark back to previous phases of their country's development unless directly challenged and in that event it will often be more effective to ridicule such charges.
- (g) We should never forget the importance of the United Nations Organisation.
- (h) For the execution of this programme additional staff and equipment will be needed and the first duty of the new director of publicity will be to formulate specific proposals.

2. No opportunity should be lost of building up opposition to communism, by detaching members from the puppet parties, by fostering the natural antipathy of religious bodies and, if possible by encouraging the formation of a new progressive party on democratic lines.

3. We should continue our efforts to wean the Prime Minister away from his association with the Tudeh Party and from one or two Ministers in his immediate entourage who are entirely under Communist influence.

4. It should be borne in mind that none of these recommendations will be finally effective unless, by determined and effective opposition to the Communist steam-roller, we can bring it home to the Russians that political aggression does not pay and that their best course will be to negotiate a general settlement with the western democracies providing *inter alia* for an ideological truce on all their frontiers.

Special Recommendations (South Persia).

1. No time should be lost in setting up regular machinery for consultation between the management of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and their staff and labour. This should include:—

- (a) Drafting by the Central Government of the trade union legislation prescribed in the new labour law.
- (b) Building up by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company of a strong Industrial Relations Department to be responsible for dealing with wage claims and awards and the organisation of all sub-committees dealing with labour questions.

(c) Setting up of factory councils.

(d) Encouragement of senior and junior Persian staff to form their own trade unions.

At least one member of the Abadan management should, by temperament, experience and knowledge of the language, be fitted to deal sympathetically with Persian problems, both local and provincial.

2. Every effort should be made to improve living standards for all categories of workers, particularly for labour, and the highest priority should be given to materials and equipment required for this purpose. The company would do well to adopt as its criterion in these matters western, rather than eastern, standards, for only in this way will they be able, in the long run, to turn the tables on their critics.

3. The Public Relations Department should be encouraged to develop its activities. Cinema projectors, a wireless re-transmitter and new films should be supplied. It is also suggested that the company should bring out a newspaper of their own at Abadan for distribution throughout the area. In general, everything possible should be done by the management to take their staff, British and Persian, into their confidence.

4. Everything should also be done to maintain the morale of the British staff, particularly in the oilfields, and to eliminate any legitimate grievance but, at the present time, the visit of a Government director is not needed and might even prove to be embarrassing.

5. From my point of view, and subject to the last paragraph of 1 above, no change in the management at Abadan or the representation at Tehran seems necessary but, during the present period of tension, it is most undesirable that the general manager should be absent from his post for an extended period.

6. A policy of reducing royalties as a means of pressure on the Persian Government is not likely to produce useful results. It would be exploited by the Communists and would afford them a pretext for invoking the arbitration clause of the concession agreement or for taking no less arbitrary retaliatory action. Only if the Persian Government themselves prove powerless in the face of serious disorder should payment of royalties cease, and in that event they should be entirely suspended until the situation has been restored. In such an event, however, it is to be assumed that we should be compelled to intervene with force.

7. The company is already exposed to criticism on account of the number of foreigners they employ and any substantial increase in their number would almost certainly produce a violent reaction, nor can it be assumed that, in future, the British staff would be allowed to operate the plants in the event of a general strike at any of them.

8. The increased sales of sterling, consequent on the company's accelerated development programme, may shortly entail an increase in the note circulation, to which there are definite statutory limits. It is therefore essential for the prosecution of their construction programme that every effort should be made by His Majesty's Government to increase the provision of British goods and services (including air services) for the Persian market.

9. Consideration should be given to the development of alternative sources of oil supply, *e.g.*, in Kuwait, and to the practicability of refining outside Persia any increased production now contemplated. On political grounds there would, I suggest, be great advantage in this.

10. The responsibility for removing agitators must remain with the Persian Government. If we were to urge action in specific cases, we might induce further deterioration, for we have no means of preventing the arrival of the same or other agitators in the area at a later date. There is at present no prospect whatever of inducing the Governor-General to take action in this or any other matter in defiance of the Central Government.

11. Unless and until there is a serious deterioration, due either to the outbreak of disorder or to the advent to power of a frankly Communist Government, more harm than good will be done by encouraging the intervention of friendly tribes or by associating ourselves openly, or secretly, with separatist movements such as that sponsored by the local Arab Union. These are factors which might be turned to some advantage at a later stage, but we shall lose nothing by holding aloof from them for the present.

12. The company's entire property in Persia should, if possible, be included in the district of one superintending Consul and, for this purpose, His Majesty's Consul at Khorramshahr should come under the superintendence of His Majesty's Consul-General at Ahwaz.

13. While the situation in South Persia remains tense, the transfer of the residency from Bushire to Bahrain should be deferred. The criticisms to which we may be exposed if we retain the residency at Bushire for the next few months will do us far less harm than the impression which would otherwise be created that we are withdrawing it in the face of difficulties.

14. In the event of serious disorder which the Persian Government is unable or unwilling to control, it may be impossible to avoid military intervention. Our military plans for dealing with such a contingency are naturally outside my competence, but, while I assume that such action would only be taken in the very last resort, it is clearly essential that the requisite military forces should be immediately available if they are required.

(2)

Mr. Bevin to Mr. Le Rougetel (Tehran).

(No. 816.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, 27th July, 1946.

YOUR despatch No. 228.

I am grateful for this excellent survey of the problem. I agree in general with your appreciation of the situation and with your recommendations for action. See my telegram No. 759 [of the 18th July] for action already taken on your special recommendations. I am also taking up your special recommendation No. 8 with the Board of Trade.

2. With reference to your general recommendation No. 2, I consider that in view of the approach of the elections we ought soon to make up our minds what party, if any, we are to encourage, and I shall welcome your views on the attitude which we should adopt towards the Persian Prime Minister's new party, and towards the other parties likely to participate in the elections, and especially the non-Communist elements and the Tudeh Party; in so far as the latter still advocate the programmes that the party put out in 1944 I feel that they ought to be encouraged.

[E 7243/5/34]

No. 18

Mr. Wall to Mr. Le Rougetel (Tehran).—(Communicated in Tabriz Despatch No. 17 of the 19th July; Received 30th July.)

(No. 23. Secret.)

Sir,

Tabriz, 16th July, 1946.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 2 of the 12th January, 1946, I have the honour to give in the following paragraphs an appreciation of conditions in this consular district during the six months ended on the 30th June.

2. The first half of this year has seen an interaction between world events and events in Azerbaijan such as can have occurred only rarely in the province's history. It is outside the scope of this appreciation to speculate what the Azerbaijan revolt may have contributed to the complicated pattern of relations between the Great Powers in a complicated post-war world, but to live in Azerbaijan during these last six months has been to experience the conflict of great abstractions translated into the little facts of human life. The crisis of the council table, at the far end of its long cone of consequence, becomes a pin-prick: Great Britain and America uphold personal liberty against Russia's ideal of compulsory progress, two interpretations of Democracy meet in irreconcilable opposition—and the interpreters of one sort cut off the British Consul's water. Russia disdainfully proclaims that her principles give the lie to imputations of intervention—and the consul breaks his car springs in the furrows her tanks have gouged in the face of Azerbaijan.

3. *The Evacuation of Russian Troops.*—As indicated in the concluding paragraph of my despatch under reference, no one in Azerbaijan believed that the Russians would adhere to the letter of the Tripartite Treaty and evacuate the province by the 2nd March. No one was therefore surprised when Moscow radio announced on the 1st March that Russian troops would remain in Azerbaijan "until the situation was clarified"—which was as straightforward an admission as one could desire that the Russians were not going to reduce pressure on this sensitive spot until they had got what they wanted from Tehran.

The precise moves of Russian troops in the province at this period are no doubt known only to the Russian General Staff, but, from a great variety of reports and a good deal of direct evidence gathered in curious and sometimes uncomfortable ways, it is reasonably certain that the Russians withdrew the bulk of their cavalry garrison from Azerbaijan during March and substituted for it an armoured force of greater strength composed for the most part of troops newly brought from Germany and Austria. This force, which perhaps amounted to a division, was at the end of March deployed upon the southern and eastern "frontiers" of Azerbaijan, i.e., in the regions of Zenjan and Miandub.

When, however, the Soviet Ambassador and Qavam as Saltaneh came to terms on the 4th April, reverse movements of Russian troops began to be observed. The agreement provided for the total evacuation of Russian forces within one month and a half from the 22nd March, and the evacuation of Azerbaijan was carried out in a leisurely fashion during all the month of April, the new armoured forces being withdrawn along with such units of the old garrison as had remained behind.

By the 4th May all Azerbaijan was clear of Soviet forces except for a detachment of tanks and artillery which was held at Tabriz for a day or so to make a show for the final ceremonial evacuation parade on the 5th May. There was some delay even after this detachment had left the town and it was not until the 9th May that the last uniformed Russian soldier was across the Aras river.

The presumption all along had been that though the uniformed troops would depart, key personnel would be left behind under cover of civilian employment or attached to the Azerbaijan army. It is almost impossible to obtain definite evidence on this point. Many suspected Russians turn out on enquiry to be Muhajirs—none the less useful to the Soviet authorities for that—while the balance of the evidence suggests that the numerous instructors attached to the Azerbaijan army early in the year were, in fact, withdrawn shortly before the 6th May. It now seems improbable that, if there was no need for the Russians to maintain an army openly in Azerbaijan, they would find it necessary to maintain a large number of disguised troops or political agents here. There are plenty of Russian civilians in the province, it is true, but the Russians have also more than enough willing instruments in the members of the Azerbaijan National Government itself and in the Muhajirs, whose numbers in the administrative departments increased conspicuously this year. Guidance can, as always, be given by the Soviet consular officers.

At the end of June the Russians still maintained at Tabriz a small party of their para-military railway corps under the command of a colonel. An Iranian railway commission which accompanied the Tehran Government's Delegation to Tabriz in June was to have taken over the Tabriz-Julfa railway, but found it in so imperfect a condition that the handing over was held up pending an investigation. That, at least, is the ostensible reason for the Russians still keeping control of it.

4. *Russian Policy.*—The behaviour of the Russians in Azerbaijan during the last six months, puzzling as it has been sometimes in detail, has not really diverged from the familiar pattern. Their troop movements in March were probably prompted by uncertainty about the real intentions of Britain and America and the extent to which Qavam, counting on British and American support, might prove unaccommodating; while their apparent abandoning of the cause of Azerbaijan independence in May and June will seem inconsistent only to those who believed that they ever had any intention of openly annexing this province.

They have, at any rate, shown singular constancy in their pursuit of the oil concession, though this may not be in itself the sole ultimate object for which they planned the revolt of Azerbaijan. The exclusion of other foreign interests from North Persia is an essential step towards Russian domination of the country, and the grant of the concession must in its turn, for some time at least, make for the continuance of a tight Russian control of Azerbaijan, for as the approval of the concession when the Fifteenth Majlis meets ("or in any case not later than seven months from the 24th March") depends on a compliant majority in Tehran, so the creation of that majority depends largely on the return of a solid, and increased, bloc of Democrat Deputies from Azerbaijan.

5. *Negotiations with Tehran.*—Paragraph 3 of the agreement signed by the Persian Prime Minister and the Soviet Ambassador on the 4th April stated that "as the Azerbaijan question was an internal Persian affair, a peaceful settlement would be sought between the Central Government and the Azerbaijan people on the basis of the existing laws and in a spirit of solicitude for the welfare of the Azerbaijan people." While no reliable information about the consultations

between Qavam and M. Satchikoff on this subject was available here, it was believed that a basis of settlement had been agreed between the two and that this basis was expressed by the Prime Minister's "Seven-point Communiqué" which was issued on the 23rd April. The Azerbaijan Democrat reply to this was simply that it was not enough. But as the end was obviously foreordained the Democrats accepted the communiqué as a basis for negotiation and a delegation headed by Jaafar Pishavari, the Azerbaijan Prime Minister, went to Tehran on the 28th April.

After more than a fortnight's discussion no result was obtained. Pishavari blamed not Qavam, but "certain reactionary members of his Cabinet" for this. It certainly seemed that someone in Tehran jibbed at playing the rôle assigned to him in this farce of negotiation, and it can scarcely have been Satchikoff or Qavam or Pishavari, who were presumably the joint authors of the piece.

The Azerbaijan delegation, on its return to Tabriz, published the exchanges of draft agreements and, in commenting on the negotiations, Pishavari praised Qavam and did not strike an altogether despairing note. A month later (the 11th June) a delegation headed by Prince Muzaffir Firuz arrived in Tabriz and in two days had signed an agreement with Jaafar Pishavari.

A Governor-General and heads of local Government departments were immediately proposed by the Presidium of the Tabriz Assembly, as provided for in the agreement, and accepted by Tehran. The Governor-General designate returned with Prince Firuz to Tehran and was still there at the end of June.

6. *The Agreement.*—The agreement, on paper, represents little if any loss of real autonomy to Azerbaijan. The talk about complete independence or separation was a red herring. The speeches and press articles of the Democrats from the beginning show that their consistent claim was for "local autonomy" within the framework of the Persian State. Far from demanding separation from Persia, Pishavari more than once declared that if the demands of Azerbaijan were not satisfied the Azerbaijanis would go to Tehran and set up a Liberal Government there. The Democrats always claimed to be working for the liberation of all Persia, and the Russians, undoubtedly, were not going to break off a part if they could swallow the whole.

The agreement, as distinct from its interpretation—which remains to be seen—leaves the Azerbaijan Democrats in as strong a position as ever. It concedes to Tehran the hollow ceremony of confirming in office the Governor-General and all other officials (except of the Department of Communications) chosen by the Provincial Council, but it leaves that body and its Presidium, which is the real seat of power, entirely in the Democrats' hands, and it gives the Provincial Council the disposal of 75 per cent. of the province's revenues.

The most important question of all—the Azerbaijan army—had been settled it seemed at the end of June by being shelved, for up to that time there was no sign of the mixed commission which is to decide the details of the army's organisation. It is even possible that the matter will be deferred until the Fifteenth Majlis meets in order to make sure that findings of the commission favourable to Azerbaijan are not rejected by the Central Government. Whatever the eventual solution may be it is reasonable to suppose that it will be one which leaves the armed forces in Azerbaijan susceptible to Democrat Party influence.

The agreement provided for a similar commission to deal with the volunteer Fida'i forces, who will form the new gendarmerie.

There is, it is true, one article in the agreement which may prove a flaw from the Democrat point of view: it is provided that the Fifteenth Majlis shall pass a new law regulating the elections of Provincial Councils, and that when this law is passed the present Azerbaijan Provincial Council (which is, of course, the old National Assembly) shall be dissolved and a new one elected on the basis of the new law. Here there is an obvious opportunity to limit the powers of the Azerbaijan local Government by defining in the new law the functions of Provincial Councils. But, again, the agreement ensures as far as human foresight may that the Fifteenth Majlis will be sympathetic to Azerbaijan.

7. *Activities of the National Government.*—Jaafar Pishavari resigned on the 14th June, for, by the conversion of the National Assembly into the Provincial Council (by changing its name), the Cabinet and Prime Ministership were abolished. The other Ministers of the National Government, with only one or two changes, substituted "ra'is" for "vazir" in their titles and carried on.

It was too soon after the agreement to judge, by the end of June, whether Tehran would have any influence on local affairs through the Governor-General. Meanwhile all the acts done in the name of the National Assembly retained their validity.

Within one month after the formation of the National Government a complete scheme of local Government for the whole province had been drawn up and approved by the Presidium of the National Assembly, which gave it force of law (the 8th January). In each locality (town, village, rural district) both an administrative and a supervisory council were created; the functions of the former being to do things, and of the latter to see that they were done according to the party line. Since no-one but a Democrat could possibly be elected to the Administrative Council, the Supervisory Council might seem superfluous, but the merits of the scheme have no doubt been demonstrated in similar conditions elsewhere. Both councils are elected by universal adult suffrage, and all adult Azerbaijanis may stand for election. The elections in all centres were held in the middle of January.

The agreement of the 13th June provides for the passing of a new Municipal Councils Law by the Central Majlis, and the Azerbaijan town councils will conform to this law. Until then the present ones continue to function. The agreement says nothing about the appointment of Farmanders and Bakhahdars (Governors and mayors of smaller towns), but the new Governor-General of Azerbaijan says they will be appointed by Tabriz.

There were two plenary sessions of the National Assembly, one in February and the other late in June, at which a mass of social and economic legislation already passed by the Presidium and put into force received the approval of the people's representatives. Much of this legislation was laudably enlightened, and perhaps the only measure which might be contested by the Persian Government is that dividing the State lands and certain big private estates among the peasants, though Qavam as Saltaneh has recorded his intention to divide up State lands over the whole of Persia at some future date. As regards private estates, the Azerbaijan law sanctions the confiscation only of those belonging to declared "enemies of the people," and there is a convenient loophole in the machinery of appeal. The agreement of the 13th June confirms the distribution of State lands and promises compensation for other sequestrations, but it is silent about the validity of other legislation which may affect Persians outside Azerbaijan, such as the Azerbaijan customs regulations.

Although six months is not long enough for much to be done in the way of public works in a country where practically nothing had been done before, the Democrat Administration has given some convincing indications of an intention to carry out its programme. A promise to complete the railway between Mianeh and Tabriz is embodied (but perhaps entombed) in the agreement; and at the end of June the new Governor-General announced from Tehran that he had obtained a contribution of 1 million tomans from the Shah's privy purse for the provision of a water supply for Tabriz. Dr. Javid, the Governor-General, being, of course, a prominent Democrat himself (and ex-Minister of the Interior in the National Government), has much more understanding of the political value of such works than a Tehrani Governor-General would have.

Tabriz municipality, for its part, has shown considerable energy in the last six months. They have gone ahead with the asphaltting and repair of the streets, which were allowed to become almost (some of them entirely) impassable under the old Persian régime, rehabilitated and extended the pleasure resort of Shah Goli and generally made much appreciated efforts to improve the amenities of Tabriz.

8. *The Army and Fida'is.* One of the first acts of the National Government was to pass a conscription law (the 21st December, 1945), but Pishavari thought it wiser not to put it into force until the Democrats were a little firmer in the saddle. It was not published, therefore, until the 7th February, 1946. All male Azerbaijanis over the age of 20—with exemptions for family reasons and previous service—were liable to serve for two years. Calling-up began from the date of publication, and by the time of the Russian evacuation about nine classes had been called to the colours. The Russians helped with instructors, equipment and uniforms, and the "People's army" in a very short time not only looked tougher and more efficient than the old Persian garrison but was able to defeat the partisan enemies of the Democrats in the Zenjan, Sain Qaleh and Kara Dag areas, who, though composed, it is true, of untrained peasants, had, in the south at any rate, the support of the Persian army.

Many of the People's army officers were Muhajirs, and, up to the 5th May, no secret was made of Russian co-operation in training. Several Persian officers who took part in the mutiny at Meshed last year arrived in Tabriz early this year and were at once given high rank in the People's army—two became generals. Other Persian deserters, perhaps to the number of twenty, came in during the

period under review, as did a few air force officers with two aircraft. One aircraft crashed before reaching Tabriz, so that the total strength of the Azerbaijan air force at the end of June was one machine.

In addition to the arms captured from the Persian garrison last year, the People's army is well equipped with Persian Brno rifles and tommy-guns supplied by the Russians. It was also supplied with some light artillery, but the Russians took that back shortly before the evacuation. Its artillery now consists only of the few pieces which were formerly the property of the Persian garrison. No tanks have been seen in the hands of the Azerbaijanis, but soldiers wearing tank-corps badges have been occasionally observed.

A women's unit was organised, with dress and equipment copied from the Russians—including side-arms.

Fairly successful efforts were made during these months to organise the volunteer bands of Fida'is who had constituted the armed force of the insurrectionary phase of the revolution, but who, in the constructive phase, began to be something of a nuisance. Individual partisans were relieved from military duties, but allowed to retain their rifles and ordered to remain ready for active service at call. The more or less coherent companies were enrolled as regular units under the orders of the Ministry for the People's Army, and given uniforms and a promise of regular pay. They still, however, retained an independent outlook, and in the villages (sometimes in Tabriz itself) their captains acted as if they were the real authorities in the land. If they are enrolled *en bloc* in the new gendarmerie the peasants are not going to profit very much from having liquidated the old one. The Fida'is began to show a certain surliness as the negotiations with Tehran progressed, and in spite of medals, uniforms and the flattering recognition which the conferring of the title of "Father of Fida'is" on Pishavari was intended to convey, they may yet cause trouble to the Democrat authorities.

In March orders were issued placing the whole of the Democrat Party on a military footing, so that besides the People's army and the Fida'is there was created a third force of part-time soldiers: not very efficient ones, perhaps, but still more or less trained to handle rifles.

9. *Military Operations.*—Most of the action between Azerbaijan forces and "reactionary" partisans took place beyond the borders of Azerbaijan proper. One centre of anti-Democrat resistance was, however, maintained for a short time by landlords in the Kara Dag, to the north of Tabriz. This was wiped out in February. In the Zenjan area Sultan Ahmed Zulfiqari kept up a longer resistance, but in face of the greater numbers and better arms of the Democrats his opposition and that of his associates further south petered out, and by May the Democrats were in control of a wide zone of country running from the north of Senandaj and Hamadan to Zenjan, where, no doubt, they would have hoped to overcome any Persian attack before it reached Azerbaijan.

Contrary to what seems to have been the belief of the Tehran press, it is doubtful whether the Democrats ever intended to advance beyond this zone. They might have given a good account of themselves in defending Azerbaijan (with the Red army behind them, of course), but they were never in any condition to sally out and conquer Tehran. The Persian Prime Minister, for his part, discouraged action against the Democrats and ordered the Persian commanders on the borders of Azerbaijan not to advance. In April a joint commission of Tehran and Azerbaijan officers was appointed to see that this stand-fast order was obeyed by both sides, and from then on there was peace, broken only by one probably quite unfounded alarm on the 19th May which roused the National Government to declare martial law in Tabriz. They recovered from their fright and abolished it the next day.

10. *Democrat Party Affairs.*—The negotiations with Tehran appeared to set up some internal stress in the party. Nothing of this was allowed to come out in public, but evidently one wing of the party, led by Ghulam Reza Ilhami, the Minister of Finance, Muhammad Biriya, the Minister of Education, and Ghulam Yahia Daneshian, the Deputy People's Army Minister, wanted to take a stronger line than Pishavari. The differences were so acute that in June there were rumours of a plot against Pishavari's life. There may have been something in this, for it was noticed that Biriya began to be accompanied everywhere about this time by his bodyguard—like two uneasy consciences, but the plot if there was one failed. Pishavari was picked for his job by the Russians, and he seems to be one of the few good picks they have made in Azerbaijan. He is not likely to lose the leadership of the party until the Russians have no further use for him. Meanwhile the party must remain

disciplined and united because it is the essential medium of control, and Pishavari is a good party organiser.

Even before the agreement the party had begun to prepare for the elections to the Fifteenth Majlis, and party leaders as early as April were touring the districts making campaign speeches just as if there had been an opposition to contend with at the polls. Such conscientiousness in the void is slightly comic, but to omit it might have been thought too cynical, and cynicism is undoubtedly reactionary. The elections for the Central Majlis will be as artificial a piece of play-acting as those for the Azerbaijan National Assembly last year: even the selection of this or the other party member to go to Tehran by the Central Committee has little importance when all public utterance is reduced to slogans and dictated formulae.

Under the provision for the increased representation of Azerbaijan in the Central Majlis the province will probably return fifty Deputies.

A party youth movement, modelled on the Russian "pioneers," was started this year. It has absorbed some of the teeming child population of the alleys, washed their faces and put them into cleanish clothes, and is perhaps teaching them the rudiments of one type of social behaviour; but it has a strong militaristic bias: the little boys parade with wooden guns, and girls of ten have been seen wearing Sam-Browne belts and pistol holsters.

11. *Education and Propaganda.*—An Azerbaijan University was opened in May. The language of instruction, according to the agreement, in this and in the middle schools may be either Persian or Turki, but instruction up to the fifth class in the elementary schools is to be entirely in Turki. The agreement enunciates the principle that the official language of Azerbaijan is Persian, but it is doubtful whether the Democrats and Russians will abandon so useful a project as the development of the Turki dialect. The agreement, in any case, concedes that office work in the local government departments may be done in Turki.

A special propaganda department was created early in the year and placed under the direction of the Democrat Party, with a credit of 1 million tomans.

The Russians presented the National Government with a wireless transmitting station as a parting gift, and Tabriz Radio began to be heard in the world early in May. It broadcasts in Turki, Persian, Russian, French and Kurdish. The programmes in Turki are relayed for the Tabriz townspeople over a network of loudspeakers, also left by the Russians.

In an effort to alleviate some of the misery of the lowest stratum, rescue homes for the destitute (Dar ut Tarbia) were opened in Tabriz and other towns this year.

12. *Finance.*—Revenue was collected during the first six months of the year at least as efficiently as it had been under the old régime. Dr. Millspaugh's income-tax law was enforced and considerable arrears collected. A tariff of export dues was put into force and the scheme of municipal taxation in Tabriz and other towns reformed to the advantage of the municipal revenues.

A budget for the year 1325 (March 1946 to March 1947), approved by the National Assembly in April, gave the total estimated revenue of the province as 64,060,000 tomans and the expenditure as 63,856,972 tomans, but the published figures were insufficiently detailed to provide a reliable guide to the real financial state of the province.

In February the National Government permitted the Azerbaijan branches of the National Bank of Persia, the Agricultural Bank and the Sipah Bank to resume limited operations, but drawings on individual accounts were restricted to 100 tomans and all operations were supervised by a committee including representatives of the Ministries of Finance and Trade.

Democrat policy under the National Government aimed at financial as well as political local autonomy. In June the long projected Azerbaijan National Bank was opened. It was said to have a capital of 5 million tomans fully subscribed by the Azerbaijan National Government, but at the end of the month its officials were still a little vague about the legality of its transactions. It is not yet clear how the agreement will affect the financial position. The Democrats have scored two points in winning the right to appoint their own Director of Finance and to retain 75 per cent. of the revenue for local expenditure (which is what they proposed last December), but obviously an intimate financial connexion with Tehran must continue and what part an Azerbaijan National Bank can profitably play in the country's economy is uncertain.

The "National Currency" which the Azerbaijan Government was rumoured to be issuing in March turned out to be simply coupons of 1 to 50 tomans in value which could be exchanged against monopoly goods at the Government shops.

They were really a device for paying Government servants partly in rationed goods instead of cash.

13. *Trade and Industry.*—The National Government tackled the trade deadlock early in the year, and in February began to permit the export of Azerbaijan products under a scheme of licences and export dues graduated to encourage the trade in carpets, skins, leather, dried fruits and tobacco, but to place a check on the export of dairy products and staple local food-stuffs as part of an effort to reduce the cost of living. Licences were granted only against undertakings by the exporter to bring the whole of the sale proceeds back to Azerbaijan. But in practice many merchants found that an undertaking to return cash proceeds was not accepted; an equivalent value of imported goods was demanded. Throughout these six months the Russians bought and exported to Russia considerable quantities of wheat and livestock without, it seems, encountering any such difficulties.

In fulfilment of their pledge to protect and develop native industries and natural resources, the Government passed laws forbidding the importation except under special licence of any kinds of "industrial products" which could be manufactured in Azerbaijan, and requiring all Government servants to use only textiles made in Azerbaijan. Laws for the encouragement of mineral exploration and grants for prospecting were also discussed.

The Government took over one textile and one leather factory, the owners and directors of which had fled to Tehran and which were on the verge of bankruptcy before the revolution. But lack of funds, skilled hands and managers and, above all, the lack of a market for the factories' dear and shoddy products hampered this venture. In an attempt to reduce costs serious cuts in workers' allowances were made. The customary grants of free clothing, boots, bread and charcoal were abolished and in some cases cash wages were reduced. But some of the privately managed factories found it impossible to impose these cuts.

Employment during the period was, on the whole, better than before, chiefly because of the public works undertaken.

A new labour law was discussed by the Presidium, but at the end of June it had not been published.

14. *Agriculture.*—Abundant winter and spring rains gave promise of a good harvest in most parts of the province, but no striking results of the Democrats' agrarian policy are to be looked for this year. The division of State lands has not materially increased the area under cultivation, since many of the recipients of parcels of this land are too poor to provide seed and means of cultivation for more than their original holdings. Under the new land tenure law passed in April the landlord is obliged to lend money for seed and implements to the tenant, but this responsibility is difficult to fix as regards the State lands, while few, if any, of the big private landlords have obeyed the law.

Again, through the unwillingness of both landlords and peasants to comply with the new law, part of the harvest this year may be wasted. The peasants, having been given an extra inch under the new law are taking an ell, while many landlords, afraid or resentful, are refusing to collect their reduced share even when it is offered. As the market is normally supplied with wheat by the landlords, not by the peasants, who keep their share for domestic consumption and seed, there is a possibility of a serious shortage in the towns this winter while quantities of wheat may be left to rot in the villages where storage is most inadequate. The new Director of Agriculture (who held that post under the old Persian régime) is aware of the danger and the local government may possibly collect the landlords' shares itself.

15. *The Kurds.*—The Kurdish National Government, formed in January under the leadership of Gazi Mohamed, waged war during most of the period under review against the Persian garrisons of South Kurdistan. This campaign, with its promise of loot, probably much more than any common belief in the principles of democracy (as expressed by the Kurdish Democrat Party), served to unite many sections of different tribes from as far north as Maku, and rallied the Iraqi Mullah Mustafa to the cause, as well as bringing in Hama Rashid from exile. The operations, which took place outside Azerbaijan, while they no doubt had the official sympathy of the National Government, roused little real enthusiasm here. There has, indeed, been a certain coolness between Gazi Mohamed and the Tabriz authorities since the beginning of the year, and it has looked at times as though there might be an open conflict over claims to such mixed districts as Rezaieh, Khoi and Mianduab. But it was obviously not in the Russians' interests to have a sub-civil war in Azerbaijan, and Gazi Mohamed was probably told to give way to the Tabriz Democrats and seek expansion southwards, where Kurdish nationalism might be more useful.

An agreement between the heads of the two National Governments was signed at Tabriz on the 23rd April. It provided for exchanges of representatives and full military and economic co-operation, as well as for the joint undertaking of negotiations with Tehran. In the spirit of this agreement—and also, no doubt, in distrust of Pishavari—Gazi Mohamed sent a representative to watch Kurdish interests at the Tehran negotiations towards the end of April, but no Kurd participated in the final agreement reached on the 13th June.

Before that, Gazi Mohamed had probably decided to make his own peace with Tehran, and the Russians were perhaps working to the same end on Qawam as Saltaneh, who ordered the Persian commander in Kurdistan to take no aggressive action. It would not do to have the Kurdish National Government at war with a pro-Russian Government in Tehran, if and when such a one is formed, and the line Gazi Mohamed was taking towards the end of May was that the war was being carried on against his wishes by intractable foreign adventurers. Late in June he went to Tehran himself, but at the end of the month there was no information here about the results of his visit.

The Kurdistan-Azerbaijan Agreement will probably lapse now that there is a Tehran-Azerbaijan Agreement, but it is interesting, nevertheless, for, in according to the Kurdish National Government the status of an independent authority, it seems to hint at the Azerbaijanis' real desire to extricate themselves from the entanglements of the Kurdish problem and the Russians' intention to keep the two parties from becoming embroiled, which could be done by the Azerbaijanis shedding responsibility for Mahabad.

16. *Armenians and Assyrians.*—The scheme for the immigration of Armenians into Soviet Armenia has slowly developed. A committee, assisted by Russian organisers, was formed in Tabriz and by early June had got as far as printing lists of the names of the first immigrants. Up to the end of the month none had left Azerbaijan. The wealthier Armenians of Tabriz kept their enthusiasm for the scheme under control.

In Western Azerbaijan, while the authority of the Democrats has probably not counted for much in the mountains, they have maintained their position in Rezaieh in the face both of Kurdish jealousy and some rather ill-organised local opposition. The leaders of the Assyrians there have probably used what influence they possess to keep the peace, for long experience has taught them that they inevitably come between the hammer and the anvil when any disorder breaks out. Their sympathies, as far as they have any outside their own community, no doubt lie with the Democrats, for their chief fear is the return of Persian rule. Pishavari, when he visited Rezaieh in June, renewed the Democrat pledge to respect their rights and culture.

The agreement with Tehran secures to Armenians, Assyrians and Kurds in Azerbaijan alike the right to teach in their own language up to the fifth class in elementary schools.

17. *American Interests.*—United States interest in Azerbaijan developed rapidly and somewhat sensationally from about February onwards and aroused both Democrat resentment and Russian suspicions. In local propaganda America supplanted Great Britain as the arch-reactionary and attacks on her ranged from charges of flooding the province with consignments of insanitary second-hand clothing to imputations of espionage against the United States Vice-Consul. In obstructing the latter, the Russians, perhaps, were doing no more than their military duty—in their own way—but the Azerbaijanis, who, of course, had a part in the obstruction and continued it after the evacuation, brought a spiteful relish to the work, adding ill-will to incompetence every time they had to deal with an American official—as, for instance, in their treatment of the United States Military Attaché when he visited Tabriz in June.

Two American correspondents succeeded in reaching Tabriz after the Russians had gone, and their vivid, if not entirely accurate, despatches did not help to make America any more popular with the Democrats.

The United States Air Attaché, who flew the military attaché to Tabriz, took the opportunity to make a reconnaissance for the opening of the air service between Tehran and Tabriz which Persian Airways have in mind.

One result of all this American interest in Azerbaijan (to say nothing of the Kurds) will probably be an effort to develop American propaganda here, including, perhaps, the opening of a shop for the sale of publications, on the lines of the British P.R.B. shop.

18. *British Interests.*—The general attitude to Great Britain throughout the period has been distinctly hostile. A piece of gratuitous annoyance was the

arrest, imprisonment and expulsion of the area manager of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company—a Persian subject, on a charge of espionage. The selling agencies of the company, however, were useful to both Russians and Democrats, and, apart from this arrest and the inconvenience caused by the impossibility of transferring sales proceeds through the bank, the company's business was not seriously obstructed.

The Imperial Bank of Persia here was accused, wrongly, of having smuggled most of the Bank Milli's cash reserve out of Azerbaijan last December, and this, together with the local manager's proper refusal, on instructions from his head office, to recognise the signatures of the Democrat-controlled officials of the native banks, roused in the National Government a hostility which was only appeased by obtaining sanction to release to them a small balance standing to the credit of one of the native banks. The Russian Consul-General was asked if the Russian military would supply protection for the Imperial Bank in case the Azerbaijan authorities, as they threatened, withdrew theirs, but the consul-general declined to commit himself.

In the circumstances that have prevailed throughout these six months British trade has naturally made no headway here. The reason, however, is almost purely political; once the barriers in the way of normal banking and import transactions are removed, there should be an important increase in the number of orders placed in the United Kingdom. But to secure this market speed of delivery is of paramount importance.

19. *British Propaganda*.—The Democrat police closed down the loud-speaker of the Public Relations Bureau shop in March. This was surprising only in two particulars: first, that they should have waited so long, and, second, that they should have chosen to do it by means of an act of inspired hooliganism which left the balance of popular sympathy with us.

In the critical months of March and April, when few Tabrizis dared come near the shop, sales of British publications declined sharply, but that it was fear, not lack of interest, that caused this was shown by the improvement as soon as the agreement with Tehran was reached. So long as British propaganda is not forcibly suppressed here, it will hold its own, on its merits, with the Russian.

20. *Conclusion*.—The first six months of 1946 have seen the consolidation of the régime inaugurated by the revolt of last December, for the agreement of the 13th June, however it may be represented by Tehran, does, in fact, confirm the Azerbaijan Democrats in power. This province has ceased to be the scene of the conflict and the centre of interest has now shifted to Tehran and the south, but Azerbaijan has still a most important rôle to play in Russian policy in Persia as being not only the gateway to the country, but also a reservoir both of material force and influence the extent of which may perhaps be revealed when the Fifteenth Majlis meets.

Finally, a purely local view might find a place among all the greater principles involved: the ordinary people of Azerbaijan—for what they may be worth in the world—are materially somewhat better off than they were seven months ago under direct Persian rule, for the local Democrats are, on the whole, honester.

21. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Foreign Office, the Government of India, G.S.I., Delhi, His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow, His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah, His Majesty's Consul at Mosul, C.I.C.I., Baghdad, and the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq.

I have, &c.
J. W. WALL.

[E 7278/149/34]

No. 19

Mr. Le Rougetel to Mr. Bevin. (Received 31st July.)

(No. 264.)

Sir,

Tehran, 17th July, 1946.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 957 of the 7th July on the subject of the new party⁽¹⁾ which the Persian Prime Minister has formed, I have the honour to enclose herein some notes on the men who, in addition to Qavam-us-Sultaneh and Muzaffer Firuz, have been brought together to form the Central Committee of the party.

⁽¹⁾ See Military Attaché's Intelligence Summaries, No. 25 et seq. (Document No. 27 (2) et seq.).

2. The list includes none of the outstanding political personalities of the country and the committee seems to have been chosen mainly from among the subordinate political associates of Muzaffer Firuz. It is not likely, therefore, to inspire confidence among those who are hoping for the formation of a party to establish honest and efficient administration in Persia and to hold in check the political excesses of the Tudeh Party extremists.

3. In Tehran, several thousand of the shopkeeper and artisan classes, as well as a number of junior officials, have joined the Democrat Party, but the upper classes and senior officials are holding aloof, largely it seems because of the presence of Muzaffer Firuz at the head of the party's affairs.

4. The party has not yet opened provincial branches and has no national organisation. The leaders of some tribes, including the Qashgai and the Bakhtiari, have telegraphed messages of adherence, but these can hardly be held to mean more than temporary tokens of personal support for the Prime Minister.

5. What the party intends to do in the elections, whether it will compromise with the Tudeh Party in the choice of candidates, or whether it will try to oppose the Tudeh Party's nominees, is still a matter for speculation and is likely to remain an open question until the party publishes its list of candidates.

I have, &c.
J. H. LE ROUGETEL.

Enclosure in No. 19

Biographical notes on the members of the Central Committee of Qavam-us-Sultaneh's Democrat Party of Iran.

Announcement made in *Mihr-i-Iran* 15th July, 1946.

1. *Muhammad Vali Mirza Farmanfaryan*.

Born about 1893, third son of the late Farmanfarma, and educated in Beirut and Paris. Sent to Tabriz as head of the Finance Department in 1945 where he achieved a reputation for taking bribes on a big scale. Is very thrifty and has large properties both in Tehran and Tabriz. Elected Deputy to 4th, 5th and 6th Majlises for Tabriz, but on the fall of his brother, Nusrat-ud-Dauleh, in 1931, he retired from public life and was little seen. Spent quite a lot of time in Europe. Elected to the 13th Majlis for Sarab in 1941 and again to the 14th Majlis in November 1943, although his election was opposed by the Russians. His appearance—that of an underfed bird of prey—seems to keep him in the background, but he has a good deal of his father's intelligence.

2. *Riza Hikmat (Sardar Fakhir)*.

Born at Shiraz about 1888. Has held various Government appointments during the past twenty-five years. Governor-General of Kerman in 1940–41 and Head of the Statistics and Civil Status Office in 1942. Deputy for Shiraz in the 14th Majlis and apparently enjoyed the support and friendship of the Qashgais. Corpulent and polite, very hospitable, but a man of curious friends.

3. *Furuzish*.

Editor of *Nijat-i-Iran* published thrice weekly. At first subsidised by Court, but circulation and influence of paper negligible. Suppressed several times in November 1944–45. During the oil crisis of 1944 his paper supported the Russians in their demand for an oil concession and signed a manifesto demanding Prime Minister Saed's resignation. Became openly pro-Tudeh in summer 1944 and received subsistence from the Russians. In 1945 went on a conducted tour to Tashkent.

4. *Amidi Nuri*.

Editor of *Dad*. In early days of Communist régime worked for Russians and is believed to have received newsprint for his paper through the Russian Embassy from 1943 onwards. Invited a press delegation to meet the Soviet Trade Union delegation at his house in August 1945 and accompanied Qavam's delegation to Moscow in February 1946.

[33728]

5. Sayyid Abul Hassan Ha'Irazadeh.

Born about 1894. A Judge in the Supreme Court of Appeal in December 1942. He played a part in constitutional matters at the beginning of Reza Shah's reign. He caused trouble for the Imperial Bank in Yazd and was instrumental in an attack on the life of the manager there in 1917. A trusted Soviet agent. Unsuccessful candidate in 1943 elections for Yazd. Bitterly opposed to Dr. Tahiri and Sayyid Kazim Jalili. Complained to Soviet Embassy of interference in Yazd elections by British Consular Agent. Lives in Tehran but has considerable political influence in Yazd. Reputed to be a good orator. Bold. Has been nominated by the Tudeh Party as their candidate for Yazd in the elections for the 15th Majlis.

6. Ali Akbar Musavizadeh.

Was President of the Provincial High Court of Ustans 1 and 2 in May 1942. An unsuccessful candidate for Yazd in 1943 elections. Suspected by our security officials and was interned in 1943. Released June 1945. A member of the Elections Council appointed by Qavam and went to Tabriz with Muzaffar Firuz in June 1946 to conduct negotiations with the Democrats.

7. Ahmad Aramish.

At present Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry—in charge of Ministry pending appointment of a new Minister. Before his appointment as Under-Secretary had held only minor posts in the Ministry of Finance. Clever and energetic, but not very experienced. Owes his appointment to personal friendship with Qavam.

[E 7599/401/34]

No. 20

Official Statement published in British Press of 7th August

THE situation in the South Persian Oil area has recently engaged public attention and His Majesty's Government have therefore thought it well to place the following views on public record.

The Persian oilfields and refineries, the development of which was accorded high priority during the war, contributed materially to Allied victories on all fronts. Persian oil has a vital rôle to play in the future welfare of the peoples of the world, and it is in the joint interests not only of Persia and Great Britain but of the world at large that this should be so.

His Majesty's Government will encourage any practicable measures designed to raise still further the standard of living of Persian employees and workers of all categories. Much has already been achieved in various directions. In the particular sense of housing, although there was some inevitable interruption in building during the war, many thousands of houses for Persian staff and workmen have been constructed and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company have a large programme of further building in hand as well as other forms of social welfare. His Majesty's Government wish it to be known that they will render to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, in the completion of their welfare and housing schemes, every assistance which is practicable in the light of present deficiencies of materials in all countries including the United Kingdom.

His Majesty's Government regard the new Labour Law introduced by the Persian Government as an important step forward. They attach particular importance to the development of harmonious relationship between management and labour, as well as between British and Persian staff. They welcome particularly the provision in the new law of machinery for industrial conciliation. It is the earnest hope of His Majesty's Government that this will enable the company and their Persian workers to settle amicably and constitutionally any points which may be in dispute between them.

The Persian oil industry provides a field for the continuance of fruitful co-operation between Great Britain and Persia to the benefit of both. As indicated by this statement, His Majesty's Government intend to play their part in any direction in which their help can be of value, and are confident that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company will co-operate with the Persian Government to the fullest extent. It is, however, the responsibility of the Persian Government

to ensure that such conditions of security prevail in the country as will enable Persian oil to play its full part in Persian and world economy.

Finally, His Majesty's Government sympathise with the serious difficulties which the staff of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in South Persia have had to face during recent years and appreciate their great achievement in the face of these difficulties.

[E 8157/149/34]

No. 21

Mr. Le Rougetel to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 20th August.)

(No. 321.)

Sir,

Tehran, 12th August, 1946.

SINCE the new Persian Cabinet⁽¹⁾ was formed on the 1st August, one or two events have taken place which, though intrinsically unimportant, are to some extent indicative of the general lines which future developments are likely to follow.

2. First, there was the meeting of the Democrat Party in the main square of the capital on the 5th August, the 41st anniversary of the Persian Constitution. Prince Muzaffer Firuz addressed this meeting in a speech full of the sorriest fustian and after the hired claqueurs had led the usual cheers for Qavam-es-Saltaneh, the party stalwarts were invited to disperse to their homes. Some groups took the route past the headquarters of the Tudeh Party and the Federation of Trade Unions, where they trailed their coats with provocative mockery. A free fight followed, in which a number of heads were broken. It seems that this clash was spontaneous and not previously planned by the leaders of either side. The men arrested were soon released, but there was one more lasting consequence, namely, the issue of an order by the Military Governor of Tehran prohibiting all public meetings, processions and demonstrations, without the permission of the chief of police.

3. A day or two later the Tudeh press stated that in an interview with the Secretary-General of the Persian Federation of Trade Unions, concerning the "inopportune intervention of the Democrat Party in the affairs of the trade unions," the Prime Minister had agreed to give instructions to the Democrat Party that it was in no way to meddle in the affairs of the trade unions. This statement, which disclosed the Tudeh Party's dislike of the Democrat Party's competition for the support of the working classes, was immediately denied by the Prime Minister in a firmly worded letter to *Rahbar*, in which he pointed out that under the new Labour Law all workmen were entirely free to join whatever party or union they wished and that any attempt by such an organisation to force workmen to join their ranks was illegal. That this document was unpalatable to the Tudeh press was shown by the distorted and truncated versions which they published in their columns.

4. Connected with the Government's labour policy, there is also the announcement made on the 9th August that the Ministry of Labour had decided to recruit three French experts to assist the department in drawing up the regulations required to give full effect to the labour law. As you already know, it seemed likely at one time that Mr. Audsley of the Middle East Office in Cairo would be invited to help in this work. The decision to employ French experts is, in all probability, due to the new Minister of Labour, Muzaffer Firuz, and to his wish to avoid the risk of exciting Russian jealousy. It is also possible that the recent visit of M. Louis Saillant has had something to do with this appeal to France for help in the solution of industrial problems.

5. A new development among the labour unions themselves is the decision of the Women's National Organisation to create branches for the wives of the male members in all unions. These branches will be controlled by the wives of some of the Tudeh Party leaders, including Mme. Kishavarz.

6. As I reported in my telegram No. 1258, the three new Ministers from the Tudeh Party are turning the establishments of their departments inside out and the Prime Minister has promised to set up a special committee to review the cadres of all Ministries. I can readily believe that many of the dismissed or suspended officials were either redundant, corrupt or inefficient, but it is equally certain that they will be replaced by Tudeh Party favourites.

⁽¹⁾ See Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 30 (Document No. 27 (7)).

7. Another political arrest was made some days ago when Amir-Taimur, a Deputy for Meshed in the last Parliament, was sent to join Sayyed Zia, Dashti and the earlier victims of article 5 of the Martial Law Act. I have been unable to gather any credible suggestions about the purpose of this arrest. Amir-Taimur has not been regarded hitherto as one of those opposed in principle to the Prime Minister's policy and my conjecture is he is more likely to have got into trouble through local intrigues in Meshed aimed at preserving his seat, than through any serious attempt to subvert the present Government.

8. On the 12th August the Prime Minister made a proclamation prohibiting all officers and non-commissioned officers and civilian employees of the army, gendarmerie and police from joining political parties. This is another step which will be unwelcome to the Tudeh Party, which has been making considerable efforts to win the sympathy and support of young officers and other ranks.

9. The general impression which emerges from these conflicting activities is that by his reconstitution of the Government, the Prime Minister has transferred the struggle for political power in this country to the inner councils of the Cabinet where he believes that his superior experience and intelligence will eventually confound or subjugate the heretics. If he were dealing with individual Persians, I should have no doubt about the outcome, but I fear he may be underrating the extent to which his new Ministers are under alien control.

I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington, Moscow, Cairo and Bagdad, and to the Government of India and the British Middle East Office, Cairo.

I have, &c.
J. H. LE ROUGETEL.

[E 8683/565/34]

No. 22

Mr. Le Rougetel to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 3rd September.)

(No. 340)

Sir,

Tehran, 22nd August, 1946.

FOR some time past I have been rather concerned by the lack of any personal contact between the Shah and myself. The last time His Majesty received me was on the 16th May, an audience which I reported in my telegram No. 680 of that date. Since then a good deal has happened. Relations between the Shah and the Prime Minister have been strained and Princess Ashraf's visit to Moscow gave rise to rumours that the Soviet Government were playing them off against each other. I have little doubt that the Shah was piqued by our new and obvious reluctance to intervene in Persian internal affairs and that in consequence he was ready to lend an ear to stories which were current and no doubt were planted on him, about a deal between ourselves and the Soviet Union, by which we had surrendered our interests in Persia in return for "compensation" elsewhere. If I am right in this, the despatch of British-Indian troops to Basra must have compelled the Shah and many of his subjects to revise their views.

2. However, this may be, a few days ago I received an invitation to dine with the Shah informally at his summer palace last night. Dinner was preceded by an audience at which the political situation was discussed, but there were no leading questions such as His Majesty has put to me on previous occasions. During the rest of the evening the conversation was of a general nature and very friendly. Altogether His Majesty kept me for three and a half hours and no one else was present. He opened the audience by saying that he had not seen me for a long time. I observed that I was always at his disposal and he said that he was well aware of this, thereby disposing of suggestions which have been made to me that His Majesty had expected me to ask for an audience. He went on to say that he wished to have the closest and most friendly relations with me, both officially and privately. He hoped I fully realised how important it was that Great Britain should make her weight felt in this country. We had recently shown very clearly that we were determined to defend our vital interests. Were we, he asked, equally alive to the importance of maintaining the independence and sovereign status of this country. I said that I was sure His Majesty need have no qualms on this score. The independence of this and all other sovereign States was one of the most important aspects of the maintenance of law and order in the world which had always been and I was sure would continue to be, the overriding concern of His Majesty's Government. While on this point I mentioned the situation in Khuzistan and pointed out that the firm attitude of the provincial

authorities during recent disturbances had been greatly appreciated, but that the situation there had not yet been cleared up. Until those who had been responsible for the bloody manifestations of the 14th July were punished, it could not be said with truth that law and order had been re-established in the province. His Majesty agreed and said that steps were now being taken to reconstitute the commission of enquiry whose activities had to his knowledge been politically suspect.

3. His Majesty then spoke of the army and expressed considerable satisfaction about the measures which the Prime Minister is now taking to sever all contact between the armed forces and the political parties. A good start had already been made and various arrests were now impending. His Majesty was almost enthusiastic about the Prime Minister's attitude towards this problem, and he also expressed satisfaction with the new Chief of General Staff, who had "so far" fully justified the confidence placed in him. He was much concerned about the activities of Sheikh Ahmad Barzani and Mulla Mustafa Barzani in Kurdistan and expressed the hope that we would use our influence with the Iraqi Government to secure their readmission to Iraqi territory. His Majesty felt that if only this could be achieved, the situation in Kurdistan would soon revert to normal and the present threat to the Turkish and Iraqi frontiers would be removed.

4. As regards the political outlook, His Majesty was less optimistic. Clearly a very great deal would depend upon the outcome of the general elections. The Prime Minister was confident of securing about eighty seats in the new Majlis for himself and his supporters and there was some talk of a fusion of the Democrat parties of Tabriz and Tehran. On this point His Majesty was plainly sceptical and I did not think it worth while to conceal the fact that I shared his misgivings.

5. The audience lasted about an hour and when it finished the Shah led me on to a terrace overlooking the garden where dinner was served. No other political questions were discussed other than those of general interest. Having just obtained his pilot's certificate, His Majesty is extremely interested in aviation and in other technical matters of the same kind. He held forth at some length about the atom bomb and appears to be immensely impressed with its potentialities. As I have said, his whole attitude was extremely friendly and he left little doubt in my mind that he was mainly concerned to repair any unfavourable impression that might have been created by his failure to send for me during the past three months.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's ambassadors at Washington, Moscow, Cairo and Bagdad, as also to the British Middle East Office and the Secretary for External Affairs at New Delhi.

I have, &c.,
J. H. LE ROUGETEL.

[UN 1769/14/78]

No. 23

Sir A. Cadogan to Mr. Bevin. (Received 4th September)

(No. 29)

Sir,

New York, 27th August, 1946

THE Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his Report on the work of the Organisation circulated as document No. A/65 and transmitted to you on 17th August, has furnished a summary account of the proceedings of the Security Council relative to the Persian and Spanish questions. In case a fuller account of these proceedings should be useful in the Department or for purposes of publication, I have the honour to subjoin two memoranda, (1) prepared by Mr. Falla, with relevant documents annexed, containing a full summary of these proceedings since the establishment of the United Nations in New York, as recorded in the Journal of the Security Council and as reported telegraphically from this post.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Missions at Tehran, Madrid, Moscow, Paris and Washington.

I have, &c.
A. CADOGAN.

(1) Second Memorandum (Spanish Question) not reprinted here.

Enclosure in No. 23

The Persian Question, 26th March-22nd May, 1946

AT its meeting of 30th January, 1946, in London the Security Council, after considering the Persian Government's complaint of interference by Soviet forces and officials in Persian internal affairs, adopted unanimously the following resolution proposed by the United Kingdom Delegate:—

"The Council,

"Having heard the statements by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Iran in the course of its meetings of 28th and 30th January, and

"Having taken cognisance of the documents presented by the Soviet and Iranian delegations and those referred to in the course of the oral debates;

"Considering that both parties have affirmed their readiness to seek a solution of the matter at issue by negotiation; and such negotiations will be resumed in the near future,

"Requests the parties to inform the Council of any results achieved in such negotiations. The Council, in the meanwhile, retains the right at any time to request information on the progress of the negotiations."

2. The Persian question was again brought before the Security Council in New York by a letter of 18th March addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Persian Ambassador to the United States (Annex A). This letter stated that a dispute, the continuance of which was likely to endanger international security, existed between Persia and the Soviet Union in consequence of the latter's continued interference in Persian internal affairs and of the maintenance of Soviet troops in Persian territory after 2nd March, contrary to the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of Alliance.

3. On 19th March (Annex B) the Soviet Ambassador addressed a letter to the Secretary-General requesting that discussion of the matter should be deferred till 10th April as negotiations between the Soviet and Persian Governments were still proceeding. On 20th March the United States representative informed the Secretary-General that at the next session of the Council he would move that the Persian complaint be immediately considered and that the Persian and Soviet Governments be requested to report on the negotiations between them. On the same date the Persian Ambassador asked the Secretary-General (Annex C) to inform the Security Council of the Persian Government's "earnest hope" that consideration of the matter would not be delayed. The Ambassador pointed out that the treaty obligation of the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops by 2nd March was not a fit subject for negotiation under either the Charter of the United Nations or the Persian Constitution.

4. The matter duly came before the Council at its twenty-fifth meeting on 26th March. The Chinese representative, who occupied the Presidency from 17th March to 17th April, first laid open to discussion the question of placing on the agenda the letter from the Persian Ambassador to the Secretary-General and connected letters.

5. The Soviet Delegate opposed the placing of these letters on the agenda. Negotiations between the Persian and Soviet Governments had, he said, taken place and had resulted in an understanding between them, as a result of which the Soviet Government, which had begun to withdraw its troops on 2nd March, had decided to withdraw the remainder beginning on 24th March. It was expected that the withdrawal would be completed within five or six weeks unless unforeseen circumstances arose. The provisions of the Security Council Resolution of 30th January had thus been fulfilled and a positive understanding between the Soviet and Persian Governments had been reached. In the circumstances it would be inconsistent with the spirit of the Security Council resolution of 30th January to place the Persian question on the agenda.

6. The United States Representative said that he did not agree. If there had been a new agreement between the Soviet and Persian Governments it was to be expected that the two Governments would have filed a joint statement reporting the agreement. But this had not happened and the Council had not heard any news of this agreement from the Persian Government, nor had the Persian Government withdrawn their letter asking for their case to be heard by the Security Council. The Council could not deny to the Persian Government the right to be heard.

7. The United Kingdom Representative associated himself with these remarks. The Council could not refuse to place the Persian application on the

agenda. Two aspects had to be considered. Firstly, the negotiations authorised by the resolution of 30th January, on which a report had been asked for in accordance with the terms of the resolution. Secondly, the new aspect raised by the Persian Government with regard to the retention of Soviet troops in Persia after the Treaty date.

8. With regard to the first aspect, the Council was now told that an agreement had been reached. The natural thing would surely be for the parties to come to the Council, report the agreement and in due course communicate copies of the agreement. The second point was of particular interest to His Majesty's Government as parties to the treaty of 1942. They had asked the Soviet Government for information about their troops in Persia but, as far as he knew, had received no reply. The Council were now told that the Soviet and Persian Governments had agreed to a modification of the treaty, although the obligation on the Soviet and British Governments to withdraw their forces by 2nd March was unconditional and the latter had carried out their part. In this modification there was the curious provision that the withdrawal of Soviet troops was now subject to no unforeseen occurrence preventing it. The Security Council ought to be acquainted with full details of the agreement, the more so as it appeared to have been reached while Soviet troops were still in Persia.

9. There was a further issue, that of confidence. The public mind was deeply concerned for the sanctity of treaties, and confidence would not be restored unless all the facts were fully discussed by the Council.

10. After further discussion the Soviet motion that the Persian item be deleted from the agenda was defeated by 9 votes to 2 (those of the Soviet Union and Poland). A motion that the Persian question be placed on the agenda was then carried by 9 votes to 2.

11. The Soviet Delegate then proposed that the discussion of the Persian item be postponed till 10th April. His reasons, he declared, were set out in his letter of 19th March, and the fact that the negotiations had now led to an understanding was a further argument for delay. If the Security Council did not agree to postpone the discussion until 10th April the Soviet Government would not be prepared to take part in any discussion before that date.

12. The Egyptian Delegate, supported by the representative of the United Kingdom, then moved that the Persian Delegation be invited to the Council table, since until they had been heard it was impossible to decide whether the discussion should or should not be postponed. The United States representative supported this proposal and declared that to postpone discussion of the Persian item without giving the Persians an opportunity to be heard would be a violation of the spirit of the Charter. The Australian Delegate thought that the first thing to be done was to call for a detailed written statement from the Persian Delegation, and he tabled a motion to this effect.

13. The Soviet Delegate said that his Government would regard an invitation to the Persians to express their views as a beginning of a discussion on the substance of the Persian case.

14. After discussion it was agreed to set up a sub-committee, consisting of the United States, French and Soviet delegates, to attempt to reconcile the Soviet, Egyptian and Australian views. This, however, proved impossible and the discussion resumed in the Security Council on 27th March. The United States representative said that according to information received from the American representative in Tehran there had been no settlement of the matters in dispute. The Persian Government had filed its case in proper form and this case should be heard; if small nations could be debarred from filing their cases all confidence in the United Nations would vanish and the Organisation would die in infancy.

15. The Egyptian Delegate emphasised that small nations were looking for an immediate decision that Persia should be invited to the table. Small Powers wanted to know that if they did not want foreign troops on their soil they could get satisfaction from the Security Council.

16. The Soviet Delegate said that if the Persian Delegate were invited to the table this would be the beginning of discussion on the substance of the question, which was what Mr. Byrnes wanted. Direct Soviet-Persian negotiations were still in progress and important results had already been achieved. For this reason he would not be able to participate before the 10th April in discussions on the Persian letters. He must insist that his proposal be taken first.

17. A vote was then taken on the Soviet motion that discussion of the Persian case should be postponed until 10th April. The motion was rejected, only Soviet Union and Poland voting in favour.

18. After some argument as to whether the Egyptian or Australian motion should be taken next, the Soviet Delegate declared that, as representative of the Soviet Union, he could not participate further in the discussions because his motion had been rejected, nor was he able to be present at the meeting of the Council. Therefore he was leaving the meeting.

19. The Soviet Delegation then left the Council Chamber.

20. After further discussion the following Egyptian proposal was put to the vote and passed by 8 votes:—

"That the Council receive the complaint of the Iranian Government embodied in its letter dated 18th March, addressed to the Secretary-General, and ask the Iranian representative to appear at the Council to hear his point of view concerning the question of postponement requested by the Soviet representative, and that subsequently the Council take such measures as it deems fit."

21. After discussion the Australian Delegate agreed that his motion was redundant in view of the passing of the Egyptian motion.

22. The Persian delegate then came to the Council table and was invited to give his view on the desirability or otherwise of delaying the hearing of his Government's case. He stated that he was prepared, pursuant to his instructions, to proceed with the presentation of the dispute. It was necessary to do so at the earliest opportunity. He had heard press reports and the Soviet delegate's announcement about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from certain parts of Iran. He did not know if any conditions were attached to the withdrawal, and knew of no agreement or understanding, secret or otherwise, having been entered into between his Government and the Soviet Union with respect to any of the matters involved in the disputes referred to the Council. His Prime Minister had sent him a report on the direct negotiations which were held pursuant to the resolution of 30th January.

23. According to this report a Persian delegation headed by the Prime Minister had arrived in Moscow on 19th February. The Persian Prime Minister had requested the Soviet Union to abstain from interference in the internal affairs of Iran and to withdraw their troops from Iran without delay. The Soviet authorities would not agree, but instead put forward the following proposals:—

- (1) Soviet troops to stay in some parts of Iran for an indefinite period.
- (2) The Iranian Government to recognise the internal autonomy of Azerbaijan. If the Iranian Government accepted this, the Soviet Government offered to take steps to arrange that:—
 - (a) The Prime Minister of Azerbaijan should bear the title of Governor-General in relation to the Central Government.
 - (b) Azerbaijan would have no Ministry of War or Foreign Affairs.
 - (c) Thirty per cent. of Azerbaijan revenue would go to the Central Government.
 - (d) Correspondence with the Central Government would be in Persian.
- (3) The Soviet Government to abandon its demand for an oil concession. Instead, an Iranian-Russian joint company with 51 per cent. of the shares owned by the Soviet would be set up.

24. These proposals, the ambassador continued, were incompatible with Persian laws, sovereignty and constitution, and with the relevant treaties and the United Nations Charter, and the Persian Prime Minister had had no option but to reject them orally and in writing. Meanwhile 2nd March was at hand. On 1st March a Soviet announcement had declared that Soviet troops would remain. The Prime Minister had at once protested and asked for their immediate and complete withdrawal.

25. Here Mr. Byrnes asked that the Persian delegate should confine himself to the point under discussion, viz., should there be delay in discussing the Persian case? The Persian delegate seemed to be entering on the substance of his case instead of giving his views on postponement.

26. The Persian delegate said that he was opposed to postponement and had no instructions to agree to postponement. Soviet troops were in Iran, interference was taking place, and demands incompatible with Iran's sovereignty and territorial integrity had been made. The matter was, therefore, one of great urgency. On behalf of his Government he requested the Council

to take these matters up at once and to reach, without reference to further negotiations, a solution consistent with the principles of the Charter.

27. The Polish delegate then asked the Persian Ambassador the following questions:—

- (1) Had he received instructions to oppose delay in hearing the Persian case?
- (2) Had he received an official communication about the present withdrawal of Soviet troops?
- (3) What had the Persian Prime Minister said in a press interview quoted by the Soviet delegate about negotiating under duress?

28. The Persian Ambassador's reply was deferred till the session of 29th March, when he stated that:—

- (1) His instructions gave him discretion to take any steps he considered necessary in defence of Persia's national interests.
- (2) He had no information, official or otherwise, that any Soviet troops had crossed the Persian border into the Soviet Union.
- (3) The reason why the Persian Prime Minister had given instructions for the Persian case to be laid before the Security Council was precisely that he wished to be free from pressure.

29. M. Ala continued that nothing had been settled by the Soviet-Persian negotiations, and that any withdrawal of Soviet troops which there might have been had not been accompanied by the unconditional assurance which the Persian Government required. The present Soviet statement suggested that Soviet troops might after all stay on in certain northern provinces. The position should be clarified without delay.

30. Mr. Byrnes then made a statement to the following effect: The assurances given to the Council by the Soviet representatives were not completely unqualified but were subject to change in the event of "unforeseen circumstances." Apparently negotiations on certain matters were still proceeding between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government, and the Council was not informed as to the exact nature or status of these negotiations. On the other hand, even if the Council should now proceed to consider the substantive issues involved in the dispute between the Soviet Union and Iran and to recommend the withdrawal of Soviet troops, these could not be withdrawn in a substantially shorter period of time than that within which the Soviet Government had declared it to be its intention to withdraw them. The Council must be careful to avoid any possibility of the presence of Soviet troops in Iran being used to influence or coerce the Government of Iran. If the Council could obtain more adequate and exact information regarding the status of the negotiations between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government, the Council might be able to satisfy itself that the assurances of the Soviet Government as to the prompt withdrawal of troops from Iran were in fact for all practical purposes unconditional. In that event there might be no need for the Council to go into the substantive issues, provided it reserved the right of either party to have the case immediately taken up by the Council should there be any developments which threatened to retard the withdrawal of troops.

31. The United States representative therefore suggested that the President of the Council request the Secretary-General to ascertain at once from the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government, and to report to the Council at its meeting on Tuesday, 2nd April, the existing status of the negotiations between the two Governments, and particularly to ascertain from the representatives of the two Governments and report whether or not the reported withdrawal of troops was conditioned upon the conclusion of agreements between the two Governments on other subjects.

32. This proposal was endorsed by the United Kingdom representative and adopted unanimously with the change of time limit from 2nd April to 3rd April.

33. At the meeting of 3rd April, the President read out a telegram from the Persian Prime Minister dated 1st April confirming M. Ala's credentials. He then read out replies from the Soviet and Persian representatives to the Secretary-General's request for information.

34. The Soviet representative's reply, dated 3rd April, stated that negotiations had already led to an understanding about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Persia, which was resumed on 24th March and would be completed in about one and a half months. Thus the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops raised in the Persian Ambassador's letter of 18th March had been settled by

an understanding between the Soviet and Persian Governments. With regard to the other questions raised, they were not connected with the withdrawal of Soviet troops. As was known, the question of an oil concession or joint company had been raised independently in 1944.

35. The Persian representative's reply to the Security Council, dated 2nd April, stated that the negotiations enjoined by the Security Council on 30th January had produced no positive result in respect of Soviet interference in Persia's internal affairs, which was still continuing. The withdrawal of Soviet troops was not and could not be the subject of negotiations, since the obligation to withdraw was unconditional. Proposals regarding oil and Azerbaijan had been made by the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran, but the Persian Prime Minister had rejected them. No understanding had been arrived at in respect of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Persian Prime Minister could not agree to any condition being attached to the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The reference of the Persian case to the Security Council was in no way to be regarded as an act of hostility to the Soviet Union.

36. Mr. Byrnes then asked the Persian delegate if in the light of these statements he had any suggestion to make as to the action which the Council should now take in respect of the Persian complaints.

37. M. Ala replied that, if the Soviet representative would withdraw his proviso about unforeseen circumstances and if the Soviet Government would give an assurance that the withdrawal of their forces would be completed by 6th May, his Government would not wish to press for action to be taken on their complaints provided that these matters remained on the agenda of the Council and could be taken up at any moment.

38. At the resumed discussion on 4th April, the United States representative moved the following resolution:—

"Taking note of the statements of the Iranian representative that the Iranian appeal to the Council arises from the presence of Soviet troops in Iran and their continued presence there beyond the date stipulated for their withdrawal in the Tripartite Treaty of 29th January, 1942;

"Taking note of the responses on 3rd April of the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government, pursuant to the request of the Secretary-General for information as to the status of the negotiations between the two Governments, and as to whether the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran is conditioned upon agreement on other subjects; and, in particular, taking note of and relying upon the assurances of the Soviet Government that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran had already commenced; that it is the intention of the Soviet Government to proceed with the withdrawal of its troops as rapidly as possible; that the Soviet Government expects the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran to be completed within five or six weeks; and that the proposals under negotiation between the Iranian Government and the Soviet Government are not connected with the withdrawal of Soviet troops;

"Being solicitous to avoid any possibility of the presence of Soviet troops in Iran being used to influence the course of negotiations between the Government of Iran and the Soviet Union; and recognising that the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran cannot be completed in a substantially shorter period of time than that within which the Soviet Government has declared it to be its intention to complete such withdrawal;

"Resolved: that the Council defer further proceedings on the Iranian appeal until 6th May, at which time the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government are requested to report to the Council whether the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran has been completed, and at which time the Council shall consider what, if any, further proceedings on the Iranian appeal are required;

"Provided, however, that if in the meantime either the Soviet Government or the Iranian Government, or any member of the Security Council, reports to the Secretary-General any developments which may retard or threaten to retard the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, in accordance with the assurances of the Soviet Union to the Council, the Secretary-General shall immediately call to the attention of the Council such reports, which shall be considered as the first item on the agenda."

39. The United Kingdom representative, supporting the resolution, paid a tribute to Mr. Byrnes for his valuable contribution towards agreement. It

was satisfactory that the Security Council had now received assurances from the Soviet Government on the particular points on which it had shown special concern. It could now well remain content to watch the implementation of these assurances. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Persia had apparently already started. We now had an assurance that the withdrawal would be completed within a fixed period, and a further very important assurance that the withdrawal was not linked with other matters. If this resolution were adopted it seemed that the Council would have taken the first step towards reaching a peaceful solution of the difficult problem before it. The Council had assumed a great responsibility in dealing with the Persian case, and it must continue to bear this responsibility for a little time yet, but Mr. Byrnes's resolution would set the Council well on the way to achieving a friendly and peaceful solution.

40. The French, Brazilian, Egyptian, Chinese, Polish and Mexican delegates also spoke in favour of the resolution. The Australian Delegate, however, considered that the Council had not proceeded as it should in this matter. It was passing direct from a procedural question to a decision on a matter of substance without properly investigating the facts of the situation, and he would have no option but to refrain from voting on Mr. Byrnes's resolution. He also reserved the right to call for a thorough investigation of the facts on 6th May or any time before that day. He also pointed out that the resolution dealt only with the question of the withdrawal of troops and omitted any mention of the Persian complaint about Soviet interference in Persian internal affairs.

41. The Netherlands Delegate said that he did not agree that the Council had adopted a wrong procedure. The important thing was not academic procedural perfection, but making some practical contribution within the scope of the Charter to the problem brought before the Council. The procedure adopted by the Council did contribute to peaceful solution of the matters raised by the Persian Delegation, so did the American resolution, which he supported.

42. The resolution was then submitted to a vote and adopted, with nine votes in favour and Australia abstaining.

43. The Persian Delegate was then asked to speak. He said that his Government's fundamental desire was to see the unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops effected as soon as possible, in order that the Government might recover freedom of action in their own country. As the Security Council considered that the Soviet Delegate's letter of 3rd April to the Secretary-General constituted a formal pledge of complete and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops from Persia by 6th May at the latest, his Government also would be prepared to accept this letter as the unconditional assurance which they desired.

44. He was confident that as soon as the withdrawal of the foreign troops had been completed, his Government would be prepared to discuss all outstanding questions of common interest with the Soviet Union with whom they desired to live in peace and friendship. In view of the Soviet assurances his Government were prepared to refrain at this stage from pressing the Council to consider their complaint about Soviet interference in their internal affairs. His Government hoped that with the withdrawal of Soviet troops interference would automatically cease and this problem would cease to exist. It was of course understood that both the questions which he had raised would remain on the agenda of the Council and that either question could be brought up at any moment.

45. The United States representative said that he hoped that the Council would always remember that what mattered was not rules of procedure, but the settlement of international problems by peaceful means. He was confident that the procedure adopted by the Council in the present case had justified itself as a means of facilitating a peaceful settlement. He was glad to hear what the Persian Delegate had said about the interference of Soviet authorities in Persia's internal affairs.

46. The next development consisted of a letter of 6th April (Annex D) from the Soviet Delegate to the President of the Security Council, describing the resolution of 4th April as contrary to the Charter, since the Persian case presented no danger to international security, as was confirmed by the publication on 4th April (Annex E) of an agreement reached as a result of the Soviet-Persian negotiations. The Soviet Government therefore demanded that the matter be removed from the agenda of the Security Council.

47. In a letter of 9th April to the Secretary-General the Persian Ambassador stated upon instructions that the position of his Government remained as stated at the session of 4th April and that they wished the Persian question to remain on the agenda. On 15th April, however, the Ambassador addressed a

letter to the President of the Security Council, the substantive part of which read as follows:—

"Yesterday, 14th April, my Government instructed me to make to the Security Council the following statement:—

"As a result of the signature of the agreement between the Iranian Government and the Government of the Soviet Union, it has been agreed that the Red Army evacuate all Persian territory by 6th May, 1946. The Iranian Government has no doubt that this agreement will be carried out, but at the same time has not the right to fix the course the Security Council should take."

"This morning I received a further telegram from my Government reading as follows:—

"In view of the fact that the Soviet Ambassador has again to-day, 14th April categorically reiterated that the unconditional evacuation of Iranian territory by the Red Army will be completed by 6th May, 1946, it is necessary that you immediately inform the Security Council that the Iranian Government has complete confidence in the word and pledge of the Soviet Government and for this reason withdraws its complaint from the Security Council."

48. This letter was read at the Council's meeting of 15th April, at which the Soviet Delegate argued that the Council's resolution of 4th April would only have been justified if a threat to the peace had existed and if a prior decision had been taken by the Council to this effect. Further, such a resolution could only be validly reached after hearing both parties. In any case the Persian Government had now withdrawn their complaint and it only remained for the Council to take note of the removal of the Persian question from its agenda.

49. The United States Delegate said that the decision of 4th April had been reached on the basis of the Soviet Government's assurances to the Council regarding the agreement reached with the Persian Government. No material change had taken place since then and there therefore seemed to be no ground for reopening the question before 6th May. The United States Government were therefore opposed to the deletion of the item from the agenda.

50. The Netherlands Delegate drew attention to the Council's responsibility to all the United Nations under Article 24 of the Charter. He thought the Council would be open to criticism if it dropped the case before the settlement had been carried into effect. In reply to the Soviet representative he pointed out that it was not the Council's fault that the Soviet Government had neglected their opportunity of being heard before the Council adopted its resolution of 4th April. He did not agree that the Council should have taken a preliminary decision regarding a threat to the peace, since it had so far only addressed itself to the question of postponement and not to that of substance.

51. The United Kingdom representative pointed out that the existence of the Soviet-Persian agreement regarding withdrawal of troops could not be adduced as an argument to show that the resolution of 4th April was illegal, since the Persian delegate had at that time stated that the negotiations regarding Soviet interference in internal Persian affairs had led to no positive result and that there had not been and could not be any negotiation about the withdrawal of troops. He agreed with M. van Kleffens' criticism of M. Gromyko's arguments, and considered that the resolution of 4th April could hardly be described as more than procedural. In any case His Majesty's Government felt strongly that the matter was now one between the Council and the Soviet Government, and that the former could not wash its hands of the matter before 6th May, by which time it was to be hoped that it would have been disposed of satisfactorily.

52. The Australian delegate pointed out that the Council had no information as to whether the Persian complaint regarding the interference of Soviet troops and officials had been satisfied. He criticised the Persian Government for its apparent failure to keep the Council fully informed of the circumstances, and pointed out that failure to withdraw Soviet troops by 2nd March constituted a *prima facie* breach of treaty. He considered that the dispute was now the property of the Council and he would not support its withdrawal from the agenda.

53. The Brazilian, Mexican and Egyptian representatives also supported the retention of the Persian case on the agenda. The French representative,

however, supported by the Polish representative, expressed the view that the retention of a case before the Council contrary to the wishes of both parties was a dangerous precedent, and that it was preferable for the matter to be dropped on the understanding that it could be re-examined before or after 6th May at the request of any of the United Nations or the Secretary-General.

54. The Soviet representative endorsed this and suggested that the United States and United Kingdom delegations did not really want a peaceful solution of the Soviet-Persian differences. The United Kingdom representative replied that on the contrary they had hoped that the Persian question had been satisfactorily disposed of by the resolution of 4th April. Under that resolution, provided the Soviet Government fulfilled their assurance, nothing more would have been heard of the question till 6th May, when he hoped the Council would be able to register the fact that the whole case was satisfactorily closed. The whole case had, however, been opened up again by the Soviet delegate's demand that the Council should rescind a resolution passed by an overwhelming majority.

55. The discussion was then adjourned until 16th April, when the President read a draft resolution in the following terms, presented by the French delegate as an alternative to the Soviet demand for removal of the item from the agenda, and eventually voted on at the session of 23rd April (see below):—

"The Security Council,

"Having again considered, at its meetings of 15th and 16th April, the question which it had placed on its agenda on 26th March, 1946, at the request of the Government of Iran, and which formed the subject of its resolution of 4th April;

"Takes note of the letter dated 14th April addressed to it by the representative of the Government of Iran in which the latter informs the Security Council of the withdrawal of his complaint;

"Notes that an agreement has been reached between the two Governments concerned;

"Requests the Secretary-General to collect the necessary information in order to complete the Security Council's report to the Assembly, in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter, on the manner in which it dealt with the case placed on its agenda on 26th March last at the request, now withdrawn, of the Government of Iran."

56. At the session of 16th April the President also read a memorandum from the Secretary-General, the substantive part of which is at Annex F, on the legal aspects of the question of the retention of the Persian item on the agenda. The memorandum, which concluded that it was open to doubt whether the Council was able under the Charter to remain seized of the question, was referred for examination to the standing Committee of Experts of the Council, who (on the proposal of the Soviet delegate) were invited to report within two days.

57. In the debate which then continued, the United States representative strongly deprecated the Soviet suspicion of United States motives and reiterated his views that the retention of the item was justified by the failure to withdraw Soviet troops by the treaty date and the fact that the Persian Government had reversed its attitude at a time when the troops were still in Persia.

58. The Soviet representative argued that the United States attitude was illogical, since Mr. Byrnes had previously contended that it was the Persian Government's insistence which prevented the matter being removed from the agenda. The Netherlands representative said that, while any member could bring a matter to the attention of the Council, the agenda was the Council's property and it alone could take up or drop items. The Chairman, as representative of China, said he would support the retention, and the Council then adjourned to await the report of the Committee of Experts. From the text of this, to be found at Annex G, it will be seen that, while the French, Polish and Soviet delegates endorsed the contention of the Secretary-General, the eight remaining representatives took the view that this rested on a narrow or erroneous interpretation of the problem and that the Council should remain seized of the Persian-Soviet dispute.

59. At the meeting on 23rd April, at which the Egyptian representative presided, the Soviet representative stigmatised as illogical the attitude of those delegations, especially that of the United States, which persisted in regarding the Soviet-Persian issue as a dispute although both parties were in agreement. Such behaviour might be due to deliberate policy, but it violated the Charter and would weaken the authority of the Council.

60. The United States representative said his Government saw no reason to bring up the Persian issue at the present time and that the view taken by the minority of the Committee of Experts was too limited and might have serious consequences for the future of the Council. He regarded the French draft resolution as designed to reverse the Council's resolution of 4th April, which the United States delegation thought should be maintained.

61. The Australian representative said that it was for the Council to decide, irrespective of the wishes of the parties, whether a dispute was likely to endanger security. No evidence had been brought to show that peace was not threatened by the presence of Soviet troops in violation of the 1942 Treaty. The position recorded in the Soviet-Persian communiqué seemed to contradict the previous understanding that the Persian Government had no power to negotiate an oil agreement while Soviet troops remained in Persia, and that there could be no negotiation regarding the withdrawal of the troops. Furthermore, the Council was still competent to investigate the complaint of interference in Persian internal affairs. For these reasons he continued to oppose the removal of the item from the agenda.

62. The French representative said that, in his view, the Council had dealt properly with the Persian case as submitted to it, but that since 4th April the position had been altered by the Soviet-Persian Agreement. He did not agree that the course which he proposed would diminish the authority of the Council, which, on the contrary, he hoped all concerned would strive to increase.

63. The United Kingdom representative pointed out that the Charter did not declare that the Council must take a dispute off its agenda if both parties asked it to, nor, indeed, did it expressly give the Council the right to keep a matter on its agenda in such circumstances. It seemed to him prudent that individual cases should be decided on their merits and on grounds of common-sense. The Committee of Experts had perhaps failed to reach unanimity because they had limited their investigation to the abstract question of procedure involved instead of the particular case of Persia. The Soviet Government had given the Council, in reply to its enquiry, an assurance regarding the withdrawal of troops, and the Council was surely entitled to keep the matter on its agenda till 6th May, when he hoped it could be recorded as settled. The matter could have been left alone after the resolution of 4th April had not the Soviet representative brought forward his present demand. If, as Sir A. Cadogan surmised from previous remarks of the French Delegate, his draft resolution meant the removal of the Persian question from the Council's agenda, then he would oppose this also.

64. The Polish representative repeated his view that the resolution of 4th April was valid but that the matter had been altered by the agreement subsequently reached. If any member of the Council were dissatisfied it was for them to make a fresh complaint. The argument that a country had no right to withdraw its own complaint would set a dangerous precedent and might lead to small countries being used as pawns in international intrigue.

65. The Mexican representative stated that his Government considered that, in view of the wide responsibilities conferred on the Council by Article 24 (2) of the Charter, it should remain seized of a matter even after the parties withdrew. The Chinese and Brazilian representatives supported this, as did the Netherlands representative, who argued that it was the Council's duty to supervise a case until a settlement had been carried out, and that it could only then conscientiously report to the Assembly on the completion of its task. He made clear that he was also opposed to the French resolution.

66. The representative of Egypt, as Chairman, then proposed that a vote should be taken first on the French draft resolution, considered as an amendment to the Soviet proposal in M. Gromyko's letter of 6th April. The Soviet representative associated himself with the French resolution, which received only the French, Polish and Soviet votes and was therefore rejected.

67. The Soviet representative thereupon stated that, in view of the Soviet-Persian agreement on all questions in dispute and of the withdrawal of the Persian complaint, the Soviet delegation considered that the Council's decision to keep the matter on its agenda was contrary to the Charter. It would therefore be impossible for them to take part in any future discussion of the question.

68. On 6th May, pursuant to the Council's resolution of 4th April, the Persian Ambassador addressed to the President of the Security Council a letter (Annex H) containing an interim report on the withdrawal of Soviet troops, which explained *inter alia*, that it had not been possible for the Persian Government to verify whether the province of Azerbaijan had been completely evacuated, since they were precluded from direct investigation by the Soviet interference already

complained of. No communication was received by the Security Council from the Soviet Government. On 8th May the Security Council met in the absence of the Soviet representative, and the United States representative proposed the following resolution:—

"*Resolved*: that in view of the statement made by the Iranian Government in its preliminary report of 6th May, submitted in compliance with the resolution of 4th April, 1946, that it was not able as of 6th May to state whether the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran had been completed, the Council defer further proceedings on the Iranian matter in order that the Government of Iran may have time in which to ascertain through its official representatives whether all Soviet troops have been withdrawn from the whole of Iran; that the Iranian Government be requested to submit a complete report on the subject to the Security Council immediately upon the receipt of information which will enable it so to do, and that in case it is unable to obtain such information by 20th May, it report on that day such information as is available to it; and that immediately following the receipt from the Iranian Government of the report requested the Council shall consider what, if any, further proceedings are required."

69. The Australian representative expressed agreement, but drew attention to the absence of the Soviet representative, which, he said, created a dangerous precedent affecting all members of the Council. He suggested that the Council should consider at an early date the implications of the absence of one of its members, and in particular whether that member should be deemed to have waived its special privileges under the Charter. The Australian delegation, for its part, had an open mind on whether the voting rules were affected by such action, but it feared a possible challenge to the legality of action by Council in the absence of a member. Furthermore, the members of the Council represented and were responsible to all the United Nations, whether their position derived from election or from special mention in the Charter. If a member could absent itself, and by so doing prevent action by the Council, it would undermine the foundation of the latter's position. The Council was entitled to ask whether such a claim was in fact made by the Soviet delegation or what the latter considered to be the implications of their absence.

70. After supporting the United States draft resolution the United Kingdom representative expressed gratitude to the Australian representative for raising these points, but suggested that he had exaggerated the consequences of the absence of the Soviet representative. The Council's business had not been halted and there was no rule as to a quorum, except perhaps that Article 27 of the Charter implied a quorum of seven. If a member chose to absent itself and so abdicate its representative function, that was a matter for that member's conscience. But it did not affect the voting position any more than the abstention from voting of a member present at a meeting. The present position, therefore, seemed to him less grave than the Australian representative had depicted it, or at all events not to constitute a new problem.

71. The Netherlands representative said he had thought the draft resolution, being procedural, could be adopted in the absence of the Soviet representative. But the Council would have to consider the point raised by the Australian representative as to whether the absence of one member prevented the adoption of even such a resolution. He considered that it did not, and recalled that this point of view had been adopted by the Council on a previous occasion. He reserved his position on whether the absence of a permanent member would prevent the adoption of a decision of substance.

72. The Chairman then enquired whether any delegate opposed the draft resolution. As there was no opposition he declared it adopted.

73. On 20th May, in pursuance of this resolution, the Persian Ambassador addressed to the President of the Security Council a letter in the following terms:—

"In compliance with the resolutions of the Security Council of 4th April and 8th May, 1946, and with reference to the report submitted on 6th May, 1946, on behalf of the Government of Iran, I beg to state that there is not sufficient first-hand information available to my Government as to the true state of affairs throughout Azerbaijan to make the complete report requested by the Security Council.

"Such information as is available to me up to 5 o'clock this afternoon is to the effect that, as a consequence of the interferences previously

complained of, the Iranian Government is still being prevented from exercising any effective authority in the Province of Azerbaijan and that Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Iran has not ceased. It has, therefore, not been possible to make such investigation as is required to establish that all of the Soviet troops have been withdrawn from the whole of Iran and, in particular, to investigate reports that Soviet soldiers have been left in Azerbaijan in civilian clothes and that military equipment had been placed at the disposal of those who challenge the sovereignty and territorial integrity of my country.

"While a commission has been appointed and is now stated to be in the city of Tabriz to make inquiries about conditions throughout the Province of Azerbaijan, it is doubtful that an adequate investigation can be conducted or a satisfactory report made by the Government of Iran until this Government is in a position to exercise its full authority throughout the Province of Azerbaijan.

"The deep concern of Iranians regarding the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of Iran and the maintenance of international peace and security is a matter of common knowledge. The disputes which my Government had believed would end by reason of the assurances of the Soviet Union given to the Security Council cannot be said, in reality, to have been resolved in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In the report of 6th May, 1946, I stated:—

"While it is hoped that arrangements can be made which will remove the unfortunate results of the interferences complained of, it is impossible to forecast at this time with certainty what the subsequent developments will be."

Unfortunately, the course of events since this statement was made has demonstrated that the threat to the integrity of Iran and to international peace has grown more serious.

"I have not received from my Government authentic information with respect to the reported clashes between Iranian troops and the military forces in Azerbaijan organised during the period of Soviet occupation. If the reports of armed conflict in this strategically critical area are true, obviously the danger to international peace and security is both serious and imminent."

74. On the 21st May the Persian Ambassador submitted a supplementary report as follows:—

"Yesterday I reported on behalf of my Government such information as was available to me up to 5 o'clock in the afternoon of 20th May, 1946, with respect to the question of the evacuation of Soviet troops from the whole of Iran and Soviet interferences in the internal affairs of my country. I referred to the commission appointed to make inquiries about conditions in Azerbaijan and have now received further information based upon telegraphic dispatches sent by the members of the Commission in Azerbaijan to my Government in Teheran.

"The information as transmitted to me at 4 o'clock this afternoon is, in translation, as follows:—

"In order to obtain information on the circumstances of evacuation of all parts of Azerbaijan, I despatched a commission of investigation from Teheran and in the course of one week it investigated carefully the regions of Azerbaijan such as following important centres: Tabriz and its suburbs, Marand, Julfa, Khoy, Salmas, Maju, Rezaeyeh and Mianduab.

"The telegraphic reports are to the effect that no trace whatever of Soviet troops, equipment or means of transport was found, and that, according to trustworthy local people who were questioned in all these places, Soviet troops evacuated Azerbaijan on 6th May."

(Signed) QAVAM-ES-SALTANEH."

75. The situation as modified by these communications was discussed by the Security Council on 22nd May, the Soviet representative still being absent. The French representative, who was President, expressed some regret at the manner of presentation of the Iranian case and, in particular, the contradiction between the Iranian Ambassador's two communications of 20th and 21st May, the first of

which had apparently been made without the instructions of the Persian Government.

76. The United States representative moved that action should be deferred, since in his view the Iranian Ambassador's letter of 21st May did not constitute a sufficient basis for immediate action: the report from the Iranian Prime Minister was incomplete and, moreover, the presence in Iran of Soviet troops was not the sole issue before the Council. He urged, however, that the Council should remain seized of the matter in order to show its continuing concern in a potentially dangerous situation.

77. The United Kingdom representative endorsed these remarks and said that he considered the latest Iranian report as an interim report only, since it was based partly on second and even third-hand information and did not state that the Iranian Government themselves were satisfied that the evacuation was complete. (Doubt on this point was fully justified by a subsequent announcement by the Soviet Government itself that evacuation was completed only on 10th May.) He questioned whether the Commission sent into Azerbaijan by the Tehran authorities had enjoyed complete liberty of movement and action, and he requested elucidation on the following points:—

- (1) What proportion of the territory formerly occupied by Soviet troops was represented by the places named in the Iranian Prime Minister's telegram?
- (2) Were the Iranian Government satisfied that the evacuation was complete?
- (3) What steps had the Commission taken to satisfy themselves as regards the removal of Soviet equipment and transport?
- (4) Had any investigation been made into current reports that Soviet soldiers had been left behind in Azerbaijan in civilian clothes?

Sir A. Cadogan explained his desire for fuller information on the grounds that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were directly interested as co-signatories to a treaty regarding the withdrawal of troops with the Soviet Government, who had so far given no explanation why they had not carried out the treaty.

78. The Polish representative, like the President, expressed regret at the manner in which the Iranian case had been presented; and he deplored the retention of the Iranian question on the Council's agenda. He asked whether the Iranian complaint still stood and whether M. Ala's letter of 20th May implied a new situation. He claimed that the Iranian Prime Minister's telegram covered the whole of Azerbaijan and that the Council should accept the statement therein that he was satisfied and regard the case as closed.

79. At the Netherlands representative's request, the Iranian Ambassador was then invited to sit at the Council table in order to give further information. In reply to a question of Dr. van Kleffens as to whether the original Iranian complaint regarding interference was on the table again, M. Ala stated that in his view it was. He said that his letter of 15th April withdrawing the Iranian complaint had been concerned only with evacuation of troops, and the information contained in the Iranian Prime Minister's latest message was inconclusive. As regards the regret expressed by the President and the Polish representative over the manner of presentation of the Iranian case, M. Ala pointed out that he had been bound by the time-limit set by the Security Council to present such information as he had by 20th May, and the information submitted subsequently had been received later than that date.

80. The Polish representative then asked the following questions:—

- (1) Having regard to the withdrawal of the Iranian case in M. Ala's letter of 15th April, did M. Ala mean that the Iranian Government had now lost their confidence in the Soviet Government, or did the withdrawal of the complaint still stand?
- (2) Did the Iranian Government agree with Mr. Byrnes's statement in an earlier discussion that the withdrawal of the troops without condition was the only sane method of solving the question of interference; or had the Iranian Government any further demand to make in addition to the withdrawal of the troops?
- (3) If the Iranian Government considered that interference still existed in spite of the withdrawal of troops, did they consider that the Soviet Union was the only Great Power interfering in the affairs of Iran?
- (4) Were all the terms mentioned in the Iranian Prime Minister's telegram in Western Azerbaijan; and did they include all important centres or not?

81. As regards question (1), M. Ala stated that the Iranian Government continued to have confidence in the Soviet Union, but the difficulty was that the Soviet Government had protected and trained the insurgents in Azerbaijan, where the Iranian Government had absolutely no authority. This constituted interference, and it could not be said that interference had ceased. For example, the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran had taken part in negotiations between the Iranian Government and the Azerbaijan authorities, and had urged the Iranian Prime Minister to agree to everything the insurgents wanted. So it was not possible for him to say that the question should as yet be taken off the agenda. In reply to question (2), while it had been hoped that the withdrawal of troops would mean cessation of interference, this was not, in fact, what had actually happened. To question (3) he replied that except for the interference he had mentioned, there was no interference by other Powers in Iranian affairs. The British troops had been withdrawn, and the United States troops had never interfered. Finally, the answer to question (4) was that all the centres mentioned were in Western Azerbaijan, and the districts referred to did not constitute even one half of Azerbaijan. Moreover, the Soviet troops had not been stationed only in towns; they had been in villages and country districts, and consequently the Iranian Prime Minister's telegram did not imply that the whole of Azerbaijan had been evacuated by Soviet troops or even visited by the Commission.

82. The Polish representative thereupon asked for further elucidation on the following points:—

- (1) M. Ala had said that the Iranian Government had not been able to send its agents to Azerbaijan, and yet the Iranian Prime Minister had spoken of a Commission. Had they actually visited Azerbaijan, or had they merely flown over it in an aeroplane?
- (2) M. Ala had stated that he could not say that Soviet troops had been withdrawn from the whole of Azerbaijan; yet the Iranian Prime Minister declared that they had.
- (3) Did the withdrawal of the Iranian case on 15th April still stand, and, if so, was M. Ala making a new complaint?

83. Here the United States representative intervened to say that he felt, after hearing what the Iranian representative had to say, that it would be more than ever a mistake to drop the Iranian question. He suggested a later meeting of the Council at the discretion of the President. The Australian representative then observed that, while information as to whether the Iranian Government maintained their complaint before the Security Council might be interesting and useful, it did not affect the main question of whether the Council remained seized of the matter—which the Council had decided that it did. The President commented that he was sure that the Polish representative was only asking for the views of the Iranian Government as regards their complaint for the information of the Council; and M. Lange confirmed this.

84. The Iranian representative then answered the Polish representative's further questions as follows:—

- (1) He (M. Ala) had said that the Tehran Government did not exercise authority over Azerbaijan. This was so. The sending of a Commission had only been a temporary matter and those sent had presumably been chosen with the approval of the authorities in Tabriz. As it happened, they had travelled in a Soviet aircraft.
- (2) If the statement in the Iranian Prime Minister's telegram were read carefully in its context it would be seen that the Prime Minister was only quoting reports of "trustworthy local people."
- (3) The Persian Government's complaint had been withdrawn on the strength of promises made as regards the removal of troops by a specified date; but the question still stood on the agenda as a result of the decision of the Security Council, which the Iranian Government respected.

85. In the course of further discussion, the President, speaking as the representative of France, said that he had hoped that the telegram from the Iranian Prime Minister would have helped the Security Council to reach a satisfactory solution. He asked whether the Security Council could not agree to leave the question on the agenda for a short while on the understanding that if no contradictory information were received from the Iranian Government within, say, a week, the question should be dropped. The United Kingdom representative opposed this suggestion and pointed out that if the Iranian Government were to declare that for their part they were satisfied that the evacuation

was complete, that would be one factor which would help the Security Council to reach a decision. The United States representative agreed. The Polish representative said that he interpreted the Iranian Prime Minister's telegram as meaning that he was satisfied that the evacuation was complete. If other members wished, however, the Council could ask the Iranian Government to state whether this was in fact so.

86. The Netherlands representative demurred on the ground that the Iranian Government's position was difficult enough already without the Security Council asking these embarrassing questions. He proposed that the discussion be adjourned till a date in the near future, with the proviso that the Council could be called together for this purpose at the request of any member. The United Kingdom representative said that M. Ala would no doubt report to his Government, who would see that one of the elements necessary for the Council to take a decision would be a plain declaration by them as to whether they considered the evacuation of Iran to be complete. The President thereupon put the Netherlands representative's proposal to the vote, and it was adopted by nine votes to one, France opposing. A vote was then taken as to whether a telegram should be sent to the Iranian Government as suggested by the Polish representative. Only two representatives (France and Poland) voted in favour of this, and the proposal was therefore not adopted.

Annex A

Letter of 18th March from Persian Ambassador to President of Security Council

PURSUANT to Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations, Iran brings to the attention of the Security Council a dispute between Iran and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. This dispute has arisen by reason of new developments since the adoption by the Security Council of the resolution of 30th January, 1946, relating to the earlier dispute between the U.S.S.R. and Iran. The U.S.S.R. is maintaining Soviet troops in Iranian territory after 2nd March, 1946, contrary to the express provisions of Article V of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of 29th January, 1942. Furthermore, the U.S.S.R. is continuing to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran through the medium of Soviet agents, officials and armed forces. These acts are in violation of the aforesaid treaty, and also in violation of the Declaration of Teheran and the Charter of the United Nations. The immediate and just solution of this dispute by the Security Council is of the greatest importance to the preservation of the good relations with the U.S.S.R. which Iran wishes to maintain as an independent and sovereign State, and to the survival of the purposes and principles which the members of the United Nations have solemnly undertaken to respect.

Annex B

Letter from the Soviet Representative to the Secretary-General dated 19th March, 1946

ON behalf of the Soviet Government I ask you to take steps in order to postpone the date of the meeting of the Security Council from 25th March to 10th April. The question which was raised by the Iranian Government before the Security Council is unexpected for the Soviet Government, since negotiations between the Iranian Government and the Government of the U.S.S.R. are being conducted at the present time.

In view of the above the Soviet Government is not prepared now to take part in the discussion of the question raised by the Iranian Government in the Security Council. In order to secure the necessary preparation of the Soviet Government to participate in the consideration of this question in the Security Council, naturally some time is required. That is why the Soviet Government suggests to postpone the meeting of the Security Council until 10th April.

Annex C

Letter from the Persian Ambassador to the Secretary-General dated 20th March, 1946

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note enclosing a copy of a letter from the Soviet Ambassador requesting on behalf of his Government a delay in the meeting of the Security Council until 10th April, 1946.

In reply, may I respectfully ask that you inform the members of the Council of the earnest hope of the Government of Iran that consideration of this matter will not be delayed. At the conference in London decision was postponed upon the merits of the earlier dispute pending negotiations between the parties. These negotiations have failed. Meanwhile, 2nd March, the date fixed by the Tripartite Treaty, has passed and the Soviet troops have not been withdrawn. The obligation of the Soviet Government to withdraw its forces from Iran is not a proper subject for negotiation under the Charter of the United Nations or the constitution of Iran.

The delays thus far permitted have intensified the critical conditions in my country caused by the failure of the Soviet Union to withdraw these troops. The state of affairs is very grave and further delays would inevitably result in increased harm to the interests of Iran.

I shall be greatly obliged if you will have the kindness to communicate these views immediately to the members of the Security Council.

Annex D

Letter from the Soviet Representative to the President of the Security Council, dated 6th April, 1946

ON 26th March, when the Security Council proceeded to consider the Iranian Government's statement of 18th March regarding the delay in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, I proposed, under instructions from the Soviet Government, that this question should not be considered by the Security Council.

I pointed out on that occasion that, under the understanding with the Iranian Government, full evacuation of the Soviet troops from Iran was started on 24th March and would be completed in five or six weeks, and that in consequence the Security Council had no reason to consider the Iranian question.

The Security Council, however, did not agree with the Soviet Government and retained the Iranian question on the agenda. In the meantime, the Soviet-Iranian negotiations continued and, as is known from the joint Soviet-Iranian communiqué published on 4th April, an understanding on all points was reached between the Soviet and the Iranian Governments.

This has fully confirmed the accuracy of the Soviet Government's statement of 26th March and the absence of any reason for bringing the Iranian question before the Security Council for consideration.

The Soviet Government, moreover, cannot ignore the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 4th April. Under this resolution the Security Council decided to continue the consideration of the Iranian question on 6th May, despite the fact that on 3rd April the Soviet Government stated that the question of the evacuation of Soviet troops had been settled by an understanding reached between the Soviet and the Iranian Governments. Such a resolution of the Security Council might have been well-founded if the position in Iran had threatened international peace and security, as provided in Article 34 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Under the Charter, the Security Council may investigate any dispute or any situation which might endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. It is, however, quite obvious that in fact such a position did not and does not now exist in Iran, so that the Security Council had no reason to give further consideration to the Iranian question on 6th May.

Accordingly, the above-mentioned resolution of the Security Council of 4th April is incorrect and illegal, being in conflict with the Charter of the United Nations.

For the above-mentioned reasons the Soviet Government insists that the Iranian question should be removed from the agenda of the Security Council.

Annex E

Translation of joint Soviet-Persian communiqué of 4th April, 1946

THE negotiations begun in Moscow between the Prime Minister of Persia and the Soviet authorities were continued in Tehran after the Prime Minister's return and the arrival of the Soviet Ambassador. These negotiations ended on 4th April and complete agreement was reached on all outstanding questions, viz. :—

- (1) All Soviet forces will have evacuated Persian territory within a period of one and a half months from 24th March, 1946.
- (2) An agreement for the formation of a joint Irano-Soviet oil company, with the conditions governing it, will be submitted to the fifteenth Majlis for its approval within seven months after 24th March.
- (3) Concerning Azerbaijan, as it is an internal problem, the Persian Government, taking into consideration the necessity of reforms in accordance with existing laws, will make the necessary arrangements with the people of Azerbaijan for a solution of present difficulties in a benevolent spirit.

Annex F

Extract from Secretary-General's Memorandum of 16th April regarding Retention of Persian Question on Agenda of the Security Council

On 16th March, 1946, the Iranian representative brought to the attention of the Security Council, pursuant to Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Charter, "a dispute between Iran and the U.S.S.R., the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." On 8th April the Council "resolved that the Council defer further proceedings on the Iranian appeal until 6th May." On 15th April the Iranian representative informed the Security Council that the Iranian Government "withdraws its complaints from the Security Council." Previously the Soviet representative had requested "that the Iranian question should be removed from the agenda of the Security Council."

The issue considered yesterday in the Security Council is whether the question can properly be retained on the agenda in view of the fact that both parties now have requested that it be removed.

The powers of the Security Council are set forth in Chapter VI of the Charter in the following manner :—

Under Article 33 the Council may call upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by negotiations, enquiry, &c. Under Article 34 it may investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute. Under Article 36 it may recommend appropriate procedures for the settlement of a dispute under Article 33, or of a situation of like nature. Under Article 37 the Council may decide to take action under Article 36 if it deems that the continuance of a dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Finally, under Article 38 it may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to pacific settlements.

It is to be noted that the Security Council can be seized of a dispute or situation in one of three ways :—

1. Under Article 35 by a State.
2. Under Article 34 by the Security Council itself.
3. Under Article 99 by the Secretary-General.

In the present case, Article 99 is obviously not applicable. The Security Council has taken no action under Article 34, i.e., it has not ordered an investigation, which is the only action possible under that Article. It is therefore not applicable at this time and cannot become applicable until an investigation is ordered.

The Council was originally seized of the dispute under Article 35, paragraph 1. Now that Iran has withdrawn its complaints, the Council can take no action under Articles 33, 36, 37 or 38, since the necessary conditions for applying these Articles (namely, a dispute between two or more parties) do not exist. The

only Article under which it can act at all is Article 34. But that Article, as has already been said, can only be invoked by a vote to investigate, which has not been taken or even suggested in this case.

It is therefore arguable that following withdrawal by the Iranian representative, the question is automatically removed from the agenda, unless—

- (a) The Security Council voted an investigation under Article 34, or
- (b) A member brings it up as a situation or dispute under Article 35, or
- (c) The Council proceeds under Article 36, paragraph 1, which would appear to require a preliminary finding that a dispute exists under Article 33, or that there is "a situation of like nature."

An argument which may be made against the view of automatic removal from the agenda is that once a matter is brought to the attention of the Council it is no longer a matter solely between the original parties, but one in which the Council collectively has an interest, as representing the whole of the United Nations. This may well be true; but, it would appear that the only way in which, under the Charter, the Council can exercise that interest is under Article 34, or under Article 36, paragraph 1. Since the Council has not chosen to invoke Article 34 in the only way in which it can be invoked, *i.e.*, through voting an investigation, and has not chosen to invoke Article 36, paragraph 1, by deciding that a dispute exists under Article 33 or that there is a situation of like nature, it may well be that there is no way in which it can remain seized of the matter.

Annex G

Report of Chairman of the Committee of Experts of the Security Council regarding the Secretary-General's Memorandum on 16th April, 1946

At its meeting on 16th April, 1946, the Security Council decided to refer to the Committee of Experts for examination and report the letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council concerning the question of the retention of the Iranian case on the agenda of the Security Council.

The Committee of Experts met for this purpose on 17th April, 1946, and in the first place sought to define its terms of reference. It decided that, by reason of the technical nature of its competence, it would study from an abstract point of view, without referring to the concrete case submitted to the Security Council, the problem whether the Security Council can remain seized of a matter after the interest parties have requested its withdrawal. It likewise decided for the same reasons that, whilst it was within its competence to consider and criticise the legal arguments put forward in the Secretary-General's memorandum on the basis of such observations as a study of this document had suggested to its members, it would not proceed to a detailed study of the memorandum.

The Committee then went on to consider the question of substance. There was agreement in principle that, when a matter has been submitted to the Security Council by a party, it cannot be withdrawn from the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized without a decision by the Security Council.

It seemed all the more necessary to define these points exactly since the Secretary-General's memorandum, which was criticised in this respect by several delegates, referred to an automatic process which seemed to exclude intervention by the Security Council.

But the very freedom of decision of the Security Council was challenged, and the Committee was divided in this respect between two opposing views.

Whilst certain delegates were of the opinion that if the parties to a dispute ask the Security Council to drop the matter—particularly when they have reached an agreement—the Security Council must decide accordingly, other delegates, on the other hand, thought that the Security Council's freedom of judgment and decision remain unimpaired.

I

Certain delegates observed in this connection that the Secretary-General's memorandum had put the problem on too narrow a basis, since it referred only to a dispute, and since it treated such a dispute merely as a lawsuit between two parties. Such a definition implied an inexact understanding, in the first place of the functions of the Security Council (which is not a Court of Justice), and in the second place of the nature of its competence, which includes the consideration

of situations, and which in any case far exceeds the narrow framework within which the memorandum would tend to confine it.

This was the opinion expressed, with variations, by the delegates of Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, Mexico, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. Some of these delegates observed that, for the Security Council to drop the matter, it is not enough for the parties to the dispute to have come to an agreement. It would be a mistake, in their opinion, to regard the problem from a purely legalistic point of view. The Charter has in fact invested the Security Council, especially under Article 24, with certain political functions of primordial importance, by conferring on it the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Moreover, Article 1, to which Article 24 refers, stipulates that the pacific settlement of disputes shall be brought about in conformity with the principles of justice and international law. The Security Council may hold that, even after an agreement has been reached between the parties, circumstances may continue to exist (for example, the conditions under which the agreement has been negotiated) which might still leave room for fears regarding the maintenance of peace, and which justify the question being retained among the matters entrusted to its care.

The Security Council may, even when the parties announce that they have reached an agreement, find it necessary to remain seized of the matter until the whole or part of the agreement has been executed, or even longer.

Several delegates of the same group drew the Committee's attention to the mistake which the memorandum seems to have made in failing to distinguish clearly between the decision by which the Security Council becomes seized of a question and any decision which it might take under Article 34. The decision by which the Security Council is seized of a question is absolutely independent of and distinct from the measures which it may decide to take under Article 34.

Several delegates of the same group questioned the argument in the memorandum which seemed to imply that unless the Security Council takes a decision under Article 34 or 36 it cannot remain seized of a dispute the withdrawal of which has been requested.

Several delegates of the same group expressed the opinion that Article 35 (1) proves that the action of the Security Council in its rôle as guardian of the peace is quite independent of the strictly legal circumstances in which a dispute develops, since, according to that text, it is not necessarily a party to a dispute which has to bring it to the attention of the Security Council. Any Member of the Organisation may draw the Security Council's attention both to situations and to disputes involving certain specified States.

II

On the other hand, according to the opinion of the delegates of France, Poland and the U.S.S.R., the rules governing the procedure for the withdrawal of a question submitted to the Security Council vary according to whether a dispute or situation is involved. The notion of a dispute is of a subjective nature. It is essentially a conflict between two or more States, which exist only by virtue of the opposition between the interested parties.

The same delegates maintained that it is in conformity with common sense, logic, and law to affirm that if all the parties to a dispute have reached an agreement, the threat to the maintenance of peace from the prolongation of such a dispute thereby disappears. If the parties to a dispute have reached an agreement after negotiations which they have undertaken, either voluntarily or in fulfilment of a recommendation made by the Security Council in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter, and if they ask the Security Council to drop the dispute in question, the Security Council is bound to do so, after having noted that their agreement has put an end to the dispute.

With regard to the notion of a "situation," it has, in the opinion of the same group, a clearly objective character. As in the case in which the attention of the Security Council is drawn to a dispute by a Member not a party to this dispute, a "situation" exists independently of the Member of the Organisation which may have brought it to the attention of the Security Council. The Security Council may remain seized of it even if the Member which has brought it to the attention of the Security Council declares its desire to withdraw the communication which it had made in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Charter.

Moreover, two hypotheses should be envisaged: the case in which the dispute originally submitted to the Security Council has reached the point where other parties are concerned other than those originally involved, and the case in which

a new situation has arisen out of the original dispute. In each case the question is a different one from that originally submitted to the Security Council. It may be brought to the attention of the Security Council by a Member of the Organisation under Article 35 (1) of the Charter, or else the Security Council itself may take it up under Article 34 of the Charter.

It follows from what has been said above that the Committee of Experts has not been able to formulate a common opinion on the question put to it by the Security Council.

Annex H

Letter of 6th May, 1946, from Persian Ambassador to President of the Security Council

On 4th April, 1946, the Security Council resolved "that the Council defer further proceedings on the Iranian appeal until 6th May, 1946, at which time the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government are requested to report to the Council whether the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran has been completed and at which time the Council shall consider what, if any, further proceedings on the Iranian appeal are required."

The Iranian appeal set forth in the letter of 18th March, 1946, related to two matters which, it was stated, were likely to endanger international peace and security. The first of these referred to the maintenance of Soviet troops on Iranian territory after 2nd March, 1946; and the second (which was first presented to the Council at its meetings in London) referred to Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Iran.

With respect to the withdrawal of the troops, the Soviet Union has officially informed the Security Council that the evacuation would be completed during a period of one and one-half months from 24th March, 1946.

For the reasons hereinafter stated, it is impossible for me to make a complete report at this time. On the basis of the information received by me from my Government up to 5 o'clock this afternoon, I am able, however, to present to the Council the following report:—

Soviet troops have now been completely evacuated from the provinces of Khorassan, Gorgan, Mazandaran and Gilan. This information is based upon investigations made by responsible officials of the Government of Iran.

So far as the province of Azerbaijan is concerned, the Government has been informed through other sources that the evacuation of Soviet troops from that province has been going forward and, it is said, will have been completed before 7th May, 1946. These reports have not been verified by direct observations of officials of the Iranian Government. The reason for this is that, as previously pointed out to the Council, the Iranian Government has been unable, because of the interferences complained of, to exercise effective authority within Azerbaijan since 7th November, 1945, and from that time to the present has had no opportunity to ascertain through its own officials what are the conditions prevailing throughout that province. While it is hoped that arrangements can be made which will remove the unfortunate results of the interferences complained of, it is impossible to forecast at this time with certainty what the subsequent developments will be.

As soon as the Iranian Government is able to ascertain through its official representatives the true state of affairs in the province of Azerbaijan, the facts will be reported promptly to the Council.

[E 9431/5/G]

No. 24

Mr. Bevin to Mr. Le Rougetel (Tehran).

(No. 291.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, 21st September, 1946.

I MET the Iranian Ambassador to-day and he raised with me the request that the Persian Government has made to us to recall Mr. Trott. He explained to me that two letters had been shown to you but he did not regard that as conclusive evidence. I informed him that I also had seen that report and it was very difficult to regard letters of introduction as evidence of plotting.

2. The Ambassador went on to say that the men who had been arrested had confessed to the whole business and the Government had come across more evidence which clearly showed that Mr. Trott was associated with the stirring up of the tribes.

3. The Ambassador said that the Iranian Government were particularly anxious that this incident should not cause difficulty between the two countries, neither did they want to involve His Majesty's Government in this matter. I pointed out to him that while on the one hand the policy of His Majesty's Government was not to interfere in these troubles at all or in any of the internal affairs of another country where we had such great interests, it was a serious thing to remove an official without evidence that he had been guilty of the charge.

4. I suggested that the Prime Minister should see you again and if he had more evidence than these letters he should be frank with us and show it to you so that it could be examined and reported to us. I informed the Iranian Ambassador that I had sent for a complete report on the whole of this matter and I was awaiting further telegrams and would deal with the matter as early as I possibly could.

5. The Ambassador read to me from a document in Persian certain statements which were rather difficult to follow, and I asked him if he would be good enough to translate the message and send it to Sir Orme Sargent at once so that we could examine it. This he undertook to do.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

[E 9741/5/G]

No. 25

Mr. Bevin to Mr. Le Rougetel (Tehran).

(No. 304.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, 26th September, 1946.

THE Persian Ambassador came to see me to-day at his own request and asked me if I had any information to give him about Mr. Trott. I said that after seeing him—the Ambassador—on the 21st September I had called for a full report and that I would discuss the matter with him immediately this was received.

2. The Ambassador told me that some time ago the Persian Government had captured certain documents which had disclosed that there would be a rising of the Kashgai tribe on the 21st September. Everything foreshadowed in this captured information had in fact come to pass, including the arrival of mystery ships off Bushire. I immediately asked him why the Persian Prime Minister had not shown you this information as soon as it was received. The only knowledge which I had was the story of two letters of introduction which apparently Mr. Trott just passed on without reading.

3. The Persian Government, the Ambassador added, also had information which implicated not only Mr. Trott but also an ex-Consul, though he did not give the name of the latter. The confessions of a number of captured Kashgai tribesmen showed that Mr. Trott had had a long association with the tribes. The Ambassador also said that his Government knew that Mr. Trott had in fact met a number of people in the tribal area during his recent visit. He again pressed for his withdrawal.

4. I urged him to produce the evidence; we would certainly study it. His Majesty's Government could not act on the very flimsy material which had been submitted to them up to now. We did not withdraw officers except on very good grounds.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

Mr. Bevin to Mr. Farquhar (Tehran)

(No. 1104)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, 30th September, 1946

YOUR telegram No. 1554 [of 26th September: Persian request for recall of His Majesty's Consul-General at Ahwaz].

In the light of this further information I am now satisfied that Mr. Trott was not in any way implicated in the Isfahan plot and I shall be glad if you will now seek an interview with the Prime Minister and urge him to withdraw his request for Mr. Trott's recall. You should point out that in spite of my request, the Persian Government have failed to produce any proof of Mr. Trott's complicity and that His Majesty's Government cannot accept, without substantiation, mere allegations, by whomsoever they may be made, that British representatives have been implicated in the plot. You should go on to say that His Majesty's consular officers in Persia have clear instructions not to interfere in any way in the internal affairs of the country and that on my instructions you have made searching enquiries and satisfied yourself that no consular officer has contravened these instructions or given any encouragement whatever to subversive elements. Mr. Trott in particular, as Qawam himself will know, is a consular officer of great experience, calm and level-headed, and a person who would not in any circumstances lend himself to unauthorised intrigues. You should leave the Prime Minister in no doubt that His Majesty's Government take a very serious view of this matter and that they take strong exception to the references which have been made both in Persian official statements and in the Persian press to British complicity in the plot.

2. I have given careful consideration to the recommendation in your telegram No. 1547 of 25th September that His Majesty's Government should now make a public statement denying all connexion with the Kashgai rising. It will clearly be necessary at some stage to make some sort of public pronouncement, if only to rebut the allegations which have been made against us, and I would be prepared to make this statement in the way Qawam appears to wish if Qawam, for his part, is prepared to adopt a more accommodating attitude. An essential condition would be the withdrawal of the request for Mr. Trott's recall. I would also hope to receive some assurance that he is prepared to control the anti-British activities of the Tudeh extremists and the anti-British outbursts of the Left-wing press. I should certainly want to feel sure that, if as a result of our moral support, opposition were to be easily overcome, he would not be likely to take advantage of the situation either to exact severe reprisals on the tribes (who have, after all, been our friends in the past) or to come to terms with the Left-wing extremists and agree to form a common front with the Communist organisations.

3. You may speak to Qawam generally on the lines indicated above. You may point out that I have for some time wanted to put Anglo-Persian relations on a more satisfactory footing (compare my telegram No. 1026 of 11th September) and that indeed the policy of His Majesty's Government, in spite of many discouragements, has consistently been the development and maintenance of friendly relations with Persia, a country which they hope to see strong and independent. It was in accordance with this policy that they supported the Persian case before the Security Council, when the country's independence appeared to be in grave danger. You may go on to say that I had hoped that the Prime Minister's earlier assurances to you (your telegram No. 1423 of 3rd September) coupled with the friendly approach which his representative had made to me in Paris (my telegram No. 2 to you from Paris of 1st September) were an indication that the Persian Government reciprocated His Majesty's Government's desire for really close and friendly relations.

4. When reporting the result of your interview with Qawam, I shall be glad if you will give me your suggestions as to the form which the proposed statement should take.

(1)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 24, Secret, for the Period 17th June to 23rd June, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 218 of 26th June; Received 3rd July.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

A translation of the Persian Government's communiqué referred to in paragraph 1 of last Intelligence Summary is given as an appendix to this Summary. His Majesty's Acting Consul-General in Tabriz reports that there are signs that the agreement between the Central Government and the Azerbaijan Government has caused a split in the ranks of the Democrat Party there. There is an unconfirmed report of an attempt on the life of Jaafar Pishevari. Ghulam Reza Ilhami, the Minister of Finance, and Muhammad Biriya, the Minister of Education in the Azerbaijan Government, who represent the Extreme Left and who have always stood out for complete independence, are dissatisfied with the agreement. The present Government of Azerbaijan is weak and muddle-headed. Dr. Javid, the new Governor-General, is not the man to improve it, as, apart from being dishonest and stupid, he has no influence over the Democrat Party or its "Fidais" (volunteer forces).

2. Muzaffar Firuz, the Political Under-Secretary of State in the Persian Prime Minister's office, in an interview with the press on his return from Tabriz, gave the following replies to questions:—

- (i) That Dr. Salamullah Javid had been appointed Governor-General of Azerbaijan.
- (ii) That, for the present, Mr. Pishevari occupies no Government post.
- (iii) That the elections would begin shortly. (Note.—There is a rumour that they have been postponed for two months, some say at the insistence of the Tudeh Party, which feels that its preparations are incomplete.)
- (iv) That all Allied forces, British, American and Russian, have completely evacuated Persia (in answer to a question about the alleged continuance of the occupation of Bushire by British troops).
- (v) That it was quite untrue that the newspapers of the Right had been suppressed.
- (vi) That the reason for the suppression of certain newspapers was the publication by them of articles calculated to embarrass the relations between the Persian Government and foreign Powers.
- (vii) That the Government was considering the adoption of a new name for the gendarmerie. (Note.—Colonel Schwarzkopf, in conversation with the British Military Attaché, said that, at a meeting held to discuss the new appellation, in which the Persian Government representatives could think of no suitable title, he felt some pride, as an American, in finding a word which was instantly accepted. The name selected was "nigger band." This surprising word is thought to be Colonel Schwarzkopf's version of "nigāhbān"—a watchman.)
- (viii) That the Azerbaijan Government's bank notes had never been current in Azerbaijan nor had they been observed in use in shops. (Note.—This statement was incorrect.)
- (ix) That a new law granting votes to women would be laid before the 15th Majlis when elected.
- (x) That a new law increasing the number of Deputies in ratio to electors would also be laid before the next Majlis.
- (xi) That the liberation of Seyyid Zia-ud-Din and others arrested at the same time was a matter for the legal authorities and competent tribunals.
- (xii) That he, Muzaffar Firuz, had been fortunate enough to secure agreement on the most ticklish question of all, namely, the evacuation by the Democrats of the Province of Khamseh (capital, Zenjan), which, though no part of Azerbaijan but forming part of the 1st and 2nd Ustans, had been occupied by them for the past six months. (Note.—Muzaffar Firuz's jubilation is premature, for Pishevari, in

a speech in Tabriz on the 17th June to the Democrat Party, declared that he was not satisfied over this point. The Persian Prime Minister had assured him that the exclusion of Khamseh from Azerbaijan was only a temporary measure. He could not agree even to that and said that the Azerbaijan Government would continue to treat Khamseh as part of Azerbaijan and would continue to maintain order there by means of their volunteer forces ("Fidais").

3. The Persian Prime Minister has sent a circular telegram to all Governors-General instructing them to change at once all town mayors and district governors ("Bakshdars") who have been in their present posts for more than one year. The reason given is that it is desirable that impartial officials should hold these posts during the next elections. It will be interesting to see just how long it takes the new incumbents to size up the election situation and to make their dispositions to ensure a steady income from both sides.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

4. The Azerbaijan Provincial Council has requested the Ministry of the Interior to allot a sum of 23 million rials for reforms to be undertaken in eastern and western Azerbaijan. Taking into consideration the former allotments to Azerbaijan, however, the Ministry of the Interior have approved a loan from the National Bank of 8 million rials to be placed at the disposal of the Governor-General of Azerbaijan.

Kurdistan.

5. According to the Minister for War, the recent fighting lasted about ten days and ceased, for the moment at least, on the 20th June. In their attacks on Saqqiz the Kurds appear to have lost heavily—General Razmara estimating their losses at over 200 killed and wounded. Ghazi Muhammad of Mahabad, who has met General Razmara and is expected to arrive in Tehran shortly, denies that his followers have broken the recently made truce and asserts that the assailants of Saqqiz were either the followers of Hama Rashid or of Mulla Mustafa Barzani, i.e., Iraqi Kurds in either case. General Razmara has also arrived in Tehran for "consultations," though his visit may be in connexion with the vacant appointment of Chief of the General Staff (see paragraph 18 below).

Hamadan.

6. By the end of May all resistance to the Democrats by the Government partisans had petered out. As previously stated (paragraph 6 of Intelligence Summary No. 14), the reasons were the cessation of support in arms and ammunition from the capital, jealousies among the leaders and the seasonal demands of agriculture. Hidayetullah Yamini has disbanded his followers and the Zulfiqaris followed suit and retired to Hamadan, thus leaving open the road to Bijar. The Democrat forces appear to be based on Zarinabad, from whence they pillage the surrounding countryside, dividing up amongst themselves all movable property.

Khorasan.

7. His Majesty's Consul-General reports that the Russians have been making heavy purchases of sheep and goats for export to Russia. The deal is said to have been concluded through a Jew and the figures given are as high as 60,000. Local religious opinion has been roused against this depletion of Persia's livestock.

8. Local propaganda by the Tudeh for the next elections is in full blast. It is anti-British and anti-American in tone.

9. Security has not improved, and on or about the 15th June five passenger buses on their way to Tehran from Meshed were held up and looted near Sabzawar.

Khuzistan.

10. It was reported in the Tehran press that the newly formed Provincial Council of Khuzistan at Ahwaz had transmitted to the Central Government in Tehran a resolution requesting that the province should be given the same privileges that have been granted to Azerbaijan. It is not known to what extent

the "Saadat" Party (who seem to have a majority in the Khuzistan Provincial Council) are the sponsors of this request or whether the Arabs (who recently approached His Majesty's Consul at Khorramshahr to enquire what should be their attitude to Tudeh infiltration) are the prime movers. Hitherto the Azerbaijan Democrats (in order to prove that they favoured no separatist movement) and the Tudeh both strongly advocated the formation of Provincial Councils throughout Persia and claimed that the reforms which they demanded for Azerbaijan should also be given to the rest of Persia. It is not expected, however, that their approval will extend to movements sponsored by adherents of other parties even though the professed aims be identical.

11. No further news of disturbances in the A.I.O.C. concessional area has been received, but an interesting development in the dispute between the company and its labour is the attendance at a Tudeh meeting on the 16th June in Abadan of about 200 Indian artisans.

12. A commission comprising Aramish, Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Commerce and Mines, Saqavi and Kaviani has left for Abadan in order to implement the recently passed Labour Law. Kaviani will remain in Abadan as the Labour representative of the Persian Government.

13. The Governor-General of Khuzistan has arrived in Tehran for consultations with the Persian Prime Minister. He intends to ask for stronger support and more definite instructions from the Central Government in his task of maintaining order in his province.

14. The Russian Consul-General and Vice-Consul from Ahwaz recently visited Khorramshahr and made detailed enquiries from the Governor as to British activities and the attitude of the Arab Sheikhs towards the Tudeh.

Appointments.

15.—(i) Abbas Forouhar (F.O. 69) to be Persian Minister to Yugoslavia.

(ii) Dr. Salamullah Javid to be Governor-General of Ustans 3 and 4 (eastern and western Azerbaijan). He was Minister of the Interior in the Azerbaijan Government. Little is known of his past. He is believed to be a Jew from Meshed.

The Court.

16. Princess Ashraf is to visit Moscow shortly at the invitation of the Soviet Red Cross to inspect their organisations in Russia. In conversation with His Royal Highness Prince Peter of Greece, now on his way through Persia to Afghanistan, Princess Ashraf stated that she was apprehensive about the safety of the Pahlevi dynasty and thought that the establishment of more cordial relations with the Soviet Government might partially dispel their hostility to Reza Shah's descendants.

Persian Army.

17. The case against General Hasan Arfa, the former Chief of the General Staff, still drags on. The preliminary investigation of the first charge—that of supplying Government arms to subversive elements—has been completed and the Public Prosecutor has informed the military tribunal that, *prima facie*, there is no case against General Arfa. Investigation under the second charge—of activities dangerous to the safety of the State—has not yet been commenced and, bail not being admissible for anyone charged under this clause, General Arfa remains in military custody.

18. The resignation, on grounds of ill health, of General Aghevli from the appointment of Chief of the General Staff has been accepted. The Persian Prime Minister informed the Minister for War that he would accept either General Razmara or General Abdullah Hidayet as Chief of the General Staff. Later he expressed a strong preference for the former. This placed His Imperial Majesty the Shah in a difficult position, since he mistrusts General Razmara and yet did not feel strong enough to refuse Qawam-us-Saltaneh's choice in an appointment for which, as titular commander-in-chief of the army, he felt he should have the right to make his own selection or, at least, to turn down the appointment of an officer whose loyalty was doubtful.

19. The following promotions are published in the press:

Sartip Abdullah Hidayet, Under-Secretary of State for War (F.O. 81), to be Sarlashgar.

Sartip Kupal, President of Military Tribunal (F.O. 114; M.A. 155), to be Sarlashgar.

Sarhang Garzan, Assistant Chief of the General Staff, to be Sartip.

Sarhang Amidi, G.O.C. 1st Division, to be Sartip.

Sarhang Alawi, A.D.C. to the Minister for War, to be Sartip.

Sarhang Mohanna, Persian Air Force, to be Sartip.

Sarhang Ansari, Chief of the General Staff Secretariat, to be Sartip.

British Interests.

20. The negotiations, which had been proceeding since the 10th June between the Persian Government representatives and Brigadier Costeloe, representing the War Office, for a settlement of the claims arising out of war-time Allied traffic over the Iranian State Railway, have resulted in a deadlock. The negotiations took place on the basis of a formula known as "A.B.C." in which "A" represented the shortfall between revenue and expenditure, "B" represented non-accounts charges, such as depreciation, and "C" represented the profit which was to accrue to the Persian Government. The figures proposed by the British representatives under the three headings were, respectively, (in million of rials) 1,398, 470 and 153, total 2,021. The British credits for cash supplied and stores (consumed but not paid for) totalled 1,842, leaving a balance due to the Persian Government of 179. Against this was to be set the sums due by the Persian Government for stores taken over and fixed assets purchased which amount to approximately 206, thus leaving a final balance due to the British of approximately 27. The Persian claim has been discussed on a technical level as long ago as January 1946 and had formed the basis of the above formula and proposals. Although the Persian Government had been pressing for the start of the negotiations, their formal claim was not produced till the 15th June and was explained at a meeting on the 16th June. It seemed to bear no relation to any known facts or figures and was too fantastic to merit serious discussion. Their figures, under the three heads "A," "B" and "C," were (in million of rials) 1,400, 1,160 and 1,728, making a total of 4,288. The net result of these figures would have meant that instead of owing the British 27 million rials they claimed from the British 240 million rials or, roughly, £20 million. The immense inflation of their claim was due chiefly to a demand for a profit of 7 per cent., to their doubling the original cost of construction of the railway to allow for the depreciation of the rial and increased replacement costs and to the inclusion under head "B" of some claims of doubtful validity.

American Interests.

21. Colonel Joseph K. Baker has been succeeded as American Military Attaché by Colonel William T. Sexton, Field Artillery, United States army. Colonel Sexton served with the United States Third Army and was for a time, a personal assistant to General Marshall.

Chilean Interests.

22. *Corrigendum* to paragraph 18 of Intelligence Summary No. 22. The name of the new Chilean Minister was wrongly given in the Persian press. It should read as Manuel Garretón. He is also accredited to Turkey.

Chinese Interests.

23. His Excellency Li Tieh-tseng, Chinese Minister in Persia from June 1942 and ambassador from May 1945, is leaving this week on transfer. He states that he is to open a new embassy in Siam. It is understood that the Chinese Consul-General in Meshed will act as chargé d'affaires pending the appointment of a new ambassador.

Appendix.

Translation from the Journal de Tehran dated 16th June, 1946.

*An agreement has been concluded between Tehran and Tabriz.
Official Communiqué.*

An agreement has been concluded as a result of the conversations which have taken place between the Government and the Azerbaijan delegates on the

subject of the seven articles of the communiqué of the 2nd Ordibehesht, 1325 (22nd April, 1946) (published as an appendix to M.A.'s Intelligence Summary No. 16, dated the 28th April, 1946), which was accepted by these delegates. The agreement comprised the following points which explain and amplify the previous communiqué and which will be read in conjunction with it.

1. It was agreed that the following phrase should be added to the context of the existing first article of the Government communiqué:—

"The Director of Finance also will be appointed on the nomination of the Provincial Council subject to the approval of the Government."

(Article 1 of the original communiqué.)

The directors of agriculture, commerce, industry and mines, local transport, education, public health, police, the departments of public prosecutors and magistrates, and of financial control will be chosen by the Provincial and District Councils and their appointment according to the regulations will be communicated to them by the Tehran Government.)

2. It was agreed in article 2 of the Government communiqué that the Governor-General would be appointed by the Government after consultation with the Provincial Council. In order to apply this principle the Ministry of the Interior will submit to the Government the name of a Governor-General chosen from a list of nominees put up by the Provincial Council.

(Article 2 of the original communiqué.)

The nomination of the Governor-General lies with the Government, prior agreement having been attained from the Provincial Council. The nomination of commanders for the military and gendarmerie forces is the responsibility of the Government.)

3. The Government, taking into consideration recent developments in Azerbaijan, will recognise as the Provincial Council the existing organisation as already set up and convened under the name of the "Azerbaijan National Assembly."

After the assembly of the Fifteenth Legislature and the approval of the new law relating to provincial and district councils, which will be put forward by the Government, an immediate start will be made on the election of the Azerbaijan Provincial Council in conformity with that law.

4. It was agreed that a commission would be set up to decide on the disposal of the local forces and their commanders which were called to the colours for compulsory military service under the orders of the Azerbaijan movement, and which, consequent on the signing of this agreement, are considered as forming part of the Iranian forces. This commission will be composed of representatives of the Government of his Excellency M. Qawam-us-Saltaneh and of the Azerbaijan Provincial Council and will assemble on the spot and submit proposals as early as possible for the solution of this problem.

5. With regard to the financial situation of Azerbaijan, it was decided that 75 per cent. of the revenues of Azerbaijan would be allotted to local expenditure and 25 per cent. remitted to the capital for expenditure within the remainder of the country.

Footnote 1.—Revenue and expenditure of Posts and Telegraphs, of Customs and Railways, and of shipping on Lake Urumiyeh are excepted. The revenue and expenditure of these will accrue to, and be defrayed by, the Government. It is laid down that telegrams of the provincial and district councils, as well as those of State services, will be transmitted free of charge.

Footnote 2.—The construction and maintenance of the principal motor routes will be the responsibility of the Government, but that of secondary or local routes will be the responsibility of the Azerbaijan Provincial Council.

Footnote 3.—In order to pay homage to the brilliant service rendered by Azerbaijan to the Constitution and in recognition of the sacrifices made by the courageous population of Azerbaijan in the establishment of democracy, it is agreed that 25 per cent. of customs revenue will be allotted to the Azerbaijan University.

6. The Government undertakes to begin as early as possible, and to complete with the minimum of delay, the extension of the railway line between Mianeh and Tabriz. It is self-evident that Azerbaijani technicians and labourers will have first consideration.

7. The voluntary forces, excepting those which were called to the colours for obligatory military service, will be transferred to the gendarmerie. It was

decided to convene a commission composed of representatives of the Government of his Excellency M. Qawam-us-Saltaneh and of the Azerbaijan Provincial Council in order to submit as early as possible a solution to the question of the future of these security forces.

Footnote 1.—Since, during the course of the past few years and in consequence of certain activities, the name "gendarmes" has caused feelings of hatred in Persian public opinion, especially so in that of Azerbaijan; and since, on the other hand, the head of the Government has recently taken upon himself the command of this force, which presages reforms and a clean-up within the service, it was decided that the wishes of public opinion and, in particular, those prevalent in Azerbaijan, with regard to the gendarmerie would be brought to the notice of the Government so that decisions may be made modifying the name of this force.

8. With regard to the division of properties amongst the peasants of Azerbaijan by the Democratic Movement, in so far as such properties belong to the State, and the Government having given its agreement to the principle of the division of the property wealth among the peasants throughout the territory, there is no obstacle to the realisation of these measures within Azerbaijan. The Government will place proposals to this effect with the minimum of delay before Parliament. But, in so far as estates belonging to third parties have been divided among the peasants in consequence of recent events, it has been decided that a commission, which will be composed of representatives of the Government of his Excellency M. Qawam-us-Saltaneh and of the Azerbaijan Provincial Council, will be set up to find a solution to the question and to recompense the owners or to give them other estates in exchange.

9. The Government agrees to the necessity of drafting and of tabling with a recommendation of urgency, after the assembly of the Fifteenth Legislature, a Bill for an electoral law based on liberal and democratic principles, which will ensure a suffrage which is universal, secret, direct, proportional and equal for all and which will include women. As soon as the Fifteenth Legislature assembles, the Government will, in addition, table a Bill with a recommendation of double urgency for a law to increase the number of representatives to be elected from Azerbaijan and other parts of the country in proportion to their population, with a proviso that the remaining Deputies, after this law has been passed, may be elected and sent to the Majlis.

10. The province of Azerbaijan will comprise the third and fourth Ustans.

11. The Government, in order to assure the satisfactory progress of affairs in Azerbaijan, agrees to convene an administrative council, composed of the Governor-General, the directors of the various services and of the committee of the Provincial Council, which will carry out its task under the direction of the Provincial Council.

12. Article 3 of the Government communiqué of the 2nd Ordibehosht, 1325 (22nd April, 1946), is not sufficiently detailed about colleges and high-grade schools; and therefore the following paragraph is added to it:—

"Courses in college and higher-grade schools will be carried out in the Persian and Azerbaijani tongues in conformity with the programme of the Minister of Education, keeping under consideration circumstances of time and place and conforming to the principles of the democrats and new progressives."

(Article 3 of the original communiqué—)

The official language of Azerbaijan will be Persian, as in other parts of the country.

All administrative and judicial office work will be in Persian and Azerbaijani (Turki dialect). Instruction in the five lower classes of the primary schools will be in the Azerbaijani tongue.

13. The Government agrees that the Kurds residing in Azerbaijan shall enjoy the prerogatives contained in this agreement and, in conformity with article 3 of the Government communiqué, shall teach in their own language up to the fifth year in the primary schools.

Footnote 1.—Minorities resident in Azerbaijan, such as the Armenians and the Assyrians, shall also enjoy the right to teach in their own tongue up to the fifth year in the primary schools.

14. Since the Government proposes to place before the Fifteenth Legislature a new municipal electoral law for the whole of the country, which is to be based

on democratic principles, that is to say, on those of a suffrage which is universal, secret, direct, and equal for all, therefore, immediately after the passing of this law, elections for the municipal councils will commence in Azerbaijan as in all other parts of the country.

[E 6436/315/34]

(2)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 25, Secret, for the period 24th June to 1st July, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 234 of 2nd July; Received 10th July.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

TWO more communiqués by the Persian Prime Minister have been published. The first, which came out on the 23rd June, was a warning to the landlords of villages of Tehran district to deal fairly with their tenants and to the tenants to disregard the attempts made by some political parties to dissuade them from paying their legal rents. The communiqué added that a special committee has been set up to hear disputes between landlord and tenant and that its findings would be strongly upheld by the Government. The second communiqué, published on the 24th June, after declaring that certain workers' organisations had abused the goodwill and indulgence of the Prime Minister and exceeded their proper functions to the detriment of the public welfare, stated in emphatic terms that such activities would no longer be permitted. The Prime Minister warned those concerned that he would not permit such workers' organisations to defy the law nor to play fast and loose with the destinies of the people.

2. The second of the above communiqués was too unpalatable a medicine for Tudeh stomachs and on the 25th June a crowd of unemployed, numbering some 300, attempted to break into the Tehran Municipal offices. The police had to open fire. One rioter was seriously wounded. Some window panes were smashed. The crowd then dispersed. Some newspapers of the Left have criticised the Prime Minister for his communiqué, saying that they have supported him so far as a reformer and friend of the people but that he will forfeit their support if he shows "reactionary tendencies"—the standard form of abuse for any Persian official who prefers the rule of Government to mob rule and who tries to maintain law and order.

3. In a lengthy broadcast on the 29th June the Persian Prime Minister announced the formation of a new political party called the "Democrat Party of Iran." Its programme is given as an appendix to this summary. It is too early to assess popular reaction, but the announcement has created a stir and many have already joined the party. Some see in this a counter-move to the Tudeh designed to entice away their adherents. Others, again, think that it is just an electioneering gambit by which Qawam-us-Saltaneh hopes to secure the election of his nominees, knowing that out of fear or flattery nearly all Persians will join a party brought into being by the Prime Minister himself and thus be obliged to vote for candidates who will, themselves, be members of the same party. One prominent feature of the Prime Minister's broadcast was a warning to the diplomatic representatives of foreign Powers to abstain from interference in the internal affairs of Persia.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

4. His Majesty's Acting Consul-General reports that the Azerbaijan National Bank was formally opened on the 19th June. It will not take over the assets or the premises of the Banque Milli, but is said to have a capital of its own amounting to 50 million rials. The source of this sum is not stated. The former assistant manager of the Banque Milli has been appointed the first manager of the new concern.

5. The same source reports that all but one of the railway commission sent from Tehran (see paragraph 15 of the Intelligence Summary No. 23) have returned to Tehran. According to this one member, the taking over of the

railway has been delayed because the commission discovered that the rolling-stock was badly damaged, the permanent way in disrepair and much equipment missing. A Russian commission is said to be coming from Moscow. It is not thought likely that the Iranian State Railway will have the temerity to make claims against the Soviet Government on the lines of those made against His Majesty's Government (see paragraph 20 of last Intelligence Summary).

6. In amplification of its recent communiqué, which stated that the province of Azerbaijan would comprise "Ustans" (Governorates General) III and IV, the Government has explained that this is, in fact, a return to the old arrangement prevailing during the Qajar régime when Azerbaijan stretched from the Caspian Sea to the Turkish frontier and as far south as Sardasht in Kurdistan. It was Reza Shah, the communiqué explains, who, for reasons of administrative convenience, split the province into two with capitals at Tabriz and Rezaieh.

Kurdistan.

7. General Razmara, in an interview given to the press and in conversation with the British Military Attaché, gave the following views and information concerning Kurdistan:—

- (i) That the present situation in Kurdistan was largely due to the lack of interest in the Kurds on the part of the Central Government, to a lack of continuity in policy or, rather, to the lack of a policy at all, to official apathy as to the need for recognising the Kurds or, indeed for that matter, any of the Persian tribes as Persian subjects entitled to the provision of health and educational services, the supply of Government-rationed commodities and facilities for trade.
- (ii) That on his arrival in Kurdistan he had found the garrisons of Saqqiz, Sardasht, Baneh, Mizdeh and Robat besieged by the Kurds and the communications leading to these places cut.
- (iii) That a visit to these places in the company of the Democrat and Kurdish representatives had established the fact that those frequent skirmishes were in all cases begun by the Kurds and not by the Persian army.
- (iv) That the Democrat and Kurdish representatives admitted this fact, recognised the sovereign rights of the Persian Government and agreed to put an end to these skirmishes.
- (v) That the agreement signed by Muzaffar Firuz and Pishvari on the 11th June in Tabriz had laid down a neutral belt of 4 kilom. in depth between the opposing forces, but that the Kurds, on the 15th June, had broken this truce, crossed the neutral zone and had attacked the Persian forces.
- (vi) That he had met Ghazi Muhammad of Mahabad at the latter's request on neutral ground and had subsequently met Hama Rashid, Omar Khan Shakkak, Mulla Mustafa Barzani and Sheikh Baba.
- (vii) That the Kurds had thereafter shown a more conciliatory spirit and had agreed to give up raiding the Persian army's communications.
- (viii) That, in regard to the "Kurdish Movement," there did not appear to exist in Mahabad any organisation comparable to that of the Azerbaijan Democrats.
- (ix) That the Kurds were grouped round their different leaders and had different aims. Among the followers of Mulla Mustafa (who number less than 800) were to be found Iraqi Kurds and a considerable number (given to the British Military Attaché as twenty) of deserter Iraqi officers.
- (x) That the total of the Kurdish forces is in the region of 5,000, inferior in both numbers and equipment to the Persian army opposing them.
- (xi) That he hoped that after the arrival of Ghazi Muhammad in Tehran (he arrived on the 26th June) the question would be settled amicably.
- (xii) (To the British Military Attaché and not to the press.) That he hoped that some conciliatory gesture towards Mulla Mustafa Barzani could be made by the Iraqi Government as he was sure that Mulla Mustafa and his followers would be very willing to return to Iraq if assured of a pardon.

Khuzistan.

8. A riot occurred in Ahwaz on the 21st June and much damage was done to house property. The hostility of the crowd was directed against the iconoclastic and atheistical sect of the Kasravi, a body of no size or importance

but which achieved some notoriety recently in Tabriz where some of their number attempted to destroy theological works and treatises on divinity.

9. His Majesty's Consul-General at Ahwaz has shed further light on the demand for a measure of provincial autonomy put forward by the Provincial Council of Khuzistan (see paragraph 10 of last Intelligence Summary). He states that, firstly, the so-called Provincial Council in reality represents Ahwaz only. Secondly, the resolution was by no means unanimous, six of the members saying that they had never been consulted. Thirdly, their demands did not go nearly so far as those of the Azerbaijan Democrats. It was, in fact, little more than a bid for political notoriety on the part of a few members of the Saadat Party. The "Arab Union," on the other hand, is a separatist movement in embryo and seems to be causing some concern, both to the local authorities, who have been expecting its reappearance ever since the sudden decline of the power of the Central Government which followed Reza Shah's abdication, and also to the Tudeh Party, who see in this alien movement by a race traditionally accustomed to look to the British for advice a possible source of danger to themselves. It has seemed of sufficient importance to the Russian Consul to warrant a visit to Susangird, where he contacted a Beni Turuf Sheikh and assured him that the anti-Russian propaganda was an error because the Russians supported the Arabs and Islam and were prepared to give them any kind of help. The Russian Consul also visited Hindiyan and Bandar Dilam.

10. The floods around Khorramshahr have abated, but the town is not yet completely out of danger.

11. Some days ago Colonel Parsitabar, the brigade commander at Behbahan, visited Agha Jari, where he was roughly handled by the local labourers and detained by them in custody for some hours. According to information received from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the situation in Agha Jari is sufficiently bad to warrant the evacuation of British and Indian women and children and a strike has been arranged for the 1st July. A minor Bakhtiari chief, by the name of Hafizullah, is said by the company to have a following of 100 men among the local labour and to be able to summon 300 more. He is defying not only the Central Government but, strangely, the Tudeh also.

12. The Minister for War informed the British Military Attaché on the 30th June that, on receipt of the news about Colonel Parsitabar, he had recommended to the Cabinet the proclamation of a state of martial law throughout Khuzistan. The Cabinet had at first demurred but later agreed, provided that the decision should rest with the Governor-General and that, in the event of its being proclaimed, the Governor-General should administer it. Unfortunately, Misbah Fatemi is still in Tehran and is not expected to return to Ahwaz for about a week. In the meanwhile, at the request of the British Military Attaché, the Ministry of War has telegraphed to the G.O.C. Khuzistan Division to warn him of the seriousness of the situation and, in particular, to caution him against any ill-timed move with inadequate forces against Hafizullah, lest the resulting defeat should have serious results on the already low morale of the Government forces.

Khorasan.

13. His Majesty's Consul-General reports that the banishment from Khorasan of Husain Amili, who recently started an anti-Tudeh party by the name of "Radical Socialists" has caused much uneasiness among the anti-Tudeh section of the populace. The new party was making some progress. The order of banishment was received by Colonel Zamani, the newly appointed, pro-Tudeh, commandant of the Khorasan Gendarmerie, direct from the Prime Minister. Colonel Zamani gained notoriety during the last elections for his high-handed acts in Sabzavar, by which he secured the election of Parviz Gunabadi. He was subsequently recalled, Colonel Schwarzkopf reported him as unfit to command even a battalion on professional grounds unconnected with his electioneering activities. His recent appointment to the command of a gendarmerie regiment was by the direct order of the Prime Minister.

Bushire.

14. Following the Tudeh-inspired strike in the Etemadiyeh spinning mill in Bushire during mid-June, the Tudeh Party are now organising a strike among the dockers. The demands are for 150 per cent. increase in wages.

Appointments.

15.—(i) Nawab, a former Persian Consul-General in New York, to be head of the Treaty Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

(ii) Sartip Ali Qadar to be G.O.C. Kerman Division vice Sarhang Azizi recalled. The recall of Azizi is said to be due to unfavourable reports on his honesty by Sartip Atapur on his recent tour.

Persian Army.

16. Two hundred and forty-four sergeant-majors have been promoted to 3rd lieutenant. The vacant post of C.G.S. has not yet been filled.

Persian Gendarmerie.

17. Colonel Schwarzkopf informed the British military attaché that two commissions—one for Azerbaijan and one for Khamseh (Zinjan)—are leaving shortly to discuss the means whereby the Democrat "Fidais" are to be incorporated in the gendarmerie. They will have no powers, but are to report to the Persian Prime Minister on return. Colonel Schwarzkopf stated that he would like the Democrats to agree to accept regular gendarmerie officers down to company commanders, but that, if this was not possible, he would agree to their accepting battalion commanders. He thought that there was a much better chance of securing agreement with the Azerbaijan Government over the future control of the gendarmerie than over the question of the future of the army.

The Court.

18. His Imperial Majesty the Shah held the usual levee on the occasion of the religious festival of Habas.

19. Princess Ashraf left for Moscow on the 28th June (see paragraph 16 of last Intelligence Summary). The Princess's suite comprised Mme. Ibtehaj (wife of Abul Hasan Ibtehaj, Governor of the Banque Milli who speaks Russian fluently), Mme. Hidayet (wife of the Under-Secretary of State for War), Mme. Fardust (wife of an aide-de-camp of the Shah), Dr. Marzaban (a prominent figure in the Red Lion and Sun Society), General Shafai (military attaché in Moscow), Mohsin Qaragozulu (a Court official), two minor Court functionaries, and Iqbal (the Russophile editor of *Iran-i-Ma*).

20. His Imperial Majesty the Shah is reported in the press to have donated a sum of 10 million rials towards the cost of the installation of a drinking-water supply for the town of Tabriz. His Imperial Majesty had previously accorded an audience to Dr. Javid, the newly appointed Governor-General of Azerbaijan.

The Press.

21. The tone of the Persian press remains violently and virulently anti-British. The usual attacks against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as capitalist exploiters continue. The sinister designs of British Imperialists in the south receive the customary prominence. The Tudeh organ *Rahbar* has come out with the *Pravda* article of the 15th June (reported in paragraph 2 of Intelligence Summary No. 23). A new target for attack is the Imperial Bank of Iran, which is accused *inter alia* of being a centre of espionage, a tool of British imperialism, of usury and of maltreatment of its Persian employees.

Appendix.

Programme of the Democratic Party of Persia.

Article 1.

The protection of the genuine independence, the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Persia.

Article 2.

To ensure the political, economic and judicial independence of Persia by means of the development of liberty and the enforcement of democratic principles.

Article 3.

A new agricultural policy, having as its object the exploitation of the resources of the country, the reconstruction of the country, and the betterment of the lot of the peasants.

Article 4.

The establishment, after special legislation of the principle of ownership on a just and equitable basis.

Article 5.

Revision of financial policy and the establishment of fiscal legislation conforming to the needs of the country.

Article 6.

Development of industry and commerce, and the increase of exports.

Article 7.

Complete overhaul of the judicial system of the country.

Article 8.

Speedy and basic reforms in the domain of Health and Education, the implementation of the law of compulsory free education, and the establishment of free mobile health units for the benefit of the whole population throughout the country.

Article 9.

Development of a spirit of initiative in the country in the struggle against unemployment, publicity in fostering a spirit of patriotism and courage to be directed especially towards the tribes by the creation of a Ministry of Information, Labour and Propaganda.

Article 10.

Revision of the organisation of the country's security forces—i.e., the army, gendarmerie and police.

Article 11.

Development and construction of communications and means of transport across the country.

[E 6686/315/34]

(3)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 26, Secret, for the period 1st July to 8th July, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 250 of 10th July; Received 17th July.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE past week has produced much political gossip and speculation but, politics in Persia consisting, as they largely do, of hasty and unconnected actions by a few highly volatile personalities, he would be a rash man who would venture to predict the outcome of recent events. For some ten days past some observers have pretended to see a cooling off in the relations between the Persian Prime Minister and the Soviet Embassy. They see in the recent visit of Princess Ashraf to Moscow an attempt by the Russians to win over the Shah and widen the breach between him and Qawam-us-Saltaneh. The formation of his Democrat Party of Iran (see paragraph 3 of last Intelligence Summary) according to these observers, is further proof of Qawam's breaking with the Russians and of his decision to stand up to the Tudeh Party. They further adduce as evidence in support of their theory the recent arrest of Ahmad Ali Sipih-Muwarrikh-ul-Douleh, the Minister of Commerce and Industry who, perhaps more than any other member of the Cabinet, was regarded as a Russian tool. [The reasons for his arrest are variously given as speculation, inattention to his duties and intrigue against the

Prime Minister but, whatever the truth may be, there is hardly a single Persian who will regret the disappearance from the political arena of this grossly dishonest, double-dealing rogue.] Meanwhile the next move by the new Democrat Party of Persia is anxiously awaited. Criticism of the venture by the papers of the extreme Left has been comparatively mild, consisting, in brief, of surprise that a Prime Minister should form a party and of fears that "reactionary" elements and dishonest capitalists will be allowed to join the party and escape thereby the punishment for their misdeeds. Indeed, there are some who say that the very mildness of the criticism by the Russian controlled press indicates that the new party's primary aim is not opposition to the Tudeh. Most of those who have already joined are junior Government officials whose sole aim, probably, is to retain their jobs. The big landlords, tribal chiefs and influential politicians are tending to hang back until Qawam gives some clearer indication of his policy *vis-à-vis* the Tudeh.

Internal Security.

Khuzistan.

2. The situation in the concessional area of the A.I.O.C. is still precarious but no fresh disturbances have been reported during the week. The strike which was due to begin on the 1st July has not yet started. A further meeting between the management and the workers is to take place on the 7th July. In Abadan, as the result of further meetings, the ultimatum given by the Tudeh leaders has been extended from the 5th July for ten days, the Tudeh demands having been submitted to the company's head office in London.

3. Misbah Fatemi, the Governor-General of Khuzistan is still in Tehran as he has not yet received confirmation in writing of his new powers regarding martial law (see paragraph 12 of last Intelligence Summary).

Fars.

4. Strikes at two spinning mills in Shiraz are reported.

5. The officer commanding gendarmerie regiment at Shiraz confirmed in conversation with His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, that Khosru Qashqai had been appointed as "supervisor" (the Persian term used was not one in normal use in governmental phraseology) of Fars and Jahrum. Khosro is reported by the same source as having been appointed as security officer for Shahreza which, lying about 50 miles south of Isfahan (its old name was Qumisheh) would appear to be well without the limits of Qashqai territory. (A different version of this information was given in paragraph 10 of Intelligence Summary No. 21.)

Bushire.

6. After the departure of the Tudeh agitators, who were not locals but had been sent to Bushire to stir up trouble, the wages dispute among the dockers (see paragraph 14 of last Intelligence Summary) was settled on reasonable terms.

Bandar Abbas.

7. An attempt to set up a Tudeh branch in Bandar Abbas has been made. On the 20th June about 100 labourers of the Khunji spinning mill went on strike for higher wages.

Zahidan.

8. A curious incident occurred in Zahidan on or about the 21st June when the body of a seven-year-old Persian boy, who had been missing for six days, was recovered from a cess-pit. Post mortem examination indicated that he had been strangled. Suspicion fell upon some members of the Bahai Sect and three of them subsequently confessed to the crime. Moslem feeling against them ran very high but the military controlled the situation and, by confining the Bahais to their houses, managed to avert bloodshed.

Birjand.

9. As the result, it is presumed, of the incident reported above, anti-Bahai riots broke out in Birjand on the 29th June to quell which the military, police and gendarmerie were forced to fire on the crowd, resulting in the death of one person and the wounding of five. Most of the Bahai houses have been looted. The city is now quiet and the military are patrolling the streets.

Gilan.

10. Some days ago a Tudeh agitator of the name of Sharifi was arrested on the orders of the governor-general. Later, telegraphic orders for his release were received from Tehran. On about the 1st July the jute mill at Resht was set fire to and partially destroyed.

Khorasan.

11. According to a consular source Ghulam Reza, said to be a son of the late Reza Shah by a temporary ("sigheh") marriage, has been arrested in Meshed. During Reza Shah's lifetime his identity was kept secret and he was given an allowance. After Reza Shah's abdication he presented himself to the present Shah but was exiled to Kerman. The recent arrest, therefore, is presumably on account of his having left his *residence forcée* at Kerman.

12. Abbas Khan Tabatabai, Governor of Kuchan, has been arrested for exceeding his powers and also for speculation.

Kerman.

13. The first overt act of violence by the Tudeh Party against the new Democrat Party of Iran is reported from Kerman. On the evening of the 2nd July, during the inauguration of the new party, the leading Tudeh representative, one Zabeti, staged a counter demonstration which ended in a riot. Some damage to the Democrat Party's headquarters was done. The police fired a few rounds into the air whereupon the supporters of both parties took to their heels.

Persian Army.

14. General Razmara, as was expected, has been reappointed Chief of the General Staff. His close association with Muzaffar Firuz and, through him, with the Russians has caused a great deal of apprehension in military circles. The Minister of War opposed the appointment but was overruled in the Cabinet. The amount of pressure brought to bear by the Persian Prime Minister to secure the appointment may be gauged by the fact that His Imperial Majesty the Shah, in conversation with the British Military Attaché about two months ago, remarked that General Razmara was disloyal, dishonest and little better than a Russian agent. The Shah went on to say that he would never consent to his re-employment and regarded him "as a viper which must be crushed." Indecisive as the Shah is, there is no reason to think that he has changed his opinions. It is his inability to make himself felt that grows plainer every day. One of General Razmara's first acts as Chief of the General Staff was to publish a communiqué stating that a commission had been set up in the General Staff to investigate complaints and grievances of officers. Officers who complain of injustice will not be victimised for so doing. Officers who fled or absented themselves on account of harsh treatment will be pardoned. This is, no doubt, intended chiefly for those officers who, in his spy-hunting mania, General Arfa banished or imprisoned as Tudeh sympathisers or suspects in the Persian army mutiny of last September. A change of Chief of the General Staff usually results in numerous changes in the higher appointments of the Persian army and this is all the more likely in the present instance since Generals Razmara and Arfa are sworn enemies and one of Razmara's first tasks will be to root out those appointed by his rival and replace them by his cronies. The replacement of Colonel Afshar Oglu by Colonel Hejazi in the appointment of General Officer Commanding, 10th (Khuzistan) Division, is the first of these changes and a second is reported in the press but not yet confirmed, namely, the replacement of Colonel Vossuq as General Officer Commanding, Khorasan Division, by Sartip Nasrullah Bayendor, the Engineer-in-chief.

Appointments.

15.—(i) Sarlashgar (Major-General) Hajali Razmara (F.O. 189 M.A. 243) to be Chief of the General Staff *vice* Sarlashgar Aghevli resigned on account of ill health.

(ii) Sarlashgar Ruhullah Kaikavusi is to proceed to Sweden to settle outstanding accounts with Swedish firms for previous arms purchases.

(iii) Sartip (Brigadier) Mazhari and Sarhang (Colonel) Mnarafi are to leave Tehran on the 8th and the 15th July respectively on a purchasing mission to the United Kingdom and afterwards to the United States.

(iv) Sarhang Abdul Hussein Hejazi to be General Officer Commanding, 10th (Khuzistan) Division *vice* Colonel Afshar Oglu. A personality note on Colonel Hejazi is given as an appendix to this Summary.

(v) Hamdullah Zukai to be Governor of Khamseh (Zenjan). He was a Deputy for Haranabad (Khalkhal) in the last Majlis, is a wealthy landowner and is reputed to have considerable local influence.

Arrests.

16.—(i) Seyyid Muhammad Tadayun (F.O. 223 M.A. 288). The reason is not clear, *i.e.*, whether it is on account of previous charges of speculation when Minister of Food in 1942 or of accepting bribes from candidates for election to the Majlis when Minister of the Interior in 1943.

(ii) Ahmad Ali Sipih-Muwarrikh-ud-Douleh, Minister of Commerce and Industry. He has been banished to Kashan.

Economic.

17. The newspaper *Ittilaat* states that, in accordance with a Cabinet decree, the Minister of Commerce and Industry is authorised to allow the export of 10,000 tons of rice and 50,000 tons of barley and to grant permits accordingly.

The Court.

18. His Imperial Majesty the Shah has now learnt to fly and has piloted a machine, solo, several times on short flights over Tehran.

Communications.

19. A commission under the leadership of Sadiqi, Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Roads and Communications, has left for Tabriz to make recommendations for the implementation of the Persian Government's recent undertaking to the Azerbaijan Government to complete as soon as possible the Mianeh-Tabriz section of the railway.

The Press.

20. The Soviet press, on the 2nd July, under the heading "Persian newspaper on situation in Khuzistan," printed a Tehran Tass agency report culled from the newspaper *Zafar* on the 28th June. The article accused the Arab chiefs of having received 50,000 rials each from British secret service funds for the struggle against "democratic organisations." Repressive action by the Persian military at the request of the A.I.O.C. is also alleged. The British are further accused of turning Abadan into an *imperium in imperio* by maintaining their own police force, of levying their own taxes, and of extracting a toll of 200 rials for every motor vehicle travelling between Abadan and Khorramshahr. In conclusion, the article demands that the Persian Government should annul the present concession and negotiate a new one by the terms of which the A.I.O.C. should be subjected to stricter control.

Czechoslovak Interests.

21. S.E. M. Miroslav Qudiat, the new Czechoslovak Minister to Persia arrived in Tehran on the 29th June.

Appendix—Personality Sketch.

Sarhang Abdul Hussein Hejazi

Studied at military school at St. Cyr, and was in France from 1924 to 1939. Has been an instructor at the officers' college and the staff college in Tehran. Was Military Governor of Tehran from August to December 1944. He was changed, it is believed, as a result of pressure by the Hizb-i-Tudeh against whom he took severe measures.

Accompanied a Persian military mission to view the French battlefields, and stayed behind in Paris till April, 1945, to clear up certain accounts in connexion with pre-war arms purchases.

5th July, 1946, appointed General Officer Commanding, 10th (Khuzistan) Division, *vice* Sarhang Lutfullah Afshar-Oglu. This appointment was presumably due to General Razmara, who disliked the latter as a friend of General Arfa.

He is well-mannered, alert, intelligent and energetic. He is said to be somewhat of an intriguer.

[E 6983/315/34]

(4)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 27. Secret, for the Period 8th July to 14th July, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 262 of 17th July; Received 23rd July.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE formation of the Hizb-i-Democrat-i-Iran has apparently met with general approval among those elements of the country who are either conservative in their outlook or who fear Russian domination. In the press were published announcements of the receipt by the Prime Minister of telegrams from the heads of the Qashgai, the Bakhtiari and the "Union of the Tribes of Khuzistan" which announced their pleasure at the formation of the party and their adherence to it; and further reference is made to the receipt of thousands of telegrams from individuals, groups and tribes.

2. Ghazi Muhammed, the Kurdish leader, has left Tehran for Kurdistan (see paragraph 7 (xi) of Intelligence Summary No. 25). The press speaks of the "informal nature" of his visit in that he had come only for "preliminary discussions," and states that official circles say that his departure does not indicate a breakdown of the talks in that he has only gone to discuss first developments with the Kurdish leaders. A further point of interest is that the same article states that, according to "usually well-informed sources," Ghazi Muhammed has demanded the termination of martial law and the withdrawal of Persian forces from Kurdistan.

3. The Persian Prime Minister, who has been ill for about a fortnight, has recovered sufficiently to enable him to resume his duties at his office.

Internal Security.

Khuzistan.

4. The situation in the concessional area of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company deteriorated during the week culminating in the outbreak of the threatened general strike on the termination of the extended ultimatum period. The negotiations between the company and the Tudeh representatives had been reduced by the 8th July to a main issue of Friday (weekly holiday) pay which the leaders insisted had to be settled immediately. The indications were that the Tudeh leaders feared that they might lose control of the workers if they could not produce early results. The matter was referred to Tehran for discussion with the Persian Government who were to decide a minimum workers' wage. In consequence it was hoped that yielding on the part of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company would be interpreted as taking place on the recommendation of the Government and not in face of Tudeh demands. However it was feared in Abadan that procrastination by the Government in making a decision would result in the Tudeh striking without further reference to their official representatives. On the 10th July both the Governor-General, Misbah Fatemi, and the new Divisional Commander, Colonel Hejazi, arrived at Ahwaz. The former was in possession of the requisite decree of the Council of Ministers authorising him to declare, at his discretion, martial law in any part of Khuzistan. He also appeared much encouraged by his conversations with the Prime Minister. Hejazi also appeared confident and stated that he had orders to take the strongest measures to restore Government authority. Meanwhile two Tudeh members had been arrested on a charge of assaulting a Persian officer in uniform while on

duty (see paragraph 11 of Intelligence Summary No. 25). The case against them was quite clear and they had already been ejected by their own headquarters from Agha Jari. From there they went to Masjid-i-Sulaiman where they engineered an abortive two-day strike. They were finally arrested at Gach Saran on the 9th July. A strike broke out at Agha Jari on the morning of the 10th as a protest against the arrests. The spokesman of the strikers was, surprisingly enough, the minor Bakhtiari chieftain, Hafizullah (referred to in paragraph 11 of Intelligence Summary No. 25). The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concurred with the Persian authorities in agreeing that the release of the two leaders would be most undesirable as being too encouraging to the Tudeh. However the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were able to report on the 11th that the local Tudeh leader had persuaded the workers to return to work. During this strike, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company reports, the Tudeh leader was in complete control. All transport was seized, the telephone exchange taken over, and British personnel confined to their bungalows by Tudeh pickets. On the 14th July a general strike broke out at Abadan, Khorramshahr and all the fields areas. The Tudeh were immediately in complete control and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company areas were isolated as regards telephonic communication. The Governor-General declared a state of martial law in Abadan. At 8 a.m. the same day in Abadan the military established pickets and started to clear Tudeh pickets who were obstructing food lorries. They were unable to assume complete control at once owing to lack of senior officers. The A.I.O.C. were to fly in some, also reinforcements of 100 men for the garrison of 250 were to arrive. Later orders had been given to open fire if necessary and some sniping was reported to have taken place. On the 15th July it was reported that there had been several cases of arson and looting but that the Tudeh were retiring to their clubs after a request by the military to control the situation. Accordingly the situation was considered to be easing. During this period essential services had been maintained but production had virtually ceased. In Masjid-i-Sulaiman also the Tudeh appeared to have established complete control. They were reported to be searching offices and one British employee was arrested by them; however, he was only taken to Tudeh Headquarters, warned to be pacific, and released. In Khorramshahr a Tudeh meeting was called for the night of the 15th July but there appear to have been no incidents. In Ahwaz all workers, including domestic servants, were prevented from going to work by Tudeh "security police." It is of interest that the Soviet Consul had been seen visiting the A.I.O.C. compound three times on the evening of the 13th, his last trip being at midnight. From the outlying fields there has been no news. The Governors of both Abadan and Khorramshahr visited the consul and appeared surprisingly at ease in face of a difficult situation. They have given out that the Tudeh are marching on the Arabs and there has been a mention of arming certain sheikhs if necessary. Conversations with Aramish in Tehran elicited the information that the Prime Minister had sent Misbah Fatemi clear instructions to maintain order, to declare martial law in any part of Khuzistan where he deemed it necessary, to arrest Tudeh police wherever found and to ascertain the names of the ringleaders with a view to their arrest or deportation. Aramish also stated that reinforcements of one battalion and twenty-four trucks were being despatched from Tehran.

Azerbaijan.

5. Dr. Javid, the new Governor-General, arrived at Tabriz on the 4th July. He was accompanied by military representatives of the Central Government who were to discuss the future of the Azerbaijan People's Army and the Fida'is (this presumably under article 4 of the Tehran-Tabriz Agreement published as an Appendix to Intelligence Summary No. 24), and by railway engineers who were to inspect the Tabriz-Julfa railway and to consider plans for the projected Tabriz-Mianeh line. The press also reports the departure of Sartip Alavi (A.D.C. to the Minister of War who recently visited Tabriz with Muzaffar Firuz—paragraph 1 of Intelligence Summary No. 23) for that town.

6. A congress of leaders of the Azerbaijan Youth Movement was held on the 6th July. It is noteworthy that most of the members of this movement are now in uniform.

7. A mail service has been restored on three days in the week but a censorship which is especially strict on Tehran newspapers is being maintained. Export of currency is still prohibited and in view of the large number of people who have left Tabriz since the exit-permit system was withdrawn the local Government are considering reimposing it.

8. The local Government are reported not to be pressing for the inclusion of Zenjan in Azerbaijan.

Fars.

9. Reference paragraph 4 of last Intelligence Summary. All employees another. returned to work unconditionally on the 11th July.

Semnan.

10. According to press communiqués published on the 10th July the Government declared martial law in the areas of Semnan, Garmsar and Veramin with Sarhang Qazim Muzahiri as Military Governor. This step was taken to quell disorders resulting from dissensions between landlords and peasants. The Government despatched a commission under M. Pirnia, Under-Secretary of State to the Prime Minister, to enquire into the circumstances. The commission has returned after cancelling certain taxes payable by the peasants to their landlords and initiating medical relief. The order promulgating martial law has not yet been withdrawn.

Khorasan.

11. The activities of the Hizb-i-Tudeh in Khorasan have taken an increasingly anti-British tone and have included attacks against Iranian members of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the posting on walls of anti-British slogans. On the evening of the 4th July a Tudeh meeting of about 1,000 persons assembled, and were addressed from the verandah of the Tudeh Club, which is opposite the consulate-general. Speeches delivered were abusive in tone against the British, putting forward the usual charges of interference in internal affairs and attempts to maintain a stranglehold on the country.

12. The Hizb-i-Democrat-i-Iran is not making much progress in Khorasan, chiefly because an unfortunate choice of local representatives has aroused doubts of the disinterested quality of Qawam's intentions. His motives are thought to be more to establish his own dictatorship rather than to cast off the Russian yoke.

13. In accordance with the Prime Minister's order (see paragraph 3 of Intelligence Summary No. 24), all Bakhshdars have been recalled from their posts to Meshed.

Rail Communications.

14. The Persian railway authorities have asked His Majesty's Embassy to arrange for discussions to take place with the Government of India respecting the operation of that section of the Quetta-Zahidan Railway which lies inside Persian territory, i.e., Mirjawa-Zahidan. The Persian railway authorities have mentioned the question of a payment to be made by the Government of India in return for permission to exploit the Persian section.

Postal Communications.

15.—(a) It is announced in the press that normal telegraphic communications with Persia and Afghanistan have been restored. They are carried by a line running through Toyabat and Islam Qila, and the charge is 6 rials per word.

(b) Postal communications have been restored between Tehran and Tabriz with a service running three days per week.

Civil Appointments.

16.—(i) Mohammed Taqi Nabavi (Moazid-ud-Dowleh) (F.O. 150; M.A. 188) to be Persian Minister to Czechoslovakia. He is father-in-law to Abul Hasan Ibtahaj, Governor of the Banque-i-Milli. About a year ago he succeeded in getting himself appointed as Persian Minister at Lisbon, but a change of Prime Ministers caused the appointment to lapse and he did not proceed.

(ii) Dr. Amir Aslani to be third secretary in the Persian Legation at Prague.

(iii) Zain-ul-Abidin Rahnema (F.O. 186; M.A. 237), Persian Minister at Paris, is proceeding to rejoin his post.

(iv) Aramish, the Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry is officiating as Minister since the arrest of Sipih.

Military.

17.—(i) Sartip Nasrullah Bayender to be G.O.C. 8th (Khorasan) Division vice Sarhang Ahmed Vossuq relieved.

(ii) Sarhang Kia to be chief of the Second Bureau (G.H.Q., *vice* Sarhang Hussain Mahin.

(iii) It is reported, but not confirmed, that Sarhang Hussain Mahin is assuming an appointment at the Officers' College.

Persian Army

18. The first detachment of the Persian contingent which attended the London Victory Parade returned via Cairo on the 9th July, and a second is following on the 15th July.

19. Lieutenant-Colonel Zanganeh, who was commanding the Rezaiyeh Brigade at the time it surrendered to the Democrat forces, has been released from arrest in Tehran, as also has been Colonel Ali Akbar Nurbakhsh, the commandant of gendarmerie at Rezaiyeh at that time (see paragraph 6 of Intelligence Summary No. 21).

20. It is reported in the press that a battalion of the 5th (Naderi) Infantry Regiment arrived at Bandar Pahlevi on the 29th June from Resht.

Gendarmerie (Nigahbani).

21. A commission assembled during the week, it is reported, in the press, to consider the establishment of an Officers' Training College for the Nigahbani. This step has been urged by Colonel Schwarzkopf ever since his arrival. By this means only, he claims, can he select and train his own officers and end the present system whereby he must accept the leavings of the Persian army.

Soviet Interests.

22.—(a) Information has been received from Zabul that the Soviet Consulate there is to be closed. The reason for this step is not known.

(b) It is announced in the press that M. Gasparov of the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs has been nominated counsellor to the Soviet Embassy in Tehran; and that M. Jakobov, additional counsellor, has returned from Moscow where he has been on leave.

Afghan Interests.

23. Abdur Rauf, the new Afghan Consul-General at Meshed, arrived there on the 9th July.

[E 7289/315/34]

(5)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 28, Secret, for the Period 15th July to 21st July, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 281 of 24th July; Received 31st July.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

Qawam-us-Saltaneh's newly formed Democrat Party of Iran does not appear to be making much headway and has so far attracted very few of the moderate or Right-wing elements. Their suspicions that the new party is merely an electioneering stunt and in no way a challenge to the Tudeh are based on the following facts:—

(i) The names of the Central Committee of Management do not inspire confidence, six out of ten of them being strong Tudeh supporters. (Brief personality notes on the members are given as an appendix to this Summary.)

(ii) No prominent politician or statesman has joined it. There are in Persia, contrary to common belief, some older statesmen enjoying a well-earned reputation for honesty and patriotism such as, for example, Mutamin-ul-Mulk, and it is significant that no one of that calibre has joined the party, much less been elected to its managing committee.

(iii) That Muzaffar Firuz is a member is sufficient cause for the honest to hold aloof.

(iv) The party, so far, has shown no signs of wishing to oppose the Tudeh, and the very mild tone of such criticism of the party as has appeared so far in the Tudeh press is significant.

(v) Had Qawam-us-Saltaneh planned to resist the Tudeh, he must have tried to win over to his party Right-wing elements, and this he has either not attempted or failed signally to achieve and must continue to fail as long as he keeps under arrest their leaders and their newspapers under suspension.

(vi) In order to obtain their oil concession in North Persia, the Russians at first showed great keenness in speeding up a settlement of the Azerbaijan issue so that elections could begin and a new Majlis come into being. Qawam-us-Saltaneh having undertaken to table a Bill for this concession before the new Majlis within seven months from the 24th March. Time is slipping by and as yet the Persian Government has made no official announcement concerning the Royal proclamation, which is the first step in the elections. From start to finish they will take at least four months, which would mean that, even if they were to commence at once, a new Majlis could not have been convened before the 24th November, *i.e.*, one month later than the outside limit set by the Russians in their agreement with Qawam-us-Saltaneh after his return from Moscow. No protest against this delay has as yet appeared in the Russian-controlled Persian press and it appears, therefore, that they are content to wait in the knowledge that time, Qawam-us-Saltaneh and his new party are all on their side and that when the elections are completed the new Majlis will contain a majority of their way of thinking.

2. The Persian Government have addressed notes to the diplomatic representatives of the Big Five Powers in Tehran requesting that Persia should be given a seat at the forthcoming Peace Conference. The note stated that Persia's diplomatic representatives accredited to the countries of the Big Five had been instructed to make parallel representations.

3. Seyyid Abul Qasim Kashani has been arrested while on his way to Meshed. No reasons have been published, but it is said that the Seyyid had made violent criticisms of Muzaffar Firuz, of Qawam-us-Saltaneh's Government and of his new party. It will be recalled that, after many unsuccessful attempts to have him arrested by the Persian police, the British military authorities finally succeeded in rounding up Seyyid Abul Qasim Kashani in 1944 as a prominent Fifth Columnist. The halo of martyrdom which he assumed on his release did not become him and his political twists and turns and his unpopularity with his brother mullahs undermined what influence he may have had.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

4. The Persian army officers who accompanied the new Governor-General to Tabriz (see paragraph 5 of last Intelligence Summary) have made no progress in their discussions about the future of either the Azerbaijan People's army or "Fidais." They are becoming impatient and wish to return to Tehran. This information, originally received from consular sources, has been confirmed by the Minister for War to the British Military Attaché.

Kurdistan

5. Ghazi Muhammad, who returned from Tehran last week (see paragraph 2 of last Intelligence Summary), is still in Tabriz. The chiefs of the Shakkak and Herki Kurds are also there. A member of the American Embassy recently paid a flying visit to Rezaiyeh and Mahabad and the American Vice-Consul at Tabriz, who accompanied him, said he was impressed by the energy and the "genuine Kurdish nature" of the nationalist movement, as also by the Kurds' antipathy to the Azerbaijan Democrats. In his one day's stay at Mahabad he failed to find any signs of Russian direction of the movement.

6. The American Military Attaché, who returned to Tehran on the 15th July from a tour of Kurdistan, gave the British Military Attaché the following account of what he saw and heard:—

General.

The 4th Division is holding a general front running east to west along the line Miranshah-Saqqiz-Baneh-Sardasht from, inclusive, Miranshah to, inclusive, Sardasht. Advance divisional headquarters are established at Saqqiz. Main headquarters, with training and reinforcement troops, are at Senneh. The

line of communication road Senneh-Miranshah is regarded as being free from any Kurdish threat and is protected only by normal gendarmerie garrisons. From Miranshah to Saqqiz the road is protected by infantry established in block-houses. The road is open during the day. West of Saqqiz the road is held by the Kurds, who have established a half-circle round Saqqiz running from north, through west, to south of the town. All garrisons west of this half-circle are isolated. These garrisons are in a state of siege. The Kurds permit military lorries to run through carrying supplies only and search them for reinforcements of ammunition or men. Communications are maintained during the day between Saqqiz and Baneh by heliograph via an intermediate station on the Miraveh(?) Pass.

Dispositions of Troops.

Senneh (main base): One regiment infantry; one regiment cavalry; one battery field artillery; one company field engineers.

Miranshah: One regiment cavalry.

Road block-houses: Four companies of infantry.

Saqqiz: Divisional operational headquarters: One regiment infantry; two regiments cavalry; two Bofors mountain guns; detachment of mortars; four tanks (?).

Air force: Five Hawker Hinds for ground strafing; five Tiger Moths.

Miraveh(?) Pass: One company infantry; one company M.M.Gs.

Baneh: One regiment.

Sardasht: One regiment infantry in town; one regiment infantry east of river at Rubat.

Tactical.

(a) In an attack in mid-June the Kurds drove the Persians off one of their outposts to the south-west of Saqqiz. This was subsequently retaken by the Persian forces in a two-company attack (under the regimental command) which was preceded by first air strafing and a subsequent artillery preparation. Persian casualties were seventeen(?) killed and a considerable number of wounded.

(b) General Humayuni considers his artillery virtually useless since they have not a sufficiently high trajectory to be effective in this steep mountain country and prefers the use of mortars.

(c) The Persians are on the defensive, since they have orders not to attack the Kurds, but are in a continual state of alert against expected attacks.

(d) The main aggressors appear to be Barzanis from Iraq.

Kerman.

7. On instructions from Tehran the Governor-General arrested all the Tudeh leaders in Kerman on the 16th July. Five of the most prominent, including Dr. Vakili, were sent to Tehran under a police guard on the 17th July. Following this action a better attitude is being shown in the mills towards the management by the employees. Merchants and shopkeepers have telegraphed their thanks to the Prime Minister.

Fars.

8. According to Consular sources Khosro Qashgai's latest intrigues are directed towards the removal of Brigadier Himmat, the G.O.C. Fars Division and towards the appointment as Governor-General of Fars of Roza Hikmat, Sardar Fakhr. This lazy and corpulent official has always shown himself amenable to the Qashgai and, though it is by now ancient history, was consistently unfriendly to the British in South Persia during World War I.

Khuzistan.

9. After the happenings related in paragraph 4 of last Intelligence Summary events in Abadan moved rapidly to a climax. After the proclamation of martial law and the arrest of five prominent Tudeh leaders by the Governor-General the military began to clear the Tudeh pickets and it appeared that the situation was getting under control. On the evening of the 15th July, however, a mass attack was carried out by a large mob of Tudeh hooligans upon the headquarters of the Arab League which resulted in casualties on both sides amounting to forty-seven killed and 176 wounded. Two prominent Arab merchants were done to death in a peculiarly brutal fashion, their corpses subsequently being mutilated. Largely owing to the energetic action taken by the Military Governor

of Abadan—a Major Fathi—the military were able to prevent a general massacre. On the following day a commission from Tehran arrived. It comprised Muzaffar Firuz, the Prime Minister's Secretary, Aramish, the acting Minister for Commerce and Industry and three Tudeh leaders. They proceeded to negotiate with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company management on the basis of the workers' previous demands for a minimum "basket" of rials 45 per diem and Friday pay retrospective from the 18th May. While these negotiations were in progress Muzaffar Firuz, announcing that he had full powers from the Prime Minister to settle the strike, forced the Governor-General to release the five arrested leaders. The negotiations concluded by the management agreeing to pay and the workers agreeing to accept a minimum "basket" of rials 35 per diem plus Friday pay. Muzaffar Firuz's action was probably due to his desire to humiliate the Governor-General and to raise Tudeh morale by claiming that the termination of the strike was only rendered possible by the release of the arrested leaders. Had the strike collapsed owing to the commendably firm action by the Governor-General and the military or to the reaching of an agreement between the management and the workers, Tudeh prestige and Muzaffar Firuz's own position *vis-à-vis* the Tudeh must have suffered. The situation is now reported to be calm for the moment with the men back at work and production in Abadan at from 50 to 60 per cent. of normal. Martial law is still in force and there are about seventy persons under arrest at Abadan and smaller numbers at Ahwaz and Khorramshahr. Arab feelings over the recent events are highly inflamed and local observers say that any relaxation of the tight control exercised by the military would result in retaliatory measures against the Tudeh by the Arabs the extent of which could not be predicted.

10. On the 17th July His Majesty's Embassy notified the Persian Government of the impending arrival in the Shatt-el-Arab off Abadan of the sloop *Wild Goose* and the cruiser *Norfolk* and asked for the usual courtesies and facilities in the event of their anchoring in Persian waters. The Persian Government replied by drawing the attention of the embassy to the law passed in 1934 which required a minimum of eight days' notice of such visits. They also pointed out that if the visit of those two ships was connected with the recent strike the Persian Government must consider it as an unfriendly act and must protest. They concluded by asking for the removal of the ships as soon as possible. In fact, neither ship entered Persian waters, the *Wild Goose* having anchored in Iraqi waters and later having proceeded to Basra to effect repairs to her wireless. The *Norfolk* also anchored for one night in Iraqi waters four miles down stream of Abadan and left the next day for Bahrain. The Persian press has made much of the affair, even the respectable *Journal de Tehran* having come out with a tale of the arrival of three cruisers entering Persian waters.

The Press.

11. The anti-British tone of the Left-wing Persian press grows more violent and this crescendo of slander will continue as long as Qawam-us-Saltaneh and his Cabinet lack the will, the power and the courage to restrain the editors of those newspapers. In the meanwhile, much disappointment is felt by persons hitherto well-disposed towards the British who interpret our silence either to fear of Russia or to lack of interest in Persia in which, as in most oriental countries, truth cannot be relied upon to prevail and many a good case goes by default. An extract, chosen at random from this week's Leftist press is given below:—

Rahbar, 19th July, 1946.

Victory Parade.—Continuation of article criticises Taqi Zadeh for not having welcomed the Persian delegation and states that if the Persian ruling class were not different and unpatriotic, other countries would not have regarded Persians as their slaves. An officer had called Taqi Zadeh the representative of the Oil Company. Persians in London complained of Taqi Zadeh and considered him a Britisher. He had revived the court of the despotic Persian rulers. Persians in London were kept ignorant of Persian affairs. They received *Ettela'at* only. Freedom-loving papers should be sent to Persians in foreign countries, especially Britain.

In the parade the British army, which had delayed the Second Front in order to weaken the Red army and help Hitler, was foremost, whereas there was no sign of the Red army which had brought Hitler to his knees. Hitler was brought into office by the help of the British and instigated to start war by the capitalists.

Britain had thrown her Allies to the front. Small countries like Persia had suffered deprivations and Seyyid Zia had been sent to them to restore the former régime. Now they had to pass in front of Churchill, who laughed in his sleeve.

Persian Army.

12. Sarhang Garzan, the Assistant Chief of the General Staff, is officiating as military secretary in addition to his other duties. It appears that General Razmara, on appointment as Chief of the General Staff, protested strongly against the removal of this department from under the control of the General Staff to that of the Ministry for War.

13. The Chief of the General Staff has asked the British Military Attaché to procure for the Persian army the following material, which, he said, was most urgently needed for operations in Kurdistan and other areas:—

Mortars, 2-inch : 100, with 500 rounds apiece.

Mortars, 3-inch : 100, with 500 rounds apiece.

Vérey pistols, 1-inch : 100.

Cartridges, illuminating : 30,000.

Grenades, No. 36 : 20,000.

In stressing the need for the above the Chief of the General Staff said that, while in Kurdistan recently, he had found their field artillery useless as lacking the high trajectory required to bring fire to bear upon positions on the reverse slopes of mountains. So much of the fighting had been at close quarters that even mountain artillery had proved ineffective and that a mortar seemed to him the ideal weapon for "winkling out" Kurds from sangars and setting them on the run, where they could be dealt with by long-range machine guns or by mountain artillery fire. He also mentioned that large quantities of hand grenades had been found in positions captured from the Kurds. When questioned as to their origin the Kurds had said they had been purchased from Czechoslovakia by the Kurdish army authorities, but the Chief of the General Staff made no attempt to conceal his conviction that it was the Russians who had supplied them. He also referred humourously to a type of "Molotov Cocktail" used by the Kurds against Persian army tanks and M.T., but unpopular with them on the grounds that the ingredients tended to exude from the stopper in the great heat, to adhere to their baggy trousers and cause the contraption to become a greater menace to the thrower than to his opponent.

14. Reference paragraph 15 of Intelligence Summary No. 26, Sarlashgar Ruhullah Kaikavusi did not proceed to Sweden. Investigations at the arms factories in his charge, according to the Minister for War, disclosed peculation on a large scale and he is now under arrest.

Appointments.

15.—(i) Sartip Muzayyini from Chief of the Personnel Department (Anglic military secretary) to resume command of the IInd Tehran Division *vice* Sartip Hushmand Afshar. The reason for Afshar's removal was given by the Minister for War to the British Military Attaché as alcoholism, but the fact that this officer (who was commanding in Kurdistan prior to General Humayuni) was a close friend of General Hasan Arfa has probably something to do with the change.

(ii) Sarhang Husain Mahin from Chief of the 2nd Bureau, General Staff, to be second in command at the Officers' Training College.

(iii) Sarhang Abdullah Bahrani to be General Officer Commanding Vth Luristan Division *vice* Sarhang Hashimi, appointed as inspector in the Ministry for War. Sarhang Bahrani commanded a brigade in Khuzistan in 1942 and was subsequently appointed second in command of the IInd Tehran Division. He has also served in the Conscription Department.

(iv) Sarhang Himmat, General Officer Commanding Vth Fars Division, to be sartip (brigadier).

(v) *Corrigendum* paragraph 17 (ii) of Intelligence Summary No. 27. For

ation to Moscow in February 1946.

assan Ha'irizadeh.

t 1894. Has on several occasions displayed an anti-British attitude complained to the Russian Embassy of British interference in the has been nominated by the Tudeh as their candidate for Yezd in g elections.

Labour.

16. M. Louis Saillant, described as the secretary-general of the World Federation of Trade Unions, arrived in Tehran on the 19th July.

The Court.

17. An obscure newspaper called *Sapidrud* came out on the 18th July with a single-sheet supplement with the head-lines: "Divorce of Queen Fauzieh. Marriage of Marshal Stalin's Daughter to His Imperial Majesty the Shah." The Persians, credulous as they are, seem to be having some difficulty in swallowing this one.

British Interests.

18. The Persian Government have notified their agreement to the reopening of the British Consulate at Resht, which has been closed since 1935.

Russian Interests.

19. In the course of an interview with the editor of *Rahbar*, the Tudeh organ, the Soviet Ambassador denied the truth of rumours to the effect that Russia desired a port on the Persian Gulf.

Tehran, 21st July, 1946.

Appendix.

Muzaffar Firuz.

See Appendix "A" to Intelligence Summary No. 7. To that account the following facts should be added:—

(i) He was removed from Harrow.

(ii) He was disinherited by his father.

(iii) Following the incident at Washington he was removed from the cadre of the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

(iv) Had his barrister's licence cancelled for cheating a client.

Muhammed Vali Mirza Farmanfarmayan.

A son of the late Farmanfarma, born about 1893. Was educated in Paris and has spent quite a lot of time in Europe. He was a Deputy in earlier Majlises, but retired from public life after 1931 till he was elected to the 13th and 14th Majlis. He was head of the Finance Department in Tabriz in 1945 and acquired a reputation for bribery. Though possessed of vast estates he supports the Tudeh and is said to have Communist leanings.

Reza Hikmat (Sardar Fakhir).

Born at Shiraz about 1888. He has held various Government posts during his life and has been Deputy for Shiraz in the 14th Majlis. He is reported to be on good terms with the Qashgai. He gave the British much trouble in Fars in World War I.

Furuzish.

Editor of the newspaper *Nijat-i-Iran*. He is an avowed Russian supporter and has been pro-Tudeh since 1944. In 1945 he made a conducted tour to Tashkent.

Amidi Nuri.

Editor of the newspaper *Dad*. He is openly pro-Russian. Accompanied Qawam's delegation to Moscow in February 1946.

Sayyid Abul Hassan Ha'irizadeh.

(iv) Sarhang Himmat, General Officer Commanding Vth Fars Division, to be sartip (brigadier).

(v) *Corrigendum* paragraph 17 (ii) of Intelligence Summary No. 27. For "Sarhang Kia" read "Sarhang Isa Hidayat."

(vi) Sartip Gulshayan to be Chief of the Ministry of War Secretariat.

(vii) Sarlashgar Zahidi to be Inspector-General of the Forces of the South.

(viii) Sarhang Shimi to be Head of the 3rd Bureau of the General Staff.

(ix) Sartip Qovanlu to be Director of the Officers' Club.

Qawam's deleg

Sayyid Abul

Born about and in 1943 elections. He the forthcoming

Ali Akbar Musavizadeh.

Was interned by the British during the war and is now very pro-Tudeh. Accompanied Firuz in June 1946 on his mission to Azerbaijan for the Democrat negotiations.

Ahmed Aramish.

A personal friend of Qawam, who has held a series of only minor Government posts until appointed as under-secretary to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

Sadiqi.

Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Roads and Communications. Nothing is known of his political beliefs.

[E 7641/315/34]

(6)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 29, Secret, for the Period 22nd July to 28th July, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 301 of 31st July; Received 8th August.)

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

H.I.M. The Shah has conferred the personal title of "Jenab-i-Ashraf" upon the Prime Minister in appreciation of the services which he has rendered to the country. In practice, a Persian Prime Minister is usually addressed by his title while in office and this act of the Shah's is commonly understood to imply the conferment of it for life to Qawam-us-Saltaneh.

2. On the 21st July the Chief of the General Staff informed representatives of the Persian press that, according to information received by the Ministry for War, the British warships seen off Abadan on the 17th July [*sic*] had not entered Persian waters but had anchored in Iraqi waters.

*Internal Security.**Khuzistan.*

3. There have been no fresh disturbances in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concessional area, but the situation, particularly in Abadan and Khorramshahr is very tense with the Arabs smarting under the blows recently inflicted on them by the Tudeh.

4. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company expected further trouble on the 27th July which was a pay day when the workers would realise that they had not received strike pay. Up to date no news of the expected outbreak has been received.

5. In Agha Jari the situation has improved with the arrest by the Persian military of Hafizullah Bakhtiari, a dangerous lunatic, with his two confederates Zubdeh and Durusti.

6. The commission of enquiry despatched by the Central Government seems to be actively pro-Tudeh. So far it has made no enquiries concerning the instigations to strike, the seizure by the strikers of 500 motor vehicles belonging to the company, the seizure of all communications during the strike and the acts which led to the murderous attack by the Tudeh mob on the 15th July on the Arab Union's headquarters. The commission so far has busied itself with hearing faked evidence of extensive gun-running by the Arabs.

Azerbaijan.

7. His Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Tabriz who recently visited Khoi, Julfa and Maku, reports that there is no truth in the report that the Kurds had taken over local government in Khoi. He states that the Azerbaijan Democrat Administration is in complete control of Khoi and, indeed, of all the places which he visited.

8. The first party of Armenian emigrants left Tabriz by rail for Erivan on the 20th July. Other parties were due to follow on the 26th and 31st July. In all 6,000 are to go.

9. Muhammad Biriya, the Minister of Education in the Azerbaijan Government, at a meeting in Tabriz on the 24th July, at which Dr. Javid the Governor-General was also present, made a highly inflammatory speech on the subject of the recent strikes in Abadan and elsewhere in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concessional area. He made a direct accusation of murder against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, stating that, instead of meeting their objections, the company opened fire with machine guns on the unarmed workers killing 46 and wounding 170. He went on to say that he had telegraphed to the Persian Prime Minister demanding the trial of the murderers and stating that if the Persian Government would not act, he would lead his Azerbaijanis to the rescue of the Abadan workers.

Khorasan.

10. Security on the highways has deteriorated. On the 26th July six buses and a passenger car were held up and their occupants robbed near Shahrud.

11. His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed reports that Qawam-us-Saltaneh's new party is not making great headway. This is due to an unfortunate choice of a local representative in the person of one Rahimian who was till recently and probably still is, a staunch Tudeh supporter. The professional and upper classes and the religious leaders are, therefore, highly suspicious of Qawam's intentions and are holding aloof, but some Government officials are joining out of fear of losing their jobs.

Kermanshah.

12. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company officials in Kermanshah fear that Tudeh elements may seize the opportunity of the absence of a Governor-General (Nikpay has been recalled to Tehran, see paragraph 16 below) to create disturbances in the town and in the refinery. They predict that the Police will not intervene to preserve order in view of the treatment they received after the 1st May disorders, when the ringleaders whom they had arrested were set free and the Chief of Police was himself arrested.

Bakhtiari.

13. According to Abul Qasim Bakhtiari, Jehanshah Khan, a son of Murtoza Quli Khan, is to replace the weak Amir Husein Khan as his co-governor. According to the same source Amir Husein, by way of compensation, is to be elected to the next Majlis as one of the Bakhtiari deputies.

14. Abul Qasim Khan stated to His Majesty's Consul at Isfahan that, while in Tehran recently, he had received a credit from the Ministry of Roads and Communications to provide for the construction of two new roads in Bakhtiari. The first will run from Shahr Kurd (I-39 U. Q4963) to Lurdokan, chief place of the Janoki Sardsir (H-39 C. V5272), and the other from Shahr Kurd to Ardal in Pusht Kuh (H-39 C. Q3424). These two roads would follow the existing track from Shahr Kurd to Gahru (I-39 U. Q5627) where the Ardal road would turn off south past the Chaqkor plain and through the Zirreh range to Ardal (there is already a track part of the way as far as point Q4592). The Janeki road would go on from Gahru through Ganduman (H-39 D. Q8213) Pul-i-Karreh which must be rebuilt, Abul Qasim Khan having destroyed it when a rebel in 1942 (H. 39 D. V8879) and thence to Lurdekan. There already is a motorable track as far as Dorahan (H-39 D. V8787).

15. His Majesty's Consul Isfahan reports a brisker trade in Government rifles in his area, the chief purchasers being large landowners and tribesmen. Average prices for a complete Persian Army rifle of B.R.N.O. pattern are from 7,000 to 8,000 rials, and about 5,000 rials for the complete components which are sometimes stocked up locally. This illicit trade is said to be well organised through Persian Army officers employed in the arsenal at Tehran. In this connexion it is interesting to note that the Minister for War, when commenting to the British military attaché on the arrest of General Kaikavusi (see paragraph 14 of last Intelligence Summary) said that preliminary investigations indicated gross negligence on Kaikavusi's part in the proper supervision of his subordinates rather than peculation for his own advantage.

*Appointments.**A.—Civil.*

16.—(i) Farajullah Asif, Amir Muazzam, to be Governor-General of Kurdistan, *vice* Asadullah Arai, Shahab-ud-Dowleh, K.C.V.O., recalled on account of old age. Farajullah is a son of Asif-i-Azam and was Governor of

Kurdistan from June 1942 to September 1943. He was a Deputy in the 9th, 13th and 14th Majlises. Kurdistan is not, properly speaking, an "Ustandari" (Governorate General) but was a "Farmandari" (Governorate) under the Governor-General of Kermanshah. Two years ago, when the troubles in Kurdistan were at their worst, as the result of recommendations by Fahimi, who went there on a mission of enquiry, the status was raised to that of Governor-General in order to improve the standing of Shahab-ud-Dowleh *vis-à-vis* the Divisional Commander and also to dispel the idea of a reduction in the rank of Shahab-ud-Dowleh, himself an ex-Governor-General of Fars.

(ii) Ghulam Husein Ashrafi, Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, to be Governor-General of the IXth Ustan (Khorasan) *vice* Nasir Quli Itimadi, Nasr-ud-Dowleh recalled.

(iii) Ahmad Salahi, Salah-ul-Mulk, to be Governor-General of the Vth Ustan (Kermanshah) *vice* Nikpay recalled. Salahi was born in Tehran in 1897. Educated at the Tehran School of Political Science and entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1912. Later he transferred to the Ministry of Education and later still to the Ministry of the Interior. Governor of Qum 1941-43 and Governor of Kermanshah for a short period in 1943. Governor of Hamadan, December 1945. While Governor of Qum he was considered very co-operative by the British Military authorities there, but was adversely commented on by British Consular authorities in Hamadan as lazy, timorous and dishonest. His subservience to the Tudeh was in sharp contrast to his predecessor, Sardar Akram.

(iv) Azizullah Nikpay, Ezaz-ul-Dowleh, to be Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Prime Minister *vice* Ashrafi.

(v) Dr. Abbas Nafisi, a son of Dr. Muaddeh Nafisi (F.O. 152), to be Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Health.

(vi) Mustashari to be Governor of Shahrud.

(vii) Muhammad Fahimi to be Counsellor to the Persian Legation in Rome.

(viii) Muhsin Midhat to be Counsellor to the Persian Legation in Czechoslovakia.

(ix) Dr. Amir Aslani to be secretary to the Persian Legation in Czechoslovakia.

B.—Military.

(i) Sartip Shori to be Deputy Chief of the General Staff. He is a connexion by marriage of Sarlashgar Razmara and was appointed by him as G.O.C., Mekran Division, in 1944, relieving Sarlashgar Afkhami. He was recalled by General Arfa when Chief of the General Staff ostensibly on the grounds of dishonesty (probably well founded).

(ii) Sarhang Mahmud Amini to be Persian Military Attaché in Paris. This officer was one of the Persian army contingent which took part in the recent Victory Celebrations in London. He is one of the eight sons of Mohsin Amini, Amin-ud-Dowleh.

(iii) Sartip Vahdati to be Assistant Accountant-General.

(iv) Sarhang Fariduni to be Frontier Commissioner at Khawf.

(v) Sarhang Shamlu to be Frontier Commissioner at Quchan.

The Persian Army.

17. The Ministry for War is endeavouring to obtain from India large supplies of clothing and materials. The first list was discussed with the Government of India by the Indian Government Trade Commission in Persia when on a recent visit to India. Without waiting to learn the outcome of these discussions the Ministry for War somewhat precipitately despatched a Colonel Gharib to India with a second and even larger list of requirements. During the past three years General Ridley's military mission has, naturally, induced the Ministry for War to place its orders in America, but a shortage of dollars has now compelled the Ministry to turn to India as a source of supply as, a few months ago, it turned to the United Kingdom for other supplies the list of which was transmitted to the D.O.T. by the commercial secretary of this embassy. The Minister for War has asked His Majesty's Ambassador to make strong recommendations to the Government of India to obtain the necessary export licences, but it is clear that he does not appreciate the difficult situation in India with regard to textiles and the necessity for the measures which the Government of India has had to take to conserve its stocks to meet India's internal needs. By sending an officer to India and thus short-circuiting the Persian Government's trade representative in India it is obvious that the Ministry for War is bent on securing the utmost possible without consideration of Persia's civilian needs, but it is improbable that

the Government of India will permit the export of these materials without deducting them from Persia's quota. The more important items in the two lists are as follows:—

Woollen overcoat cloth (yards) ...	1,240,000
Woollen battledress cloth (yards) ...	1,280,000
K.D. (yards) ...	1,300,000
Boots (pairs) ...	450,000
Calico (yards) ...	3,500,000
Tents ...	4,500
Blankets ...	575,000
Water bottles ...	50,000
Mess tins ...	50,000
Sun helmets ...	20,000

18. Two new divisions have been formed, the 11th Gilan, with headquarters at Resht, and the 12th Gurgan, with headquarters at Gurgan. The Minister for War informed the British Military Attaché that "for reasons of prestige" these new formations were termed divisions, but that, for the present, their size would not be more than a brigade apiece. He further stated that the Resht "division" contained three infantry battalions and the Gurgan "division" two infantry battalions and a cavalry regiment. In answer to the British Military Attaché's question whether these two new formations could be found from the total strength of 84,000 which, it was believed, had been suggested by General Ridley, budgetted for by Dr. Millspaugh and agreed to by the Ministry for War, the Minister replied that he was now working on a total strength of 100,000.

19. On the advice of General Ridley, the Ministry for War has agreed to the disbandment of the Mechanised Brigade. This expensive toy was of little use and the comparatively large amount of M.T. locked up for the use of the small number of men comprising it can, in the opinion of the American Military Mission, be more profitably employed elsewhere.

Persian Gendarmerie.

20. The commission which was despatched to Khamseh (Zenjan) and Azerbaijan to discuss the future organisation of the gendarmerie in these provinces has submitted its recommendations to the Ministry for the Interior (see paragraph 17 of Intelligence Summary No. 25). Colonel Schwarzkopf informed the British Military Attaché that he had not yet seen the recommendations regarding Azerbaijan, but that in respect of Khamseh the commission had recommended the absorption of the Democrat "Fidais" of that province into one battalion of gendarmes. The Democrats had agreed to accept a commanding officer and two out of four company commanders from the Central Gendarmerie. The remaining officers are to be found from the "Fidais."

Communications.

21. A press communiqué states that by a decision of the Ministry for Roads and Communications the section of the railway line Kazvin-Mianeh has been separated from the Central Railway Administration and will, in future, form an independent section termed the North-Western Railway. Steps are being taken to verify the truth of this report which, on the fact of it, seems hardly creditable. In the first place the Minister for Roads and Communications has not the power to make such a decision. Secondly, though in actual fact the Democrats control the railway from Khurramdarrah (50 miles beyond Kazvin) to Mianeh it is unbelievable that the Persian Government should thus recognise their independence and make them a present of this section of railway more especially since a credit has recently been given to provide for the extension of the line from Mianeh to Tabriz.

Economic.

22. A company has been formed in Isfahan with a capital of 10 million rials to link up the Kuhrang waters with the Zayandehrud. Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners have made the necessary survey and report favourably on the possibility of construction. Up to the present 2,500,000 rials have been paid up by the public and another 500,000 is expected shortly. The dam will take five years to construct. The same firm has also been examining projects for a water supply for Shiraz town.

The Press

23. The chief topics have been the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company strikes, the arrival (completely untrue) of three British cruisers in Persian waters and the activities of M. Louis Saillant. The Tudeh organ *Rahbar* gives an indication of the programme and slogans to be adopted in the meetings which will be held throughout the country on Persian Constitution Day, 14th Mordad (5th August). They are as follows:—

- (1) The necessity of Persia participating in the Peace Conference.
- (2) The freedoms gained by the democratic revolt of Azerbaijan to be extended throughout the country.
- (3) Clean up of the ruling classes; prosecution and punishment of those responsible for the killings in Khuzistan and Somnan.
- (4) Investigation of the military *coup d'Etat* in Kerman and the establishment of individual and collective security, particularly for peasants, throughout Persia.
- (5) Non-intervention of the A.I.O.C. in Persian internal affairs.

The Court.

24. Her Royal Highness Princess Ashraf and her suite returned to Tehran from their tour in Russia on the 24th July. Much prominence has been given in the Persian press to the interviews between Princess Ashraf and Marshal Stalin at which the only other person present was M. Molotov and to the decoration of the Princess by Stalin with the "Red Flag of Labour." The Minister for War also informed the British Military Attaché that General Shafai, the Persian Military Attaché in Moscow, who accompanied the party, had been presented with a gold sword. (With a malicious grin General Ahmedi said that he had advised General Shafai, as an ex-chief of the arsenal, to have the sword assayed, lest a change for the worse in his relations with the Russians might render it necessary for him to pawn it.)

[E 7896/315/34]

(7)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 30, Secret, for the Period 29th July to 4th August, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 312 of 7th August; Received 14th August.)

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

ON the 31st July at 6 p.m. the Council of Ministers was assembled and awaiting the arrival of the Prime Minister for a routine meeting. At 6.15 p.m. Muzaffar Firuz arrived and asked them to begin as he had a communication to make to them from the Prime Minister. He called upon the Minister of Finance to read the message, which was to the effect that Qawam-us-Saltaneh thanked them for the collaboration, that circumstances rendered necessary a reconstitution of the Cabinet on a coalition basis and that in order to leave his hands free he called upon them all to resign forthwith. So thunderstruck were they at this completely unexpected development that they all meekly assented and signed the message in token of acceptance. The Minister for War, who informed the Shah a few minutes later, found him in complete ignorance of the affair and much perturbed by it and it was not till 9 a.m. on the following day that Qawam-us-Saltaneh sought an audience to inform the Shah of what he had done and of the names of the persons he proposed to include in his new Cabinet (see paragraph 2 below). It is generally thought that Qawam-us-Saltaneh, having decided to stage this minor *coup d'Etat* on his own, feared to inform the Shah in advance lest His Imperial Majesty were to go one better and dismiss him—an act which, in the absence of a Majlis, he had the constitutional right to do.

2. The new Cabinet is as follows:—

- (1) Prime Minister, Minister of Interior and Minister for Foreign Affairs: Ahmad Qawam, Qawam-us-Saltaneh (F.O. 183; M.A. 295).
- (2) Minister for War: Sipahbud Ahmedi (F.O. 16; M.A. 21).
- (3) Minister of Finance: Abdul Husein Hazhir (F.O. 79; M.A. 104).
- (4) Minister without portfolio: Anushirwan Sipahbudi (F.O. 205; M.A. 282).

- (5) Minister of Roads and Communications: General Muhammad Husein Mirza Firuz (F.O. 72; M.A. 94).
- (6) Minister of Justice: Allahyar Saleh (F.O. 198; M.A. 253).
- (7) Minister of Posts and Telegraphs: Dr. Manuchihr Iqbal (F.O. 94).
- (8) Minister of Agriculture: Shams-ud-Din Amir Alai.
- (9) Minister of Labour, of Social Affairs and Propaganda and Political Under-Secretary of State to the Prime Minister: Muzaffar Firuz (Appendix A to Intelligence Summary No. 7 and Appendix to Intelligence Summary No. 28).
- (10) Minister of Commerce and Industry: Iraj Iskandari.
- (11) Minister of Public Health: Dr. Murteza Yazdi.
- (12) Minister of Education: Dr. Kishavarz.

Nos. 1, 2, 5 and 8 hold the same appointments as in the previous Cabinet.

No. 7 exchanges Public Health for Posts and Telegraphs.

No. 4 has now no portfolio.

No. 3 was Minister of Finance in Hakimi's Cabinet.

No. 5 was for a few weeks Minister of Interior in Hakimi's last Cabinet and leads the "Iran" Party which recently amalgamated with the Tudeh Party.

Nos. 10, 11 and 12 are newcomers to Cabinet rank. Short personality notes on them are given in an Appendix to this Summary.

3. According to the Minister for War and the President of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce great consternation has been caused by the recent Cabinet changes and the general impression is that complete subservience to Russian demands will ensue. The issue of a proclamation by the Prime Minister (see paragraph 4 below) has deepened the gloom and leads many to think that its ominous threats and restrictions will but serve to keep the ring while Russian policy is carried out. Conviction that the Democrat Party of Iran was but an electioneering gambit grows and some people predict its early demise by absorption in the Tudeh. According to General Ahmedi in the latter days of the last Cabinet (*i.e.*, after the dismissal of Muwarrikh-ud-Dowleh and the rupture between Bahar and the Russians) on political issues in which Russia's interests were concerned or on questions on which the Russians had made known their views the voting in the Cabinet was usually four to three, Qawam-us-Saltaneh, General Firuz, Amir Alai and Zuka-ud-Dowleh taking the Russian side and General Ahmedi, Bahar and Dr. Iqbal the other. Sipahbudi usually contrived to avoid voting at all and Bayat's loutish brain rarely grasped the point at issue before the voting was completed. As the general pointed out, the present set-up is much less balanced and the expected score is 8 to 3, *i.e.*, Qawam-us-Saltaneh, General Firuz, Saleh, Amir Alai, Muzaffar Firuz and the three Tudeh members *v.* Ahmedi, Hazhir and Dr. Iqbal, with the possible addition of Sipahbudi who, after a life career in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, is displeased at being deprived of his portfolio. Further cause for alarm is given by a rumour that the Prime Minister intends to include one or more of the members of the Azerbaijan National Government in his Cabinet as Ministers without portfolio.

4. On the 3rd August a communiqué was published by the Persian Prime Minister. After explaining that the need for national unity had forced him to make changes in his Cabinet he went on to explain the principal points in his Government's programme as follows:—

- (i) Progressive national economy and the encouragement of Persian capital for the benefit of new industries and of agriculture.
- (ii) Reallocation of the budget to make better provision for Education, Health, Industry and Agriculture.
- (iii) Revision of the law within the framework of the United Nations Charter.
- (iv) Summary and condign punishment for all embezzlers, armed bandits and disturbers of the peace.
- (v) Setting up of special courts to try traitors.
- (vi) Reviewing the relations between landlord and tenant.
- (vii) Agricultural reforms, including the distribution of Crown Lands among the peasants.
- (viii) A complete overhaul of the country's financial system.
- (ix) A drive against unemployment and the improvement of the lot of the workers by strict enforcement of the new Labour Law.

Turning to foreign policy, the Prime Minister repeated that he based this upon the maintenance of friendly relations with all countries and especially with the

U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the United States. He insisted upon maintaining the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Persia and he would repeat that he would brook no interference by any foreign Power in Persia's internal affairs. To effect this the following rules would be strictly enforced:—

- (1) For the future all contact with embassies and legations is prohibited to all Persians except State officials whose duties require them to enter into relations with foreign missions and who have been authorised to do so by their official superiors. Those who contravene this injunction will be at once dismissed.
- (2) Persians not in State employ nor connected with foreign missions shall abstain from all contacts with them.

The Prime Minister went on to say that he, for his part, would enforce these regulations to the utmost, and that he called upon all foreign embassies, legations and consulates to abstain from all contacts save those arising out of official business.

5. On the 2nd August a B.B.C. broadcast repeated a communiqué from the Government of India to the effect that, "in order that they may be at hand for the protection, should circumstances demand it, of Indian, British and Arab lives and in order to safeguard Indian and British interests in South Persia, troops are being sent from India to Basra. There are many hundreds of Indians employed in the oilfields and refineries in South Persia and India depends largely on this source for her vital supplies of petrol." A subsequent news item from the same source stated that "it is learnt from General Headquarters that the force sent from India to Basra is a brigade group. There is no question, it is stated officially, of troops going into Persia, except in the case of grave emergency, which, it is hoped, will not arise." The reference to the Arabs was unfortunate and may be exploited by the Left-wing press, who have consistently accused His Majesty's Government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company of stirring up the Arabs to fight the innocent Tudeh. A little thought would make it clear to the average Persian that a decision to take some precautionary measures must have been made by His Majesty's Government several weeks ago when the troubles in Khuzistan first assumed serious proportions. A little more thought would make it clear that the move of a brigade group from India to Basra could not have been achieved overnight. In spite of this, however, there are many who will believe that this movement of troops is His Majesty's Government's counter-move to the recent reconstitution of the Cabinet.

Internal Security.

Khuzistan.

6. Another infantry battalion, making three in all, has been sent to Ahwaz as reinforcements. It left Tehran on the 1st August. The Chief of the General Staff informed the British Military Attaché that the battalion was from Mekran and, being composed of Baluchis, would be more immune to Tudeh propaganda. According to the General Officer Commanding, Khuzistan, as reported by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, one infantry company stationed at Abadan, belonging to a locally recruited infantry battalion, had become infected with this propaganda.

7. The Indian artisans employed by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company have been trying to force the company's hand. About seven hundred of them handed in their passports and demanded repatriation to India. Much of their discontent, it is believed, is due to the unsatisfactory conduct of the Indian Welfare Officer, who is more concerned with drawing his large salary than in investigating the complaints of Indian workers.

8. Though no fresh disturbances have taken place at any of the company's installations, the situation is still precarious with the Arabs straining at the leash to avenge themselves upon the Tudeh. At Agha Jari some disappointment has been felt by the release by the Central Government of Hafizullah, Zubdeh and Durusti, who had been arrested and deported to Tehran by the local military authorities (see paragraph 5 of last Intelligence Summary).

East Persia.

9. From a consular source it is learned that the closure of the Soviet Consular Agency at Zabul has not yet been effected. On the 23rd July the Soviet Vice-Consul from Meshed and two Russian military officers arrived at Zabul, and after a five days' stay left for Birjand.

Isfahan.

10. A branch of V.O.K.S., the Russo-Persian Cultural Society, has been opened at Isfahan. Ismail Mirza, a brother of Sarem-ud-Dowleh, has accepted the presidency (after asking His Britannic Majesty's Consul if there was any harm in his doing so!). Apart from him, the remaining members are small fry with political rather than cultural leanings.

Economic.

11. In official circles there is some apprehension over the recent discussions regarding a minimum wage of workers (see paragraph 9 of Intelligence Summary No. 28). It has just been realised, apparently, that a minimum wage will have to be adopted universally and not only by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The Government mines, about fourteen in number, the four Government textile mills, the seven Government sugar factories and the six other factories in and around Tehran will all be affected. They have all been running at a considerable loss for many years through mismanagement and speculation, and the load imposed by these increases in wages will impose on the Government's finances a heavier strain than they can bear.

Appointments.

A.—Civil.

12.—(i) Abbas Iskandari to be Governor-General of Tehran. This is a newly created appointment, Tehran having been hitherto only a governorate. Abbas is a nephew of the late Suleiman Mirza, a Qajar prince, who founded the Tudeh Party and died about two years ago. He is a brother of Iraj. In business circles he has an unsavoury reputation, and some three years ago he departed very suddenly to Cairo, having decamped, it was subsequently learned, with a large portion of the funds of the Iran Insurance Company.

(ii) Muhammad Vali Mirza Farmanfarmayan (F.O. 73) to be president of the Caspian Fisheries Board.

(iii) Mehdi Quli Mirza Muzaffari, a son of the late Prince Nusrat-us-Saltaneh, G.C.V.O., to be Governor of Arak (Sultanabad).

(iv) Husain Diba to be counsellor at the Persian Legation in Brussels.

(v) Muhammad Hasan Kabiri to be Governor of Maku.

(vi) Dr. Mihtash to be Governor of Tabriz and Deputy Governor-General of Eastern and Western Azerbaijan.

B.—Military.

Sartip Reza Jawadi to be Chief Engineer vice Sartip Bayendor, appointed G.O.C., Khorasan Division.

Legislation.

13. The text of the Persian Government's Labour Law, passed on the 18th May by the Council of Ministers (referred to in paragraph 10 of Intelligence Summary No. 20), has now been received. It is styled "Decree for Experimental Enforcement." The draft law, for it amounts to such, is to be laid before the Majlis at the beginning of the fifteenth term. It contains forty-eight articles and promises additional legislation to elaborate numerous points, of which the chief are:—

Classification of industries; special laws to govern agriculture; classification of employment, e.g., heavy, dangerous, &c.; the fixing of working hours for certain specified industries; the form of contract between employer and employee; health regulations; rules governing employment agencies; the conduct of trade unions' affairs; how wages are to be paid; rates of pay; workers' councils; the functions of the Supreme Labour Council; workers' funds.

Despite this formidable list of legislation not yet enacted, the new Labour Law is more definite and seems more practicable than any piece of Persian law hitherto seen.

The Court.

14. Prince Ahmed Reza and Prince Hamid Reza (the fifth and seventh sons of the late Reza Shah by his third queen, Esmet-ul-Muluk) have left for Paris to continue their studies.

Appendix.

Dr. Kishavarz.

Born about 1906. Son of a Yazdi doctor. Was deputy for Pahlevi in the Fourteenth Majlis. Has been prominent in all Tudeh Party activities since the end of the Fourteenth Majlis. In 1945 he was invited by the Soviet Government to attend ceremonies held in Tashkent on the twentieth anniversary of the inauguration of the "Central Asian Middle East College." He is the editor of the newspaper *Razm*. An accomplished public speaker and a hypocrite.

Iraj Iskandari.

Born about 1900. Brother of Abbas Iskandari and nephew of the late Suleiman Mirza, founder of the Tudeh Party. A lawyer, educated in France. One of the group of Communists imprisoned by Reza Shah in 1938. Prominent in the Tudeh Party organisation, and was a member of the Tudeh Political Committee and secretary to the party in 1944. He is on the editorial board of the newspaper *Rahbar*, of which he holds the licence.

Dr. Murteza Yazdi.

Born about 1900. Educated in Germany. Joined the Communist Party there and later in 1942 was holding meetings at his home in Tehran. Was on the Inspection Committee of the Tudeh Party in 1944, and was responsible for the party's demonstration at the end of that year. In early 1946 he made a tour of the south and east in an effort to whip up Tudeh support, and was responsible to a large degree for the Tudeh swing over in Isfahan in April. He was appointed a member of the Directing Committee of the Russo-Persian Cultural Relations Society for 1946-47.

[E 8162/315/34]

(8)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 31, Secret, for the Period 5th-11th August, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 328 of 13th August; Received 20th August.)

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

1. On the 6th August the Ministry for Foreign Affairs addressed a note to His Majesty's Embassy in which, after referring to the radio announcement about the despatch of an Indian Brigade Group to Basra (see paragraph 5 of last Intelligence Summary), they protested against the possible future entry of this force into Persia on the grounds that (a) they had already taken adequate precautions against a possible recurrence of the disorders; (b) that a strike in any country was an internal affair of that country and could not serve as a pretext for armed intervention by another Power. The note concluded by asking for the return of the force to India and for some statement by His Majesty's Government to remove the bad impression created by the radio announcement referred to.

2. On the 5th August, after a mass meeting of the Democrat Party, a clash occurred between them and the Tudeh in which some half a dozen people were killed and more wounded by sticks and knives. Some damage was done to both the Tudeh and Democrat Parties' headquarters. The Tudeh are said to have begun the fight. The mob was dispersed by the police firing over their heads.

3. A general purge appears to be operating in nearly all the Ministries. Naturally it is most drastic in those Ministries to which Tudeh members have been recently appointed. In the Ministry of Education the Directors-General have been reduced from fifteen to two by Dr. Kishavarz, one of them being Khalil Maliki, an active member of the editorial board of *Rahbar*. The Minister of Commerce and Industry, Iraj Iskandari, has dismissed about thirty officials, suspended five Directors-General and eleven heads of sections. The Minister for Agriculture, Amir Alai, has suspended or dismissed sixteen senior officials of that Ministry, who were alleged to be implicated in timber smuggling from the forests of Mazandaran.

Internal Security.

4. The situation is quiet throughout the concessional area of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The military tribunal (referred to as a commission of enquiry in paragraph 6 of Intelligence Summary No. 29) has so far fulfilled the predictions concerning its activities. Some changes in its personnel have been made, but not in its biased procedure. More Tudeh leaders have been released and the tribunal seems bent on exonerating the Tudeh completely and on fixing the blame for the recent disturbances on the company or the Arabs.

Fars.

5. According to His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz the Qashgai are toying with the idea of autonomy for Fars on the Azerbaijan model.

Azerbaijan.

6. Muhammad Biriya has resigned his post as Minister for Education in the Azerbaijan Government but still remains chairman of the Workers' Union.

7. The local Government have issued notices calling upon landlords to sell 70 per cent. of their wheat harvest and 10 per cent. of their barley to Government at 2,000 and 900 rials respectively per ton delivered in Tabriz. Peasants are required to sell 20 per cent. of their shares to Government at prices ruling in the district.

8. His Majesty's Acting Consul-General reports vague rumours of Russian troop concentrations on the Russo-Persian frontier. At the moment it is unlikely that they have any foundation of truth, but many Persians believe that in the possible event of the entry of British troops into Khuzistan a similar move by Russian troops into Azerbaijan would follow. The Persian Government's sharp reaction to the Indian radio announcement (see paragraph 1 above) would appear to be partly due to this fear of Russian retaliation, and there is evidence to show that, during the whole course of the strike in Khuzistan, Russian-inspired Tudeh policy has been directed towards stampeding His Majesty's Government into precipitate action in the south.

9. Colonel Purastigar, a former Chief of Police of Tabriz, who had been imprisoned by the Democrats since the fall of the Central Government's authority there, has been liberated and allowed to come to Tehran.

10. His Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Tabriz recently accompanied the Assistant United States Military Attaché on a short tour of Western Azerbaijan. His conclusions are interesting and are reproduced as Appendix B to this summary.

Persian Army.

11. Owing to the insecurity prevailing on the Tehran-Meshed road, a motorised company of infantry has been sent to Shahrud.

12. The Minister for War informed the British Military Attaché on the 10th August that the negotiations between the Central Government and the Azerbaijan Government regarding the future of the army and gendarmerie had broken down.

13. Generals Murteza Yazdanpanah and Ahmad Nakhjowan have now returned to Persia. After attending the Victory Celebrations in London they were invited to France by the French military authorities.

Economic.

14. The regulations for the newly created Supreme Labour Council were approved by the Council of Ministers at their meeting on the 7th August. They are published as Appendix A to this Summary.

15. Three French advisers for the Ministry of Labour are to be engaged.

16. Pressure is being brought to bear on the Council of Ministers by the Governor of the National Bank to pass a law whereby all foreign banks operating in Persia shall be forced to place a percentage of their deposits with the National Bank without interest.

The Press.

17. The moderate Right newspaper *Tehran-i-Musawwar* has been suppressed for criticising the Prime Minister.

18. An issue of the Right-wing newspaper *Hur* was suppressed. In this issue an article appeared in which the editor ridiculed the freedom of the press

proclaimed by Muzaffar Firuz and said that, in reality, only papers favourably regarded by the Russians were allowed to appear. The editor went on to contrast Qawam-us-Saltaneh's brave words about the prevention of foreign interference in Persia's affairs with the situation as it actually exists in which Russian interference is clearly visible. Finally, he threw scorn on Qawam-us-Saltaneh's promises to preserve the territorial integrity of Persia and asked sarcastically how this was to be achieved while a third of the whole country (Azerbaijan, Khamseh and Kurdistan) was practically under foreign domination.

19. The Tudeh organ *Rahbar* came out with the following:—

"According to a report received from Abadan, Colonel Underwood and Mr. Jeacock, political heads of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Abadan, have drawn up a plan for the murder of a Britisher in Khuzistan so that the British Government may thus have an excuse to bring the Indian troops, which are at present centred in Basra, into Persia and separate Khuzistan from Persia to the advantage of the Arab Union. We draw the attention of the Cabinet to this report and request that such treacherous intrigues may be stopped."

Appointments.

20.—(a) *Civil*.—Dr. Taqi Razawi to be Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Health *vice* Dr. Abbas Nafisi, resigned.

(b) *Military*.—Sarhang Muhammad Daftari to be Provost Marshal *vice* Sarhang Sartipi. Colonel Daftari is a brother of Matin Daftari, an ex-Prime Minister, and was formerly Director of Studies in the Officers' Training College.

Arrests.

21. Amir Taimur Kalali has been arrested in Meshed. It is thought that he was whipping up opposition to the present Government among the clergy of Meshed. He was a Deputy for Khorosan in the 14th Majlis.

British Interests.

Hirings, Claims and Disposals.

22. It may be of interest to give a brief account of the progress made and of the situation at the present time, *i.e.*, six months after the evacuation of Persia by our forces. These matters are in the hands of Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, an officer of the Disposals Staff, who has been introduced to the Persian Government as an assistant military attaché.

(a) Hirings.

Buildings.—542 hired buildings have been returned to their owners and in all cases a "No Claim" certificate has been obtained. The number of hired buildings remaining is one. (This is a small house at Ahwaz retained as an office pending the disposal of remaining Army and Petroleum Division assets in Southern Persia.)

Lands.—398 hired sites for camps, &c., have been cleared and returned to owners and "No Claim" certificates obtained. With one exception (*i.e.*, Doroud) no compensation was paid in lieu of reinstatement, it being part of disposals contracts that sites are restored to condition as on occupation by purchasers of W.D. structures. The following camp sites are still being cleared and work on them will continue for approximately one more month:—

	Sites.
Andimeshk	16
Kermanshah	4
Bisitun	15

(b) Claims by individuals.

Information regarding the number of claims settled by the British authorities since the 15th March, 1946, is not at the moment available. There are still thirteen cases awaiting settlement, mostly under discussion with higher authority, *e.g.*, the War Office and the Claims Commission, M.E.F., Cairo.

(c) Claims by the Persian Government.

The chief outstanding items are:—

(a) Claim for restoration of the W/T Station at Kermanshah, awaiting decision by the War Office.

(b) Iranian State Railway Agreement (a summary of which was given in Intelligence Summary No. 24 dated the 23rd June, 1946).

(c) Claim for compensation to be paid for a building at Hamadan, the property of the Department of Roads and Communications, which was destroyed by an explosion. Amount claimed by Persian Government is 750,000 rials. This is ridiculously high, and details as to how this figure has been arrived at have been requested and still awaited.

(d) Claim by the Iranian State Railway Department of Supply for a large quantity of cement supplied to British units at Andimeshk at latter end of 1941 and early 1942. Claim has only been preferred and is being investigated.

(d) Claims against the Persian Government.

(a) An outstanding debt of £320,000 for Telecommunications sold on which the Persian Government have failed to meet their undertakings to pay. Continuous pressure is being brought to bear on them.

(b) Settlement on account of Dizful Water Supply plant at Dizful. Still in process of negotiation.

(c) A sum of 2 million rials, being the balance of 10 million rials due to His Majesty's Government for cereals supplied.

(e) Disposals of Fixed Assets.

One hundred and sixty-six items have been disposed of at a total sum of 39,376,488 rials, and the following remain:—

(a) U.K.C.C. buildings at Andimeshk.

(b) Tinning plants Nos. 3, 5 and 6 at Andimeshk.

(c) No. 390 Company R.A.S.C. Workshops at Dizful.

(d) Karun River West Bank Pumping Station at Ahwaz.

(e) Staging Camp at Zahidan.

(f) Airfield and camp at Zahidan.

(g) Airfield and camp at Mirjawa.

(h) Airfield camp at Kerman.

(f), (g) and (h) are being negotiated direct with the Iranian Government by the Chairman, Fixed Assets Disposals Executive, G.H.Q., M.E.F., Cairo.

(i) Runways at Mehrabad Airfield, Tehran.

(j) Runways at Mehrabad Airfield, Tehran.

(i) and (j) are being negotiated direct with the Iranian Government by the Chairman, Fixed Assets Disposals Executive, G.H.Q., M.E.F., Cairo.

(k) Petroleum Division assets in Southern Persia. These are chiefly oil pipe lines and associated pumping plants.

Appendix A.

Regulations for the Supreme Labour Council.

Chapter I.—Duties of the Supreme Labour Council.

Article 1. Preparation of laws connected with labour.

Article 2. Preparation of regulations and stipulations connected with the Labour Law and which are provided for in the said Labour Law.

Article 3. Supervision to ensure proper enforcement of the Labour Law, regulations connected with it, Workers' Insurance Law and other laws connected with labour.

Article 4. Study of all problems connected with labour and the drafting of Bills for the provision of work, the prevention of unemployment and the solution of economic crises.

Article 5. Composition of differences not composed by the procedure laid down in the Labour Law.

Article 6. Approval of a minimum wage for the various working classes in all regions in the country.

Article 7. Supervision of the administration of the Workers' Central Co-operative Fund, Unemployment Fund and Health Fund.

Chapter II.—Organisation of the Supreme Labour Council.

Article 1. The Supreme Labour Council shall be composed of the following persons:—

The Minister of Labour or a representative nominated by him.

Three representatives for the workers appointed by the Workers' Union which has the largest membership.

Three representatives of the employers appointed by the Union of Private Factory Owners which has the largest membership.

One representative from the Ministry of Labour and Propaganda.

One from the Ministry of Agriculture.

One from the Ministry of Roads and Communications.

One from the Ministry of Health.

One from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

Seven advisers—legal, economic, engineering, commercial, banking and industrial experts, appointed by the Government as far as possible from connected organisations and institutions.

NOTE.—The seven advisers shall be appointed for one year by the Ministry of Labour.

Article 2. From among the Government representatives and advisers the Supreme Labour Council shall appoint one chairman and one secretary, and from among the representatives of the workers and employers two deputy chairmen shall be appointed.

Article 3. The representative of the Minister of Labour shall hold the post of reporter to the Supreme Labour Council.

Article 4. The budget of the Supreme Labour Council shall be met from the budget of the Ministry of Labour.

Chapter III.—Procedure of the Supreme Labour Council.

Article 1. The representatives of the workers and the representatives of the employers shall be allowed to attend meetings of the council with their own advisers, but with not more than a maximum of three advisers. Such advisers shall not have the right to participate in the deliberations of the council.

Article 2. Meetings of the Council shall be convened at least once per week and extraordinary meetings may be convened at the request of the representatives of the workers or the employers or the Department-General of Labour.

Article 3. The meetings of the council shall take place in the Ministry of Labour.

Article 4. The representative of the Ministry of Labour and the representatives of the various Ministries shall have one collective vote, and the three persons representing the employers and the three representing the workers shall also have one collective vote each.

NOTE.—If, when disputes are relegated to the Supreme Labour Council by the Committee for the Settlement of Disputes or by the Government, agreement is not reached between the representatives of the workers and the representatives of the employers, the advisers and the representatives of the various Ministries and the representative of the Ministry of Labour shall be bound to investigate the dispute and reach a solution acceptable to both parties, to announce such a solution with the agreement of the representatives of the workers and the representatives of the employers, and to see to its enforcement.

Article 5. The resolutions and minutes of the meetings of the Supreme Labour Council shall be official if signed by the representatives of the workers, the representatives of the employers, the representative of the Ministry of Labour or his deputy and three of the representatives of the various Ministries or advisory members.

NOTE.—If one of the representatives of the workers or of the employers should receive recognition from his fellow-members as official representative of them all, then the presence of such a representative shall be sufficient for the convening of a meeting and for the minutes of such meetings to be recognised as official.

Appendix B.

This brief tour, the first I have been able to make this year, has enabled me to see for myself that Democrat control of this part of the province is as effective as, from reports I had received, I had judged it to be. It has confirmed, too, the belief which I have previously based on my observations in Tabriz, that the system of control through secret police and supervisory bodies—whether local party committees or supervisory councils within the framework of municipal government—is very efficiently organised. I felt a very great difference in the province since my last journeys, undertaken during the insurrectionary stage of the "revolution" in November and December last year. The undisciplined bands of partisans have disappeared from the roads, together with their barriers, and instead of them there is a close network of uniformed police and Fida'is keeping a strict control of all movement. They are no less uncompromising than the partisans, but one feels that they are under effective discipline, and, within the limits allowed by their orders, they are correct and courteous. In general, after the turmoil of the insurrectionary months, the provincial administration has emerged as something smarter, more efficient and far stronger than the old Persian Administration.

The tour has also afforded me an opportunity to make the acquaintance of some of the Democrat officials. They are drawn chiefly, it seems, from the skilled stratum of the proletariat. The two officials with whom we had to deal at Julfa, for instance, told us that they had been convoy lorry drivers; the Farmandar of Khoi, who has just been transferred, was a garage worker, and the head of security police at Maku gave the impression of being also one of this class of worker. In general, the Democrat officials, while they obviously have not the social graces of some of the old Persian officials, and have received perhaps little enough literary education, strike me as men of much shrewdness and practical experience; they are interested in their own local affairs and are, I have no doubt, far more capable municipal administrators than the officials formerly sent from Tehran. But they are, above all, the type of men that the Russians know eminently well how to handle. To meet them prompts once more the reflection that the greatest weakness of the old Persian Administration of the province was in not knowing how to make use of such men. As it is, the Russians have used them for their own purposes, but these men themselves have, in my opinion, clearly demonstrated that they can run this province more efficiently than Tehran ever did; and, underneath the stock propaganda phraseology and slogans of their conversation, I feel a genuine strain of local patriotism and enthusiasm which is not likely, even without Russian encouragement, to acquiesce in any attempt to restore the old conditions.

[E 8486/315/34]

(9)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 32, Secret, for the Period 12th August to 18th August, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 338 of 21st August; Received 28th August.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

Most of the Persian newspapers published the following version of His Majesty's Government's reply to the Persian Government's note of protest against the despatch of the Indian Brigade Group to Basra:—

"In the reply dated the 13th August, 1946, sent by the British Embassy on instructions from their Government to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs' note of the 6th August, it was stated that all reports to the effect that orders had been given to the Indian force sent to Iraq to enter Persian territory were devoid of foundation.

Regarding recent events in South Persia the British Government expressed appreciation of the prompt and effective steps taken by the authorities of the Imperial Government to restore order and declared their complete confidence.

In addition, in the above-mentioned memorandum it was stated that the British Government are in entire agreement with the Persian Government's view that the maintenance of security and the execution of the laws of the country are the duty of security forces of the Persian Government."

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One omission is notable, *i.e.*, the sentence in which His Majesty's Government informed the Persian Government that any movement of troops in the existing circumstances to or from Iraq is a matter of concern only to His Majesty's Government and the Iraqi Government. The Persian Prime Minister is reported to have expressed himself as satisfied with the reply.

2. Martial law has been declared in the areas of Shahriyar, about 15 miles south-west of Tehran, and Sanjbulagh, half way between Tehran and Qazvin. Agrarian unrest due to the incitement of peasants by the Tudeh is given as the reason. The Persian Government seems to realise, at last, that failure to secure this year's harvest will produce a famine and the Prime Minister has recently addressed a circular to all Provincial Governors urging on them the necessity for preventing any agrarian disturbances which might endanger the collection of grain.

3. The Supreme Labour Council (see paragraph 14 of last Intelligence Summary) met for the first time on the 14th August.

4. Cathartic treatment of their Ministries by the new Ministers continues and Dr. Yezdi, the Minister of Health, has dismissed thirteen and suspended thirty-nine officials.

5. On the 16th August Sheikh Husain Lankorani and his three brothers were arrested. The Sheikh was a typical "akhund" (itinerant preacher) double dealing and venal. He was elected as Deputy for Ardebil in the last Majlis by Russian support. Up till about two months ago he was one of the chief Russian stooges in the Tudeh Party but fell out of favour with them and became a bitter opponent of the Tudeh. His arrest was said to be imminent at the time when Seyyid Abul Qasim Kashani was arrested (paragraph 3 of Intelligence Summary No. 28).

Internal Security.

Khuzistan.

6. No further incidents have been reported from Abadan or the oil fields. On instructions by the Governor-General the Military Governor of Abadan arrested two prominent Tudeh leaders, Muradi and Najafi on the 13th and 14th August respectively.

Khorasan.

7. His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed reports that there are rumours of a concentration of Russian troops at Askabad of a strength of from three to four thousand. Local gossip credits them with the intention of entering Persia should British troops enter Khuzistan but it is possible that they may be normal reliefs for garrisons on the frontier or on the Central Asian Railway. His Majesty's Consuls-General at Meshed and Tabriz (see paragraph 8 of last Intelligence Summary) have been asked to confirm or deny the truth of these reports.

Bakhtiari.

8. The necessary orders for the appointment of Johanshah Khan as Co-Governor of Bakhtiari with Abul Qasim Khan have now been issued by the Persian Prime Minister (see paragraph 13 of Intelligence Summary No. 29). The district of Chahar Mahal has also been placed under their jurisdiction.

Azerbaijan.

9. At the invitation of the Prime Minister, a delegation of the Azerbaijan National Government's representatives has arrived in Tehran to continue the discussions concerning the future of the Azerbaijan People's Army and the "Fidais" (volunteers). The delegation, which includes the Governor-General, Dr. Javid, is led by Shabistari, the President of the Provincial Council. Padegan, the Vice-President of that body is a member, and "General" Panahian, Chief of Staff of the People's Army represents the Azerbaijan "Regular" forces and "General" Kabiri the "Fidais."

Persian Army.

10. General Razmara, the Chief of the General Staff, has been appointed A.D.C. to H.I.M. The Shah.

11. Another infantry battalion has been sent from the Central Garrison to Qazvin. This increases the garrison at that place to three infantry battalions plus elements of the new 3rd Azerbaijan Division now in process of forming.

12. The Persian Prime Minister has issued a proclamation prohibiting all ranks including civilian employees of the army, gendarmerie or police from joining any political party. Three officers have been dismissed the service for participation in politics. Their names are Lieut.-Colonel Niv, Colonel Nakjawan and Captain Samqabadi. According to the Minister for War they had been active Tudeh propagandists and responsible for much of the recent political trouble among warrant officers at Isfahan, Kerman and Ahwaz. According to the same source a number of warrant officers have been summarily dismissed the service.

The Press.

13. Khuzistan remains the chief topic and some stir has been caused by a report that the Arab League had asked the Government of Iraq to support their claim to independence by an appeal to U.N.O. The newspapers of the extreme Left continue their attacks on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and *Rahbar*, the Tudeh organ, states that British and Indian military personnel are being smuggled at night from Basra into Abadan where they are disguised as employees of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

British Interests.

14. The Persian Prime Minister has informed the Tehran representative of Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners confidentially that he is determined to go through with the Lar Valley hydro-electric and irrigation project and also with the Tehran water supply project and hopes to be able to secure the contracts for both schemes for this firm.

Russian Interests.

15. On the 12th August about 500 Armenians left Tehran for Mianeh by special train. They are to emigrate to Armenia U.S.S.R. Another fifty are reported to have left Meshed for Tehran with the same destination. It is presumed that the contingent from Isfahan, where emigration propaganda has been actively disseminated by the Armenian Bishop of Julfa, is included in the above total of 500.

16. An unconfirmed report emanating from an official in the Ministry of Roads and Communications states that Russia has secured the contract for the supply of rails for the Mianeh-Tabriz section of the Iranian State Railway on the completion of which work is to begin shortly. The same source added that, in order to facilitate delivery of material, the Russians had insisted on work commencing from the Tabriz end and on the gauge being the same as that of the Julfa-Tabriz section, *i.e.*, 5-ft. instead of the 4-ft. 8½-in. of the Iranian State Railway. The Russians, according to the same source, had said that the Persians could alter it later if they chose to do so. This last statement hardly seems credible but, if true, it would explain the Persian Government's communiqué reported in paragraph 21 of Intelligence Summary No. 29. Steps are being taken to verify this information.

[E 8755/315/34]

(10)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 33, Secret, for the period 19th August to 25th August, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 349 of 28th August; Received 4th September.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

GREAT satisfaction is expressed at Persia's success in obtaining a seat at the Peace Conference and the Leftist press are loud in their praises of the Russian delegate in supporting Persia's claim. The delegation has left by air. It comprises Anushirwan Sipahbudi, Minister without Portfolio in the present Cabinet and a former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Fazlullah Nabil, head of the Third Political Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and a junior official Hoveida, a relative of Sipahbudi's, as secretary. Mr. Eden's highly complimentary but unfortunate phrase describing Persia as "The Bridge of Victory" has been made much of and expanded into the incredible statement that "no

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country (*sic*) has suffered greater losses in the late war than Persia." The Persian, with his airy disregard of historical truth, as the years pass by will probably come to believe that it was the hosts of Darius who, unaided, brought Hitler to his knees.

2. The delegation from Azerbaijan referred to in paragraph 9 of last Intelligence Summary is now engaged in conversations with the Persian Government but no official communiqué as to the results so far obtained has been issued.

3. Two more political arrests have been made. One was Dr. Taheri, a member for Yezd in the last Majlis, a strong advocate of good relations with Great Britain, a supporter of Seyyid Zia and a man of much influence inside and outside of the Majlis. With his disappearance the political arena is almost clear of any opponent to Qawam-us-Saltaneh and the Tudeh in the next elections. The other arrest was that of Hisam-ud-din Daulatabadi elected for Isfahan by the mill owning interest in the last elections, a clever and intriguing man whose opposition to Qawam's present policy was well known. Reference paragraph 5 of last Intelligence Summary, it now appears that four and not three of Sheikh Husein Lankorani's brothers were arrested with him, their names, as given in the press, being Ahmad, Hisam-ud-din, Murteza and Mustafa. Nothing is known of their antecedents.

4. Some stir has been caused by an alleged broadcast by the B.B.C. to the effect that Abdullah Khazal, son of the late Sheikh of Muhammerah, was proceeding to Cairo to plead before the Arab League the case of the Arabs of Khuzistan. A statement on the same subject attributed by the press to King Ibn Saud added fuel to these flames. Chassib Khazal, Abdullah's eldest brother, has since sent a telegram to the Persian Prime Minister in which he assures the Persian Government of the loyalty of its Arab subjects in Khuzistan.

Internal Security.

Kurdistan.

5. According to the Chief of the General Staff there is a slight improvement in the situation in Kurdistan. He informed the British military attaché on the 22nd August that Qazi Muhammad seemed to be losing his influence in areas other than his own zone of Mahabad. Amar Khan Shakkak continued to protest his loyalty to the Persian Government. Some other minor chieftains had left the "front" taking their armed contingents with them. Hama Rashid, as far as his information went, was trying to get into touch with the Iraqi Government with a view to his return. Mulla Mustafa Barzani was, therefore, the immediate problem. He had, the Chief of the General Staff knew, been receiving more assistance in arms and money from the Russians who now appeared to regard him as a better bet than Qazi Muhammad. Mulla Mustafa himself had sent an emissary to the G.O.C. in Kurdistan saying that he was under pressure by the Russians and must soon make up his mind which side to adhere to. He could not, without Russian support, continue indefinitely to reside as an unwanted guest among the Persian Kurds (at this juncture the Chief of the General Staff quoted the well-known Turkish proverb to the effect that a fish and a guest both stink after three days) and that unless the Persian Government could use their influence to secure him a pardon from the Iraqi Government he must perforce throw in his lot with the Russians.

Azerbaijan.

6. More tension between Kurds and Democrats in Western Azerbaijan is reported by His Majesty's Acting Consul-General in Tabriz. In Rezaiyeh both sides are endeavouring to secure the power with the Kurds attempting to utilise for their own ends local opposition to the Democrats whether among Azerbaijanis discontented with the Democrat régime or among minorities such as the Assyrians. In Miandoab on the 10th August a force of Kurdish irregulars attempted to take over the administration but retired without fighting when faced with the Azerbaijan People's army to which reinforcements had been sent from Tabriz.

Bakhtiari-Fars.

7. A press report states that an alliance has been formed between the Bakhtiari and the Qashgai and that the leaders of these tribes (presumably Abul Qasim Bakhtiari and Nasir Qashgai) have pledged themselves to support Qawam-us-Saltaneh's Government. Until more detailed information as to the scope of the alliance is received it would be premature to guess at the real

motive behind it but one point is significant, *i.e.*, the non-inclusion of Qawam-ul-Mulk who was a signatory to the Kuhruyeh Pact (referred to in paragraph 7 of Intelligence Summary No. 30/44 and paragraph 8 of Intelligence Summary No. 32/44); the other two being Nasir Qashgai and Murteza Quli Bakhtiari and it is reasonable to suppose that one object of the alliance is to undermine still further the influence of Qawam-ul-Mulk in Fars.

Khuzistan.

8. The situation in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concessional area has slightly improved owing to further arrests of prominent agitators by the local Persian authorities.

9. Russian interest in the recent strikes and unrest does not flag and on the 11th August the Russian Consul, accompanied by six Russians, visited Abadan refinery.

Khorasan.

10. His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed reports that the recent ban on intercourse between Persians and foreign embassies, legations and consulates has resulted in a virtual boycott of his consulate-general, only two Persians having visited it between the 3rd and 23rd August. The English classes, which are held in a house outside the consulate, continue to be well attended and no diminution in the number of pupils is evident. According to the same source the number of Persians visiting the Russian Consulate-General is still considerable though less than before the imposition of the ban. Indeed, such a ban need affect Russian consular contacts but little since they have so many alternative approaches through their Cultural Society, their Travel Bureau, their Air Service, their Trade Agency, their Transport Agency, their Bank and their Insurance Company.

11. Severe famine conditions are reported from the Kainat area whence a large number of people have migrated to Khorasan. Though there is a surplus of grain in Khorasan and Seistan the Persian Government do not seem to have considered the possibility of moving stocks to areas affected by the famine.

The Press.

12. Most of the Left-wing papers continue to praise Russia for its support of Persia's request to be represented at the Peace Conference. They also urge the need for making an early start with the elections, *Rahbar* (the "Tudeh" organ) naively adding that the agreement between Russia and Persia necessitates this. *Zafar*, the organ of the Workers' Union, came out with what is perhaps the most violently worded article yet written about the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company saying that the crimes of Hitler and Mussolini paled into insignificance compared with the diabolical treatment accorded by the company to its Persian workers. As is usual in a Communist philippic, imperialism was placed in the dock alongside of capitalism and Britain was accused of trying to turn Khuzistan into a graveyard in her greed for oil.

Persian Army.

13. A marriage allowance of 100 rials per mensem has been granted to warrant officers.

14. A time scale for promotion for n.c.o.s has been introduced by the Ministry for War. It is as follows:—

After six months' service: promotion to trained soldier.

After six months' at a corporals' school: promotion to corporal.

After twelve months' at a sergeants' school: promotion to sergeant III class.

After four years' service: promotion to sergeant II class or sergeant I class.

After five years' service: promotion to company sergeant-major or regimental sergeant-major.

15. The Chief of the General Staff informed the British military attaché that a further consignment of 48 guns (75-mm. mountain) had arrived, or were just about to arrive, in Khorramshahr from Bofors, Sweden. They were a further consignment out of the 200 guns of this type ordered by the Persian Government

between 1933 and 1939 delivery of which was interrupted by the war. A Colonel Taqi Riahi has gone to Sweden to discuss future deliveries with this firm. According to the Chief of the General Staff the Ministry of War have a large credit there and they are now desirous of altering some of the orders placed (e.g., for a shell filling plant) to material for which they stand in greater need.

16. The Chief of the General Staff has stated that he is contemplating a new organisation for the army which will be better suited to Persia's internal tactical needs. This new organisation is dependent on the arrival from Sweden of the balance of the order for 200 Bofors 75-mm. mountain guns originally placed by Reza Shah and of the 2-inch and 3-inch mortars for which the Persian army has recently made enquiries from the War Office and India. Up to 1941 only 120 of these guns had arrived; from this quantity the army lost fifty-four to the Russians in the operations of August 1941, and a further eight in Azerbaijan in December 1945, thereby reducing the total available to fifty-eight. Now a further forty-eight of the original order have arrived, or are due to arrive shortly, leaving a balance of thirty-two still to come. This will give the army an eventual total of 34½ batteries. The new organisation contemplated by the Chief of the General Staff aims at making the infantry regiment ("Hang-i-Piyadeh") the tactical unit complete with its own supporting arms. The organisation proposed is as follows:—

- Infantry regiment: 3 infantry battalions and 1 artillery battery of 4 mountain guns (under command).
- Infantry battalion: 3 companies of 3 rifle platoons and 1 close support platoon.
- Rifle platoon: 2 sections, each section having a commander and two sub-sections of six men.
- Close support platoon: 1 mortar section and 1 medium machine gun section.

Persian Navy.

17. The Russians have announced their willingness to hand back to the Persian navy its vessels used by them during the late war on the Caspian Sea. As far as is known they consist of four boats of 80 tons displacement of the H.D.M.L. type and eight or ten small motor launches.

American Interests.

18. Colonel Joseph K. Baker, American military attaché in Tehran from 1943 to 1946 has been decorated by H.I.M. the Shah with the order of Humayun III Class. This decoration was also recently awarded to the outgoing Chinese and Belgian military attachés. The announcement in the press stated that this is the highest distinction bestowed upon foreign service attachés. Actually, the decoration the Persian Government intended to bestow upon Major-General Fraser on his departure but which General Fraser was not permitted to accept was the 1st Class of this order.

19. The American labour attaché in Cairo is at present touring Persia.

Russian Interests.

20. (See paragraph 7 of last Intelligence Summary and paragraph 8 of Intelligence Summary No. 31). His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed has been unable to confirm or deny the truth of Russian troop concentrations near Askabad. His Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Tabriz states that his American and Turkish colleagues had heard the same rumours of Russian concentrations at Julfa. The rumours, for such they appear to be, are circulated, probably as part of a war of nerves, by Caucasians and "Muhajirs."

Tehran, 25th August, 1946.

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Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 34. Secret, for the period 26th August to 1st September, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 356 of 4th September; Received 11th September.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

YET another Supreme Council has been set up, this time for the drawing up of a seven-year plan of town planning and general development for Persia. There are some imposing names on the council including those of Fahim-ul-Mulk and Adl, shrewd men of much ministerial experience, Hazhir, the Minister of Finance, Drs. Said Malik, Roza Zadeh Shafaq and Sadiq, General Riazi, Nikpur, the President of the Chamber of Commerce, and Ali Vakili, a prominent financier and business man.

2. The Persian Ambassador in Washington has been making discreet enquiries from His Majesty's Government's permanent representative at U.N.O. as to Persia's chances of being elected to a seat on the Security Council of U.N.O. in place of Egypt and as to His Majesty's Government's reactions to such a request. Husain Ala seemed to think that his country could count on Russian support for this venture because M. Vyshinski had previously supported Persia's claim to representation at the Paris Peace Conference. Realising, perhaps, that this allusion to Russia's predicted attitude coupled with the Persian Government's present policy might give the impression that Russia was about to add another disciplined voter to her trained band of supporters, Mr. Ala hastened to add that Qawam-us-Saltaneh was "standing up to Moscow pretty well" and was not likely to allow himself to be dictated to by the Soviet Government. Mr. Ala would appear to be about due for a liaison visit to his motherland for a "refresher course" in her present politics.

3. The official *Pars* news agency issued a denial of "certain foreign broadcast announcements" to the effect that, at an interview with the American Ambassador, the Persian Prime Minister had complained to him of Russian interference in the north of Persia and of British interference in the south and had asked him to secure the mediation of the United States Government. In point of fact this very suggestion was made to the American Ambassador by the Persian Prime Minister.

4. In the press, in an account of a reception held on the 27th August by the Tudeh Party in honour of the Azerbaijan delegation at which the Persian Prime Minister and other notables were present, it was stated that, at the close of the party, the fusion of the Tudeh, Persian, Persian Democrat and Azerbaijan Democrat Parties was announced. This statement did not appear in all the newspapers and the report requires confirmation. Whatever the real objects of Qawam-us-Saltaneh's new Persian Democrat Party were it was evident, from the outset, that open and firm opposition to the Tudeh was not one of them. It is, however, surprising that he should have been such a fool as to allow the fact to be publicly announced and thus forfeit his chances of gaining the adherence of the centre and moderate Right elements in the country.

Internal Security.

Khuzistan.

5. A further improvement in the situation has been effected by the arrest of more Tudeh agitators. On the 20th August Muslih, Wafaizadeh and Nasir Islami were arrested—Tarbiyat, Dashtipur and Safavi, whose arrest had been ordered have absconded and their present whereabouts is unknown. A number of persons found in possession of property looted during the disturbances of the 14th July have been arrested. Dabiri, the Tudeh leader at Masjid-i-Suleiman oilfields has been arrested and sent to Ahwaz. General Kupal, the Judge Advocate General, sent from Tehran to investigate the work of the military tribunal has changed three members of it. While the above arrests have done much to restrain the Tudeh, the effect will, it is feared, be only temporary, as so far no one has been tried and convicted and, in Persia, arrested persons tend to be liberated after a short while owing to lack of evidence upon which they can be brought to trial, the relevant dossiers having miraculously disappeared from the Public Prosecutor's office.

Bakhtiari-Fars.

6. Some information is now available concerning the Bakhtiari-Qashgai pact referred to in paragraph 7 of last Intelligence Summary. It was supplied to His Majesty's Consul at Isfahan by Choragh Ali Khan, a younger brother of Murteza Quli Khan, who, in the past, has proved a fairly reliable informant. He stated that the agreement consisted of three clauses, viz:—firstly, that the two tribes pledge themselves to be obedient to the Central Government; secondly, that they will join in punishing raiders in the territory of either; thirdly, that they will unite in defence against aggression by outside parties. By "outside parties" presumably the Tudeh is meant for it is known that both tribes are very concerned with the spread of Tudeh influence towards the south.

7. Martial law was proclaimed in Shiraz on the 28th August with a 10 p.m. curfew and a prohibition against carrying arms. The exact reason for this step is not known but it may be in connexion with a rumoured plot on the part of the Bakhtiari and Qashgai to seize the towns of Isfahan and Shiraz respectively, to liquidate the Tudeh and to take over the Government. Khosro Qashgai has been summoned to Tehran by a cypher message from his temporary associate Muzaffar Firuz stating that he would hear something to his advantage. A further possible cause of unrest in Shiraz is the receipt of an order from Tehran to arrest one Khavari who was Seyyid Zia's agent there. The Governor-General is reported to have replied that he dared not arrest him but that he had suppressed his newspaper. Following the proclamation of martial law there was a scuffle at the Tudeh Party's headquarters arising out of an attempt by the police to remove their loudspeaker. The military fired a few shots in the air and the Tudeh rioters fled.

8. Some stir has been caused by the receipt in Tehran of a manifesto from the people of the south which is reproduced as Appendix "A" to this summary. How close a connexion this has with the rumoured plots of the Bakhtiari and Qashgai referred to above is not yet known but it is certain that some trouble is brewing in the south and that other tribes, such as the Saveh branch of the Shahsavans, the main Shahsavani tribe of Ardebil and the Afshars of Ardalan are aware of it.

9. M. Nicolas Denissov, the Soviet Vice-Consul from Isfahan, accompanied by a secretary named Pietro Koulikof, have arrived in Shiraz to open a Soviet consulate there.

Kurdistan.

10. Some confirmation of the remarks made by the Chief of the General Staff in respect of Mulla Mustafa Barzani (see paragraph 5 of last Intelligence Summary) is afforded by a report from His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah to the effect that Ghazi Muhamamd of Mahabad has been superseded as head of the Komala movement by Mulla Mustafa and that the change was made at the instigation of the Russians.

Azerbaijan.

11. The Soviet Railway Commission (referred to in paragraph 5 of Intelligence Summary No. 25) has arrived in Tabriz and is proceeding with the handing over of the Julfa-Tabriz railway.

12. The Azerbaijan delegation is still in Tehran and, though no official communiqué has been made concerning the negotiations, it is believed that they are at a standstill. In the meanwhile, according to His Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Tabriz, the Provincial Council, apparently without reference to Tehran, have appointed Daneshian, Deputy Minister for Defence in the former National Government, as commandant of the Azerbaijan gendarmerie, which consists of the entire body of the "Fidais." Daneshian, according to the same source, has also been commissioned to organise the gendarmerie in Mahabad, but it is not yet known whether the Kurds will agree to this.

13. The Democrats and Kurds have failed to come to any agreement over Rezaieh and both sides maintain patrols inside the town though the surrounding villages are in Kurdish hands.

Kermanshah.

14. Considerable extension of Tudeh influence in the Kermanshah district is expected as the result of the activities of Alawi, the Provincial Director of Education. He has started an attack on the newspaper *Kermanshah*, whose tone was mild and friendly to the British and intends to leave as the sole possessor of the journalistic field the Tudeh organ *Bisitun*. He is also appointing teachers of known Tudeh sympathies to the important schools.

Communications.

15. A five-year construction programme has been approved by the Council of Ministers. This programme is the first of two five-year plans. A summary of it is given in Appendix "B" to this Summary.

16. The Khurramshahr-Tanuma road, washed away by the floods in the late spring, has now been reopened for traffic.

*Appointments.**A.—Civil.*

17.—(i) Dr. Abul Qasim Sheikh, Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, has been appointed to supervise all students sent by that Ministry to Europe. He is leaving for Paris shortly.

(ii) Sodiqi Nijad to be Director of Education, Fars.

(iii) Dr. Husain Ali Amir Aslani to be second secretary at the Persian Legation in Paris.

(iv) Akbar Darai to be second secretary at the Persian Legation in Prague.

B.—Military.

(i) Sarhang Ghulam Reza Saqavi to be Chief of the Second Bureau of the General Staff vice Sarhang Isa Hidayot.

(ii) Sartip Safar Ali Ansari to be Deputy Director (Technical) of Armaments vice Sarhang Hasan Baqai who has been appointed Deputy Director (Administrative) of that Department.

Arrivals.

18.—(i) Ali Soheili (F.O. 217; M.A. 283) from Switzerland. The purpose of his voyage is not known, but it may be in connexion with the case still pending against him.

(ii) Rukn-ud-Din Mirza from Paris. He is a son of the late Crown Prince of Persia and is, therefore, a step-brother of Hamid Mirza and Hussein Mirza and Princess Giti all of whom are now in England. According to the press he has come to discuss with the Government the question of his father's estates, some of which, e.g., Sultanabad and Aqdasiyeh, were seized by Reza Shah and utilised for military installations.

American Interests.

19. Major-General Arnold of the Operations Directorate of the United States Army arrived in Tehran from Cairo on the 31st August. He was due to leave again on the 2nd September.

*Appendix A.**Alarm!—Proclamation by "The Resistance Movement of the South."*

Dear Countrymen!

Unfortunately the hour of danger is approaching. The unfortunate hour which was avoided by us is now coming and the mass disturbers, after five years of war of nerves and undesirable preparations at the cost of the freedom, independence and integrity of Iran, are now sitting in the seats of the Ministries and taking into their hands the fate of the oppressed people of the country. Unfortunately, it is seen that those who were condemned for Communist doctrines and organisations and those who had records of espionage against this country, have now occupied the seats of the Ministries under the name of Tudeh leaders and are ruling over 15 millions of patriotic Moslem Persians. To tolerate more than this is not possible. It cannot be called anything other than gradual dishonourable death and surrender to the rule of the Communist disturbers and anarchists. Qavam, who took the reins of the Government six months ago, was respected and supported by the people of Persia for the purpose of eradicating the illegitimate interference of foreigners in the internal affairs of Persia, and smashing the feet of the mischief makers of the stateless Tudeh Party people in the arena of Persian policy. Therefore, any pressure brought by the Qavam's Government on the

people of Persia was resisted bitterly. Our statesmen, who were nationalists and patriots, were sent to jail without any fault and the press which was considered the tongue of the people and the fourth column of democracy, was suppressed. The intolerable pressures of taxes and the cost of living were enhanced, but these undesirable deprivations were tolerated in the hope that foreign influence might be eradicated in the country and subversive elements of irreligious disturbers prohibited from interfering in the internal affairs of Persia. Unfortunately, not only were these expectations not realised, but it was a prelude to the rule of the Tudeh leaders. It is seen that five important Ministries were occupied by the Tudeh leaders.

Dear countrymen, our patience is running out and it is intolerable to see the education of our boys and girls left to the Tudeh ministers. According to the party programme, the inclusion of religion in the school programmes will be considered as reactionary. In this case, atheism will be taught in our schools. We, the Resistance Movement of the South, are those who are not prepared to listen to the radio and hear statements made against our religion, nationality, &c. We are not a people to be cold-blooded in the face of any accusation and abuse. As it is proved by history, we have showed our resistance during long years in the face of the world powers and no power could fight with us. The faithful members of the Resistance Movement of the South have arranged their organisations from long ago on the tops of the mountains and in the depths of the valleys and forests of the south. No positive action has been shown against the Tudeh disturbers. But to-day, when it is proved in action that the head of the Government is intimidated by foreign political activities, so that he believes that the participation of the Tudeh leaders in the Cabinet is necessitated, we deem it necessary to utilise our legitimate privilege and declare to the people and the Government of Persia and also to the democratic Governments and peoples of the world, that due to the fact that the Resistance Movement of the South sees the participation of the Tudeh leaders in the Cabinet as open interference of foreign policy in Persian affairs and that surrender to the same means the betrayal of Persia, and since the participation of the anarchist leaders in the Government of the democratic Moslem country of Persia is considered as a warning of danger to the independence and integrity of Persia, we hereby declare an alarm so that the peoples of the world may understand that more than 1 million men and women of the Resistance Movement of the South with the co-operation of the movements of the west and south-west and other parts of the country with their life in their hands and rifles on their shoulders, will begin open resistance. This proclamation which has been made on the mountains and deserts is considered as the last proclamation of the Resistance Movement of the South to the Government and the democratic Governments of the world. We want the mistake to be redeemed, otherwise they will have to be eye-witnesses of the bloody fighting and the vengeance of the Moslem patriotic people of Persia who are the basis of this movement. "Peace be on those who follow the guidance of the Resistance Movement of the South."

Appendix B.

A.—Roads.

Roads have been divided into three main categories:—

National Roads, which are those starting from the capital and terminating at ports or at the frontiers of neighbouring countries.

Provincial (Ustan) Roads, which are those joining one province to another.

Town (Shahristan) Roads, which are those connecting cities together. Asphalting is to be done on roads according to their importance.

1,680 kilom. of roads in the south and west of the country have already been asphalted and during the next five years it is intended to asphalt the following 3,560 kilom.:—

Karaj-Qazvin; Tehran-Qum; Kulin-Resht; Qum-Sultanabad-Malayer; Takestan-Zenjan-Tabriz; Tehran-Shahrud-Meshed; Qum-Isfahan-Bushire; Kashan-Murcheh Khur; Isfahan-Azna-Chalan Chulan.

In addition, it is hoped to complete 6,500 kilom. of road and to open up some 1,600 kilom. of new roads. The necessary funds to meet the costs incurred will

come from a yearly credit and also from a suggested special tax on transport vehicles which will be collected as a road tax on asphalted roads or added to the cost of petrol.

B.—Railways.

The main line from Tehran to Bandar Shah in the north and from Tehran to Bandar Shahpur in the south, a distance of 1,395 kilom., was completed in 1937. In the same year three branch lines were started, i.e., Tehran to Tabriz, Garmsar to Meshed and Qum to Yazd.

These three lines are half-finished and their completion is given first priority in the list of railway construction to be carried out in the next five years. The work to be done is, briefly, as follows:—

(a) Tehran to Tabriz.

This line is completed up to Mianeh, a distance of 439 kilom. On the remaining 305 kilom. work has already started.

(b) Garmsar to Meshed.

This line is 811 kilom. in length, 313 kilom. of which are already in operation to Shahrud. A certain amount of work has been done on the remaining 498 kilom.

(c) Qum to Yazd.

This line is 475 kilom. in length and the track at present is almost complete as far as Yazd.

After completion of the above three lines, the following lines are to be considered:—

- (i) Andimeshk to the Iraqi frontier, to join up with the line Kut-ul-Amarah-Bagdad, which is expected to be built by the Iraq Government. The distance is approximately 90 kilom.
- (ii) Tabriz to Qutur (Turkish frontier), about 180 kilom.
- (iii) Yazd to Kerman and Zahidan, to join the Indian railway system, a distance of about 900 kilom.
- (iv) Meshed to Darjaz to join the Turkestan and Siberian Railways, about 250 kilom.
- (v) Kashan to Isfahan, approximately 185 kilom.

C.—Ports.

The most important ports through which the greater part of exports and imports have passed before and during the war are:—

- (a) Bandar Shahpur in the south.
- (b) Khurramshahr in the south.
- (c) Bandar Pahlevi on the Caspian.
- (d) Bandar Shah on the Caspian.
- (e) Nowshahr on the Caspian.

There are several other much smaller and less important ports situated chiefly on the Gulf coast. The water at these places is too shallow to admit cargo vessels, all loading and unloading being carried out by means of lighters, which are obliged to go out some distance to the anchorage. No work is to be done at these places.

Repairs and constructions for the principal ports are detailed as follows:—

(a) Bandar Shahpur.

This port is very favourably situated at the southern terminus of the Trans-Iranian Railway. It is given precedence over Khurramshahr owing to the much greater expense incurred in the exploitation and maintenance of the latter port.

Construction of the port is now complete and what work there is to be done is solely of a repair nature.

(b) *Khurramshahr.*

It would appear, owing to the disadvantage mentioned above, that no arrangements for modifications or repairs have been made in the Five-Year Plan.

(c) *Bandar Pahlevi.*

This is the most import port in the north with a naturally good situation. Owing to the fall in the sea level of the Caspian, renovations are planned for the breakwaters and jetties, of which one or two new ones will have to be built. Two new lighthouses are to be constructed and the present ones repaired, together with several houses for the port personnel.

(d) *Bandar Shah.*

This port is situated at the northern terminus of the Trans-Iranian Railway. It requires extensive dredging every few years. A comprehensive programme of repair and reconstruction is prepared, including the purchase of lighthouses, a lightship, two diesel tug boats, a 7-ton floating crane and two other cranes, a fire-fighting ship and a motor boat. Construction work includes the extension of the embankment of the port area and the building of new storage depots.

(e) *Nowshahr.*

This is a newly made port situated 210 kilom. from Tehran. Extensive repairs and dredging are needed and are to be included in the five-year programme. Other items include the extension of the western breakwater, the installation of two lighthouses and the erection of storage depots.

In general, two complete hydrographic sets for the northern and southern ports will be purchased in order that regular weather reports may be produced. Also two sets of complete diving equipment for under-water repairs, construction and salvage for both the northern and southern ports are to be bought.

A scheme to train technical staff and engineers in Persia and abroad in port work will be set in motion under the new programme.

[E 9208/315/34]

(12)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 35, Secret, for the Period the 2nd September to the 8th September, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 361 of 11th September; Received 17th September.)

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

THE report of the fusion of the four parties mentioned in paragraph 4 of last Intelligence Summary appears to have been incorrect in one small detail, the term "fusion" having been used in place of "co-operation." Confirmation of some degree of cohesion between the parties is afforded by the holding of a large meeting in Tehran on the 6th September, when 350 bedecked lorries paraded before Qawam-us-Saltaneh, among whose entourage were also found Ministers, the Azerbaijan delegation, and the leaders of the Tudeh, Iran and Iran Democrat Parties. Yet another recruit to this unholy alliance (according to the Persian press quoting London radio retransmitting a Tabriz broadcast) would appear to have been secured in the shape of the Kurdish Democrats, who have telegraphed to the Prime Minister and to the Irani Democrat, Azerbaijan Democrat, Iran, and Tudeh Parties expressing their desire to coalesce with them.

2. The deadlock in the negotiations between the Central Government and the Azerbaijan delegates continues. The Persian Prime Minister, in conversation with His Majesty's Ambassador, and the Minister of War, in conversation with the British Military Attaché, both stated that, while Dr. Javid and M. Shabistari were disposed to be co-operative, it was Pishaveri who prevented them from making any concessions. The future organisation of the Azerbaijan People's army, the method of merging the "Fida'is" into the gendarmerie, and the re-assumption of control by the Central Government over the province of Khamseh (Zenjan), are the main points at issue, though questions of finance are also proving difficult, the Azerbaijan Government being short of money and the Central Government being unwilling to continue to finance a provincial Government over which it has long ceased to exercise any control whatever.

*Internal Security.**Khuzistan.*

3. Major-General Kupai left Khuzistan for Tehran on the 1st September, and rumours are now being heard of the anticipated findings of the military tribunal. These are to the effect that the Military Governor of Abadan, Major Fateh, and the Chief of the Police, Colonel Leali, are to be made the scapegoats and will be charged with dereliction of duty on two points, firstly, that they failed to make proper dispositions to prevent riots, and, secondly, that they failed to recover looted property and to identify casualties. Major Fateh, who is further accused of speculation in respect of sums given to him by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to defray the cost of evacuating a number of families, has already been relieved of his post (his arrest has been reported in the press). Leali is to return to Tehran.

Bakhtiari/Fars.

4. Khusro Qashgai returned to Shiraz on the 3rd September after a very brief stay in Tehran. He appears to be most pleased with himself, and is telling extravagant stories of his talk with the Prime Minister, which can be boiled down to the fact that he has successfully ingratiated himself with Qawam once more. The news of the proposed tribal revolt (see paragraph 7 of last Intelligence Summary) has become common knowledge in Isfahan. Both Abul Qasim Khan and Jehanshah Khan had been summoned to Tehran, but, according to His Majesty's Consul, only the former intended to come as it was not adjudged expedient for both co-governors to be absent at the same time. There are reports of various arrests to be made, and His Majesty's Consul considers that even if any attack on Isfahan were now to be made it would be most unlikely to succeed. According to the *Journal de Tehran*, of the 9th September, Muzaffar Firuz arrived in Isfahan on the 7th September and at once proceeded to arrest Jehanshah Khan, son of Morteza Quli Khan, the co-governor of Bakhtiari, and also his brother, Amir Bahman, on the grounds that they had been plotting against the State. The same paper adds that a motorised company of gendarmerie has been sent to Isfahan. Further details concerning these arrests and the situation in Isfahan are awaited from His Majesty's Consul. Muzaffar Firuz flew to Isfahan in a chartered Russian plane.

5. Further attempts at tribal unity in the south are reported by His Majesty's Consul in Shiraz, who gives news of an agreement concluded between the Qashgai, Dushmanziari, Boir Ahmadi and the "coastal union." The tribes comprising this latter "union" have not yet been identified, but Fathullah Khan Hayat Daudi is one of the signatories.

Azerbaijan.

6. The spasmodic resistance to the Democrats which has been offered by the Shahsavan tribe of the Ardebil area has completely collapsed, and the Democrats have re-established full control of the area.

7. The Russians are buying wheat from the new harvest through contractors, in consequence of which the price of the commodity has doubled in the last month and a serious shortage in the towns is anticipated.

8. There are no further reports of Russian troop movements on the frontier.

9. On the 3rd September the first anniversary of the founding of the Azerbaijan Democrat Party was celebrated at Tabriz with parades and a reception, the latter being attended by Qazi Mohammed, the Kurdish leader.

Khamseh (Zenjan).

10. A press report announces the arrival of two companies of gendarmerie at Qazvin from Tehran. These are said to be destined for Zenjan at a later date.

Khorassan.

11. Famine conditions are reported from the Qainat area in the south-east of the province. They are causing anxiety but little is being done to ease the situation.

Mokran.

12. Zabul is seriously short of water and the Nurab River is dry as far as 20 miles into Afghan territory. The shortage appears to be due to unusually hot weather.

Persian Army.

13. The new transport specialist of the United States Advisory Mission to the Persian army has under consideration a plan for the re-equipment of the army with mechanical transport. He considers that most of the present vehicles, such as the jeep, are unnecessary and, owing to their construction, needlessly expensive in running and maintenance costs. Accordingly he has produced a programme of purchases to cover five years starting from the Persian year 1326 (1947-48). New vehicles are to be from the "International" range of post-war commercial models and will include all types from a general utility van to be used instead of jeeps and ambulances to 10-ton lorries to replace the present Bussing-Nag tank transporter. The major item is a 5-ton heavy duty lorry, of which 500 are to be ordered. Other items include 100 2-ton lorries and 50 10-ton. Initial purchases will cover the present army stocks of vehicles in the first two years 1326 and 1327 (1947-48 and 1948-49). During this period all vehicles at present in the possession of the army will be sold to offset budget expenditure. The total cost of the programme (after deduction of profits through sales) is estimated to be \$1,966,000 or 62,912,000 rials (estimated at the current fixed rate of exchange and current market prices). This programme has been approved by General Ridley but has not yet been presented to the Minister of War.

Persian Navy.

14. Reference paragraph 17 of Intelligence Summary No. 33. The press has announced the official handing back by the Russians of the Caspian "fleet" on the 1st September.

Obituary.

15.—(a) H.R.H. Sardar Inayatullah Khan of Afghanistan.
(b) Lutf Ali Khan, Amir Mofakham (M.A. 63) of the Il-Khani branch of the Bakhtiari.

Agricultural.

16. A Government decree has been published forbidding the cultivation of the opium poppy and the use of opium. The opium monopoly administration will be dissolved and the sale of opium forbidden as from the 23rd October.

Communications.

17. The pontoon bridge which was thrown across the Karun River above Khorramshahr by British military forces during the war has now been re-erected over the Barmanshir Creek (separating Abadan Island from the mainland to the north-east) to replace the ferry which sank during June, and has been in use since the beginning of the month.

18. It is reported in the press that the Ahwaz-Khorramshahr extension of the Trans-Iranian Railway has been reopened for light traffic.

Appointments.

19. *Civil*—
Ali Akbar Vasiq to be Fermandar of Kazerun.
Hadi Ashraf to be Fermandar of Rafsinjan.
Safavi to be Fermandar of Damaghan.
Hadi Qawam to be Director-General of the Tobacco Department *vice* Mehdi Vossuq.
Mehdi Vossuq to be Director-General in the Ministry of Finance.
Isa Ehteshami to be Fermandar of Babul.
Azizullah Najafi to be Fermandar of Turbat-i-Haidari.
Hassan Mustafavi to be Fermandar of Jahrum.
Isa Iskandari to be Fermandar of Sari.
M. Ahi, the Persian Ambassador to Moscow, has returned to Tehran on leave.

The following proposed by the Governor-General of Azerbaijan and accepted by the Ministry of the Interior:—

Jalil Azarbadagan to be Fermandar of Ardebil.
Ghulam Reza Javidan to be Fermandar of Maragheh.
Jabar Zar'e to be Fermandar of Khoi.

Military—

General Alavi to be head of the Military Tribunal *vice* General Kupal.
General Farajullah Aghevli (late Chief of the General Staff) to be Governor of the Sepah (Military) Bank.

[E 9483/315/34]

(13)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 36. Secret, for the period 9th September to 15th September, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 372 of 18th September; Received 24th September.)

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

On the 13th September the arrest of Colonel Abdul Hussain Hejazi, who was sent to command the 10th (Khuzistan) Division only two months ago, was announced. It appears that Hejazi had been summoned to Tehran in connexion with the case against Major Fateh, lately Military Governor of Abadan (see Intelligence Summary No. 35, paragraph 3). While in Tehran he was summoned to the Prefecture of Police and, on his arrival, was subjected to an interrogation by Muzaffar Firuz, the exact nature of which has not yet been learned. Towards the end of it he became alarmed to find that he was the object of suspicion and, leaving Firuz's office in haste, went to the Ministry of War. The Minister for War thereupon rang up the Prime Minister to ask if he had issued an order for his arrest. On receiving a reply in the affirmative the Minister for War said he would resign. The cause of this precipitate action is that, under Persian law, an army officer can only be arrested and interrogated by the military authorities. The Minister for War followed up his threat by handing his resignation personally to the Shah and General Razmara, Chief of the General Staff, also sent in his. The Minister of War states that the Shah requested him not to resign and that the Prime Minister the next day visited him and General Razmara in his office to apologise for the incident and offered to publish a statement about it. Marshal Ahmadi agreed to this and it was drafted in his office. The text of the proclamation is attached at Appendix "A." Military honour being thus satisfied the resignations of both officers were withdrawn. However, a state of intense indignation persists: Marshal Ahmadi, in conversation with the assistant military attaché, referred to Muzaffar Firuz in insulting terms and said that the affair was by no means settled. Meanwhile Colonel Hejazi is in military arrest awaiting an enquiry and Colonel Ghulam Reza Saqafi, who was one of the party attending the Victory Parade in London, has been selected for the Khuzistan command.

2. The Minister for War states that Firuz was trying to prove that Hejazi had been plotting with His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Ahwaz.

*Internal Security.**Khuzistan.*

3. The arrest of Colonel Hejazi in Tehran has caused much alarm and speculation and the Governor-General has expressed the fear that the morale of the troops will be gravely affected.

4. It is announced in the press that a delegation claiming to represent the Arabs of Khuzistan has presented to the Iraqi Government a request for the affiliation of that province to Iraq. Dr. Jamali of Iraq is quoted as saying that he will pass it to the Secretary-General of the Arab League for consideration at its next session.

Isfahan-Fars.

5. Further arrests followed those reported in last week's Intelligence Summary, those arrested include Merteza Quli Khan, Ahmed Quli Samsan, the former Majlis Deputy; while in Tehran Amir Hussain Bakhtiari and Amir-i-Jang are in house arrest. All those arrested in Isfahan have been brought to Tehran. The main agent in keeping Firuz informed appears to have been Abul Qasim, who, taking advantage of the confidence Jehanshah Khan had in him, kept Firuz fully informed. Abul Qasim, who now appears to be enjoying the complete confidence of Firuz, and who has been appointed sole Governor of

Bakhtiari, is reported to have been the recipient of a large number of rifles together with the requisite ammunition.

6. Meanwhile the Qashgai appear to have kept themselves clear of suspicion. Khosro Khan evaded going to Isfahan and sent Mohammed Hussain Khan in his stead when summoned there by Firuz.

7. The final outcome of this *démarche* by Firuz is not yet clear, but for the moment the Bakhtiari part in the plot appears to be quashed. There are tales that the Qashgai intend to go ahead with their part of the scheme, and Firuz is reported to have taken the precautionary measure of warning Mohammed Hussain that he could send 40,000 Caucasians against the tribe, thus indicating a lack of belief in the good faith of the Qashgai, but as yet there is insufficient evidence by which to judge their real intentions.

8. Muzaffar Firuz and elements of the press have made much of the complicity of "foreign elements" in the plot. Beyond this there have been references to the visit of the ambassador to Isfahan to which, coinciding as it did with these events, sinister motives have been attributed, and there has been a general assumption that the British were directly involved.

9. Firuz, on his return, told the United States Ambassador that he had "documentary proof" that His Majesty's Government had engineered the plot and went on to say that the evidence secured in Isfahan was of such a nature that the Persian Government were considering an appeal to the Security Council.

Kermanshah.

10. The Governor-General has been making himself unpleasant to representatives of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and efforts of the company to start a Workers' Welfare Society inside the compound has met with early opposition.

Khamseh (Zenjan).

11. The two companies of gendarmerie whose move to Qazvin was reported in last week's Intelligence Summary have not yet left for Zenjan. A commission had preceded the party to Zenjan where they have been engaged in conversations with local officials. Reports are current that the gendarmerie force for Zenjan is to be composed of 300 men of the Central Government force and 300 Fidaïs.

Tehran area.

12. Military law has been reimposed in the areas of Shariar and Sanj Bulagh to the south-east of Tehran.

Mazanderan.

13. The press reports the departure of a commission to investigate complaints from the province arising from dissension between the peasants and landowners.

Azerbaijan.

14. It is reported that the Soviet Railway Commission (mentioned in paragraph 11 of Intelligence Summary No. 34) numbers forty-eight of which number six are senior officers. An officer seen by the consul was wearing khaki uniform and not the navy blue of the para-military Railway Corps and appeared to be wearing badges and insignia of the regular army. It is expected that the hand-over will be completed about the 20th of this month. The Persian Commission is working under the local head of the Railway Department who was appointed by the Azerbaijan National Government.

Commercial.

15. An extra tax of half a rial on each litre of benzine and a 5 per cent. tax on the international price of automobiles has been decided upon in order to increase the budget for road maintenance and improvement.

16. A commission has been set up to decide upon and to implement measures to bring down the present very high cost of living.

17. A communiqué has been issued by the Prime Minister to Governors-General and Governors asking them to take steps to prevent disputes between landlords and peasants over the division of produce.

Appointments.

Military.

18. Sartip Ali Akbar She'ri to be G.O.C. 3rd Division *vice* Sarlashgar Pourzand.

Sarlashgar Aghevli to be Governor of the Banque-i-Sepah (Army Bank).

Sartip Alavi to be Chief Accountant to the Army *vice* Sartip Baharmast to be a Special Inspector in the Ministry for War.

NOTE—The appointments of these Special Inspectors are sinecure posts.

Sarhang Ghulam Reza Saqafi to be Commander 10th (Khuzistan) Division *vice* Sarhang Abdul Hussain Hejazi, arrested.

Civil.

Husain Ali Turkman Naseri, Yamin-ud-Dowleh (sixth son of the late Nasr-ud-Din Shah) to be Counsellor to H.I.M. The Shah.

Muhammed Vahed Tunakabuni to be Under-Secretary of State to the Ministry of Agriculture.

Hassan Kaviani, Director-General of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce to be also Inspector-General of the Industrial Bank.

Husain Ala and Nasrullah Intezam to represent Persia at U.N.O. in September. The latter attended the United Nations Conference in San Francisco in May 1945.

Dr. Mujtahidi, a Director-General in the Ministry of Education, to represent Persia at the International Mechanics Conference in Paris.

Khusru Afshar Qasimlu to be Secretary to the Persian Government Delegation to U.N.O.

Dr. Musharraf Nafisi to be representative of the Persian Government and National Bank representative to the Allied International Bank.

Hishmatullah Sami'i to be Farmandar of Hamadan.

Abbas Tabatabai to be Farmandar of Malayir.

Ahmed Aramish, Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, has resigned.

Mustafa Muqaddam, Director-General of the Banque-i-Sepah, transferred to the Prime Minister's office as Financial and Economic Adviser.

Ahmed Zanganeh, Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, to represent Persia at the International Industrial Conference at Paris.

Obituary.

19. Abdul Majid Ahi, Persian Ambassador to Moscow, on the 14th September while on leave in Tehran.

Chinese Interests.

20. The new Chinese Ambassador, Mr. Cheng Yo-tung, has arrived in Tehran.

American Interests.

21. Mr. Harold Lasswell, Special Adviser to the United States State Department and Director of Culture and Information, has arrived in Tehran.

Persian Army.

22. A motorised infantry battalion has been despatched from the capital to Isfahan.

Persian Navy.

23. The vessels of the Caspian Fleet as handed back by the Russians (see paragraph 14 of last week's Intelligence Summary) are reported in the press to number five.

24. From a directory of Tehran newspapers compiled by the Press Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy the following facts are taken. Out of a total of 301 newspapers registered, 100 are not being published and 23 Right wing and 6 others have been suppressed. Of the 172 still appearing 4 are styled Right, 9 moderate Right, 25 moderate Left and 37 Left. It is interesting to note that of this total only eight have a circulation of over 2,000. Even so, for a city of a total population of 750,000, out of which at least 50 per cent. are illiterate, 301 newspapers would seem to be an unusually high number.

Appendix "A."

Although in several of my communiqués I have forbidden any insulting behaviour towards officers of the Persian army and have stated that any insult to them will be considered as an insult to the State, I learn that, contrary to my orders and my wishes, a lack of respect has been displayed towards an officer of the army.

While regretting this incident I have issued an order for the officer to be handed over to the military judiciary to be tried according to established law.

I repeat once more that army officers must be respected in all places and by all people. It goes without saying that anyone disobeying this order will be the subject of investigation and will be severely punished.

CHAPTER IV.—SAUDI ARABIA

[E 6400/6400/25]

No. 28

Mr. Grafftey-Smith to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 9th July.)

(No. 86. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, 1st July, 1946.

IN accordance with standing instructions, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith my annual report on the heads of foreign missions in Jedda.

I have, &c.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 28

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Jedda, 1st July, 1946.

Egypt.

Awad el Bahrawi Bey, who became Minister to Saudi Arabia only, and no longer to Iraq also, in April 1945, was absent in Egypt from May until November, when he returned for the Pilgrimage. He accompanied Ibn Saud to Cairo and back, on His Majesty's State visit to King Farouk in January 1946, but left again immediately for Egypt and has not since reappeared. He is, indeed, reported to have been dangerously ill. He is a well-disposed, talkative man, who has evolved considerably in the direction of moderation and anglophil sentiment since his Black List days, as a student in Switzerland, during the first World War.

Hassan Abdel Ghaffar, who acted as chargé d'affaires during the summer of 1945, left in October, and during the Minister's later absences the legation has been in the charge of Aly Fahmy El Amroussi, a very mature Second Secretary. He is physically unimpressive, but more intelligent than he looks. He is rather overwhelmed by his young wife, a large and popular girl, the daughter of Hamed Shawarbi Pasha, who treats her husband with no particular respect. M. Amroussi is expecting an early transfer to Angora, but he hopes to go on the staff of Abdu Hamid Badawi Pasha to the Supreme Court at The Hague, instead.

Ahmed Jabr Bey, a former consul in Bombay, succeeded Amroussi Bey in mid-June 1946, as chargé d'affaires.

In view of King Farouk's impending visit on this year's pilgrimage, the Egyptian Legation is negotiating for the lease of a large house outside the City wall, which will be an improvement on its present premises. A special residence in Mecca is being built for King Farouk.

France.

M. Max Rageot presented letters in March 1945. His career has been in Morocco, where he was for some time in charge of the department handling British affairs and was well spoken of by His Majesty's representatives at Rabat. He was working at the Quai d'Orsay when France fell and remained in Paris during the German occupation. A German interrogation about listening to British Broadcasting Corporation broadcasts ensured him immunity from any later process of purge. A pleasant and intelligent little man in the late fifties,

he is able to judge French policy in the Levant States from a Moroccan angle of relative detachment, and he is helpful without being notably pro-British. His second, or it may be third, wife accompanied him to Jedda and gave him a son in September 1945, of which and of whom he is inordinately proud. He was absent from Jedda from early June until November 1945, leaving no-one in charge, and, after an official visit to the Yemen, in May and June 1946, he went away again. This is likely to be his last post.

M. Paccard, who came as French Vice-Consul in May 1946, was formerly "chef de Cabinet" of the French *délégué* in Damascus, and as such earned much unpopularity in Syria. My Syrian colleague describes him as an "assassin," and alleges that he shot many innocent Syrians from his office window. His Majesty's Minister, Beirut, on the contrary, informs me that M. Paccard was himself stabbed by Syrians some days before the alleged incident. He is a scrubby little man and, in the circumstances, unlikely to stay long in Jedda.

Iraq.

Jamil Pasha Al-Rawi, who was in Jedda from November 1939 to 1941 as Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires, returned, after two years as minister in Kabul, and presented his credentials on the 4th March, 1943. He had served with the Turkish forces, and later under King Hussein, during the 1914-18 war, and was at one time principal aide-de-camp to King Hussein. He has been a very pleasant and friendly colleague, but his health is frail. He has a pleasant Iraqi wife, who speaks English. He himself speaks French. He was absent from the Hejaz, during the period under review, until the 1945 pilgrimage season; and his life was then made miserable during the few months of his stay by the bitter dispute over Rashid Ali al-Gailani's expatriation from Riyadh. He managed to obtain permission to visit Bagdad on some pretext in January 1946, and he certainly has no intention of returning to Jedda.

As the status of the head of the Saudi Legation in Bagdad has been reduced to that of a chargé d'affaires *ad hoc*, it is most unlikely that another Iraqi Minister to Saudi Arabia will be appointed at present.

After the departure of Muhydeen Mumaiyis, and, later, of Mohammed Al Saigh, a swarthy little effendi named Sayed Sami El Saqqar took over as

chargé d'affaires on the 9th March, 1946. He is 26 years old, and was formerly vice-consul in Jerusalem. He speaks fluent English, but snoops unashamedly and has a tactless, rather tiresome manner.

Netherlands.

M. Van der Meulen left for Holland in July 1945, and is now employed in Sumatra. The legation was in the hands of a Javanese clerk until late November 1945, when Dr. H. Dingemans arrived from Holland, with his wife and little daughter. He presented his credentials on the 5th December, 1945. Experience of the German occupation of Holland has effectively removed any tendency towards Nazi sympathies that Dr. Dingemans may once have had, and, though somewhat stiffly starched, he and his wife do their best to be friendly and co-operative.

They left Jeddah in early June for Erkowit, to avoid the hot weather, and the unpronounceable Javanese clerk once again rules in the legation.

Turkey.

M. Fuad Carim arrived as Turkish Minister in August 1945, presenting his letters on the 26th August; and during his all too brief tour of service in Jeddah the Turkish Legation blossomed into unaccustomed social activity. He is a cultured and intelligent man, spiritually more at home in Montparnasse than in Jeddah, and was for long married to a leading actress of the Moscow Art Theatre, now dead. He left, on appointment as Assistant Secretary-General in the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in January 1946, leaving M. Neshet Damadoglu as chargé d'affaires. On the 30th May M. Firuz Kessim, formerly Turkish Consul-General in Alexandria and, I believe, at one time nominated as minister to the Lebanon, arrived from Egypt and stayed long enough to present his letters on the 14th June, before leaving again on the 20th June. He presented letters as chargé d'affaires only, though having minister's rank himself, in order (by his own account) to be able to leave more discreetly and

rapidly. He is Jesuit-educated, large and bluff, and talks good French; but, as with most other oriental diplomats, one look at Jeddah was enough for him. M. Neshet Damadoglu, an unprepossessing but nice little man, a veteran of Gallipoli, remains with us. He has the pre-1918 contempt of the Turkish soldier for the Arab. His wife speaks only Turkish and has had every known illness in Jeddah.

United States.

Colonel William A. Eddy returned from leave in December 1945 with his wife; but she, unfortunately, had a sudden and severe mental breakdown shortly afterwards, and he had to take her to Egypt for treatment and thence to the United States. This domestic tragedy has necessitated his transfer to the State Department, where he can be near his wife; and he left Saudi Arabia for Washington on the 28th May, shortly after returning from an official visit to the Yemen. Colonel Eddy will be much missed by all communities here. During his long and frequent absences the legation has been in the charge of Mr. William Sands, a rather exhausted young gentleman from South Carolina; but he was superseded in June 1946 by Mr. Harlan Clark, formerly United States Consul in Aden, who seems much more alive.

Mr. James Rives Childs arrived in Jeddah to succeed Colonel Eddy on the 23rd June, 1946, and presented his letters on the 29th June. He was formerly in charge of the United States Legation in Tangier, from January 1941, where his relations with His Majesty's representative seem to have been good, with occasional bad patches. I knew him as a secretary in Cairo between 1930 and 1933. He was then something of a "fellow-traveller" and had written, under a *nom-de-plume*, an autobiography of pinkish colour. I am confidentially informed that his pro-Russian proclivities prevented his appointment as minister in Bagdad in 1945. He is an expert breaker of ciphers and was employed in the United States Government's "Black Office" during the first world war. His wife, a "White" Russian, is expected to join him in Jeddah in November.

Representatives Accredited also to other Governments.

Afghanistan.

Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq al-Majaddidi is also minister to Egypt and resides in Cairo. He last came to the Hejaz on pilgrimage in 1942, but was not then seen by his Christian colleagues.

Lebanon.

Shaikh Sami al Khoury, Minister to Egypt, presented letters as the first Lebanese Minister to Saudi Arabia on the 11th March, 1946. After visiting Ibn Saud at Riyadh, he returned to Cairo on the 13th March. Sayed Abdurrahman Adra, who is supposed to be chargé d'affaires, is the former manager of a soap-factory and was Secretary-General of the Moslem bloc in the Lebanon. He hurried away from Jeddah in March to fetch his wife and has not yet returned; much to the dismay of his colleague, Assad al Assad, who wants to get away himself. This portly young man, who looks like a composite portrait of every effendi in the Levant, has his living and office

accommodation in a local garage, but better housing is being prepared for him.

Persia.

Ali Akbar Bahman, Minister to Saudi Arabia and Ambassador to Egypt, terminated his mission here on an unspecified date in 1942, and no successor has yet been appointed.

Syria.

Jamil Mardam Bey, Syrian Minister in Egypt, presented letters as the first Syrian Minister to Saudi Arabia on the 28th December, 1945, and left again at once. He did not call on his local colleagues, who were informed of his appointment by carbon copies of a circular letter typed in Cairo. Saleh Aqil, who acted briefly as chargé d'affaires was succeeded in March by Dr. Farid al Khani, son of the Qadhi of Damascus, whose large and inarticulate wife is a daughter of Shaikh Tajuddin. Farid al Khani studied law in Paris. He is a pleasant colleague, but pathologically anti-French.

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No. 29

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN SAUDI ARABIA

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Note on Titles, &c.

1. *Sherif*.—Said to apply strictly in Arabia to persons recognised as being in the direct male descent from Hasan, the son of the Caliph Ali. There is, however, much confusion as to the exact meaning of this and the following term.

2. *Seyyid*.—Said to apply in Arabia, though much abused in some other countries, only to persons recognised as being in the male descent from Huseyn, the son of Ali.

3. *Amir*.—Given as a title to all princes of the blood and describes the office of practically all provincial governors.

4. *Sheykh*.—Applied very widely, but not indiscriminately, not only to tribal personages, but to townsmen of consequence, especially, perhaps, though not exclusively, to those in official positions, e.g., Sheykh Yusuf Yasin.

5. *Bey*.—Still used, sometimes in preference to Sheykh, by persons who would have been so called by right or courtesy in the Turkish system and who may dislike the association of "Sheykh" with age or desert life, e.g., Fuad Bey Hamza.

6. *Hajji*.—Convenient, in a country where every Hejazi adult has made the pilgrimage, for certain persons not otherwise easy to give a title to, e.g., Hajji Yusuf Zeinal.

7. *Effendi*.—Still applied to persons hardly entitled to be called Sheykh or anything equally honourable, e.g., Muhammad Effendi 'Ali Ridha.

8. *Ibn, &c.*—Means, like its variant, Bin, "son of," or by extension, "descendant of." Replaced sometimes by the article "al," which is not always easy to distinguish from "al," meaning "of the house of." All four forms are illustrated by the name of the King, "Abdul-'Aziz ibn (son of) Abdurrahman al (son of) Faysal al (of the house of) Sa'ud," and the abbreviated names Ibn Sa'ud or bin Sa'ud. The use of the patronymic "Ibn So-and-So" is so common as often to make a man's personal name difficult to trace.

9. *Abu*.—Means "father." Used in combination with the name of an actual son or the name of an object to form a familiar name or nickname, which sometimes becomes an accredited surname. Thus, Colonel Glubb is known in the desert as "Abu Hunaik," or the father of the Little Jaw. Similar names are sometimes formed from other terms of relationship.

10. *Composition of Names*.—The most normal formation is to build from a person's own name by adding that of his father and sometimes names of remoter ancestors and/or a family name. It is not uncommon to omit at least the first Ibn and place the father's name immediately after that of the person described, e.g., 'Abdullah Ibrahim al-Fadhl. It cannot be assumed, however, that the second of two unseparated names is that of the father, especially if the first be Muhammad, which is often little more than a prefix.

11. The following index gives, except in two cases, the first name of all living Arabs mentioned otherwise than incidentally in the report, but where

Muhammad appears to be no more than a prefix it is reduced to M. and ignored for purposes of alphabetical order. Secondary entries have been made in many, but not in all, cases, where a patronymic or a family name seems likely to help to trace particular individuals:—

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G.B.E. on that occasion), and he represented Sa'udi Arabia at the Silver Jubilee and at the Coronation of His Majesty King George VI. In 1940 he visited India.

Sa'ud's designation as Heir to the Throne was formally announced on the 11th May, 1938. He resembles his father in appearance and physique. Also suffers from eye trouble, but has inherited Ibn Sa'ud's "magnetic smile." Said to have had some schooling from Dr. 'Abdullah Damluji and Sheykh Hafiz Wahba, but to be in the main untutored. May in other respects be a chip of the old block, but has had little opportunity of displaying his quality to Europeans. Is strongly Islamic, but since his return from Europe has shown many signs of a broadened outlook and little, if any, of the fanaticism which seemed to characterise him earlier. Had commanded on the Eastern front in the Sa'udi-Yemen war. He now affects a European style of entertaining—even serving afternoon tea to his English visitors—and prides himself on his skill in the management of Christian cutlery, to the amusement of his father, who calls him "Sa'ud the Civilised." He professes a desire to see Sa'udi Arabia progress on Western lines (e.g., introduction of air communications, modern architecture, &c.). He claims that he himself designed his country house at Badia near Riyadh, the amenities of which include a swimming pool. He owns a cinema projector and gives regular showings of British news films. When His Majesty's Minister visited Riyadh in February 1942 Sa'ud broke with Arabian custom by inviting the ladies of the party to dinner. His eldest son, Fahad, was born about 1925, and was married to a daughter of the Amir Faysal, No. 1 (3), in May 1943. Is being allowed by his father to take an increasing share in the internal administration of the country and is present at many of the audiences between His Majesty's Minister and the King. Appointed Commander-in-chief of the Sa'udi army in March 1944. Came to Mecca on pilgrimage in November 1945 and acted as Viceroy during his father's visit to Egypt, January 1946. Attended the meeting of heads of Arab States in Egypt 28th-30th May, 1946, but as a figure-head only, King Farouk having been appointed as Ibn Saud's spokesman. The Amir Saud has latterly been at pains to indicate that his father's policy of friendly relations with His Majesty's Government is emphatically his own, also.

(3) *Faysal ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz*.—Viceroy of the Hejaz in his father's absence and permanently President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Interior, and, in theory, War. Born of a lady of the family of 'Abdul-Wahhab in or about 1905. Educated partly by Sheykh Hafiz Wahba. Intelligent and has at least had more opportunity than most of his brothers of cultivating his intelligence and powers of observation as he has lived mostly of late years in the comparatively civilised surroundings of Mecca and has travelled in Europe; in 1919, when he was in England; in 1926, when he visited England, France, Holland and perhaps other countries; and in 1932, when he headed the Sa'udi mission which visited London and many other capitals, and often since. In physique a much feebler version of his father and elder brother owing to excessive delight in the harem from his youth upwards. At first very listless and rather nervous in European company, but could rise to an occasion, as he showed in 1932 by playing his part in London, albeit that of a figurehead, with a good deal of distinction. Believed not to see eye to eye with his father and joined in the onslaught by Fuad, Philby and others on Ibn Sa'ud's principal henchman, 'Abdullah Suleymán, in October 1931. Although 'Abdullah Suleymán had the best of this in the end, the King has continued to treat Faysal with consideration. Received many decorations during his tour in 1932, including an honorary G.B.E. In 1935 showed surprising dash as a horseman in races held at Riyadh on occasion of Sir Andrew

Ryan's visit. Reported to have married in October 1935 a daughter of his aunt Nura. Represented Sa'udi Arabia at the London discussions on Palestine in 1939, and seems to have played the part well. In the last two years or so he has acquired much more self-confidence and tries to fill his rôle as Foreign Minister by showing an up-to-date knowledge of events. He talks freely and intelligently in the company of Europeans whom he knows. He has none of his father's picturesqueness of language, but speaks a very pure Arabic, clearly enunciated, with little trace of the Nejd accent which all his brothers possess. On occasion he is capable of acting with firmness within the instructions given to him by the King, as was shown in the expulsion of the Italian Minister in February 1942. Visited America and England from September to December 1943 with his brother, Khalid (No. 1 (5)). The two Amirs, who were accompanied by the Shaikh Hafiz Wahba (No. 25), travelled all the way by air. On their return journey, in December 1943, visited the battlefields in North Africa. Headed the Sa'udi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945 and to the Preparatory Commission and First Assembly of the United Nations, November 1945 to January 1946. Represented his father at celebration on 17th April in Damascus of withdrawal of foreign troops from Syria and went on to pay an official visit to the Lebanon.

He spent some time in England on his way back from San Francisco in August 1945 undergoing treatment for severe gastric ulcers and alternating dignified appearances at the Dorchester Hotel with the entertainment at a country house near Dorking on strictly non-Wahhabi lines, of the more dubious disjuncts of Mayfair. After a brief visit to Saudi Arabia, he returned to England in November 1945 until late February 1946 and now appears to have recovered from his ulcer trouble.

(4) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz*.—Born in or about 1913. Headed the Sa'udi forces which entered Medina in 1925. Was made acting Viceroy when the Amir Faysal went abroad in 1932, but got beyond himself and was replaced by his brother Khalid. Met Faysal at Kuwait on his return and shared in the bout of dissipation there. Visited the United Kingdom with the Amir Sa'ud in 1937 and 1938. Lives mostly at Riyadh, visiting the Hejaz only for the pilgrimage. Said to be popular with the tribes. Appears to be being brought gradually into his father's counsels; was present, together with the Amir Sa'ud, at several interviews between His Majesty's Minister and the King at Riyadh in March 1942. Visited India for health reasons in June 1943 together with Mansur No. 1 (9) and Shaikh 'Abdullah Suleiman (No. 11). Owing to their indiscreet and extravagant living their visit was not a success. Returned in October 1943. Accompanied his father to Egypt for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in February 1945. He, together with two other joy-riding princes (Fahad and Nawwaf—see list of sons below), accompanied the Sa'udi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945.

(5) *Khalid ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz*.—Born in or about 1916. Acted as Viceroy of the Hejaz in 1932 (see (4) above). Visited the United Kingdom with the Amir Faysal in 1939. Full brother and constant companion of Amir Muhammad (4) above. Accompanied his brother Faysal when they visited America and England in the winter of 1943.

(6) to (27). Sons of 20 and less in 1939 numbered twenty-two. The following is a correct list in order of age: Nasir (1920), Sa'd (1921), Fahad (1921), Mansur (1921), 'Abdullah (1922), Bandar (1924), Sultan (1924), Mus'ad (1927), Mish'al (1927), 'Abdul-Muhain (1928), Mubari (1932), Muteb (1933), Talal (1933), 'Abdur-Rahman (1933), Turki (1934), Badr (1934), Nawwaf (1934), Nawef (1935), Fawwaf (1936), Ma'jid (1937), Sulman (1938) and (?) (1939).

Mansur, No. 1 (9), deserves separate notice. His mother, a Caucasian concubine, was the King's favourite until her death in 1938. A favourite of his father, he is perhaps alone among the King's sons in being interested in something other than political gossip, field sports and domestic pleasures. He likes machines, personally sees to the maintenance of his cars and spends a good deal of his time at the Royal garage in Riyadh. Usually in charge of arrangements when the King moves from Riyadh to the Hejaz or to camp, and is said to be responsible for the maintenance of the electrical installation at the Royal Palace at Riyadh. Visited Egypt in March 1942 as the guest of the British Commander-in-chief. On his return to Jedda he gave an interview (with his father's approval of his remarks) to a representative of the B.B.C., which was recorded in the Royal Palace at Jedda and later broadcast from London. He owns a cinema projector. Visited India, for health reasons, in June 1943 with his brother, Muhammad and 'Abdullah Suleiman. In October and again in November he visited Palestine for further medical treatment, returning with Faysal, whom he joined in Egypt, in December 1943. Appointed Minister of Defence in March 1944. Visited Khartoum in December 1944 to arrange for the training there of Sa'udi army personnel in driving and maintenance. Accompanied his father for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in Egypt in February 1945. Acting Viceroy during the absence of the Amir Faysal at the San Francisco Conference, and from November 1945 to February 1946.

Talal, No. 1 (18).—One of the King's favourite sons. His mother, Umm Talal, one of the royal concubines, is the King's favourite. Talal went to Egypt in August 1944, on board H.M.S. *Sagitta*, for medical treatment. He was found to be suffering from syphilis, and after not very successful treatment returned by air in October.

Brothers. All Amirs.

No. 28 in 1943 report, Muhammad ibn 'Abdurrahman.—Died July 1943 (see obituary).

(28) and (29) Sa'd and Sa'ud, who died in 1916 and 1939 respectively. The former left three sons: Faysal, Sa'ud and Fahad; and the latter two: Muhammad and Faysal.

(30) *'Abdullah ibn 'Abdurrahman*.—Born about 1894. Accompanied King on his visit to Egypt in February 1945 for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill.

(31) to (34) Ahmad, Mus'ad, Sa'd and 'Abdul Muhain.—Younger men, the children of the old age of 'Abdur-Rahman ibn Faysal.

'Arif Branch. Also Amirs.

Certain of the King's cousins are dealt with in separate notices, but a general mention may be made of the 'Arif as being members of a senior branch of the family by virtue of descent from Sa'ud ibn Faysal, an elder brother of the King's father and a former ruler at Riyadh. Their generic name of 'Arif is one applied to raided camels, subsequently "recognised," as the root implies, and recovered by their owners. It seems to have been given to them because they had remained in the hands of the Beni Rashid, but escaped to Ibn Sa'ud in the course of battle in 1904. Some of them rebelled against him in 1910, but the present members of the family form portion of the King's posse of satellite princes. Although inconspicuous, they might produce a claimant, by right of senior descent, to the throne. Various names are given in the *Almanach de Gotha* and Philby's *Arabia*. The most important of these princes, who bear individually the surname of al-'Arafa, would appear to be—

(35) *Sa'ud ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud ibn Faysal*.—Married the King's sister Nura. Seems to play a certain rôle in Ibn Sa'ud's entourage. Probably the same Sa'ud al-'Arafa who was

described in a report from Kuwait as being, according to a reliable informant, a friend of the 'Ajman tribe and secretly hostile to Ibn Sa'ud. Daughter reported to have married Amir Faysal (q.v.) in October 1935.

2. *'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Ibrahim*.

Governor of Medina (technically Acting Governor vice the King's son Amir Khalid, who never actually held the post) until May 1936, when he was replaced by Abdullah as Sdayri (No. 50 (1)). Had the reputation of being a severe and arbitrary Governor. Was Governor of Abha in 1926 at the time of the clash between the Ikhwan and the Yemeni pilgrim caravan, the 'Usba, in the Wadi Tanuma. In 1936 appointed a member of the Council of Ministers.

3. *'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Mu'ammir*.

Governor of Jedda until June 1935, when he was appointed Governor of Taif in the room of Amir 'Abdullah, maternal uncle of Amir Faysal (No. 1 (3)). Born in or about 1904. Comes of a former ruling family of Nejd, apparently the same Beni Mu'ammir of Aysina, who were prominent in the early days of the Wahhabi movement and are mentioned several times in Philby's *Arabia*. Brought up principally at Riyadh. Was Governor of Yanbu' for some time and earned a good reputation there. Was appointed to Jedda in August 1932, with the title of Amir, on the death of Hajji 'Abdullah 'Ali Riza, a leading local merchant who had been governor with the old title of Qaimmaqam since King Huseyn's time. He is good-looking and pleasant, but pretentious; probably on the score of his blue blood. He was keen on riding and other forms of sport until afflicted by paralysis in 1939. He went to India for special treatment in March 1941, but returned incurable in October 1941. Now completely deaf and unable to walk.

4. *'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Mus'ad ibn Jiluwi ibn Sa'ud*.

Second cousin to the King. Governor of Hail since 1925 or earlier. Said by the Sheykh of Kuwait in March 1932 to be only 40, but to have aged greatly owing to worry. Was much in evidence in 1929 as one of the King's right-hand men at the time of the Akhwan rebellion. Came into prominence in February 1930, when, apparently without the King's authority, he conducted a raid on the scale of a punitive expedition, which it was, in fact, intended to be, into Transjordan. Disavowed by the King at the time, but maintained in his governorate. Was in November 1932 put at the head of the principal force despatched to reduce the 'Asir rebels, and proceeded from Riyadh to 'Abha and Jizán, where he assumed supreme command of the forces in 'Asir. Said then to be intended for the Governorate-General of the whole 'Asir area, but eventually returned to Hail. A man for occasions requiring drastic action. Appointed inspector of the frontier area on the Sa'udi-Iraq frontier in 1936, duties he combines with those of Governor of Hail. In 1939 was said to have aroused suspicion at Riyadh as having designs on the throne which he might try to carry out on the death of Ibn Saud.

5. *'Abdul-'Aziz (ibn Hamud) ibn Zeyd*.

Inspector of Bedouin in Transjordan frontier area. Born probably about 1897. Comes of a Hail family said to be related to the Beni Rashid. Said to have been educated in Constantinople. Sent to Amman in summer of 1926 to discuss claims in respect of raids, and attended with two other Sa'udi delegates an abortive conference at Ma'an in September. Was one of the two Sa'udi delegates on tribunal which sat at Jericho from February to May 1927 in accordance with the Hadda Agreement. Was later an Assistant Governor of Jedda. Sent to Amman in August 1930 as Sa'udi agent at the MacDonnell investigation regarding raids. Appointed Inspector

of Beduin in the frontier region in January 1931, and has since the 3rd June, 1931, held meetings at long intervals with Captain Glubb, his opposite number in Transjordan. Personally amiable, but will take no responsibility without reference to the King. From 1936 to 1938 was inspector of the whole Transjordan-Saudi frontier, under a scheme for dividing the northern frontier area into three sectors under inspectors with wide powers. In May 1943 was appointed Saudi Consul at Damascus in succession to Rishayd Pasha.

6. 'Abdullah ibn Blayhid.

A leading figure among the Wahhābi Ulama. Comes from Hail. Qādhi of Mecca after its occupation by Ibn Sa'ūd, and was described in Eldon Rutter's account of him (1925-26) as a "bent and wizened little man." Appointed Grand Qādhi of the Hejaz in January 1926. Was instrumental in May 1926 in obtaining a *fatwa* from seventeen Ulama of Medina in support of the Wahhābi policy of destroying tombs. Head of the Nejd delegates at the Moslem Congress of June 1926. Again visited Medina in November of that year in attendance on the King and in the company of 'Abdullah ibn Hasan (see 12 (1)). Bent on purging the place of iniquity as Mecca had been purged. Vacated post at Mecca in 1928 and returned to Hail. Was thought at that time to favour the extremists of the Akhwān movement. Still visits Mecca at intervals. Thought to be embarrassing in high places owing to his frankness and fanaticism. Signed the pronouncement by the Ulama of Nejd in favour of Jihād at the time of the Ibn Rifāda rebellion in 1932.

7. 'Abdullah Kāzim.

A Hejazi said to be of Cossack origin. Born about 1887. Was employed in the Mecca Post Office in King Hussein's time. Appointed Sa'ūdi Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in 1926 and still holds the post. Went to Port Sudan in March 1926 as one of Ibn Sa'ūd's delegates to negotiate about the E.T.C. cable and showed himself an obstructive negotiator. Was again pretty sticky in taking delivery of Marconi wireless in 1931-33, but created a good impression at the time of the cable and wireless negotiations in the spring of 1935.

8. 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Aqil (or 'Aqayil).

In 1926 Governor of Jauf, but had vacated the post by March 1928, when he was put in command of a force sent to quell the disturbance created at Wejh by Hamid ibn Rifāda. Probably identical with the ibn 'Aqil who was mentioned in May 1931 as a possible candidate for the governorship of Tebuk but was not appointed. 'Abdullah ibn 'Aqil commanded the Akhwān mobilised in June 1932 to repress the further rebellion of Hamid ibn Rifāda.

9. 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad al-Fadhil.

Vice-President of the Legislative Council and Assistant Viceroy. Probably born about 1883. Principal member of the Fadhil family *q.v.* Was formerly a merchant in Jedda. Described in 1917 as "anti-Sherif and pro-English" and as going by the sobriquet of "Englisi" in Jedda. Put in prison at that time in Mecca for some unknown offence. Played no particular rôle subsequently (and was so little valued for brain-power as to be known as "the Sheep") until ex-King 'Ali sent him on a delegation to negotiate with Ibn Sa'ūd at Mecca. Went over definitely to Ibn Sa'ūd and acted as his representative at Rabigh for the 1925 pilgrimage, in which employment he is said to have feathered his nest. Attached to the King's son, Muhammad, as adviser when the young Amir occupied Medina later in 1925. Figured as a Hejazi delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Obtained about the same

period, in partnership with Indians settled in Mecca, a contract for motor transport, but lost it. Did better as purveyor to the Government. Sent on an unsuccessful mission to Eritrea in 1927 in connexion with negotiations for the recognition of Ibn Sa'ūd by Italy and proposed treaty arrangements. Also had some part in the treaty negotiations with Great Britain. Became assistant to the Viceroy at Mecca and so on to appointment to his present post in or before 1929. Went in that year on a mission to Persia. Alleged in the same year to have done nicely in the company of 'Abdullah Sulaymān by cornering benzine, &c., just before new duties were imposed. Appears to enjoy the King's confidence in a high degree and to steer an even or waggly course between rival factions. Not impressive in appearance or conversation; still somewhat of a sheep; but wears his recent dignities with an acquired air of dignity, sobriety and sagacity, which may be a part of his success. May still have commercial interests, but has long been dissociated from the business of the other Fadhils. Acting Viceroy during Faisal's absence in 1939 and again during Faisal's absence in the winter of 1943.

10. 'Abdullah an Nafisi.

Important as being Ibn Sa'ūd's agent at Kuwait, where he is established as a merchant and once did a large business in rice, &c. Now elderly and less active. Seems sensible.

11. 'Abdullah ibn Sulaymān al-Hamdān

Minister of Finance. Born about 1887. Of plebeian 'Aneyza origin. Started life in a small way with the Qusaibis, originally, it is said, as a coffee boy. Spent ten years as clerk in their Bombay office. Returned to Nejd about 1919. Said to have gone bankrupt as a broker. Recommended by the Qusaibis to replace his brother, who had died, as a clerk in the King's Diwān. Rose to be head of the Diwān. Became Director-General of Finance and had acquired complete control of all financial matters by September 1928, when it was remarked that he travelled in greater state than the King himself between Mecca and Jedda. Has since been the most powerful of the King's advisers. His position was strongly assailed in October 1931 by a cabal, which included the Amir Faysal, Fuad Hamza, 'Abdullah al-Fadhil (perhaps a doubtful enemy) and Mr. Philby. Was sent for a time to lend a hand with the Tawil mission in Hasa, but had his place kept warm for him and returned to it. Was promoted in August 1932 from being Director-General of Finance to the post of Minister of Finance for the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies, thus obtaining the title of Wazir, hitherto enjoyed only by the Amir Faysal. Continues to be supreme in the financial administration and has his finger in many other pies, being in effect Comptroller of the Privy Purse, Grand Master of Ordnance, Quarter-Master-General on occasion, general manager of the King's establishment of slaves and pilgrimage-organiser. Appointed in 1935 to the specific additional post of Deputy Minister of Defence. Probably entirely faithful to the King, whose needs he supplies at the expense of others having demands on the Treasury, and who gives him a free hand in finance regardless of the effect on public opinion. A man of rather mean appearance, but emphatically a "live wire." Ready and energetic in conversation and full of ideas about development. In recent years has often spent long periods at Jedda acting as the representative of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, taking turns in that duty with Yusuf Yasin. The main burden of dealing with the Italian Minister's procrastinations and evasions in January and February 1942 fell on him and he acquitted himself very creditably. He was the originator of the agricultural development scheme at Al Kharij and showed great energy and enthusiasm in the face of much hostility, envy and

ill-natured criticism from his brother advisers. A keen fisherman and a tireless traveller, his other pleasures include tobacco, and the bottle. He has a good sense of humour and repartee sharpened in many verbal battles with his rivals. His position was weakened somewhat by the dismissal in April 1944 of his friend and protégé Najib Salha (No. 69) whose pro-American enthusiasm he is thought to share. Was a very harassed and worried man during 1944 when faced with the prospect of having to reorganise the country's finances and economy on sounder lines. Accompanied the King to Egypt in February 1945 for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. Is cultivated by the Americans whose increasing tendency to play the rôle of Lady Bountiful to Saudi Arabia naturally appeals to him as Minister of Finance. The abuse of his official position by his brother Hamad, and the latter's sons, is gross and scandalous.

12. Abdul-Wahhāb, Descendants of.

The following seem to be the most notable of the descendants of the founder of Wahhābism:—

(1) 'Abdullah ibn Hasan.—Is one of the leading Wahhābi Ulama in Mecca. Played a rôle in 1926, with 'Abdullah ibn Blayhid (*q.v.*), in the Wahhābi purging of the Holy Cities, and was in 1929 thought, like him, to favour the Akhwān extremists. Signed the pronouncement of the Ulama in favour of Jihād at the time of the Ibn Rifāda rebellion in 1932. Now Grand Qādhi. Proud and fanatical.

(2) Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Shaykh, nicknamed as-Sahābi, formerly Governor of Taif, transferred to Riyādh in 1932 as Assistant to the Amir Sa'ūd.

(3) 'Abdul-Latif Family.—Four sons and a probable grandson of a descendant named 'Abdul-Latif were among the ten signatories of the declaration of Jihād referred to under (1). No. (2) and the mother of the Amir Faysal (*q.v.*) also probably belong to this connexion.

13. 'Abdul-Wahhāb Abū Malha.

A personage of consequence in 'Asir, possibly of the Shaykhly family of Malha near Sabya, although this cannot be affirmed. Was described in 1927 as Director of Finance in 'Asir, and was in that year one of four delegates sent by Ibn Sa'ūd to negotiate with the Imam Yahya. Probably still has the title of Director of Finance and commanded the Sa'ūdi forces which entered Sabya in November 1932.

14. 'Abdur-Ra'uf as-Sabbān.

Born in the Hejaz probably between 1888 and 1893. Grandson of an immigrant from Egypt. Educated in the Hejaz and in Egypt. Associated with his father, Hasan, and others in what was in 1917 the principal hide and skin business in Jedda and Mecca. Impressed the Hejazis at that time by his knowledge and European manners. Was made Director of Education in Jedda, but was dismissed and reverted to trade in cotton goods and skins. Edited in 1925 the anti-Sa'ūdi paper *Al-Umma* in Cairo with the help of one of the Dabbāghs. Given a post by the Amir 'Abdullah as manager of his estates in Transjordan in or before 1931. Was an active supporter of the Hizb-al-Ahrār-al-Hijāzi, and was concerned in 1932 in the press propaganda and financial arrangements of the outside promoters of movements against Ibn Sa'ūd. Seems to have gone at least once to Eritrea in this connexion. Was dismissed by the Amir 'Abdullah in the autumn of 1932 as a result of these political activities, but went on with them. Excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan, whereupon he retired to Bagdad, where he was understood to have become a private secretary to the late ex-King Ali. Returned to the Hejaz with or at the same time as Ahmad al-Mujallid in July 1935, and was appointed in 1936 a member of

the Legislative Council. In 1938 did some propaganda for Ibn Saud in Egypt. Appointed Director-General of Waqfs in December 1942 in succession to Seyyid Abdul-Wahhab. Appointed president of the Mecca Municipality in November 1945.

15. Muhammad Sa'id al Kurdi.

Formerly Director of Police in Jedda. Of Kurdish origin, from Zakho. Was previously Director of Police at Rabigh and gave offence to the legation by trying to commandeering a car which was taking the Nawab of Bahawalpur to Medina. Was transferred to Jedda in 1932 and confirmed in the post early in 1933. Was removed from his post in Jedda and apparently reappointed to Rabigh in 1933. Officer Commanding troops in Jedda in 1936, in which capacity he was in charge of aviation during the presence of the Italian Air Mission 1937-39. According to a Russian pilot, showed ability and a real desire to learn about aviation. Was cultivated assiduously by the Italian pilot, probably received bribes from him, and learned Italian. Very anti-British when the Palestine trouble was at its height.

16. 'Abdur-Rahman al-Bassām.

Second Assistant in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Educated in Egypt. Speaks English. Helped Sheikh Yusuf Yasin with the English versions of the Sa'ūdi-Koweit Agreements signed at Jedda in April 1942.

17. 'Ali Taha.

Assistant Governor of Jedda since 1928. A Hejazi born about 1894. Rose from a small post as secretary to the Governor. Cadaverous and unhealthy. Speaks Turkish well. Well meaning, and not without intelligence, but frightened of his own shadow. Serves as no more than a transmitter of messages to and from Mecca. Acted as Deputy Governor of Jedda from April 1944 and showed himself helpful and co-operative over routine matters with His Majesty's Legation. Has a working knowledge of French but is afraid to use it. Reverted to his former post of Assistant Governor on the appointment in April 1945 of a new Governor, Abdurrahman Sdayri (*q.v.*).

18. Bujād (or Humayd) Family.

A leading family in the notoriously fanatical Ghutghut section of the 'Ateyba tribe. A confusing effect is produced by the use in past reports of the names Sultan ibn Bujād, ibn Humayd ibn Bujād and ibn Bujād *tout court*, but they would appear all to apply to one and the same man. This is assumed in what follows regarding:—

(1) Sultan ibn Humayd ibn Bujād.—Once one of Ibn Sa'ūd's stalwarts and one of the commanders of his troops when they took Mecca in 1924. Had a daughter married to the King's brother Muhammad. Noted early in 1927 as one of the extremists who were then inclining against the King. Became reconciled with him later, but finally stood in with Ibn Sa'ūd's opponents in the Nejd rebellion of 1929 and was accounted second only to Faysal ad-Dawish in importance. Was one of the earlier leaders to fall into the King's hands and was imprisoned at Rivādh in the spring of that year. Appears to be still in close confinement, as no record has been found of the death of Sultan ibn Bujād, the best known of the names cited above, and "ibn Humayd" was mentioned as one of the prisoners who were receiving more lenient treatment than before, though, unlike the others, he was still not allowed to see his women-folk. May still prove important, as he had a strong hold on his tribesmen, some of whom were reported sullen over his imprisonment.

(2) Naif ibn Faysal ibn Humayd.—A pretender to the chieftainship of the 'Ateyba, but moved to Iraq in 1924, having been ousted by No. (1). Played

with the idea of recovering his position in June 1929 and sent a minor relative, 'Obeyd, to spy out the land, but was apparently dissuaded by King Faisal from going ahead. Mentioned in 1932 as being still a refugee in Iraq and as a possible aspirant to the hand of Mazyūna, sister of Faysal ad-Dawish, but the engagement or marriage was denied.

19. Dabbāgh Family.

A Mecca family of "Moorish" (i.e., some North-West Africa) origin. Appear to be Seyyids. Became prominent in 1932 in connexion with plot behind the revolt of Ibn Rifāḍ and the preparations for the retarded revolt in 'Asir. The family is numerous. Certain members of it still reside in the Hejaz, including two who were arrested and deported to Riyādh in June-July 1932, viz:—

- (1) Ibrahim ibn 'Abdullah and
- (2) Isa ibn 'Abdullah.

More important are the following persons abroad:—

(3) Huseyn ibn 'Abdullah, brother of the above. Migrated to Mokalla in or about 1926. Has since done school-mastering in South-West Arabia and has been an active intriguer against Ibn Sa'ūd. Went to India in 1927 to enlist support for the Hizb-al-Ahrār al Hijāzi and their National Pact. Sought, and probably enlisted, the support of Shauqat Ali, who, with his brother, had been violently at loggerheads with Ibn Sa'ūd at the Moslem Congress of June 1926. Went to Egypt and perhaps to Transjordan in 1929. Said to have attended Moslem Congress at Jerusalem in December 1931, when persons concerned in Hizb-al-Ahrār seem to have devised a pendant organisation called Jami'at ad Dif'a lil Hijāz. Was using Aden as base early in 1932, but left in summer owing to adverse attitude of British authorities and seems to have since worked mainly in Eritrea. Now excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan. Returned to Aden in 1936 and allowed to stay there. Opened a school, but soon began to send anti-British articles to Egyptian papers. Left for the Upper Yafa' country, where he engaged in anti-British propaganda. Probably financed by the Italians. Arrested in the Hadhramaut in June 1942. Deported and handed over to the Saudi authorities who detained him in Jizān. Attempted to escape early in 1944 but was unsuccessful and has been kept in chains ever since. Otherwise well-treated by the local Amir.

(4) M. 'Ali ibn 'Abdullah, another brother. Less conspicuous, but also very active. Took a hand in the actual revolt in 'Asir. Reported drowned at Jizān, but report was contradicted later.

(5) M. Tāhir ibn Mas'ūd, uncle of the above. Described as "an egg-shaped man." Born in 1890. Had some employment under King Huseyn. Obtained British-protected passport at Cairo in 1926 on strength of alleged subjection to Sultan of Mokalla. Author of letter from Lahaj to Amir Shākir of the 20th February, 1932, which fell into hands of Sa'ūdī Government, and revealed plans of conspirators. Seems to have gone further east, as he arrived at Aden from Singapore early in June 1932. Has since been very mobile, visiting Eritrea, Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq. Was excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan. Was understood in January 1933 to be heading back to Massawa, and perhaps thence to Aden and the Hadhramaut. Made his peace with Ibn Sa'ūd after promulgation of amnesty early in 1935. Returned to Sa'ūdī Arabia that year and in 1936 was appointed Director of Education. Suspected of being involved in the Sherifian plot, 1940-41, but later pardoned by the King. Relieved of his post, December 1945.

Other members of the family need not be enumerated, but they all seem to hang together and to have attacks with Hashimites. One, Mas'ūd, a

hanger-on at 'Ammān, was closely concerned in the Ibn Rifāḍ affair and was killed with Ibn Rifāḍ. The family also have attaches with the Idrisi, although there is nothing to explain one mention of (3) above as Huseyn bin 'Abdullah ad-Dabbāgh al-Idrisi.

20. Dawish Family.

A leading family in the Mutayr tribe. Its best-known member, Faysal ad-Dawish, famous as a raider, as one of Ibn Sa'ūd's principal lieutenants and as a rebel against him, died as a State prisoner at Riyādh in October 1931. His name is, however, still potent in Eastern Arabia, where he was regarded as more than an ordinary sheykh—a kingly man and a king maker. This gives importance to his sons, two of whom have figured in reports from Kuwait.

(1) Bandar ibn Faysal ad-Dawish.—Still a young man. Said to be looked to by the Mutayr as the leader they desire, but to be himself very cautious and unwilling to move at present. Reported in December 1932 to have countered a question by Ibn Sa'ūd as to whom the Mutayr wanted for a leader by saying "No one but Your Majesty."

(2) Al-Humaydi ibn Faysal ad-Dawish.—Visited Ibn Sa'ūd at Riyādh in the autumn of 1932, when the King was making efforts to reconcile the ex-rebel Mutayr and 'Ajman, still hostile to him, and was well received and rewarded.

The ladies of this family seem to count. The political agent at Kuwait, who had befriended them when Faysal was surrendered to Ibn Sa'ūd in January 1930, was visited by various of them on several occasions in 1932. They included Faysal's mother, who hid bitter hatred of the King beneath copious praises; a sister, whose rumoured marriage to a Harb Sheykh was regarded as an augury of reconciliation between his tribe and the Mutayr, but was afterwards denied; and a cousin, still a woman of considerable charm and humour, who had been married to Sheykh Mubārak of Kuwait, to a deceased son of Faysal ad-Dawish and, lastly, as prize of war, to Ibn Sa'ūd's brother 'Abdullah.

21. Fadhl (al-Fazal) Family.

Nejdis of Aneyza origin long settled in the Hejaz. An original 'Abdullah had at least five sons, all now deceased, with one possible exception. Each of these had issue. Members of the first and second generations after the original 'Abdullah were concerned in firms doing important business in the Hejaz and India, where they had a high reputation, enhanced by their position as business agents of Ibn Sa'ūd, until 1930. Family differences and bad trade led to the collapse of their business at Bombay and Karachi in that year. The two partners most actively concerned in the business in India absconded to the Hejaz, where a third tried to dissociate himself from the partnership. The affairs of the family have for some years been the subject of very complicated litigation and have engaged the attention of various British authorities for reasons too long to recapitulate. The family still have influential connexions in the Hejaz, and several members of it have been given employment by Ibn Sa'ūd. Apart from 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abdullah, who is the subject of a separate notice, the following deserve mention:—

(1) Muhammad, son of the 'Abdullah just mentioned. In business in Jeddah and does a tidy trade in grain. Disinherited by his father in 1943 as a result of a quarrel.

(2) Ibrahim ibn Abdurrahman.—One of the two who absconded from India in 1930. Appointed a member of the Legislative Council in October 1930. Became later a secretary to the Amir Faysal. Was called on to resign, ostensibly on grounds of ill-health, by Amir Faysal. He is now living in Mecca and engaged in trade in an unimportant way; but is still said to enjoy the confidence of Amir Faysal.

(3) Muhammad ibn Abdurrahman ibn 'Abdullah.—Was a partner in the firm which collapsed in India in 1930, but resided in Jeddah and tried to dissociate himself from the other partners, his brother and cousin.

(4) 'Abdullah ibn Ibrahim ibn 'Abdullah.—Private secretary to the Amir Faysal in 1926. Afterwards one of the partners who absconded from India. Selected in 1931 for the post of chargé d'affaires in Holland, under scheme which did not materialise for having a legation there with the Sa'ūdī Minister in London as minister. Appointed Treasurer to the Government later in 1931, as a result of the cabal against 'Abdullah Suleymān. Later became Director of Finance in Jeddah, then Government representative to the Arabian-American Oil Company at Dhahran and now Sa'ūdī representative for supply matters in Bahrain. Speaks English. Appointed member of the Council of Ministers in February 1946.

(5) Ibrahim ibn Suleymān al 'Aqil.—Son-in-law of father of (4), and has taken the place of (2) as Rais-ul-Diwan of the Amir Faysal. Is an important official and enjoys Amir Faysal's complete confidence. Accompanied him to London in 1939 for the Palestine discussions. As a young man spent considerable time in India. Speaks a very little English and some Urdu. A man of culture and pleasing manners. Accompanied the Amir Faysal to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. Has been suggested as a possible minister in London; but for some reason Ibn Saud does not like him.

22. Fahad ibn Zu'ayr.

Late Governor of 'Asir. Was head of the mission sent to 'Asir in May 1930 to make the arrangements which subsequently culminated in its practical annexation by Ibn Sa'ūd. Was later appointed Amir, though probably not the first to hold the post. Reported to Ibn Sa'ūd with increasing urgency in the autumn of 1932 that the Idrisi was getting beyond himself. The Idrisi, professing complete loyalty to the King, complained bitterly of Fahad's rough treatment. The King, anxious to placate the Idrisi, steered a middle course and sent a commission to investigate. Before it could reach the spot the Idrisi had gone into open revolt and Fahad had to escape from his seat of government at Jizān. Was little heard of for some time afterwards, but was appointed Governor of Qunfida in or about June 1933.

23. Fawzān as-Sābiq.

Sa'ūdī Chargé d'Affaires in Egypt and consul-general in Cairo. Appointed in August 1936 upon the conclusion of the Sa'ūdī-Egyptian Treaty of May 1936. Previously Sa'ūdī agent in Egypt. Born about 1888. Belongs by origin to the 'Uqayl, the guild, as it were, of recognised caravan-guides. Educated in a Turkish school at 'Ammān. Said to have lived for many years in Bombay. Is by profession a dealer in camels and horses and still appears to do this business. Was Ibn Sa'ūd's agent in Damascus before 1924. Moved in that year to Cairo, where he became Sa'ūdī Chargé d'Affaires in 1937. Is described by Sir Walter Smart as a devout Moslem, plain, slow, courteous and old-fashioned; politically rather innocent, but possessed of a certain native shrewdness. He is never used by Ibn Saud for important political work. A keen race-goer who spends much of his time at the races in Cairo and Alexandria. Promoted to rank of minister in January 1946 during Ibn Saud's visit to Egypt.

24. Fuad Bey Hamza.

Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born about 1900, he is a Druze of Abeih, in the Lebanon, where

the family are less prosperous than they were. One brother Sa'id was accused of complicity in the murder of a Christian priest at Abeih in 1930, but was finally acquitted in April-May 1934. Educated in Turkish schools in Syria, the Teachers' Training College, Beirut, and the Syrian Protestant College, Beirut. Was Inspector of Schools at Damascus for a time. Obtained a post as clerk under the Palestine Department of Public Health in 1921. Resigned after a few months and took service under the Department of Education as a teacher in Acre. Transferred in 1922 to a secondary school in Jerusalem as teacher in English and remained until 1926. Studied simultaneously at the Law School, got a certificate of Legal Studies in 1925 and qualified in five subjects, including Constitutional History and Public International Law, for the Diploma, but did not complete the course. Had a uniformly good record in Palestine, but was mixed up in politics and the Druze insurrectionary movement. May have feared arrest, although he was not, in fact, in danger of it. Left for Egypt on the 2nd December, 1926. Apparently was to go to India on a Syro-Palestinian delegation, but was drawn to the Hejaz, where, after giving English lessons for a time, he was taken into the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by Yusuf Yasin, then acting for Dr. 'Abdullah Damlūji. Became Acting Minister in July 1928, when Dr. Damlūji left on a mission, never to return. Had probably worked earlier to undermine Damlūji's position. Remained Acting Minister until the Amir Faysal became titular Minister with Fuad as Under-Secretary, but still effective head of the Ministry in December 1930. Retained his post, with a seat on the Council of Ministers when the latter was constituted early in 1932. Visited Europe for the first time as a member of the Sa'ūdī Mission under the Amir Faysal in the spring of 1932 and did all the real business. Was made an honorary K.B.E. during the visit to London, and for several years carried a passport in which he and his wife appeared as Sir Fuad and Lady Hamza. Visited Europe again in 1934 and 1935 and conducted important negotiations with the Foreign Office, and in 1939 went to London with the Amir Faysal and took a prominent part in the Palestine discussions.

Fuad Hamza is alert, intelligent, well informed on matters pertaining to his work and industrious. Speaks English well and Turkish and some French. Equally devoted to his own ambitions and to the cause of Arab nationalism, serving Ibn Sa'ūd as its exponent, though inclined sometimes to despair of the system of which he has made himself part. Keeps in touch with other Nationalists in Palestine, and probably Syria. Very hostile to 'Abdullah Suleymān and took part in the unsuccessful drive against him in 1931. Is a very poor Moslem, and conforms to Wahabism no more than he is obliged to. Would like to see Sa'ūdī Arabia, a name of which was one of the authors, develop on modern, more or less constitutional lines. Rather bumptious and sometimes difficult to deal with, but responds to personal handling. His attitude towards foreign Powers is determined by Arab nationalism, and if, as there is some ground to believe, he accepted a large bribe from the Italians at the time of the Ethiopian war, it does not follow that this affected his advice to Ibn Sa'ūd. Possesses a splendid villa in the best part of Beirut which could not have been built out of legitimate savings, even supplemented by a sum of £3,000 which Ibn Saud is said to have contributed to this object.

In 1939 was appointed first Sa'ūdī Minister to Paris. Removed to Vichy after the collapse of France in 1940, where his record was not reassuring. Withdrawn from there and appointed first Sa'ūdī Minister in Ankara where he proceeded in April 1943. The King did not want him to return to Sa'ūdī Arabia, and the great power he once wielded passed entirely into the hands of his rival, Yusuf Yasin.

Incur the King's displeasure by intrigues and attempts at mediating between the French and the Syrians and the latter and the Lebanese when on a visit to the Lebanon during the troubles in November 1943. Was permitted to return to Sa'udi Arabia in April 1944 and was present at most of the interviews between His Majesty's Minister and Ibn Sa'ud in April and May. Left for Angora again in the autumn of 1944 but lingered on in Beirut on the way and meddled in the abortive Franco-Syrian negotiations early in 1945, before returning to Turkey. After a brief visit to Saudi Arabia in the autumn of 1945, he left again for urgent medical treatment (heart trouble). Returned, rather unwillingly, in April 1946 and has since completely re-established himself in the King's confidence as His Majesty's adviser on foreign affairs, in Riyadh. Ibn Saud twice went out of his way to assure His Majesty's Minister in May and June 1946 that Fuad Hamza is an able and much-maligned man.

25. *Hafiz (Hafidh) Wahba.*

Sa'udi Minister in London. An Egyptian born probably between 1885 and 1890. Educated at Al-Azhar. Mixed up in Nationalist and pan-Islamic politics in early manhood and was closely associated with 'Abdul-'Aziz Shawish. Definitely anti-British at time of Great War and said to have been deported from India. Said to have been in Bahrain at one time. Started a school at Kuwait and passed thence in Ibn Sa'ud's service. Became tutor to the Amir Faysal and accompanied the prince to London in 1919. Was one of Ibn Sa'ud's delegates at the abortive Kuwait Conference in 1923-24. In supreme charge of the civil side of the Administration at Mecca in 1925, with a viceregal title, and did well. Read the King's inaugural address at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Much employed on missions and negotiations during the ensuing years. *Inter alia* took part in negotiations with Sir G. Clayton in 1925, 1927 and 1928 and expounded Ibn Sa'ud's views and fears regarding Italian policy in the Red Sea, Bolshevik activity and Hashimite sovereignty in neighbouring countries to the Residency at Cairo early in 1928. During all this period waged a ding-dong struggle against the Syrian influences around the King, and had ups and downs. Was occulted towards the end of 1926, but returned to favour soon after and became Assistant Viceroy beside the Amir Faysal. Thought to have indisposed the Amir by his masterfulness as a tutor and his disregard as Assistant Viceroy for the Amir's position. Relegated in July 1928 to the post of Director-General of Education. Went to London in 1929 to represent Ibn Sa'ud at the International Postal Congress. While there was selected for the post of Minister in London, but did not take up the post for over a year, during which interval he went on a sort of undefined mission to Kuwait and was also employed much about the King's person, though he appeared on the whole to have lost ground to the Syrians. He and Fuad Hamza are deadly enemies. Has during his tenure of the legation in London represented his country on international occasions, at Geneva and elsewhere. Was designated in 1931 to be Minister at The Hague, but the arrangements have never materialised for reasons of economy. Represented Sa'udi Arabia at the opening of the Tokyo mosque in 1938.

Hafiz Wahba has sown his political wild oats. His anti-British sentiments are supposed to have undergone a change in or before 1928, when he was reported as being accustomed to say that, as regards Egypt, he would always be against Great Britain, but, as a servant of Ibn Sa'ud, believed the King's interest to lie in friendly relations with His Majesty's Government. He has certainly shown himself well-disposed in London, and has been distinctly helpful. He is a good propagandist for Ibn Sa'ud on the lecture platform and in society. Neither taciturn nor talkative, he appeals by his sense of humour and

looks anything but a Wahhabi (except that he abstains from alcohol and tobacco) at the Hyde Park Hotel or the Savoy. Likes the theatre too, and alleged to have a passion for night clubs to which he gave full rein in New York in 1938. Speaks moderate English, but is not fluent. A useful servant to the King, whose respect and confidence he commands. He was on leave in Sa'udi Arabia early in 1940 and returned via Koweit, where he settled with the Political Agent the temporary form of the Sa'udi-Koweit Agreements, which were then brought into force pending the drawing up and signing of the final texts. Accompanied the Amirs Faisal and Khalid on their visit to America and England in the winter of 1943. He returned with them to Sa'udi Arabia in December 1943 and was present at most of the interviews between His Majesty's Minister and the King in March and April 1944. Showed himself genuinely concerned at state of country's finances and general corruption of Sa'udi officials. The King appeared to consider him as one of his most trustworthy counsellors. He returned to England in April 1944. Visited the King again in January 1945 and accompanied him to Egypt in February for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. Was a member of the Sa'udi delegation which attended the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. Was Assistant Saudi delegate to Preparatory Commission and First Assembly of United Nations. Made a K.C.V.O., 10th May, 1946.

26. *Hamad Suleymán.*

Under-Secretary of State for Finance, brother of 'Abdullah Suleymán, *q.v.*, and has worked under him. Once a petty trader in Bahrain and fled the country to evade payment of debts. Acted for his brother as Director-General of Finance during his relegation to Hasa towards the end of 1931. Was appointed Wakil or Under-Secretary when Abdullah was made Wazir or full Minister in August 1932. Has been employed on missions in 'Asir, notably in November 1932, when he was sent with Khálid-al-Qarqani to investigate the differences between the Idrisi and Ibn Sa'ud's Governor. They were too late to reach the spot before the Idrisi went into open revolt. Went with a Sa'udi mission to the Yemen in 1933, and was reported to have been detained by the Imam at San'a on the situation with Sa'udi Arabia deteriorating. Returned well before the outbreak of hostilities in 1934. In 1935 was a member of a Sa'udi delegation which visited Bahrain, to negotiate the Transit Dues Agreement, and to Kuwait, to discuss the question of the Sa'udi blockade of that neighbouring State. Whilst at Bahrain he was sued by a local Persian merchant, the political agent reported, for an old debt. Fell into disgrace with Ibn Sa'ud in the spring of 1936 (as he had done at least once previously) but was apparently begged off by his brother 'Abdullah. Of even meaner appearance than his brother, a poor talker and not, apparently, very intelligent. He disclosed to His Majesty's Minister at Taif in 1942 that his favourite outdoor sport was throwing stones. His eldest son, Suleymán-al-Hamad, born about 1917, takes some part in public affairs; he was for a time director of the agricultural project at Al-Kharj, and early in 1943 he went to Egypt to buy machinery and spare parts for the Minister of Finance; Suleymán represented Shaikh Yusuf Yasin as Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs during the latter's absence in October and November 1943. Visited Egypt again from May to July 1944, ostensibly on Government business, but managed to find time to indulge in lavish personal expenditure on the Government's account. He is a shallow, self-seeking young man.

27. *Hamdi Bey.*

Formerly Director-General of Military Organisation. Born about 1892 to 1896. Believed to be an Iraqi Kurd and to have risen to non-commissioned

rank in the Turkish army. Was a colonel in the army of King Huseyn, but passed to the service of Ibn Sa'ud and was officer commanding troops at Yanbu' before 1928. Became officer commanding in Jeddah in that year. Appointed Director-General of Military Organisation in 1931 in succession to Fawzi Bey Kawokpi. Hamdi seems to be a man of indifferent character, with a gift for intrigue, which he displayed in connexion with the vicissitudes of the British staff of the Hejaz air force in 1931-32. Now insignificant, having ceased to hold any important military position and to be confined to duties as A.D.C. to the Amir Faysal. Stated in 1939 that he had resigned and wanted to return to Iraq, but was not allowed by Ibn Saud to leave the country. Boon companion of the Amir Faysal's Albanian step-father-in-law, Ibrahim Adham. In spite of a gorgeous uniform gives an impression of seediness and has been known to touch a member of the legation for a loan of 2 riyals.

28. *Seyyid Hamza al Ghauth al Madani.*

At one time consul-general designate for Java. Became first Sa'udi Minister to Bagdad 1938. A Hejazi of Medina, born perhaps 1895. Said to have been educated in Turkish schools and to have frequented Turkish society. Sided with Turks at time of Arab revolt, and edited an anti-Huseyn paper at Medina in their interest. Continued to be anti-Huseyn after the success of the revolt and fled. Said to have been sentenced to death by default during his absence. Seems, nevertheless, to have been given an important post at Damascus, which he continued to hold under King Faisal's régime there, even after King Huseyn had launched against him an accusation, probably trumped up, of having stolen valuables from the Prophet's Tomb. Was in Ibn Sa'ud's service by end of 1923 and was one of his delegates at the abortive Kuwait Conference of 1923-24, an appointment which led to a revival by the Iraqi delegates of the robbery charge. Became Assistant Governor of Medina after its occupation by Sa'udi forces in 1925. Was later employed in the Palace. Selected in 1931 for the proposed consulate-general at Batavia, to the creation of which the Netherlands Government agreed, but which has never been opened, probably owing to financial difficulties. Filled in time as a member of the Legislative Council, whence he was transferred to the Amir Sa'ud's Diwán in September 1932. Came in King's train to Mecca in March 1933. Much of a palace man evidently. Fell into disfavour during his visit to Medina in 1941, but was later pardoned and reinstated in the King's entourage, and is now frequently present at meetings of the "cabinet."

29. *Hithlayn Family.*

People of importance in the 'Ajman tribe, much concerned in the Nejd revolt of 1929. Its principal member, Dhaydán ibn Hithlayn, was slain treacherously in April of that year. The following other members of the family deserve mention:—

(1) *Náif ibn Hithlayn* (nicknamed *Abú 'l Kiláb*).—Succeeded Dhaydán and carried on the revolt, but surrendered in January 1930 to the British authorities in Kuwait, and was in due course handed over to Ibn Sa'ud. Has since been a State prisoner at Riyadh, closely confined.

(2) *Hásim ibn Hithlayn* also took an active part in the revolt, and was one of two leaders who in July 1929 visited Kuwait in the hope of enlisting support. Was fighting together with Náif in October. Eventual fate unknown.

(3) *Khálid ibn Muhammad ibn Hithlayn*, described as a "debonair and handsome young warrior." Was one of the Mutayr and 'Ajman Sheykhs living in Iraq under King Faisal's protection. Visited Kuwait in 1932 at the time of the Ibn Rifáda affair,

apparently to size up the chances of new anti-Sa'udi action. Made his peace with Ibn Sa'ud and returned to Sa'udi Arabia towards the end of 1934. Appointed Amir al Bádiya or Governor of the Ajman desert, with headquarters at 'Aweyma (80 miles W.N.W. of Al Qatif) in 1936.

30. *Huseyn al 'Awayni (or 'Aouzini).*

A young Syrian merchant established in Jeddah. An enterprising fellow, who derives some importance from being a friend of Fuad Hamza and Yusuf Yasin and having connexions in Manchester; notably with another Syrian, 'Abdul-Ghání Ydlibi, the naturalised British head of a small company there. This association was closed early in 1932, when Ydlibi visited Jeddah in order to work up business and with great ideas of getting concessions of all sorts. They claimed to have important support in Lancashire, specifically that of the Calico Printers' Association (Limited). It was understood in 1932 that 'Awayni was leaving Jeddah for good, but he still returns occasionally. In February or March 1933 he went to Riyadh on behalf of certain merchants to try and dissuade the King from proceeding with the concession to the ex-Khedive's group for the creation of a national bank. A man likely to have ups and downs of fortune in dealing with whom commercially great care should be used. Closely associated in business with Najib Salha (*q.v.*). Spends most of his time in Beirut, where he is said to act as Ibn Sa'ud's semi-official purchasing agent. Although nothing has yet been proved against him, the British security authorities regarded him for a long time as suspect and only reluctantly agreed to his return to the Lebanon. Visited Ibn Sa'ud in February 1944 and returned to Beirut in April. Ibn Sa'ud wished to appoint him first Sa'udi Minister in Beirut, but later agreed with His Majesty's Government that his appointment would be unsuitable.

31. *M. Huseyn Nasif.*

A well-known Hejazi of Jeddah of Egyptian origin. Born about 1882. Inherited much property from his father, 'Omar Nasif, who was a notable personage in Turkish times, as well as the agency in Jeddah of the Sherifs of the 'Abadilah branch. Occupies the largest house in Jeddah and was once very prosperous, but is now probably less so. Was said in 1917 to have lost favour with King Huseyn, who had previously been accustomed to stay with him when in Jeddah. Was said also to be desirous of British naturalisation at that time. Described as having been a Wahhabi by conviction, even before the Sa'udi invasion. Deported to 'Aqaba during King 'Ali's short reign. Figured as a Hejazi delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Was given the privilege of putting Ibn Sa'ud up during the years following the fall of Jeddah, but has not done so since the King acquired the "Green Palace." Has not held office, as was expected, under the Sa'udi régime, perhaps owing to doubt as to his trustworthiness. Rather a dark horse nowadays and may both dislike and be disliked by the régime, but keeps quiet. Said to be a good Arabic scholar and possesses what passes in Jeddah for a remarkable library. An aldermanic figure. His eldest son, Husain Nasif, has written a book on the history of the Hejaz. A cousin, M. Salih Nasif, was the figurehead president of the Palestine Defence Committee in Mecca in 1937-38.

32. *Ibrahim al Mu'ammár.*

Kalmakam of Jeddah 1937. Identical with the Ibrahim al Junaifi mentioned in *The Heart of Arabia* and, according to the author, Mr. Philby, has a very doubtful claim to the historic name of Mu'ammár, which he subsequently assumed. In early life travelled much in India, Persia, Egypt and

elsewhere in the East, as trader and probably also as journalist and propagandist. About 1926 became head of Ibn Sa'ud's diwan; transferred to that of the Amir Sa'ud in 1932. In 1933 was appointed *Chargé d'Affaires* at Bagdad. His alleged undiplomatic activities were the subject of complaint on several occasions, and in 1937 necessitated his removal. An active, able man, interested in world affairs and with a great sense of humour. Has improved Jeddah considerably, is useful in pilgrimage matters, and is helpful to foreigners within the limits of his powers. At one time was the principal channel of communication between the legation and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but is not now trusted by the King or the Amir Faysal in confidential matters.

His eldest son, Abdullah, born about 1920, formerly served under Yusuf Yasin in the Political Bureau at Riyadh and has now (May 1943) been appointed first secretary at the Sa'udi Legation in Bagdad. Another son, 'Abdul 'Aziz, born about 1923, is a student at the American University of Beirut. A hearty rogue, he was dismissed in April 1944 as a result of a scandal connected with a slave-girl and his unblushing speculation of Government stores and smuggling activities.

33. Ibrahim Shakir.

Born about 1903 in the Hejaz of Turkish-Syrian parents. Was employed as chief clerk in the Jeddah Quarantine Department during the latter part of the Hashimite régime. Next heard of as partner of Hussain-al-Awayni (q.v.) in 1927. Has since managed Aawayni's piece-goods business in Jeddah and acquired a considerable personal fortune in conjunction with Aawayni and Najib Salha (q.v.). Acts as land agent for the Amir Faysal. In 1943 built a large mansion outside Jeddah, which he has now (July 1944) let to the United States Legation at an exorbitant rental. Has also built a luxurious villa in Cairo. A close friend of Yusuf Yasin. Director of the "Sa'udi Arabian Trading Company" formed in January 1945 which advertises itself as importers of cars, tyres, refrigerators and miscellaneous machinery. The Dodge car agency formerly held by Aawayni has been taken over by the company. According to Ibrahim Shakir two-thirds of the capital are owned by 'im and a third by Najib Salha. Ibrahim Shakir has also obtained the agencies of the Banque Misr and other Misr organisations including the Misr Steamship Line in Sa'udi Arabia, and he is associated with Abdullah Suleyman in the exploitation of a valuable agricultural area near Hadda in the Wadi Fatma. He is used also by American big business.

34. Izzet Din Shawa.

Born about 1905 in Gaza. Palestinian of a well-known family. Educated at St. Catherine's College, Cambridge, where he took a diploma in agriculture. Speaks flawless English. Joined the rebels and took an active part against the British during the Palestine troubles in 1937-38. Was at one time private secretary to the Mufti. Violently anti-Jew. Came to Iraq in 1940 with his wife, who is French, and joined Rashid Ali's rebel army in May 1941. Escaped after the rebellion had been crushed and was granted asylum by Ibn Sa'ud provided he refrained from political activities. He has been in Sa'udi Arabia ever since and has kept his word. Appointed Director of Agriculture at Al Khar' early in 1944 and in April Director of the Office of Public Works at Jeddah in succession to Najib Salha. A sincere Nationalist, he is outspoken about his views on Palestine, but is not really anti-British. The legation found him to be an intelligent and co-operative colleague in his new job, and therefore a pleasant change from the majority of Sa'udi officials. Has a son at Victoria College. He found the task of cleaning out the Augean stables of the Directorate of Transport, while fighting against Nejd and Syrian influences, too much for him and, in June 1945,


resigned. He then claimed that Ibn Saud had appointed him one of his personal advisers, but there has been no evidence that the King's goodwill towards him can resist the constant intrigue and innuendo of Abdullah Suleyman, Yusuf Yasin and others, to whom a relatively honest and go-ahead Palestinian is a menace and a danger. Indeed, Izzet Din Shawa, who has been absent from Arabia for some months, is said to be moving heaven and earth to find some other employment. He was last heard of (June 1946) lecturing in United States.

35. Muhammad 'Id Rawwaf.

Formerly Sa'udi Consul in Damascus. Born about 1898. One of a Sherari family which migrated from Jauf to Damascus in 1910. Family not highly considered in Damascus, but 'Id's father maintained close connexion with Ibn Sa'ud and was helpful to him in negotiations with the Turks. He, the father, made a fortune in camel-dealing and left wealth to his two sons. According to his own account, Muhammad made a large sum of money during the Great War by buying up English banknotes in Damascus at a discount of 20 per cent. to 40 per cent., stealing away to Bagdad as soon as it fell into British hands, and cashing the notes at par. Appointed to his Damascus post in 1929 in succession to his brother Yasin. Had then only had primary education, but was stated last year to be busily improving on it. Was considered by His Majesty's present consul in Damascus rather stupid, though pleasant and useful. Well informed on local currents of thought and pushes in Syrian Nationalist circles, without apparently carrying much weight, the idea of an Arab Empire with Ibn Sa'ud as a suitable ruler for it. The brother Yasin Rawwaf, whom he succeeded, is said to have become Governor of Medina in 1929-30. He was appointed second assistant to the Viceroy of the Hejaz in September 1930, but has faded out of Sa'udi official life and now lives at Damascus. Muhammad 'Id Rawwaf was superseded as consul at Damascus by Rusheyd Pasha (q.v.) in May 1933 and appointed an Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In 1935 was appointed Acting Governor (Kaimakam, not Amir) of Jeddah, but in 1937 exchanged posts with Ibrahim ibn Mu'ammir. Ceased to be *Chargé d'Affaires* at Bagdad in 1938, when a Sa'udi Minister was appointed, and was made a member of the Council of Ministers.

36. Idrisi Family.

Founded by Ahmed al Idrisi, a native of Fez, who became a notable religious teacher at Mecca and created a Tariqa, or school of religious doctrine. Moved on to Sabya, in 'Asir, where he acquired land and died in the odour of sanctity about 1837 and where his tomb is still venerated. The Idrisi supplanted the Sherifian family, which had ruled at Abū 'Arish in the time of his son Muhammad and Muhammad's son 'Ali. The branch of the family most identified with 'Asir is descended from these two, as appears from the following table, which is not necessarily complete or accurate as regards order of birth:—



The numbered members of this branch deserve further notice.


(1) This Muhammad was a notable man in his day. Born in 1876. Studied in Egypt and at Kufra. Organised opposition to the Turks in 'Asir in and after 1904. Made treaties with His Majesty's Government through the Resident at Aden in 1915 and 1917. Came to terms with Ibn Sa'ud in 1920, when he ceded to him any rights he might have in the country about 'Abba.

(2) Displaced (3) in 1926, after complicated events. Accepted in that year the suzerainty of Ibn Sa'ud by a treaty signed at Mecca. Accepted in October 1931 the practical annexation of 'Asir by Ibn Sa'ud, retaining a simulacrum only of quasi-sovereign rights. Joined in the rebellion against Ibn Sa'ud in November 1932, and on its collapse in due course took refuge in Yemen. After strenuous efforts to obtain his surrender, Ibn Sa'ud agreed recently that he should remain in the Yemen under the Imam's supervision, and accorded him a pension. Appears to be a man of weak character, very amenable to influence. Was described some years ago as "monkish."

(3) Succeeded his father in 1923. Was upheld by the Masariha and other tribes in 1924 against an attempt to displace him by his cousin Mustafa, No. (6), who established himself temporarily at Hodeyda, then an Idrisi possession. 'Ali, in turn, lost Hodeyda to the Imam in 1925, and was displaced by (2) in 1926. Returned to Mecca in August 1926, and seems to have lived mostly there until he was suddenly arrested and deported to Riyadh in the summer of 1932, under suspicion, apparently, of intending a coup in 'Asir. Attempted to escape. Was foiled, but did not die, as was rumoured.

(4) and (5), who died on the 5th April, 1935, were very active in organising and conducting the 'Asir revolt of November-December 1932.

The original Ahmed has a numerous posterity through another son, variously called 'Abdul-'Al or 'Abdul-Mutal. His descendants have been principally associated with Dongola, where his tomb is a place of pilgrimage, and with Egypt. The following table shows only those of the branch who have come to notice in connexion with Arabia:—



(6) Was a trusted British agent during the Great War. Later played a rôle in opposition to his cousin 'Ali, No. (3). Died in Egypt in 1930.

(7) One of the 'Asir delegation which came to Mecca in October 1930 to complete the arrangements for the absorption of 'Asir into Ibn Sa'ud's dominions. Concerned in the rebellion of November-December 1932, and left with No. (9) for Massawa after it collapsed.

(8) Was politically active for many years. Worked normally, it was alleged, in the Italian interest, but played an apparently pro-Sa'udi rôle in 1926-27, at the time of and after the establishment of Ibn Sa'ud's suzerainty over 'Asir. Visited Mecca at least three times from September 1926 to September 1927. Was thought perhaps to aspire himself to the post of ruler of 'Asir. Visited His Majesty's agent and consul in Jeddah on the 15th September, 1927. Mr. Stonehewer Bird described him at that time as being the King's unofficial adviser in regard to 'Asir and Yemen. He found him a man of intelligence and broad views—pro-Sa'udi, but not pro-Wahhabi. Accused by the Sa'udi Government in 1932 of again serving Italian interests, and of being concerned in the political plot behind the 'Asir revolt.

(9) Much concerned in the 'Asir revolt of November-December 1932. Was at Jizân at the crucial time, and attempted by a letter and a visit

to Kamaran to get His Majesty's Government to recognise what he represented as the restoration of Idrisi rule. Withdrew early in 1933 to Massawa, with his relative M. Al-'Arabi, No. (7).

All members of the family have the title of Seyyid. There is a close connexion between the family and the Senûsis, whose founder was a disciple of the original Ahmed al Idrisi. The spiritual relationship has been reinforced by intermarriage at various times. The Idrisis have also a connexion with the Mirghani family, whose head resides in the Sudan, and is chief of yet another Tariqa, once powerful and still important.

36A. Kaaki Family.

The war has brought into the limelight the previously unknown family of Kaaki. Reputedly of Syrian origin but long resident in the Hejaz, this family followed the traditional family calling of baking, as their name suggests. They dabbled in the money market and various members of the family were small independent money changers. They are now the real financiers of Sa'udi Arabia, and no money transaction ever now takes place without the Kaakis being directly concerned. They owe their present position first to Najib Salha (q.v.), the venal right hand man of Abdullah Suleyman and former Director of Public Works, and to Abdullah Suleyman himself. Since His Majesty's Government started paying an annual subsidy to Ibn Sa'ud the Kaakis have made money at will. A high proportion of the subsidy goods that come into the country are dealt with by this family, and through their machinations and those of Najib and of Abdullah Suleyman much of the gold presented by His Majesty's Government has eventually found its way into the coffers of one or other of the various Kaaki firms. In 1944 Sadaka and Siraj Kaaki, the most important combination, were discovered in an attempt to smuggle £gold 25,000 to Egypt. This money was confiscated and there were rumours of dire reprisals on the law-breakers. These however gradually faded into the background and when Ibn Sa'ud arrived in Jeddah after meeting King Farouq at Yenbo Sadaka and Siraj Kaaki petitioned His Majesty on the grounds that they did not know that they were doing wrong and the King, fresh from his successful entertainment of King Farouq, pardoned the Kaakis and returned them the money. It is certain that Abdullah Suleyman arranged this. Sadaka and Siraj having advanced the money by which Ibn Sa'ud was able so royally to entertain King Farouq. A rough estimate of the family fortune is about £gold 300,000 of which Sadaka and Siraj have, at the very least, £gold 175,000, besides valuable property in Mecca. In April 1945 they started to interest themselves in real estate and began by purchasing from the Minister of Finance, Abdullah Suleyman, the Banque Misr Hotel and several other buildings in Mecca. The Banque Misr building alone cost £gold 30,000.

The most important members of this family are:

(1) Sadaka Kaaki and

(2) Siraj Kaaki.—Brothers, these two are partners in the most lucrative business in the country. They are the Government brokers and are represented in every town in the Hejaz and the Nejd with the exception of Medina where the financial activities of Sheikh Mohammed-al-Khuraji are protected by his son-in-law, Sheikh Abdullah Suleyman. The firm of S. & S. Kaaki is by far the most important of the Kaaki firms. Its 1940 capital was about £gold 10,000—and is now at least £gold 175,000. (See also remarks above.)

(3) Abdul Aziz Kaaki.—A money changer in Jeddah who also owns a bakery business. Abdul Aziz's pre-war worth was about £gold 2,000—and now he can boast of something like £gold 20,000. He also partners his two uncles (see 4 and 5) in another firm of money changers in Jeddah and Mecca, the

capital of this being separate from the figure £gold 20,000—mentioned above.

(4) *Salah Mousa Kaaki* and
(5) *Abdullah Mousa Kaaki*.—These two are brothers and uncles, it is believed, of (1), (2) and (3) above. Before the war they were the most affluent of the Kaaki family and flourished in Mecca with a capital of something like £gold 15,000. Their present capital exceeds £gold 60,000—and from their partnership with Abdul Aziz Kaaki (3) above they have a share of a business which hardly existed before the war but is now worth £gold 15,000.

37. *Khalid Al Qarqani* (alias *Al Hud*, alias *Abu'l Walid*).

A Tripolitan, who is said to have served under the Senusi, fought the Italians and retired into exile in Egypt, where he has a daughter married to Abdur-Rahman 'Azzam Bey, formerly a desert fighter in the Senusi cause, former Egyptian Minister to Iraq and Sa'udi Arabia. Al Qarqani was brought to Ibn Sa'ud's notice, it is said, by Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, and came to the Hejaz in 1930. Was appointed in September 1930 First Assistant to the Viceroy, but apparently soon vacated the post and went into business with the German merchant, afterwards honorary German Consul, de Haas. Was re-employed by the Government to accompany the American engineer Twitchell on his tours of survey for water and minerals. Was sent with Hamad Suleyman (q.v.) to Asir in November 1932 to investigate the dispute between the Idri and Ibn Sa'ud's Governor. This mission could not be accomplished by the two delegates, who, in the following year, with Turki al Madhi, formed an equally unsuccessful delegation to Sana before the outbreak of the Sa'udi-Yemen war. Was a Sa'udi delegate to the Bahrain Transit Dues and Kuwait Blockade Conferences of 1935. Was also a Sa'udi representative at the negotiations over the Red Sea oil concession with Petroleum Concessions (Limited) (added in 1939). Acted as buyer for certain German goods for the Sa'udi Government. In 1938 was found to be on the staff of Amir Sa'ud, but later in the year officially appointed to that of Ibn Sa'ud. Said to have a large salary. Seems to be a trusted adviser, and said to be honest in negotiation, though not necessarily scrupulous in financial matters. Accompanied Dr. Mahmud Hammuda to London and Paris in 1939 in connexion with the proposed amendment of the Sanitary Convention. Visited Germany in 1939 before the outbreak of war on a mission to purchase arms for Sa'udi Arabia. Had an interview with Hitler, but was otherwise unsuccessful. Has a slight impediment in his speech. Speaks French and Turkish and perhaps Italian. Claims to have travelled a good deal in Europe, including Russia, and is regarded by Ibn Sa'ud as an expert on European affairs. An interesting talker but can be waspish. Said by some people to be anti-British but is probably only rather sourly pro-Arab. Is now in poor health (1943). Attempts by His Majesty's Legation to obtain permission for Khalid (who has been given only two years to live by his doctors) to settle in Egypt with his family have so far (June 1945) proved unsuccessful, but he paid a short visit to Cairo in the winter of 1945.

38. *Muhammad ibn 'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Madhi*.

A Nejd, formerly Governor of Jizan. Transferred about 1940 to be Governor of Al Khobar, which post he now holds. Speaks nothing but Arabic and that with a strong Nejd accent. Comes much into contact with the Americans of the Arabian American Oil Company at Dhahran and was lavish in his hospitality to His Majesty's Minister when he visited Dhahran in March 1942. Earned the gratitude of the Royal Air Force for his help when one of their

aircraft force-landed on Tarut Island in January 1942. A younger brother is Governor of the town of Al-Qatif, and another brother, 'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Madhi, is Governor of Dhiba.

39. *Mehdi Bey*.

Director-General of Police, with headquarters in Mecca, for several years, but in 1938 was made Director-General of Public Security, though no change in his functions was announced or observed. An Iraqi, who has, however, lived little in Iraq. Said to have been a regimental clerk in the Turkish army, in which a brother of his is still an officer. Was employed also in King Huseyn's army. He appears to be arbitrary and ruthless and to wield considerable authority. A man of organising ability, and the Mecca orphanage, which is under his charge, has been declared by a competent Indian witness to be the best-organised concern in Sa'udi Arabia. In 1938, when he had extended the system of regular police to Hasa, he was given by Ibn Sa'ud the title of *al Muslih* (The Reformer). Went on leave in autumn 1945 and has not yet returned.

40. *'Abdur-Rahman ibn Mubarak*.

Governor of Wefh. Little known to the Legation, but worth mentioning because of the importance of his post in relation to Egypt and Transjordan, and because he was one of the leaders of the forces, with advanced base at Dhaba, employed against Ibn Rifada in 1932. Is possibly a tribal personage rather than an administrative Governor, and may be of the family of Huseyn ibn Mubarak of the Harb tribe, who was a power at Rabigh at the time of the Arab revolt.

41. *Muhammad at-Tawil*.

A native of Jeddah of Egyptian origin. Got a small post in the customs in Turkish times and rose to be Director of Customs in Jeddah under King Huseyn. Played a leading part in the movement of the Hejazi notables to compel Huseyn's abdication and the accession of King 'Ali in October 1924. Remained in theory Director of Customs only, but wielded great influence under 'Ali, and was described as being "practically dictator" in November 1925, after his triumph in a dispute with Ahmed Saqqaf, the Prime Minister, who decided to leave. Promised at that time to devote to the cause of the Hejaz every penny of "certain economies" which he had effected while Director of Customs. Left the Hejaz on the fall of Jeddah, but returned in 1927 or early in 1928 and started a motor transport business. Was said in 1928 to have been president of the Hizb-al-Ahrar al-Hijazi, but made his peace with Ibn Sa'ud after an absence at Riyadh, which was described in February 1928 as a deportation. Was slow to receive official employment, and was perhaps considered unsuitable for such employment in the Hejaz, but was in September 1930 placed at the head of a commission to study and reorganise the financial and economic situation in Hasa. Remained for some time in this employment, despite rumours of assassination or flight. Appeared to have tightened up regulations and trodden on Qusaibi corns in the process, but not to have made the Hasa Customs as paying as he hoped. A capable and well-reputed man, liked by the authorities at Bahrain, but he fell foul of the Arabian American Oil Company to such an extent that Sayyid Hashim was sent to look after their business with the Government in 1935. At-Tawil was recalled in 1936 and replaced by two separate officials in his posts as Director of Finance and Director of Customs. In 1938 appointed (against his will) manager of the Nejd Motor Transport Company. Since 1943 appears to have lived in retirement on his estate in Hasa. The company is now defunct.

42. *Mustafa Badruddin*.

Director of Customs in Jeddah. A North African or of North African origin. Born probably about 1892. Was given a small post in the Jeddah custom-house some years ago, and later became Director of Customs at Yanbu. Transferred to Jeddah in the same capacity in 1930. A man of little ability, obstructive and not very honest. Popularly supposed to hold "Axis views" and certainly conceals very well any affection he may have for the British. Is reputed to be well in with gangs of dhow-men smuggling goods across the Red Sea. Arrested in May 1944 when a large consignment of gold was caught being smuggled out of Jeddah to Egypt. Released shortly after. Finally dismissed in December 1945. Now resident in Medina.

43. *Ibrahim an-Neshmi*.

Formerly Amir of Jaufr. Said to be a Nejd, to have been originally a maker of native foot-gear; to have been in Medina while the Hashimites still held it; and to have escaped to the Sa'udi side, where his knowledge of the situation in Medina was so useful that he was given a command. He appears to have been employed at Tebuk and perhaps at Yanbu in the ensuing years. He became notorious in February 1930 for a large-scale raid into Transjordan similar to that of 'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Musaid (q.v.) about the same time. He was apparently at the time already Governor of Jaufr, a post from which the King dismissed him about the end of the year, not, it was explained, because the man was bad, but because the King desired to eliminate causes of quarrel with His Majesty's Government. Reappeared subsequently as Governor of Al-'Ula, but was transferred to an unspecified post in or about June 1933. Is now (May 1934) one of the more important subordinate commanders in the Western Army on the Sa'udi-Yemen border. Governor of Turaba in 1934 until September 1935, when he was appointed Governor of Najran.

44. *Qattan Family*.

(1) *Yusuf ibn Salim Qattan*, said to have been originally a servant in a coffee-shop in Mecca and afterwards of the original Qattan family whose name he took. Became a guide for Javanese pilgrims. Rose to be president of the Mecca municipality under the Turks, but was still so uneducated that he was said to be unable to tell "the letter Alif from a telegraph pole." Became Minister of Public Works under King Huseyn. Was said in 1930 to be full of schemes connected with the pilgrimage and the advancement of his son No. (2) below. Has also come to notice as one of the agents concerned with the properties of the Sherifian family.

(2) *'Abbas Qattan*, an ambitious young man, born about 1901, who was himself president of the municipality in Mecca in 1930 and occupied that post until November 1945. He is the right-hand man of Sheikh 'Abdullah Suleyman, Minister of Finance, and is chief organiser of the hotels at Mecca, Jeddah and Medina.

45. *Qusaibi Family*.

An important merchant family in the Persian Gulf. The legation is indebted to the political agent in Bahrain for an account of them, which was drawn up in June 1931, and of which the following is a summary:—

Said to be descended from a butcher of Riyadh. Composed of the five brothers mentioned below: children of the same mother by two brothers, Hasan and Ibrahim, who married her successively; partners in business and property; engaged in trade between Bahrain, their headquarters, Hasa and Nejd. Accounted, despite the acquisition of wealth, extremely plebeian and disqualified by Arab custom from intermarriage with women of better birth.

(1) *'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Hasan*, simple and wise; the mainstay of the firm; reputed pious; respected by Ibn Sa'ud. Was Sa'udi delegate to the abortive Blockade Conference at Kuwait in 1935.

(2) *'Abdur-Rahman ibn Hasan*, more enlightened and a wonderful fellow for pearl dealing. Possessed of some knowledge of French and English and accustomed to go to Paris on pearl business. Sensible but conceited.

(3) *'Abdullah ibn Hasan*, intelligent and sharp, but of mean and low character and meddlesome. Inclined to be boastful and disliked by Ibn Sa'ud.

(4) *Hasan ibn Ibrahim*, very foolish and gruff and as low a character as (3). Hot tempered.

(5) *Sa'ad ibn Ibrahim*, permanently resident in Hasa. Not personally known to Captain Prior, said to be a good "mixer," but similar in character to (3) and (4).

When the above information was supplied in 1931 the Qusaibis had great influence owing to their position as agents of Ibn Sa'ud in Bahrain and buyers of his requirements for Nejd, as well as to their wealth and their hold on many to whom they had lent money. Their most distinguished debtor was the King himself, who owed them in 1930 something like £80,000, and who, although about half of this had been paid off by June 1931, still owed them the balance. Abdurrahman was given in the latter year a roving commission to try and raise the wind for the Sa'udi Government in Europe, but failed completely. The relations of the Qusaibis with the King no longer seem to be as close as formerly. They resented the reforms introduced by Muhammad at-Tawil (q.v.). They were driven by bad business to press the King for money. He has of late employed other persons to buy for him, but he is not known to have deprived the Qusaibis of their general agency for him at Bahrain. The Amir Sa'ud frequently employed the Qusaibis to buy goods for him in Bombay, but was said in April 1942 to have become dissatisfied with them and to be employing other agents.

46. *Rashid Family*.

Former rulers of Hail. Little is known of the remnants of this family once so powerful and later so fallen, even before its final collapse, that it was "accounted infamous, even in such a land of violence as Arabia, for its record of domestic murders." It deserves attention, however, because of the possibility of its reappearance on the scene, e.g. if the Shammar tribes from which it sprang should go against Ibn Sa'ud. It is understood that, after the fall of Hail, the King pursued a policy of absorption, not of annihilation, and that many persons belonging to the Beni Rashid, or connected with them, passed into his entourage. Two lads who are being brought up with his younger children and are included in the list of his sons are said to be the children of a Rashid lady, whom Ibn Sa'ud married after their birth. Their names are—

(1) *Sultan* and

(2) *Mish'al*—

the latter of which corresponds with that of an infant child of the last ruling Ibn Rashid, as given in the 1917 volume of *Personalities in Arabia*. Two other persons have come to notice, who are said to be related to the Beni Rashid, viz.:—

(3) *Mansur ibn 'Asaf*, who is said to have been taken into Ibn Sa'ud's service and to have served for a term as Governor of Tebuk; and his brother—

(4) *Nasir ibn 'Asaf*, who also served Ibn Sa'ud, but was reported to have deserted into Transjordan in 1931.

As the information about this family is so meagre, it is worth noting that the following members of it accompanied Ibn Sa'ud from Riyadh to Jeddah in March 1934:—

(5) *Muhammad ibn Talal* (a daughter of his was married to Ibn Sa'ud in 1938).

- (6) Mash'al ibn Mas'ud ibn 'Abdul 'Aziz.
 (7) Rashid al Muheysin al Jabr.
 (8) Sultan ibn Talal al Jabr.
 (9) Fahad ibn Hamud al Jabr.

Of these (6) and (8) may be identical with (1) and (2) given above. The *Umm al Qura* early in 1935 gave a list of the Beni Rashid who came to the Hejaz with Ibn Sa'ud in March of that year. This list gave all the names, except (6), unless the name Mash'al al Sa'ud in the 1935 list corresponded with the same person. Two other names appear in the 1935 list.

- (10) 'Abdullah al Mit'ib.
 (11) 'Ubad al 'Abdullah.

At least one Ibn Rashid accompanied the King's son, the Amir Faysal, to the Yemen front in April, 1934.

The younger princes are greatly in evidence in Ibn Sa'ud's entourage, being treated generally very much like his own younger sons.

The only member of the family outside Sa'udi Arabia, and therefore of some importance, is (12) Muhammad ibn 'Abdul Muhsin ar Rashid, born about 1910. Lives at the Court of the King of Iraq (according to a 1935 report), out of whose privy purse he is said to receive a pension of about £20 a month. Twice stated to have set out, with the cognisance of the late King 'Ali, to raise the Shammar, cross the frontier and take Hail, but returned on each occasion with standards still unfurled, having judged the moment not propitious. Still keeps in touch with the Shammar and maintains bedouin mode of life. Described as ordinarily a rather dull, brooding young man, and perhaps not very resourceful, but, presented with a good enough opportunity, he would quickly be off across the desert to recapture his ancestral home.

47. Rifada Family.

Chiefs of the Billi tribe, with an urban establishment at Wej. The most notable recent member of the family, Suleyman Afnan, played a not inconsiderable rôle during the Great War, but was killed in a raid in 1916 and left two sons, Ibrahim and Ahmed. His brother Salim, who had died earlier, left a son, Hamid. The cousins in this generation were at enmity. Hamid made a bid for the Sheikhship on his uncle's death. He was one of several Hejazi Sheikhs who approached the Residency in Cairo in 1924, complaining both of King Huseyn's tyranny and his inability to protect them against the Wahhabis. He came into greater prominence in 1928, when, having returned from Transjordan and taken to brigandage, he attempted a coup at Wej, hoping to dislodge his cousin Ibrahim, who was Governor there and head of the tribe. After a further period of exile he came into still greater prominence in 1932 by invading the Hejaz at the head of a rebel band. He and two, it was said, of his sons were killed, but there may be survivors of this branch. At the outset of the revolt Ibrahim visited the King at the head of a loyal delegation. He is still head of the Billi tribe in the Hejaz, but the Governor of Wej is now Ibn Mubarak (see No. 40). The family have *attaches* with a section of the Billi established in Egypt.

48. Rushdi Malhas.

Was editor of the *Umm al Qura*, the more important of the two weekly newspapers published at Mecca and the unofficial organ of the Sa'udi Government, but no longer occupied post in 1936, though believed to be still connected with the newspaper. A Palestinian from Nablus. In 1937 or before was appointed Assistant Director of the Political Section of the Royal Diwan. The following year had a violent quarrel with his chief, Yusuf Yasin, but retained his position. In appearance a down-trodden little man, but away from his chief

he is affable and talkative. Well read in Arabic literature and history. Speaks good Turkish and some French.

49. Salih ibn Abu Bakr Shata.

Born probably not later than 1890. Comes of a learned family in Mecca, where he was born. Much employed on Committee for Waqfs, grain distribution, &c., under the Hashimite régime. Fled to Jedda after the Sa'udi capture of Taif. Was one of the Hejazi notables who compelled the abdication of King Huseyn in October 1924 and rallied in due course to Ibn Sa'ud. Became one of two assistants to the Amir Faysal in his capacity as Viceroy. Spoken of in 1930 as a possible Minister of Education in a Cabinet then rumoured to be in contemplation, but, if the rumour was true, the project was not pursued. When the Cabinet was eventually organised on its present lines early in 1932 and the Amir Faysal was given the Ministry of the Interior, as well as others, Salih Shata was made his chief assistant in that Ministry. In 1936 was a member of the Legislative Assembly. Related to No. 67. Referred to in 1943 as "Second Deputy" of the Advisory Council.

50. Sdayri Family.

Take their name from the district of Sdayr in Nejd. Are related to Ibn Sa'ud through the fact that his mother was a Sdayri. He has, moreover, taken two wives from the family. Six members of the family are worthy of notice, viz.:

- (1) 'Abdullah as-Sdayri, Governor of Tebuk since about the beginning of 1931. Transferred early in 1936 to Medina (see No. 2).
- (2) Turki as-Sdayri, Governor of Asir, with headquarters at Abha.
- (3) 'Abdul 'Aziz as-Sdayri, Governor of Jauif, with headquarters at Qariyat. Because of the proximity of his Governorate to Transjordan and his frequent contacts with the authorities of that country he is the best known and most important member of the family.
- (4) Muhammad as-Sdayri, younger brother of (3). Governor of Sakaka.
- (5) Ahmad ibn Turki as-Sdayri, Governor of Al-Qunfida.
- (6) 'Abdur Rahman as-Sdayri, formerly Governor of Dhofar, appointed Governor of Jedda in April of 1945. A handsome, cruel-looking man of about 35. Not particularly bright, but wisely relies on Ali Taha (q.v.) for advice in his new post.

51. Sha'ibi Family.

Important in Mecca as the Keepership of the Key of the Ka'aba is hereditary in the family. The prerogative is very lucrative because all persons entering the Ka'aba are supposed to make a present to the Keeper according to their means. The family are admittedly descendants of the Quraysh tribe, but not of the Prophet. It is claimed that the pedigree is continuous from pre-Islamic times and that the right to keep the key also dates from that early period. According to one story, there was a blot on the escutcheon in the 19th century, when the male descent failed and the succession passed through a lady of the family who married a slave. The late Keeper's physical appearance suggested that this might be true, but there is no proof of it. Another branch of the family, claiming similar descent, formerly lived in Tunis, but now resides in Mecca. The present Keeper of the Key is—

- (1) Muhammad ash-Sha'ibi, an elderly man, probably the nephew of the late Keeper, who died in January 1934 and whom this relative was appointed to succeed.
- (2) 'Abdullah ash-Sha'ibi, next in succession as Keeper of Key. Is member of the Legislative Assembly and has held numerous other important posts of an honorary nature. Highly respected.

52. Sherifian Family.

Also called Hashimites by virtue of descent from the great-grandfather of the Prophet, but this name seems to be more particularly affected by the family of King Huseyn. There have been in the past and are in the present numerous families claiming this descent through one or other of the sons of 'Ali, the fourth Caliph and son-in-law of the Prophet. There are in Arabia itself many individuals bearing the title of Sherif, which is held to imply descent from Hasan, the elder son of 'Ali, and whole clans known collectively as Ashraf. The strains most conspicuous in the Hejaz trace this descent through an intermediate common ancestor Hasan ibn 'Abu Numey, who was Grand Sherif of Mecca in the latter part of the 10th century. Three groups of his descendants are accounted specially important, viz.:

- The Dhawi Zeyd.
- The Abadila, a particular branch of whom are the Dhawi 'Aun, and
- The Dhawi Barakat.

All Grand Sherifs of Mecca in the 17th century were drawn from the rival Dhawi Zeyd and Dhawi 'Aun. The last Grand Sherif belonging to the former was 'Abdul-Mutallib, who held the post three times at long intervals. The majority belonged to the Dhawi 'Aun, of whom came the late King Huseyn and his sons.

Although the most important members of the Sherifian family now live outside Sa'udi Arabia, their connexion with the Hejaz is so close as to justify this general notice. The following list, very incomplete, shows those who are worthy of notice:—

- (A) Dhawi Zeyd.
 - (1) 'Ali Haydar.—Formerly resided in Constantinople. Worked in with the Young Turks and was at one time Minister of Augaf. Appointed Grand Sherif to supersede King Huseyn in or about 1917, but was naturally unable to assume the post effectively. Sought early in 1926 for British support in obtaining post of Regent or Governor of Hejaz under Ibn Sa'ud. Moved later that year to Beirut, where he died in 1934. Had several sons, the eldest of whom, 'Abdul-Majid, is married to a Turkish princess (who is not, however, as stated in a previous Personalities Report, a daughter of the ex-Caliph 'Abdul Majid), and showed signs of political ambition after the Armistice. One of 'Ali Haydar's wives and the mother of two of his younger sons is of British birth. Yet another son studied at St Andrew's and had the distinction of acting as best man at the marriage of a Scotch divine at St. Giles's Cathedral. Civilised people, important to keep in mind, though of no obvious political importance at present.
 - (2) Ja'afar Haidar, brother of the above. Also lived in Constantinople. If alive, may be identical with the elderly Sherif 'Ali Ja'far who lived at Labej in 1932 and was described as a descendant of 'Abdul-Mutallib.
 - (3) Sharaf 'Adnan Pasha al Ghdlb as-Zeyd.—Formerly frequented both Constantinople and the Hejaz. Spoken of in 1925 as a possible ruler of the Hejaz, if Ibn Sa'ud won the war. Elected president of the Moslem Congress at Mecca in June 1926, and was later the vehicle of Ibn Sa'ud's refusal to hold another owing to attitude of the 'Ali brothers. Represented Ibn Sa'ud in 1927 at conference at Jizan to deal with the Red Sea Petroleum Company's concession in the Farsan Islands. Described in 1928 as "grizzled and doddering." Still resides in Mecca, but apparently a back number.
 - (4) Sharaf Ridha, usually called Sherif Sharaf tout court.—Appointed Acting Minister of Finance under Ibn Sa'ud in January 1926. Resides in Mecca and is now a member of the Legislative Council. In 1936 appointed to be a member of the King's suite. Appears now (1943) to spend all his time at Mecca

and Taif. A courteous, dignified man, rather silent and with something of a brooding air.

(5) Khalid.—A nephew of the 'Ali Ja'far mentioned at (2). Implicated in the conspiracy against Ibn Sa'ud in 1932 and was active in and around Aden. Perhaps the same as Sherif Khalid Sadiq Adnan.

(B) Dhawi 'Aun.

(6) 'Ali ibn 'Abdullah.—Formerly Grand Sherif. Dismissed by the Turks in 1907. Resides in Egypt. Described in June 1932 as an active supporter of the Hizb-al-Ahrar al Hijazi.

(7) 'Ali ibn Huseyn.—Ex-King of the Hejaz. Succeeded King Huseyn on his abdication in October 1924, but was compelled to abandon untenable position in Jedda in December 1925. Resided mostly in Bagdad, where he died on the 13th February, 1935.

(8) Faysal ibn Huseyn.—King of Iraq. Died in 1934 and was succeeded by his son Ghazi, who died in 1939 leaving an infant son Faysal.

(9) 'Abdullah ibn Huseyn.—Amir of Transjordan.

(10) Zeyd ibn Huseyn.—Had a Turkish mother, a granddaughter of the well-known Grand Vizier Reshid Pasha, and has property interests quite distinct from those of his brothers. Born in Constantinople in 1900—formerly Iraqi Minister at Ankara. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935. Now resides in Turkey occasionally visiting his nephew the Amir 'Abdul Ilah, Regent of Iraq.

All these, except perhaps (10), have issue. So had King Huseyn's brother Nasir, now deceased, who left six sons and four daughters.

(10a) 'Abdul Hamid Al'Aun.—Understood to be a grandson of (6). Chiefly noteworthy as being the principal figure in the Sherifian plot against Ibn Sa'ud in 1940. Arrested and sentenced to death, he was pardoned (Amir 'Abdullah of Transjordan interceded for him). After a period of detention at Riyadh he was allowed to leave the country with the two younger brothers and some other relatives who were also implicated. Now believed to be in Egypt.

(C) Dhawi Barakat.

(11) Sharaf ibn 'Abdul-Muhsin.—Seems to have served King Huseyn in Egypt, but entered the service of Ibn Sa'ud and became Amir-al-Arbab, or Director of Tribes. Appointed President of the Inspectorate of Government Departments in 1930. His present official status is not known, as the inspectorate is understood to have been abolished.

(D) Apparently of the Abadila stocks though not of the Dhawi 'Aun.

(12) Shkir ibn Zeyd ibn Fawwda.—Formerly Governor of Taif, a post which seems to have been hereditary in his family. President of the Beduin Control Board in Transjordan and intimately associated with the Amir 'Abdullah, with whom he has thrown in his lot. Died at Amman in December 1934. Was a tenacious enemy of Ibn Sa'ud and much less a play-boy than his master.

(13) Hamud ibn Zeyd, brother of the preceding.—Probably the same as the 'Sharif Hamud' who joined the plot with No. (10a) and was carried off to Riyadh, dying, it is said, on the road.

(14) Sharaf ibn Rajih, a cousin of (12) and (13). Said to have also been Governor of Taif at one time. Now resides at Bagdad. Identified both in Jerusalem and Bagdad as being the Sherif Sharaf mentioned by Tahir ad-Dabbagh in February 1932, in a letter which fell into the hands of the Sa'udi Government, as a man who might be enlisted in the conspiracy against Ibn Sa'ud.

(E) Even less easy to place, but perhaps of the Abadila.

(15) 'Ali ibn Ahmad ibn Mansur.—A younger member of a family, two of whom were prominent in King Huseyn's time and had great influence in the

Harb tribe. This 'Ali has only come to notice as having been one of the persons arrested at Mecca and deported to Riyadh at the time of the Ibn Rifāda affair in 1932.

(16) *All ibn Huseyn al Harithi*.—One of the Sherifs of Mada'iq, near Taif. Took part in the Arab revolt and is remembered as one of the conquerors of Damascus. Described by Colonel Lawrence as having been at that time an attractive young man, physically splendid and full of courage, resource and energy. Seems to have resettled in the Hejaz, as he was arrested at Mecca and deported to Riyadh at the time of the Ibn Rifāda affair in 1932.

(17) *Muhammad Mohanna*.—One of the Jedda family, one member of which was chief of the Controlling Department in 1917, and was then described as a "bottle-nosed bandit," while his brother, still alive, was said to have acquired wealth by smuggling and general robbery. This Muhammad is only interesting because he was arrested at Jedda and sent to Riyadh at the time of the Ibn Rifāda affair.

(18) and (19) *M. 'Ali and Muhammad al-Bedawi* (a diminutive of Bedawi). Members of a family distantly related to King Huseyn and formerly important in the Juhayna tribe and in the coast towns of the Northern Hejaz. Despite the similarity of name, they would appear to be two distinct, though closely related persons. Both were mixed up in the Ibn Rifāda affair in 1932. M. 'Ali became an object of attention in Transjordan and was more or less arrested in July to the displeasure of the Amir. Muhammad seems to have been in trade at Suez and Dhaba and was concerned in attempts to get supplies by sea to Ibn Rifāda. It was probably he who was reported killed in the defeat of the rebels.

53. *Swayt Family*.

Leaders in the Dhāfir tribe. Two members of it figured in reports from Kuwait about 1936:—

(1) *Ju'dān*, a disgruntled man, hovering between allegiance to King Fayṣal or to Ibn Sa'ūd and too proud to come to terms with either; and

(2) *'Ajemī*, recognised as chief of the tribe by Ibn Sa'ūd.

54. *Abu Tuqayqa Family*.

Formerly chiefs of the Tihāma, mainly Hejazi, section of the Huwaytat tribe, with an urban connexion at Dhaba. Rafī'a, their common ancestor, was chief of the tribe prior to his death in about 1870. One of his many grandsons, Ahmed ibn Muhammad ibn Rafī'a, was chief in 1917. He came to notice in 1924 as one of several Hejazi sheikhs who approached the Residency in Cairo with a complaint of King Huseyn's tyranny and his inability to protect them against the Wahhābis. He appears to have been Governor of Dhaba in 1927, but in that year the family were apparently in serious trouble with the Government, as it is said that Ahmed and four others were "killed by Ibn Sa'ūd," and others fled to Egypt. Numerous members of the family were concerned in the rebel invasion of the Hejaz by Ibn Rifāda in 1932. Seven of them lost their lives in that adventure and five more were reported by the Sa'ūdi commander to have been slain after Ibn Rifāda's defeat. Among the survivors was, however:—

(1) *Muhammad bin [?] Abdurrahim ibn Aliwan ibn Rafī'a*, who was regarded as co-leader with Ibn Rifāda. He escaped, and after many vicissitudes left 'Aqaba for Egypt early in October 1932. May be the person against whom an exclusion order was made in Egypt rather later, but whose name is given as Muhammad bin Ahmed.

Another probable survivor is:—

(2) *Mahmūd ibn Ahmed ibn Rafī'a*, who rallied on Ibn Rifāda early in the rebellion and tried to make his peace with Ibn Sa'ūd.

Although the above summary cannot be verified at all points, it is inserted in view of the obvious tenacity of the family hatred of Ibn Sa'ūd, and the survival of (1), who seems to have been an active leader and may crop up again.

55. *Turki ibn Madhī*.

Was in 1932 Inspector-General of 'Asir and was associated with Fahad ibn Zu'ayr in efforts to make Ibn Sa'ūd realise the gravity of the situation preceding the open revolt of the Idrisi at the end of October. Identical with the person mis-named at the time 'Abdullah ibn Turki ibn Mahdi, who, with Abdul-Wahhāb Abu Malha and two chiefs of Asiri tribes, was sent on a mission to the Imām Yahya in June 1927. Took part in further negotiations with the Imām early in 1928. Would therefore appear to be one of Ibn Sa'ūd's experts in 'Asir and Yemen affairs. Accompanied Khalid al-Qarqani and Hamad Suleyman on their fruitless mission to San'a in 1933, before the outbreak of the Sa'ūdi Yemen war. Visited the Yemen again in May 1943, and in the autumn of 1944 as Ibn Sa'ūd's special envoy to the Imām. The real purpose of his visit was to report on conditions in the Yemen. He described the people as groaning under the yoke of the Imām and anxious to transfer their allegiance to Ibn Sa'ūd.

56. *Yahya an Nasri*.

Principal quarantine doctor at Jedda. A Syrian, like most doctors, now employed by the Sa'ūdi Government. Born probably about 1897. Studied in Constantinople and Beirut. Previously quarantine doctor at Yanbu'. Pleasant and well regarded by the legation. Speaks Turkish and French. Was Sa'ūdi delegate to the meeting of the International Health Office, Paris, in October 1934. Appointed early in 1943 to be Director-General of Public Health in succession to Mahmūd Hamdi Hamūdā. (See 1937 report.) Reported to have suffered a mental collapse and to have left for treatment in January 1945. Relieved of his post in May 1946.

57. *Yusuf Yasin, Shaikh*.

Probably born about 1898. A Syrian from Latakia, said by his enemies to be of Yezidi origin. Was at school in Jerusalem in 1917. Joined King Fayṣal at 'Aqaba and went with him to Damascus. Left on the approach of the French and joined King Huseyn in Mecca. Attached by him to the Amir 'Abdullah at 'Amman, with whom he remained six months. Formed so low an opinion of the Amir that, according to his own account, he broke with Huseyn in consequence. Joined Ibn Sa'ūd in due course. Came to Mecca in 1924-25 and started the *Umm-al-Qura* newspaper. Figured as a Nejdī delegate at the Moslem Congress of June 1926. Remained editor of the *Umm-al-Qura* for some years, but was also official Director of Publicity. Took part in negotiations with Sir G. Clayton in 1925, 1927 and 1928. Acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in absence of Dr. 'Abdullah Damlūji in 1926 and 1927. Reported in 1928 to have worked to undermine influence both of Damlūji, who resigned that year, and of Hafiz Wahba (q.v.). Employed in various negotiations and again acted at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for Fuad Hamza early in 1931, and for the Amir Fayṣal and Fuad as well in 1932, but has for some years been principally important as a personal secretary to the King, who made him head of the political section of his diwān in 1930, and whom he always accompanies. Was intermittently in charge of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, during the absences of Fuad Hamza, in 1934, 1935 and 1936. Went to Bagdad at the end of 1935 to negotiate the Sa'ūdi-Iraq Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance. Was notorious for his obstructiveness during the Clayton negotiations, and is naturally obstinate and hair-splitting in discussion, but can on occasion be

amiable and even conciliatory. Takes his cue, in fact, from the King himself, to whom he appears to be genuinely devoted, and who probably trusts him as much as any of his near advisers, except 'Abdullah Suleymān. Is probably a more convinced Wahhābi than most of the King's alien entourage and is also a strong Arab nationalist, with fewer ulterior motives than Fuad Hamza, having a simpler character and less European knowledge. Has the eyes of a fanatic, but has acquired the figure of a *bon vivant*. Works very hard but delights in creating difficulties and seeks to earn his master's praise for solving problems of his own manufacture. He feels sufficiently sure of his usefulness to the King and the real power of his position to allow himself to be the butt of the King and of those who aim their wit the same way as the King, and often deliberately plays the clown when he judges the King to be in the mood. His gluttony and monogamy are standing palace jokes. He is very jealous of 'Abdullah al-Suleymān and of the latter's powerful assistant, Najib Salha. Since 1941 has lived almost continuously in the Hejaz, spending most of his time in Jedda. As the principal channel of communication between the King and the legation he has in practice exercised the functions of Foreign Minister, the Amir Fayṣal being little more than a figure-head. He was the negotiator for Sa'ūdi Arabia of the Sa'ūdi-Koweit Agreements which he signed at Jedda on the 20th April, 1942. He still exercises control over the publication in it. He has much increased the stock of English which he acquired during a short stay in Saratov when he accompanied the Amir Sa'ūd to England for the coronation of King George VI. Speaks Arabic with perhaps greater rapidity than any other man in Arabia and retains something of his native North Lebanon accent. Went on a visit to Lattaqia, where he and his two brothers own farm property, in May 1943. A rapprochement took place between him and Najib Salha (No. 60) in 1943 and he bitterly opposed the latter's dismissal in April 1944, remaining in close touch with him after his departure to Egypt. During the discussions between His Majesty's Minister and Ibn Sa'ūd early in 1944 on the reorganisation of Sa'ūdi finances and economy was mostly obstructive and supported 'Abdullah Suleiman in opposing any proposals for reform. A pompous busybody, his loyalty to the King appears to be genuine though it occasionally serves as a cloak to hide personal motives. A difficult colleague with the small-mindedness of a Latakian grocer but not unpleasant if taken with a pinch of salt. His English continues to improve, thanks to the successive efforts of legation secretaries.

Was the Sa'ūdi delegate at the Preparatory Committee Meeting of the Arab Conference at Alexandria in October 1944, and signed the covenant of the Arab League on behalf of Sa'ūdi Arabia in March 1945. Accompanied Ibn Sa'ūd on his visit to Egypt for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in February 1945. Was the Sa'ūdi delegate at the special meeting of the Arab League assembly in June to discuss the Syrian crisis.

He has been Saudi delegate at all meetings of the Arab League Council, and this has kept him for long periods away from Jedda, much to the relief of the local foreign missions. Unfortunately, he leaves no one responsible or intelligent in charge during his absence. His feud with the Minister of Finance grew in bitterness during 1945-46, and, as a sop for one uncomfortable scene between the two of them, Ibn Saud appointed him to the rank of Minister.

Shaikh Yusuf, when accompanying the King on his state visit to Egypt, pocketed considerable sums intended for the remuneration of Egyptian journalists. He also asked King Farouq's Chief Aide-de-camp to find him a little estate in Egypt costing from £E.40,000 to £E.50,000. Like most of

those around the King, he is busily making hay while the sun shines. His wife, who lives in a Cairo suburb, is said to be dissolute and a drunkard.

58. *Muhammad Surūr as-Sabbān*.

Administrator of the Finance Department. Son of a slave of the Sabbān family (mother stated to have been Abyssinian), and became the moving spirit in their hide and skin business, which was at one time important, but became latterly bankrupt. Was a clerk in the municipality under King Huseyn, and is said to have tried to assassinate Ibn Sa'ūd when he conquered the Hejaz in 1925, and to have been subsequently incarcerated at Riyadh. Returned to the Hejaz about 1929 and was taken up by the Minister of Finance, whose powerful influence got him appointed to his present post. Became second only to him in the Ministry of Finance in practical importance, and during the latter's absence at Hudeyda in May 1934 was in effective control of it. Manager of the Arabian Export Company, a corporation formed to promote the export trade of the country. Continues to have great influence and to be much concerned in commercial enterprises. Reported in 1936 to have a great following in official circles. Pleasant, generous and most capable. Has a younger brother, 'Abdullah, who is not, however, of any importance. By 1939 Muhammad Surūr had lost all influence, and was kept strictly to the limits of his post as head of the Accounts Branch of the Ministry of Finance. Since the dismissal of Najib Salha (q.v.) has rapidly regained his influence. Early in 1945 was reported to have quarrelled with Shaikh 'Abdullah Suleymān owing to the appointment over him of an Inspector in the Ministry of Finance. Left for Egypt in a huff in June. He returned in the autumn of 1945, apparently reconciled. As head of the newly-created Department of Pilgrimage Affairs, he has produced a more reasonable tariff than usual and has shown himself most forthcoming and helpful.

59. *'Abdul Kerīm ibn Zeyd*.

Appointed Governor of Qaf in 1936. Nephew of 'Abdul-Aziz ibn Zeyd (No. 5).

60. *'Abdullah Khawaiter*.

Of Nejdī origin. Born about 1887. Intimate of 'Abdullah Suleymān and Hamad Suleymān with whom he spent many years in Bombay. Head of a section of the Ministry of Finance and may be a coming man. Is spoken of as a rival to Muhammad Surūr (No. 58).

61. *Asaf ibn Huseyn*.

Appointed Governor of Najrān and the "territories of Yam" in 1934, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Taif with the Yemen. Had previously been Governor of Rus.

62. *Ibrahīm Shura*.

Egyptian. Born about 1897. Came to the Hejaz in about 1928 as a teacher. Appointed head of the Education Department at Mecca in 1930. Friendly with Shaikh Hafiz Wahba. Amiable but unimpressive. Has a smattering of English. In 1936 appointed head of the Sa'ūdi Pilgrimage Propaganda Bureau at Mecca.

63. *Jamil Daūd al Musallimi*.

Legal adviser, or assistant, in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Born about 1906. A Hejazi trained in Egypt. Good knowledge of English. Received his present appointment vice 'Id Rawwaf (No. 35) in January 1936. This was notable chiefly as a Hejazi encroachment on what has been for some time almost a Syrian preserve, and was attributed to the

influence of Amir Feysal. Jamil Da'ud is brother of a pilgrim guide whose activities have come to the unfavourable notice of the legation. Has been found on many occasions obstructive and tactless. Is probably neither very intelligent nor energetic. Has shown himself latterly (1944) to be more co-operative in his dealings with the legation. Accompanied the Sa'udi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. Appointed first secretary at the London legation, August 1945.

64. Kamil al Qassab.

Syrian. Born about 1875. Formerly Acting Director of Education in the Hejaz under King Huseyn. Later threw in his lot with Ibn Sa'ud and became Sa'udi propagandist. Prominent in 1936 during troubles in Palestine on account of his activities as Ibn Sa'ud's go-between with the Supreme Arab Committee at Jerusalem, where he went from Egypt when charged with communications from Ibn Sa'ud. Paid an unobtrusive visit in summer of 1936 to the Hejaz, and in 1937 tried to persuade Ibn Sa'ud to take part in a Moslem conference on Palestine. In 1942 was fishing for the post of Syrian representative to Sa'udi Arabia.

65. Khairuddin Zurakli.

Syrian journalist. Born about 1880. Editor of *Al Qibla*, Mecca newspaper, official organ of King Huseyn for some years. Later was Hashimite propagandist in Egypt. Go-between between King Ali and Ibn Sa'ud. Later joined the latter. Adviser to the Sa'udi Agency in Cairo in 1935. Now (1943) Secretary of the Sa'udi Legation there. Counsellor of the legation in 1944. A crony of Shaikh Yusuf Yasin and Najib Salha. It is he and not the ageing Fawzan-as-Sabig (q.v.) who runs the Sa'udi Legation which he skilfully uses as cover for the promotion of his personal interests and those of Yusuf Yasin, Najib Salha and other Syrians in the Sa'udi Government. Consequently he has done considerable harm to Sa'udi prestige. A thoroughly unpleasant type, unscrupulous and an intriguer. Attended the Preparatory Committee Meeting of the Arab Conference in Alexandria in October 1944 with Yusuf Yasin and also the discussions which led up to the signing of the Covenant of the Arab League in March 1945. Sent for to Jeddah June 1946 to act for Shaikh Yusuf Yasin during the latter's absence on Arab League business. It may be that this practice will be followed on similar future occasions.

66. Muhammad Sadiq ibn 'Abdullah.

Born in Hejaz about 1888. In 1920 was principal of the Military School at Mecca. Was commandant of the Jeddah garrison during last days of King Ali. Left for Egypt in 1927.

An associate of Tahir ad-Dabbagh in anti-Sa'udi activities abroad. At instance of Sa'udi authorities was required to leave India in 1933. Subsequently travelled in Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine. Returned with Tahir to Sa'udi Arabia under the amnesty of 1935 and in 1936 was made successively Assistant Director of Aqaf and Director of the Census. Reported to be a man of integrity.

67. Seyyid Muhammad Shata.

Younger brother of Salih ibn Abu Bakr Shata (No. 49). Born about 1906. Holder of an Egyptian degree in religious law. Inspector in the Ministry of Education. In 1935 member of an unofficial delegation for the collection of Waqf moneys in various Islamic countries and India, which did not, however, leave this country. In 1936 appointed Inspector of Sharia Courts.

68. Muhsin at Tayyeb.

Moroccan by origin. Born about 1887. Held police appointments under the Hashimite régime.

Under Ibn Sa'ud he was similarly employed. Promoted at the beginning of 1936 from a post in the Sa'udi police to be secretary and A.D.C. to the Deputy Minister for Defence. Attached as liaison officer to the British R.A.C. training unit which arrived in Taif in May 1944 to instruct the Sa'udi army in the handling of armoured cars presented to the Sa'udi Arabian Government by His Majesty's Government. An intriguer who is not popular with his colleagues and who in September 1944 was replaced by a younger officer.

69. Najib Ibrahim Salha.

A young man of Syrian origin, educated at the American College, Beirut. Born probably about 1902. Came in 1927 to the Hejaz via the Sudan, where employed for a short time by Gellatly, Hankey and Company (Sudan) (Limited). After a short but troubled period of service with that firm in Jeddah, he entered the Ministry of Finance. Speaks English well and has an easy manner. Made himself useful to the Minister of Finance, whose secretary he became. In 1936 placed in charge of a newly-created department of the Ministry of Finance, styled the "Office of Public Works," established to deal with the growing number of foreign concerns holding concessions in Sa'udi Arabia. By 1939 he had established himself in the confidence of Abdullah Sulaiman to the detriment of Muhammad Surir, was employed as purchasing agent for the Government, and was enriching himself almost openly by bribery and commissions. Became indispensable to the Minister of Finance and was specially commissioned by the King to deal with supply matters, but found it difficult to exercise his functions without much interference from Yusuf Yasin. After the outbreak of war he was in constant contact with the legation and showed himself intelligent and frank. He worked very hard and co-operated most helpfully with the legation in the endeavour to organise the provisioning and finances of the country. Was free in his criticism of the ignorance and incompetence of most of the members of the Sa'udi Government and made many enemies but was loyally backed by 'Abdullah al Suleyman, and was probably the most efficient of all the King's servants. He was said to have enriched himself but this is scarcely remarkable in a country where emoluments are certain of payment only if the official is in a position to help himself. Although he abstains from tobacco and alcohol he makes no pretence of being a Wahhabi or even a very devout Moslem. Early in 1944 evidence came to light which showed him in his true colours. It was found that he had made use of his position to enrich himself, and one of his associates in crime now estimates his personal fortune at £360,000, in addition to a handsome account in the Guarantee Trust Bank of New York. It transpires that he had deliberately misinformed the legation about the true supply and financial situation of the country in order to ensure the continuance of His Majesty's Government's generous assistance to Sa'udi Arabia and thereby to increase his own fortune. When in Cairo early in 1944 he began intriguing with the Americans, whom he had always sought to play off against the British, and warned His Majesty's Minister that the Sa'udi Arabian Government would ask for his recall if he were not more complacent over the matter of supplies and finance. Ibn Sa'ud, who learned of Najib's activities, was furious and dismissed him in April, in spite of strong pressure from Abdullah Sulaiman and Shaikh Yusuf Yasin, telling His Majesty's Minister that he had always disliked Najib and had only kept him on because he enjoyed British support. He is at present (July 1944) in Cairo, where he has started a transport company. Ibn Sa'ud, always generous to those that have served him, is said to be paying him a "retaining fee." His place as Director of the Office of Public Works at Jeddah has been taken by Izet Din Shawa (No. 84). Najib remains in Egypt,

where he acts as unofficial agent of the Sa'udi Royal Family, and is in close touch with Yusuf Yasin and his associates. He has acquired valuable house property in Cairo, for which he has paid about half a million pounds. He is busy trying to obtain the agencies of American cars and is a partner of Ibrahim Shakir (q.v.) in the Sa'udi Arab Trading Company formed in January 1945. Continues (June 1946) to reside in Cairo, posing as Saudi purchasing agent. His name stinks in British and United States Disposals Board nostrils because he is known to have been assisted to acquire vehicles, &c., on Saudi Government priority and to have sold them to Egyptian purchasers privately, at large personal profit, within 24 hours.

70. Sa'ud ibn 'Abdullah ibn Jiluwi.

Appointed Governor of Hasa upon the death of his father in October 1935. Born about 1900. Made an unfavourable general impression on Sir Andrew Ryan, who was received by the new Amir at Hofuf with a singular lack of ordinary Arab politeness, in December 1935. Described as repulsive in appearance owing to a super-squint. Reported from Bahrain to take an even stronger line with the Bedouin than his father did, and that much of the father's work in the last four years of his life was, in fact, done by the son. Shows nervousness in the presence of foreigners, but this can be overcome. In 1938 it was reported that his powers were being curtailed by the King, and that troops not under his control were to be quartered at Hofuf.

71. Sa'ud ibn Hedhlul.

Appointed Governor of Tabuk in 1936 in succession to 'Abdullah as-Sdayri (No. 50 (1)). Reported from Transjordan to have made a popular start, partly by recruiting his bodyguard locally, a departure which created a favourable impression.

72. Tala'at Wafa.

Born about 1900 in the Hejaz. In 1934 member of Sa'udi boundary commission for the Yemen-Sa'udi frontier after the conclusion of the Treaty of Taif. Police official of importance, being Director for the Provinces of Asir and Najran, and O.C. regular forces in Najran and Abha in 1936. Appointed Deputy Director of Public Security in 1943.

73. Ibrahim Tasan.

A Nejd born and brought up in Asir. Formerly in the Ottoman army. Now Commandant of the Jeddah military district and "Director of the Air Force." Served in the Arab army of Sharif Hussein and was associated with Colonel Lawrence.

74. Asad al Faqih.

Syrian, a native of Aley in the Lebanon. Counsellor to the Sa'udi Legation in Bagdad in 1938. Afterwards chargé d'affaires and appointed in 1943 to be minister there. Has some knowledge of English, and speaks French well. Member of the Sa'udi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. Became first Saudi Minister in Washington, December 1945.

75. Khalil Hajjan.

Director of Police, Jeddah. Formerly in Turkish army. Captured by the British during the Great War, but volunteered to join the Sharifian forces. Joined Ibn Sa'ud after the fall of Jeddah in 1925. A heavy drinker.

76. Khuraji, Shaikh Muhammad al-

Father-in-law to Shaikh Abdullah Sulaiman, to whose influence is attributed the fact that he has become the wealthiest man in Medina.

77. Sa'd ibn Faisal.

Governor of Duwadmi, 1938. Born about 1898. Son of a Royal slave.

78. Shaikh al Ardh.

Family name of two young Syrians, brothers. The elder, Midhat, who is doctor of the Royal ladies, accompanied the Crown Prince to England for the Silver Jubilee. He came to Riyadh as a penniless refugee and is known to have become rich in a few years, not by doctoring. Stated on very good evidence to have brought with him from Syria a maid to his wife an Armenian girl (entered on his passport as his sister) and to have handed over the unwilling girl to Ibn Sa'ud as a concubine. Accompanied the Amir Mansur on a visit to Egypt in March 1942. The younger brother, Fakhri, who describes himself as an agricultural expert, was in charge of a small experimental garden at Riyadh in 1939, and was also employed that year as Courier to Paris. Fakhri was appointed first secretary to the Sa'udi Legation in Bagdad in 1942 and transferred in 1943 as first Sa'udi Consul to Basra. Midhat was dismissed by the King in July 1943 but later reinstated at the request of Yusuf Yasin (q.v.) and other Syrians in the Sa'udi Government.

79. Shaikho, Muhammad.

One of the numerous young Syrians in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Accompanied the Amir Sa'ud to the United Kingdom in 1935 for the Silver Jubilee. Sent to the Yemen in 1937 to sign various agreements on behalf of the Sa'udi Government. Assisted Yusuf Yasin in negotiating the Sa'udi-Koweit Agreements at Jeddah in 1940-42. Appointed private secretary to the Amir Mansur in February 1945.

80. Yusuf ibn 'Abdullah al Fauzan.

Formerly lived in Bombay, where he acted as unofficial agent for Ibn Sa'ud. Appointed consul-general at Jerusalem in February 1941. An intelligent young man with pleasing manners. Speaks English well. Replaced in Jerusalem, 1945.

81. Bashir as-Sa'dawi.

A Tripolitan, believed to be related to Khalid al Qarqani (q.v.). Like Khalid, fought against the Italians. In 1939 used by Ibn Sa'ud as emissary in Syria and was present at all but the most confidential talks between the King and His Majesty's Minister at Riyadh. Holds no definite post but ranks as one of the King's advisers. Talks Turkish in addition to Arabic but no European language. Was not much in evidence during His Majesty's Minister's visit to Riyadh in March 1942, nor during his visits to the King in the spring of 1944. Accompanied Ibn Sa'ud to Egypt in February 1945 for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. He was sent to Damascus in February 1946, after accompanying Ibn Saud on the state visit to Egypt, to act as His Majesty's spokesman to the Syrian President on various issues. He was one of the advisers accompanying the Amir Saud to Inshass, May 1946. He especially cultivates the Amir Saud, and seeks to instruct and develop him. His presence in Tripoli seemed useful to the Civil Affairs authorities in Cairo in the summer of 1946, and his application to visit his home was welcomed by them and approved by Ibn Saud. He is at the moment of writing (June 1946) in Egypt.

82. Nasir ibn 'Abdullah ibn 'Aqil.

Director of Finance at Jeddah. A cousin of Ibrahim al Suleyman ibn 'Aqil.

83. *Suleyman Nanih.*

Director of Coastguards. A Nejd, like nearly all the rest of the service. Friendly and helpful. Dismissed in May 1944 for incompetence in dealing with the smuggling of gold from the Hejaz, but was reinstated shortly after.

84. *'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Fawzan.*

Manager of the Royal garage at Riyadh. A Kuwaiti by origin who claims, although it is not known on what grounds, to be a British subject. Said to have served with the British Red Cross in Iraq during the war of 1914-18. A fat, sly, talkative man. He likes strong drink and has an inexhaustible fund of humorous reminiscences and anecdotes. During the Yemen war he was in charge, under the Amir Sa'ud, of the Sa'udi army's mechanised

transport. Although not likely to become a figure of political importance he is worth mentioning as being on intimate terms with the King and his advisers and as having proved from time to time that he has a pretty accurate knowledge of what goes on in the King's councils. He is much in contact with the Amir Mansur who frequents the garage. Appointed Deputy Minister of Defence in December 1944 but resigned in January 1945, owing, according to him, to the intrigues of Shaikh Yusuf Yasin. Seems to be genuine in his dislike of the latter as of the rest of the Syrian gang whose influence in the government of the country he constantly deplures. Headed a Purchasing Mission to Cairo, to acquire Disposals Board materials, May 1946.

CHAPTER V.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON

[E 6220/1123/89]

No. 30

Mr. Berin to His Majesty's Representatives at Bagdad (No. 261), Cairo (No. 511), Tehran (No. 208), Beirut (No. 258), Jeddah (No. 159), and Amman.

Sir,

Foreign Office, 10th July, 1946.

IN the fifth paragraph (sub-sections (g) and (h) of my despatch of the 18th October last No. 279 (to Bagdad), No. 697 (to Cairo), No. 255 (to Tehran), No. 239 (to Beirut), No. 182 (to Jeddah), [to Amman only: to His Majesty's representatives in the Middle East, of which a copy is enclosed] certain reservations were made regarding the inclusion of the Levant States within the orbit of the British Middle East Office. In particular, His Majesty's Minister at Beirut was excluded from membership of the Standing Committee composed of His Majesty's representatives in the Middle East and it was decided that contacts with the Arab League should not deal with questions affecting either Syria or the Lebanon.

2. In view of subsequent developments, I have decided that the orbit of the British Middle East Office should now be extended to include both Syria and the Lebanon. You should accordingly regard the above-mentioned reservations regarding the Levant States as cancelled.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

[E 7245/2/89]

No. 31

Mr. Shone to Mr. Berin.—(Received 30th July.)

(No. 128.)

Sir,

Beirut, 22nd July, 1946.

WITH the departure from Beirut of the last "Delegate-General and Plenipotentiary of France in the Levant," his replacement by French Ministers in the Lebanon and Syria who will enjoy no special precedence, and the final evacuation of the Lebanon by the bulk of the French armed forces in the course of the next few weeks, the last symbols of the French mandate have gone and a new phase opens in the relations of the Levant States with France. The sovereign independence which Syria and the Lebanon have obtained after so much strife and clamour is more complete than that of any other Arab State—except Saudi Arabia—inasmuch as they have no treaty obligations to any Great Power. Apart from such commitments as they may be held to have inherited from past régimes (which they will be extremely reluctant to recognise unless it suits them) and their obligations as members of the Arab League, the only shackle on their independence is the control which France can still exercise over their finances, as members of the franc bloc, through the Banque de Syrie.

2. I propose in this despatch to give some account of the present state of relations between France and the Levant States, and to venture some general observations as regards the past and the future. I will deal first with the French position in Syria, which is very different from that in the Lebanon, where local diplomatic relations were not only never severed but have continued to be friendly, at least on the surface.

3. In Syria the French will, to all intents and purposes, have to make a fresh start. General Beynet, when he called on me to say goodbye, remarked that he did not envy the new French Minister in Damascus his task. One of the first difficulties will no doubt arise over the question of what constitutes French property in Syria, on which the Syrians, by all accounts, hold very different views from the French. The Syrian Prime Minister has stated that he has no objection to this question being referred to a mixed Franco-Syrian claims commission, with appeal in the event of failure to reach agreement to an international tribunal. There may also be claims and counter-claims for damage to life and property during the events of last summer. The Syrian Prime Minister has said that French interests and French schools will receive the same treatment as those

of other countries; but there may well be differences of opinion about the French interests—in particular, about what constitutes a "French" school—and it may not be easy for the French, who were able in the mandatory period to do much as they liked with regard to school programmes, &c., to conform to the Syrian requirements which are likely to be very strictly applied in the case of French schools.

4. In general, I have no doubt that the Syrian Government, and not least the President, are still deeply suspicious of the French, because they fear that the French may still endeavour to play upon the Christians and such other elements, particularly amongst the Druzes and the Alawites, as looked to France for protection or favours in the past. There are, no doubt, Syrians of various sorts who, despite the events of last year, have still maintained contact with the French *Délégation Générale*. (General Beynet himself gave me to understand on more than one occasion that he was receiving information about events and trends in Syria, even after the withdrawal of the French forces and political officers.) I should, therefore, expect the Syrian Government to keep a close watch on French activities and to be chary of accepting French consular officers in any district where their appointment is not warranted by the existence of recognised French interests. It is worth mentioning in this connexion that at least one nationalist newspaper has asked why a British consular officer should have been appointed at Deir-ez-Zor.

5. I was frankly somewhat surprised at the readiness of the Syrian President and Prime Minister to re-establish local diplomatic relations with France—at least so soon. Like General Beynet, I think that M. Serrés will not have an easy time to start with; and the success of his mission will depend on the extent to which he and his staff can dispel the Syrians' suspicions—above all, by refraining from courtship of the minorities and of the disaffected elements. I should not expect the French to be able to make much headway in the commercial field, at least until a measure of confidence has been established. But much will, of course, depend on the extent to which British and American commercial interests and political prestige are affected by the ultimate decision on Palestine.

6. The French, so far as I know, have shown no sign of abandoning the financial control to which I have referred above; but they do not seem to have tried, as yet, to use it as a means of securing other advantages (if their financial control can be so described). The Syrians appear to be more anxious than the Lebanese to be rid of it; rumours are current that some of the leading Lebanese politicians are being tempted with offers of posts connected with the *Banque de Syrie*. In any case the French will no doubt do all they can to build up their commercial position in the Lebanon and also to maintain the cultural influence which they have exercised for so long. If they go the right way about it, and avoid especially arousing fears that they are out to re-establish any form of political control, I should expect them to have considerable success.

7. The departure of General Beynet was the occasion of a spate of entertainments in Beirut, including a ball at the "*Résidence des Pins*" which was attended by the Lebanese President, the Cabinet and many hundreds of people, and a similar party on board the French cruiser *Georges Leygues* which conveyed General and Madame Beynet to France via Algiers. My former Iraqi colleague here, Tahain Kadri, who has just passed through Beirut on his way to take up his post as Minister in Paris, told me that he was surprised by the marked friendliness which many Lebanese showed towards the Beynets. Tahain Kadri who, when he was Minister here, was always a prominent champion of Lebanese independence, made no secret of his concern at what he described as "a deterioration in the situation" or of his suspicions of French intentions in the Lebanon. I went to some pains in an endeavour to reassure him and to convince him that it was not only natural but desirable that the Lebanese who, although Arabs, had many ties with the Western world, and not least with France, should cultivate friendly relations with her, now that their full independence had been obtained and the French, on their side, were obviously carrying out the withdrawal of their forces according to schedule and had made a fresh start by establishing normal diplomatic relations. But I fear he remained sceptical.

8. It is no doubt true that if General Beynet had gone a year, or perhaps even six months ago, he would not have been the object of such friendliness. The reception at the "*Résidence*" on the 14th July last year, which, like other parties there, normally drew large crowds, was singularly ill-attended. But even when all due allowance is made for the innate friendliness and politeness of the Lebanese, and for their love of a show of any kind, the relative cordiality which marked General Beynet's departure is not without significance. I believe it

to be symptomatic, not merely of the ability of pro-French Lebanese to give expression to their feelings in a way which they might not have ventured to do a while ago, but also of a change in feeling amongst the Christians towards France. This comparatively exuberant speeding of their parting guest should not, however, be regarded as implying that the Lebanese nationalists, especially the Moslems, or the present Government, are reassured as regards the future. (This will be the subject of a further despatch.)

9. I need not examine to what extent the traditional connexion of France with the Levant States, and especially with the Lebanon, rests on rights, associations or legend; what is important is that this tradition has for long past been so deep-rooted in French sentiment that it, together with considerations of strategy and prestige, has largely moulded French policy in this area. It has led France to regard the preservation of the sympathy and affection which her protection of the Christians in the Levant had won for her under the Ottoman régime as one of her foremost interests, if not indeed as something of a sacred obligation. Later, in the mandatory period, and even after she had proclaimed the independence of the Levant States in 1941, she gave favoured treatment to other minorities as well, notably the Druzes and the Alawites in Syria. Her pursuit of this policy was one of the main factors in creating difficulties for herself—and to no small extent for the minorities as well—as the tide of Arab nationalism rose; and the fear that she may continue to pursue it even now is one of the main reasons for the suspicion with which Syrian and Lebanese nationalists, and especially the Moslems, still regard her. Count Ostrorog once described the tradition to me as something which was "wound up inside every Frenchman": the Lebanese President, himself a Maronite Christian, once remarked to me that, "it makes them love us too much." No one can expect the French to forget it or to forbear from seeking to preserve it. But if they go to extremes with that end in view, the effects are likely to be disastrous, not only in the States themselves, but on France's relations with them. It is surely in France's own interest, as a "Moslem Power," to find the happy mean, as it were, between Count Ostrorog's version of the tradition and the Lebanese President's.

10. In her conduct of affairs in the Levant, France always had to take account of the repercussions which it was likely to have in her North African empire. If she made too extensive concessions to Arab nationalism in the Levant, she ran the risk of having her hand forced in Tunisia at least, if not also in Algeria and Morocco; but there was obvious danger in excessive repression of Arab nationalism in the Levant. It has always seemed that France lost a great opportunity when she herself rejected the draft treaties which she had negotiated in 1936 with the Levant States and which they had accepted—treaties which were in some respects more favourable to her than ours with Iraq and Egypt. Thanks to subsequent events and notably to France's defeat by Germany in 1940, the opportunity was never to recur. But even if she had ratified those treaties and circumstances had been more propitious for her resumption of a predominant position in the Levant in 1941 than they actually were, it can hardly be doubted that, as things have turned out, she would already have been faced with the alternatives of revising them drastically, as we are now revising our treaty with Egypt, or of maintaining her position by force. The tide of Arab nationalism, of which France, as the weaker Power, was the first to experience the effects in the Levant, is now causing us difficulties elsewhere in the Middle East, and it may presently create trouble for France in North Africa—a region which, I imagine, no one would deny is of more vital importance to France, strategically and otherwise, than the Levant.

11. The Mediterranean must surely be one of the areas in the world where it is highly important that the community of French and British interests should be recognised in fact as well as in word. Nevertheless, there has been a marked divergence between British and French policies towards the Arabs. Whereas Great Britain (who brought the Free French back to the Levant in 1941), espoused a policy which, in general, encouraged the aspirations of the Arab peoples towards independence and supported the ideals inherent in the Arab League, France held back and pursued a less liberal policy, partly because of what she regarded as her commitments to, and her interests in respect of, the Christians in the Levant, partly because of considerations of strategy and prestige and because of her apprehensions with regard to her North African empire, and partly, perhaps, because she failed to appreciate either the force of Arab nationalism or her own weakness. There were reasons for both policies in the minds of the parties concerned, and either can no doubt find grounds for criticising the policy

of the other. But it seems self-evident that neither can afford, in present circumstances, to pursue a policy not only separate from, but perhaps even in opposition to, that of the other.

12. It is easy to understand how deeply the French must feel about the sacrifices they have had to make in the Levant, for which many of them may for long continue to blame us, whether justifiably or not. It is easy, too, to appreciate their dislike of the possibility that we may supplant them here, despite our oft-avowed intention to do nothing of the kind. We, for our part, have always hoped that the situation which has now been reached in the Levant would put an end to the rivalries and suspicions which have for so long past marred our relations with France in this area. If this hope is to be fulfilled, it seems essential in the first place that both we and the French should abstain from interference in the internal political affairs of the States and avoid becoming too closely identified with different parties, sects or individuals—the more so as the tendency in both States to play off one Great Power against another is inveterate. But it seems no less necessary that we should find some way of ensuring that our respective policies with regard to the Arab world in general, or any particular part of it, are not divergent.

13. We have proclaimed in the past that we want nothing for ourselves in the Levant, in connexion with our recognition of a special position for France. If it be the primary interest of Great Britain, in so far as the Levant is concerned, that it should not fall under the influence of a potentially hostile Power, this and other statements of the kind were no doubt fully justified on the assumption that a friendly France would be able to regain and maintain such a position without the employment of unduly coercive methods. Unfortunately, this assumption has been falsified by events; and the result has been that something of a vacuum has been created at a time when the Levant States are floundering in a state of helplessness and there is considerable ferment in other regions in the Middle East.

14. Great Britain's interest in these two small countries might be negligible if they were elsewhere on the map or if the four Great Powers were in harmony about international affairs or even about policy in the Middle East. As things are, the Levant States, as members of the Arab world and the Arab League—with a considerable nuisance value, to rate them at their lowest—must continue to be of concern to us so long as the region of which they form part is of vital importance to us. The special position which we have recognised for France in the Levant has not been recognised by other Powers and is no longer admitted by the States themselves. Even the Anglo-French accord of December last, in so far as it referred to the continuance of special interests and responsibilities for France in the Levant, was highly unpalatable to both States; and I understand that it was not regarded with much favour in Washington. In the Lebanon, France may be able to regain considerable influence; in Syria, any such prospect seems remote. The Syrians have so far shown no marked inclination to turn to the United States for the advice and support which they are well aware they need. I do not know to what extent the United States would give it, if they did. The danger of Soviet infiltration may not yet be grave or imminent; but it is surely a contingency which the Western Powers, and especially Great Britain and France, with their great interests in the Moslem world, cannot afford to disregard.

15. Of the two Levant States, Syria is perhaps the more important to us and the Syrians have certainly shown greater readiness to turn to us than have the Lebanese. I am fully alive to the importance of sparing French susceptibilities; but the risk, in present circumstances, of leaving a vacuum in Syria seems to me considerable. We and the French have contracted to work together in order to improve economic and social conditions in the Arab world. If the French come to realise that they can now achieve little in this way in Syria, may it not be possible to convince them that it is in our mutual interest that we should not be debarred from doing what we can there?

16. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Cairo and Bagdad, to the High Commissioner for Palestine and to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda.

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

[E 8374/2/89]

No. 32

Mr. Shone to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 26th August.)

(No. 146.)

Sir,

Beirut, 19th August, 1946.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 705 of the 7th August, reporting the arrival of the French Minister at Damascus, I have the honour to inform you that the Syrian Prime Minister gave the Oriental Secretary the following account of his conversation with M. Serres on the latter's first visit to him:—

2. The French Minister first raised the question of reopening the French schools. Saadullah Bey replied that there was no objection to this provided the French complied with the laws of the country. These prescribed that instruction in no one form of religion was compulsory and that children could not be compelled to attend the services of other denominations or religions. The French Minister having specifically referred to the French agricultural and technical schools, the Prime Minister said that all such schools would in future be run by the Syrian Government, who proposed to make English the second language. As regards the reopening of the Palais Azem (the French Institute) and the re-starting of archaeological research by Frenchmen, Saadullah Bey said that he could not agree to this for the time being.

3. The French Minister then said that in the past the French had consulates at Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Deir-az-Zor, Lattakia, Tartous, &c., and would like to reopen them. The Prime Minister replied that on the contrary the French had had consulates only in Damascus and Aleppo and that in the other towns there had merely been representatives of the French High Commissioner or Délégation. He could not, therefore, allow French consulates to be opened elsewhere than in Damascus and Aleppo. Nor, in reply to an enquiry from M. Serres, did he see any reason for the French having a consulate-general in Aleppo, since neither the British nor Americans had one.

4. The French Minister then asked what steps the Syrian Government were taking with regard to French property. Saadullah Bey replied that there was no French property in Syria. When the Minister began to argue this point, the Prime Minister said that, if the French prepared a list of property which they considered to be theirs, the list could be considered by a Franco-Syrian Commission.

5. When the Minister asked whether there was any objection to French tourists visiting Syria, Saadullah Bey was unresponsive. He said that he himself was prepared to have official dealings with the French Minister or members of his staff, and that he had given instructions to the various Syrian Governments to do likewise, but he was not prepared to have any personal contact outside official business. It was, he said, little more than a year since the French had bombarded Damascus and they could not now expect to have personal contacts on a normal basis. If the French behaved incautiously there might well be incidents and the Syrian Government were not in as strong a position as they wished to ensure order owing to the French Government's objection to arms being provided for the Syrian security forces. Saadullah Bey accordingly advised the French Minister to have, for the time being, only a small staff, to attend strictly to business, to make no attempt to secure personal contacts and to discourage Frenchmen from visiting Syria.

6. The Syrian Prime Minister then spoke to the Oriental Secretary about the ostentatious manner in which the French Minister flew his flag all day and every day from the legation building, and carried on his car a flag so big that it seemed to have been specially made for the purpose. (In fact it is no larger than the flags usually flown by French officials here; but these are, admittedly, larger than everyone else's.) He said he feared that if the French flag was continually flown on the French buildings it would sooner or later be certain to provoke an incident, and that he would send round a circular to all foreign missions asking that they should fly their flags only on Fridays and Sundays and on their own and Syrian national holidays.

7. M. Serres called on me in my absence on the 12th August and I returned his call in Damascus on the 16th August. He seems a pleasant and innocuous little man and a good choice for what is undoubtedly a most unenviable position. I had him and his wife and step-daughter to luncheon on the following day and he seemed to appreciate that we were anxious to help him in any way we could. His wife is a most disagreeable person, and is, I think, suffering—perhaps justifiably—from nerves.

8. At the presidential reception on the evening of the 16th, the President was extremely civil to him and he appeared to make a good impression on the other guests. His only lapse was to ask the President, in the course of a general conversation about shooting, what one shot in Syria; but everybody refrained, with commendable self-control, from making the obvious reply. Saadullah Bey was noticeable for his absence, presumably as a result of his decision, referred to in paragraph 5 above, not to have any personal contacts with the French outside official business.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I have, &c.

T. SHONE.

[E 8746/8746/89]

No. 33

Mr. Young to Mr. Bevin. (Received 4th September)

(No. 158)

Sir,

Beirut, 28th August, 1946

WITH reference to your circular despatch No. 012 of 4th February last, I have the honour to enclose herein a political review of Syria and Lebanon for the year 1945, which has been compiled by Mr. M. J. R. Talbot and Mr. T. E. Evans, first secretaries at this post. I regret that owing to shortage of staff and the pressure of current work, it was not possible to complete this report earlier.

I have, &c.

G. P. YOUNG.

Enclosure in No. 33

Political Review of Syria and Lebanon for 1945

I.—The Struggle with France

THE affairs of the Levant States in 1945, both internal and external, were, as in the preceding years, so dominated by the struggle for emancipation from the former mandatory power that it will be convenient to deal first with this aspect fully, and then to mention separately and individually such other matters as are necessary in order to complete the general picture.

2. The year which saw the opening of the final phase in this long-drawn-out tussle began in an atmosphere of relative calm. Negotiations resumed in the autumn of 1944 between France and the two States with a view to arranging the transfer to the latter of the remaining "Services" in French hands, had rapidly reached a deadlock. The French had refused to hand over the *Troupes Spéciales*, which was the States' principal demand, except as part of a general settlement, and the indications they had given of the lines which they expected such a settlement to follow had been frigidly received by the local Governments. At the turn of the year, however, all parties were waiting to see if the departure of Sir Edward Spears from the post of His Majesty's Minister meant a change in that the British had decided to come down on the French side of the fence. When after a few weeks it became clear that no such change would occur, the political temperature began to rise. This tendency was encouraged in the Lebanon, where feeling ran almost as high as in Syria, by the fall of the Riad Solh Government on 7th January and its replacement by one under Abdul Hamid Kerameh, a Sunni Moslem from Tripoli with a long record of anti-French activities. The other leading figure in this Government was Henri Pharaon, a millionaire banker and a Greek Catholic, who received the portfolio of Foreign Affairs after the sudden death of Selim Tacla.

3. Demonstrations, mainly of students and schoolchildren, calling for a national army, took place during January in various towns of Syria. There is little doubt that the Syrian Government were playing up this issue to divert attention from their administrative shortcomings, but in response to the exhortations of His Majesty's Minister and the General Officer Commanding Ninth Army, they suppressed the demonstrations with some difficulty.

4. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government resolved to make a further effort to break the deadlock by exhorting both sides to be more reasonable. His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris was instructed to make strong representations to the French Government urging them to adopt a more realistic attitude towards the suspended negotiations, and making it clear that there could be no question of the British joining the French in an attempt to coerce the States if the latter persisted in their refusal to give France a predominant position. Early in February, His Majesty's Minister also was instructed to press the States' Government at least to find out what the French wanted in the way of a final settlement and not merely to remain entrenched in their attitude of refusing to discuss anything. After some hesitation the Syrians acquiesced and in an unusually cordial interview between the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Count Ostrorog on 5th February, the latter undertook to suggest to General Beynet that the French Government should be asked to state their proposals. Jamil Mardam Bey, for his part, emphasised that the Syrians had only one demand, the immediate transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales*, and only one condition, that they would not give France a pre-eminent or privileged position.

5. At this juncture the opportunity was taken of the simultaneous presence in Cairo of the Syrian President (returning from a visit to Ibn Saud), and of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden for a further clarification of the Syrian and British standpoints. This interview was particularly useful in view of a statement by the Minister of State in the House of Commons that His Majesty's Government had "endorsed" but not "guaranteed" the independence of the States. This statement received disproportionate publicity in the Levant and somewhat shook local confidence in British intentions. The attitude of His Majesty's Government was redefined by Mr. Churchill on 27th February, when he said in the House of Commons: "I must make it clear that it is not for us alone to defend by force either Syrian or Lebanese independence or French privilege. We seek both and we do not believe that they are incompatible."

6. The British representations to the two parties were followed up in February by admonitions on similar lines from the United States representatives at Paris and Beirut. The day after Mr. Wadsworth saw the Syrian President, the latter reviewed the whole situation with General Beynet, who left for Paris on 9th March with a view to preparing proposals for submission to the States' Governments.

7. A certain *détente* seemed now to have been achieved in the relations between France and the Levant States, thanks largely to the efforts of His Majesty's Government seconded by the United States Government and some of the Arab States. The appearance was, however, illusory and was in any case of short duration, for the position of the parties had undergone no fundamental change. In both Syria and the Lebanon the Governments came under fire from the extremer elements. Conciliatory references to the French in a speech by the Syrian President to the Chamber on the occasion of Syria's entry into the war were most unpopular, and led to demonstrations and a shower of anti-Government pamphlets in the principal Syrian towns. On 7th April the Syrian Government was reformed under the same Prime Minister, Fares el Khoury, and with the same Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jamil Mardam; these saw that their best method of regaining popularity would be a policy of resistance to the French. In the Lebanon, too, where the President returned from a two months' course of treatment in Palestine early in April, the Opposition's campaign, which was directed in particular against the Minister for Foreign Affairs, had the effect of forcing the Government to adopt a nationalistic line and make common cause with the Syrians, though they were content to leave the latter the lead.

8. While the internal situation deteriorated in the two countries, the Franco-Syrian discussions on the revised French draft of a university convention, which had been resumed during the *détente*, came to a standstill. The Syrians objected that the draft would entail French interference in their educational programme—and they had reason to believe that they could count on United States support for this attitude—and the French members of the joint committee professed inability to modify the draft. No headway was possible before the return of General Beynet and this was eagerly awaited in the Levant as the *Délégué Générale's* reappearance with fresh and more reasonable proposals seemed to provide the only hope of reaching a general settlement before the temperature reached fever heat. The French Government, however, judged the situation otherwise, and the general's departure was deliberately postponed. They also considered the moment suitable for sending two cruisers to the Levant

with reinforcements on board. His Majesty's Government had urged the French to hasten General Beynet's return and to ensure that the proposals he would bring with him would be moderate. On learning of the proposed despatch of French troops and warships, they made strong representations, as did also the United States Government, pointing out that such a step would appear provocative and gravely prejudice the forthcoming negotiations. The French Government, however, remained unmoved and not even a personal message from Mr. Churchill to General de Gaulle, delivered by His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, on 4th May, could induce them to reconsider their policy. In his reply, the general said that France's strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean would have to be assured before she could hand over the Troupes Spéciales to the two States.

9. On 7th May the French cruiser *Montcalm* arrived at Beirut with 800 Senegalese on board. At the instance of His Majesty's Legation the French authorities had informed the local Governments in advance that this movement was in the nature of a relief; but now the French had demonstrated their ability to send troops to the Levant against the presumed wish of His Majesty's Government, the two Governments were gravely concerned lest reinforcements should follow. Their immediate reaction was to send similar notes to the Délégation Générale and to the British, United States and Soviet Legations, requesting that in view of the end of the war in Europe, Allied troops should not be brought into their territory in future without the previous consent of the Government concerned.

10. Tactless French ebullitions of feeling on V.E.-Day (8th May) heightened the tension everywhere, but especially in Beirut, where there were exaggerated displays of tricolours and parades of lorries filled with French employees shouting "The country is yours, Oh de Gaulle." Unfortunately, about 200 Palestinian soldiers were induced by local Moslems to join in Arab Nationalist demonstrations which included the parading of a portrait of the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, and the damaging of a French convent whence a stone was believed to have been thrown at the demonstrators. The offending battalion was immediately withdrawn, but the French made the most of the incident.

11. On 12th May General Beynet returned at last from Paris. Every effort was made by His Majesty's Legation to counsel patience on the local Governments, but the latter made it clear from the start that they would only negotiate if further French troops did not arrive. It was, however, already being rumoured in Syria that this would occur and anti-French demonstrations began in the principal Syrian towns on 13th May. The rumours proved all too true, for on 17th May the cruiser *Jeanne d'Arc* arrived with 600 more troops on board.

12. On the following day General Beynet met the two Foreign Ministers together in Damascus and gave them identical notes, which described French interests in the Levant as of three kinds: cultural, economic and strategic. It was proposed to safeguard the first by a University Convention, the second by agreements on the usual lines, and the third by bases guaranteeing France's communications with the Far East. When these three points had been settled the Troupes Spéciales would, with certain reservations, be handed over. On 19th May the two Governments presented notes to the four Powers, stating that the despatch of further French troops constituted an infringement of their sovereignty, that the proposals contained in the French notes were incompatible with their independence, and that they were not prepared to negotiate under threat of force.

13. The news of these developments caused general indignation in the Levant, and the main towns of Syria at once closed in sign of protest. The first serious riot took place on 25th May at Aleppo, where a French officer, an n.c.o. and a soldier were murdered; the French then used armoured vehicles to clear the streets, and several civilians were wounded. In Damascus on the following days a number of attacks were made on individual Frenchmen, and a series of large demonstrations, though well controlled, strained the resources of the gendarmerie to the utmost. In the Lebanon, where the Government had better control of the situation, there was a complete three days' protest strike from 19th to 21st May, but no serious disorders.

14. At this time the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Force, visited the Levant States and was appealed to by the Syrian Government for additional arms for the gendarmerie, who were obviously tiring; but the French, to whom this proposal was referred, categorically refused. All British authorities continued to urge restraint on both sides, but as late as 19th May General Beynet affected to believe the situation no worse than it had been at the beginning of the year.

Two days later, however, he appeared more concerned, and spoke of the possibility of "performing a surgical operation," though he went on to say this would serve no useful purpose.

15. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government were in touch with the United States Government with a view to concerting joint means of averting a dangerous explosion. On 26th May His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris saw General de Gaulle, who showed great irritation that the Americans should take part and said he would only be prepared to discuss with them the Arab question as a whole, including Palestine and Egypt. Forceful representations were also made to the French Embassy in London about provocative military preparations by the French in the Levant.

16. On 27th May such serious disturbances broke out in Homs and Hama that the Syrian Government informed His Majesty's Legation that they could no longer be responsible for internal security. In fact, communications in Syria broke down completely, and Damascus was cut off, except for the wireless, from everywhere except Beirut. The Syrian President told His Majesty's Minister that he had done all he could to carry out the advice given him by Mr. Churchill in Cairo, but the Syrians could not negotiate with the French under the threat of force. Point was given to this remark by the Syrian Government's discovery of a draft proclamation by General Oliva Roget, the French delegate in Damascus, indicating his intention to proceed with aggressive measures for cowing the Syrians.

17. The situation now moved rapidly to a climax in nearly every district of Syria. On the night of 27th-28th May a northbound train was derailed north of Hama and three French armoured cars were ambushed at that town, one being destroyed. During the night of 27th and the mornings of 28th and 29th there was indiscriminate mortaring and shelling by the French of both Homs and Hama, with numerous casualties. General fighting ensued.

18. At Deir-ez-Zor a bomb was thrown into the French Political Offices on the night of 28th-29th May. Next morning, barricades having been erected in the streets, the French fired on the crowd, but on the following day withdrew to positions outside the town which they bombarded with armoured cars and aircraft.

19. In the Jebel Druze the Mohafez, Emir Hassan el Atrash, occupied the citadel of Soneida on 29th May without meeting any resistance. All the French-commanded troops in the area deserted *en bloc*. In the Hauran the French barracks at Ezraa were also occupied without resistance, but it took the townspeople some forty-eight hours' fighting to capture the barracks at Deraa.

20. In Damascus itself 29th May was a day of unnatural quiet until the evening. About 7 o'clock a shot was fired near the Sérail, apparently at a deserter. Fire was immediately opened on the crowd from the Cherkass Barracks, and a general fusillade followed, from the French all over the town. Civilians and gendarmerie in the street replied, and soon afterwards the French opened indiscriminate mortar and artillery fire on the centre of the town. This went on intermittently for the next sixty hours. The Syrian Parliament building was largely destroyed by shell-fire, and the gendarmerie, after suffering many casualties (particularly when bombs dropped by an aircraft hit their headquarters in the Citadel) were withdrawn to avoid further losses.

21. As soon as reports of the outbreak of open hostilities in Damascus and other parts of Syria were received in London, the Cabinet met to consider what steps could be taken to restore order in the Levant and to eliminate the serious threat to Allied lines of communication with the Far East. On the afternoon of 31st May Mr. Eden informed the House of Commons that a message from Mr. Churchill was being handed to General de Gaulle in Paris stating that in view of the grave situation which had arisen between French troops and the Levant States, and the severe fighting which had broken out, His Majesty's Government had with profound regret ordered the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to intervene in order to restore order. President Truman had been asked to approve this order; his approval was received after it had already been issued.

22. In the late afternoon of 31st May the General Officer Commanding Ninth Army informed the French Territorial Commander of His Majesty's Government's decision, and General Humblot replied that he had received orders from Paris not to oppose the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Force. General Oliva Roget in Damascus also acquiesced with considerable reluctance and after reference by telephone to Beirut. The Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, arrived by air in Beirut on 1st June and left for Damascus with His Majesty's Minister. A British armoured column entered the town in the late afternoon amidst great popular enthusiasm and ensured the return to barracks

of all French troops who had not already obeyed their own commander. The official Syrian figures of casualties in Damascus were: killed, gendarmes 80, civilians 400; wounded, seriously 500, minor injuries 1,000; and 500 gendarmes missing. Considerable damage was done by high explosives and fire near the centre of the town and there had been much looting by Senegalese soldiers and Troupes Spéciales.

23. As a result of their intervention the British military authorities were immediately faced with two main problems, namely, the avoidance of disturbances in the Lebanon and the protection of French lives and property. No disorders in fact occurred in the Lebanon in spite of the excited state of public opinion; and the rapid deployment of British forces which took place immediately after their intervention, together with the arrangements made for the speedy withdrawal under British protection of a considerable number of French military units and civilians, proved largely effective in safeguarding French life and property. The Syrian authorities for their part made great efforts to reorganise their security services, and in this they received notable help from the British in the form of much-needed equipment. A small British training team was also provided for the reorganisation of the gendarmerie. But the Syrian authorities, though by and large they co-operated well with the British, made it plain at once that they were firmly opposed to French officers and troops remaining in the country, and the Acting Syrian Prime Minister told a press conference that there could be no peace in the Levant States until all the French had left. By 12th June the evacuation of French personnel from Damascus had been virtually completed, but the French air force remained in control of Mezzé airport. French forces were also rapidly evacuated from Homs and Hama but not from Aleppo or the Mohafazat of Latakia, with the result that considerable tension continued in both these centres.

24. Despite the energetic action of the British military authorities, a considerable number of incidents occurred. The most serious of these occurred on 8th June, when the French Méharist Company at Dmeir revolted and killed six of their officers and four n.c.o.s, and on 17th June at Idlib, where two French officers who had entered the town ahead of a convoy without notifying the British, were attacked by the crowd and killed. The French were soon evacuated or driven out of a number of isolated posts in North Syria, and at the end of June the remaining garrisons were withdrawn and concentrated at three places in the Jezireh. Desertions from the Troupes Spéciales, although not encouraged (at least officially) by the Syrian Government, went on increasing and began to constitute a serious element of insecurity. Nevertheless, the British forces were just able, by making full use of their mobility, to stifle or confine the outbreaks which continued to occur at widely separated points.

25. Another problem which called for the urgent attention of the British military authorities was that of supplies, which arose from the refusal of the Syrians to have any further dealings with the French personnel in the Offices des Céréales Panifiables. The very name of this body was closely connected in the Syrians' minds with the French, and the Commander-in-Chief decided that it was necessary for the Ninth Army to take over responsibility for feeding the two countries. A temporary organisation known as Mira was accordingly set up for this purpose.

26. Among the other problems posed by the sudden withdrawal of the French from Syria one of the most difficult was that of the Mixed Courts, suspension of which, following the departure of the French judges, caused considerable hardship to litigants. The Syrian Government took the view that the courts lost their legal basis as a result of the termination of the French mandate consequent on the adhesion of Syria to the U.N.O. His Majesty's Government concentrated their efforts, as an interested Power, on trying to secure a *modus vivendi* until a final agreement could be reached; but no headway had been made on this issue up till the end of the year.

27. Meanwhile, the French authorities took every opportunity to spread the view that British intervention in Syria was unnecessary and was to be attributed to purely selfish motives. General de Gaulle showed no readiness to take part in tripartite discussions with the British and United States Governments, and countered with a proposal for a general conference on the Middle East to which China and the U.S.S.R. would also be invited. His Majesty's Government replied that they considered such a conference inappropriate and rather than find themselves in a minority of one to two, the Provisional French Government decided to open direct negotiations with the States' Governments. These had continued to keep in close touch during the period following the

shelling of Damascus and at a meeting on 21st June, they agreed to follow a joint policy aiming at the dismissal of all French employees in their service, the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales and the withdrawal of all French troops. The first of these aims was put into effect forthwith. The two Governments also declared once more their determination not to grant a special or privileged position to any foreign Power.

28. Count Ostrorog returned from Paris on 27th June and informed the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs "unofficially" that the French Government might be prepared to transfer the Troupes Spéciales to the States immediately, to give a guarantee to withdraw French troops at the same time as British troops and to discuss the transfer of the services still remaining under French control. He did not mention a treaty. After consulting the Syrian Government and His Majesty's Minister, the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that both States' Governments gladly accepted the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales, and that the other points could be discussed afterwards. After further conversations on this basis the Délégation Générale was authorised to issue a statement on 8th July which, after expounding at length France's good wishes towards the two States, declared that the Troupes Spéciales would be transferred to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments and that the formalities for the transfer would be worked out within a maximum of forty-five days. On the next day the two Governments issued a joint declaration expressing their satisfaction at this development. Throughout these negotiations—and indeed all subsequent negotiations during the year—the Syrians refused to have direct contact with the French, and used the Lebanese as intermediaries.

29. The French, Syrian and Lebanese commissions to arrange the details of the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales met on 12th July, and at once came up against a difficult problem in the shape of the Avenantaires, local troops engaged by special contract to serve in the French regular forces. The Syrians held strongly the view that these men should not leave the country, and it was only after the personal intervention of His Majesty's Minister with the Syrian President that a compromise was eventually reached. Avenantaires who had signed contracts since the 30th June, 1945, and who did not desire or were not acceptable for service in the national armies, should return to their homes before the 31st July. Those who desired to serve in the national armies would be transferred with the remainder of the Troupes Spéciales, and those remaining in French service would be withdrawn from their units together with French personnel.

30. The actual transfer of the Troupes Spéciales began on the 1st August and was completed without major incidents. The next step on the road to the full independence of the two States was seen to be the transfer of the services still under French control. French, Lebanese and Syrian commissions were formed to study this question and first met on 2nd August. Little progress was made at the start and the Syrian representatives withdrew as their Government maintained that they were ready to discuss the details of transfer but not the principle. The French and Lebanese, however, did at last reach, in October, agreement for the transfer of a large number of the less important services, the principal outstanding ones being Radio Levant, the telephones and the Tripoli topping plant. Although the Lebanese still accused the French of obstructiveness, an exchange of letters regarding the transfer of the Tripoli topping plant took place on 26th November. Another conciliatory act of the same nature by the French was the return on 28th November of the gold reserves of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, which had been taken to France by General Dentz in 1941. Negotiations for the transfer of the remaining services had not, however, led to anything by the end of the year.

31. The completion of the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales brought a pause for breath in the struggle with France and a temporary preoccupation with internal politics. Changes of Government took place in both countries during August. In the Lebanon the operation was painless and produced definite results. The Kerameh Government, although given much credit for its part in securing the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales, was subjected to increasing criticism by the extreme nationalists of the Riad Solh group. More insidious, however, was the general desire for a change which regularly seizes Lebanese political circles when a Government has enjoyed power for more than six months. The Prime Minister, who was unfamiliar and disgusted with local political methods, asked the President to give him a free hand to reform the electoral system and purge the machinery of government. When the President declined, Abdul Hamid Kerameh submitted his resignation on 20th August, after the Chamber, which

had been called in extraordinary session and was aware of the Prime Minister's decision, had given the Government a vote of confidence by 34 votes to 9, with two abstentions. Two days later a new Government was formed by Sami Solh, with Hamid Frangieh as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and was on the whole welcomed by public opinion. The leaders of the preceding Government went into Opposition and formed a new party called the Independence Party.

32. The change of Government in Syria was more protracted. Succumbing to a vigorous attack by the extreme nationalists directed in particular against the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Fares Khoury resigned on 20th August, but formed another Government six days later, which included five members of the previous Administration. Jamil Mardam, however, was dropped (he later accepted the post of Syrian Minister in Cairo), and replaced as Minister for Foreign Affairs by Mikhail Lian, a Christian from Aleppo with no experience or qualifications for the post. This reshuffle did little to satisfy the demand for a change, and the situation deteriorated so much that the President of the Republic became alarmed at the possibility of a breakdown of the administrative machine. Eventually, on 30th September, Fares Khoury was induced to tender his resignation and the same day a Government was formed by Saadullah Jabri, who himself retained the portfolios of Foreign Affairs and Defence. The new Prime Minister had a reputation for firmness and the public greeted his reappearance with relief.

33. Once the new Governments were in the saddle, attention reverted to the problem of relations with France, and the conclusion of hostilities in the Far East immediately revived various dormant questions, such as the maintenance of military controls and even the withdrawal of Allied troops from the Levant. The suggestion now began to figure prominently in the press that the two Governments should address a joint note to His Majesty's Government and the French Government requesting the evacuation of their troops. Such a step was seriously considered, but in deference to the representations of His Majesty's Minister the despatch of this note was postponed for the time being.

34. Nevertheless, the withdrawal of all French troops from both States was the principal objective of the foreign policy of the new Syrian Government, the others being the transformation of the French Déléation Générale into a Legation (which should contain no person who was a member of the Déléation Générale at the end of May); the withdrawal of all French political officers and an immediate ban on the circulation of the French troops remaining in Syria. As a first step towards implementing this programme the Syrians embarked on a process of making life as unpleasant as possible for the French. This took the form of making difficulties about food supplies, which had as a result to come from British sources, and about the escorting of French convoys by British guards. Orders were actually given to forbid the entry into Syria of any French vehicle, whether escorted or otherwise, but these were eventually rescinded as a result of strong pressure from the British authorities.

35. The Syrian authorities also made difficulties over the reopening, at the beginning of the new academic year in October, of the French and French-protected (including Vatican) schools. Saadullah Jabri having assured the chargé d'affaires that the Sûreté Générale would take no steps to close the French schools, the Déléation Générale made arrangements for these to reopen as usual. The Syrian authorities, however, immediately closed all of them at Aleppo and all but two at Damascus, on the ground that they did not have the necessary permit. A long wrangle ensued about the bearing on the situation of the Syrian Education Law of 21st December, 1944, of the Franco-Turkish agreements of 1901 and 1913 and of a circular of March 1945, addressed by the Syrian Ministry of Education to all foreign schools, to which the French schools had never replied. Both sides adopted an intransigent attitude which the efforts of His Majesty's Legation failed to modify, and it became clear that no progress could be made with this problem before the evacuation of the French forces.

36. The new Syrian policy led inevitably to a recrudescence of incidents which had diminished markedly during the period following the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales. Now the ever-more insistent Syrian demands for the evacuation of foreign troops were paralleled by French attempts to recover some of their lost privileges, and the popular attitude hardened in Aleppo and the Mohafazat of Lattakia. The ostentatious erection of sandbag defences and the bringing in of cannon and ammunition by air by the French increased local suspicions at the former place, but it was at Tartous that a clash first occurred when a party of unarmed French *avenantaires* were fired on by civilians and British troops were forced to intervene. The situation continued to deteriorate,

and on 17th September M. Cuinat, representative of the French Déléation Générale in Damascus, was wounded in the leg by a group of youths, and he was withdrawn without replacement on 10th November.

37. Meanwhile His Majesty's Government, fresh from their victory in the general election, resolved to exert their influence on the French Provisional Government with a view to reaching an agreement on the evacuation of the forces of both Powers from the Levant States. Conversations between Mr. Bevin and M. Bidault during the latter's visit to London in September led to exploratory discussions between British and French officials and the emergence of a tentative draft agreement. It soon became clear, however, that the French were unwilling to consider the question of the Levant States except in relation to the Middle East as a whole. At the end of October a draft formula was produced to cover this requirement, but a long delay ensued on account of the elections in France. News of these Anglo-French negotiations leaked out and in the absence of any official statement the Lebanese and Syrian Governments showed impatience and growing concern lest the outcome might prove to be a bargain at their expense. This fear was nourished by certain press reports. Eventually, on 13th December, an official communiqué was released in London and copies of it and of the agreements on evacuation and on the similarity of British and French aims in the Middle East to which it referred, were handed the same day by His Majesty's Minister to the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents. Both expressed appreciation of the efforts made by His Majesty's Government to secure the agreement, but their general attitude was reserved, and in particular they raised very strong objection to a passage which appeared to mean that French troops would remain alone in the Lebanon. In response to a pressing appeal from the Lebanese President, His Majesty's Minister was authorised to assure both Governments that there was no intention of withdrawing British troops from either Syria or the Lebanon in such a way as to leave the French there alone. This assurance did not become general knowledge and the public greeted the communiqués with even more reserve, and in Syria with some suspicion.

38. On 21st December, as provided in the agreement, British and French military experts held their first meeting in Beirut. When they exchanged their instructions, however, considerable divergencies were revealed. The French subsequently referred to Paris for further instructions, but some headway was made with plans for the evacuation of Syria. Meanwhile the agreement continued to receive the closest attention of the Lebanese and Syrian Governments, but in the absence of a lead from the Syrian Government both public opinion and that of the Syrian Chamber remained perplexed. The Government was violently attacked in the Chamber on 17th December, which brought home to them the need to take a definite line in favour of the agreement. It was, however, too late, and feeling was already beginning to crystallise against it. This process was not arrested either by the publication of the texts on 22nd December or by a speech of the Syrian Prime Minister on the same day, in which he emphasised the benefits Syria would draw from the agreement. On 27th December the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Syrian Chamber presented a report which was uncompromising in its general tone and which described the agreement as "contrary to the United Nations Charter and the elementary principles of international law." On 31st December, the Syrian Chamber unanimously passed a resolution based on the recommendations of this report and stating that the Government should protest to the United Nations Organisation against the agreement and ask them to intervene to secure complete and immediate evacuation. The resolution also urged the Government to call forthwith a meeting of the Council of the Arab League to study the agreement and take measures with a view to the evacuation of all foreign forces from Syria and the Lebanon.

39. The attitude of the Lebanese Government was on the whole more consistent. The initial reaction of the Chamber of Deputies was frigid, and this attitude was reflected in a communiqué which the Lebanese Government felt obliged to issue on 22nd December, in which they solemnly declared *inter alia* that, not having taken part in the talks leading up to the agreement, they were not bound by the decisions, and that they would not accept any act or reservation tending to modify the status of the Lebanon.

40. In the last days of December the tone of the Lebanese press became almost violent and further fuel was added to the flames by the arrival of General Oliva Roget at Mezzé aerodrome, near Damascus, and by the landing on the same day of 186 French military personnel at Beirut. The Syrian Prime Minister's immediate reaction to the former was to order road-blocks to be placed on all exits from the airfield and on the Syro-Lebanese frontiers, and to

forbid all French convoys to enter Syria even when escorted by British troops. The Lebanese Government's reaction to the latter was to protest that the troops had been brought in without their previous consent. The incident was, however, closed by the French undertaking to notify the Lebanese Government of all future movements of troops into the Lebanon; the same procedure would also be observed by the British authorities. The situation at Aleppo also deteriorated during the last days of the year, largely because of the personality of the French Délégué, M. Fauquenot, who had been called to Beirut for consultations and whom the French insisted on sending back to Aleppo for reasons of prestige. The year thus ended on a far from encouraging note and there were few indications that the conclusion of the Anglo-French Agreement which it had been hoped would have put an end to an abnormal and intrinsically dangerous situation was producing the desired results.

II.—Relations with Other Powers

The Arab League

41. Both States sent delegations to attend the Cairo Conference of Arab Foreign Ministers in February under the leadership of their respective Ministers for Foreign Affairs. The meeting in March was attended by the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Syria and by the Prime Minister of the Lebanon with four Deputies. While Syria favoured a strong League, the Lebanon, with its Christian majority and traditional fear of Moslem domination, aimed at making the League as loose as possible, and the Lebanese delegation were largely responsible for the comparatively weak form the League eventually took when constituted at the Cairo Conference in March. But whatever their basic divergence in attitude towards the League, both Syria and the Lebanon looked to it for support in their struggle with France. Three days before the outbreak of hostilities in Damascus the Acting Prime Minister informed the Syrian Chamber that it had been decided to request a meeting of the Arab League Council to consider the situation in the Levant States. The meeting (in Cairo) was attended by Saadullah Jabri as President of the Chamber, and the Council uncompromisingly condemned the French action and called for the withdrawal of all French troops from the Levant States. Similarly, the resolution of the Syrian Chamber on 31st December urged the Government, as is mentioned in paragraph 38 above, to call a meeting of the Council of the Arab League to study the Anglo-French Agreement of 13th December.

42. Another subject on which Syria and the Lebanon, as well as the other Arab States, turned to the Arab League for support, was that of Palestine, which came rapidly to the fore after the end of the war in Europe. The Zionist Conference, which was held in London in August, and President Truman's declaration on Palestine, evoked strong reaction in both countries, Christian opinion being in general as anti-Zionist as the Moslem. Both Governments further decided to take special measures to control their southern frontier, with the object of preventing the passage of illegal immigrants, and the Syrian Government went so far as to turn back 105 Bulgarian Jews who were on their way to Palestine, making it clear that they intended to offer no further facilities to Jewish immigrants. On 2nd November, the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, the shops of a number of towns in Syria and the Lebanon were closed, many newspapers appeared with black edges and there were orderly demonstrations. The statement in the House of Commons on 12th November about the provisional continuance of immigration was communicated in advance to the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents. Both appreciated the courtesy, but the absence of any reference to the White Paper was noted with misgivings. The reply of the Arab League was communicated to His Majesty's Legation by the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs on 5th December, the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs pointing out orally that it was intended to leave the door open for further discussion. The two Governments lost no time in taking action to implement the Arab League's decision to impose a boycott on Zionist goods, although the decision was received with some anxiety in commercial circles, where it was realised that Palestine was the two States' best customer.

43. Inside the Arab League Syria and the Lebanon tended to associate with Egypt and Saudi Arabia against the Hashemite *bloc* consisting of Iraq and Transjordan. The reason for this was fear of the "Greater Syria" ambitions attributed to the Hashemite family, as the realisation of these would mean the absorption of the Lebanese Christians in one large and overwhelmingly Moslem unit, and in Syria the dispossession of the clique now ruling the republic.

Friendship between Syria and Saudi Arabia was strengthened by the visit of Shukri Kuwatli to Ibn Saud in March, on the way back from which he stopped at Cairo. His visit to Bagdad immediately afterwards, however, was a flop as the Iraqis, angry that the President should have visited Ibn Saud first, treated him with marked coldness. Relations between the Levant States and the Hashemite *bloc* were further strained as a result of the dramatic passage through the Lebanon and Syria to Saudi Arabia of the Iraqi rebel, Rashid Ali. The Iraqi authorities suspected that he had been aided and abetted in his escape by the Governments of the Levant States, though their resentment was somewhat mitigated by the belief, later proved erroneous, that the rebel's escape had been arranged by the French without the knowledge of the two Governments. Close and friendly contact was maintained throughout the year with Egypt, and several Egyptian missions, humanitarian, technical, &c., visited the Levant States.

Turkey

44. At the beginning of the year Turkey was alone among the neighbouring Powers in not having recognised the independence of the Levant States. The reason for this was Syria's refusal to make any formal acknowledgment of the Turkish title to the Hatay, which the Turkish Government were anxious to obtain in return for recognising Syrian independence. Occasional interpellations in the Syrian Chamber, press articles, pamphlets and even demonstrations in favour of the return of the Hatay, possibly sponsored in part by the U.S.S.R., who found it easy to work upon the Armenian refugees from the Hatay, kept the question alive and made it impossible for any Syrian Government to sign away the province irrevocably. Efforts to reach an agreement continued, nevertheless, to be made by the Turkish Government, who, in face of the threat to their northern frontiers, felt an increasing urgency to establish amicable relations with their southern neighbour. Drafts of two notes were submitted by the local Turkish Consuls to the two Governments early in the year, and arrangements had actually been made for a Turkish delegation to visit Damascus to negotiate an agreement involving recognition, when the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs detected that a clause in the draft would bind Syria to accept the Turkish annexation of the Hatay and accordingly felt unable to proceed. The Syrian Government then appealed to His Majesty's Government to mediate, but the latter felt unable to do so. The matter was taken up again at discussions in August between the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was passing through on his way back from San Francisco. These led to nothing on account of the same stumbling-block. The same fate overtook an attempt to mediate later on by Nuri Said Pasha, and up till the end of the year there was no indication that either side would give way on the Hatay question. It should be recorded, however, that the Syrian frontier authorities succeeded in establishing satisfactory relations with their Turkish opposite numbers following the withdrawal from the frontier zone of the French officers who were in the past responsible for day-to-day dealings with the Turkish frontier authorities.

U.S.S.R.

45. The recently established Soviet Legations in Beirut and Damascus displayed increasing activity during the year. This took the form of encouraging the growth of local Communist parties, which was exceptionally marked in the Lebanon. In the international field the U.S.S.R. showed that they favoured the complete independence of the two States and were therefore opposed to the efforts of the French to keep them in tutelage. The Soviet Government confined themselves, however, to occasional expressions of view on this matter, such as a note which they addressed to the British, French and United States Governments on 29th May, deploring the developments in Syria and hoping for a settlement by negotiation. But they did not on this or any other occasion seek to take an active part in the diplomatic discussions, largely no doubt out of a desire not to trouble their relations with France without some compensating gain. Mention should be made of the visit of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch to Moscow in January to take part in the enthronement of the Patriarch of All the Russias and of the latter's return visit, which coincided with the disturbances in Damascus at the end of May. Developments in Azerbaijan also had an influence in the Levant States, where the presence of some 200,000 Kurds in an area comparatively near to the Persian province caused some anxiety. Another minority directly affected by Soviet policy were the 190,000 Armenians in the Levant States, whose

immigration to Soviet Armenia the Government of the U.S.S.R. announced towards the end of the year that they would facilitate. Early in the year Faiz Khoury, brother of the Syrian Prime Minister, was appointed first Syrian Minister in Moscow, but he returned after a few months and was not replaced.

The United States

46. The United States Government had, like the U.S.S.R., recognised the independence of the two States without any qualification, and the latter looked to them for support in the struggle with France. Mention has already been made of how His Majesty's Government consulted with the United States Government at every step on the road which led ultimately to British military intervention in Syria and how President Truman specifically telegraphed his approval of that act. Both States hoped to obtain material assistance from the United States in the form of equipment and technical advice. Specific approaches, however, for the purpose of obtaining American experts to train the Syrian army and gendarmerie and American participation in a grain-collecting organisation, came to nothing. The United States authorities showed most interest in the field of civil aviation and did their utmost to persuade the local Governments to agree to the principle of the fifth freedom, even offering in return to build modern airports in the neighbourhoods of Damascus and Beirut. Neither Government, however, succumbed to the considerable pressure thus brought on them, largely as a result of the advice of His Majesty's Legation. The views of the latter were not unknown to the United States Legation and relations between the two suffered accordingly during the latter part of the year. The Americans were also active in the promotion of their oil interests and a concession was obtained from the Lebanese Government in September for the erection of two refineries at Tripoli. Relations between the United States and the two States naturally suffered on account of the American policy towards Palestine, and the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs presented an aide-mémoire to the United States Minister emphasising the solidarity of Syria on the Zionist issue and pointing out that the present situation largely resulted from declarations published in Washington. It should be mentioned, as evidence of the continued interest of the Americans in the affairs of the Levant States, that visits were paid by six Congressmen early in September, by another Representative, Mrs. Frances Bolton, later in the same month, and by Senator Pepper shortly afterwards.

III.—General

47. The independence of the Levant States was recognised by several countries of secondary importance to them during the year. After they had, by declaring war on the Axis Powers early in April, obtained seats at the San Francisco Conference and become members of the United Nations Organisation, they took the line that this implied that their independence was automatically recognised by all the other member States. The Syrian delegation to San Francisco was led by the Prime Minister and included the Minister of Finance; the Lebanese delegation was weaker and contained only one Cabinet Minister. Nevertheless, both delegations succeeded in making good use of the publicity facilities offered by the conference in order to present their case against the French. The Charter of the United Nations was ratified by the Lebanese and Syrian Chambers on 30th August and 4th September respectively.

[E 6539/1478/89]

No. 34

THE HATAY (OR DISTRICT OF ALEXANDRETTA). (With map.)

THE Franco-Turkish dispute on this subject was treated fully in a Foreign Office memorandum of the 11th January, 1937, and in another of the 12th January, 1938. The present paper reviews the question up to date.

1919-1939.

2. It is evident that very soon after the utter defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 the leaders of modern Turkey had the ultimate recovery of Alexandretta (Iskenderun) in mind. Although the local Turkish majority was not absolute, but only relative, the district (or sanjak) of Alexandretta was no doubt meant to be covered by the clause in the Turkish National Pact of the

18th January, 1920, which declared that all territories inhabited by an Ottoman Moslem majority must remain part of Turkey. Accordingly, in the Franco-Turkish agreement negotiated with M. Franklin-Bouillon on the 20th October, 1921, after they had driven the French garrison out of Cilicia, the Turks obtained (a) a definite promise that the district should have a special régime with Turkish officials in the localities inhabited by a Turkish majority, with Turkish as an official language and with schools and all facilities for developing Turkish culture; (b) an undertaking by M. Franklin-Bouillon to recommend to Paris that local Turks should be allowed to fly the Turkish flag and that Turkey should have a free zone and transit facilities at the port. Although the French did not act on the recommendations (b), they duly carried out the definite promise (a). The Organic Regulation of the sanjak which was proclaimed with the Syrian Constitution on the 14th May, 1930, gave limited powers to a governor and council in matters of public appointments and finance. These concessions proved in course of time to be the thin end of the wedge which led first to autonomy, then to independence—with a marked Turkish complexion—and finally to incorporation in Turkey.

3. The frontier laid down in the Franklin-Bouillon agreement of 1921 was adopted in the treaty of Lausanne of the 24th July, 1923, and on the same date the French Government confirmed the general validity of the agreement. Both the Turkish inhabitants of the sanjak and the Turkish Government seemed satisfied with the 1921 settlement until 1936, when the French proposed to turn their mandate into a treaty of alliance with Syria. From that date the Turkish Government worked without respite or scruple to secure the sanjak of Iskenderun for Turkey. Some pretext was afforded them by the fact that the proposed Franco-Syrian treaty did not explicitly mention the special privileges of Turks in the sanjak, although it did refer specifically to the special régimes of the Latakia district and the Jebel Druze. It is likely that the Turkish Government was actuated largely by the fear of Italy establishing herself in Syria on the withdrawal of France.

4. The Turks conducted their offensive by well-defined stages. As soon as the proposed Franco-Syrian treaty was initialled on the 9th September, 1936, they started discussions with the French Government, arguing that the sanjak was preponderantly Turkish and must not be left under a Syria which was to become independent. When the French Government spoke of autonomy the Turks demanded independence and allowed an anti-French campaign to develop among the Turkish public and in the press. Great Britain gave Turkey counsels of moderation and received from her assurances that she had no territorial ambition whatever. The French Government maintained that as mandatory it had no power to cede the sanjak. The Turkish Government proceeded to work up feeling both among the Turks in the sanjak and in Turkey itself, to create disorders in the sanjak and to protest when the French suppressed them. The sanjak was conveniently found—and the latest researches tend to confirm the theory—to have been the original home of the Hittites, from whom the Turks claimed descent. It was therefore named the Hatay, and a Hatay Independence Association was formed in Turkey and endowed with flag and anthem almost identical with the Turkish. The Turkish Government also spoke of leaving the League of Nations unless it got satisfaction from it. In the face of sustained Turkish pressure the French Government proposed to refer the matter to the League. Turkey agreed, and the League Council sent three neutral observers to the sanjak at the end of 1936.

5. The Turkish agitation was kept at boiling point, and when further French proposals hung fire Atatürk made a theatrical start for the Syrian frontier and was reported to have been persuaded only with great difficulty to turn back. On the 27th January, 1937, the League Council adopted the following principles:—

- (i) That the sanjak should be independent internally but subject to Syria in its foreign relations and included in the same monetary and customs administration as Syria.
- (ii) That Turkish should be an official language in the sanjak.
- (iii) That the League should supervise the execution of a Statute and a Fundamental Law which should be drafted to define respectively the sanjak's international status and its internal constitution, and that a Frenchman should be the League's delegate on the spot.
- (iv) That the sanjak should be demilitarised.
- (v) That France and Turkey should jointly guarantee its territory.
- (vi) That Turkey should have transit facilities at Iskenderun.

This settlement seemed to please everyone except the Syrian nationalists. Its outline had, in fact, been suggested by M. Blum. The Turkish parliament acclaimed it as a triumph of Atatürk. Mr. Eden's mediation earned thanks on all sides. And *Izvestia* welcomed it as a satisfactory end to the dispute.

6. Having thus obtained international sanction for autonomy, the Turks dropped their agitation for a few weeks. But in March, when they found that the pretensions of their delegate (M. Numan Menemencioglu) were not immediately admitted by the other experts engaged at Geneva in working out the details of the settlement, the Turks started the second stage of their offensive and turned the heat on to the French Government once more, complaining of anti-Turkish incidents—which they had themselves probably provoked—in the sanjak and on the frontier and concentrating troops at Diyarbakir. By April 1937 it had almost been arranged that the League should send out an international commission to investigate conditions on both sides of the frontier. But this did not suit the Turkish book at all, and the agitation died down again when the League reached the decision on the 29th May, 1937 (i) to bring the new Statute and Fundamental Law into force on the 29th November, 1937; (ii) to appoint a commission of five to organise and supervise elections.

7. After a lull of several months the third and most vigorous stage of the Turkish offensive started in the autumn of 1937. It concerned the elections. The international electoral commission was an impartial body under the chairmanship of a British subject (Mr. T. Reid), which after investigating the local situation, drafted an electoral law calculated to ensure a fair vote. This was the last thing the Turks wanted. They therefore directed an attack firstly on the draft electoral law itself, secondly on the French authorities who would be in administrative charge during the elections and thirdly on the electoral commission which was to supervise the elections. They protested vigorously against the draft electoral law and demanded that it should be revised in consultation with France and Turkey, who were now—by virtue of the League's settlement of the 27th January, 1937 (para. 5 above)—the two guarantor Powers. The Turks denounced the Franco-Turkish convention of friendship and good neighbourliness of the 30th May, 1926, regarding the Turco-Syrian frontier. Atatürk was uncompromising at Angora and Dr. Rüstü Aras was combative at Geneva. The French were unresisting and H.M. Government consented with misgiving to the appointment of a fresh commission, including a Frenchman and a Turk, to agree on a modification of the draft electoral regulations. The crux of the matter was that the primary voters were first of all to register under communities (Turks, Sunni Arabs, Alawites, Greek Orthodox, Armenians, etc.), and that every thousand primary voters registered under a community were to entitle that community to one deputy in the Assembly. The registration of the primary voters would thus determine the complexion of the Assembly, and the electoral commission had taken care that the draft law should provide effective guarantees against a primary voter being intimidated into registering outside his own community. Applying to the League and in particular to France a crescendo of bluff, bluster and blackmail the Turks succeeded by the end of March 1938 in making the commission abolish these safeguards. They were replaced by provisions which were conducive to fraud inasmuch as they contained nothing to prevent the big Turkish landlords and numerous Turkish observers from bringing pressure on non-Turks—even in non-Turkish districts—to register as Turks.

8. Although the electoral law had thus been redrafted to the Turks' taste, there was in early May little chance of the absolute Turkish majority which the Turkish Government was bent on obtaining by hook or by crook. In spite of Turkish pressure only 5 per cent. of the Arabs, no Armenians and no Christians had registered as Turks and some of the Turks themselves had failed to do so. Violent disorders occurred—presumably at the instigation of Turkish agents—in Antioch (Antakya) and the French military authorities had to take charge of the situation. Franco-Turkish relations were strained to the utmost and Dr. Rüstü Aras professed himself profoundly uneasy—as well he might be—and launched an attack on the French officials, charging them with preventing the Turkish inhabitants from registering. Whether there was any substance in the accusation or not, it would not have been surprising if French officials had shown some bias, considering the humiliation and invective to which Turkey had subjected them. As a result of this pressure the French made a private agreement with the Turks that the elections should result in a Turkish majority of about 55 per cent. H.M. Government, when they heard of it, informed both Governments that they could not take cognisance of it. The French excuse was that appeasement of Turkey had been decided on as early as January 1937 for reasons of high policy and

that the Turks, whom they estimated to be really about 40 per cent., were in any case certain before long to find means of raising the percentage to 55 by pressing the indeterminate elements in the population to register as Turks. Dr. Aras had no shame in saying that if the French authorities failed to deliver the agreed Turkish majority of 55 per cent. Turkey would consider that they had broken faith and would regard herself as freed of all obligations.

9. At the end of May 1938 the Turkish authorities started a campaign to rid them of the electoral commission. Fresh disorders occurred, and the commission stopped work. Many Armenians and other non-Turks fled. When the commission protested against evident pressure on the primary voters, the campaign of abuse against it started again, its offices were attacked and some Arabs were killed. On the 29th June, at the request of the League and the French Government, the commission withdrew.

10. While thus disposing of the electoral law, of the French officials and of the electoral commission, the Turkish Government resorted to the time-honoured dodge of demanding to send troops to repress disorders which it had itself caused. The French refused at first, but on the 4th July, 1938, they sold the pass by entering into a military convention with the Turks for the internal and external security of the sanjak, in virtue of which the Turks sent in troops that same day. In return the Turks joined in a new Franco-Turkish treaty of friendship to replace that of 1926 which, as a tactical move, they had denounced in 1937 (para. 7).

11. The entry of Turkish troops was the beginning of the end. They were welcomed with pre-arranged festivities and behaved with moderation. The administration passed wholly into the hands of local Turks, Arab and other officials being dismissed and French officials ignored. The registration of electors was resumed, and under these new conditions the number who registered as Turks was soon enough to yield the agreed Turkish majority of 22 out of 40 deputies. The final results were declared on the 25th August, 1938, as 22 Turks, 9 Alawites, 5 Armenians, 2 Sunni Arabs and 2 Orthodox Greeks. On the 2nd September a Turkish High Commissioner (M. Acikalin now Ambassador in London) with the Turkish general on his right and the French délégué on his left, inaugurated the Assembly in a wholly Turkish atmosphere, where the Marseillaise was unheeded and the minority deputies did not utter. This packed Assembly immediately proclaimed the sanjak to be the Republic of Hatay with capital at Antakya (Antioch). Local Turks were chosen as President, Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet, and there was imposed on the so-called Republic a top-heavy Turkish administration which cost about four times the new State's income.

12. The next stage was the assimilation to Turkey of the so-called independent Republic. By March 1939 the process had gone so far that the Hatay was Turkish in all but name. Two bits of adjoining Turkish territory—the Kaza of Dörtöl and the nahiye of Hassa—were added to the Hatay. Passport restrictions on the Turkish-Hatay frontier were relaxed and Turks arrived in large numbers. The Turkish currency, exchange control and customs tariff were introduced, causing a complete dislocation of trade and a sharp rise in prices. It was generally taken for granted that the Assembly would vote the Hatay into Turkey, and the French Government protested against any such development. The local Turks were by no means pleased at the prospect of losing their new jobs when the administration should be reduced to the normal establishment of a Turkish vilayet. The non-Turks, to the annoyance of the Turkish Government, left in large numbers from fear of military service and taxation coupled with the economic slump.

13. The climax of the story of blackmail and appeasement came on the 23rd June, 1939, when France finally ceded the Hatay to Turkey. On the same day, however, Turkey joined France in a declaration promising reciprocal help in the event of aggression conducive to war in the Mediterranean region. This was followed on the 19th October by the Anglo-Franco-Turkish alliance. This alignment of Turkey with the Allies was the justification for the supine policy of France. There is little doubt that Atatürk had made up his mind before 1936 to get the sanjak at the first opportunity. The growing concern of the French Government with the European situation gave him his chance. It seems likely that the French Government had never felt very confident of keeping the sanjak, for the capital which they sank in public works there was insignificant compared with what they spent on other parts of Syria, on Tripoli (a harbour naturally much less promising than Alexandretta) and on the Lebanon in general. But when the Turks became aggressive in 1936 the French Government adopted the definite policy of giving way on any point rather than risk a quarrel. The

Turks were well aware of the weakness of the French position and, as has been shown, exploited it with utter ruthlessness, treating the French to a press campaign, a military concentration and threats to leave the League and renounce all obligations towards France, and at the same time constantly dangling before the French the bait of Turkish friendship at the price of compliance with Turkish demands. Both parties did their best to saddle the League with odium: the Turks, for the modification of the electoral law; the French, for a surrender deeply resented by the Syrians.

1940-1946.

14. After the annexation the Turks maintained excellent order in the Hatay, but the regulations of the Turkish régime were by no means to the liking of the inhabitants. The minorities felt the Turkish restrictions on their schools and other institutions. The whole trading population felt the Turkish control of business which soon produced economic stagnation. The Armenians had taken care to leave before the annexation, and after six months' experience of Turkish administration Greek Orthodox, Catholic and other Christians left in large numbers. Many Moslem Arabs and even Turks would have gone if the Turkish authorities had allowed them. To some extent this loss of population was made up by the settlement of refugees from earthquakes in Anatolia.

15. The complete failure of France to defend the interests of Syria profoundly disillusioned the Syrians, greatly increased the unpopularity of the French and hastened the decline of French prestige. Fortunate though it was for the Allies that in 1941 and 1942 Iskenderun was not in the hands of Vichy, the rape of the sanjak by Turkey continued to rankle with the Syrians. Agitation for its recovery was fostered less by the Government than by rapidly growing Nationalist sentiment, by the merchants of Aleppo and elsewhere who suffered from the loss of the natural port of the north, by the refugees from the Hatay and by certain politicians who owned property there. In 1945 what already amounted to a national determination to recover the territory began to receive the support of Russian propaganda which found it another handy stick for beating the Turks.

16. However, it was probably due in a large measure to the common Russian menace that both Turkey and Syria thought it to their advantage to compose their differences. Syria was anxious for Turkish recognition of her independence provided it did not involve signing away the Hatay. Turkey desired friendship with Syria provided there was no Syrian demand for the Hatay. But Syria's anxiety for Turkish recognition was much diminished after her independence had been generally acknowledged by the attendance of her delegates at the San Francisco conference in the spring of 1945. Turkey on her part felt it difficult to overlook the statement made on the 29th August, 1945, in the Syrian Assembly by the Prime Minister that Syria could in no circumstances give up her claim to the Hatay. In the end, thanks in great measure to the mediation of Nuri Pasha es Said, the former Iraqi Prime Minister, the two countries agreed to recognise one another's independence and to establish relations. Leaving the Hatay thus out of account, they accredited diplomatic representatives to one another in May 1946.

The Syrian Case.

17. But for various reasons it is likely that Syria will reopen the question at the first favourable opportunity. For a long time to come no Syrian Government will be strong enough to abandon the claim to the Hatay, and to-day the Government can feel that at least the non-Hashemite part of the Arab League is behind it. Moreover, now that the French evacuation is an accomplished fact, the Hatay may well become the Syrian nationalists' bugbear. Lastly, an agitation for the Hatay, being bound both to embarrass Turkey and to create a disturbance throughout the Middle East, would doubtless be welcome to the Kremlin and have its full support. The Syrian claim can be based on the following grounds.

18. *Geographically* almost all the Hatay belongs to Syria. The natural boundary is the Amanus (see map). Only Iskenderun and a narrow coastal strip are on the Turkish side of the range. Antakya (Antioch) and the greater part of the Hatay lie on the Syrian side.

19. *Historically*, too, the district has been a part of Syria rather than of Asia Minor, from the time of the Romans, when Antioch was a city of great magnificence, to that of the Ottoman Empire, when both Antakya and Iskenderun were fever-stricken townships in the vilayet of Aleppo.

20. *Juridically* the Syrians can claim that, as the French contended in 1936, it was *ultra vires* for France as mandatory to hand over part of the mandated territory—especially when the cession was vehemently opposed by the population both of Syria in general and of the sanjak in particular.

21. During the course of the dispute Turkey sought to promote the view that her original surrender of the district had been conditional. This was true to only a limited extent. Under Art. 3 of the Lausanne Treaty the frontier laid down in the Franco-Turkish agreement of the 20th October, 1921, was adopted as the Turco-Syrian frontier, and under Art. 16 of the Lausanne Treaty Turkey renounced all rights and title whatsoever over and respecting the territories outside the new frontier, without prejudice to special arrangements made between Turkey and her neighbours. This last clause, it is true, plainly covered the special régime promised by the French in the 1921 agreement (see para. 2 above), but as they had carried out the promise, the Lausanne Treaty in fact gave Turkey no ground for claiming the independence of the sanjak.

22. With characteristic ingeniousness Dr. Aras also tried to argue on behalf of Turkey that if the mandate, when allotted in 1920, had been meant to include a preponderantly Turkish district like the sanjak, it would have been extended northwards to other districts inhabited by Turks in Cilicia, which was then occupied by the French. The truth is that in 1920 the frontiers of Syria had not been defined and that in the following year Turkish military pressure forced the French to retire to a line subsequently adopted as the 1921 boundary.

23. Equally unconvincing was the Turkish argument that the omission of mention of the sanjak and its special régime from the text of the mandate approved by the League on the 24th July, 1922, showed the sanjak to be outside the scope of the mandate.

24. It is evident that by joining the League, as she did in 1932, Turkey implicitly accepted not only the mandatory principle enshrined in the Covenant but also the mandate over the Levant States as exercised by France and therefore as including the sanjak.

25. *Economically* the sanjak was of great value, though not indispensable, to Syria. It is well watered, sheltered and fertile. It can grow tobacco and cotton, chrome and copper are reported to exist, and it is thickly populated. Iskenderun is the natural port of Aleppo and northern Syria. Although the railway connecting these two towns is devious, road communication was good. The loss of the sanjak caused great discontent to the merchant community of Aleppo.

The Turkish Case.

26. The attitude of the Turks is to hold that there is no more to be said about the matter. Their main argument has always been the *preponderance of the Turkish inhabitants*. In the days of the Ottoman Empire the linguistic and ethnical boundary, though by no means clearly marked, was considered to run roughly along the line which is now the south-eastern frontier of the Hatay. But south of the Iskenderun-Aleppo road the territory—including Antakya—was half Turkish and half Arabic in speech, except for the Amik plain, which was almost entirely Turkish-speaking, and the Orontes valley, where there was a considerable number of Arabic-speaking villages. In 1936, when the dispute began, a large proportion of the population was Turkish both racially and linguistically. Many educated people did not know Arabic. The French authorities gave the total population as about 220,000 and its chief components as follows:—

		Per cent.
Turks	82,242	39
Arabs—		
Alawites	62,026	
Sunnis	22,461	
Christians	18,051	
	102,538	47
Armenians	24,911	11
Various	10,309	3
	220,000	

The Turkish census of 1944 showed a total population of 246,138, but details of race and tongue are not yet available. In view of the inclusion in the Hatay in 1939 of two small bits of Turkish territory (the districts of Dörtöl and Hassa), the exodus of Christians, the installation of Turkish refugees, and in particular the Turkish authorities' propensity for reckoning Arab Moslems as Turks,

detailed census figures may be expected to show an overwhelming Turkish majority.

27. *Economically* the port of Iskenderun, which is now infinitely superior to Mersin, would seem destined to become the port of south-eastern Turkey. But with the departure of the Christians its population fell in 1939 from 20,000 to 5,000 and business died. After that the war prevented its commercial resuscitation. What use the Turks will make of its economic possibilities therefore remains to be seen.

28. *Strategy* is with little doubt the main source of the Turks' interest in the Hatay. The strategic value of the region, which has been acknowledged throughout history, is greatly enhanced to-day by our development of the port of Iskenderun during the war as a first-class harbour. Further, the Adana-Nusaybin railway with which Iskenderun is connected by a short branch, is one of the Turks' three lines towards their eastern frontier and disaffected Kurdish districts. If they were denied the right of military transport over the intermediate Syrian section, which they obtained under the Franco-Turkish agreements of the 20th October, 1921, 30th May, 1926, and 27th October, 1932, it would not be beyond their financial and technical resources to build a loop in their own territory. The Turks must therefore feel the importance of denying such a base as Iskenderun to an enemy and, particularly in these days of Russian pressure, keeping it available to receive reinforcements and supplies from an ally. It will not have escaped them that Moscow might one day sponsor a claim of Soviet Armenia, of Soviet Georgia or even of a Kurdistan to Cilicia and might then stretch that claim to embrace Iskenderun. The Turks' main motive may therefore be taken to be the desire for security, rather than irredentism or mere land-grabbing. There is little doubt that they would fight to retain sovereignty over the Hatay.

Difficulty of a settlement.

29. Both before the annexation and in recent months partition has been mooted on behalf of Syria, but Turkey has shown no interest in the idea. The proposal certainly seems impracticable for at any rate two reasons:—


- (i) There is a preponderance of Turks in the South. Even before the annexation the Amik plain was almost wholly Turkish. Since then Turkish immigrants have been settled at Beylan and Kirikhan and other places in the south vacated by Armenians.
- (ii) Neither the Syrians, on economic and general grounds, nor the Turks, mainly on strategic grounds, would be satisfied to go without Iskenderun.

30. Another solution which has been spoken of is that Turkey should lease to Syria a free zone at Iskenderun and grant traffic facilities to her in the shape of sealed lorries and railway trucks passing over Turkish territory. Although something of the kind is contemplated in the Turco-Iraqi treaty signed on the 29th March, 1946, no enthusiasm for this scheme has been shown by either the Turkish or the Syrian Government. The Turks may indeed suspect it, as it is the converse of a scheme which the French evaded in 1921 (see paragraph 2) and which Dr. Aras propounded again when in predatory mood in 1936 and imposed (paragraph 5). The Syrians, who have no illusions about the dead hand of Turkish administration, are unlikely to attach much value to the scheme unless it be at any rate put under international control. They would probably prefer to develop the port of Latakia. For their part the Turks would no doubt be strongly opposed to the introduction of foreign supervision, even if, to save their face, it was dressed up on an analogy with some other internationalised port. They would be particularly reluctant to have Soviet delegates in so vital an area. But on the Turks' past record it is in fact extremely improbable that they would carry any such scheme out competently and fairly, even were it under international supervision. Only if, owing to the menace of Russia or for some other reason, they felt an overwhelming need to placate Syria, would they be likely to grant facilities which in practice the Syrian trader would think worth having.

31. In any case Syrian resentment is so deep and the Turks' insistence on full sovereignty so strong, that at present no solution seems to lie either in partition or in economic facilities.

*Research Department, Foreign Office,
5th September, 1946.*

THE HARETTA)



THE HATAY (OR THE SANJAK OF ALEXANDRETTA)



[E 9414/1211/89]

No. 35

Mr. Weld-Forester to Mr. Shone (Beirut). (Communicated in Beirut Despatch No. 123 of 12th September; Received 23rd September)

(No. 6)

Sir,

Damascus, 19th July, 1946

THERE has recently been formed in Syria a quasi-political organisation which has taken the name of "Al Ikhwan Al Muslimeen" (Moslem Brethren) and has commenced publication of its own newspaper called *Al Manar*. I have the honour to give herewith a short autobiographical account of the leader of this movement, Sheikh Mustafa el Seba'i, who calls himself Controller-General of the Ikhwan Al Muslimeen in Syria and the Lebanon, and is the acknowledged head of the new organisation, which was obtained direct from him by the legation interpreter. I also give an account of the origin and aims of the association derived from the same source.

Sheikh Mustafa el Seba'i was born in Homs in 1915 and, having completed a course of studies at local schools, went shortly before war was declared in 1939 to the Al-Azhar University in Cairo. He received his diploma from the Al-Shari'a College of Al-Azhar, and then continued his studies for the degree of Bachelor of Arts. When in his third year, the revolutionary movement of Rashid Ali in Iraq broke out; Sheikh Mustafa was, at the request of the British authorities, arrested by the Egyptian police on a charge of having been concerned in the issue of a circular calling on the Egyptian people to support Rashid Ali's movement. He was detained for fifty days at the police prison in Cairo without being tried, and was then deported from Egypt via Palestine and was arrested and detained in Sarafand by the British authorities. After seven months' imprisonment he was released and sent to Syria where he was again arrested and detained for a period of two years, first at Mieh-Mieh, and later in the Fort of Rashia. He was then released by the French authorities, but told he would not be allowed to leave Syria.

According to Sheikh Mustafa, various Moslem youth organisations have been inaugurated in Syria since 1936, but, in order that the French might not become alarmed, different names were given to the organisations in different parts of the country. Now that this reason for camouflaging the movement has disappeared with the cessation of French control, it has been decided to combine all of them in one organisation with the title of "Al Ikhwan Al Muslimeen." The headquarters and central committee are located in Damascus; there are branches, called centres in all the Mohafazates, and sub-branches, in the cazas. In the larger towns a centre is composed of several divisions corresponding to the various quarters of the town. The Lebanese organisation is represented on the Central Committee in Damascus and shares the expenses. The reason given for this arrangement by Sheikh Mustafa el Seba'i is that the Lebanese Moslem Brethren, for internal political reasons peculiar to the Lebanon, are afraid of creating unnecessary denominational rivalries there if they work independently of the Syrian body. The Ikhwan of Syria and the Lebanon are administratively and financially independent and receive no instructions or orders from other organisations with the same name in Egypt or elsewhere but, according to Sheikh Mustafa, the aims of the Ikhwan are similar in all countries and they co-operate on all political and social questions, keep in close contact and exchange information. The Syrian Brethren have inaugurated their own newspaper, *Al Manar*, and hope to collect a sum of £Syr.100,000 to finance its publication. This amount has nearly been attained already by the sale of share capital bonds. The owner of the newspaper *Al Arab* was persuaded to cease publication of his paper and to sell his printing press to the Ikhwan. *Al Manar* already has a circulation of 3,000 copies, 2,500 representing papers delivered to regular subscribers, and the remaining 500 editions being sold to the general public. The demand is greater than the supply and the circulation larger than that of any other daily newspaper published in Damascus. At the present moment shortage of newsprint is the factor which limits the further increase of circulation. I was recently informed by Rudolph Kecati, the editor of *Al Zamaan*, that the board of *Al Manar* were endeavouring to buy another printing press in Beirut, and, according to Sheikh Mustafa, an eventual circulation of 10,000 is envisaged.

A principal aim of the Ikhwan, according to Sheikh Mustafa, is to combat communism in Syria, and he gave three reasons for this:—

- (1) That Marxism is anti-religious.
- (2) That it is a foreign doctrine not needed by Moslems because they already have a better one derived from Islam.

- (3) That the Communists of Syria form a "colonial bridge" by which the influence of a foreign Power can take root in the country.

He describes the policy of the Ikhwan as to maintain and foster the Islamic Mission. They are guided by the Prophet Mohamed and his teachings, according to which life in this world and the next is one and the two worlds are inseparable. Thus, Islam lays down laws for this world, the observance of which is a prerequisite of life in the next. Islam thus embodies all aspects of life, political and social, and any reforms should be derived from the spirit of Islam and not from any foreign source. The People of the Book, i.e., all Christians and Jews, are entitled to protection and can expect to live in security under the laws of Islam in all Islamic countries. They may therefore, according to Sheikh Mustafa, be likened to British subjects of religious sects other than Anglican, who are all recognised as being members of the British nation with the same political, social and personal rights as Anglican Protestants.

I enclose a list of leading personalities who are members of the Ikhwan Al Muslimeen in Syria and the Lebanon, and a list of the members of the provisional Board of Directors of *Al Manar* newspaper.

I have, &c.

W. WELD-FORESTER.

Enclosure in No. 35

List of Leading Personalities Members of the Al Ikhwan al Muslimeen

Sheikh Mohammed el Mubarak (Damascus).	Sheikh Mustafa el Zarqa (Aleppo).
Sheikh Omar el Amiri (Aleppo).	Sheikh Ahmad el Ajouz (Beirut).
Sheikh Mustafa el Seba'i (Homs).	Sheikh Sa'di Yasin (Beirut).
Sheikh Abdul Qader el Sabsabi (Aleppo).	Dr. Nouris Abdul Razzaq (Hama).
	Sayid Abdul Wahhab el Azraq (Deir ez Zor).

List of Provisional Members of the Board of Directors of Al Manar

Ahmad Qadma.	Sheikh Mustafa el Seba'i.
Beshir el 'Aouf.	Fuad Hashem.
Sami el Haffar.	Abdul Rahman Abou Harb.
Adel Soudan.	

[E 6193/213/89]

No. 36

(1)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 218, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 11th June, 1946.—(Received 4th July.)

General.

PUBLIC interest in both countries has been centred during the week on the extraordinary session of the Arab League at Bloudan, some 20 miles outside Damascus, the publication of the news of the Grand Mufti's escape from France and speculation as to his whereabouts.

The Lebanese President, accompanied by members of the Lebanese Government, made his first official visit to Damascus on the 7th June, returning to Beirut the following day. He was met at the entrance to Damascus by the Syrian President, and the two Presidents proceeded to the Sérail, where they received members of the Government, members of the Diplomatic Corps, Syrian notables and such delegates to the Arab League Conference as had arrived in the capital. Sheikh Bechara el Khoury spent the night at the Presidency, where a dinner was given in his honour, to which some sixty guests were invited. It was followed by an open-air reception and entertainment at which films were shown of the evacuation ceremonies in Damascus on the 17th April and of the meeting at Inshass of the heads of Arab States. One of the films began with pictures of the damage to Damascus by the French bombardment a year ago; these were immediately followed by pictures of the Arab military and air contingents and of Syrian troops marching past at the evacuation celebrations. There were no pictures of foreign forces; and the whole show was in tune with the current

feeling of Arab nationalisation. The Syrian press gave a warm welcome to President Khoury and it is reported that his Excellency was much impressed by the welcome he received. According to usually reliable sources, the question of the Hatay was not discussed with the Syrian Government and it is therefore probable that this matter will not be raised by the Lebanese in Angora during the President's forthcoming visit.

Delegates to the extraordinary session of the Arab League convened to discuss the Anglo-American Commission's report on Palestine began to arrive in Damascus on the 6th June. The session was declared open at the Grand Hotel in Bloudan under the presidency of Mohamed el Sharaiki Pasha, Transjordan Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the absence of the Transjordan Prime Minister, at 6 p.m. on the 8th June. The following is an official list of the delegates as published in the press on the 8th June:—

Lebanese Delegation—

Saadi el Munla (Prime Minister and head of delegation).
Philippe Tacla (Minister for Foreign Affairs).
Saeb Salaam (Minister of Interior).
Fuad Amoun (Director-General of Ministry for Foreign Affairs).
Habib Abi Chahla (ex-Minister and Deputy).

Egyptian Delegation—

Mohammed Hussein Heikal Pasha (President of Chamber of Senators) (head).
Mahmud Fahmi el Nokrashi Pasha (ex-Prime Minister).
Makram Obeid Pasha (ex-Minister).
Abdul Rahman Haqqi Bey (Minister in Syria and Lebanon).
Ahmad Selim Bey (Secretary-General of Finance).
Ahmad Fathi el Aqqad (Adviser for Arab Affairs at Ministry for Foreign Affairs).
Hafeq Ramadan Pasha.

Iraqi Delegation—

Hamdi el Bajaji (ex-Prime Minister) (head).
Dr. Fadel Jamali (Minister for Foreign Affairs).
Sadeq el Bassam.
Abdul Mahdi.
Isseddin el Nakib.
Ahmad Pasha el Rawi.

Yemen Delegation—

(1) Emir Abdullah Saif el Islam.
(2) Ali el Mouayad.
(3) Hassan Amin ali Ibrahim.

Syrian Delegation—

Saadullah Bey Jabri (Prime Minister) (head).
Faris Bey el Khouri (President of Chamber of Deputies).
Jamil Bey Mardam Bey (Syrian Minister in Cairo).
Lutfi el Haffar (ex-Minister).

Saudi Delegation—

Sheikh Yousef Yassin.

Transjordan Delegation—

Ibrahim Pasha Hashem (Prime Minister) (head) (presided over second and subsequent meetings of the Council).
Mohammed el Shreiki Pasha (Minister for Foreign Affairs) (presided over first meeting of Arab League on the 8th June in absence of Transjordanian Prime Minister).
Fauzi el Melqi (consul-general in Cairo).

Palestine—

Jamal el Hussein.

The parallel with the Arab Conference held in Bloudan in 1937 has not escaped the notice of the Syrians. It is remembered that Nabih Azmeh, at that time president of the Committee for the Defence of Palestine, invited Arab Governments to attend the conference in Bloudan to discuss the action to be taken as a result of the publication of the Peel Commission's report. Full Arab

representation was not achieved at the 1937 Conference, but active resistance among the Arabs in Palestine took place during the next two years, at the end of which the 1939 White Paper was issued by the British Government. Nabih Azmeh is now Minister of Defence in the Syrian Government; many of the people prominent in the 1937 Conference have again gathered at Bloudan; and the primary subject for consideration is the report of the Anglo-American Committee.

Sittings of the Council of the Arab League were held on the 8th, 9th and 10th June, after each of which communiqués were issued. The following are the main points from the communiqués:—

(1) The Council of the League thanked the heads of the Arab States for the statement issued after their meeting at Inshass, expressed appreciation of the directives referred to therein and said all the necessary measures would be taken to realise the wishes expressed by the heads of States.

(2) Two committees had been set up, an Internal Committee and a Political (Foreign) Committee, the members of which were as follows:—

<i>Internal Committee.</i>	<i>Political (Foreign) Committee.</i>
Syria—	
Jamil Mardam Bey.	Fares Khouri.
Lutfi Haffar.	Jamil Mardam Bey.
Lebanon—	
Saib Salaam.	Philippe Tacla.
Transjordan—	
Fowzi Mulki.	Mohamed Shurqi.
Saudi Arabia—	
Yousef Yassin.	Yousef Yassin.
Egypt—	
Hafez Ramadan Pasha.	Makram Obeid Pasha.
Yemen—	
Ali el Mouayad.	Husni ben Ali Ibrahim.
Palestine—	
Jamal Hussein.	

(3) A telegram was read from the Transjordan Minister for Foreign Affairs informing the Council of the League of the independence of Transjordan and the accession of His Majesty King Abdullah, the constitutional monarch.

(4) In view of the possibility of an International Commission being set up to take the opinion of the inhabitants of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, the Council of the League had requested the Secretary-General to communicate with the Foreign Ministers of Great Powers asking that the Arab League should participate in the enquiry.

In statements to journalists the Secretary-General of the League made the following points:—

- The Political Committee of the League was studying the first step to be taken in connexion with Palestine: whether it was permissible to refer the question to the Security Council or to the General Assembly of the United Nations Organisation and, should either alternative be constitutionally possible, whether it would be in the interests of the Arabs of Palestine to do so.
- The Internal Committee requested that the heads of the Palestinian parties should be invited to Bloudan to discuss ways and means for unification of the Arab front in Palestine.
- After the third meeting of the League the Secretary-General said that the Palestine question might be referred to the General Assembly of the United Nations Organisation but not to the Security Council, since Palestine was under mandate.

It appears that in general the discussions of the League, at least in the earlier stages, took a more reasonable and moderate line than was anticipated. Such information as is available suggests that the delegates were influenced by a desire not to offend His Majesty's Government before a decision had been taken on the

Anglo-American Commission's report, and to play for time in order to strengthen the Arab resistance movement in Palestine. There was disinclination to refer the problem immediately to the United Nations Organisation, where Jewish influence is thought to be prevalent and where at best the Arabs might find themselves again supported by the Soviet Union against Great Britain and America.

Very considerable excitement has been caused in all circles by the news of the Mufti's escape from France. The press published a number of stories alleging his arrival in Damascus, the Lebanon, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. One story, telegraphed by the *Daily Express* correspondent in Jerusalem, stated that he had arrived in a British aircraft in Damascus on the 9th June. This was denied by the legation; no British aircraft landed in Damascus on the 9th June. The Syrian Government also officially denied that they had any knowledge of his whereabouts.

A meeting was held at Chtaura on the 10th June, attended by the representatives of the Governments of Palestine, Syria and the Lebanon, to discuss the tightening up of frontier control. A number of minor points were settled connected with the interchange of information and regular meetings between security officials concerned, but no decision was reached on the proposal of the Government of Palestine that Palestinian security forces should be authorised to operate in the execution of their duty up to 12 kilom. inside the Syrian and Lebanese frontiers. A further meeting is to be held in Nazareth on the 20th June.

Economic.

The workers of the Régie des Tabacs Company in the Lebanon went on strike on the 11th June as a result of the refusal on the part of the company to grant them the benefits which accrued to the tramway workers following the decision of the Special Tribunal (see Weekly Summary No. 213, "Economic"). The Lebanese Government had anticipated this development and before the outbreak of the strike had itself contested the validity of the decision of the Special Tribunal.

The strike of factory workers in Aleppo continued, but the Mohafez is actively intervening in the hope of settling the matter by negotiation. There was a one-day general strike of all workers except transport workers as a mark of sympathy and solidarity with the weavers operating power-driven looms, the dyers and the shoemakers.

Syria.

See "General" above.

A representative of Syrian ex-British servicemen called at the legation during the week and stated that he represented unofficially some 4,000 Syrian ex-British servicemen in Damascus and another 8,000 in the provinces. He asked that a delegation might be received by the British authorities in order that the ex-servicemen might state their request for British assistance, similar to that given to ex-British servicemen in neighbouring countries, for special concessions in the purchase of goods from the Army Disposals Boards, particularly transport, and in finding fresh employment. A communication received by the Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs from the Syrian ex-British servicemen in Lattakia was passed to His Majesty's Legation. The British military authorities in Beirut are being asked to receive a delegation.

His Majesty's Consul, Aleppo, reports that there has been a considerable increase of interest in the Greater Syria movement in the area; the pamphlets distributed during the previous week (see Weekly Summary No. 217, "Syria") have given rise to much discussion, but the press has refrained from comment. It is reported that Akram Bey Gaylani and Sheikh Abdul Ghani Taraf Haimur were responsible for the distribution.

Steps are being taken in Aleppo to raise funds to supply Armenian emigrants to Soviet Armenia with clothing and food. An Armenian Committee has been formed to assist prospective emigrants; but as it is becoming increasingly known that the Soviet Government will not supply clothing and food, that the journey will be uncomfortable and that it is unlikely that the emigrants will have any living accommodation in Armenia until they themselves have built it, some of the emigrants are beginning to feel doubts as to the wisdom of leaving Syria. The anti-Communist Tashnag group is said to be carrying out propaganda designed to foster these doubts and fears, but His Majesty's

Consul reports that on the whole the enthusiasm of the emigrants is being maintained.

The Department of Education in Aleppo organised an "Education Week" in which a series of lectures, celebrations, receptions, &c., took place. The general public, however, was not particularly interested in these activities.

An incident occurred in the Alaouite Mohafezat on the 4th June in which followers of Suleiman Murshid attacked the gendarmerie post of Ain al Tineh, releasing one of their comrades who was under arrest and disarming the three gendarmes. As a result of this incident Colonel Hrant, head of the Syrian gendarmerie, visited the Mohafezat and, on his return, gave a somewhat gloomy picture of conditions there to a member of the legation staff. He said that the Alaouites were dissatisfied that the Syrian Government had given most of the Government posts in the Mohafezat to Sunni Moslems. He explained that it was difficult, however, for the Government to do otherwise since for the past twenty-five years the Alaouites had generally co-operated with the French against the Central Government, whereas the Sunni Moslems of Lattakia and Tartous had not done so; it was therefore natural that the Central Government would appoint to Government posts the people on whom they had learnt to rely. He thought it probable that the Alaouites intended to create a series of incidents in the Mohafezat which, in view of the extremely difficult nature of the country, would be beyond the power of the Syrian security forces to deal with; as a result, the prestige of the Central Government would deteriorate unless a thoroughly efficient and experienced Mohafez was appointed. The recently announced appointment as Mohafez of Adel Azme, brother of Nebih el Azme, was unsatisfactory as he was a man of little administrative experience and possessed none of the qualities required to deal with the Alaouite problems.

A Turkish military aircraft made a forced landing at the Aleppo aerodrome when flying from Caesarea to Erzerum. The occupants were well received by the Syrian authorities but reported that the landing ground was in very poor condition.

Lebanon.

Accounts of the meetings of the Arab League Conference in Bloudan have featured prominently in all the newspapers. The pro-Russian *Saut-esh-Shaab*, in an editorial, wrote that the British would have preferred the conference to have been held elsewhere than in Syria: the British had their army of experts in Syria, but no tanks or armoured cars to run over demonstrators as in Egypt. In consequence of this and other articles offensive to Great Britain, the Lebanese Government have again suspended this newspaper. The Bloudan Conference has, however, been somewhat overshadowed by the news of the Mufti's escape and rumours of his presence in Syria. The Lebanese authorities profess to have no knowledge of his whereabouts.

The forthcoming visit of the Lebanese President to Turkey has been the subject of widespread speculation, particularly in connexion with the possible formation of an oriental bloc composed of the Arab States and Turkey, and pro-Russian newspapers appear to be anxious. In the communiqué issued by the Minister for Foreign Affairs it was emphasised that the visit was purely one of courtesy and friendship, and that no political discussions would be undertaken. It was later officially announced that the President would be accompanied by the Prime Minister, the Minister for Defence, Habib Abi Chahla (president of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber) and Georges Haimari, Director-General at the Presidency, and that they would leave on the 18th June. The absence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs from the party is taken as confirmation that no political discussions will take place, but it is reported that the following subjects will probably be raised:—

- (1) The question of Lebanese property in Turkey and Turkish property in the Lebanon.
- (2) An extension of the "option period" for ex-Ottoman subjects resident abroad who have not opted for either Lebanese or Turkish nationality.

Pamphlets containing violent attacks on the Government and the President have appeared, and the text of an alleged despatch from General Catroux to the Quai d'Orsay reporting an interview with Bechara el Khoury before he became President, in which the latter begged for French assistance to help him attain his high office, has also been circulated. Criticism of the present régime continues to be widespread and vehement, and there is a marked tendency to blame the British authorities for having brought the present Government into power.

Rumours have been current to the effect that Riad es Solh, Hamid Frangieh and Joseph Salem have been involved in some financial transaction with the French from which they have personally derived considerable benefit.

The recent Syro-Lebanese Cereals Agreement has been the subject of criticism as holding out no prospect of a reduction in the cost of living, and the appointment of Lieut.-Colonel Jones to the Lebanese MIRA and the policy of the Lebanese Government in having recourse to foreign experts, in general, has been attacked. The Government have also been blamed for their failure to report developments in connexion with the evacuation of British forces from the Lebanon, it being pointed out that frequent notices in connexion with the withdrawal of French troops have been published.

The Lebanese Chamber met on the 5th June and made further progress in connexion with the Labour Law.

A programme of Russian films (including a film featuring the exploits of Red army tanks) is being shown in Beirut.

[E 6194/213/89]

(2)

*Weekly Political Summary No. 219, Secret, Syria and Lebanon,
18th June, 1946.—(Received 4th July.)*

General.

The Arab League held further meetings in Bloudan on the 11th and 12th June. On the 15th June, His Majesty's Minister being unable on account of previous engagements to visit Damascus, Mr. Young called at the Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and received from the secretary-general of the Arab League and the Syrian Prime Minister the following documents, all of which were in Arabic, without English or French translations:—

- (1) A memorandum, in reply to the communications addressed to the Arab Governments on the 20th May, containing observations and comments on the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry.
- (2) A memorandum from the secretary-general covering the text of the communication which the council of the league had decided to recommend the Governments of member States to address to His Majesty's Government.
- (3) A letter from the secretary-general transmitting the council's decision regarding Egypt.
- (4) Two notes from the Syrian Government identical with memoranda (1) and (2) above.

The American Minister was subsequently handed memoranda by Azzam Pasha and the Syrian Prime Minister; the contents of these notes have not yet been communicated to His Majesty's Legation, though the Syrian Prime Minister told Mr. Young that their terms were "very severe" and maintained that the United States Government were not an interested party and that they should withdraw from Palestinian affairs.

No public release has yet been made of the texts of any of the above-mentioned documents, and in general the press of both countries has refrained from speculation about the decisions taken by the Arab League and has offered little comment other than praise for the united stand taken by the Arab Governments against the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee's report, though *Saut-esh-Shaab* has continued to attack the Arab League for being too lenient with Britain at the expense of the Arabs in Palestine. Mr. Bevin's Bournemouth speech has been well received in both countries and the press has welcomed his statement that he is not prepared to bring an additional division into Palestine in order to admit the 100,000 Jewish immigrants; *Saut-esh-Shaab*, however, describes the speech as "worse than the Balfour Declaration."

Rumours concerning the ex-Mufti have continued to circulate freely and categorical denials of knowledge as to his whereabouts have been made in the press by the Lebanese Prime Minister and the Syrian Prime Minister; and, in conversation with members of the staff of His Majesty's Legation and Brigadier Clayton, by the Syrian President, Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, as well as Azzam Pasha.

Economic.

Figures for weekly grain purchases are not yet available from the new MIRA organisations in Syria and the Lebanon.

According to a Damascus newspaper, the Committee for Communications of the Arab League put before the secretariat at Bloudan the following recommendations:—

- (1) That all railways in the Arab States should be constructed to the same gauge.
- (2) That all locomotives used on these railways should be oil fired as oil is plentiful in the Arab States, but there is little coal.
- (3) That the reconstruction of the Hejaz railways should be undertaken as soon as possible.
- (4) That the Arab States should take over immediately all railways constructed during the war, *e.g.*, Haifa-Beirut-Tripoli Railway, and also all foreign-operated railways within their territories.
- (5) An agreement should be reached concerning uniform rail freight charges.
- (6) That a technical committee should be formed to study all questions relating to transportation in general.
- (7) That a permanent committee should be formed to control communications.

The Régie des Tabacs workers in Beirut are still on strike (see Weekly Political Summary No. 218) and on the 15th June were joined by the tramway and electricity workers in protest against the decision of the Government to contest the ruling of the special tribunal. The strike coincided with the interruption of some of the main power cables in Beirut, with the result that most of the town was without electrical power for several days. The Minister of the Interior declared that he would do everything in his power to help the workers, but that he refused to act under the threat of force. He insisted that the necessary repairs should be effected without delay, threatening the company with requisitioning if this was not done, but it was not until late on the 18th June that power became available in many of the Beirut quarters. On the same day, at the meeting of the special tribunal, when the workers were represented by Sami Solh, the former Prime Minister, the case was reopened. It was announced that a decision would be given on the 26th June.

The labour situation in Aleppo has greatly improved and the strike of power-loom weavers finally came to an end on the 8th June; it was agreed between the workers and their employers that the wage increase of 20 per cent., which came into force last December, should be reduced to 10 per cent.

The Syrian Minister of Finance, in a press conference on the 13th June, stated that the French Treasury have paid not 12 but 16 billion francs to compensate for the devaluation of the franc in 1944 in accordance with the agreement reached in this connexion.

Mr. Sykes and Mr. Hold, representatives of Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, have completed a tour through the Jezireh and Aleppo areas. The latter made a survey of the Syrian coast and came to the conclusion that Lattakia presented the best possibilities for the construction of a port, and that the work could be accomplished for about £2 million sterling. He considers that barrages on the Euphrates in the district of the Jezireh would not be suitable as they would inundate almost as much land as they would irrigate; his solution would be a series of pumps of suitable capacity along the banks of the river. He was much impressed by the possibilities presented by the country in the rain belt south of the eastern spurs of the Taurus Mountains, where the annual rainfall is about 20 in.

Mr. Gerrard, representative of Pan-American Airlines, informed His Majesty's Consul in Damascus that he expected to remain in Syria as the representative of the company for a period of at least three years. He said they expected to begin their long-distance flights—New York-Damascus and return—at the end of June, but so far they had obtained verbal permission only and were still awaiting written confirmation; they were nevertheless bringing in certain gear and equipment and storing it at Mezzé Airport. He added that the lack of proper meteorological equipment at Mezzé was a serious disadvantage and would particularly affect the company as regards flights to Angora.

Syria.

Damascus has been full of rumours during the week as to the whereabouts of the Grand Mufti. One newspaper reported in effect that the Mufti was

staying at the house of Shukri Bey Quwatli's mother, and on the following day an official press communiqué was issued as follows:—

"A number of papers recently have indulged in extravagant reports about the presidency, some of which were quite unfounded. It is again stressed that no reports connected with the President of the Republic should be published except those issued officially in the form of a communiqué to the press. On this occasion it is appropriate to draw attention to the contradictory reports concerning his Eminence the Grand Mufti and to the necessity not to publish such news hurriedly and without reference to informed quarters."

The Minister of National Defence, Nabih el Azmeh, resigned from the Cabinet on the 16th June. It appears that for some weeks past he has not shown himself sufficiently tactful in his dealings with Saadullah Bey and other members of the Cabinet. Particular points on which disagreement arose were:—

- (a) He wished to see implemented forthwith the combination in technical matters of the Desert Force, gendarmerie and police with the army. This view was opposed by the Minister of the Interior.
- (b) He desired a considerable expansion in the army budget.
- (c) He wished to appoint Taha Pasha Hashimi, a former Iraqi politician and general, as Chief of Staff and also certain elderly Syrian ex-Turkish officers to high appointments in the Syrian army.

As a result of his resignation, Ahmed Bey Sharabati has been appointed Minister of Defence and the Emir Adel Arslan Minister of Education. It is to be hoped that Nabih el Azmeh's resignation indicates that the Syrian President has, at least temporarily, broken away from the influence which the former has exercised over him during the last year.

It has been reported that a delegation of the Liberal Union Association visited Sultan Pasha el Atrash at his residence in the Jebel Druze, ostensibly to thank him for the part he played in securing the release from arrest of the secretary of the association (see Weekly Political Summary No. 214, Syria, paragraph 2). It is possible, however, that the association, which lacks any picturesque personality, may try to build up Sultan Pasha el Atrash's reputation as leader of the Druze revolt, and make him a figurehead of the movement.

There have been various references in the Damascus press during the last week to the misuse of Government funds by the employees of the Ministry of Finance. The Minister of Finance has stated that Russell and Co., the British firm of chartered accountants, have been invited to help him in the investigations he has ordered.

It is learned that Dr. Carlton, of the American College at Aleppo, was recently asked by the Inspector of Education there why the college was doing evangelisation, why English was being taught below the secondary classes and why the school was not teaching history and geography in Arabic from prescribed books. Mr. Crawford, the head of the new American School in Damascus, later raised the matter with the Minister of Education, who confirmed that the law laid down that no primary classes should teach English and that this applied to all schools, both Government and private. An Irish father at the Père Lazariste School in Damascus has confirmed to His Majesty's Consul that the prescribed history books taught purely from a Moslem angle and were therefore not suitable for use in Christian schools.

About 100 Armenian families left Damascus by train for Beirut on the 18th June on the first stage of their journey to Soviet Armenia. It is understood that they were told by the Committee for Immigration to Soviet Armenia that they should take with them seven days' rations and a two years' supply of clothing.

The Armenian Orthodox Bishop in Aleppo informed His Majesty's Consul that only a few hundred Armenians from the Aleppo and Jezireh areas would be included amongst the first batch of emigrants, the majority of whom, the bishop said, would be chosen from the Armenian workless refugees now in the Lebanon.

The new Mohafez of Aleppo, the Emir Mustapha Shehabi, has taken up his appointment.

Lebanon.

The Lebanese President left by road on the 18th June for Rayak, where he boarded the special train put at his disposal by the Turkish President to take him to Angora.

General Paget made a farewell visit to Beirut on the 14th June. He was received and entertained to luncheon by the President of the Republic, who again expressed his gratitude to General Paget and to the British military authorities for what they had done for the Lebanon. General Paget also called on General Beynet.

On the 18th June the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs handed His Majesty's Minister a note inviting His Majesty's Government to enter into negotiations for an agreement to terminate the present régime in Palestine. The terms of the note are almost identical with those recommended by the Arab League and with those of the Syrian note (see *General* above). In conversation with the Lebanese President, His Majesty's Minister expressed surprise at the tone and wording of the resolution of the Arab League on Anglo-Egyptian relations, which there was reason to believe had been proposed by the Lebanese delegation. The President said he had himself been surprised by the resolution, which went beyond the statement issued by the Arab rulers. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was present at the interview, said that the Lebanese delegation had felt bound to record their solidarity with Egypt, but that they had not drafted the resolution, which was the work of the League Secretariat. His Majesty's Minister formed the impression that the Lebanese felt somewhat uncomfortable about it.

The Lebanese Chamber met on the 14th and 17th June. At the former meeting articles 31 to 37 of the Labour Law were passed. Foreign affairs were also discussed, including the President's visit to Turkey and press reports to the effect that the Lebanese Government had requested that British troops should remain in the Lebanon until the French withdrawal had been completed. The Prime Minister denied that he had any knowledge on the latter subject. The meeting on the 17th June was largely devoted to a debate on economic policy following an interpellation at the previous sitting regarding a consignment of foreign matches which had been unloaded on the local market, and which it was claimed was causing unemployment in the Lebanese match industry. The Prime Minister explained that the previous Government had allowed the consignment to be disposed of locally as the importer had given evidence of his good faith and the consignment had been ordered before the present regulations came into force. His Government, he said, had issued no import permits and would not do so pending the formulation of an adequate economic policy. The purchase of the H.B.T. Railway, which has been the subject of considerable comment in the press, was also discussed and the Minister for Foreign Affairs said that the question of the price to be paid by the Lebanese Government was being carefully considered. The debate on the Labour Bill was deferred to enable the House to consider the MIRA Law, which was approved by a majority vote.

The *Saut-esh-Shaab* newspaper has been suspended *sine die* for attacks on a friendly Power. This action followed a series of anti-British articles culminating in an attack on British policy in Egypt, and others referring to MIRA scandals, in which there were thinly veiled allusions to the implication of British officials. His Majesty's Minister was about to draw the attention of the Lebanese President to these articles, when the President himself raised the matter and said he had already spoken to the Minister of the Interior on the subject. There were limits, the President said, to what newspapers could be allowed to publish.

A request by the British military authorities for the Haifa Staff College to carry out training and manœuvres on the Litani River as in previous years has been declined with apologies by the Lebanese Government as inopportune in the present circumstances. The French authorities had raised no objection. It is understood, however, that the Lebanese Government were subjected to pressure by pro-French elements.

[E 6574/213/89]

(3)

Weekly Political Summary No. 220, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 25th June, 1946.—
(Received 15th July.)

General.

WHILE the subject of Palestine has to some extent receded into the background during the past week, there have been a number of matters raised in the

anti-Government press of both countries which have been given a twist unfavourable to Great Britain. The visit of the Lebanese President to Turkey has given rise to considerable anxiety in Syria, and a number of papers have suggested that His Majesty's Government are making use of the Lebanon either to complete the encirclement of Syria in the interest of the formation of a Greater Syria under a Hashemite King, or to create an Arab-Turkish bloc as a buffer against Russia. Syrian newspapers have made comment unfavourable to Great Britain in connexion with the Palestinian-Syrian-Lebanese frontier discussions and the appointment of a vice-consul at Deir-az-Zor, and a story has been published that British officers recently accompanied a party of armed Shammar tribesmen from Iraq on a raid into Syrian Agaidat territory. A Damascus newspaper published *in toto* without comment an objectionable and tendentious article from the French newspaper *Paysage* on the coronation of the Emir Abdullah and on British policy regarding the creation of a Greater Syria; the names of the late T. E. Lawrence, Colonel Stirling, "Colonel" Marsack and Glubb Pasha are mentioned as those of British agents working for this end. In the Lebanon the pro-French and Russian newspapers exploited a leakage from Lebanese official sources concerning the British request that the Haifa Staff College should carry out manœuvres on the Litani River (*Weekly Political Summary No. 219, Lebanon*); they have also been conducting a campaign to cast doubt upon the evacuation of the Lebanon by British troops; and *L'Orient* featured prominently extracts from the Egyptian newspaper *Rose el Youssef*, according to which the British envisage the partition of Palestine and rectification of the frontiers of Syria and the Lebanon in order to make the scheme more palatable.

The Lebanese note commenting on the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry on Palestine has now been received. It differs considerably both in form and content from the Syrian note. It is a much lengthier document and more legalistic in approach. Although a carefully reasoned exposé, it is however no more constructive. It emphasises that the Arab States would retain their liberty of action in the event of the report being implemented, and concluded with the recommendation that the Jewish Agency, which had declined an invitation to disarm, should be dissolved.

Reports have been received of the presence of Jewish terrorists in the Lebanon. Action is being taken by the Lebanese security authorities.

Philippe Takla, the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, met Saadullah Jabri, the Syrian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs at Chtaura on the 22nd June. In a press interview and subsequently in conversation with a member of the staff of His Majesty's Legation, the former denied that questions of high policy had formed part of their discussion which had concerned (1) entry visas for Syria and the Lebanon, (2) the employment in the Lebanon of taxis registered in Syria, and (3) the Madkour case. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs is reported to have handed Saadullah Jabri a letter from the Lebanese Acting Prime Minister in connexion with the latter case.

The first batch of Armenian *émigrés* returning to Soviet Armenia left Beirut by the s.s. *Transylvania* on the 23rd June. Most of the repatriates, numbering some 2,000, were from the Lebanon, but some hundred families from Syria were also included.

Economic.

The labour situation in Beirut has deteriorated in the course of the week. The electricity and tramway workers returned to work on the 20th June, having accepted an offer by the company of a bonus of two months' salary which would be retained by the workers in the event of the special tribunal deciding in favour of the company. A threatened strike of chauffeurs was happily averted, but the Regie des Tabacs employees are still out. The port employees also went on strike and the syndicate of the D.H.P. workers announced on the 25th June that they would strike on the following day. A considerable stir has resulted from the issue of the warrant for the arrest (and subsequent disappearance) of Muhsen Selim, lawyer and editor of the newspaper *El Jedid*, who seconded Sami Solh in the defence of the workers' interests before the special tribunal.

The Lebanese Ministry of National Economy has issued a decision re-establishing the freedom of export to all countries of local agricultural and industrial products, with the exception of cereals and their derivatives, cotton material and yarn.

Syria.

The Syrian Prime Minister has confirmed to His Majesty's Minister that his Government have given their *agrément* to the appointment of M. Jean Charles

Serres as French Minister to Syria, who it is understood will take up his post at the end of July.

Investigation has been continued into the defalcations reported to have been discovered in the Syrian Finance Department, and the Damascus press reported a rumour that the Minister of Finance had resigned from his post; Edmond Bey Homsî, however, stated that he had no intention of resigning.

Akrîm Bey Rikabi, Director of National Economy, has tendered his resignation, and it is understood that he has accepted employment with the Near East Resources Company.

The arrest of the Lebanese Director of Mira, Georges Madkour, in connexion with the murder of Ghattas Quzma and his confession that he hired two professional assassins from the Lebanon to shoot Quzma when the latter refused to pay the agreed rake-off, has resulted in charges in the Lebanese press that the confession had been obtained by force. The Syrian Prime Minister complained of the attitude of the Lebanese press in this matter to the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and asked him to send over a medical commission to examine Madkour professionally and report on the truth of the allegations. According to Saadullah Jabri, the report showed that the allegations were completely unfounded, and he therefore asked Philippe Takla to take the necessary action to deny the charges brought against the Syrian authorities.

On the 17th June the representative of the British Council in Damascus was shown by the head English teacher of the Ulmieh Wataniyeh School (the largest non-Government school in Damascus with some 1,400 boys and girls), a copy of a letter which the headmaster had addressed to the Soviet Minister in Beirut asking for French and English translations of Russian books about Russia and particularly books for use in the kindergarten section of the school. The letter ended with an expression of the hope that the Soviet Minister would co-operate with the school in the future.

His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo reports that there is some evidence of the growth of anti-Communist feeling amongst the Armenians in Aleppo for the following reasons:—

(a) Armenians who have no intention of emigrating are becoming increasingly alarmed at the manner in which Communist Armenians are taking a leading part in strikes and labour troubles organised by the local Communists and the resulting anti-Armenian feeling among the Moslems.

(b) The religious and social leaders of the Armenians have been irritated that the representatives of the Soviet Legation who arranged for the registration in Aleppo of intending emigrants scarcely consulted them and dealt exclusively through the chosen Soviet mouthpieces who, in some cases, had been previously regarded as nonentities.

(c) The knowledge that the Soviet authorities contributed next to nothing towards the emigrants' journey and that Armenians abroad were expected to finance the emigration scheme.

Lebanon.

From all accounts the Lebanese President is much enjoying his visit to Turkey. He is expected to return to Beirut on the 29th June. Meanwhile internal affairs continue to drift steadily from bad to worse, in the absence of any Government worthy of the name, and there has been outspoken criticism, both in the press and in conversation of the action of the President in going off with the Prime Minister on a trip, stated to be without political significance, at a time when the country is clearly going through a serious internal crisis, as typified by the strikes referred to under "Economic" above.

A communiqué was issued by the British authorities on the 23rd June, in view of the campaign conducted by the Communist and pro-French elements in the Lebanon in connexion with the evacuation of British troops ("General" above), explaining that some 7,000 officers and other ranks had left the Lebanon since March, that Major-General Pilleau had left on the 22nd June, and that the last British regiment had crossed the frontier on the same day. There were some 1,500 officers and men still in the country, but by the 30th June only some 170 would be left (in accordance with the Anglo-French agreement) as a Liquidation Committee to dispose of British property and deal with outstanding claims. The newspaper *L'Orient*, which had been in the forefront of the agitation on this question, relegated the communiqué to its back page and claimed that it had no knowledge of any arrangements for the presence in the Lebanon after the 30th June of a British Liquidation Committee. It also quoted *Al Hayat* to the effect that these arrangements had been made in order to meet the request

that British and French troops should evacuate simultaneously. The phrase "outstanding claims" was widely misinterpreted (as meaning "claims against the Lebanese Government").

As a sequel to the suspension of *Saut-esh-Shaab* (see Weekly Political Summary No. 219, "Lebanon"), the newspaper *Al Aayash* has been suspended for having lent its name to what in fact was a reincarnation of *Saut-esh-Shaab*. This newspaper, which was founded last year, has been suspended on several occasions.

Further anti-Government pamphlets of Communist origin have appeared. They were immediately seized and those responsible for their distribution arrested.

[E 6986/213/89]

(4)

Weekly Political Summary No. 221, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 9th July, 1946.—
(Received 23rd July.)

General.

THE evacuation of British forces from the Lebanon was completed according to plan on the 30th June. On the following day a communiqué was issued by the Lebanese Government in which they expressed satisfaction that the withdrawal had been completed within the appointed time, and at the same time emphasised that the British Liquidation Staff had been provided for in the military agreement made in Paris, of which the Lebanese Government had received notification on the 19th March. General Beynet informed the press that 200 French military personnel left Beirut on the s.s. *André Lebon* on the 28th June, and that there were only some 200 French officers and troops left in the country, with the exception of a small contingent of Senegalese. According to a communiqué subsequently published by the Joint Franco-Lebanese Military Commission, 1,788 French officers and men remained in the Lebanon on the 30th June, apart from 892 Avenantaires, who would also be evacuated in due course. General Beynet left Beirut on the 6th July in the French cruiser *Georges Leygues*. M. du Chayla, the new French Minister to the Lebanon, arrived by air on the 8th July.

Public attention during the past fortnight has centred, particularly in Syria, on the action taken by the British authorities in Palestine against Jewish terrorism. At first reaction was favourable, but before long a note of doubt began to creep in as to whether His Majesty's Government would again yield to Jewish and American pressure.

A second meeting of representatives of the Governments of Palestine, Syria and the Lebanon took place at Aley on the 26th June to discuss frontier control. Further progress was made in connexion with the details of the exchange of information, communications and visits between members of the security services of the three countries, but the Syrian and Lebanese representatives showed themselves unwilling to go beyond the terms of the "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement of February 1926, in which there is no provision for the entry of Palestine security forces into Syria and the Lebanon. A sub-committee was formed to study the question of communications and frontier passes and a meeting was fixed to be held at Haifa on the 3rd July, but this meeting was subsequently postponed.

A meeting between members of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments was held at Chtaura on the 24th June, at which, according to the Syrian Prime Minister, the following matters were discussed: visa questions, registration of cars; the evacuation of foreign troops from the Lebanon; Palestine affairs; and the notes sent to Great Britain and America; whether or not a permanent representative should be appointed to the United Nations Organisation, and the affairs of M.I.R.A.; he denied that the question of Alexandretta had been discussed.

A second batch of Armenian immigrants to Soviet Armenia has left Beirut on board a Russian steamer.

A civil aviation conference, attended by representatives of the Arab States, was held at Aley on the 9th July.

Economic.

There have been widespread strikes for the past fortnight throughout the two countries. In the Lebanon the special tribunal dealing with the case of the Régie des Tabacs workers met on the 26th June and deferred judgment to enable the accounts of the company to be examined. A regrettable incident occurred on the 27th June at Furn es Shubak, when Régie des Tabacs workers refused to allow the unloading of a consignment of cigarettes; a clash took place between workers

and gendarmerie and resulted in the death of an 18-year-old girl; twelve other workers sustained injuries. The Minister of the Interior has continued to act with considerable firmness, and, when necessary, has requisitioned workers of the Régie des Tabacs, and has used the threat of requisition to ensure the continuance of essential work at the port, where the employees returned to work on the 2nd July after having received an assurance from the Government and the company that their just demands would be met. The general situation, however, continued to deteriorate, and on the 9th July there was a possibility of a general strike backed by the Front du Travail. Some improvement was realised following consultations between the President of the Republic and Henri Pharaon (president of the Front du Travail), and on the 9th July it was announced that the D.H.P. workers would return to work on the next day, having accepted a bonus of fifteen days' pay and an advance in respect of a similar period.

The Syrian Minister of Finance stated at a press conference on the 4th July that the Governments of the two Levant States have been able to ensure 14 million dollars for the period the 1st January, 1946, to the 31st December, 1946, of which Syria's share will be 55 per cent. and the Lebanon 45 per cent.

Syria.

Considerable interest is still being taken in the Syrian press over the alleged defalcations in the Ministry of Finance and in other Government Departments, and the Minister of Finance has stated at a press conference that further defalcations have been discovered in the Taxation Department in connexion with agricultural products.

His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo reports that there has been an increase in Monarchist activity in the area during the past few weeks. The consul himself has been approached by Naqib el Ashraf in an attempt to elicit from him some favourable statement. It is reported that Nazim Bey, Qudsi and Rushdi Kakhia, leading members of the parliamentary Opposition, have also been approached and are favourably inclined, though they have been unwilling to commit themselves. The centre of activity for the moment appears to be Hosroufieh Mosque, and speeches against the present régime have been made in the mosques during the last few weeks.

Mr. Besly, late legal counsellor to His Majesty's Embassy, Cairo, visited Damascus on the 29th June in connexion with the question of the Mixed Courts. He obtained from the Prime Minister a verbal agreement on the lines that the pending cases before the Mixed Courts should be tried before a Special Panel of Syrian judges in the National Courts and that the British law of national status should be applied by the Syrian Courts to all British subjects on the basis of reciprocity. Mr. Besly later saw the Minister of Justice to discuss details and to give him drafts of letters to be exchanged between the British and Syrian Governments on these points. Agreement was reached subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government to the texts to be used.

The French Consulate at Damascus has published a notice in the press dated the 8th July informing the public that the consular offices have been moved from the former French Délégation in Damascus, which is not French property, into the former residence of the Délégué opposite the Syrian Chamber; the offices will be open to the public every morning, except on Sundays and holidays. The Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs have stated verbally that while they do not recognise the French Consulate as such, they have no objection to members of the general public going there for visas and other normal consular services.

The Damascus press on the 4th July published the text of the communiqué issued by the Ministry of the Interior on the subject of Armenians who elect to leave Syria and go to Soviet Armenia. The communiqué says that the Council of Ministers have approved their departure on two conditions: (1) that emigrants will lose their right to reside permanently in Syria the moment they leave the country and also lose their Syrian nationality should they hold it; (2) that emigrants must dispose of any immovable property, and once they have left the country renounce all claim to any further ownership of land, buildings, industry, &c., in Syria.

His Majesty's Consul, Aleppo, reports that the arrangements made for the departure of Armenians for Beirut *en route* to Soviet Armenia were very poor. About 225 families, *i.e.*, some 1,100 people, had to be crowded into fifty lorries at short notice owing to the railway strike. The committee organising immigrants seem to have done nothing to help immigrants to make their plans for the sale of their houses or effects. But despite the fact that the Soviet authorities have contributed little, if anything, towards the cost of the immigrants' journey and the

expenditure involved is being borne by Armenian charitable organisations, there exists among the immigrants a feeling of enthusiasm at the prospect of going to Soviet Armenia and of gratitude to the Soviet Government for enabling them to make a new start in life. On the other hand, those who remain, the Armenian Tashnaks in particular, are far from pleased with the additional burden thrown upon them and with the fact that several thousands of Christians will have left Northern Syria, thus weakening the position of those who remain as a minority among the Moslem majority.

The new Turkish Minister to Syria, M. Abdulahad Akçin, arrived in Damascus on the 26th June and presented his Letters of Credence on the 1st July. Ihsan Bey Sherif, the newly appointed Syrian Minister to Angora, accompanied by a clerk, left Damascus on the 6th July *en route* for his new post. The newspaper *Al Kifah*, which is regarded as especially the organ of the presidency, has eulogised Turkey for having appointed a Minister to Syria as well as to the Lebanon instead of combining their diplomatic representation in both countries in one Head of Mission, and has followed this up with a further article urging other foreign Powers to do the same.

Joseph Bey Haddad, head of the Central Administration of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has been appointed Consul-General attached to the Syrian Legation in Cairo.

A Damascus newspaper reports the arrival of an Egyptian Mission of three physical training teachers, which has been sent by the Egyptian Ministry of Education at the request of the Syrian Ministry of Education to train Syrian teachers at the former British army camp at Qatana, which is to be open during the summer as a drilling camp for the Futuwwa (Youth Movement).

Dr. Cruikshank has been invited by the Dean of the University of Damascus to lecture in surgery to the Medical Faculty of the University; Dr. Cruikshank came to Syria at the invitation of the Director of Health and Hygiene.

The Damascus press on the 3rd July reports that the Ministry of Education has decided to send fifty students to specialise in law, medicine, engineering, physics, chemistry, mathematics, zoology, geology, geography, history, philosophy, social science and botany in Egypt, Europe and America. On the completion of their courses candidates will be expected to teach at the Syrian University. It is further reported that the Ministry of Finance has selected six candidates to be sent to America to specialise in economics and financial affairs, and that the Director of Agriculture will leave immediately for America to follow a special course in agriculture.

Lebanon.

The President returned from his visit to Turkey on the 29th June. He appears to be highly pleased with his visit, as also do other members of the party. The Prime Minister informed journalists that he had been greatly impressed by model farms in Turkey and that he hoped to send an agricultural mission to that country.

The closing down of the British naval base at Beirut at the end of June was complicated by the inability of the Lebanese authorities to make the necessary arrangements; although they had been duly warned at least six months previously, they failed to appoint officials who would be responsible for the general supervision of the port and to whom the British Naval Officer-in-Charge could hand over. It had been suggested by the French during the negotiations at Paris that a British Naval Liaison Officer stay on after the 30th June to assist in the work of evacuation. The Lebanese agreement to this suggestion, however, only reached His Majesty's Legation on the 26th June, by which time the French had decided that the appointment was no longer necessary, and the Foreign Office ruled that, in the circumstances, it would be preferable if Captain Arnot left on the 30th June. In view of the need to liquidate a naval base which had been operating up to that date, it will not be possible for him to leave for some fifteen days. He has, however, severed connexion with the port and has joined Headquarters, British Liquidation Staff, North Levant. An informal approach has been made by the Lebanese authorities to Captain Arnot with a view to his taking up, on demobilisation, an appointment as Director of the Port. His Majesty's Legation has not been informed officially of the matter.

A member of the legation staff called on the President on the 30th June and informed him that the British authorities could take no responsibility for any confusion which might result in connexion with the operation of the Port of Beirut as a result of the failure of the Lebanese Government to make the necessary arrangements. He also spoke of the anti-British campaign in the press, and pointed out that the Government had failed to reinforce the first British

communiqué on the evacuation by making a suitable statement to the Chamber or by other means. The details of the final evacuation communiqué were also discussed. On the following day Mr. Young, on behalf of His Majesty's Minister, who was indisposed, called on the President and spoke strongly of the series of anti-British articles which had appeared in the press and which had culminated in an article in *L'Orient* of the 30th June. This article directly implied that no confidence could be given to the British communiqué and insisted that a communiqué should be issued by the Lebanese Government. The President instructed the Minister of the Interior to convene a meeting of journalists and issue a warning that newspapers would be suspended if articles unfriendly to foreign Powers were published. The President also said that in addition to issuing a communiqué on the withdrawal of British forces, he would arrange for a suitable expression of appreciation to be made in the course of a debate in the Chamber.

Owing to the death of Moussa Namour, a former President of the Chamber and ex-Minister, the meeting of the Chamber on the 4th July when the Government was expected to ask for a vote of confidence was postponed until the 8th July. When the Chamber met on the latter date the foreign and internal policy of the Government was heavily attacked and an interpellation by Georges Akl regarding the labour situation and, in particular, the Furn es Shubak incident (see "Economic," paragraph 1, above) was debated. Abdullah Yafi, Sami es Solh and Henri Pharaon criticised the Government for their handling of the situation. The Minister of the Interior, replying to the debate, stated that in accordance with the Criminal Code the Government could requisition the workers of the D.H.P., which was a public utility company, and added that the demand of the workers for strike pay was inadmissible as its acceptance would only encourage further strikes. When the question of confidence was put to the vote thirty Deputies supported the Government, two voted against and two abstained.

Following the meeting of the so-called Nationalist Party (Emil Eddé's group), a telegram was addressed to Emil Eddé in Paris expressing appreciation of his activities. A reply was received thanking the party for their support, and adding that as long as the independence, sovereignty and individuality of the Lebanon were safeguarded, the maximum co-operation would be pursued with other Arab countries within the framework of the Cairo Charter. It is noteworthy that this is a considerable concession to the Moslem and Nationalist point of view, and the President and Government are considerably concerned at this development; the more extreme Christian elements, though at first showing surprise and resentment, now appear to support him, realising the advantage of the move from an electioneering point of view, and *L'Orient* has come out with an article frankly welcoming the development.

The Communist newspaper *Saut esh Shaab* as reappeared after a suspension of twenty-one days. The Minister of the Interior informed Mr. Young that he has received assurances that the paper would not give grounds for complaint. He attached little value to these assurances, but he said that he felt he had to give the paper a chance. He added that he considered one of his most important tasks at the present time was strict vigilance in connexion with Communist activities.

Following a rather childish altercation between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and his Director of Protocol, Nicola Boustros, the Government decided to abolish the Department and to dismiss M. Boustros. Considerable pressure was brought to bear on the President and this decision was finally reversed in favour of the establishment of a Disciplinary Court before which M. Boustros would be summoned to appear.

[E 7449/213/89]

(5)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 222, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 16th July, 1946.—(Received 3rd August.)

General.

DURING the past week Palestine and the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, in particular the proposed Joint Defence Board, have received considerable attention in the press of both countries. There has also been speculation regarding the possibility of an Anglo-Arab Joint Staff, a proposal which has been heavily criticised by the pro-French and pro-Russian newspapers. In the Damascus press a number of leading articles have appeared both for and against the partition

of Palestine. Three Damascus newspapers, including *El Manar*, the organ of the Moslem brethren, have published news of the organisation in France of the Jewish Republican Palestinian Government. The energetic measures taken by the Egyptian Government against Communists have, on the whole, been welcomed, though the Egyptian Minister has had occasion to protest to the Lebanese Government against an article which appeared in a Beirut newspaper attacking the Egyptian Government.

Economic.

The D.H.P. and Régie des Tabacs strikes ended on the 13th July. The Special Tribunal dealing with the test case in the Régie dispute announced its decision on the 10th July. This decision reversed the judgment of the former tribunal and was thus unfavourable to the workers. It had been announced that the D.H.P. employees would return to work on the same day, but the majority refused to abide by the decision of their committee and remained on strike. The Minister of the Interior announced that he would not hesitate to conscript the railway workers if they persisted. As regards the Régie des Tabacs strike, he said that the Government did not consider it illegal and that negotiations were continuing. On the 12th July the D.H.P. workers finally accepted the conditions originally offered and the committee of the Régie des Tabacs workers also announced that the employees would return to work on the following day, having accepted an offer of a bonus of one and a half months' pay and a two months' advance of pay. According to Henri Pharaon, the president of the Front du Travail, which has played a large part in the negotiations, some of the members of the Régie des Tabacs Committee are Communists and are in direct touch with the Soviet Legation, which has contributed substantially to the committee's funds. A Damascus newspaper reports that the Syrian Minister of Public Works has decided to grant a gratuity of half a month's wages to the workers of the D.H.P. and Hedjaz railway lines.

A "Proctor" demonstration aircraft, flown out by the Hunting Aviation Company, has been giving demonstration flights from Mezzé aerodrome during the past week, and the Syrian Government have ordered three machines of this type, two of which are to be used temporarily by M.I.R.A. and the third by the desert guard; it is understood, however, that the two first will revert to the Ministry of Defence when the M.I.R.A. organisation ceases to exist. Negotiations have been continuing between the representative of the Hunting Aviation Company and the Syrian Government, with regard to the supply of additional machines and the equipment of a Flying Training School, but for the time being negotiations have reached a dead end since the Hunting Aviation Company are not permitted to supply certain items of military equipment which the Syrian Government require in order that service pilots may be trained; as the financial provision for the flying training school appears on the Syrian army budget, the money cannot be used for purely civil purposes.

The two representatives of the Imperial Bank of Iran (see Weekly Political Summary, No. 217, Economic) have again visited Damascus, and the Syrian Minister of Finance has expressed his agreement in principle to the opening of a branch of the bank in Syria and said that he saw no objection under the existing law to the employment of an English manager. It is understood that a manager will be arriving in Damascus towards the end of July, when he will make formal application to open the bank and will endeavour to obtain suitable premises.

Syria.

Aref Bey Nakadi has been appointed President of the Syrian Council of State in place of Said Bey Haidar, who resigned some months ago.

The Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs have confirmed a report published in the press that the Syrian Minister in Paris has received instructions to make a formal protest to the French Government against the treatment of Syrians on the Island of Guadaloupe and in Tunisia. Saadullah Bey Jabri, in a press conference, stated that the French Government had promised to investigate the charges and to punish whoever may be found responsible.

The following have been nominated as members of the Syrian Judicial Committee set up in accordance with the decisions of the Arab League:—

President: Muhsen Barazi.

Members: Said Ghazzi, Naim Ghazzi, Munir Beiraqdar.

Secretary: Ahmed Samman.

The Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs have informed His Majesty's Legation that the following countries have recognised Syrian independence since the beginning of the year:—

Canada: 30th January.
Ecuador: 1st March.
Netherlands: 1st May.
Venezuela: 14th June.

Mexico and the Vatican, which have recognised Lebanese independence, have not yet recognised Syrian independence.

M. Taymans, on the 13th July, presented to the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs his letters of credence as Belgian Chargé d'Affaires en Titre.

The Emir Hassan el Atrash, Mohafez of the Jebel Druze, in a conversation with a member of the staff of His Majesty's Legation, made it clear that he and his family resented the appointment of the Emir Adel Arslan (by extraction a Lebanese Druze) as Minister of Education in the Syrian Cabinet and made it clear that he considered that the Syrian Government had insulted the Jebel Druze by making such an appointment. The Emir went on to recapitulate his grievances against the Syrian Government—the insults heaped upon the Druze in connexion with the evacuation ceremonies in Damascus on the 17th April, the Government's refusal to allow the Druze notables to attend the Coronation ceremonies in Amman, the continued lack of appreciation of Druze activities in 1925 and again in 1945, &c. The Druze, he said, were preparing a manifesto stating their grievances and complaints and proposed to distribute the manifesto throughout Syria in neighbouring countries and to foreign legations. He added that the Minister of the Interior had suggested that Soltan Pasha el Atrash should meet the President but that Soltan Pasha had refused to do so. It was suggested to the Emir Hassan that no useful purpose could be served by Soltan Pasha's refusal to see the President and that such a refusal would not only be discourteous but would close the door to any rapprochement between the Druze and the Central Government. Furthermore, the publication of the manifesto of grievances could do no good to anybody. The Emir finally agreed to try to persuade Soltan Pasha to see the President, and it was learned a few days later that the Emir Hassan and Zeid Atrash, son of Soltan Pasha, lunched with the President at Zebdani.

Lebanon.

Count Armand du Chayla presented his letters of credence to the Lebanese President on the 11th July. In a press conference the new French Minister emphasised that he would only be concerned with normal diplomatic work, and added that the Press Department of the French Legation would refrain from propaganda but would be available to journalists for the supply of information, &c. He has lost no time in paying the customary calls on notables, including the Maronite Patriarch and the Mufti. M. du Chayla has received a good welcome from the press and has succeeded in making a good first impression. He is clearly anxious to emphasise the purely diplomatic quality of his appointment; for example, the military guards at the Residence have now been withdrawn.

The reception held on the 14th July was well attended.

The outstanding event in the field of internal politics has been the dispute between the Maronite Patriarch and the Vatican following the refusal of the Patriarch to consecrate two bishops appointed by the Pope, and the consequent decision of the Vatican to appoint a deputy Patriarch. Reports that Emile Eddé, in the course of his visit to Rome, had been responsible for this development has caused considerable embarrassment to his party, and a *démenti* has been issued by Georges Akl, the Secretary-General of the party. There has been considerable comment in the press and the Nationalist organs have been speculating as to whether the French are attempting to impose a religious mandate on the Lebanon in place of the political mandate. The President of the Republic is opposed to the appointment of a locum tenens and is supporting the Patriarch. He suggested to His Majesty's Minister that His Majesty's representative in the Holy See should use his influence to hasten the appointment of a Papal Nuncio following the recognition by Rome of Lebanese independence, an appointment which he alleged certain elements were endeavouring to prevent in order to keep Mgr. Le Pretre, the Apostolic Delegate, in his present position. He also had a long interview with Toufiq Awad, the factotum of the Patriarch, who afterwards left for Rome by air to intercede with the Papal authorities. There is no doubt that Eddé's opponents are taking full advantage of this development to embarrass

his party even if they were not responsible for the original reports that Eddé had suggested the appointment.

Rumours of the formation of an Anglo-Arab Joint Staff referred to in section 1, paragraph 1, above, have not been without effect on the Lebanese President. On the 15th July his Excellency enquired of a member of His Majesty's Legation whether he could be furnished with information regarding the proposed Joint Defence Board, and expressed the hope that the Lebanese were in no way committed. He was informed that the present negotiations concerned His Majesty's Government and Egypt, and that clearly no arrangements could be made involving other Arab Governments without their agreement. It is clear that pro-French elements are in a position to exert considerable pressure on the present Government, who are in consequence anxious to avoid offending their susceptibilities. There is evidence, however, that the more thorough Nationalists are in favour of such a scheme. In fact, Riad Solh informed a member of the staff of His Majesty's Legation that he had advocated such an arrangement for the past three years.

On instructions from His Majesty's Minister, Mr. Young called on Count Ostrorog to enquire whether he could not induce a more restrained tone in the French and pro-French press. Count Ostrorog stated that the anti-British utterances in the press were really anti-Government, and that as regards the newspaper *L'Orient* there was little he could do as, for about a year, relations between the délégué and the direction of the paper had been strained.

The Lebanese Cabinet has decided in principle to appoint foreign experts and technicians in a number of Government Departments. An informal decision in this sense was reached some time ago. The newspaper *L'Orient* welcomes this development provided the competence of those appointed is beyond question and the work is not such as can be done by Lebanese. The paper had objected to the appointment of Lieutenant-Colonel Jones to the Lebanese M.I.R.A. on the ground that these conditions were not fulfilled. The proposal that experts should be selected from among nationals of small Powers is welcomed by *L'Orient* with the proviso that the possibility of engaging in some cases Soviet, British, French or American candidates is not excluded.

The Communist paper *Saut esh Shaab* has been suspended for having published an offensive article directed against the President of the Syrian Republic.

A further batch of 1,834 Armenian repatriates left Beirut on s.s. *Transylvania* on the 12th July.

A decree has been published authorising the Emir Abdul Megid Haidar to divest himself of his Lebanese nationality. The Emir Haidar has been appointed by King Abdullah as Transjordan Minister in London.

[E 7786/213/89]

(6)

Weekly Political Summary No. 223, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, ending 23rd July, 1946.—(Received 12th August.)

General.

PALESTINE and the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations have continued to be the centre of interest in both countries. Reaction to the King David Hotel incident was one of extreme indignation and suspense as to whether or not the British reaction would be as violent as the brutality of the crime merited. Leading Syrians have expressed the hope that the incident will prevent the implementation of the Anglo-American Committee's report with regard to the immediate immigration of 100,000 Jews. Mr. Attlee's statement in Parliament that His Majesty's Government would not fail to seek a just solution of Palestine's problem caused some dismay, and several Damascus newspapers compared this statement with British reaction to the bomb outrages in Alexandria, which were held by certain sections of the British press to have endangered the success of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations.

The Committee of Jurisprudence of the Arab League Council which met last week at Bludan is reported in the press to have arrived at the following decisions:—

- (1) The drawing-up of a unified commercial code for the Arab countries.
- (2) The drawing-up of a common maritime code.
- (3) The founding of a free institute for Moslem jurisprudence attached to the Fouad I University in Cairo.

- (4) The standardisation of legal terms, starting with the penal codes and rules of legal procedure.
- (5) The drawing-up of a standard law to combat the drug traffic.

The drafts mentioned above are eventually to be submitted to the individual Arab States for ratification.

On the 20th July the Syrian Prime Minister informed His Majesty's Consul in Damascus that Syria was anxious to be elected to the temporary seat on the United Nations Supreme Council, which was due to be evacuated by Egypt. He said that the Arab League secretariat had already indicated that they would welcome the nomination of Syria, and that Egypt herself had signified her readiness to support Syria's application. A few days later he informed His Majesty's Consul that the Turkish Minister had told him that the Turkish Government would welcome and support Syria's candidature. It has also been reported in the press that the Lebanese Government have agreed to give their support to the suggestion.

Economic.

A meeting was held at Tripoli during the week, presided over by the Lebanese Prime Minister, at which Syrian and Lebanese experts examined the delivery of cereals to the Lebanese, complaints having been received that the quality of the wheat furnished by the Syrians was poor. A Syro-Lebanese meeting will be held on the 24th July at Shtaura to discuss a reduction in price of the grain delivered by the Syrian M.I.R.A. to the Lebanon.

The Middle East Air Traffic Conference (see Weekly Political Summary No. 221, General) reached agreement on a number of minor points, but failed to do so regarding fares, owing to the opposition of the American representatives, who would not agree to the fixing of fares on any of the Middle East routes.

An engineering expert, Mr. Loveday, connected with the Anglo-Syrian Purchasing Commission, has arrived in Syria. It is understood that he has come at the request of Brigadier Frere in a private capacity to have a look round Syria, and in particular to examine a small area in the Jezireh with a view to making recommendations as to what type and size of pumps would be required to provide adequate irrigation. The area to be examined is at Raqqa, where a group of landlords having adjoining properties have already been in touch with the Anglo-Syrian Purchasing Commission with a view to agricultural development in the neighbourhood.

An official communiqué has been issued to the Syrian press to the effect that a committee composed of the Prime Minister, the Ministers of National Economy, Interior, and Finance, and the Mohafez of Damascus, have met to discuss the high prices of food-stuffs. The communiqué adds that measures have been adopted to reduce the present high prices, and that from the 22nd July the price of brown sugar will be reduced from 120 to 100 Syrian piastres a kilog., the price of white sugar from 150 to 125 piastres a kilog., and the price of rice from 60 to 50 piastres a kilog. The price of other food-stuffs will be fixed during the next few days. It is understood that the prices of these commodities are being lowered by a reduction in the Government tax.

Syria.

A Damascus newspaper has quoted the Syrian Prime Minister, in connexion with the resumption of diplomatic relations with France, as saying that there will be four French officials at the legation in Damascus, that a mixed committee of French and Syrians will be formed to settle outstanding questions, that French schools will be permitted to reopen provided they observe the rules and regulations of the Syrian Ministry of Public Instruction, but that professional schools, such as the Bouka Agricultural School near Lattakia, would be taken over by the Syrian Government, and the French would not be permitted in the future to run establishments of this nature.

His Majesty's Consul in Damascus received a telegram from one of eight Palestinian seamen who had landed at the beginning of the month near Tartous, saying that they had been in prison in Lattakia for twenty-three days without reason, and requesting His Majesty's Consul's assistance. His Majesty's Consul in Aleppo was asked to look into the matter, and on the 20th July the Syrian Prime Minister informed His Majesty's Consul at Damascus that he had received a telegram from the Mohafez of Lattakia stating that His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo had approached him for information concerning these men, and requesting instructions from the Prime Minister. Saadullah Bey Jabri told His Majesty's

Consul at Damascus that he failed to understand what right His Majesty's Consul in Aleppo had to approach the Syrian authorities in Lattakia since he was not consul in Lattakia, which was a forbidden area. It subsequently transpired that the men, who had been sentenced on the 20th June to two months' imprisonment and a fine of £Syr. 50 each for illegal entry into Syria, had been allowed to commute their sentences to the payment of a lump sum and were released on the 18th July. The occurrence has shown (a) that the present Syrian Government consider the Mohafazat of the Jebel Alaouite as a forbidden area in which foreign consuls are not allowed to reside, and that for the time being they hold the view that foreign consuls should not exercise any of their functions in this area, and (b) that, although the Syrian Government were asked to grant Mr. Vaughan-Russell his exequatur for the whole of his consular district, comprising the Mohafazat and the municipal area of Aleppo and the Mohafazat of the Alaouites, the exequatur was granted only for the Aleppo municipal area and the Aleppo Mohafazat.

Brigadier Hayes, of General Headquarters, Middle East, has discussed with the Syrian Minister of Defence the question of the disposal of British camps and stores in Syria, which the Syrian Government has previously undertaken verbally to purchase. The Syrian Government have, in fact, taken over the twenty-four installations concerned during April against detailed schedules and receipts. A proposal that they should give guarantees for the purchase of the installations against payment of £Syr. 2½ million by January 1947 has been submitted in writing to the Syrian Government.

His Majesty's Consul, Aleppo, reports that the Greater Syria movement appears to be continuing to make progress in the Aleppo area, although political personalities are unwilling to declare themselves as sympathisers of a monarchical movement which would give the present Syrian Government grounds for accusing them of treasonable activities. Further attempts have, in vain, been made to obtain a statement from His Majesty's Consul which would indicate the support of His Majesty's Government for such a scheme.

An Aleppo newspaper has published an article regarding the Soviet Government's attitude towards Haj Amin Hussein. The article stated that the Soviet Government did not look upon the Mufti favourably since he was chief of an organisation whose members were against communism. On the other hand, the U.S.S.R. would like to assist the Mufti because of his feud with the Hashemite family and because his return to Palestine might put an end to the Greater Syria project, which is not favoured by Russia.

Lebanon.

In the course of the week attention has largely centred on internal politics. There have been rumours of a rapprochement between Henri Pharaon, Abdul Hamid Karami and Riad Solh, and there is a general belief that the days of the Munia Cabinet are numbered. It is known that the Syrians, in particular Shukri Quwatli, are concerned at the drift in Lebanese politics and that they have brought some pressure on the President to strengthen his position. There is little evidence, however, that the rumours are well founded—Riad Solh has again warned the President against Henri Pharaon (stating that the Moslems would never accept him as President) and has urged the President to weaken him by the dissolution of para-military parties (*i.e.*, the Phalangists).

Henri Pharaon himself is experiencing some difficulty with his Phalangist supporters. It is significant that Pierre Gemayel, the Phalangist leader, has publicly expressed his approval of the reorientation of Eddé's policy, *i.e.*, his insistence on a Lebanon independent of the East and the West but within the framework of the Arab League.

The President continues to show great concern in connexion with the activities of Eddé and his supporters, particularly as regards reports that Eddé had succeeded in coming to some arrangement with the British authorities. He has requested His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires to ascertain whether it is true that Eddé contacted British personalities in Paris.

Cardinal Tappouni returned to Beirut on board a French warship. The President informed a member of the legation staff that if his Eminence returned on a French warship he would make no arrangements for his reception, and it is known that the Syrian authorities protested, but without success, to the French regarding these arrangements. In the event, however, the President weakened and Cardinal Tappouni was welcomed on his arrival by the Secretary-General of the Presidency.

Ex-Prime Minister Sami Sohl has tabled a Bill for electoral reform. According to the press the proposal provides for the formation of a Chamber composed partly of elected members and partly of elder statesmen and representatives of professional bodies and the universities.

Azzam Pasha, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, has come in for considerable criticism. In a declaration published in the press, Pierre Gemayel, the Phalangist leader, stated that the Secretary-General of the Arab League was not the political representative of the Arab league and that the league itself was not a super-State. Azzam's proposal regarding the creation of an Arab army was also attacked. As might be expected, *L'Orient* has joined in the anti-Azzam campaign.

An article in the *Ittihad al Lubnan* regarding reports of an Anglo-Lebanese treaty providing for the use of bases in Lebanese territory has been the occasion of an editorial in *L'Orient*, in which the writer maintained that treaty relations with Great Britain or with any other major Power were not in Lebanese interests.

An altercation at Bhamdoun Casino between two rival gangs offering protection to gambling establishments resulted in the death of one man and in the wounding of others. The incident has caused a considerable stir and the press has urged the Government either to apply or to modify the laws in connexion with gambling.

The Lebanese Government have decided to engage Captain Arnot (formerly naval officer in charge) as Director of the Port of Beirut for a period of three months as from the 1st September. It is understood that at the end of this period the appointment will be extended for a further period provided the necessary funds are available.

[E 8094/213/89]

(7)

Extracts from *Weekly Political Summary No. 224, Secret, Syria and Lebanon*, 30th July, 1946.—(Received 19th August.)

General.

DURING the week speculation has continued in the press of both countries concerning the discussions of the Anglo-American Committee of Experts and the counter-measures which the British authorities are likely to take in Palestine as a consequence of the King David Hotel incident. In Syria, in particular, the idea was general that the Anglo-American Committee of Experts were about to recommend partition as a solution, and most papers published strong articles condemning such a solution. The *Alef Ba*, a Damascus newspaper with monarchist sympathies, however, published an article taking the line that partition was probably the best solution, and *Fata el Arab*, another staunchly monarchist paper, published a leading article expressing considerable sympathy for Great Britain, reminding the Syrians of the help which the British have extended to them in the past and calling on the Arabs to link themselves with Great Britain in this hour of their struggle with the Jews.

On the 24th July a note was handed to the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, and on the 25th July to the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, recalling His Majesty's Government's previous undertaking to consult all parties concerned before reaching a decision on the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry regarding the problem of European Jewry and Palestine, and inviting the respective Governments to send a delegation to London for this purpose. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was obviously much pleased, asked that a message of thanks should be conveyed to His Majesty's Government, and added that the official reply of the Lebanese Government to the invitation would be transmitted without delay. The Syrian Prime Minister expressed great satisfaction and formally accepted the invitation on behalf of the Syrian Government. On the 30th July His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires saw the Lebanese President, who informed him that the Lebanese Government were opposed to the Syrian proposal for common Arab representation at the forthcoming conference, and added that no official reply to the invitation had been sent by the Lebanese Government owing to reports that the partition of Palestine would be discussed at the conference. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires informed him that the basis of discussion was not partition but a scheme for provincial autonomy; the President, after consulting the Minister for Foreign Affairs, formally accepted the invitation with the reservation that the Arabs should not

be called upon to sit at the same table as the Jewish representatives. The same reservation had previously been made by the Syrian President and by Saadullah Bey Jabri.

Economic.

It is reported in the Damascus press that agreement was reached between members of the Syrian and Lebanese Cabinets at a meeting held in Shtaura on the 24th July to strengthen and develop economic relations between the two countries by means of a joint supreme council. At the same meeting it was agreed to modify the Lebano-Syrian Mira Agreement reducing the price of a ton of wheat to £Syr. 423 and a ton of white barley to £Syr. 260 *ex* Aleppo. The cost of transportation from Aleppo to destination in the Lebanon would be paid by the Lebanese Government. It was further agreed to reduce the quantity of barley to be supplied by Syria from 30,000 to 10,000 tons, thus bringing the total quantity of cereals to be supplied to the Lebanon to approximately 100,000 tons. It was decided to adopt a joint policy in regard to imports and exports and to take joint measures to reduce the cost of living and to appoint a committee composed of Lebanese and Syrian lawyers and experts to study railway conditions and present and future legislation.

Mr. Paton, a director of the firm of Messrs. Alexander Gibb and Partners, consulting engineers, has been received by the President of the Lebanese Republic, following an approach by the Minister of Public Works, who enquired whether the firm would undertake an economic survey of the Lebanon on the lines of the survey in Syria. It is understood that the question will shortly be referred to the Cabinet.

With reference to W.P.S. No. 222, Section 2, paragraph 3, Mr. E. S. Matheson arrived with his wife in Damascus on the 25th July as manager of the branch of the Imperial Bank of Persia, which he intends to open as soon as he has obtained the necessary permission and found suitable premises.

Syria.

Reports have been received of a continued increase in monarchist activities throughout Syria. It is learned that a pamphlet has been distributed in the Jebel Druze calling on the Druze to rise against the Syrian Government and to fight for King Abdullah. Full details are not yet available. Reports from Aleppo refer to a meeting of tribal sheikhs at which were present such leaders as Emir el Shaish, Sheikh Barakat el Faraj, Sheikh Mohammed Faraj, Sheikh Khalil el Hashim, and a number of others, including Sheikh Issa el Zeidi, who for some months past has been actively pushing monarchist claims. At the meeting it was stated that money and arms would soon be sent to supporters of the movement.

Sheikh Yusef Yassin, in a long conversation with the oriental secretary, stressed the dangers to Great Britain and to the Arab world in general of a Hashimite kingdom of Greater Syria. He produced all the usual arguments, and ended by requesting His Majesty's Government to inform King Abdullah and the Regent of Iraq that they were opposed to any alteration in the *status quo* in the Middle East. The oriental secretary said that he would inform His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires of Sheikh Yusef's request, but added that he felt that such action would be rightly considered by Transjordan and Iraq as interference in their internal affairs and that it appeared to be a matter for the Arab League itself, whose Constitution provided for the settlement of disputes amongst member States. Sheikh Yusef Yassin has been in Syria since the Arab League conference at Bludan, ostensibly on holiday, but it is learned that he has been trying to counter monarchist propaganda to build up Shukri Quwatli and the present régime and to secure adherents for the present régime should a monarchist coup take place.

The internal political situation in Syria is clearly becoming increasingly affected by manoeuvres in connexion with elections for the Chamber of Deputies which are due to be held next year. Reference has been made in previous summaries to a number of appointments which have been made recently to key posts, with a view to securing National Bloc representation in the new Chamber. The most recent of such appointments is that of Maj Ed Din Jabri Bey, a nephew of the Prime Minister, as President of the Municipality in Aleppo; he has openly expressed to His Majesty's Consul in Aleppo his intention of working to further the interests of the National Bloc. Superimposed on the manoeuvres to secure the election of a National Bloc majority of Deputies is the question of the election of a new President, which is due to take place in 1948. The election

is made by the Chamber of Deputies and therefore potential candidates for election as President are interested not only in the election of National Bloc Deputies, but in the election of personal supporters. There are indications that friction is developing between Shukri Bey Quwatli and Saadullah Bey Jabri, who, it is thought, is hoping to become the next President; the former has refused to confirm a number of administrative appointments desired by the latter. Jamil Bey Mardam returned to Syria on the 30th July, but it is too soon to forecast which side he will take or whether he will work solely for his own interests. Other candidates for the presidency are taking heart from the signs of a rift between Saadullah Bey and the President of the Republic.

During the past week there have been signs of renewed interest in French intentions. One Damascus newspaper, in a leading article, claims to have information that the French in the Levant States have withdrawn notices of termination of employment issued to a number of their officials and employees and that French security services have re-started their activities. Unfavourable comment has also appeared in the press concerning French actions in North Africa.

His Majesty's Consul in Aleppo reports that an increase in Communist activity in the area continues and that the public is being encouraged to believe that communism alone can save the Arabs from the present Syrian Government, and at the same time save Syria from falling into the clutches of King Abdullah.

Reports have been received that a meeting of the leading Kurds in Syria, together with a number of Kurds from Iraq and Turkey, was held at Ain Divar, near the Turkish frontier, on the 12th and the 13th July under the presidency of Dr. Naif, and that a committee was formed with the object of raising funds from all Kurds for the purpose of cultural development and medical aid to Kurdish people; messages, it was stated, were received from Mustafa Barzani and Ghaz Mohammed Khan, promising support for the proposed scheme to create an autonomous Kurdistan.

The Society for Cultural Co-operation between Syria and the Soviet Union was to have held a reception in Damascus on the 27th July to mark the opening of an exhibition devoted to the life of Maxim Gorki. The Syrian Prime Minister, on receiving a notification from the president of the society, Dr. Kamel Ayyad, a teacher in the Government Tajhiz School, informed him that he was not prepared to allow Syrian officials to mix themselves up in any movement inimical to the best interests of Syria. The reception was, therefore, cancelled, but the exhibition remained open for three days.

Adnan Atassi, the Syrian Minister to France, returned to Syria on the 24th July. It is not yet certain whether he and Nazim Kudsi will resign from their posts in order to return to their duties in the Syrian Chamber of Deputies; the extension granted to them by the Chamber (and to Jamil Bey Mardam) expires at the end of August.

On the day following the blowing up of the Palestine Government offices and Army Headquarters in Jerusalem, the Syrian Government enquired from His Majesty's Legation and Consulate in Damascus whether there would be any objection to the Syrian security authorities sending plain clothes security officials to protect the legation and consulate buildings from any possible terrorist attack. The Syrian Government were informed that, since they were responsible for internal security, it was felt that this was a matter on which the Government were fully entitled to take whatever action they considered necessary.

British Council scholarships for post-graduate studies in England have been awarded to Khaldoun Kinani, a teacher in the Tajhiz School in Damascus and a prominent member of the Ikhwan-el-Muslimin, and to Fakher Agel, an inspector of primary schools and a prominent member of the Communist Party.

Lebanon.

Reports from the Lebanese Minister in London (confirmed by His Majesty's Legation after reference to His Majesty's Embassy in Paris) that M. Eddé had not been in touch with British representatives in Paris have somewhat reassured the President (reference W.P.S. No. 223, Section 4, paragraph 3). An interesting corollary to the campaign by Eddé supporters that he had come to some understanding with the British authorities is an improvement in the tone of the pro-French press. During the week the *Orient* in particular has abstained from its usual anti-British line.

A Moslem-Christian conference on the Palestine question was held in Aley on the 28th July. No representatives of the Lebanese Government or prominent personalities from other Arab countries attended. In Government circles it was

felt that now that the Arab League was dealing with the question the time for such conferences was past, and at one stage it is known that the Minister of the Interior was considering banning the meeting. There is little doubt that the meeting was little more than a publicity stunt on the part of its organisers.

The Bhamdoun incident (W.P.S. No. 223, Section 4, paragraph 8) has been the occasion of a press campaign attacking the Government for the recent deterioration in public security. Considerable prominence has been given to a statement by Mgr. Moubarak, the Maronite Archbishop of Beirut, to the effect that slavery with security was better than independence with insecurity. This statement has been warmly welcomed by the anti-Government press, and has been equally attacked in the Nationalist newspapers.

The Beirut newspaper *An Nahar* has been suspended for ten days. Rumours were current to the effect that this action had been taken by the Government as a result of a protest by the Soviet Legation, but it is reliably reported that the cause of the suspension was the anti-Government attitude of the paper. The Communist newspaper, *Saut-esh-Shaab*, reporting a reception given by the British Press Attaché in Aleppo at which His Majesty's Consul spoke to journalists regarding current Middle East problems, accused His Majesty's Consul of overstepping his functions and interfering in the internal affairs of Syria. The paper grossly misquoted His Majesty's Consul, particularly in connexion with references to communism.

The agrément of the U.S.S.R. Government to the appointment of Khalil Takieddine as Lebanese Minister to Moscow has been communicated to the Lebanese Government, and decrees have been published providing for the establishment of a Legation in Moscow and for the appointment of Takieddine.

[E 8688/213/89]

(8)

*Weekly Political Summary No. 225, Secret, Syria and Lebanon,
6th August, 1946.—(Received 3rd September.)*

General

DURING the week public attention has been focused on Mr. Morrison's speech in the House of Commons concerning the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Experts for the future of Palestine. The press of both countries, particularly the Nationalist newspapers, have shown themselves strongly opposed to the proposals, which are almost universally described as "partition proposals"—and a number of newspapers in Damascus, including *El Manar*, the organ of the Ikhwan Muslimin, openly advocated that the Arabs should put into operation the "secret" decisions of the Bludan Conference of the Arab League and should resort to force; appeals for violent action, however, disappeared from the press after a few days (for further details of the reactions in Syria and the Lebanon see "Syria" and "Beirut" below).

A bomb exploded in the British Consulate-General at Beirut at about 8.30 p.m. on the evening of the 4th August and shortly afterwards three explosions occurred in the American Legation; some material damage was done but there were no casualties. The Lebanese authorities are investigating the outrage but no arrests have yet been made. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister called on His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires to express their regret. As soon as the Syrian authorities learned from the American Legation in Damascus of the incident, they placed additional armed guards on the American Legation and on the British Legation and Consulate. Early next morning the Syrian President sent his personal A.D.C. to express his regret at the incident and to ask whether His Majesty's Legation were satisfied with the measures taken by the Syrian authorities for protecting British property.

The general reaction in both countries, in the press and among the public, to these bomb incidents has been one of complete disapproval. In the Lebanon most papers agree that no Lebanese could have been responsible for the outrage and it is regrettable that the Lebanese Government seem to be adopting a similar attitude and to be attempting to blame in turn the Jews, the Communists and the French for the incidents for which, *prima facie*, Arab extremists appear likely to be responsible.

Economic.

The second Syro-Lebanese Economic Conference was held at Sofar on the 1st August, when measures to combat the high cost of living and to control foreign trade were discussed. The economic union with Syria continues to be the subject of adverse comment in anti-Government papers of Beirut, which express doubt whether the present arrangements are in the interest of the Lebanon. *L'Orient* has suggested that an independent foreign expert should be appointed to study the question.

Employees of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban went on strike on the 31st July. Their demands included increases in salaries and better conditions of work. They returned to work on the 6th August on the understanding that the management would sympathetically consider their demands. The strike was, however, resumed when it became known that a number of employees had been dismissed by the bank authorities, who also insisted on the employees signing individually what the latter considered as humiliating conditions.

Mr. Lanahan, representing the Trans-Arabian Oil Company, has visited Beirut and asked the Lebanese Government for its conditions in the event of the company routing the proposed pipe-line through Lebanese territory.

Two "Proctor-5" aircraft supplied by Hunting Aviation, Limited, for the use of the Syrian M.I.R.A. arrived in Damascus from England on the 31st July, having made the journey in 28 hours. Unfortunately, one of the pilots, who, it was hoped, would have accepted a year's contract with the Syrian Government, refused to do so, and one of the machines is therefore grounded until a pilot can be found.

At a meeting of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on the 6th August, articles 61 to 82 of the Labour Bill were passed.

Syria.

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, dining informally with the Syrian President and the Prime Minister, found that, while their reaction to Mr. Morrison's declaration on Palestine was, as expected, unfavourable, they still seemed prepared to send a Syrian delegation to London in response to the invitation extended by His Majesty's Government on the 25th July. Brigadier Clayton later saw both the Syrian President and Prime Minister and confirmed that, while there had been perhaps some slight increase in their hostility to the proposals as a result of a further study of the texts and the unfavourable reaction in the local press, they still seemed ready to send a delegation to London. Saadullah Bey Jabri made the point that it was unfortunate, and made matters more difficult for the Arabs, that His Majesty's Government had seen fit to publish their proposals straight away rather than await the opening of negotiations. He said that this inevitably opened the way to unfavourable and irresponsible press comment and to the application of pressure from public opinion on Arab statesmen; by the publication of the proposals at this juncture His Majesty's Government appeared to wish that they should be regarded as a statement of policy. He also voiced criticism of the proposal for the creation of four provinces, as three of them would eventually be Jewish; a similar line was taken by the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on the grounds that the Arabs would have no control over immigration into the Jerusalem area or into the Negeb.

The new French Minister Plenipotentiary to Syria, M. Serres, arrived in Damascus on the 1st August and was met in the name of the Syrian Government by the Director of the Political Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. M. Serres is living in the former Residency, which is to become the French Legation.

With reference to the alleged embezzlement of public monies by Syrian Government officials, referred to in previous Summaries, it is reported that the Supreme Legislative Council have found that there is a *prima facie* case against Mohammed Kojan, a former Director of Finance of the Mohafazat of Damascus city, and against a former official in the Ministry of Finance. It is also reported that Hassan Bey Jabbara, former Minister of Finance, has instituted proceedings for libel in the Courts of First Instance against a newspaper which charged him with complicity with Mohammed Kojan and others accused of embezzlement.

During the week a Communist pamphlet was distributed in Damascus which attacked the Syrian Government on a number of matters of internal policy, including their failure to reduce the cost of living, misappropriation of public funds and the dictatorial methods employed by members of the Government. In the same pamphlet the population were called upon to resist the British colonising policy in the Middle East, particularly the scheme for an Eastern bloc.

which would be a tool in the hands of the British, and the "Greater Syria" movement, which was a part of Britain's policy to destroy the independence of Arab countries.

On the 1st August an official communiqué was issued by the Syrian Minister of the Interior concerning the press. It declared that newspapers showed an entire lack of responsibility and patriotism both in the way they attacked the Government and Government officials and in their treatment of foreign affairs. As regards attacks on officials the Minister of the Interior has instructed all Government departments under his Ministry to institute libel actions against any paper which accused Government officials of irregular conduct. The Minister of the Interior has already ordered that a lawsuit should be instituted against a Damascus newspaper for an article on bribery in the gendarmerie. This measure has been well received by a number of newspapers not all of which normally support the Government.

Saadullah Bey Jabri, at a peace conference on the 30th July, said that all other Arab States had expressed their satisfaction with the Syrian application for a non-permanent seat in the Security Council and had promised their utmost support.

Beirut.

First reports of the Lebanese President's reaction to the proposals of the Anglo-American Committee of Experts were that he considered the scheme to be unacceptable to the Arabs; later, however, he informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that he thought the proposals constituted a reasonable basis of discussion and represented the best way out of the dilemma. At the same time he was fairly certain, speaking informally, that the Arab States would feel bound to reject the proposals. The less extreme Arab Nationalists appear to be in favour of the scheme though they would prefer outright partition; and in private conversation at least some of the more extreme Nationalists have adopted a surprisingly moderate attitude. Riad Solh, in conversation with Brigadier Clayton, stated that, while he condemned the scheme (particularly the non-inclusion in the Arab province of the Negeb area), it was in the interests of the Arabs to accept certain disadvantages in order to be rid of the problem. It seems to be generally agreed, at least in informal conversations, that the Arab States should go to London for the proposed discussions.

In the Chamber of Deputies on the 6th August, the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs reviewed Mr. Morrison's proposals and was reported in the press to have stated that when faced with partition, inasmuch as it put an end to the unity of Palestine, the Lebanese Government considered it was necessary to consult the other Arab Governments as to whether they should refuse to negotiate. He had received a telegram from the Secretary-General of the Arab League to the effect that the Arab Foreign Ministers would meet at Alexandria on the 12th August and, if necessary, would constitute a meeting of the Arab League, that the Lebanese would take the same stand as other Arab States and that the principle of partition was unacceptable. The Minister for Foreign Affairs later informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that there would be no extraordinary meeting of the Arab League, and added that his statement in the Chamber regarding the rejection of partition had been incorrectly reported. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires congratulated the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the decision to hold a meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, expressing the view that a discreet meeting *in camera* was clearly preferable to a meeting of the Arab League with its inevitable competitive orgy of patriotic oratory. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires took the opportunity of emphasising the undesirability on the eve of the London Conference of any speeches calculated to prejudice the issue.

The main development in internal politics has been a rapprochement between Riad Solh and Henri Pharaon; matters of detail remain to be settled but they have agreed to co-operate in the next Cabinet (which would be in power during the elections) on the basis of a free hand in the elections for Henri Pharaon in the Bekaa and for Riad Solh in South Lebanon. If the arrangement is maintained the position of the Nationalists will be greatly strengthened in the coming elections, but Henri Pharaon's supporters in the Independence group, such as Abdul Hamid Keramé, Abdullah Yafi and Omar Beyhonn, are not pleased.

At a meeting of the Chamber on the 6th August the deterioration in internal security in the Lebanon was discussed. The Minister of the Interior expressed his regret at the bomb outrages and stated that the Government would spare no effort to arrest the perpetrators; the Government were also taking energetic measures to disarm the population.

At a review of French and Lebanese troops on the 1st August, General Borgnis-Desbordes, Officer Commanding French Troops in the Lebanon, handed over to the Lebanese Army a quantity of army vehicles and artillery as a gift from the French Government.

Mustafa Ariss, president of the Syndicates Union, and Nicholas Shawi, editor of the Communist newspaper *Saut-esh-Shaab*, have returned from Moscow (see Weekly Political Summary No. 217, "Beirut"). A clash occurred between the gendarmerie and villagers in Ehden, a village near the Cedars; a gendarmerie lieutenant was killed and several people injured.

[E 8687/213/89]

(9)

Weekly Political Summary No. 226, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 13th August 1946.—(Received 3rd September.)
General.

THE Palestine question has again been the principal topic in the press but little if anything new in the way of comment has appeared, though certain Damascus newspapers have reverted to the theme that the Arabs should take direct action to safeguard the rights of their brethren in Palestine.

His Majesty's Legation informed the Lebanese and Syrian Governments, on instructions, that His Majesty's Government hoped that the British proposals would be accepted as a basis of discussion at the London conference but that other proposals emanating from either the Jews or the Arabs would not be excluded from discussion, that His Majesty's Government were not committed to implement the plan irrespective of the results of the conference and that the question of Jewish immigration to the Negeb and Jerusalem areas, as indeed the whole plan, would be open to discussion.

About 1,000 Armenians, mostly from Syria, left for Soviet Armenia on the 10th August. According to the press, instructions have been received from Erivan that the despatch of further immigrants should be suspended until more houses have been built for their reception.

At a meeting of representatives of Palestine, Syria and the Lebanon in connexion with frontier control at Aley on the 7th August, telegraphic, telephonic and wireless communications were considered. Both the Syrian and Lebanese Governments showed considerable reluctance to accept any financial responsibility for the necessary equipment and the question is being referred to the Government of Palestine. The Levant States were given lists of military and police officers whose duties would frequently take them across the frontier and lists of British troops stationed in the frontier area; the States undertook to provide similar lists and asked the Palestinian representatives for lists of police posts. The use by the Palestine Police and British forces of the frontier road in the Merjayoun area, which runs for some distance inside Lebanese territory, caused some difference of opinion and it was decided that representatives of the Governments concerned should examine the question on the spot. Agreement was unanimously reached on the question of frontier passes and *laissez-passer*.

Economic.

The strike of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban employees in Beirut ended on the 8th August. The employees returned to work on condition that there were no dismissals and that they were not called upon to sign any written undertakings. The Minister of the Interior agreed to study their demands for a bonus of one month's pay, and for the revision of their conditions of employment.

Press reports that the Lebanese Government have signed the Fifth Freedom Agreement with the United States of America are apparently unfounded. An agreement has, however, been reached to the effect that the Lebanese Government would grant Fifth Freedom rights if and when the Iraqi Government did so.

An agreement has been reached between the Lebanese Government and the Trans-Arabian Oil Company specifying the arrangements which would apply should the company decide to route the pipe-line through Lebanese territory. An interesting feature of the agreement is that the company have admitted the principle of transit dues.

Syria.

Saadullah Bey Jabri and Jamil Bey Mardam left Damascus in a special Egyptian aircraft on the 12th August to attend the conference of Arab Foreign Ministers in Alexandria.

The new French Minister to Syria, Jean Serres, presented his letters to the Syrian President on the 7th August; the customary formal speeches were not exchanged. On the following day M. Serres called officially on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and, according to Saadullah Bey, raised the following points:—

(a) The reopening of French schools.

Saadullah Bey replied that he would have no objection providing they complied with the Government's regulations for foreign schools; he also pointed out that no religious instruction was to be made compulsory for adherents of any different confession.

(b) The reopening of French technical and agricultural schools.

Saadullah Bey said that in future such schools would be run by the Syrians as they proposed to make English the second language.

(c) The reopening of French Consulates.

M. Serres said that the French, in the past, had consuls in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Deir-az-Zor, Lattakia and Tartous, &c. Saadullah Bey denied that the French had ever had consulates anywhere except in Damascus and Aleppo; elsewhere French officials had been representatives of the High Commissioner and he was not prepared to allow the French to open consulates except in Damascus and Aleppo.

(d) The position regarding French property in Syria.

Saadullah Bey said that he knew of no French property in Syria, but, if the Minister would present a list of properties which he claimed to be French, the list could be considered by a joint Franco-Syrian Commission.

Saadullah Bey then volunteered some advice to M. Serres as to the need for utmost discretion on the part of his staff in their actions and contacts with the Syrians if they wished to avoid incidents. He said that he himself was prepared to have official dealings with him and with members of his staff and had given instructions to the various Departments to do likewise; but he was not prepared to have any personal contact outside official business.

At the request of the Secretary-General of the Presidency, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has had an Arabic translation made of the Constitution of the United States and Amendments; at the same time the presidency procured a book on *Post-War Constitutions in Europe*. This suggests that amendments to the Syrian Constitution are being considered and that Shukri Bey Quwatli is looking for some means by which he can retain the presidency after his period of office expires in 1948; as the Constitution stands at present, he cannot be elected for the following term.

It is reported in the press that Russia is to support the Syrian application for a non-permanent seat in the Security Council and that the Yugoslav Government have indicated that they have no objection to the Syrian candidature.

It is reported that there has been a brawl arising out of a meeting at Homs between the supporters of Adnam Atassi, the Syrian Minister to France, and his brother Nazim, as to which of the two should stand for election to the Chamber of Deputies next year; four people were killed and eighty injured. Order was restored after some hours by the gendarmerie and army.

Five Christian Polish engineers have been given a three months' contract (renewable for a further period of three months) with the Mohafazate of Damascus for work on the various schemes for improvement of the city.

The Lebanon.

An explosion occurred on the evening of the 7th August at the American University of Beirut. There was no damage or casualties. On information furnished by the American Legation, three Arabs, including one Mohamet Rustam Tabbara, Secretary of the National Youth Organisation, have been arrested in connexion with the previous bomb outrages at the British Consulate-General and the American Legation. The American Minister, who saw the President on the 9th August, protested strongly against the outrage and the inability of the Lebanese authorities to trace those responsible.

The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs left Beirut on the 12th August for Alexandria to attend the Conference of the Arab Ministers for Foreign Affairs. A day or two before leaving, acting on instructions from the Lebanese President, he asked His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires to call on him to discuss the new British proposals for Palestine; he reiterated the determination of the

Lebanese Government to exercise a moderating influence at the Alexandria meeting.

The Lebanese Chamber met on the 10th August, when the Prime Minister read a lengthy statement in which he dealt with, *inter alia*, the allegations against misappropriations of money from the Piastre for the Poor Fund, the discharge of employees at the Ministry of Defence, the allocation of hard currencies, M.I.R.A. and Common Interests. A suggestion that the statement should be circulated and debated was accepted, as was also a proposal that a Parliamentary Committee should be set up in connexion with the Piastre for the Poor Fund. The latter subject was hotly debated, and the meeting ended abruptly in some confusion.

A Reuter report to the effect that M. Eddé, in conversation with a correspondent in Paris, had spoken in favour of the partition of Palestine and had referred to the establishment in the Lebanon of a Christian National Home on a par with the Jewish National Home in Palestine has been strongly criticised in the press. M. Eddé has issued a *démenti* and the incident has been the occasion of a strong attack on Reuters in the newspaper *L'Orient*.

The first manoeuvres of the Lebanese army were held over the week-end in the Shouf district, and were attended by the President of the Republic.

[E 8716/213/89]

(10)

Weekly Political Summary No. 227, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 20th August, 1946.—(Received 3rd September.)

General.

THE decision of the Alexandria Conference of Arab Foreign Ministers to send representatives to the London conference on Palestine was generally deplored in the Syrian press and unfavourably criticised in the ultra-nationalist and pro-French press of the Lebanon. The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs is reported to have said at a press conference that the decisions taken were in the interests of the Arab peoples and had been adopted unanimously; the Arab delegates would not accept to negotiate on the basis of partition. Both the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs stated to journalists that the Arab delegates would not sit at the same table as the Jews. There is a tendency on the part of a number of Syrian newspapers to suggest that the Arabs should ask for Russian support for the independence of Palestine.

Economic.

The Lebanese Cabinet have decided to engage Messrs. Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners for an economic survey of the Lebanon and the Minister of Public Works has been instructed to open negotiations for this purpose.

Syria.

The 17th August was the anniversary of Shukri Bey Quwatli's election as President of the Syrian Republic. On the 16th an Iftar was given at the Presidency in celebration of this anniversary to which members of the Syrian Cabinet, Jamil Bey Mardam, Syrian Minister to Cairo, members of the Diplomatic Corps, of the Presidency staff and His Majesty's Consul were invited. The Prime Minister was not present and it was announced that he was not well. There is some reason to think that his illness was a diplomatic (or political) one, as it is common talk that he did not welcome the celebrations. The press was far from universally laudatory towards the President on this occasion. While no direct attacks were made on him, various papers took the occasion to criticise the Government, the principal line of argument being that they are a bunch of reactionary feudal landlords who are only occupied with their personal interests.

On the 17th August a review of the Syrian Army was held in Damascus, the President taking the salute. In the evening a display of tribal dances was given by the Desert Guard under the patronage of the Minister of Defence.

At a press conference the Prime Minister is reported to have said that Syria will never recognise the Communist Party and that the Government would continue to fight communism. At the same time he affirmed that the Soviet Government would not interfere in matters concerning the Communist Party in Syria. He added that the Government had in hand social projects which would, by

ameliorating the lot of the people, leave no grounds for them to turn to communism.

The following is the present position as regards aircraft for the Syrian Government:—

Two Proctor V's have already been delivered for the use of MIRA, and two more are on order from Hunting Aviation, Limited, who have also been asked to supply six reconditioned Tiger Moth aircraft. One Fairchild purchased direct from R.A.F. disposals has already arrived and seven others are on order and expected in the near future. An order for four Piper Cubs has also been placed with an American firm.

According to the press, a Syrian Aviation School is to be opened at Mezzé early in September; agreements have been concluded with three Egyptian pilots who will be employed as instructors, while five more are expected to arrive shortly. The Syrian Ministry of Defence have decided to send one group to study aviation in Iraq and another to Egypt.

Colonel Gordon Fox, formerly head of the British training team in Syria, returned to Damascus on the 17th August as civilian adviser to the Ministry of National Defence.

Fares Khoury (Syrian Personality No. 129) and Adel Arslan (Syrian Personality No. 16) with the Syrian Minister in London will represent the Syrian Government at the forthcoming London conference on Palestine.

The consecration as bishops took place in Homs recently of two Indian Syrian Orthodox priests. They are the first Indian priests to be consecrated as Syrian Orthodox bishops. They said, in conversation with a member of the staff of His Majesty's Legation, that they were leaving the country with the impression that the Syrian Orthodox Christians were on the whole happy and contented and well treated by the Syrian Government.

Lebanon.

The First Secretary of the American Legation (the American Minister having left for the United States, where it is understood he has been entrusted with a mission to the General Assembly of the United Nations Organisation) told His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that he had been instructed by the State Department to inform His Majesty's Legation that the American Government were on the point of concluding a treaty of commerce and friendship with the Lebanese Government. He also stated that Fifth Freedom rights had been granted by the Lebanese to the United States of America. Both these statements were denied by the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

An official communiqué was published on the 15th August to the effect that two young men, Mouheiddin Kreidieh and Abdel Rahman Attar, who had been arrested in connexion with the bomb outrages at the American Legation and the British Consulate-General (see W.P.S. No. 225, General) had confessed their guilt. On the following day in a sensational article published by *El Hayat*, a certain Mohammed Shoukeir alleged that for political reasons pressure had been brought on the two men concerned, and that the Minister of the Interior had admitted to him that their confession was necessary in order to avoid implicating seven others. These allegations were denied in an official communiqué and also by the Minister of the Interior in the Chamber on the 17th August. It is, nevertheless, believed that they are substantially correct. Riad Solh, Hamid Frangieh and Habib Abi Chahla, speaking in the Chamber on the 17th August, condemned the outrage and the misguided patriotism which had been responsible for it. A motion expressing the Chamber's regret and the desire that an official apology should be conveyed to the British and American Governments was carried unanimously.

The Lebanese Minister in London will represent his Government at the forthcoming London conference on Palestine. He will be assisted by his two counsellors of legation.

A telegram protesting against the presence of French consular officials in Sidon was read in the Lebanese Chamber on the 17th August; the question has also received some attention in the press.

Three Jewish suspects were arrested on the s.s. *André Lebon* which arrived in Beirut from Haifa on the 20th August.

[E 8959/213/89]

(11)

Weekly Political Summary No. 223, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 27th August, 1946.
—(Received 10th September.)

General.

Comment on the forthcoming discussions in London on Palestine continues to be prominently featured in the press of both countries. Almost without exception newspapers warn the two Governments to refuse to discuss partition or federation, and a number of newspapers have suggested that the secret decisions taken at the Arab League Conference at Bludan should be put into effect.

Economic.

The Syrian Minister of Finance is reported in the press to have stated that a scheme has been studied for allowing the American pipe-line from Saudi-Arabia to pass through Syria and that discussions will be held with the director of the American company concerned, who will be visiting Damascus shortly.

The Lebanese press reports that the Banco di Roma will not be permitted to reopen before the liquidation of the Lebanese claims against Italy for war damage. A representative of the Italian Government is expected to arrive shortly in the Lebanon to settle outstanding financial questions before diplomatic relations are established.

Syria.

The Damascus newspapers continue their violent attacks against Saadullah Jabri's Government and against the leading members of the National bloc. Although the Prime Minister has denied that any change is imminent, there are the symptoms of absentee Ministers and rumoured resignations which normally precede a change in the Government.

The President, Saadullah Jabri, and members of the Cabinet left Damascus in an American aircraft for Aleppo, where they will stay three days for the opening of the Medical Congress. Up to the last moment Saadullah Bey Jabri declared that he was too ill to accompany the President.

Fares Bey, in conversation with a member of the Legation staff, expressed the view that he did not expect agreement to be reached at the London Conference on Palestine, but he felt that an exchange of views would be valuable; in any case, the problem could not be submitted to United Nations Organisation unless and until the discussions had broken down. He himself thought the federation plan good, except for the continuation of Jewish immigration and the uncertainty as to the future of the Negeb; as long as Jewish immigration continued so would political Zionism, and there could therefore be no finality.

An interview with M. Serres, the French Minister, was reported in two Damascus newspapers. He is stated to have said that he wished to draw an iron curtain across the past; he did not ask to be granted any special privileges; he had met with great courtesy and kindness from the Syrian authorities, and hoped that it would be possible to settle the outstanding matters between his Government and Syria, the most important of which was the question of French property; all French schools had been granted permission to reopen and had undertaken to apply the regulations of the Syrian Ministry of Education.

The Damascus press reports that the Syrian Government have received a note from the Secretariat of the Arab League asking that Syria should adhere to a common policy regarding the extradition of criminals.

In a conversation with the Oriental Secretary, Saadullah Bey complained of the action of Glubb Pasha in recruiting Syrian nationals for the Arab Legion against the wishes of the Syrian Government. He showed a letter, which he alleged had been written by a recruiting officer of the Arab Legion, offering enlistment to Syrian nationals and said that this was one of many in his possession. He went on to speak with considerable heat of King Abdullah's meddling in Syrian internal affairs, pointing out that bad relations between Syria and Trans-Jordan were not in the interests of His Majesty's Government at a time when the Palestine problem had to be solved and the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations were in progress. He asked that His Majesty's Government would use their influence to persuade King Abdullah to cease his activities in Syria. The Oriental Secretary pointed out that the Arab Legion and Glubb Pasha were the responsibility of the Government of Trans-Jordan and were in no way under the control of His Majesty's Government, and that, therefore, the matter of the recruitment of Syrian subjects should be dealt with either directly between

the Syrian and Trans-Jordan Governments or through the Arab League. Saadullah Bey made the closest enquiries as to whether the Anglo-Trans-Jordan treaty would in any way commit His Majesty's Government to take the side of Trans-Jordan in any negotiations which he might institute, pointing out that the last thing he wished for was any occasion to arise causing friction between Great Britain and Syria.

The heat and Ramadan have combined to reduce activity to a minimum in the Aleppo area. There has been, however, a number of political meetings in private houses, both of supporters and of critics of the Government. The supporters of the Greater Syria movement and the Communists are becoming more outspoken in their criticisms of each other, and threats of violence have been made. There are indications of closer co-operation between the Monarchists and the Ikhwan el Muslimin.

Lebanon.

The Lebanese President is being increasingly blamed for the failure of successive Governments to bring down the cost of living and to clean up the administration. Sheikh Bechara el Khoury is inclined to shut his eyes to his growing unpopularity in the belief that the Lebanese are dissatisfied with the Chamber of Deputies and not with himself; it is learnt that he is considering the possibility of dissolving the present Chamber.

The Najjadeh, a Youth Organisation, mostly Moslem, has been attacked in the pro-French press on the grounds that a statement recently issued by the Najjadeh demands a census in the Lebanon, ignoring Lebanese emigrants who have retained their Lebanese nationality (the majority of these are Christian), and threatens to boycott Government schools unless the curriculum is revised (the present curriculum being largely a legacy from the French).

The French cruiser "Montcalm" arrived in Beirut on the 24th August and is due to leave on the 30th carrying General Borgnis-Desbordes and the last of the French operational troops.

It is reported that the French Consul at Sidon (see Weekly Political Summary No. 227, "Lebanon") has refused to obey the instructions of the Mohafez with regard to the flying of the French flag and the wording of his doorplate.

The office of the French Délégué in Zahlé has been turned into a consulate. M. Mantel is temporarily acting as consul.

[E 9199/213/89]

(12)

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 229, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 3rd September, 1946.—(Received 17th September.)

General.

General Borgnis-Desbordes, General Officer Commanding French Forces, with members of his staff together with the last contingent of French troops, excluding a liquidation staff of 30 officers and 300 other ranks in civilian clothes, left Beirut on the French cruiser *Montcalm* on the 30th August. Farewell honours were rendered to the French commander by a detachment of Lebanese troops, the ceremony being attended by the Director-General of the Lebanese Foreign Ministry and the commander of the Lebanese army.

Economic.

The Syrian Mira up to the 22nd August had collected 130,000 tons of cereals from the 1946 crop, of which 11,000 tons is white barley and a similar amount black barley.

Further economic talks between Lebanese and Syrian representatives were held in Damascus on the 2nd September, at which decisions are understood to have been taken regarding the respective Governments' attitude towards the distribution of O.C.P. profits.

The Syrian Minister of Finance informed a member of the legation staff that the Syrian and Lebanese Governments have not yet agreed to the French proposal that £5 million sterling should be placed by the French at the disposal of the two Governments for the year 1946. They maintain that under the annex

to the Anglo-French Financial Agreement of 1944 the Syrian and Lebanese Governments themselves are entitled to decide their requirements of sterling; in these circumstances they are not prepared to accept the French figure.

Syria.

A message to the Syrian people on the occasion of Id el-Fitr from the President was published in the press in which Shukri Bey Quwatli said, *inter alia*, "On this feast the whole of the Arab peoples are awakened and looking forward with eagerness for the future. They are happy that God has granted independence to a dear part of their lands as a result of their sacrifices and look forward to the time when all Arab territories will be independent." He also mentioned the value of the Arab League, particularly in connexion with the Palestine question and expressed his belief that the Arab nations will in the future take their rightful place in the community of nations.

The President returned to Damascus by air on Friday, the 30th August, having visited Homs and Hama after presiding at the opening of the Medical Congress at Aleppo.

According to Saadullah Bey Jabri in conversation with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires and His Majesty's Consul on the 2nd September, the visit of the President to Aleppo was an unqualified success. The streets were lined by orderly crowds with banners "like a military parade," each section being marshalled under the respective heads of quarters. A great ovation was accorded to the President and no sound of criticism or opposition marked the proceedings. According to another source the visit, while not an unqualified success, went off better than had been expected.

Rumours concerning the disintegration of Saadullah Bey's Cabinet which were widely current before the end of Ramadan have died down; it appears that the disagreements between the Prime Minister and members of his Cabinet have been composed, at least for the time being. Saadullah Jabri's last minute decision to accompany the President to Aleppo (see Weekly Summary No. 228, "Syria") has been taken to indicate that the two are again working in close co-operation. It is perhaps not without interest that the violent press campaign against the present Government and the obvious rift between the President and the Prime Minister coincided almost to a day with the period of Jamil Mardam Bey's visit to the Levant States.

Saadullah Bey Jabri told His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that the Syrian Government, without consulting other Arab Governments, had informed the Palestine Higher Arab Committee that they disagreed with the decision not to attend the London Conference if partition was to be on the agenda and if the Grand Mufti was not invited.

The publication in the press of the texts of telegrams exchanged by the Presidents of the Turkish and Syrian Republics on the occasion of the re-election of Ismet Inönü to the Presidency, and the visit of three Syrian newspaper representatives to Turkey were the occasion for critical comment in a number of Damascus newspapers expressing surprise at the Syrian Government's attitude when the matter of Alexandretta was still unsettled.

The Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs informed His Majesty's Legation that the Syrian Government had decided not to permit any foreign consulates to be established in the Euphrates area, and that they therefore regretted that they were unable to "respond to the request" that Mr. Shadforth should proceed to Deir-az-Zor as British Vice-Consul. Saadullah Jabri has on previous occasions made it clear that his Government considered the Jebel Alaouite and the Jezireh district as forbidden areas. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires immediately arranged to see the Prime Minister in order to take up the matter of British consular representation in these areas. The Prime Minister explained that the measures were in no way directed against British consular officials, but were solely due to Syrian anxiety lest French, Russian, or Turkish agents should start intrigues in these areas; he hoped, he said, that his Government would find it unnecessary in a few months' time to maintain the restriction; meanwhile he had no objection to His Majesty's Consul in Aleppo visiting the Alaouite and Lattakia areas in connexion with his consular duties, providing he did not establish a residence or office in either. He also said he would be prepared to amend Mr. Vaughan-Russell's exequatur to include the Alaouite Mohafazat, although it was originally made valid only for the Aleppo Mohafazat and the municipal area. As regards Deir-az-Zor, he regretted that he was unable to agree to a British consular representative residing there. It was pointed out that the Syrian Government had in 1943 given permission for a British Consulate to be opened in Deir-az-Zor, and if they wished now to withdraw this decision,

a note to this effect should be addressed to the legation. The note already sent was not adequate, inasmuch as it refused a request which had never been made. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires pointed out that it was necessary for Mr. Shadforth to return to Deir-az-Zor in order to close down the consulate; the Prime Minister replied that he had no objection to Mr. Shadforth returning to his post for a limited time, say two or three months, in order to close it down.

Captain Hazek, an Egyptian with some twelve years' service with the Mistr Aviation Company, has arrived in Syria as adviser on aviation to the Government. He is understood to be a highly qualified English-trained pilot, who is very pro-British in outlook and a great admirer of R.A.F. methods. He has been invited to make arrangements to bring four more Egyptian pilots and one highly-qualified Egyptian engineer to Syria.

According to the Bureau de Presse et de Publication, the American T.W.A. Company has offered to place at the disposal of the Syrian Government for the pilgrimage four large air transport planes with accommodation for forty-eight passengers in each to take pilgrims direct from Damascus to Jedda. The cost of return tickets by air would not be greatly different from the normal expenses of the sea route.

Lebanon.

The Lebanese Ministry of Finance has circularised all Government Departments with a statement showing that the revenue in the 1947 budget year will not exceed £Leb. 50 million, and giving a preliminary table of expenditure amounting to £Leb. 50,256,000. The main items shown are £Leb. 10,500,000 for the Ministry of National Defence, £Leb. 10 million for the Ministry of Public Works, £Leb. 9,130,000 for the Ministry of the Interior, £L. 3,800,000 for the Ministry of Education. The total expenditure represents a reduction of some £Leb. 15 million on the current year's expenditure.

The editor of a Beirut newspaper who is now in Paris has sent a telegram to Pierre Gemayal, president of the Lebanese Phalangist Party, expressing surprise and regret that the Lebanon was not represented at the Peace Conference, in view of the contribution to the war effort in men, material and concessions made by the Lebanon which greatly exceeded those of any Middle East country.

M. Ivan Tchokime, a Russian Orientalist, has arrived for a visit to Beirut and has already made contact with a number of Lebanese distinguished in science and literature. His arrival coincided with the announcement that there is to be a Cultural Conference in Soviet Armenia next month, which will be attended by Armenians from all parts of the world, including two from the Lebanon.

A meeting was held during the week at the Lebanese Foreign Ministry with members of the French Liquidation Staff to discuss the question of the method to be followed in handing over a number of French barracks and establishments.

The statement issued by the Najjadeh Party (see Weekly Political Summary No. 228, "Lebanon") has continued to be widely discussed in the Lebanon. Pro-French circles are extremely critical, while Nationalist circles generally welcome the statement. The Maronite Patriarch, in a meeting with Maronite Deputies, is quoted by a Nationalist paper as saying that the statement has no goodwill in it, and that the Patriarchate cannot in any circumstances agree to it. He is then reported to have asked the Deputies who were present to oppose the policy of the Najjadeh Party on the grounds that the Lebanese will otherwise be submerged by the powerful Arab current which is undermining the economics of the country and placing the Lebanon at the mercy of "others." A deputation representing the Palestine Najjadeh Party visited Beirut and met representatives of the Lebanese Najjadeh.

The French Vice-Consul in Sidon, after receiving a letter from the Mohafez of South Lebanon stating that he could not recognise the status of the French Vice-Consul in Sidon before the conclusion of a Consular Agreement between the Lebanon and France, has taken down the doorplate and no longer flies the French flag—see Weekly Political Summary No. 228, "Lebanon."

Extract from *Weekly Political Summary No. 230, Secret, Syria and Lebanon*, 10th September, 1946.—(Received 21st September.)

General.

Nothing to report.

Economic.

Arrangements for the liquidation of the O.C.P. are still hanging fire. At an interview with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, the Syrian Minister of National Economy stated that he could not agree to a meeting of French, British, Lebanese and Syrian representatives to discuss the division of the profits since the French were not concerned in the matter. He did not, however, contend Mr. Young's point that the Syrian and Lebanese Governments could not bilaterally liquidate the quadripartite organisation. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires said that he could not agree to tripartite discussions about the distribution of the profits unless the Minister of National Economy was prepared to give him an undertaking that the discussions would result in the British claim to a share of the profits being accepted. The Minister of National Economy regretted that he was unable to give this assurance, and Mr. Young informed him that in the circumstances he would be raising the matter with the Syrian President and, until the British claim was met, the O.C.P. profits would have to remain in the bank, profiting no one. The President subsequently told Mr. Young that he was ignorant of the question, but would give it sympathetic consideration.

The Lebanese President has now made the following counter-offer for the purchase of the Haifa-Tripoli Railway:—

- (a) The payment of £Leb. 3 million over a ten-year period.
- (b) The Lebanese Government to reserve the right to buy as much of the rolling-stock as would be necessary to exploit the railway.
- (c) The Lebanese Government to indemnify the owners of land through which the railway passes.

Mr. Matheson, of the Imperial Bank of Iran (see Weekly Political Summary No. 224, Economic), has been informed that his application to open a branch of the bank has been approved and officially registered.

The chief representative in Syria of Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners has left for the United Kingdom on the 6th September with a provisional report, which he intends to have published after it has been approved by the firm, and to bring it with him on his return to Damascus in the near future.

It is learnt that the Banque de Syrie et du Liban recently asked the Syrian Government to agree to an increase in the bank's capital. This request has been refused.

Syria.

During the past month there have been reports from various parts of Syria of incidents in which Syrian security authorities have been involved. Following the incidents reported in previous summaries at Homs, Hama, and in the Alaouite mountains, at Zebdani, near Bludan, some 25 miles from Damascus, trouble occurred during the week between villagers and an armed Mira guard under the control of Faisal el Assali, a nephew of the Minister of the Interior. Gendarmerie, with armoured cars, restored order after some forty people had been arrested. In the Jebel Druze Syrian soldiers have fired on a number of Druze near the frontier, killing two. The Druze maintain that the firing was unprovoked and are threatening reprisals, the soldiers maintain that the Druze were engaged in smuggling, and did not stop when challenged. In the Alaouite territory a serious clash is reported to have taken place between Government forces and the followers of Suleiman Murshid, when messengers from King Abdullah to Suleiman Murshid were intercepted, and the Syrian Government sent a force of gendarmes with tanks and armoured cars to arrest Suleiman Murshid. Fighting is still believed to be going on in the area between Tel Kalakh and Jobit.

A number of indications are combining to suggest that Shukri Bey Quwatli is endeavouring to exercise a moderating influence in the Arab world over the Palestine question and has exerted himself to persuade the Arab Palestine Higher Committee that the decision to boycott the London Conference was harmful to

Arab interests. Akram Zueiter, Izzat Darwaza and Wassef Kamal, three Palestine Arab leaders now resident in Syria as political exiles, left Damascus by air on the 7th September for Cairo on their way to see the Grand Mufti at Alexandria. According to Muhsin Bey Barazi, first secretary at the Presidency, before they left they had an interview with the President, who urged them to impress upon the Mufti the desirability of moderation and the advantages of the Higher Committee accepting the invitation of His Majesty's Government to go to London. All three, it is understood, showed understanding of the President's arguments. Ahmed Hilmi Pasha, another Palestinian leader, and his father, Ahmed Khudeira, are now on a visit to Damascus in connexion with their financial interests and have called upon the President, who again took the opportunity of expressing to them his views, and urging them to use their influence to persuade the Higher Committee to adopt a less intransigent attitude.

A report received from His Majesty's Consul in Aleppo throws a somewhat different light on the President's recent visit to Aleppo (see Weekly Political Summary No. 228, Syria). His Majesty's Consul reports that the general public showed very little interest or enthusiasm towards the President and the Ministers who accompanied him. The crowds lining the streets were small and listless, and the number of visitors who attended the President's reception were much smaller than had been expected. A special procession to welcome the President was organised later during his visit, which resulted in some 10,000 persons taking part.

According to the press the following resolutions and decisions were passed at the Arab Medical Congress held in Aleppo recently: (a) Extensive campaigns to be launched in country districts of all member States of the Arab League in conjunction with the exhibition of films dealing with hygiene; (b) the establishment of centres of hygiene throughout the Arab districts of Palestine; (c) the organisation of a boycott of Zionist pharmaceutical establishments and medical products; (d) organisation of meetings to discuss public health in every Arab city where future conferences are held; (e) the discussion at the next conference of the use of penicillin, dysentery, its prevention and cure, labour hygiene, and the eastern ulcer; (f) a preliminary agreement that the next conference would be held in Tunis, Khartum or Cairo, according to circumstances.

The Ikhwan el Muslimin held a youth training camp at Yabroud lasting from the 30th August to the 2nd September, in which detachments of Futuwwa from all centres of the Ikhwan took part. This camp was followed by a meeting in Damascus of representatives from all over Syria.

Fares Bey Khouri and the Emir Ardel Arslan, the Syrian representatives to the London Conference on Palestine, left Damascus for Egypt on the 6th September.

A telegram addressed to His Majesty's Legation at Damascus was received from delegates elected at a meeting organised by the Arab National Party of Aleppo protesting against French policy and actions in North Africa. Amongst the signatories was Rushdi Kekhria, the leader of the Opposition Party in the Syrian Chamber of Deputies. Considerable publicity was subsequently given in the Damascus press to news of the "Tunisian revolt against French rule and French atrocities," and the French were accused of keeping up their aggressive policy against the Arabs.

Lebanon.

A communiqué issued to the Lebanese press on the 7th September by the Franco-Lebanese Evacuation Commission stated that during the month of August 201 officers, 2,038 n.c.o.s and other ranks were evacuated or demobilised. The statement also announced the termination of the French Aviation Command in the Middle East, and of the French Naval Command, with the departure of the two commanding officers.

The Lebanese Chamber of Deputies met on the 4th and 10th September. On the 4th September Habib Abi Chahla made a long speech criticising a number of aspects of the Government policy, particularly in connexion with the economic and financial plight of the country. He urged that the Government should engage experts to lay down a co-ordinated and constructive policy. Other Deputies criticised the Government for the favouritism shown in the making of Government appointments, excessive taxes imposed on industries and their failure to encourage the tourist industry. One Deputy complained that while the Arab League had been partly successful in the political field, it had failed completely in matters of economic interest to the Arab States. At the meeting of the Chamber on the 10th September the sum of £Leb. 12 million was voted by a large majority for the construction of a modern aerodrome at Khalde, some 10 kilom. south of Beirut.

Several anti-Government newspapers in Beirut have published a joint statement issued by the Syrian and Lebanese Communist Parties on the occasion of the complete military evacuation of the Levant States. Pamphlets containing the statement have also been distributed in the principal towns of both countries. The statement says that the Communists have come to the conclusion that British economic, political and colonial interference in the internal affairs of both countries is what has prevented, and is still preventing, the establishment of stability of economic, political and social progress in Syria and the Lebanon.

A memorandum was presented to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the 6th September drawn up by the "Political Committee of the Christian Moslem Conference." The general gist of the document was that the British have let the Arabs down completely and that the latter will consequently turn to Russia for support. The Christian Moslem Conference, which was held recently in Alep, was in no way supported by the Lebanese Government, nor, so far as is known, by other Arab Governments; no one of accepted political importance took part.

CHAPTER VI.—TRANSJORDAN

[E 6403/5507/80]

No. 37

General Sir A. Cunningham to Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated by Colonial Office; Received 9th July.)

Sir,

Jerusalem, 18th June, 1946.

I HAVE the honour to submit an account of the ceremonies at Amman on the occasion of the proclamation of the independence of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan and of His Highness the Amir Abdullah as King.

2. The ceremonies opened at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 25th May with a special session of the Legislative Council of Transjordan, at which an amendment was passed to the Organic Law replacing all references to His Highness the Amir Abdullah by references to His Majesty King Abdullah the First of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan. The amending law also removed certain references to the mandatory Power which appeared in the previous text. The Legislative Council then issued a proclamation declaring Transjordan to be a completely independent State with Abdullah Ibn Hussein as King.

3. A delegation consisting of the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and four members of the Legislative Council then proceeded to the Palace in order to obtain the consent of His Highness to the draft law. Following the assent of His Highness, the amendment came into force and the head of the State became King. Upon the return of the delegation to the Legislative Council the Prime Minister read to the public the text of the amending law and of the proclamation of the council. This reading was marked by a salute of 101 guns.

4. At 10.30 a.m. His Majesty the King arrived in the Throne Room of the palace, in which were assembled the Council of Ministers, the Legislative Council, distinguished visitors, official delegations and heads of departments of the Transjordan Government. His Majesty was presented with a scroll commemorating his accession, together with a copy of the Koran in a golden box, presented by the people of Amman. After a speech read by the Minister for Foreign Affairs inaugurating the new era, His Majesty made a brief reply. The Qadi al Quda then recited a prayer for the country and its ruler; after which the King left the Throne Room and the ceremony ended.

5. Besides myself, those present in the Throne Room included His Royal Highness the Regent of Iraq, accompanied by Sayyed Ali Mumtaz, General Ismail Nameq and General Nuri Pasha-es-Said; the British Resident of Transjordan, Mr. A. S. Kirkbride; the Commander-in-chief, Middle East, General Sir Bernard Paget; Vice-Admiral Sir William Tennant; Air Marshal Sir Charles Medhurst; the General Officer Commanding Troops in Palestine and Transjordan; the Chief Secretary to the Government of Palestine; members of the consular corps accredited to Transjordan; a member of the Lebanese Cabinet and a number of Lebanese officers; Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, secretary-general of the Council of the Arab League (who, I am told, had come uninvited); and a number of Syrian and Iraqi tribal chiefs, including Fawaz Sha'lan and Sufuq Ajil. His Highness the Amir Seif el Islam Abdullah was to have represented his father, the Imam of the Yemen, but, owing to unforeseen delays, did not arrive at Amman until late on the following evening.

6. There followed a review of detachments of the Arab Legion at a parade on the R.A.F. landing ground at Amman. The parade included mounted police, desert camel police, infantry companies and part of the mechanised brigade, numbering some 2,500 men of all ranks. The King and the Regent of Iraq drove in the same car throughout the proceedings and took the salute together at the march past. On all appropriate occasions the Transjordan and Iraqi national anthems were both played, in that order. At His Majesty's invitation, I followed the King and the Regent during the inspection of the parade in the second car, accompanied by Sir Bernard Paget.

7. The drill during the parade was of a high standard and the parade itself was an unqualified success, although, as is usual on Arab occasions of this kind, the spectators defied any attempt to limit them to their proper enclosures. The traffic to and from the landing ground verged at times on the chaotic. The large crowd, however, remained in a good humour, despite the heat and dust, and gave the Royal Party an enthusiastic reception.

An *alfresco* luncheon was served in the garden of the Arab Legion depot after the parade.

8. I remained in Amman for the State dinner at the palace in the evening and returned to Jerusalem the same night. Most visitors, however, left Amman after lunch, owing to the shortage of accommodation. I understand that Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha expressed his gratification at the arrangements made by the R.A.F. for his journey by air between Cairo and Amman.

9. The following day was devoted to various entertainments and festivities, all the official ceremonies having been completed on the first day. On the 27th the remaining visitors were taken to Jerash for a visit to the antiquities site and a picnic luncheon.

10. Iraq, the Lebanon and the Yemen were the only Arab States to send official delegations to Amman. The Syrian Government not only did not send an official delegation, but appears to have been at considerable pains to prevent visitors from Syria from travelling to Transjordan to take part in the celebrations. His Majesty made some bitter comments to me on this matter. Apart from your message of congratulations and good wishes, messages were also received from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Commander-in-Chief Middle East, the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief on behalf of the Chief of the Air Staff and all ranks of the Royal Air Force, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean. These messages were delivered to the King by Mr. Kirkbride. His Majesty also received numerous messages from his friends and acquaintances in various parts of the British Empire.

11. Although no references were made in public to closer union between Transjordan and Iraq, the arrangements made and the large influx of Iraqi visitors, official and unofficial, tended to emphasise the existing spirit of friendship and co-operation between the two Hashimite States. The crowds were in very good humour, and British visitors were given a friendly welcome. His Majesty himself spoke publicly on several occasions of the debt which he and the people of Transjordan owed to Great Britain for having raised them within twenty-five years from an unknown corner of the Ottoman Empire to the status of an independent kingdom.

12. Efficient arrangements were made for broadcasting of the ceremonies, which were attended by representatives of the British Broadcasting Corporation, the Palestine Broadcasting Service and the Sharq el Adna. There were also numerous cinematograph operators and photographers and representatives of the American, European, Palestine and Iraqi press. The frontier with Palestine was thrown open for the occasion and no visas or other formalities were required by the Transjordan authorities for persons moving between the two countries. This privilege also applied to Jewish visitors.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to the British Middle East Office, Cairo, His Majesty's Ambassadors in Cairo and Bagdad, and to His Majesty's Ministers in Jedda and Beirut.

I have, &c.

A. B. CUNNINGHAM,
High Commissioner for Palestine.

[E 7745/5507/80]

No. 38

Sir A. Kirkbride to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 10th August.)

(No. 23.)

Sir,

Amman, 27th July, 1946.

I HAVE the honour to submit a brief description of the system used in Transjordan for carrying out elections for the Legislative Council.

2. The Legislative Council consists, at present, of sixteen elected members and six *ex officio* members who are the members of the Council of Ministers which is provided for in article 20 of the Organic Law. The Prime Minister presides over the meetings of the Legislative Council.

3. Transjordan is divided into four electoral districts:—

Ajlun district which returns three Moslem members and one Christian member.

Belqa district which returns five Moslem members, two of whom are Circassians, and one Christian member.

Kerak district which returns two Moslem members and one Christian member.

Ma'an district which returns one Moslem member.

In addition to these four districts, the nomadic tribes of Transjordan, which are specified by name in the Electoral Law, return two members by a special system described in paragraph 7 of this letter.

It will be noted that, in order to ensure the adequate representation of all communities on the Council, there is differentiation in the distribution of seats on religious, racial and social lines. In practice the system works satisfactorily, and the present division of seats is approximately proportionate to the numbers of the various communities of the country.

4. The elections of the Councillors are conducted in two stages. Every male Transjordanian, not being a member of a nomadic tribe, who has completed his eighteenth year, is entitled to vote in the primary elections, subject to the usual disqualifications regarding lunacy, bankruptcy, interdiction by courts, &c.

The electoral districts are divided into convenient voting areas, in which every 200 primary electors return one secondary elector. The secondary elector must be a person registered as a primary elector in the district for which he is returned.

The differentiation between the various communities does not apply, in law, at this stage of the elections, but, in practice, the primary electors of each community return as secondary electors members of that community.

5. Every male Transjordanian who has completed his thirtieth year is eligible to be a member of the Legislative Council, subject to the following disqualifications:—

- (a) A claim to foreign nationality or protection.
- (b) Undischarged bankruptcy.
- (c) Interdiction by a competent court.
- (d) Conviction for an offence not of a political nature.
- (e) Tenure of an office of profit under the Transjordan Government.
- (f) The holding of a material interest in any contract with a public department of the Transjordan Government.

Candidates for membership of the Legislative Council must be secondary electors for the district they wish to represent, and must be nominated for election by five other duly qualified secondary electors.

If the number of persons nominated does not exceed the number to be elected, the persons nominated become members of the Legislative Council without further formality, otherwise they are elected by a secret ballot of the secondary electors for the district.

6. At the ballot the secondary electors are given a paper which shows the names of all the persons nominated, and each records his vote against the name of the candidate which he selects for each of the seats in the Council by which his district will be represented. For instance, in the Ajlun district each secondary elector may give one vote to each of three Moslem candidates and one Christian candidate on the list of such shown on the ballot paper.

This means that, while the actual membership of the Council is divided on communal lines, each member has, nevertheless, been selected by the whole of the electorate of the district which he represents.

7. As regards the two members furnished by the nomadic tribes, these are elected by two commissions of ten members each. The two commissions represent respectively the tribes of the north and the tribes of the south; these members are tribal sheikhs nominated by an order of the King.

The law does not restrict the choice of the commissions in any way, but, in practice, the persons elected are taken from amongst the most influential tribal leaders of the two zones, north and south.

8. In describing the salient features of the electoral system in Transjordan, I have not thought it necessary to set out details of the procedure followed in such matters as the preparation of lists of voters, objections to nominations, the control of ballots, &c., because this varies little from that used elsewhere for these purposes.

9. The idea of an election in two stages was inherited from the Ottoman Empire, and the system was designed to suit the needs of a population which was largely illiterate: the intention being to ensure that the members of the Council were selected from and elected by persons of substance and influence.

The restriction of the election of the members to a relatively few secondary electors enables the central authority to exercise some influence over the final ballot. It also had the disadvantage of opening the way to abuse in the form of the sale of votes by secondary electors, which would not be possible if the candidate for membership was dealing with thousands of voters in a single-stage election instead of scores of voters in a two-stage election.

10. On the whole, however, the system works quite well and is still popular, although there is a growing feeling evident amongst the new and better educated generation that it should be replaced by a single-stage election, which would offer a better chance of success to those who do not belong to the traditional and conservative class of notable.

The change will, no doubt, become inevitable in time.

I have, &c.

A. S. KIRKBRIDE.

[E 8470/8470/80]

No. 39

Sir A. Kirkbride to Mr. Bevin. (Received 28th August)

(No. 31)

Sir,

Amman, 6th August, 1946

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a first list of notable personalities in Transjordan.

I have, &c.

A. KIRKBRIDE.

Enclosure in No. 39

Personalities in Transjordan⁽¹⁾

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Royal House of Transjordan

1. 'Abdullah ibn Hussein, G.C.M.G., C.B.E.

King of Transjordan, second son of the late King Hussein of the Hejaz, born at Mecca in 1889. Moved from Mecca to Constantinople with his father about 1899 and lived in Turkey thereafter until his father was appointed Amir of Mecca by the Ottoman Government in 1908.

He was Deputy for Mecca in the first Turkish Parliament after the grant of the new Constitution by the late Sultan Abdel Hameed.

Married, as his first wife, the daughter of his paternal uncle Nasr ibn Hussein, with issue of one son, Talal, and two daughters, Haya and Munira.

His second wife was a Turkish lady, with issue of one son, Naif, and one daughter, Makbula.

He undertook the preliminary discussions with the late Lord Kitchener which led ultimately to the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Turks in 1916. During the revolt he commanded the southern Arab army which operated in the vicinity of Medina and ultimately accepted the surrender of the Turkish garrison of that city.

After the end of hostilities he became his father's Minister for Foreign Affairs. There was a family agreement that in the new Arab Empire he would be King of Iraq, while his brother Faisal took over Syria. Faisal, however, lost Syria and was subsequently made King of Iraq by agreement of the Allied Powers, leaving Abdullah with a grievance and few prospects. He thereupon resigned his post as Minister and set out with a force of some 2,000

men with the avowed intention of reconquering Syria on his own account. He arrived at Ma'an in the winter of 1920-21 and waited to see what His Majesty's Government, who were responsible for the several local governments set up in the districts of Ajlun, Belqa and Kerak of what is now Transjordan, would do. As no action was taken, he advanced to Amman in March 1921 and took over power from the local governments. His arrival was welcomed generally and he established the present administrative machinery which now constitutes the Government of Transjordan.

His position in Transjordan was accepted by His Majesty's Government a few months later and regularised formally by the Transjordan Agreement of 1928, an instrument which remained in force with some slight amendment until replaced by the Transjordan Treaty of 1946.

He assumed the title of King of Transjordan in May 1946, after the international recognition of Transjordan as an independent State.

He paid official visits to the United Kingdom in 1922, 1935, 1937 and 1946.

2. Talal ibn 'Abdullah

Amir and heir apparent. Born at Mecca about thirty-nine years ago. Educated privately in Transjordan and subsequently sent to Sandhurst after a period of private tuition in the United Kingdom.

Married Zein, the daughter of his maternal uncle, Sherif Jamil ibn Nasr, with issue of two sons, Hussein and Mohamed.

Possesses a highly strung temperament and a quick temper, but is intelligent; he was on bad terms with his father for many years and his conduct was so unsatisfactory during the early part of last war that he was excluded from the succession by a secret order under the law regarding succession to the Amirate.

Latterly, however, he has been at pains to reconcile his father and to mend his ways generally and, as his brother Naif had in the meantime shown signs of irresponsibility, he was restored to the succession in February 1946.

It is probable that his early unsatisfactory conduct was due largely to his close association with his cousin, the late King Ghazi of Iraq, of whom he was a great admirer.

3. Naif ibn 'Abdullah

Second son of the King and half-brother of Talal. Born at Mecca about thirty years ago. Educated

privately and then sent to the Victoria College at Alexandria.

Married a granddaughter of the late Sultan 'Abdel Mejid of Turkey, with issue of one son, 'Ali.

Lacks intelligence, but got on better with his father in the past, because of his lack of character, than was the case with Talal. He has fallen out of favour of late owing to his association with contraband trade and other irresponsible activities.

4. Amira Haya

Eldest daughter, married to a nonentity, 'Abdel Kerim Haidar, a member of the allied branch of the Hashemite family known as the Dhawi Zeid.

5. Amira Munira

Second daughter, unmarried.

6. Amira Makbula

Married to the Amir Hussein ibn Nasr, brother of Talal's mother.

7. Sheikh Ahmed Saqqaf

Rais Diwan, born at Mecca about seventy years ago. A pensioner of the Hashemite family who has been given the present post in order to relieve the privy purse of the cost of his upkeep.

8. Hussein Bey Sarraj

Chamberlain, born at Mecca about forty years ago.

Educated at the American University at Beirut and has served in a number of posts in the District Administration before taking over his present appointment. Speaks English fluently.

9. 'Abdel Hameed Sarraj

Master of Ceremonies. The brother of Hussein Bey Sarraj.

10. Dr. Showkat es Sati

Private physician to the King, born at Constantinople about forty-five years ago of Arab parents. Qualified in medicine at Constantinople and given a commission in the Turkish army, from which he deserted in order to come to Transjordan. Does not take an active interest in politics.

Council of Ministers

11. Ibrahim Pasha Hashim, C.B.E.

Prime Minister, born at Nablus about sixty-two years ago. Educated at the Law School, Constantinople, and served the Ottoman Government in various judicial posts until 1918, when he became president of the Court of Appeal at Damascus under the late King Faisal. Moved to Transjordan after the French occupation of Syria in 1920.

Held numerous judicial and financial posts in Transjordan, including those of Minister of Justice, Minister of Finance and Chief Minister. He resigned from the post of Chief Minister in 1938 and took up banking until recalled as Prime Minister in 1945. He signed the Transjordan Treaty of 1946.

A shrewd lawyer and a judge of wide experience, but his work as an administrator suffers from his liking to take the line of least resistance. Moderate in his political views and a sincere believer in the value of Anglo-Arab co-operation.

12. Sheikh Fahmy Hashim.

Qadhi el Qudat and Minister of Education, born at Nablus about sixty-two years ago and a relation of the Prime Minister.

A graduate of the El Azhar University of Cairo who spent the whole of his career in the Sharia Courts. Surprisingly broad-minded for a religious sheikh, follows the Prime Minister's lead in politics.

13. Mussalam Pasha Attar

Minister of Justice, born at Damascus about fifty-five years ago. Educated at Constantinople and served in the District Administration under the Ottoman Government, the late King Faisal and, finally, in Transjordan, until he retired on pension in 1940. First appointed to a ministerial post in 1945.

A pleasant character, but somewhat ineffective as a Minister.

14. Mohamed Pasha Shureiki

Minister of Finance and Foreign Affairs, born at Lattakia about fifty years ago. Served in the Department of Education of Transjordan from 1925 until his appointment as Minister in 1945.

Stubborn and argumentative, constitutionally inclined to be obstructive but his honesty of purpose redeems many of his shortcomings. Strongly Nationalist in his politics.

⁽¹⁾ Unless otherwise stated the person^s mentioned in this list are Moslem Arabs.

15. Nicola Bey Ghanma

Minister of Trade and Economics, born at el Husn (near Irbid) about fifty years ago. A member of the Greek Orthodox Community. Served for twenty years as a judge in the Judicial Department from which he retired on pension in 1939. First appointed Minister in 1941. His great virtue is his determination not to cause trouble to any one.

Elected Members of the Legislative Council

17. Sabri Bey Taba'a

Represents the Moslem Arabs of the Amman constituency; a native of Damascus aged about 50. A merchant by profession and president of the Amman Chamber of Commerce. His commercial reputation is good and his politics follow directives from the palace.

18. Fowzi Bey el Mufti

Represents the Circassian communities in the Amman constituency. A Circassian of about 40 years of age, born at Amman; the owner of a considerable landed property. A nonentity and under the influence of his elder brother, Said Pasha el Mufti.

19. Hussein Bey Khawaja

Represents the Circassian communities of the Amman constituency. A Circassian of about 40 years of age, born at Wadi Sir village near Amman. A small holding cultivator of little influence.

20. Haj Sa'ud Pasha Nabulsi

Represents the Moslem Arabs of the Belqa constituency. A native of Nablus of about 60 years of age, settled in Transjordan, where he owns large estates, since his youth. A popular figure in the land-owning class with moderate political views.

21. Sheikh Nofan es Sa'ud

Represents the Moslem Arabs of the Belqa constituency. A member of the Adwan tribe of about 50 years of age.

22. Salameh Twal

Represents the Christian Arabs of the Belqa constituency. A native of Madeba of about 36 years of age, member of the Greek Orthodox community. A wholesale merchant by profession with some influence amongst the bedouin tribes of the Madeba sub-district.

23. Salem Pasha Hindawi

Represents the Moslem Arabs of 'Ajlun constituency. A native of Naimah village where he owns a large estate, of about 45 years of age. A popular figure with some personality. He was exiled for two years in 1930 and 1931 for opposition to the Government and to the head of the State, but has now made his peace with the authorities and exercises a moderating influence.

24. 'Abdel Qader Bey el Tel

Represents the Moslem Arabs of the 'Ajlun constituency. A native of Irbid, where he owns both urban and rural property. Aged about 45, a mischief maker and intriguer by taste and extremely anti-foreigner in politics.

Heads of Departments

33. Dr. Jamil Pasha Tutunji

Director of the Department of Health, about 50 years of age and born at Damascus. Qualified medicine at the American University of Beirut and came to Transjordan with King 'Abdullah ibn

16. 'Omar Bey Ma'ani

Minister of Communications, born at Ma'an about fifty years ago. Served in the District Administration prior to becoming a Minister.

Poorly educated but honest and determined in character.

His politics follow directives from the palace.

25. Musa Awad el Hejazi

Represents the Moslem Arabs of the 'Ajlun constituency. Born at Irbid, where he owns rural property, about 35 years of age. Without personal influence, having been elected on the strength of his family connexions.

26. 'Issa el Awad

Represents the Christian Arabs of the 'Ajlun constituency. Born at El Husn about sixty years ago and a member of the Greek Orthodox Community. Served for many years as an official in the Department of Customs and now owns a number of commercial ventures, including a tannery.

27. Ma'arek Pasha el Mejali

Represents the Moslem Arabs of the Kerak constituency. Born at Kerak about fifty years ago, a member of the Mejali tribe and the owner of a large estate.

A meek individual who was elected on the strength of his late father's reputation. His politics follow directives from the palace.

28. Hussein Pasha el Tirro

Represents the Moslem Arabs of the Kerak constituency. Born at Kerak about seventy-five years ago; a member of the Tarauneh tribe. Wealthy but mean and, in consequence, unpopular. In politics identified with Haj Amin el Husseini of whom he is a great admirer. *Mal ra* in palace circles.

29. Yusef Bey el Akasheh

Represents the Christian Arabs of the Kerak constituency. Born at Kerak about forty years ago and a member of the Roman Catholic (Latin) community. Served for some time in the Judicial Department of the Transjordan Government and now practises as a lawyer.

30. Mahmoud Pasha Kreishan

Represents the Moslem Arabs of the Ma'an constituency. Born at Ma'an some sixty-five years ago, a merchant and landowner. Illiterate and entirely under palace influence.

31. Sheikh Adhoub ibn Zeben

Represents the nomadic tribes of the northern part of the desert area. Born about fifty-five years ago and a member of the Beni Sakhr tribe. Entirely under palace influence.

32. Sheikh Hamed ibn Jazi

Represents the nomadic tribes of the southern part of the Desert Area. Born about sixty-five years ago and a member of the Howaitat tribe of which he is the paramount chief. Wealthy but inclined to be avaricious. Entirely under palace influence.

Hussein as the latter's private physician in 1921; became director of the department in 1939. A good administrator although only a moderate physician. Does not interest himself actively in politics. Speaks fluent English.

34. Subhi Bey Kahali

Director of the Department of Public Works, born at Damascus forty-five years ago and qualified in Civil Engineering at the American University of Beirut. A sound engineer with good practical experience in his work but rather lacking in energy. Does not interest himself actively in politics. Speaks fluent English.

35. Nassouh Eff el Taher

Director of Agriculture, born at Nablus about forty years ago. Was employed for many years as Agricultural Inspector by the Department of Agriculture in Palestine from which he resigned in 1945 in order to take up his present post. An expert in olive culture and a sound general agriculturist but handicapped by deafness. Does not interest himself actively in politics. Speaks fluent English.

36. 'Abbas Pasha Mirza, M.B.E.

Director of the Department of Interior. A Circassian born at Jerash about fifty years ago, served in the District Administration from 1922 until he was appointed to his present post in 1944. A good administrator and a strong character but of rather doubtful honesty, having acquired wealth in a mysterious manner during the early years of the war.

37. Saleh Bey Besseiso

Director of the Department of Justice, born at Gaza about sixty-five years ago. Was educated at the Law School at Constantinople and served the Ottoman Government in various judicial capacities.

District Administration

42. Sidki Bey Qassim

Warden of the capital, born at Tulkarem about fifty years ago. Served in the Ottoman army from 1914 to 1918 and joined the Arab Legion in 1922. Transferred from the Arab Legion to the District Administration in 1939. A good administrator but hampered in his work by indifferent health. In politics, always supports the Government in power.

43. Falah Pasha Madadha

Mutassarif of the 'Ajlun district, born at Kerak about fifty-five years ago. Served in the Judicial Department from 1922 until 1940 when he was transferred from a presidency of the Court of First Instance to the District Administration. A strong character and an efficient administrator. Inclined to be chauvinistic in his political views.

44. Baha el Din Toucan

Mutassarif of the Belqa District, born at Es Salt about forty years ago. Educated in Palestine and employed in the Department of Education of Trans-

prior to the 1914-18 war. Came to Transjordan in 1922 and served as a judge until transferred to his present post from the presidency of the Court of Appeal at Amman. Does not interest himself actively in politics.

38. Yacoub Bey Sukkar

Postmaster-General, born at Es Salt about fifty years ago. A member of the Greek Orthodox community. Served for many years as headmaster of the Arts and Crafts School before being appointed to his present post. Speaks English fluently.

39. Abul Nasr Bey el Mufti

Treasurer, born at Amman about fifty years ago. Has served in the Treasury since 1925, possesses a sound knowledge of financial procedure but is inclined to be pettifogging. Suffers from a tendency toward xenophobia.

40. Natm Bey Irfan

Director of the Agricultural Bank, born at Damascus about forty-five years ago. Has occupied financial posts in Transjordan since 1925. Does not take an active interest in politics.

41. Siyah Bey Roussan

Acting Director of Education, born in Irbid about forty years ago. Not very efficient in his work and a member of the political party which claims Transjordan for locally-born people to the exclusion of Arabs from neighbouring territories.

Jordan until 1941 when he was seconded to the B.B.C. as an Arabic announcer; he returned to Transjordan in 1944 and was then appointed to the District Administration.

Acted as secretary to the Prime Minister of Transjordan during the negotiations in London in connexion with the Transjordan Treaty of 1946. Clever but shallow. Speaks English fluently.

45. Mahmud Bey el Daher

Mutassarif of the Kerak district, born at Es Salt about forty-five years ago. Has spent the whole of his career in the District Administration. Belongs to the political party which wants Transjordan cleared of intruders from neighbouring Arab countries.

46. Mohamed 'Ali el Kurdi

Mutassarif of the Ma'an district, born at Amman about forty-five years ago. An efficient civil servant with few interests outside his work. Does not take an active interest in politics.

Other Persons of Influence

47. 'Abdel Qader Pasha el Jundi, O.B.E.

Second-in-command of the Arab Legion, born at Damascus about fifty-five years ago. Educated at the Military College, Constantinople, and a regular officer in the Ottoman army until 1918. Joined the Arab Legion in 1921. A professional soldier with a keen sense of duty and loyalty. Patriotic but realises that Anglo-Arab co-operation is of value to both races.

48. 'Abdel Mahdi Bey Shemaileh

Born at Kerak about sixty-five years ago. Served for fifteen years in the District Administration and was appointed later Minister of Communications. After leaving office as a result of a change of Government, took up cultivation in the Jordan valley with great success. A fiery, impulsive and

energetic individual, holding, nevertheless, political views of a moderate nature. Not on good terms with King 'Abdullah.

49. Haditha el Kreisha

Sheikh of the Kharshan section of the Beni Sakhr tribe, born in Transjordan about seventy years ago. An attractive personality with dignity and courtesy but possessing a fanatical twist in religious matters which makes him a potential source of trouble in times of political stress.

50. Haidar Bey Shukri

Manager of the Ottoman Bank at Amman, born at Haifa about forty-eight years ago. Came to Amman as assistant manager of the bank twenty years ago. A sound financier with considerable influence in local business circles. Speaks French and English fluently.

51. *Mithqal el Faiz*

Paramount Sheikh of the Beni Sakhr tribe, born near Madaba about sixty-eight years ago. A source of much trouble during the early years of the Amirate of Transjordan owing to a greedy and turbulent nature but now matured and quietened by age. From being a raider of renown in his youth, Mithqal is now a landowner with a residence at Amman.

52. *Mohamed 'Ali Bey Ajluni*

Born at Anjara (near Ajlun) about fifty years ago. Served in the Arab Legion until 1936 when he resigned in order to join those directing the Arab rebellion in Palestine from Damascus. Trouble over the expenditure of rebel funds entrusted to his care in 1938 resulted in a hasty return to Amman. Cultivates a fictitious reputation for heroism and patriotism. Head of the movement referred to elsewhere for excluding from Transjordan persons from neighbouring Arab countries. Bitterly anti-British.

53. *Paul Salman*

Greek Catholic Archbishop of Philadelphia and Petra, born in the Lebanon about fifty-five years ago. Of great learning and piety with considerable personal influence over members of communities other than his own, including many Moslems.

54. *Said Pasha el Mufti*

Leader of the Caucasian communities of Transjordan, born at Amman about fifty years ago. Held

posts in the District Administration and was Minister of Communications in 1945. Courageous but rather slow in the uptake. Politically moderate.

55. *Samir Pasha Rifai*

Born at Safad about forty-eight years ago and educated in Palestine. Held numerous administrative and ministerial appointments between 1921 and 1945, when he became Prime Minister for a period of eight months. Intelligent but is inclined to apply the principle that the end justifies the means to public business with results that are not always happy.

56. *Tewfik Pasha Abul Huda, C.B.E.*

Born at Acre about forty-nine years ago. Held numerous financial and ministerial posts including the appointment of Prime Minister from 1938 to 1945 when he resigned for reasons of health. The best administrator in Transjordan with a high reputation for honesty. Has considerable personal influence over the Arab politicians of Palestine, Lebanon and Syria although moderate in his own political views.

57. *Wafa Bey Dajani*

Born at Jerusalem about fifty-five years ago. Preserved his Turkish nationality in order to be able to benefit from family property in Turkey. A leading figure in commercial circles at Amman. Does not take an active interest in Transjordan politics.

CHAPTER VII.—THE YEMEN

[E 7352/657/91]

No. 40

M. de Guiringaud to Mr. Garran.—(Received 1st August.)

(No. 504.)

Cher M. Garran,

Ambassade de France,

Londres, le 27 juillet 1946.

JE vous fais parvenir ci-joint, ainsi que je vous l'avais annoncé lors de notre entretien de mercredi, le texte de l'accord commercial qui a été conclu le 26 mai dernier entre la France et le Yémen.

Cet accord consiste tout simplement en un échange de lettres entre M. Max Rageot, notre Ministre en Arabie Saoudienne et au Yémen, d'une part, et le Cadi El Karim Mutahhar, Ministre par intérim des Affaires étrangères du Yémen d'autre part.

Très sincèrement vôtre,

L. DE GUIRINGAUD,

Premier Secrétaire.

(1)

M. Abdel Karim Moutahhar à Son Excellence M. Max Rageot, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de la République Française.

Sanaa, le 26 mai 1946 (correspondant au 25 Djumada II 1365).

Excellence,

JE me réfère au Traité d'Amitié entre le Yémen et la France signé à Sanaa le 25 avril 1936, correspondant au 3 Safar 1355 de l'Hégire.

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître que le Gouvernement yéménite est disposé à accorder le bénéfice complet du traitement réservé à ceux de la nation la plus favorisée à tous les produits naturels ou manufacturés qui, originaires de la France ou des territoires placés sous la souveraineté de cette Puissance ou y ressortissant, seront importés au Yémen, tant pour la consommation intérieure que pour la réexportation ou le transit. Ce régime vise en particulier les droits de douane, les taxes de toute nature, ainsi que toutes les dispositions réglementant l'exercice du commerce ou la protection des marchandises.

Le Gouvernement français accordera, en contre-partie, le bénéfice complet du traitement réservé à ceux de la nation la plus favorisée à tous les produits naturels ou manufacturés qui, originaires du Royaume du Yémen, seront importés en France ou dans les territoires placés sous la souveraineté de cette Puissance ou y ressortissant, tant pour la consommation intérieure que pour la réexportation ou le transit. Ce régime vise en particulier les droits de douane, les taxes de toute nature ainsi que toutes les dispositions réglementant l'exercice du commerce ou la protection des marchandises.

2. Je serais reconnaissant à votre Excellence de vouloir bien me faire connaître si le Gouvernement de la République française est disposé à donner à ces propositions la valeur d'un accord régissant les relations commerciales entre les territoires placés sous la souveraineté respective des deux Puissances ou y ressortissant, chacune des deux hautes parties contractantes se réservant la faculté de dénoncer cet accord par lettre, avec préavis de trois mois.

3. Il est entendu que cet accord n'inclut pas : d'une part le bénéfice des régimes spéciaux consentis par la République française aux territoires placés sous sa souveraineté ou y ressortissant; d'autre part, le bénéfice des régimes spéciaux consentis par le Royaume du Yémen, en vertu d'accords régionaux particuliers, aux marchandises de pays limitrophes de ce Royaume.

4. Si les propositions contenues dans cette note rencontrent l'agrément de votre Gouvernement, cette note et la réponse par laquelle votre Excellence

m'aura fait connaître son acceptation tiendront lieu d'accord entre les deux Gouvernements.

Je saisis, &c.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères yéménite
par intérim :

(Signé) ABDEL KARIM MOUTAHHAR.

(2)

M. Max Rageot à son Excellence le Cadi Abd El Karim Moutahhar, Ministre des
Affaires étrangères du Yémen par intérim.

Légation de France en Arabie saoudienne,
Sanaa, le 26 mai 1946 (correspondant au
25 Djumada II 1365).

Excellence,

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception de la lettre de votre Excellence, en date
du 26 mai 1946, correspondant au 25 Djumada II 1365, ainsi conçue :

" Je me réfère à l'article 6 du Traité d'Amitié entre le Yémen et la
France, signé à Sanaa le 25 avril 1936, correspondant au 3 Safar 1355 de
l'Hégire.

" J'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître que le Gouvernement yéménite
est disposé à accorder le bénéfice complet du traitement réservé à ceux de la
nation la plus favorisée à tous les produits naturels ou manufacturés qui,
originaires de la France ou des territoires placés sous la souveraineté de
cette Puissance, ou y ressortissant, seront importés au Yémen, tant pour la
consommation intérieure que pour la réexportation ou le transit. Ce régime
vise en particulier les droits de douane, les taxes de toute nature, ainsi que
toutes les dispositions réglementant l'exercice du commerce ou la protection
des marchandises.

" Le Gouvernement français accordera, en contre-partie, le bénéfice
complet du traitement réservé à ceux de la nation la plus favorisée à tous
les produits naturels ou manufacturés qui, originaires du Royaume du
Yémen, seront importés en France ou dans les territoires placés sous la
souveraineté de cette Puissance ou y ressortissant, tant pour la consom-
mation intérieure que pour la réexportation ou le transit. Ce régime vise
en particulier les droits de douane, les taxes de toute nature, ainsi que toutes
les dispositions réglementant l'exercice du commerce ou la protection des
marchandises.

" 2. Je serais reconnaissant à votre Excellence de vouloir bien me faire
connaître si le Gouvernement de la République française est disposé à donner
à ces propositions la valeur d'un accord régissant les relations commerciales
entre les territoires placés sous la souveraineté respective des deux Puissances
ou y ressortissant, chacune des deux hautes parties contractantes se réservant
la faculté de dénoncer cet accord par lettre, avec un préavis de trois mois.

" 3. Il est entendu que cet accord n'inclut pas : d'une part le bénéfice
des régimes spéciaux consentis par la République française aux territoires
placés sous sa souveraineté ou y ressortissant; d'autre part, le bénéfice des
régimes spéciaux consentis par le Royaume du Yémen, en vertu d'accords
régionaux particuliers, aux marchandises de pays limitrophes de ce Royaume.

" 4. Si les propositions contenues dans cette lettre rencontrent l'agrè-
ment de votre Gouvernement, cette lettre et la réponse par laquelle votre
Excellence m'aura fait connaître son acceptation tiendront lieu d'accord
entre les deux Gouvernements."

En réponse à cette communication, j'ai l'honneur de confirmer à votre
Excellence l'accord complet de mon Gouvernement sur le contenu de cette lettre.

Je saisis, &c.

(Signé) MAX RAGEOT.

[E 9106/657/91] No. 41

(Communicated by Washington Chancery in Letter dated 8th September to
Eastern Department; Received 13th September.)

(1)

Mr. Eddy to Al Qadi Abdul Karim Moutahhar.

Special United States Diplomatic
Mission to the Kingdom of the Yemen.

Sana'a, 4th May, 1946.

Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to make the following statement of my Government's
understanding of the agreement reached through conversations held at Sana'a,
the 14th April to the 4th May, by representatives of the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of the Yemen with
reference to diplomatic and consular representation, juridical protection, com-
merce and navigation as hereafter defined. These two Governments, having
in mind the letter dated the 4th March, 1946, from the President of the United
States of America to the Imam Yehya Bin Mohamed Hamid-ud-din, King of the
Yemen, by which the United States of America recognised the complete and
absolute independence of the Kingdom of the Yemen, and desiring to strengthen
the friendly relations happily existing between the two countries, and to respect
the rights of this independence recognised by the above-mentioned letter as the
basis for all their relations and to maintain the most-favoured-nation principle in
its unconditional and unlimited form as the basis of their commercial relations,
agree to the following provisions :—

ARTICLE 1.

The United States of America and the Kingdom of the Yemen will exchange
diplomatic representatives and consular officers at a date which shall be fixed by
mutual agreement between the two Governments.

ARTICLE 2.

The diplomatic representatives of each party accredited to the Government
of the other party shall enjoy in the territories of such other party the rights,
privileges, exemptions and immunities accorded under generally recognised prin-
ciples of international law. The consular officers of each party who are assigned
to the Government of the other party, and are duly provided with exequaturs,
shall be permitted to reside in the territories of such other party at the places
where consular officers are permitted by the applicable laws to reside; they shall
enjoy the honorary privileges and the immunities accorded to officers of their
rank by general international usage; and they shall not, in any event, be treated
in a manner less favourable than similar officers of any third country.

ARTICLE 3.

Subjects of His Majesty the King of the Yemen in the United States of
America and nationals of the United States of America in the Kingdom of the
Yemen shall be received and treated in accordance with the requirements and
practices of generally recognised international law. In respect of their persons,
possessions and rights, such subjects or nationals shall enjoy the fullest protection
of the laws and authorities of the country, and shall not be treated in any manner
less favourable than the nationals of any third country. Subjects of His Majesty
in the United States of America and nationals of the United States of America
in the Kingdom of the Yemen shall be subject to the local laws and regulations,
and shall enjoy the rights and privileges accorded in this third article.

ARTICLE 4.

In all matters relating to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed
on or in connexion with importation or exportation or otherwise affecting
commerce and navigation, to the method of levying such duties and charges,
to all rules and formalities in connexion with importation or exportation, and

to transit, warehousing and other facilities, each party shall accord unconditional and unrestricted most-favoured-nation treatment to articles the growth, produce or manufacture of the other party, from whatever place arriving, or to articles destined for exportation to the territories of such other party, by whatever route. Any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity with respect to any duty, charge or regulation affecting commerce or navigation now or hereafter accorded by the United States of America or by the Kingdom of the Yemen to any third country will be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the commerce and navigation of the Kingdom of the Yemen and of the United States of America, respectively. The advantages relating to customs duties now or hereafter accorded by the United States of America to the Republic of Cuba shall be excepted from the provisions of this agreement.

ARTICLE 5.

There shall be excepted from the provisions of article 4 of this agreement advantages now or hereafter accorded: by virtue of a customs union of which either party may become a member; to adjacent countries in order to facilitate frontier traffic; and by the United States of America or its territories or possessions to one another or to the Panamá Canal Zone.

The last clause shall continue to apply in respect of any advantages now or hereafter accorded by the United States of America or its territories or possessions to one another irrespective of any change in the political status of any such territories or possessions. Nothing in this agreement shall prevent the adoption or enforcement by either party within the area of its jurisdiction: of measures relating to the importation or exportation of gold or silver or the traffic in arms, ammunition, and implements of war, and, in exceptional circumstances, all other military supplies; of measures necessary in pursuance of obligations for the maintenance of international peace and security or necessary for the protection of the essential interests of such party in time of national emergency; or of statutes in relation to immigration and travel. Subject to the requirement that, under like circumstances and conditions, there shall be no arbitrary discrimination by either party against the subjects, nationals, commerce or navigation of the other party in favour of the subjects, nationals, commerce or navigation of any third country, the provisions of this agreement shall not extend to prohibitions or restrictions: imposed on moral or humanitarian grounds; designed to protect human, animal, or plant life or health; relating to prison-made goods; or relating to the enforcement of police or revenue law.

ARTICLE 6.

The provisions of this agreement shall apply to all territory under the sovereignty or authority of either of the parties, except the Panamá Canal Zone.

ARTICLE 7.

This agreement shall continue in force until superseded by a more comprehensive commercial agreement, or until thirty days from the date of a written notice of termination given by either party to the other party, whichever is the earlier. Moreover, either party may terminate articles 1, 2, 3 or 4 on thirty days' written notice.

If the above provisions are acceptable to the Government of the Kingdom of the Yemen this note and the reply signifying assent thereto shall, if agreeable to that Government, be regarded as constituting an agreement between the two Governments which shall become effective on the date of such acceptance.

Accept, &c.

WILLIAM A. EDDY,

Chief, Special United States Diplomatic
Mission to the Kingdom of the Yemen.

(2)

Abdul Karim Mutahhar to Mr. Eddy.

Sana'a, 4th May, 1946

(Jamada-al-Thaniya 3, 1365).

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's letter dated the 4th May, 1946, corresponding to Jamada-al-Thaniya 3, 1365, the text of which is as follows:—

I have the honour to make the following statement of my Government's understanding of the agreement reached through conversations held at Sana'a, the 14th April to the 4th May, by representatives of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of the Yemen with reference to diplomatic and consular representation, juridical protection, commerce and navigation as hereafter defined. These two Governments having in mind the letter dated the 4th March, 1946, from the President of the United States of America to the Imam Yehya Bin Mohamed Hamid-ud-din, King of the Yemen, by which the United States of America recognised the complete and absolute independence of the Kingdom of the Yemen, and desiring to strengthen the friendly relations happily existing between the two countries, and to respect the rights of this independence recognised by the above-mentioned letter as the basis for all their relations and to maintain the most-favoured-nation principle in its unconditional and unlimited form as the basis of their commercial relations, agree to the following provisions:—

ARTICLE 1.

The United States of America and the Kingdom of the Yemen will exchange diplomatic representatives and consular officers at a date which shall be fixed by mutual agreement between the two Governments.

ARTICLE 2.

The diplomatic representatives of each party accredited to the Government of the other party shall enjoy in the territories of such other party the rights, privileges, exemptions and immunities accorded under generally recognised principles of international law. The consular officers of each party who are assigned to the Government of the other party, and are duly provided with exequaturs, shall be permitted to reside in the territories of such other party at the places where consular officers are permitted by the applicable laws to reside; they shall enjoy the honorary privileges and the immunities accorded to officers of their rank by general international usage; and they shall not, in any event, be treated in a manner less favourable than similar officers of any third country.

ARTICLE 3.

Subjects of His Majesty the King of the Yemen in the United States of America and nationals of the United States of America in the Kingdom of the Yemen shall be received and treated in accordance with the requirements and practices of generally recognised international law. In respect of their persons, possessions and rights, such subjects or nationals shall enjoy the fullest protection of the laws and authorities of the country, and shall not be treated in any manner less favourable than the nationals of any third country. Subjects of His Majesty in the United States of America and nationals of the United States of America in the Kingdom of the Yemen shall be subject to the local laws and regulations, and shall enjoy the rights and privileges accorded in this third article.

ARTICLE 4.

In all matters relating to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connexion with importation or exportation or otherwise affecting commerce and navigation, to the method of levying such duties and charges, to all rules and formalities in connexion with importation or exportation, and to transit, warehousing and other facilities, each party shall accord unconditional and unrestricted most-favoured-nation treatment to articles the growth, produce

or manufacture of the other party, from whatever place arriving, or to articles destined for exportation to the territories of such other party, by whatever route. Any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity with respect to any duty, charge or regulation affecting commerce or navigation now or hereafter accorded by the United States of America or by the Kingdom of the Yemen to any third country will be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the commerce and navigation of the Kingdom of the Yemen and of the United States of America, respectively. The advantages relating to customs duties now or hereafter accorded by the United States of America to the Republic of Cuba shall be excepted from the provisions of this agreement.

ARTICLE 5.

There shall be excepted from the provisions of article 4 of this agreement advantages now or hereafter accorded: by virtue of a customs union of which either party may become a member; to adjacent countries in order to facilitate frontier traffic; and by the United States of America or its territories or possessions to one another or to the Panamá Canal Zone.

The last clause shall continue to apply in respect of any advantages now or hereafter accorded by the United States of America or its territories or possessions to one another irrespective of any change in the political status of any such territories or possessions. Nothing in this agreement shall prevent the adoption or enforcement by either party within the area of its jurisdiction: of measures relating to the importation or exportation of gold or silver or the traffic in arms, ammunition, and implements of war, and, in exceptional circumstances, all other military supplies; of measures necessary in pursuance of obligations for the maintenance of international peace and security or necessary for the protection of the essential interests of such party in time of national emergency; or of statutes in relation to immigration and travel. Subject to the requirement that, under like circumstances and conditions, there shall be no arbitrary discrimination by either party against the subjects, nationals, commerce or navigation of the other party in favour of the subjects, nationals, commerce or navigation of any third country, the provisions of this agreement shall not extend to prohibitions or restrictions: imposed on moral or humanitarian grounds; designed to protect human, animal, or plant life or health; relating to prison-made goods; or relating to the enforcement of police or revenue law.

ARTICLE 6.

The provisions of this agreement shall apply to all territory under the sovereignty or authority of either of the parties, except the Panamá Canal Zone.

ARTICLE 7.

This agreement shall continue in force until superseded by a more comprehensive commercial agreement, or until thirty days from the date of a written notice of termination given by either party to the other party, whichever is the earlier. Moreover, either party may terminate articles 1, 2, 3 or 4 on thirty days' written notice.

On behalf of the Government of the Yemen, I declare my Government's adherence to the provisions stated in this agreement which is considered effective on the date of signature.

ABDUL KARIM MUTAHHAR,
Deputy Foreign Minister

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office

CONFIDENTIAL

(17349)

Further Correspondence

respecting

EASTERN AFFAIRS**PART 67****October to December 1946**

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING
EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 67.—OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 1946

CHAPTER I.—AFGHANISTAN

(A) Miscellaneous

[E 10710/668/97]

No. 1

Mr. Attlee to Mr. Squire (Kabul)

(No. 39)
Sir,

Foreign Office, 6th November, 1946

WITH reference to Mr. Bevin's despatch No. 35 of 19th September, the Afghan Minister was received by Sir Orme Sargent on 28th October. He was told that His Majesty's Government were giving urgent consideration to the question of a possible loan but that, as Mr. Bevin had already explained to him, this was a very difficult problem and one of which His Majesty's Government could give no assurance at this stage, although they would continue to consider the matter sympathetically and would return a definite reply as soon as possible. The Afghan Minister appeared to appreciate the difficulties of His Majesty's Government in giving an immediate answer on the subject. He took the opportunity, however, of expatiating at length on the wish of his Government to establish close co-operation with His Majesty's Government both economically and politically, and Sir Orme Sargent reciprocated these wishes. The Minister pointed out that, as regards the economic side of the question, Afghanistan before the war had traded with and borrowed from Germany and elsewhere, but that she now realised that her economic future was tied up with Great Britain. His Government did not, for instance, wish to have to obtain a loan from the United States, as this would mean that they would have in return to buy everything they wanted from the United States.

2. Sir Orme Sargent then referred to the Afghan Minister's recent approach regarding Afghan-Indian frontier problems. Sir Orme Sargent pointed out that this was a matter which closely affected the Government of India and the future relations of the Indian and Afghan Governments. His Majesty's Government did not feel able to return a final reply to the Afghan Government's propositions without full consultation between themselves and the Government of India. In view of the present political situation in India, His Majesty's Government were by no means certain that the present was an opportune time for such a matter to be raised with the Indian Government, which had just taken office and were naturally preoccupied with pressing matters of internal concern. It was hoped, however, that it would be possible to return a further reply to the Afghan Minister at no very distant date. His Highness observed that the Afghan Government wished to establish friendly relations with the new Indian Government as soon as possible; he was, however, afraid that if the frontier question were left unsettled, it might be more difficult to establish such relations later. The Minister seemed to recognise that the Government of India would have to be consulted about the Afghan proposals, but expressed the view that Pandit Nehru's recent visit to the North-West Frontier and his reception there had created a "scandal" which made an early settlement all the more desirable.

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B

3. The Minister went on to say that the experiment now being carried out in India might, if it went wrong, have world-wide repercussions and consequences which would naturally react on Afghanistan and, in view of these unpleasant possibilities, the Afghan Government were anxious to establish their own international position on the basis of close co-operation with Great Britain. Sir Orme Sargent said that he took note of what the Minister had said, and that His Majesty's Government were also anxious to assist and work with Afghanistan as closely as possible in the new era.

4. Sir Orme Sargent also enquired about the Afghan Trade Mission which is expected shortly in this country. He assured the Minister that we were looking forward to the visit and that we maintained a strong interest in the satisfactory development of Anglo-Afghan economic relations. There were, he said, a number of questions which His Majesty's Government were anxious to discuss with the mission when it arrived. His Highness explained that the mission was still engaged in negotiations in Switzerland, but that he hoped it would have finished its work within the next two or three weeks and would then come to London. He emphasised the importance of a speedy arrangement for supplying cotton to Afghanistan. Any kind of cotton would do.

I am, &c.
C. R. ATTLEE.

E 11136/818/97

No. 2

RUSSO-AFGHAN BOUNDARY AGREEMENT⁽¹⁾

Mr. Squire to Mr. Bevin. (Received 13th November)

(No. 87)
(Grant)
Kabul,
Sir,

2nd November, 1946

The text of the recent Russo-Afghan boundary agreement, on which I reported in some detail in my despatch No. 43 of 20th June, 1946, has now been published in the Afghan press, and I enclose a full translation of the agreement itself and of the Afghan Government resolutions containing its formal ratification.

2. As I anticipated, the previous account published in the Afghan press was a summary of its main clauses rather than a translation of the document itself. The agreement, however, contains nothing of importance which has not already been mentioned. I have been unable to discover the exact meaning of the term "Farwarter" which has been transliterated in the Persian. Apparently it means the centre of the main portion of the stream, but no one of the Afghan officials whom I have questioned on the subject is able to explain it. The point is of potential importance and it would be interesting to know whether the Russian version is more explicit or whether the term "Farwarter" itself is anywhere defined.

3. Steps for the setting up of the missing boundary posts are to be taken immediately, and I understand that both Russian and Afghan delegates have already been appointed. Mr. Alexander, the American

adviser to the Afghan Ministry of Public Works, though not a delegate, has been asked to be present in Northern Afghanistan during the negotiations, but to remain in the background, in order to give expert advice to the Afghan Government should disputes as to the actual location of the boundary occur, a contingency which the Afghan Government seem to consider inevitable.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India, the Government of India and to His Majesty's Ambassador, Moscow.

I have, &c.
G. F. SQUIRE.

Enclosure in No. 2

Translation of the Text of the Russo-Afghan Agreement and the Protocols and Correspondence relating thereto (as Published in the Newspaper Islah of 19th September, 1946)

In order to strengthen the friendly relations happily subsisting between the two countries, and further to extend these in future, the Royal Afghan Government of the one part and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the other part have

⁽¹⁾ Exchange of Ratifications took place in Kabul on 12th January, 1947.

decided to conclude the present agreement for which purpose there have been appointed as their plenipotentiaries:—

For the Government of His Majesty the King of Afghanistan—His Excellency Sardar Sultan Ahmad Khan, Afghan Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

—and for the Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Assembly—His Excellency Pasilov Mikhailovich Molotov—the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The above-named plenipotentiaries, after mutual presentation of their credentials, which were found to be in due and proper form, have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1

Where the rivers Oxus and Panj are navigable the frontier shall follow the thalweg of these rivers, and where the thalweg is not determinable shall follow the centre of the actual main channel (Persian "Farwarter"). Where the River Panj is unnavigable the centre of the stream shall be considered to be the boundary line.

The island of Aral Paighambar shall continue to form part of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the island of Urtatagai shall remain a part of the territory of Afghanistan.

ARTICLE 2

From the village of Khamyab to the Zarfol rivulet the task of precise delimitation of the boundary line, in the light of the stipulations contained in article 1 of this agreement, shall be assigned to a joint commission composed of three representatives from both the contracting parties. The commission shall draw up a map of this boundary line, decide the ownership of the islands and set up boundary pillars at places where they consider them necessary. The commission shall further compile a detailed report on this boundary line and on the places where boundary pillars have been set up. The commission shall commence its task within three months of this agreement coming into force. The protocols formulated by the commission, together with its report and map of the frontier, shall be subject to ratification by the Governments of both the contracting parties.

ARTICLE 3

Possession of the islands in the rivers Oxus and Panj shall be determined by the

commission, referred to in article 2 of this agreement as follows:—

Where the rivers Oxus and Panj are navigable the islands situated between the thalweg or centre of the actual main channel and the left bank of these rivers shall be allocated to Afghanistan, whereas such islands as are situated between the thalweg or centre of the actual main channel and the right bank shall be allocated to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Where the River Panj is unnavigable possession of the islands shall be determined by the position of the boundary line.

ARTICLE 4

This agreement shall be subject to ratification and shall come into force with effect from the day on which the ratifications are exchanged. The ratifications shall be exchanged at Kabul as soon after the agreement has been signed as possible.

ARTICLE 5

This agreement has been drawn up in two copies, each copy being in both the Persian and Russian languages. Both texts shall be considered to have equal force.

Drawn up in Moscow on 13th June, 1946, corresponding to 23rd Jauza, 1325.

(Signed) SULTAN AHMAD,
*Representative of His Majesty
the King of Afghanistan.*

(Signed) MOLOTOV,
*Representative of the Executive
Committee of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics
Assembly.*

*Translation of a Letter dated 12th June,
1946 (Enclosure to the above Agreement)*

M. l'Ambassadeur,

I have the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice that on their part the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree to initiate the renewal, as early as possible, of the boundary pillars on the land frontier stretching from Zulfiqar to Khamyab on the basis of the protocols and documents of the Anglo-Russian Division of 1885-88, and that a joint Russo-Afghan commission should be set up for that purpose.

I avail, &c.
MOLOTOV.

Translation of Letter dated 13th June, 1946, sent in reply to the Letter above

M. le Ministre,

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Afghan Government agree to initiate the renewal, as early as possible, of the boundary pillars on the land frontier stretching from Zulfiqar to Khamyab, on the basis of the protocols and documents of the Anglo-Russian Division of 1885-88, and that a joint Russo-Afghan commission should be set up for that purpose.

I avail, &c.

SULTAN AHMAD.

PROTOCOL

Consequent on the signing of the Russo-Afghan Frontier Agreement of to-day's date, the contracting parties confirm that clauses 9 and 10 of the agreement concluded between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Afghanistan on 28th February, 1921, are annulled and will therefore be considered as no longer in force.

This protocol shall form a part of the agreement of to-day's date.

Dated 13th June, 1946 (23rd Jauza, 1325).

(Signed) SULTAN AHMAD,
*Representative of His Majesty
the King of Afghanistan.*

(Signed) MOLOTOV,
*Representative of the High Execu-
tive Committee of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics
Assembly.*

Translation of a Letter dated 13th June, 1946 (forming an Enclosure to the above Agreement)

M. l'Ambassadeur,

I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in order to settle amicably the questions of the use of the water of the River Kushk and the construction of a dam on the River Murghab, agree to remove the ban on the use of the water of the River Kushk on the Afghan side of the frontier north of Chihil Dukhtar, provided that the quantity of water taken on the Afghan side in future does not exceed that being taken at the present time. The people on the Afghan side of the boundary should continue to observe the present practice in the use of

the water. The above-mentioned ban was imposed in accordance with the documents relating to the Anglo-Russian Division of 1885-88. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics relinquish their right to construct a dam on the River Murghab or to derive any benefits from the Afghan side of the river, provided that the Afghan party will not construct in the frontier region of its own territory any such dam as will cause a diminution of the quantity of water in the said river which flows into Soviet territory.

Please accept, &c.

MOLOTOV.

Translation of a Letter dated 13th June, 1946, sent in reply to the above

M. le Ministre,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's note of to-day's date, the subject of which is as follows:—

"I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in order to settle amicably the questions of the use of the water of the River Kushk and the construction of a dam on the River Murghab, agree to remove the ban on the use of the water of the River Kushk on the Afghan side of the frontier north of Chihil Dukhtar, provided that the quantity of water taken on the Afghan side in future does not exceed that being taken at the present time. The people on the Afghan side of the boundary should continue to observe their present practice in the use of the water. The above-mentioned ban was imposed in accordance with the documents relating to the Anglo-Russian Division of 1885-88. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics relinquish their right of construct a dam on the River Murghab or to derive any benefits from the Afghan side of the river, provided that the Afghan party will not construct in the frontier region of its own territory any such dam as will cause a diminution of the quantity of water in the said river which flows into Soviet territory."

In this connexion I have the honour to inform your Excellency that on their part the Afghan Government agree to the proposals relating to the use of the water of the River Kushk, and to the right to construct a Russian dam on the River

Murghab as set forth in your Excellency's note—reproduced above.

Please accept, &c.

SULTAN AHMAD.

Translation of the Ratification of the Agreement by the Afghan National Assembly

The agreement for the delimitation of the frontier dated 13th June, 1946 (corresponding to 23rd Jauza, 1325) between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of Afghanistan, which was concluded in Moscow between the accredited representatives of the contracting parties, viz., his Excellency Sardar Sultan Ahmad Khan, Ambassador of His Majesty the King of Afghanistan in Moscow, and his Excellency M. Pasilov Mikhailovich Molotov, the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and one copy of which is included above has been debated in the Afghan National Assembly. The National Assembly, after discussion and examination of this agreement, which has been concluded in order to strengthen and extend the friendly relations subsisting between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Afghanistan, consider it to be advantageous and have ratified it unanimously.

SULTAN AHMAD,

*President of the Afghan National
National Assembly.*

Translation of the Ratification of the Agreement by the Afghan House of Notables

The agreement for the delimitation of the frontier dated 13th June, 1946 (corres-

ponding to 23rd Jauza, 1325) between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of Afghanistan, which was concluded between the accredited representatives of the contracting parties, viz., his Excellency Sardar Sultan Ahmad Khan, Ambassador of His Majesty the King of Afghanistan in Moscow, and his Excellency M. Pasilov Mikhailovich Molotov, Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a copy of which is contained in these nine pages and which was ratified by the National Assembly on 8th September, 1946 (corresponding to 16th Sumblah, 1325), was also scrutinised by the House of Notables in its session of 19th Sumblah, 1325 (corresponding to 11th December, (sic) 1946). As it is considered that the agreement is designed to extend and strengthen the friendly relations between the two countries, the House of Notables, considering that it will help to strengthen the friendly relations between the two parties, is pleased to ratify it unanimously.

FAZL-I-AHMAD MUJADDADI,
President of the House of Notables.

Decree No. 3442/5437, dated 24th Sumblah, 1325 (16th September, 1946)

The agreement concluded between the Afghan Government and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the delimitation of the frontier as per details set forth in these papers, which has, after discussions, been ratified in the National Assembly and the House of Notables, is approved.

HIS MAJESTY THE KING.

(*) This is obviously a misprint for 11th September.

E 11387/11387/97

No. 3

GENERAL REPORT ON A TOUR CARRIED OUT BY THE MILITARY ATTACHÉ, KABUL

Mr. Squire to Mr. Bevin. (Received 21st November)

(No. 89)
Grant

Sir,

Kabul, 9th November, 1946

I have the honour to forward a copy of a most interesting and valuable report by Colonel A. S. Lancaster, my military attaché, on an extensive tour which he has recently undertaken in North-Eastern Afghanistan.

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2. The fact that Colonel Lancaster was freely allowed to tour in this almost unknown part of the country and was given every assistance by both the Central Government and provincial officials throughout the trip is a very good indication, not only of the confidence which he personally inspires in the Afghan Government as a result of his long residence in

B*

the country, but also of the success that has attended their efforts made during the last two or three years to remove the suspicions of the British which for the last 100 years have been one of the most notable features of the Afghan scene and which the Government themselves had formerly encouraged. The Afghan attitude is all the more surprising in view of the fact that they must have known that this tour would arouse, as indeed it has done, the envy of the Soviet Ambassador, who has already complained that the facilities which the Afghans give freely to Colonel Lancaster are not accorded to him and his staff.

3. From the political angle the most interesting part of the report is contained in the concluding paragraphs 14 to 17.

These show clearly that while at present conditions in the area offer plenty of scope for Communist propaganda, the Afghans could easily improve them by insisting on more considerate treatment of the inhabitants by their officials. The Government will have only themselves to blame if by their high-handedness they so alienate the people as to drive them into the arms of the Russians, who are, at the moment, universally feared and distrusted.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India, the Government of India (and to His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow, with a copy of paragraphs 14 to 17 only of the report).

I have, &c.

G. F. SQUIRE.

Enclosure in No. 3

General Report on a Tour carried out by the Military Attaché, Kabul, in North-Eastern Afghanistan during September and October 1946

[Extract]

1. Attitude of Afghan Officials in the Provinces

(a) Towards Foreigners

The most noticeable feature of my tour was the extremely frank and friendly way in which I was received and treated by district and provincial officials everywhere. This attitude may have been due to instructions issued by Kabul or to the importance lent to my party by the presence of a police escort from Kabul, but whatever the reason may be, local officials appear to have lost a great deal of the suspicious manner with which they regarded foreigners and particularly the British. The Russians are still, however, viewed with great suspicion. I found officials ready to answer most of my questions and even eager to show me anything I wished to see. Bazaars could be visited without a C.I.D. official being present, and only on one occasion were the local people prevented from entering into conversation with me. I was not given any facilities for meeting army officers, but officers of the armed police (gendarmerie) frequently rode with me and were ready to describe the country and discuss their local problems. Officials everywhere did all they could to make my party comfortable, though I fear that the provision of labour and supplies would have assumed the shape of a levy on the local people had I not insisted on paying cash for all services rendered, or where cash payment

was not accepted, making small presents to village headmen or giving gratuities to labour employed. I found that villagers even in the most remote valleys were only too keen to help once they learnt that they would be recompensed for their services. Afghan officials are, however, in the habit of travelling about the country at the expense of the people, with the result that in villages where such visits are frequent their reception may, at times, be cold. This, in turn, may affect the hospitality shown to foreigners, the Afghan official being keen to show off his country's hospitality at its best, while the villager may regard the foreigner's visit as another imposition on him.

(b) Towards the Local People

The average Afghan official in northern Afghanistan is inclined to regard himself as a superior being whose special rôle it is to rule, control and even subjugate the people of his district. While I would not go so far as to say that Afghan rule is harsh or cruel, there is little doubt that opposition to the wishes of the local officials or the Kabul Government does produce reactions distinctly unfavourable to the Uzbek and Tajik, and occasionally to very strained relations between them and their Afghan overlords. It is difficult for a foreigner to size up the exact position, but my impressions are that Afghan officials treat the Tajiks, who are regarded as half Afghans, better than the Uzbaks and

Turkomans. The Uzbaks, in particular, are distrusted, and Afghan officials and settlers regard them as a subject race to be used as occasion demands to further Afghan interests. The Uzbaks and Tajiks are very subservient in their attitude to Afghan officials knowing that the whip would be produced should they refuse to comply with demands made on them for hospitality, supplies or forced labour. While the Uzbaks and Tajiks may secretly dislike their Afghan masters they appear to fear the Russians still more, and perhaps realise there is little they can do about securing any change in their present lot. How far senior officials in the Afghan Government are aware of the bullying attitude of their junior officials in the Kataghan and Badakhshan provinces it is not possible to say, but it would seem advisable for them to take some steps to ameliorate conditions for the Uzbaks and Tajiks if they wish to make them loyal subjects of the Kabul Government. It was, however, noticed that the more senior the Afghan official the better was his treatment of the people.

All the more important appointments in districts and sub-districts are held by Afghans and their control of the people appeared to be complete in every respect.

2. Attitude of the People towards the Government

The Uzbaks and Tajiks of Kataghan and Badakhshan appear to be apathetic in their attitude towards the Kabul Government and to regard Durani rule as something to be endured with patience and fortitude. They are not unmindful of the bad old days of the 19th century when Uzbaks carried off Tajiks to the slave markets of Bokhara, and Tajiks and Nuristanis enslaved Uzbaks, or of the oppressive and cruel rule of the Mirs of Kunduz and Faizabad. They also remember that until the late Amir Abdur Rahman gained control over Badakhshan and Nuristan at the end of the 19th century, the province was the scene of constant internecine warfare, and that Afghan rule has at least given them more peaceful conditions. Religion plays a big part in their lives and they probably do not see any advantage in attempting to exchange Afghan rule for that of Soviet Russia, where religious freedom has not until very recently been tolerated. The Tajiks are probably more loyal to the Kabul Government than the Uzbaks, as the former are more trusted by the Afghans and receive slightly better treatment, while the latter are thoroughly distrusted and regarded as a treacherous subject race.

The Afghan Government have, for many years, been settling families of Afghan stock in northern Afghanistan, and though the process has had some success the numbers so settled are not sufficient to provide stern resistance to any Russian attempts at infiltration or aggression in northern Afghanistan. The Afghan Government will, if they are wise, do everything in their power by providing better treatment and improved economic and social conditions for the Tajik and Uzbek, and so make contented and loyal subjects. Should they fail to take suitable measures to this end Russian propaganda will probably have an effect on the people which would be disastrous for the Kabul Government and result in the loss to Afghanistan of its richest provinces.

3. General Conditions in North-Eastern Afghanistan

(a) Conditions were peaceful throughout the whole area covered by my tour, and the only complaints heard referred to the high prices and shortage of piece-goods and the Government's demands for forced labour. There was no shortage of food anywhere, even though owing to an unusually low rainfall last spring crops in many districts had been below normal. In prosperous districts such as the Panjshir, Taluqan, Khanabad and Kunduz, the price of food grains was high and near to those prevailing in Kabul, while in the more remote districts prices were low due to inability to export surplus grain. An example being wheat price at R.20 to R.25 Afghanis per 16 lbs. in Kabul and R.3½ Afghanis per 16 lbs. in parts of Badakhshan. The very poor farmer of Badakhshan stated that he was now unable to buy high priced cotton piece-goods except when marriages occurred in his family or on some other special occasion. Shops in Badakhshan are now almost denuded of goods of foreign manufacture and stocks of cloth, iron-mongery, &c., of Russian, Japanese or Indian origin have disappeared. Kerosine oil and matches are scarce, and on several occasions I was asked to supply the village headman with a little kerosine oil for entertaining his Afghan guests.

(b) Frequent references were made by Afghan officials to the prevalence of Russian propaganda in Badakhshan and Kataghan, but I was unable to find any concrete evidence from the people of its existence. The Russian radio station at Tashkent is said to put out a constant stream of propaganda comparing the condition of the Tajiks and Uzbaks residing south of the Oxus with those living in

Russia, but unless this is backed by oral propaganda within Badakhshan itself it cannot have much effect as the people have no radio receivers, any there are being owned by Afghan officials. The Afghan Government are alive to the dangers of Russian propaganda and would appear to have issued instructions to their officials to instil into the people through their religious leaders a lively fear of communism.

(c) The establishment of primary schools in Badakhshan has proceeded very slowly. There were no primary schools in any of the villages between Bazarak in the Panjshir and Jurm, a distance of over 160 miles. Village "mullahs" do, however, try to teach boys to read and write, but attendance at such schools is optional.

(d) The people of Badakhshan appear to have been almost completely disarmed as I did not meet a single individual carrying a rifle on any track or road in Badakhshan, and any rifles seen in villages were very ancient types used for sport. The trapping rather than the shooting of wild animals is the system in vogue. A beehive contraption made from branches and twigs, with traps of horse hair, is in common use for catching pigeon and chikor.

(e) Afforestation and land development in Badakhshan has been neglected up to the present, though the provincial Government are now considering what can be done in this direction. The hills are generally speaking bare of trees, but valuable stretches of scrub and willow exist in the beds of the Anjuman and Kokcha rivers. In the Kataghan province much more has been done and considerable tracts of land in the Taluqan, Kunduz, Baghlan and Pul-i-Khumri areas have been brought under cultivation.

(f) Afghan officials consider that Badakhshan has great possibilities, particularly in the shape of minerals, and they point out that the existence of gold-washing operations, mining of Lapis Lazuli, and a proved iron deposit all tend to show how potentially valuable the province is. They stated that the Government propose to open up the province by constructing motor roads and then exploit its mineral resources.

4. A few Military Considerations regarding Badakhshan

Geographically the province is one of high mountains and deep narrow valleys or gorges containing rivers which are usually unfordable except in the autumn. The Kokcha River and its main tributaries drain a large proportion of Badakhshan

but contribute very little to the irrigation of crops. Entry into Badakhshan from the east, south and south-west is only possible by crossing high mountain passes closed by snow in winter. Entry into Badakhshan from the north by a force of any size would be very difficult, though small bodies of troops could be sent into the province by using available fords and ferries over the Oxus and Panja rivers. These rivers can be crossed at many points on ice during the winter months. The easiest approach to Badakhshan for an invader from the north would probably be between Chah-i-Ab and Khwaja Ghar and thence to Rustak and Taluqan. The solitary motor road to the heart of the province comes in from the west from Khanabad and runs to Faizabad and Jurm following the Kokcha River from Kishm onwards. This road in its present state of development is unsuitable for military motor traffic other than "jeeps." In many parts of the province existing tracks are unfit for use by camel transport, and ponies of the local breed are the most useful type of transport animal. Telephone communications are poor and consist chiefly of single lines on wooden poles between towns. Equipment is bad and frequently out of order. No W/T installations exist in the province. Sites for airfields are few and far between, those at Jurm and Baharak being the best seen. There is some cover from the air in village orchards, strips of jungle in river beds and the shade provided by rocks and gorges. Supplies, except in well-populated districts such as Faizabad, Baharak and Jurm are scarce and in places with a high altitude unprocureable except for very small parties. The climate between December and April would render military operations very difficult, while from April to July floods make many rivers and streams unfordable, and any bridges there may be are frequently washed away. In the summer and autumn, districts with an elevation of 4,500 feet or over have a reasonable or healthy climate and little malaria, those below this height have a humid climate and malaria is prevalent. Military operations in Badakhshan are, owing to nature of the country, likely to be confined to those of the guerilla type and the employment of large forces would be extremely difficult. Mounted infantry would seem to be the most suitable arm to employ provided they are supplied with the sturdy Badakhshan pony. No fortifications exist other than the usual kind of mud-built serais with wooden doors and one to four towers. Should the Russians ever decide to adopt an aggressive attitude

towards Afghanistan, infiltration by small parties of armed men into Badakhshan would probably pay them a good dividend. It would be difficult to turn them out and they could extend their activities by raiding into Nuristan and even the eastern and Kabul provinces during the summer and autumn months. The Afghan military authorities are aware of the danger, and it is for this reason that they would like to develop road communications between Kabul and Badakhshan. Russian infiltration into Badakhshan might also affect, though more indirectly, the defence of India since their presence in Badakhshan would have a disturbing effect on Chitral, the tribesmen of Bajaur, the Kunar valley and Mohmand territory. The Afghan

Government cannot afford to maintain large military forces in Badakhshan, and they now rely largely on armed police units for maintaining the internal security of the province and patrolling the frontier. A large proportion of the armed police are mounted infantry who patrol wide areas, control all movements and provide useful information to the Government. It is proposed to equip the armed police with No. 19 or No. 22 W/T sets purchased in India when sufficient operators have been trained. The Kabul Government will be well advised to develop communications in this backward province and do everything possible to gain the confidence, support and loyalty of the Badakhshani people.

(B) Weekly Intelligence Summaries

[E 9824/13/97]

No. 4

EXTRACT FROM WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 37

For the Week ending 13th September, 1946

(Communicated in Kabul Despatch No. 75 of 18th September; Received 2nd October)

1. Political and General

(a) Senior officials in the Government have been showing great interest in political developments in India and particularly the formation of the Interim Government under Mr. Nehru. It is understood that the Afghan consul-general at Delhi has been instructed to pay a visit to Mr. Nehru and offer him the congratulations of the Afghan Government on the formation of his Government. Cabinet Ministers and senior Afghan officials have avoided making any comment about Mr. Nehru's Government, though junior officials have expressed surprise that a new Government has been formed in India without the inclusion of representatives of the Muslim League.

His Royal Highness Muhd Hashim Khan is said to be taking an interest in Muslim League affairs, and Abdul Hamid Khan (Who's Who 45A) has been ordered to produce a translation of the league's pamphlet *My Leader* in Persian. The *Islah* has, without comment, published a serial article entitled "Pakistan," in its issues of 2nd to 5th September.

(b) Lieutenant-General Muhd Daud Khan has not resolved his differences with his uncle, the Prime Minister, and it is now said that Lieutenant-General Asadullah Khan, the Chief of the General Staff, has been appointed officiating Minister of Defence, though no official announcement of the change has appeared in the Kabul press.

(c) Reference Summary No. 35, paragraph 5.

The series of articles published in the *Civil and Military Gazette* of Lahore by Mr. J. C. Goodwin, of the Associated Press of America, have, as was anticipated, produced reactions and the Afghan Government have denied the truth of various statements attributed to Afghan Cabinet Ministers. It is possible that the Russian embassy have registered a protest about some of the statements alleged to have been made, and asked the Afghan Government whether there was any truth in them. The Afghan Government are still sensitive about articles published in the foreign press about their country, and all such articles are carefully scrutinised and submitted to them by their representatives abroad.

(d) Ali Muhd Khan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, is to officiate as Minister of Education during the absence of Najibullah Khan (Who's Who, 465a) at the International Conference for Air Navigation at Cairo.

2. Russo-Afghan Relations.—Frontier Agreement

Reference Summary No. 25, paragraph 2.

The *Islah* newspaper of 9th September stated that the Afghan National Assembly has ratified the new agreement relating to the demarcation of the Russo-Afghan frontier.

[E 10767/13/97]

No. 5

EXTRACT FROM WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 41

For the Week ending 11th October, 1946

(Communicated in Kabul Despatch No. 85 of 15th October; Received 1st November)

1. Political and General

The birth of a further son to His Majesty King Zahir Shah has caused much pleasure in Government circles, and to the Afghan public. His Majesty has received many deputations of civil and military officials and tribal leaders who visited the Dilkusha Palace during the week to offer their congratulations. The heads of diplomatic missions in Kabul were asked to sign the visitors' book at the Dilkusha Palace on 7th October. The new prince has been given the name of his uncle, Shah Mahmud Jan, and on 8th October His Majesty and the Queen are stated to have entertained about 700 Afghan guests, including ladies, to mark the birth of the prince.

3. His Royal Highness Muhd Hashim Khan left Kabul for India *en route* to Egypt and Mecca on 10th October. He was in particularly good spirits prior to leaving Kabul and stated that he was looking forward to his holiday and to visiting England. While the visit of His Royal Highness to Europe is stated to have no political significance it is probable that he will lose no opportunity of studying political conditions in India and Europe and of furthering the interests of the Afghan Government and the country as a whole.

4. On the termination of the half-yearly session of the Afghan National Assembly members were received by His Majesty King Zahir Shah on 6th October. His Majesty, in his address to them, stressed that although the country had suffered indirectly from the world war, it was the

policy of strict neutrality which had preserved Afghanistan and its people from undue hardships. The Government now intended to embark on a series of reforms and everyone must strive for the uplift and progress of fellow Muslims. His Majesty also intimated that he intended to visit all parts of the country directly his tour in Northern Afghanistan was over in order to make himself better acquainted with the political and economic condition of the Afghan people.

2. Foreign Missions

Chinese Legation

Reference summary No. 40, paragraph 5.

The Chinese Minister recently stated that in a recent conversation he had had with M. Bakoulin, the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul, the latter had said that the Soviet Embassy in Kabul was at present inactive and marking time. M. Bakoulin considered that the American Legation are making efforts to increase their influence in Afghanistan, while he thought the British like the Russians are comparatively inactive. He had, however, some slight suspicions that the Americans and the British might be working together and expressed the opinion that should these suspicions be confirmed then the Russians would have to get busy too. The Minister also stated that the reason for M. Bakoulin's appointment here as an ambassador was the fact that he enjoyed the personal friendship and confidence of M. Stalin.

[E 10877/13/97]

No. 6

EXTRACT FROM WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 42

For the Week ending 18th October, 1946

(Communicated in Kabul Despatch No. 86 of 26th October; Received 5th November)

1. Political and General

(a) His Majesty King Zahir Shah is continuing his tour in the Kataghan Province; he arrived at Girdabi on 11th October, Fallul on 12th, Ghoris Sang on 13th and Dahana-i-Farang on 15th October. His Majesty celebrated his 35th birthday at the latter place, and on 16th October broadcast a message of greeting to the people of Kabul and congratulated them on the seventeenth anniversary of the freeing of Kabul from "Bacha Saqao." One of the No. 19 W/T sets supplied to the Afghan army from India was utilised for sending the above message.

(b) His Royal Highness Shah Mahmud Khan, the Prime Minister, visited the Ministry of Defence on 15th October, but Lieut.-General Muhd Daud Khan has not yet resumed his duties as Minister of Defence. Meanwhile Lieut.-General Asadullah Khan is acting as Minister of Defence, and is referring important matters to the Prime Minister for decision.

(c) The Afghan Government are very perturbed about the scarcity of wheat flour in Kabul and certain other areas, and in order to allay anxiety the Kabul press has been laying emphasis on the impending arrival of flour from the United States. It has been announced that the first ship conveying this flour has arrived at Karachi and four similar vessels are due to reach Karachi by 2nd November. The total shipments made so far from the United States are stated to be 14,000 kharwars (1 kharwar = 1,280 lb.). The Government have issued a statement to the effect that the purchase and transport of wheat can be effected in the Kabul Province without restriction and that the authorised rates are R.16 Afghanis per 16 lb. for wheat, R.18 Afghanis per 16 lb. for wheat flour, R.12 Afghanis per 16 lb. in Kabul and R.10 Afghanis per 16 lb. in the suburbs of Kabul for maize and barley. The black-market price of wheat flour in Kabul is R.20-21 Afghanis per 16 lb. at present.

Abdul Majid, the Minister of National Economy, has announced that the

Government of India have agreed to supply increased quotas of piece-goods, petrol and kerosene oil to Afghanistan, and many Afghan officials have been expressing their gratitude to the Government of India for providing these additional supplies at a time when they are so urgently required.

(d) The *Anis* newspaper of 15th October in its weekly review of world affairs stated that the closing meetings of the Peace Conference at Paris were marked by a more conciliatory spirit between the delegates of the various countries attending the conference. The paper thought that the views of Field-Marshal Smuts expressed in his recent speech coincided with those of Mr. Winston Churchill.

The question of the future control of the Dardanelles was given a certain amount of space and references were made to the despatch of American and British notes to Moscow giving their views on this problem. In commenting on the Dardanelles question the writer stated that, although Russian reactions to these notes were not yet available, it was considered that the problem of the Dardanelles was outside the realm of direct settlement between Turkey and Russia and would have to be dealt with on an international basis.

Political developments in India were reported and the possibility of the Muslim League joining the Interim Government was mentioned without comment.

2. Demarcation of the Russo-Afghan Frontier

Reference: Summary No. 25, paragraph 2.

It is understood that a joint Russo-Afghan Commission has been appointed to demarcate the Russo-Afghan frontier between Kushk in the Herat Province and the Oxus River. New boundary pillars are to be erected. Mr. J. B. Alexander, American engineer, is to advise the Afghan members of the commission, but is not a member of the commission, and will have his headquarters at various points well within the territory of Afghanistan.

EXTRACT FROM WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 43

For the Week ending 25th October, 1946

(Communicated in Kabul Despatch No. 86 of 26th October; Received 5th November)

1. Political and General

(a) His Majesty King Zahir Shah has continued his tour in the Kataghan Province during the week and visited in turn various places in the Khost-Farang, Warsuch and Farkhar districts. His Majesty arrived in the Farkhar Valley on 22nd October and, after a short stay there for fishing, will proceed to Kishm. Radio communication between Kabul and His Majesty's camp has been maintained and daily reports and messages have been exchanged. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and National Economy are to proceed to Northern Afghanistan during the first week in November to join His Majesty for the concluding part of his tour.

(b) Lieut.-General Muhd Daud Khan (W.W. 238) has not so far resumed his duties as War Minister and, according to rumours in Kabul, he is to be granted leave for one year; meanwhile his uncle, the Prime Minister, will retain the portfolios of both Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and Lieut.-General Asadullah Khan, the Chief of the General Staff, will act as Assistant Minister of Defence. Prior to the departure of His Royal Highness Muhd Hashim Khan on pilgrimage to Mecca he is stated to have nominated his nephew Lieut.-General Muhd Daud Khan as his heir. The execution of formal documents to this effect was, however, postponed as it was found that this involved the payment of large sums in registration fees.

(c) Afghan officials remain concerned about the shortage of wheat flour in Kabul, and the press has taken the unprecedented step of publishing an article criticising the economic policy of Abdul Majid (W.W. 73), the Minister of National Economy. The article, written by an official in the Press Department, created quite a stir in Kabul and the *Islah* newspaper, which published it, was immediately sold out, and several thousand more copies had to be printed to meet the public demand. It is probable that officials in the Prime Ministry and Ministry for Foreign Affairs responsible for censoring articles published in this Government-controlled newspaper made a slip and failed to appreciate the implications which were involved. Abdul Majid

has now begun a campaign in the Kabul press in order to justify his economic policy, and has to some extent placed the blame on India for failing to give an adequate supply of piece-goods to Afghanistan.

2. The Pushtu Language

The Afghan Government are again trying to popularise the use of the Pushtu language, and have issued instructions to the effect that routine correspondence, notices, receipt and issue forms, social invitations and discharge certificates for Government employees should be in the Pushtu language. The Prime Minister, who is keen on maintaining good relations with the Pushtu-speaking tribes of the Eastern, Southern and Kandahar Provinces, possibly regards this as a good propaganda move, but does not realise the immense administrative problems involved in changing and printing Government forms or the fact that many Afghan officials, both senior and junior, are not acquainted with the Pushtu language or have any desire to learn it. The majority of Afghan officials do, however, have a keen sense of how the political wind is blowing and are prepared to follow any line given to them by a Prime Minister.

3. Afghan Relations with North-West Frontier Tribes

The Afghan Prime Minister gave an interview to a large number of Wazir and Mahsud tribal leaders who reside on both sides of the Indo-Afghan frontier on 18th October.

In reply to a question put to him by F. M. Ahmad Jan Mahsud, son of N. S. Musa Khan, he is alleged to have stated that the Afghan Government have very friendly relations with the Governments of India and Great Britain, and to have asked the tribal leaders why they created trouble on the Indo-Afghan frontier by producing "Malangs," "Khalifas," "Faqirs" and "Hajis" to stir up tribal unrest. He advised them to abstain from these tactics in future and endeavour to lead peaceful lives; he also informed them that he had advised the Faqir of Ipi to surrender himself to the British authorities. Some of

the tribal leaders then asked the Prime Minister whether it was true that the Afghan Government had mortgaged their country to the Americans, as rumours of this sort had been in circulation recently.

The Prime Minister informed them that he could guess the source of such rumours, and advised them to ignore this type of propaganda as no Afghan would ever sell his independence to a foreign Power.

EXTRACT FROM WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 44

For the Week ending 1st November, 1946

(Communicated in Kabul Despatch No. 88 of 2nd November; Received 13th November)

1. Political and General

(a) His Majesty King Zahir Shah cancelled his visit to the Kishkm district and proceeded to Kunduz from the Farkhar valley on 27th October. The next day His Majesty inspected the cotton ginning, soap and porcelain factories at Kunduz. During the tour His Majesty caught a 5 lb. brown trout, but was eclipsed by Sultan Ahmad Khan, president of the National Assembly, who landed a 6 lb. trout. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and National Economy are leaving Kabul on 2nd November for Mazar-i-Sharif, where they are to join His Majesty for the remainder of his tour.

(b) The Prime Minister is reported to have attended office in the Ministry of Defence on two occasions during the week to transact business. Lieut.-General Muhd Daud Khan, in the course of conversation with the British Military Attaché on 29th October, displayed more interest in the country's military affairs than he has done for some months, and he discussed such matters as the reorganisation of the Afghan army and the training of army and air force officers in India. He stated that he had cancelled his proposed tour to Kandahar. Lieut.-General Asadullah Khan (W.W. 199) continues to combine the duties of C.G.S. with those of acting Minister of Defence, but refers important matters to the Prime Minister.

(c) Abdul Majid (W.W. 73), the Minister of National Economy, informed the military attaché on 30th October that he was considering a proposal to form a general transport company with separate branches for motor transport and civil air services. The authorised capital would be R.50 million Afghanis. He was, however, doubtful whether a civil internal air service in Afghanistan would ever pay, and thought that in the initial stages it might be better to link civil aviation with the Afghan air force, which had officers with some experience in flying and main-

taining aircraft. He mentioned that the intention was to permit one or more foreign air services to operate on the line Kabul-Horat, while any Afghan air services would act as feeders to this main line. He also considered that it might prove cheaper to develop airfields and secure equipment through military or air force channels than from civil aviation concerns or other civil sources abroad. One of Abdul Majid's suggestions was that a big motor transport combine in Afghanistan would make large profits, and that these profits could be set off against a possible loss on the running of an internal air service.

2. Russian Propaganda in Northern Afghanistan

Abdul Majid, the Minister of National Economy, stated (a) on 30th October that the Tashkent Radio was putting out daily broadcasts comparing the condition of the Tajiks and Uzbaks in Northern Afghanistan with those in Russian territory north of the Oxus. He thought that these broadcasts could not have a great deal of effect because not more than twenty or thirty people in Northern Afghanistan, and most of these were Afghan officials, had radio receivers, but that if this programme of vilification of the Afghan Government was combined with oral propaganda there might be some danger, and it behoved the Afghan Government to do all they could to ameliorate the lot of people residing north of the Hindu Kush. It was for this reason that he is a strong exponent of developing to the utmost extent the natural resources of the Badakhshan, Kataghan, Mazar-i-Sharif and Maimana provinces. The Government could only provide amenities for the people in the shape of cinemas, education, better houses, electric light, &c., when they had developed their trade and resources and were obtaining an increased revenue.

3. Foreign Missions

(a) British Legation

(i) Reference Summary No. 41, paragraph 3 (a).

Major A. S. B. Shah and Mr. D. Gilsinn returned to Kabul from their tour in Northern Afghanistan on 29th October.

(ii) Major D. W. McLean, Scots Greys, and Major C. W. B. Rankin, late assistant private secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy of India, arrived in Kabul on 28th October. They are to travel to Persia en route to England, via Mazar-i-Sharif, Maimana and Herat, and will leave Kabul for Mazar-i-Sharif on 2nd November.

(iii) Major T. Creagh-Coen, Indian Political Service, arrived in Kabul on 31st October. He will leave Kabul for Peshawar on 3rd November.

(b) The Russian Embassy

(i) M. I. Bakoulin, the Russian Ambassador, is stated to have been more than usually tactless during his recent tour to Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif. At Kandahar and Girishk he asked most pointed questions about the pay, condi-

tions of service and general activities of American engineers and Afghan labour employed on the construction of the Boghra Canal. It is believed that the American engineers intentionally gave him some very incorrect information. Between Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif he made attempts to make side trips off the main route, but according to Afghan officials such facilities were refused. He then stated that if other foreigners could make side excursions he should be given the same facilities.

(ii) Two members of the staff of the Russian Embassy made references during the week to the British Military Attaché, asserting that his attitude and general bearing was "imperialistic" and in general accord with the policy of his Government. This can probably be put down to jealousy on the part of the Russians in Kabul in that the British Military Attaché was recently allowed to tour in an area forbidden to them, and possibly on account of the supply of military equipment from India. The staff of the American Legation in Kabul are coming in for similar criticism on the part of the Russians.

[E 11386/13/97]

No. 9

EXTRACT FROM WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 45

For the Week ending 8th November, 1946

(Communicated in Kabul Despatch No. 90 of 9th November; Received 21st November)

Political and General

(a) His Majesty's King Zahir Shah spent the period 27th to 30th October in the Kunduz district and inspected factories, a horse show and dealt with complaints regarding the allotment of land. On 1st November His Majesty arrived at Tashkurghan and has since been joined by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and National Economy and Sher Ahmad Khan, Minister of State.

Various committees of enquiry have been appointed by His Majesty in the places visited for the purpose of investigating complaints put forward by the people. The senior member of several of these committees is Sultan Ahmad Khan, the President of the National Assembly.

(b) Id-uz-Zuha was celebrated in Kabul on 5th November and public offices and schools were closed from 5th to 8th

November inclusive. For the first time since 1932 prayers were offered in the open instead of in mosques, and 30,000 to 40,000 people gathered on the Chaman-i-Huzoori for the purpose as the Idgahmosque is still under repair. His Royal Highness Shah Mahmud Khan attended, together with other Cabinet Ministers and senior civil and military officials. The revival of the custom that His Majesty The King or another senior member of the Royal Family be present on such occasions has pleased the public. The murder of the late King Nadir Shah, in 1933, led to the abandonment of the custom.

(c) Lieutenant-General Muhd Daud Khan (W.W. 238) attended "Id" prayers on the Chaman-i-Huzoori in mufti. He has not yet resumed his duties as Minister for War or has any official announcement been made that he has or intends to resign

the appointment. A decision one way or another will probably be made when His Majesty King Zahir Shah returns to Kabul from his tour.

(d) The *intelligentsia* of Kabul and Afghans are taking an interest in the communal disturbances in India and are said

to be questioning Indian Muslim traders and teachers in Kabul concerning the present political situation in India.

The Kabul press publishes details of the riots and disturbances in India as given out by Indian broadcasting services, but makes no comment on the reports received.

[E 12236/13/97]

No. 10

EXTRACT FROM WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 46

For the Week ending 15th November, 1946

(Communicated in Kabul Despatch No. 91 of 16th November; Received 18th December)

1. Political and General

(a) His Majesty King Zahir Shah attended "Id-uz-Zuha" prayers at the Mosque of the shrine at Mazar-i-Sharif on 5th November and afterwards received "Id" greeting from officials and notables. His Majesty also ordered the release of 211 prisoners from the jails of Qunduz, Khanabad, Taluqan and Baghlan and 326 from the prisons of Mazar-i-Sharif, Balkh, Shibarghan and Haibak. On 8th November His Majesty visited Balkh, and the military cantonment of Dehdadi, and then proceeded to Tashkurghan. On 10th November His Majesty left Tashkurghan for Haibak and spent three or four days in this district for shooting. On 13th November he arrived at Chamzai near Dahana Ghor and is then to visit the textile factory at Pul-i-Khumri. His Majesty is expected to return to Kabul on or about 24th November. The tour is described by Afghan officials as having been a great success.

(b) The Kabul press has announced that His Royal Highness Muhd Hashim Khan arrived at Jeddah en route to Mecca on 31st October and that His Royal Highness Shah Mahmud Khan visited the Panjshir Valley on 8th November to inspect the new motor road between Gulbahar and Bazarak.

Rumours are again in circulation to the effect that His Royal Highness Shah Wali Khan is to return to Kabul from Paris to take up the appointment of Minister for War, which Lieutenant-General Muhd Daud Khan refuses to accept unless the Prime Minister agrees to his terms.

(c) Afghan officials state that the food supply situation in Kabul and a few other towns is still difficult and wheat flour scarce. The Government took steps recently to seize wheat and flour coming into Kabul from outlying districts with a

view to selling them at controlled prices, but the result was that supplies from this source dried up and the Government were compelled to remove their restrictions, and permit free import and sale of wheat coming from outlying districts.

The Government are now using all available motor transport for bringing wheat to Kabul from the provinces and hope to build up an adequate reserve before snow closes the main roads. Officials assert that there is no shortage of wheat or flour in the majority of country districts, but that the supply situation in Kabul is always complicated in the winter months by an influx of people like the Hazaras whose homes lie at high altitudes where they cannot live in winter.

(d) The American civil aviation firm of Trans-World Airways is despatching a mission consisting of General Giles and seven other members to Kabul. The mission is expected to travel from Tehran to Kabul by air and will reach Kabul within the next few days. The mission is to discuss the possibility of establishing a west to east civil air service via Persia and Herat to Kabul.

2. Russian Embassy

The staff of the Russian Embassy continue to show an interest in tribal affairs on the North-West Frontier of India, in the political situation in India, in the organisation of the Indian army and even in State forces. They ask innumerable questions about India whenever opportunity offers and have suggested that India may be opened to Russian visitors from Afghanistan in the near future. The type of question put by the Russians to other foreigners in Kabul about India leads to the supposition that they are compiling a report or treatise on the country.

EXTRACT FROM WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 47

For the Week ending 22nd November, 1946

(Communicated in Kabul Despatch No. 93 of 23rd November; Received 5th December)

1. Political and General

His Majesty King Zahir Shah has continued his tour in Northern Afghanistan during the week and spent the period 15th to 19th November at Pul-i-Khumri. His Majesty inspected the textile factory, hydro-electric plant at Pul-i-Khumri, the sugar factory and agricultural farm at Baghlan and laid the foundation stones of a mosque and a school at Baghlan. On 19th November he proceeded to Ashraf on the Paiyandeh river for fishing and shooting. His Majesty is to return to Kabul on 25th November and is to be given a public reception. The streets have been decorated and addresses of welcome are to be presented by the National Assembly, the Council of Nobles and the Kabul Municipality.

The outbreak of cholera in the Southern Province is stated to be under control and, according to the Ministry of Defence only one death occurred on 20th November at Gardez. Steps have been taken to limit the movement of both troops and civilians between Kabul and the Southern Province.

The food supply situation in Kabul is still regarded as acute, but certain individuals amongst the public are apparently prepared to profit from the situation. Bread sold at the Government controlled price of 80 pulis is being resold at 150 pulis in the black market. The Government have increased the number of licenced bakers and have also arranged for the sale of bread from motor lorries which make a round of the city.

The Afghan Prime Minister expressed his appreciation to His Majesty's Minister of a film depicting the arrival of 570 tons of Afghan wheat at Peshawar which was shown to him, other senior Afghan officials and the Diplomatic Corps at this legation on 16th November.

The Kabul press has announced that Afghanistan's representative to the United Nations Organisation would be introduced to the Assembly on 19th November and that the country's delegate Abdul Hussain Khan (W.W. 47) would make an address in the Assembly to mark the occasion. His speech will probably consist of platitudes but may give some indication of the Afghan Government's attitude towards

certain problems, which are of immediate concern to them.

The Kabul press has been remarkably reticent about the political situation in India and about events in Bihar Province. Afghan officials are, however, now taking an interest in India and have begun to ask questions about the causes of the communal disturbances in Bengal and Bihar, the visit of his Excellency the Viceroy and Pandit Jawarhalal Nehru to the north-west frontier of India and the reactions of the Indian people as a whole to present developments. These Afghan officials are, as is natural, particularly interested in the future status of the tribes on the north-west frontier of India, but do not commit themselves in any way by giving their views on what they consider to be a reasonable solution of the problem.

The air mission headed by General Giles, the vice-president of Trans-World Airways, has not arrived in Kabul so far and it is believed that the mission has returned to Cairo from Tehran. The mission is to visit Kabul at a later date and the Afghan Government are desirous of importing from India 1,000 gallons of 100-octane aviation spirit to meet the possible requirements of their aircraft. It is understood that a similar mission representing Pan-American Airways will also visit Kabul in the near future.

2. Economic and Trade

(b) *Russo-Afghan Trade—Trade Agreements*

(Reference Section No. 13, paragraph 4 (d).)

The Russian trade agent in Kabul is reported to have resumed negotiations with the Afghan National Bank for a trade agreement, but the chief stumbling block to a successful result is the Russian desire to pay 1936 prices for Afghan commodities and sell Russian goods to Afghanistan at present-day prices. The Russians have also annoyed the Afghans by suggesting that their figures and statement are inaccurate.

The Russians are apparently anxious to purchase wool and opium, but are stated

to offer ridiculously low prices for these commodities.

(c) *Contract with British Consulting Engineers (India) (Limited).*

(Reference Section No. 11, paragraph 6 (b).)

The Afghan Government are stated to have agreed to give a contract to Associated Consulting Engineers (India) (Limited) for the following projects:—

- (a) The construction of a hydro-electric plant and an irrigation scheme on the Panjshir River, or, alternatively, the implementing of a similar

plant and scheme near Khanabad in the Kataghan Province.

(b) The erection of two textile factories, probably in Kabul or the Eastern Province.

(c) The reconstruction of the tanning factory at Kabul or the erection of a tanning factory at Jalalabad.

(d) The preparation of plans for any other project which the Afghan National Bank may from time to time wish to carry out.

The agreement will probably be signed when the Minister of National Economy, Abdul Majid (W.W. 73) returns to Kabul from Northern Afghanistan.

EXTRACT FROM WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 48

For the Week ending 29th November, 1946

(Communicated in Kabul Despatch No. 94 of 30th November; Received 12th December)

1. Political and General

(a) His Majesty King Zahir Shah spent the 21st and 22nd November at Ashraf on the Paiyandeh River, 23rd November at Doab Mekhazari and 24th November at Chabar Deh in the Ghorband valley. His Majesty returned to Kabul on 25th November and was accorded a public reception, shops, schools and offices being closed to mark the occasion. Although the reception was to a great extent stage-managed, His Majesty seems to have been enthusiastically received by students and the public. The arrangements for His Majesty's tour in northern Afghanistan are stated to have been good and the tour was carried out without a hitch. The credit for this is due to Lieutenant-General Muhd Umar Khan, Chief Secretary to His Majesty. The success which has attended the tour of King Zahir Shah has given rise to rumours that either he or the Prime Minister will carry out a tour in the eastern or Kandahar provinces within the next month or so.

(b) According to Afghan officials the outbreak of cholera in the southern province is under control, though restrictions on the movement of troops and civilians remain in force.

(c) His Royal Highness the Prime Minister continues to follow a policy of appeasement in relation to tribal leaders and other prominent Afghans who have in the past been suspected of being disloyal to the Yahya Khel dynasty. He is appar-

ently more generous than his predecessor in the shape of allowances to tribal leaders, and has given tribal leaders free motor vehicles or sold them at concessional rates in the hope that these leaders will settle down to more peaceful pursuits, released a number of them from jail or police surveillance in Kabul, and granted land to a few of them who have remained loyal over a period of years. The Royal Family are probably well aware that this policy has certain dangers for them, but they have apparently decided to try it out for a period. Should the policy succeed the ground will have been prepared for further progress and a gradual slackening of the rigid control and restrictions which have been such a feature of life in Afghanistan in recent years whether for Afghans or foreigners.

(d) The bread and flour supply situation in Kabul remains unpleasant for the poorer people, and large numbers of them have to queue up daily to obtain bread at 80 pulis per loaf (controlled price) which two years ago cost them 35 pulis per loaf.

2. Foreign Missions

American Legation

The staff of the legation and Americans in Afghan employ are making headway in their drive to cultivate Afghans in Kabul. Foreign wives of Afghan officials have been permitted to accept invitations to American houses and an American lady has attended

an Afghan wedding. A baseball match between an Afghan and an American team has been arranged for 1st December, and is to be attended by the Prime Minister and His Majesty King Zahir Shah. Anything which will broaden the outlook of the

Afghans is to be welcomed from the British point of view, though the Russians look on these developments from a different angle and are inclined to see something very sinister in the Afghan desire to go 70 to 80 per cent. American.

E 12367/13/97

No. 13

EXTRACT FROM WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 49

For the Week ending 6th December, 1946

(Communicated in Kabul Despatch No. 96 of 7th December; Received 23rd December)

Political and General

(a) The Muharram passed off peacefully as usual. His Majesty the King, accompanied by the Prime Minister, his two sons and other members of their families, visited the tombs of ex-King Nadir Shah and other relatives. After the visit the King and the Prime Minister are reported to have distributed alms amongst the poor.

(b) During his recent tour of the northern province His Majesty is said to have received complaints from the people that the distribution of cloth was unsatisfactory. It has been decided that at big centres like Andkhui, Mazar, Kunduz, Faizabad, Shiberghan and Akhcha the cloth will be distributed under the direct supervision of one representative of the Ministry of National Economy and one from the Central Government. There has been an appeal in the press for teachers and professors to help in this connexion during the vacations.

(c) Najibullah Khan, acting Minister of Education, accompanied by K. M. Abdur Razaq Khan, has arrived back in Kabul after three months' absence, when they represented Afghanistan at the International Air Conference on Navigation at Cairo.

(d) The Afghan press continues to take a likely interest in general world affairs

and in the affairs of the United Nations. The introduction of the Afghan representative, Abdul Hussain Aziz, to the General Assembly on the occasion of Afghanistan's admission to U.N.O. and the speech that he delivered has been given much prominence. In this speech he stated that both the Afghan Government and Afghan nation were deeply interested in the United Nations basic principles.

(e) The Afghan Government is contemplating an agreement with the Indian National Airways by which, in the first instance, the latter would operate regular services between Kabul and Peshawar and, later, when Afghanistan has purchased civil planes, the service would be reciprocal. I.N.A. officials are said to have been invited to visit Kabul in order to inspect the aerodromes available. It is expected that the service will start shortly and be carried on throughout the winter. It is also reported that a tentative agreement with the Persian Government has been concluded on the same lines, but that arrangements are not yet complete. It is thought that a final agreement for a service between Kabul and Persia will not be reached until spring 1947. Both these arrangements are reported to have been made by Najibullah Khan, the latter in Cairo, and the former on his return via India.

CHAPTER II.—IRAQ

E 11845/226/93

No. 14

REPORT ON LEADING PERSONALITIES IN IRAQ

Sir H. Stonehewer-Bird to Mr. Attlee (Received 9th December)

(No. 461)

Bagdad, 25th November, 1946

Sir,
With reference to Mr. Thompson's despatch No. 377 of 14th September, 1945, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on the leading personalities of Iraq as on 1st November, 1946.

2. Last year's report has been completely revised and to a large extent re-written and a number of new names have been added.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 14

Royal Family

1. King Feisal II.

Born in Bagdad the 2nd May, 1935. Succeeded to the throne on the death of his father, Ghazi I, on the 3rd April, 1939. His mother is a sister of the Amir Abdul Illah.

He and his mother were confined in the Qasr Zahur during most of May 1941, but were removed to the summer palace at Pir Mum (Arbil) just before Rashid Ali and his associates decamped. He is a bright, intelligent child, though somewhat delicate with a tendency to asthma. His Majesty visited Egypt in April 1943, proceeding and returning via Palestine and Transjordan. In 1944 he again spent the summer at Alexandria. In 1945 he did not leave the country.

In June 1946 the King paid his first visit to England. He was present at the Victory celebrations on 8th June and afterwards was the guest of The King and Queen at Buckingham Palace. He was accompanied by the Queen-Mother and the Princesses. Early in 1946 an English tutor was appointed to succeed the governess who had previously been in charge of his studies. The Regent decided that, on his return from England, the King should start to learn Kurdish.

He returned to Bagdad on 8th October. There is reason to hope that his asthma has been reduced by treatment in the United Kingdom.

2. Abdul Illah, His Royal Highness the Amir.

Only son of Ali-bin-Hussein, ex-King of the Hejaz, who died in 1935. Born in the Hejaz 1912. Came to Bagdad as a child with father in 1926, after the latter's expulsion from the Hejaz. Educated partly at home and partly at Victoria College, Alexandria. He speaks good English.

In November 1936 he married in Bagdad the daughter of Salah-al-Din Fauzi Beg and granddaughter of Amin Yahiyah Pasha of Cairo.

He is keenly interested in Arab horse racing and maintains a large stable.

Became Regent on the death of King Ghazi on the 2nd April, 1939.

In November 1943 he was declared Heir to the Throne under the provisions of an amendment to the Organic Law passed in October.

Divorced his wife in the summer of 1940.

During the Cabinet crisis of January 1941, which led to the fall of Rashid Ali's Cabinet, he

endeavoured to resist the Prime Minister's demands for the appointment of new Ministers, but fled to Diwaniyah to escape the threats to his life made by the four army officers, Salah-ud-Din Sabbagh, Kamil Shabib, Fahmi Said and Mahmud Salman. Rashid Ali thereupon resigned and Taha al Hashimi succeeded him. The Regent then returned to the capital.

During the night of the 1st April the four army commanders already mentioned occupied the city with their troops and went to the Palace to demand the resignation of Taha al Hashimi and the appointment of Rashid Ali as Prime Minister. The Regent was, however, warned in time, eluded them and took refuge in the American Legation. Thence he was smuggled out to Habbaniya on the 2nd April and flown to Basra. On instructions from Bagdad the Officer Commanding, Iraq army, at Basra attempted to arrest the Regent, who took refuge on board one of His Majesty's ships. By now any hope of rallying support for his cause in the south had been lost. On the 16th April he was flown to Jerusalem, together with Ali Jaudat and Jamil Maffal, who had meanwhile joined him at Basra. During the hostilities in May the Regent remained in Palestine. He returned to Bagdad on the 1st June after the collapse of Rashid Ali's régime and was welcomed by a large gathering of officials, notables and well-wishers.

Since then, he has taken his public duties seriously and has done his best to establish his position among the people. He has undoubtedly developed in character during the past five years and has, on several occasions, shown marked firmness and powers of decision, but he lacks the personality which appeals to the imagination of the public and is painfully shy. Like all weak men he suffers from too much advice and is apt to believe the last person he has spoken to.

He was made an Honorary Air Commodore in the Royal Air Force in September 1943. He caused a Cabinet crisis in September 1943 by injudicious interference in the choice of Government candidates for the General Election. He has, however, shown sound sense in his desire to reform the Administration and improve the general condition of the country. At the invitation of His Majesty's Government the Regent paid an extensive visit to the United Kingdom in December 1943. For three days he was the guest of Their Majesties the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace. He returned delighted with the hospitality shown to him and much impressed by Britain's war effort.

During 1944 the Regent toured extensively within the country and paid particular attention to the army manoeuvres which he constantly attended. In June he visited Alexandria, returning early in July. In September he again visited Transjordan and Egypt. He paid a second brief visit to Transjordan in February 1945.

In the spring of 1945 he was much discouraged by Mr. Churchill's failure to invite him to join King Ibn Saud and others for talks in Cairo. This led to a threat of abdication.

In May 1945 he left on an official visit to the United States, returning via Canada and Britain. In London he was twice received by the King, met the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet and

attended the Victory Thanksgiving Service. He also visited the occupied area of Germany. He returned via France and Italy, whence he proceeded on an official visit to the President of the Turkish Republic before returning to Iraq in September. While in the United States he displayed irresponsible extravagance, spending over \$200,000 on jewellery. He has also invested heavily, at the cost of grave indebtedness, in speculative industrial enterprises in Baghdad. All this is generally known and has markedly decreased his prestige, and may give rise to serious political complications.

In 1946 the Regent again visited London and was present at the Victory Celebrations on 8th June. He returned to Iraq at the end of July. He greatly enjoyed his visit and there is no doubt that he finds English life and methods increasingly congenial. This has its disadvantages from the Iraqi point of view.

The Regent continues his policy of making himself *persona grata* with the army, particularly with the younger officers, a number of whom were sent to England during the summer. There is no doubt that this step produced excellent results in that all the officers came back with pronounced pro-English views.

The Regent was created G.C.M.G. in 1942 and G.C.V.O., with the award of the Royal Victorian Chain, in 1943.

3. Zaid, His Royal Highness the Amir.

Born in Constantinople in 1900. Youngest son of the late King Hussein of the Hejaz. Half-brother of King Ali, King Feisal and the Amir Abdullah (of Transjordan). His mother was a Turk. Educated in Constantinople. Fought with the Arab Nationalist forces during the Great War, and won the good opinion of the British officers with the Sharifian army. Made a G.B.E. for his services in the war of 1914-18.

Came to live in Iraq in 1922, and was commissioned in the Iraqi cavalry. Acted as Regent for a short time in 1924 during King Feisal's absence.

In 1925 he went to England and studied agriculture at Oxford for nearly three years. During this period he took an active part in the social life of the university and rowed in the torpids for Balliol. In 1928 he joined his father in Cyprus and remained there until King Hussein's death in 1931. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in January 1932.

In 1933 it became known that one of his sisters had contracted a clandestine marriage with Attia Beg Amin, some time first secretary at the Iraqi Legation at Angora (and later at the Legation in London). The Royal Family were indignant, and Zaid was transferred to Cairo in January 1934 as the first Iraqi Minister at King Fuad's Court. He did not, however, proceed to this post, which he ultimately refused to accept. At the end of 1934 he was busy in Athens engaged in litigation concerning extensive properties which he claims to have inherited in Greece. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935. In the spring of 1937 it was suspected that he had been using his position as Iraqi Minister to give false certificates for arms destined for Spain. He was recalled to Iraq for enquiries, but apparently established his innocence and returned to Berlin.

He is a pleasant, well-mannered man. A shrewd and somewhat cynical observer. He likes his easy private life in Istanbul and is reluctant to assume official responsibilities. He speaks excellent English and Turkish.

In 1933 he married a Turkish lady who had been divorced by her husband. She is agreeable and flamboyant with artistic pretensions. She is never seen in Iraq. This *mésalliance* mattered little so long as he was not living in Iraq, but when he was withdrawn from Berlin in the spring of 1938 and came to live in Baghdad it was counted against

him locally. But for his wife he would probably have been made Regent after the death of King Ghazi in April 1939. In the summer of 1939 he went to live in Istanbul.

Came to Baghdad in October 1941 to meet his brother the Amir Abdullah on the occasion of his State visit to the capital and remained for some time living quietly in a small house.

He returned to Turkey in June 1942. Accompanied by his wife, he came to Baghdad in November 1943 to act as Regent while the Amir Abdullah was in England, and remained until May 1944, when he went back to Turkey.

He returned to Iraq in 1945 to act as Regent during the Amir Abdullah's absence in America and Europe.

In 1946 he acted in a similar capacity. When, in 1946, agreement was reached that the Iraqi Mission in London should be raised to the status of an embassy, he was nominated as the first Iraqi Ambassador.

4. Hussein Nasir

Cousin of the King and Regent with the style of "Highness."

For a time held an appointment at the Palace. In 1945 married a daughter of the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan. In 1946 appointed Iraqi Consul in Jerusalem. A good-humoured, genial person without pronounced personality.

Other Personalities

1. Abbas-i-Mahmud Agha.

Chieftain of the Pizher tribe (Kurdish) (see Babekr Agha). Generally on the side of disorder when trouble is brewing. Maintains a tradition of being at feud with Babekr Agha, but both take care that this enmity shall not weaken the strength of the tribe.

2. Abbas Mahdi.

Shiah. Born 1898. Secretary to Iraqi Legation in Tehran 1931. Minister for Education, November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of Tapu in October 1933.

Became Minister for Economics and Communications in February 1934, but resigned with Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in August 1934. Reappointed Director-General of Tapu, December 1934.

Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the Palace March 1937. Joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in June 1937 as Minister for Economics and Communications, and was appointed Minister for Justice in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfa'i in August 1937 after Hikmat Sulaiman's resignation.

Transferred to the Ministry of Economics and Communications in October 1938, and resigned with whole Cabinet in December 1938.

Appointed Principal Private Secretary at the Royal Palace in July 1941.

Appointed Minister at Tehran in January 1943. Pleasant but without personality. Returned to Iraq in June 1945 and appointed first Iraqi Minister in Moscow.

Proceeded in November 1945 full of gloom. After a holiday in Stockholm, returned to Baghdad in October 1946 ostensibly on leave.

3. Abdul Amir al Uzri.

Shia, born Kadhima in 1899. Educated Baghdad and United States, where he graduated from Michigan University as D.Sc. (S.E.). He returned to Iraq in 1929 and was appointed engineer in the Directorate-General of Irrigation, in which he rose to the post of Assistant Director-General in 1941. He acted as Director-General on several occasions.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet in June 1944. Was Minister of Supply in August 1944, returning at the end of the month to his former Ministry. Resigned

with Cabinet in February 1946. Appointed Director-General of Irrigation in May 1946. Speaks English well and is pleasant, intelligent and friendly.

4. Abdul Aziz-al-Mudhaffar, M.B.E.

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1897. Speaks English, German and French well. Served as superintendent in Deputy Military Governor's Office, Bagdad Basafah, under the Government of Occupation from March 1917, and in 1919 became Mudir of Basafah. Secretary to the Ministry of Interior, December 1920, and Director of the Press Bureau in 1922. Director of Census Department 1927.

Appointed Mutesarrif of Mosul, May 1931. Withdrawn September 1931 for incompetence and tried for misappropriation of public funds. Found not guilty and appointed to be member of Muntafiq Land Court. Lost this post when the court was abolished in June 1932. In the summer of 1933 was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Tehran, and in May 1934 was transferred to be consul-general in Beirut.

Appointed counsellor to the Iraqi Legation in Paris, May 1935.

In the spring of 1937 he was accused of giving false certificates for munitions bought for Spain and recalled to Iraq. In Syria he was arrested, but extradition was refused and he was released, but remained in Syria. He is married to a daughter of Najil-Suwaidi, and this family connexion brought about his full exoneration in December.

He returned to live in Bagdad in January 1938, and shortly afterwards it was officially announced that it had been proved that he was innocent of the charges made against him in 1937. On his return he went into business.

Early in 1941 started a trans-desert transport service between Bagdad, Syria and Palestine. Was suspected of working for Rashid Ali. After the collapse of Rashid Ali's régime, did his best to clear his name and made lavish use of the "V" sign on his business stationery and press advertisements. As director of Iraqi Manufacturing and Trading Company was interested in the erection of a wax match factory in 1944.

5. Abdul Aziz-al-Qassab.

Sunni of Bagdad. Kaimakam of Kut under the Naqib's Provisional Government and did very well. In October 1921 he was appointed Mutesarrif of Mosul on probation for six months, but refused to go without the salary of a full mutesarrif. In the beginning of 1922 he went as Mutesarrif of Karbala, was transferred to Muntafiq in January 1923, and to the Ministry of Interior as Director-General of General Administration in June of the same year. Appointed Mutesarrif of Mosul in January 1924. A capable and well-intentioned official without much strength of character. Minister of Interior, January 1928. Minister for Justice, November 1929.

Went out of office with the resignation of Naji Pasha's Cabinet in March 1930. Has not held any other Cabinet post since. Has an adequate pension. Appointed Chief Administrative Inspector, Grade I, November 1933.

He was appointed Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfa'i in March 1935, but resigned with all his colleagues twelve days later. Elected a Deputy for Bagdad in the general elections of August 1935. Appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts in December 1937, in succession to Taufiq-al-Suwaidi.

6. Abdul Fettah bin Ibrahim

Born Bagdad 1906. Educated in Basra and Bagdad he was appointed as a teacher in 1924. He was sent to the American University, Beirut, whence he graduated B.A. in 1932. On returning to Iraq he was given an appointment as translator in the Port Directorate and in 1933 was transferred in the same

capacity to the Ministry of Justice. In 1934 he returned to Education as a teacher and served in Bagdad and Nasiriyah. In 1939, on account of his Leftist political views, he was transferred to Anah but succeeded in getting re-transferred to Bagdad in 1940. He taught in various schools in Bagdad until 1943, when he was appointed "Specialist Inspector" in which capacity he was undoubtedly an evil influence. In an endeavour to reduce the growth of communism in the capital he was transferred as Director of Education, Basra Liwa, in 1945. He refused to take up the appointment and resigned on 11th June, 1945. After quitting Government service he became director of the Babitah Printing and Publishing Company, which prints and publishes most of the Leftist literature. He still holds this post.

Undoubtedly he was infected by communism while in Beirut. After his return, he was reported as openly teaching communism to his students. All efforts to curb him failed, as will be seen by his frequent transfers. During the war he worked hard against "the Nazis" but at the same time worked equally hard with the "underground" campaign against the Government and made preparatory propaganda against the British. He was the founder of Hizb el Ittihad el Watani (Party of National Unity) and the chief instigator of Hizb el Sha'abi e-Watani (Popular National Party). He is probably one of the few convinced Communists, albeit more restrained than most.

7. Abdul Hadi Chalabi

Shiah. Born in Bagdad in 1895, the son of a wealthy landowner who was several times Minister of Education.

Chalabi was first elected a Deputy for Bagdad in 1934. In March 1935 he was arrested in connexion with the Kadhimain riots and deprived of his political rights until the amnesty of November of that year. He became a Deputy again in 1939. He attended the Atlantic City Economic Conference in August 1945. He is one of the most important corn brokers in the country and has large dealings with Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co., consequently better known in business than in political circles; this is his first Cabinet post. In the past he has supported Nuri al Said and Jamil Madfa'i. Speaks only Arabic and Persian. He has a wife who appears in public.

Minister of Communications and Works in the al Umari Cabinet of June 1946.

8. Dr. Abdul Hadi al Pachachi

Born in 1894, the son of a former Rais Belediya of Bagdad. He was educated in Bagdad and Istanbul and qualified as a doctor in France. He entered Government service in 1933 as director of the Isolation Hospital and has recently been a lecturer at the Medical College. Together with two Bagdadi Jews he is responsible for the direction of the Sa'adun Clinic and Hospital. Fat and smiling he does not appear a forceful personality and until now has played no part in politics; he is, however, a cousin of Hamdi and Muzabim al Pachachi. Is married to a very charming White Russian wife who is well known in British society in Bagdad. He speaks fluent French and a little English.

Became Minister of Social Affairs in the al Umari Cabinet of June 1946.

9. Abdul Hadi Dhahir

Shia. About 60. Former Deputy for Hilla, dabbles in law and has had considerable administrative experience. Appointed Director of Tribal Affairs, February 1943, and Mutesarrif of Hilla later in the same month. Appointed Judicial Adviser, Ministry of Finance, August 1944. Too rich to have to work, his intellectual vitality is such as to prevent his sitting in idleness, hence his legal activities. His governmental work may be partly ascribed to the

same cause. More of a student than man of action, but not afraid to assume responsibility and take decisions. Like Sa'ad Saleh, a bitter opponent of Saleh Jabr. In view of his wealth, unlikely to be corruptible. Minister of Economics in Tawfiq Suweidi's 1946 Cabinet.

10. Abdul Ilah Hafidh

Born about 1897 in Mosul. Son of the late Muhammad Ali Fadhl, who was for some time a Senator. Educated in Paris, where he qualified as a dentist. He also studied political economy. He obtained a degree in political science. Became Deputy for Mosul in 1926 and afterwards lost his seat. He then set up a dental clinic in Baghdad. Again elected Deputy in 1933. In 1935 he was appointed Iraqi Consul in Paris, but did not stay there long, and in September 1935 he became Director-General of Commerce. His subsequent posts were Consul-General, Beirut, 1938-39; Consul-General, Bombay, 1939-40; Director-General of Revenue, 1941. In July 1942 he became Minister of Economics and Minister for Foreign Affairs in October 1942. A fat, genial personality with wider horizons than most Iraqis. Speaks fluent French and fair English.

Appointed Minister of Education in June 1943 and was well spoken of by his British advisers. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

Joined Arshad al Umari's Cabinet in September 1946 as Minister of Supply, acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs during Dr. Jamali's absence in London.

11. Abdul Jabbar al Chalabi

Born Baghdad about 1906. Graduate in Agriculture, University of California and in Education, Columbia Teachers' College. Formerly Director of Elementary Education, February 1943. Promoted Chief Inspector of Education, February 1946. Has had the difficult task of reorganising the Iraqi educational system. Member of the Iraqi delegation to San Francisco Conference, and of the delegation to the United Nations Educational Conference in London, has also represented Iraq at the cultural conferences of the Arab League. Quiet, sober, of a studious turn of mind, his brain is one of the best in Iraq at the moment. Backed by sound administrative experience he is not afraid to take decisions or responsibility. As a result of his fairly extensive travels is a sincere Nationalist and convinced Shi'a, but is yet the reverse of narrow-minded. Convinced of the need of British aid for Iraq and has many British friends. Dislikes Saleh Jabr and Fadhl al Jamali. His name has never been linked with any suggestion of corruption. His English is perfect.

As Minister of Supply in the Suweidi Cabinet of 1946 he was an outstanding success. In September 1946 was appointed Director-General of Communications and Works.

12. Abdul Latif Nuri

Born in Baghdad 1888. Gazetted as officer in the Turkish army in 1908. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Promoted *agid* (lieutenant-colonel) in 1926 and *zaim* (colonel) in 1929. He has held the command of the Northern and Southern Districts, and has passed the senior and junior officers courses, and was posted to the Northern District in 1933. Promoted *amir linea* (brigadier) in 1932.

Joined General Bakr Sidqi as leader of the army revolt against Yasin-al-Hashimi in October 1936, and became Minister of Defence in the Government formed by Hikmat Sulaiman.

Resigned after the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 and was then placed on retired pay.

Left Iraq in the same year for medical treatment and lived abroad. While in hospital in Damascus he was placed under arrest by the British military

authorities when Syria was occupied in June 1941, but was allowed to return to Iraq in September 1941, since when he has been living quietly in Baghdad on his pension.

13. Abdul Mahdi (Sargid)

Shiah of Shutiya (Muntafiq). Born about 1894. Belongs to an influential family and owns a large estate (Abu Hawan Muqatah). Deputy for Kerbala in Turkish Parliament, and in Iraqi Chamber in 1927. Minister for Education under Rashid Ali-al-Gilani, March-October 1933. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the election of 1934.

He was a strong partisan of Yasin Pasha and a member of the Executive Committee of the party of National Brotherhood (Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani).

After the dissolution of the party in 1935 he played no part in politics, until he was again elected to the Chamber in December 1937.

He was again returned for this constituency in June 1939.

In February 1941 became Minister of Economics in the Cabinet of Taha al Hashimi. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet when Rashid Ali seized power in April. Appointed Minister of Economics in the Cabinet formed by Nuri as Said in October 1941.

Made Senator October 1941.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in February 1942. Resigned in November 1942 as a result of a personal quarrel with Tahir Ali, the Minister of Education. Has been politically active and verbose in the summer of 1945, protesting against French policy in the Levant and in favour of treaty revision, but is generally regarded as a wind-bag whose days of effective agitation are done.

14. Abdul Majid Alawi, C.B.E.

Born 1898 of a large Shia family of Baghdad. Graduated in law at Baghdad and for some time practised as a lawyer. Elected a Deputy in 1928 but was not returned in 1930. Is a founder member of the Iraqi Bar Association. In 1932 was appointed Legal Adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs but was sent at once as vice-consul to Khorramshahr. Transferred to Tehran 1933 and to Tabriz in 1934, where he remained for four years and where he co-operated closely with His Majesty's Consul. Became Director of Oriental Affairs in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1938 and Acting Director-General and Director of Political Affairs in 1941. He was much upset when Dr. Fadhl Jamali was made Director-General in 1944, leaving him merely as Director of the Political Department of the Ministry. On the 21st December, 1944, he joined the Cabinet of Hamdi al Pachachi as Minister of Social Affairs. He talks English well, if rather pedantically, and has always been consistently pro-British. He has recently married a second wife who appears in public, which is surprising for a Shia.

Since February 1946 has held no post in the public service. Created C.B.E. for war services, 1946.

15. Abdul Qadir-al-Gilani

Elder brother of Yusuf Gilani. Born Baghdad 1904. Entered Government service 1926, and shortly afterwards was appointed attaché in the Iraqi Legation in London. While in London he studied at the London School of Economics. Speaks good English.

Appointed third secretary at Iraqi Legation in Cairo 1934. Promoted second secretary 1938. On many occasions he was in charge of the legation and maintained excellent relations with the British Embassy. In Egypt he married an Egyptian girl of good family and was popular in Egyptian society. Appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Royal Palace, April 1940, where he appeared likely to exercise a good influence.

These hopes were, however, disappointed, and he associated himself closely with his cousin Rashid

Ali when the latter became Prime Minister in March 1941, and during the rebellion led by Rashid Ali in May 1941. When it collapsed he took refuge in Persia. After the Allied occupation of Persia he was arrested by the British forces, and after some months' internment in Ahwaz he was sent to Southern Rhodesia. Was sent back to Iraq with the other Iraqi internees for trial in April 1944. Tried in August 1944, he was found guilty of having, in May 1941, insulted the Queen Mother on the telephone. Although he was sentenced to three months' imprisonment, the Regent intervened and he was detained in the Police School, Baghdad, and later transferred to Amara. Released in October 1944. Has been described as arrogant and selfish, he certainly gives the impression of being a *four bon-homme*.

During 1946 he and his wife have made determined efforts to return to public life and to win the favour of this embassy.

16. Abdul Qadir-al-Rashid

Sunni of Baghdad, related to the Gilani family. Born 1894. Speaks English well.

Appointed secretary to the Council of Ministers in 1924 in succession to Hussein Afnan. Remained in that post, the duties of which he discharged with noteworthy tact and efficiency, until November 1932, when he was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Naji Shaukat's Cabinet. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Was appointed an assistant manager in the Rafidain Oil Company in October 1933 and is now well received in British business circles.

His Turkish wife is one of the most accomplished women in Baghdad and one of the chief hostesses of the capital.

He was awarded the King's Medal for service in the cause of freedom in 1946.

17. Abdul Razzaq Hussein

Born in Baghdad 1893. Sunni Moslem of a poor family. Educated in Baghdad and received his military training in Istanbul. Appointed as officer in Machine Gun Corps of Turkish army in 1912. Was captured by the British in 1915(?) and imprisoned in Cairo Citadel, where he learned to speak English and, as he says, to appreciate the English. Took no part in Arab revolt. Joined Iraq army on the 15th February, 1924.

Is very pro-British. On the 17th May, 1943, he, along with eleven other Iraqi officers, went on a tour of the battle areas of the Western Desert on the invitation of the Commander-in-chief, Middle East. As a brigadier he was Director-General of Defence Affairs, and in November 1944 he was promoted Amir Liwa, which rank he now holds as Officer Commanding 3rd Division of the reorganised Iraq army. Led the Iraqi contingent in the London Victory Parade in June 1946. Is jovial and fond of gay parties.

18. Abdul Razzaq al Uzri

Born about 1890. Shi'ah. A Baghdad lawyer. Deputy 1931-32. Public Prosecutor in 1932. Subsequently held post of Mutassarif of Kerbela and Diyala. Appointed Minister of Social Affairs by Nuri Said in November 1942. Ineffective and lacking in personality, he became a Minister only because no other eligible Shi'ah could be found.

Lost his portfolio when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in December 1943. Appointed Mutassarif of Hillah in August 1944 as a result of Saleh Jabr's intrigues. Mutassarif of Baghdad March 1945.

Director-General of Tapu, October 1946.

19. Abdul Wahab Mahmud

Sunni. Born Basra 1900. Brother of the late Muhammad Zaki Mahmud, a former Minister of Justice, who was at one time President of the Chamber of Deputies. Brother-in-law of Ismail

Namiq. Educated Basra and Bagdad, where he graduated in law in 1932. Reported during the thirties to hold decided Communist views and to have distributed Communist propaganda; his house was raided in 1934, but it was believed that his brother's influential position saved him from arrest. Engaged in anti-Madfa'i Government propaganda in 1938; toured the Diwaniya tribes in an attempt to unite them against the Government. Arrested December 1938 on the orders of Jamil Madfa'i and despatched to *residence forcée* in North Iraq. Released shortly afterwards when Nuri became Prime Minister. Deputy since 1939 and *rapporteur* of the Finance Committee of the Chamber of Deputies during 1945. Minister of Finance in the 1946 Suweidi Cabinet.

20. Abdul Wahid, Shaikh

Chief of the Fatlah tribe, son of Haji Sikkar, once the most powerful sheikh on the Euphrates. Abdul Wahid cultivates extensive properties on the left bank of the Mishkab from Abu Sukhair to the Ibrahim. Throughout recent years he has steered his course with a view to maintain to the utmost his political and tribal influence. His support and loyalty were carefully cultivated by King Feisal, and all political parties have thought it worth while to try to make him an adherent. He has many friends and many bitter enemies, and is reputed to deal harshly with his fellaheen.

He was prominent as a leader of discontent in the Middle Euphrates area in the spring of 1935, working with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani to overthrow Ali Jaudat's Cabinet.

He had much influence during Yasin-al-Hashimi's tenure of office, but so abused it that after Yasin's fall in October 1936 he was afraid to return to his tribe.

He was elected to the Chamber in February 1937, but in July 1937 he was arrested and imprisoned for fomenting tribal disturbances in Diwaniyah. After the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Government in August 1937 he was released from prison, but kept under surveillance first in Sulaimani and later in Samawa.

He was permitted to return to his home in July 1938 and elected Deputy for Diwaniyah in June 1939.

In April and May 1941 he closely supported Rashid Ali. In August he was interned in Fao and in December transferred to Samarra. He continued, nevertheless, to keep touch with his friends and supporters, among whom Hassan Suhail, of the Beni Tamim, was prominent.

Transferred to the internment camp at Amara in the summer of 1942. He was released in 1944 and lived in *residence forcée* in Mosul till April 1945, when he was allowed to reside in Samarra. The compulsory economy of his exile leaves him the richest tribal leader in the Euphrates. His influence is still probably greater than that of any other chief of the Fatlah tribe.

21. Abdullah-al-Damluji

Formerly called Abdullah Said Effendi. Born 1895. A native of Mosul. Studied medicine in Constantinople and calls himself doctor, though it is believed that he did not graduate. Seems to have been serving in the Turkish army when Ibn Saud occupied Hassa in 1913, and to have transferred his allegiance to Ibn Saud. Soon rose to a position of influence in Ibn Saud's Court, and came to Bagdad as his unofficial representative in 1921. Was Ibn Saud's Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1922 and signed the Uqair Protocol. Went with the Amir Feisal-al-Saud to London in 1926, and took part in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Treaty of Jeddah in 1927. After this his influence waned owing to the intrigues of Fudh Hamza and Yusuf Yasin.

In August 1928 he represented the Court of Nejd, the Hejaz and its dependencies at the Medina Railway Conference at Haifa. The conference was a failure, and when it ended, instead of returning to the Hejaz, Abdullah Damluji came to Bagdad, posting his resignation to Ibn Saud. Arrived Bagdad, September 1928. Appointed Iraqi Consul-General, Cairo, in 1930, recalled October 1930, and appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. This at first was resented by Ibn Saud, and for a short time Damluji's presence at the head of the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs seemed likely to embarrass Nejd and Iraqi relations, but when Nuri Pasha visited Jedda in April 1931 Ibn Saud stated that he no longer wished to raise any objection to Damluji's appointment. Was left out of office when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Director-General of Health, July 1932, and succeeded Safwat Pasha as Court Chamberlain at the end of 1933.

Returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Jamil-al-Madfa'i's second Cabinet in February 1934; resigned in July and was reappointed Director-General of Health in September.

He was suspended in 1935 and tried for misappropriation of public funds. He was acquitted and reinstated in his post at the end of December, but resigned a few months later.

For nearly two years he remained out of public life, but in July 1937 he was appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Palace in succession to Abbas Mahdi.

He headed the Iraqi representatives at the funeral of Atatürk in November 1938. Soon after Nuri-al-Said became Prime Minister in December 1938 he was removed from the Palace to an obscure appointment in the Health Department, which was later abolished.

Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs and Health in November 1941.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in February 1942.

Resigned in June 1942.

Has given up politics for business and is unlikely to return. Speaks good English.

22. Abdullah Qassab

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1900, the son of an Alim Shaikh, Abbas Amin-al-Fatwa. Nephew of Abdul Aziz Qassab, q.v. Educated in Bagdad, graduated from the Law College in 1928 and entered the Civil Service. Became kaimakam of Samarra in 1936 and later became Director of Tribal Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior.

Appointed Mutassarif of Kerbala in October 1941 and was transferred to Diwaniyah a month later. Did well as a Mutassarif and joined Nuri Said's Cabinet as Minister of Interior in October 1943. Quiet and efficient with no marked political leanings. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in December 1943 and was dropped from Nuri's immediately following Cabinet. Appointed Mutassarif of Mosul in March 1944.

A strong and capable administrator. He initiated and worked hard at the Conferences (Der ez Zor, June 1944, Bagdad, May 1945) to settle Shammar-Ageidat disputes.

In June 1946 joined Arshad al Umari's Cabinet as Minister of the Interior, but resigned in August owing to a difference with the Premier. Awarded King's Medal for service in the cause of freedom 1946.

23. Ahmad, Shaikh of Barzan

A chieftain of the Kurdish Barzan tribe. Headquarters at Barzan at the foot of the Chia-i-Shirin. Exercised powerful influence over the Barosh and Mazuri Bala areas to the north-west of Rowanduz. Friendly relations were established with him in 1919, but no administrative control was exercised in his tribal area. In 1920 he was implicated in the murder

of two British officials. He and Faria Agha of Bera Kapra were declared outlaws with a price on their heads, and Barzan was destroyed by troops, but his country was not occupied. In 1922 he welcomed Turkish agents into Barosh and Mazuri Bala, and in September 1922 his men made an unsuccessful attack on Amadiyah. A month later Barzan was again destroyed by the Royal Air Force co-operating with Assyrian irregulars. In 1923, the Turks having been driven from Rowanduz, Sheikh Ahmad turned on their retreating columns and came into Agra to make peace with the Anglo-Iraqi authorities. His outlawry was cancelled, and he was permitted to continue in unmolested control of his tribal villages and mountains. In the summer of 1931 he began a private war with a neighbouring chieftain of Baradost, Sheikh Rashid of Lolan. He was everywhere successful, drove Sheikh Rashid to flight into Persia and set fire to his villages. Government intervention became necessary to restore order. Iraqi troops were concentrated early in 1932, and after some sharp fighting, followed by intensive air action by the Royal Air Force, Sheikh Ahmad was defeated and driven across the Turkish border in June. He and his two brothers, Muhammad Sadiq and Mulla Mustafa, were interned for a time in Turkey, but the two latter contrived to find their way back into their old haunts in the following winter. After holding out in the mountains for some months they surrendered and were pardoned in July 1933 and allowed to return to their villages. A short time afterwards the Turks surrendered Sheikh Ahmad to the Iraqi Government on condition that his life should be spared. For a little over a year he lived in comfortable and honourable detention in Mosul, but in November 1934 it was found that he was in collusion with Khalil Khushawi, who was disturbing the peace of the Barzan area, and he was thereupon removed to Hillah.

Permitted to come to Bagdad in April 1935. A short while later he went to live in Sulaimani. After the escape of Mulla Mustafa from Sulaimani in the autumn of 1943 Sheikh Ahmad was removed to Hillah and remained there until a settlement was made with Mulla Mustafa in January 1944. Thereafter he was permitted to return to Barzan. He is now heavily overshadowed by Mulla Mustafa in local tribal affairs. His own home-made religion, which is tolerant to Christianity and which brought him into conflict before with Sheikh Rashid of Lolan, led him to arrange for the liquidation of various Mullahs in 1944-45. There is evidence that he is mentally unbalanced and his "dervish" influence is so strong that Mulla Mustafa dare not directly oppose him and resorts to flattery and cunning to get his way. Throughout 1945 he was opposed to the moderate course pursued by Mulla Mustafa and expressed his disapproval by announcing his intention of retiring into the background; but his feud with the Reikan tribes has never died and in July 1945 he came forward again and ordered his tribe to overthrow the local Government. Disorder has spread and the Barzanis, with Mulla Mustafa, are committed to wholesale resistance to the Government's intention to crush them, for the fourth time in 25 years.

Despite warnings, disorders started and a campaign was necessary to crush the Barzanis. Aided by lavish bribery, which the Minister of the Interior administered, the Iraqi army operations were eventually successful. Shaikh Ahmad and his brother fled to Persia. At first they were well received and courted by the Russians, but in September 1946 it was reported that Ahmad was seeking to return to Iraq as a suppliant.

24. Ahmad Mukhtar Baban

Born about 1895. Sunni of the Baban family which is Kurdish in origin. He, himself, knows no Kurdish and has no racial interest in the Kurds. A

lawyer by profession, he served as a judge for many years. For a short time in 1942 he held the war-time post of Director-General of Supplies and in October 1942 he joined Nuri Said's Cabinet as Minister of Social Affairs. A fortnight later he was transferred to Communications and Works, where he remained until the Cabinet was re-formed in December 1943, when he was appointed to the Ministry of Justice. He kept the same Ministry in Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet of June 1944. Has held acting portfolios of Finance and Foreign Affairs in the absence of the respective Ministers. Not a brilliant man, he steers clear of political intrigue.

Minister of Social Affairs February 1946; resigned April 1946. In the autumn of 1946 he was appointed head of the Royal Diwan.

25. Ahmad al Rawi, K.B.E.

Born about 1896. Sunni of Bagdad. Son of one of the leading Sunni Alims. Became a police officer soon after the formation of the Iraqi Government and after reaching the rank of commandant served in several liwas as a mutassarif. In February 1939 he was made administrative inspector and not long afterwards placed on pension. In June 1941, after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebel Government, he was recalled to duty by Jamil Madfa'i and made Director-General of Police. In this position he co-operated energetically with the British officials in eradicating pro-Nazi propaganda and intrigues and also gave his personal and official support to all plans for improving Anglo-Iraqi relations.

In 1943 Amir Abdullah of Transjordan created him a Pasha. Appointed Minister to Syria and the Lebanon in June 1941. The unprecedented number of farewell parties to Ahmad Pasha reflected the popular esteem in which he is held. A good sportsman, with a keen sense of humour, he is intelligent and though not sufficiently forceful to administer with successful results, he may have found his *métier* in this new appointment.

In August 1946 he was also appointed as first minister to the King of Transjordan, but returned to Bagdad during September to take up the post of Director-General of Foreign Affairs. He has twice been asked, by Hamdi Pachachi at the end of 1945 and by Arshad al Umari in September 1946, to join the Cabinet, but prefers not to do so until he can join one which has some chance of durability. Is a brother of Najib al Rawi (q.v.). Created K.B.E., for war services, 1946.

26. Ahmad-al-Shaikh Daud, Saiyid

Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1875. He comes of a family of learned men, his father was a well-known teacher in Bagdad, under whom most of the men of Sheikh Ahmad's generation studied. In the early days of the occupation he was a prominent Nationalist. He was arrested and deported to Henjam in August 1920, but was allowed to return to Bagdad in February 1921. Elected to the Constituent Assembly in March 1924, he opposed the treaty of 1922 and voted against it. Failed to secure a seat in the subsequent general election, but was successful at a by-election. In October 1925 he became pro-treaty, but in January 1926 voted against ratification of the extension of the treaty period. Minister for Auqaf under Abdul Muhsin Beg in January 1928, but resigned office April 1929. Elected to the Chamber as Deputy for Bagdad in October 1933, and retained this seat in the elections of 1934. Lost his seat in August 1935.

He is now an ageing man and is unlikely again to play a prominent part in politics.

Made a Senator in May 1937. Resigned October 1937. Reappointed to Senate January 1943.

His daughter Sabiha (a teacher on the Women's Training College) became the first woman student in the Bagdad Law College in 1937.

27. Ahmad-i-Taufiq

A Kurdish notable of Suleimani, born 1898, who has had the advantage of a better education than most of his contemporaries. He has held a number of administrative appointments since the first days of the occupation of the Suleimani Liwa. Was appointed mutassarif after the reoccupation of Suleimani in 1924. The Iraqi Government have several times endeavoured to replace him by others less sympathetic to Kurdish aspirations, but those chosen have not been successful. Ahmad Beg has now (1933) been mutassarif without interruption since 1930. He is connected by marriage with the ruling families of the Pishder tribe, and owns property in the Surdash nahivah. A pleasant and presentable man, who has always been popular with British civil and military officers.

Transferred as mutassarif to Arbil in April 1935.

Made an administrative inspector April 1939. Placed on pension in spring of 1940.

28. Ahmad Zaki-al-Khaiyat

Shiah Baghdadi. Born 1890. Educated Bagdad Law School. Has held the following posts: Secretary of the Ministry of Education, consul-general at Muhammerah and Bombay, kaimakam in several places. Mutassarif of Kut and Hillah and Land Settlement Officer. Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in July 1937. Was instrumental in placing important telephone contract with British firm against keen foreign competition.

Dismissed from his post in June 1941 on account of the support which he had given to Rashid Ali's régime in May.

Appointed Director-General of Press and Propaganda in August 1944, in which position he co-operated well with the British.

Appointed Iraqi Consul in Jerusalem, May 1945. Appointed consul at Jedda 1946, but resigned the service rather than proceed and took up practice as a lawyer. A feeble individual. Speaks quite good English.

29. Akram Mushtaq

Born Bagdad 1903. Moslem Sunni. Brother of Talib Mushtaq (q.v.). Gazetted officer in army 1927. Passed through Cranwell and appointed to Royal Iraqi air force in 1930. Promoted captain 1932. Took an active part in the *coup d'Etat* of October 1936. Promoted major 1937 and lieutenant-colonel in 1938. Appointed Commander of Iraqi air force in September 1937. Retained this post until April 1939, when he was relieved of his command and commission and appointed Director of Civil Aviation. Married a daughter of Sheikh Ahmad-al-Shaikh Daud in spring of 1940. Member of Iraqi delegation to International Civil Aviation Conference at Chicago in November 1944, and to meetings of the Communications Committee of the Arab League in summer, 1946.

Has a thorough knowledge of the intricacies of civil aviation and is an intelligent and likeable person. Speaks excellent English.

30. Ali Jaudat

Sunni, of humble Mosul origin. Born 1886. Officer in the Turkish army, fought at Shuaibah; subsequently surrendered to the British and spent most of 1915 at Basra. Was there employed to encourage Turkish officer prisoners to join the Sherif. He was a member of the Ahd-al-Iraqi. After the war he was Military Governor of Aleppo after the resignation of Jafar Pasha early in 1920, and was subsequently in Dair. Returned to Bagdad with the Amir Feisal in June 1921, and in October 1921 was given the post of Mutassarif of Hillah, which he held till September 1922. He took a very active part in the anti-mandate agitation, and was finally dismissed (on the advice of the High

Commissioner) for defrauding the Treasury by under-estimating revenue demands on supporters of his political views. In January 1923 he was appointed Mutassarif of Karbala in the hope that he might be able to reconcile the *mujtahids*. He was unsuccessful, and in May was transferred to Muntafiq, where he did very well. Minister of Interior in the Askani Cabinet, November 1923-July 1924, and voted for the treaty. Appointed Mutassarif of Diyala, and later of Basra. In early 1930 was made Director of the Ministry of the Interior. Minister for Finance under Nuri Pasha, March 1930. Resigned from Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in September 1930, as a protest against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of that year, and his seat in the Chamber in 1931, together with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani and Yasin-al-Hashimi in March 1932. Re-elected for Mosul 1933. Appointed principal private secretary to the King, March 1933. Became Prime Minister and Acting Minister of the Interior in August 1934. Was forced to resign in February 1935 on account of the agitation worked up against him throughout the country by Yasin-al-Hashimi and Rashid Ali-al-Gilani. He was made President of the Chamber in March 1935 and appointed Iraqi Minister in London in August 1935. Transferred to Paris in December 1936.

He came to Bagdad on leave in October 1937 and decided not to return to his post at Paris.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet in April 1939. Resigned with whole Cabinet in February 1940.

After Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat* in April 1941 he escaped to Basra, joined the Regent and accompanied His Highness to Jerusalem. He returned to Iraq after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion and was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfal in June 1941.

Resigned with the whole Cabinet in October 1941. Has a son, Nizar, who was educated at Downing College, Cambridge.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Washington in March 1942.

Has interested himself in conducting propaganda in the United States to make better known the Arab side of the Palestine question.

Speaks English.

31. Ali Mahmud Shaikh Ali

Born 1902. Sunni Arab connected with the Ubaid tribe. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School in 1923 and practised as a lawyer for about thirteen years. He also learnt to speak English and French. He became well known as an extreme Nationalist and contributed many articles to the newspaper the *Istiqal* attacking British policy in Iraq. He was arrested in 1924 on account of his agitation against the first Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but was acquitted on trial. He was brought before the courts again in 1930 for a similarly violent agitation against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance signed in that year and sentenced to a short term of imprisonment. He has twice been elected to the Chamber of Deputies. He was one of the members of the delegation of Iraqi notables which visited Palestine and Egypt in 1936, and a short time after his return he was appointed (through the personal influence of Yasin-al-Hashimi, the Prime Minister) to a judgeship in the Court of Appeal. In this post he has shown more talent and good sense than was to be expected from his past career. Appointed Minister of Justice in Hikmat Sulaiman's reorganised Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned August 1937 and returned to the Bar.

Banished from Bagdad by Jamil-al-Madfal's Cabinet in November 1938, but was permitted to return when Nuri-al-Said formed a Cabinet in December 1938. In February 1939 he was appointed Mutassarif of Basra, where he soon began to make trouble for the Sheikh of Kuwait. After holding this appointment for about a year he was transferred to

Bagdad to be Director-General of Customs and Excise. As a mutassarif he allowed his political prejudices to colour too deeply his administrative activities.

Appointed Minister of Justice in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. Fled to Persia with the rest of the Cabinet after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941. Handed over to the British military authorities by the Persian Government after the entry of British forces into Persia in September 1941. Imprisoned in Abwaz and thence sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment. Sent back to Iraq and handed over to the Iraqi court for trial in March 1942 and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment in the following May.

32. Ali Mumtaz

Born 1901. Sunni of Bagdad. Belongs to the Daftari family. Graduated at Bagdad Law College and entered Government service in 1920. Married a daughter of Yasin-al-Hashimi in 1933. Appointed Director-General of Revenues in 1935, but was obliged to leave Iraq for a time when Bakr Sidqi overthrew Yasin-al-Hashimi's Government in 1936. In January 1939 he was reappointed Director-General of Revenues by Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet.

Appointed Minister of Finance in the Cabinet formed by Taha al Hashimi in February 1941. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in April after Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat*. In May 1941 he was appointed director of the newly-created Rafidain Bank, and in October he became Minister of Finance in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said.

Resigned in October 1942 largely on account of his inability to get on with Saleh Jabr, then Minister of the Interior.

Made Minister of Finance in Nuri Pasha's ninth Cabinet in December 1943. Headed Iraqi delegation to Middle East Financial Conference in April 1944. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

Minister of Communications and Works in the Suweidi Cabinet of 1946. When this resigned he was partly responsible for the calculated leakage to the press of a Cabinet memorandum advocating drastic revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. He is efficient but has not shown himself very straightforward.

33. Ali Shukur

President of the Railway Labour Union (now illegal). An ex-engine driver of radical outlook who was dismissed from the Iraqi State Railways at the end of 1944. Became President of the Union in November 1944 and was active in promoting the Railway labour strike, which lasted from the 15th April to the 1st May, 1945, and was the biggest labour movement which has been seen in Iraq since the formation of the Trade Unions. He appeared willing to stop the strike after a few days and to discuss terms with the Minister of Social Affairs, but the majority was in favour of continuing. Was arrested during the strike when the Union was closed and made illegal.

The Union has not yet been allowed to function again, despite the strenuous efforts of Shukur, who has been sending petitions to all the Ministers concerned with great regularity.

34. Alwan bin Hussein, C.B.E.

Sunni, Arab, born Bagdad 1899, of good middle-class family. Married, 1923, daughter of Namuq Beg, a relation of Sherif Pasha. He was educated at the English Protestant School, Bagdad, and would have gone to the United Kingdom but for the outbreak of the First Great War. On the formation of a Civil Police Force after the occupation of Bagdad in March 1917 he was amongst the first Iraqis to be enrolled, having been appointed

Station Clerk Sub-Inspector on 11th May, 1917. Here, working with experienced police officers he learned rapidly and when Mosul was occupied in November 1918 he volunteered and accompanied the police party as inspector. He did outstandingly good work, both before, during and after the rising of 1920. He was one of the first three Iraqis to be promoted to gazetted rank in 1920 when he became Assistant Commissioner of Police, Mosul Town. He remained in Mosul until 1924 when he was promoted Commandant of Police and posted as C.P., Central Criminal Investigation Department. In 1930 he went to the United Kingdom. He was attached to the Birmingham City Police and later attended the "Senior Officers' Course" at New Scotland Yard. Returning to Bagdad he gradually took over the C.I.D. and its allied departments from the British D.I.G. Police and by the time Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations had assumed complete charge. However, he did not find favour with the late Yasin Pasha al Hashimi and Rashid Ali al Gailani, and it was not long before he was removed. When Nuri Pasha came in in 1939 he immediately put Alwan back into the C.I.D. and there he remained until the "Golden Square" and Rashid Ali gained control when he was pushed out again, first to Diwaniyah and then to Kirkuk at both of which places he was under the open constant surveillance of the Iraq army. After the collapse of the rebellion he was brought again to Bagdad headquarters and became Assistant Director-General, Political and Criminal Investigation Branch. For "Security" and other reasons he retained control of the C.I.D. itself as *ex officio* Director. He remained as A.D.G.P. until his promotion to Director-General on 28th September, 1946. Created C.B.E. for war services, 1946.

35. Amin Zaki Sulaiman

A Moslem (Sunni) of Turkoman origin. Born 1887 in Bagdad. Received his military training in Istanbul and appointed second lieutenant in the Turkish army in 1905.

He joined the Iraq army in 1921 as a captain, and was promoted major in 1926 and lieutenant-colonel in 1930, when he was placed in command of the 4th Iraqi Infantry Battalion.

He was promoted colonel in 1934 and appointed to the command of the Northern Division with headquarters at Mosul, and a month later he was appointed quarter-master-general. In October 1935 he was given the command of the Euphrates Division, Diwaniyah. Promoted brigadier in June 1936.

He was much opposed to the Bekr Sidqi régime in 1936. He remained with the Euphrates Division until August 1937, when he was appointed G.O.C., the 2nd Division, Kirkuk, which position he was still holding when he was appointed acting C.G.S. in March 1940. Promoted major-general in June 1940.

In 1940 he was 53 years old and was the senior officer serving in the Iraq army. A staunch supporter of Taha-al-Hashimi, he was considered a capable officer and a strict disciplinarian, but was generally unpopular in the army with both officers and men.

Under pressure from Salah-ud-Din Sabbagh, he threw in his lot with Rashid Ali in April 1941 and signed a proclamation charging the Regent with treason against the State. He fled to Persia when British troops advanced on Bagdad at the end of May and fell into our hands when British and Russian troops occupied Persia in August 1941. After provisional internment in Abwaz, he was sent to Southern Rhodesia. Sent back to Iraq for retrial in March 1942, and in May was sentenced by a military court to five years' imprisonment.

36. Arshad-al-Umari, K.B.E.

Of the well-known Umari family of Mosul. Born 1888. Trained as an engineer in the days of the Turk.

Municipal engineer in Constantinople. Staff officer during the war. Speaks French and understands some English. Member of the first Iraqi Parliament and supporter of Abdul Muhain Beg. Appointed by latter first Iraqi Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs. Made Amin-al-Asimah (Mayor of Bagdad), November 1931, and during his two-year tenure of that appointment did much for the improvement of the amenities of Bagdad. Was appointed Director of Irrigation in November 1933. Joined Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934 as Minister for Economics and Communications. Resigned with the Cabinet in February 1935 and remained without a post until May 1936, when he was appointed Director-General of Municipalities. In November 1936 he again became Mayor of Bagdad, in which capacity he is well known and liked by most of the foreign community. He has proved himself a good friend to Great Britain.

Following the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941, when Rashid Ali and his Cabinet fled to Persia, Arshad Beg formed a Committee of Internal Security to conclude an armistice with the British forces and to maintain order until the return of the Regent.

In November 1941 he was reappointed Lord Mayor of Bagdad. Has done much to embellish Bagdad by opening up new roads and laying out public gardens.

As president of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society he has shown himself very willing to co-operate with the organisers of all kinds of war charity work.

In June 1944 he joined Hamdi-al-Pachachi's Cabinet as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acting Minister of Supplies. Rushing at supply problems, he soon met difficulties and had to relinquish his portfolio in August 1944. He headed the Iraqi delegation to the Arab Unity Congress in Cairo, signed the Protocol and returned to Iraq in October 1944. As leader of the Iraqi delegation to San Francisco, he failed to substitute the ideal of independence for that of trusteeship (with Palestine in mind) and refused to sign the Charter. Returning to Iraq in July 1945, after discussions in Cairo, he was coolly received and resigned in August 1945.

In June 1946 he formed a Cabinet. It was to be a caretaker Government for the express purpose of holding speedy elections. It developed, however, into a headstrong dictatorship which threatened to bring into disrepute not only the Cabinet and the British connexion but also the Regent and the Royal House.

His obstinacy and inability to endure the slightest criticism are the worst faults of an otherwise most likeable and hardworking man. Created K.B.E. for war services, 1946.

37. Asim-al-Naqib, Saiyid

The fourth son of Saiyid Abdul Rahman and younger brother of Saiyid Mahmud. Born Bagdad 1879. Appointed Nagib on the death of Saiyid Mahmud in July 1936. A man of little character, but he has successfully acquired the conventional appearance of a Sunni Alim and holy man.

38. Ata Amin

Born 1897. Appointed secretary to the Iraqi Legation in London, September 1932, on transfer from a consular post at Angora.

In the summer of 1933 it was discovered that he had, while in Turkey, married one of the sisters of the Amir Zaid, a younger brother of King Faisal I. This was regarded as a scandal at the time, but later on he was forgiven. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Rome, October 1934. Transferred to London as counsellor in August 1935. Transferred to Paris as chargé d'affaires in August 1938 and to Berlin in February 1939.

In July 1939 he returned to Rome and remained there until June 1940, when he was transferred to London as chargé d'affaires. Returned to Bagdad,

and was appointed Director-General at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in October 1943. Was appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in August 1944. He speaks good English.

A weak and ineffective individual.

39. Aziz Sheriff (Abdul Aziz bin Sheriff bin Abdul Majid)

Born Anah, Dulaim Liwa, 1904. Sunni Muslim. Lawyer.

Educated up to middle school at Anah he entered the Secondary School Teachers' Training College and the Law College, Baghdad. He graduated from the Law College in 1931 and set up practice in Basra. He practised before the Basra Courts until 1941 when he was appointed to the Judicial Service and posted as judge at Hillah. Later he was transferred to Baghdad. In 1945 he resigned and returned to practice in partnership with Nadhim al Zabawi.

He always has been anti-British and anti-Government but came to particular notice as a Communist only some ten years ago. During the war years he did good work in combating "the Nazis," but always with an anti-British bias. After the Rashid Ali rebellion he, with other extremists including Muhammad Saleh Bahr el Ullum, tried to form a society Hizb el Wahidah el Wataniyah el Demokratiyah. Owing to its combination, particularly the association of the latter individual, the good intentions of the proposers were doubted and sanction was not accorded. They continued to work and eventually the Hizb el Sha'ab was formed with Aziz Sheriff as the first President. Previously he had worked for a time with Kamil al Chadarchi (q.v.) but the views and policy of al Chadarchi were not sufficiently advanced for him and his associates, most of whom were employed in underground activity, and in the publication of secret Communist literature, e.g., *El Shararah*, *El Qa'idah*, *El Aaml*, &c., and in forming Communist "Cells" all over the country. Working with this group were many capable men and the publications, always published at the right moment, had considerable effect. Throughout they were extremely critical of Britain, belittled her efforts and praised anything and everything Russian. Aziz Sheriff himself owns the very strongly Leftist paper *El Wattan*, which openly publishes in a milder form matter formerly published in the "underground" press.

If there really exists a "Communist Party of Iraq" which the underground press used to declare was its sponsor, and which still appears on pamphlets and the like from time to time, Aziz Sheriff will be closely linked with it and certainly he, and his Hizb el Sha'ab and its associate (very loose) Hizb el Tahurur el Watani, will contain most of the members. Although there is no proof as to its truth, it has been rumoured that Aziz Sheriff is heavily subsidised by the Soviet.

40. Baba Ali Shaikh Mahmud

Son of the well-known Shaikh Mahmud (q.v.). Spent much of his early life in Persia while his father was engaged in his various rebellions. After Shaikh Mahmud's surrender to the Iraqi authorities in 1927, Baba Ali was sent to school by the Iraqi Government in Baghdad and later at Victoria College, Alexandria. In 1933 he went to America and studied political economy at Columbia for five years. On his return he was given a minor post in the railways, but resigned after a short time as he did not like the life of a Government official. In 1941 he was ill in Sulaimaniyah and did not join his father, who escaped from Baghdad. His open criticism of the Administration led to his arrest and exile in July 1943. After his release in November he settled down to the improvement of his agricultural property, but again in February 1945 openly attacked the shortcomings of the Mutesarrif of Sulaimaniyah. This incident almost led to his arrest again.

Baba Ali speaks excellent English and possesses an attractive though not very forceful personality. Is very keen on improving the tobacco situation in Kurdistan and on preserving the remaining Kurdish forests. He has considerable practical knowledge of and enthusiasm for agriculture and if not blocked by bureaucratic methods may achieve something as Minister of Economics.

41. Babekr Agha

A powerful chief of the Pizhder (Kurdish) tribe of Qalah Diza (on the Lesser Zab River, north of Suleimani). Has always been honest and friendly in his dealings with the Government, whether British or Iraqi. An able and most estimable man, who has been liked and respected by all who have had close contact with him.

His rival for tribal influence is Abbas Mahmud Agha, who has always tended to be against the Government. Both, however, visited Baghdad in October 1933 and protested their loyalty and obedience to the Iraqi Government.

He behaved well after the Iraqi Government established normal administration in the Pizhder area in 1938.

On the outbreak of hostilities between Rashid Ali's rebel Government and the British forces in May 1941, Babekr Agha, together with Sheikh Mahmud and many of the Suleimani tribal chiefs, planned a revolt against the Government. Rashid Ali's régime was, however, overthrown before their plans could materialise.

He visited the ambassador in December 1941 and pledged himself to act always under British guidance.

42. Darwash al Haidari

Born in 1907, graduated from an American agricultural college and entered Iraq Government service in 1930. The greater part of his career has been spent in the Department of Agriculture, and for a long time he was manager of the Abu Ghurab experimental farm. In 1942, however, he became Acting Director-General of Grain. He was successful on the whole, but his term of office was marred by a quarrel with the then Mutesarrif of Baghdad, Ja'afar Hamandi (q.v.), as a result of which he appeared before the Officials' Disciplinary Committee on a charge of illegally disposing of sixty sacks of grain belonging to the Supplies Department. He was transferred back to the Department of Agriculture.

In June 1943 he went to America as a member of the Iraqi delegation to the Hot Springs Food Conference, and in July 1946 he was appointed to his present post, that of Director-General of Agriculture.

His political views have generally been regarded as pro-British. He has, in the past, been considered a "Leftist" and a "Nationalist"; he now claims to be a "Democrat." He is not politically active, but in August of 1946 he was associated with Tahir and Nadim al Pachachi and others in an attempt to found a "United Nations Society," the aims of which were stated to be the enlightenment of the people on U.N.O. and the putting forward to the U.N.O. of suggestions in the Arab cause.

Thanks to the period spent in the United States, he has acquired many American ways. He speaks excellent English, as does his British-educated wife, who is the sister of Yusuf and Abdul Qadir al Gailani.

43. Daud-al-Haidari

Sunni of Baghdad. Born about 1880. Son of Ibrahim Effendi, ex-Sheikh-al-Islam. The family comes from Arbil, where Ibrahim Effendi has a small property. Daud Pasha was a Deputy and an aide-de-camp to the Sultan Abdul Hamid. Speaks Turkish better than Arabic. His English is fluent. He was in Constantinople during the war, and returned to Baghdad in 1921. Appointed, in October

1922, Amin-al-Umana (Chamberlain) in the King's palace. Member for Arbil in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924, and Vice-President. Voted for the treaty 1924. Hazb-al-Shah and opposed treaty of 1926. Minister for Justice under Taufiq Suwaidi, April-November 1929. Disliked and distrusted in Arbil.

Re-elected to Chamber of Deputies to represent Arbil in general election of 1930, but has not held Cabinet appointment since Taufiq Suwaidi's Cabinet resigned in August 1929. In 1930 became lawyer for the British Oil Development Company in Baghdad, and has done quite well out of this work. Was not elected to the Chamber in the elections of 1934.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Tebran in June 1941. Appointed Minister of Justice in February 1942, but was squeezed out of the Cabinet in June 1943 because of his intrigues against the Prime Minister. He was immediately appointed a Minister Grade I in the Foreign Service *en disponibilité*. Posted to London as Minister in October 1943. He took an active part in founding the Anglo-Iraqi Society in England, where he experienced the war at first hand, the Iraqi Legation being damaged by a bomb. His two daughters are emancipated and, after a successful debut in London, are now in Baghdad. Of very doubtful financial reputation.

44. Daud-al-Sa'adi, Sa'iqid

Sunni of Baghdad. Born about 1887. Prominent extremist. Lawyer. Usually connected with all Nationalist agitations and intrigues. Elected to the Chamber for Hillah in August 1935.

Appointed public prosecutor in August 1936 by Yasin-al-Hashimi's Cabinet. Resigned in December after Yasin's fall.

Elected to the Chamber for Kut in December 1937 and again in June 1939. Banished from Baghdad by Jamil-al-Madfa'i in December 1938, but returned as soon as Nuri-al-Said became Prime Minister.

An active supporter of Rashid Ali in 1941, he fled to Persia at the end of May after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. He was handed over to the British military authorities by the Persian Government after the entry of British forces into Persia in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwaz and then sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment. Brought back to Baghdad for trial in March 1944.

He succeeded in obtaining his release on medical grounds and is now the doyen of the ex-internees and a leader of the Independence Party.

45. Fadhl Jamali Dr.

Born Kadhmain 1902. Shiah. Educated at the American University of Beirut 1921-27. Columbia University, New York, 1927-29. Wrote a thesis on education among the tribes for his doctorate. On his return to Iraq he was appointed to the Ministry of Education. In 1933 he was made Director-General of Instruction. He has a natural predilection for American methods and is a disciple of Mr. Dewey.

In early 1938 he was invited by the British Council to visit the United Kingdom to study British educational methods. He was well entertained and shown the best colleges and schools of all kinds. As a result he became far more favourably disposed towards British education.

Although he posed as pro-British and generally collaborated in a friendly manner with the Embassy in developing the work of the British Council, he cannot escape responsibility for the deplorable state of education in Iraq. He was determined to do his utmost to resist British influence and opposed the appointment of a British adviser and the establishment of a boarding school on public school lines under British control. He was finally transferred from his post of director-general and appointed counsellor at the Iraqi Legation in Washington in January 1943, but at the end of May he was still in Baghdad hoping to contrive somehow to return to a

post in Education. A year later he was still in Baghdad as transport by air could not be found to take him and his family to the United States. He has a Canadian wife, and is on friendly terms with the United States Legation. Appointed Director-General for Foreign Affairs in 1944. Member of Iraqi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. Returned to Iraq August 1945. Still desirous of returning to Education. Is outwardly zealously pro-British nowadays, and professionally always obliging and helpful.

In June 1946 joined Arshad al Umari's Cabinet as Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which capacity he attended the Palestine Conference in London in September.

He is a self-made man and the first of the type to reach a prominent position. He is intensely ambitious, but has to feel his way carefully and is therefore something of a "Yes-man." No one has ever been able to accuse him of corruption. He is rabid on the subject of Zionism.

46. Hamdi Pachachi, K.B.E.

Born about 1890. Sunni of Baghdad. Belongs to the Pachachi family, who are one of the richest families of the city. He himself owns valuable property in the town and also agricultural land outside in the liwa. In the early days of the creation of the Iraqi State he had the reputation of being a young hot-head, and a leader of the extreme nationalists. Became Minister for Aqaf in June 1925 under Abdul Muhsin al Sadun, and resigned with the Cabinet in November 1926. After this he remained outside politics for many years but returned to public life as Minister for Social Affairs in Taha al Hashimi's Cabinet in February 1941. He took no part in Rashid Ali's adventures in May 1941 and in November 1941 was elected President of the Chamber. He was re-elected to this position in November 1942, and again in October 1943. Ceased to be President of the Chamber when he became temporarily Minister of Economics in December 1943. Was not reappointed a Minister in Nuri's ninth Cabinet formed on the 25th December, 1943. Succeeded Nuri Said as Prime Minister in June 1944.

Appointed Senator, May 1945. In order to drop the obstinate Tahnin Ali from Defence, he put in a formal resignation of the Cabinet in August 1944 and reformed the Ministry without Tahnin Ali.

His Ministry resigned in February 1946. Dignified and firm, he is a typical landowner with the advantages that he has no ambition to increase his holdings and gives a personal boost to any schemes for agricultural development (such as the Dujaila collective farm project).

Has taken a prominent part in the Arab Unity Conferences and signed the Protocol. Despite prophecies, he has held his Cabinet together for a record period for recent years by steadiness, moderation and good sense, which were notable in his handling of the Levant crisis of May 1945.

Speaks a little English and French. A violent anti-Zionist.

Created K.B.E., for war services, 1946.

47. Hanna Khaiyat

Syrian Catholic of Mosul. Born 1884. Medical diploma at Beirut and Paris, much medical and administrative experience and extremely able on both sides. Head of the Mosul Hospital under the Government of Occupation. Appointed Minister of Health 1921. When the Ministry was abolished in 1922 he accepted the post of Director of Medical Services. Speaks excellent French. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs October 1931. Appointed Inspector-General of Health in 1933. Became director of the Bagdad General Hospital and dean of the Royal Medical College in September 1934. Appointed Inspector-

General of Health September 1937. Inspector-General of the Ministry of Social Affairs in December 1939.

Placed on pension at the end of 1940. Reappointed Director-General of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Director-General of Health in July 1941.

Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in January 1943.

Headed Iraqi delegation to Arab Medical Congress 1943. Elected a Deputy, October 1943. Became an invalid in April 1944.

48. Hashim Jawad

Born Bagdad 1911. Muslim, Shia.

Educated in Bagdad schools and at Beirut and London Universities. After graduating he returned from London in 1936 and shortly afterwards was posted to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and nominated as Iraq's representative on the permanent International Labour Office at Geneva. In that capacity he took part in several conferences. He returned to Iraq in 1941 and has been employed on labour affairs in one capacity or another ever since. In 1946 he was transferred to the Ministry of Social Affairs, as Director-General of a newly created Labour Department, in which capacity he attended the I.L.O. Congress at Montreal in September.

A very quiet, serious and studious man; well balanced and moderate of speech. He holds strong views on the rights of "Labour" and undoubtedly tries to act up to his principles. Since the Trades Union Movement and Labour questions have come more to the fore in Iraq he has gained much valuable practical experience in the settling of disputes and labour conditions generally, and there seems reason for hoping that in time he might be able to do something tangible to better the working and social conditions of the Iraqi working classes. He is not lacking in personality, but is more of a quiet, solid plodder than an enthusiast, such as is really wanted for the task. As might be expected, in politics his conversation indicates an inclination to the Left, but he is neither a member nor an associate of the members of the Political Leftist Parties recently established in Bagdad.

49. Hikmat Sulaiman

Sunni. Born 1886. Director of Education in Bagdad under the Turks. Also Assistant Governor. Member of C.U.P. Was in Constantinople at the time of the occupation. Returned in January 1921 and was a candidate for the Ministry of Education. Made Director of Posts in April 1922 and Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1923. Minister of Interior in the second Sadun Cabinet. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, but became Minister for Interior in March 1933. Resigned from Cabinet with Rashid Ali in October 1933, and from Chamber in November 1933. He played an active part in organising intensive opposition to Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in the early months of 1935, but refused office in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha after Ali Jaudat's fall. Paid a long visit to Turkey in the summer of 1935 and returned full of praise for modern Turkish methods. In the autumn of 1935 he was offered the portfolio of the Ministry of Justice, but did not accept it. Is very influential in political circles, where his intelligence is much respected.

In October 1936 he joined with Bakr Sidqi in the plot which resulted in the successful military revolt against Yasin-al-Hashimi's Government, and upon Yasin's resignation he became Prime Minister. He remained in office until August 1937 when, after the murder of Bakr Sidqi, he and his Cabinet resigned. As a Prime Minister he was disappointing. His intentions were excellent, but his impatience with detail and administrative routine, coupled with the malign influence exercised by Bakr Sidqi over the Cabinet, prevented him from achieving anything of importance.

A well-mannered man of wide Liberal views.

In 1938, though he took no active part in politics, he was on the alert to keep Nuri-al-Said from returning to power. When Nuri-al-Said formed a Government in December 1938, he sent messages of goodwill to Hikmat and later calls were exchanged between Hikmat and Sabah, Nuri's son. In spite of their reconciliation, he was arrested early in March 1939, tried by court-martial for treason and sentenced to death. This was at the same time commuted to five years' imprisonment. In the summer of 1939 he was removed to Sulaimani, where he was interned in a comfortable house.

In April 1941 was released by Rashid Ali and allowed to go to Persia, where he remained throughout the May rebellion. He afterwards returned to Bagdad and gradually began to take part in social life.

He is now a flourishing farmer and apparently determined to give up politics altogether. His wife is a Daghistani, a sister of Mrs. Najib-al-Rawi (q.v.). The Regent does not like him.

50. Husain Fauzi-bin-Hassan

Sunni of Kurdish origin. Born in Bagdad in 1889. Entered the Military College in Istanbul and received a commission in the Turkish army in 1909. Joined the Iraqi army (artillery) in May 1922. Promoted major 1925. He has passed the Senior Officers' Course at Belgaum, India, and has twice been attached to units in England for training. Promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1929 and colonel in 1933. In 1934 he was appointed Commandant of the Staff School, Bagdad, and in February 1935 he was given the command of the Northern District. In August 1935 he became a brigadier, and in November 1936 he was made G.O.C., 1st Infantry Division. A pleasant man with good manners. He speaks good English. He had nothing to do with the military revolt of October 1936. After the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 he was appointed Chief of the General Staff. Relieved of his appointment and placed on pension in February 1940 for interference in politics.

51. Ibrahim Akif-al-Alousi

Sunni. Born Bagdad 1894. Educated Bagdad and Turkey. Graduated from Medical College, Istanbul, 1916, and came to Iraq, where he served in several places under the Turks. Joined Iraqi Health Service, and served as Director of Health, Basra and Bagdad, with considerable success.

Was Director-General of Public Health in May 1939 and afterwards Inspector-General of Health Services in Ministry of Social Affairs. He is secretary-general of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society. Appointed Minister of Education in Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet in June 1944.

Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs in 1946.

52. Ibrahim Kamal

Sunni. Born 1895. Captain in the Shereefian army. A very good officer in the field, where he commanded a battalion. Wounded at the first battle of Maan. Legal officer to O.C. Damascus, under Feisal's régime. Came to Iraq with Jamil-al-Madfa'i in 1919 making propaganda for the Shereefians. Was afterwards at Dair, but not known to have participated in the attack on Tall Afar. He was in Damascus in April 1921, but subsequently returned to Iraq, and was said to be engaged in inciting people against any form of British control. Was appointed commandant of police, Bagdad, on the resignation of Abdul Latif Felahi. He did well in some ways and kept excellent discipline, but was removed after innumerable complaints of various kinds. After leaving the police he took up the legal profession. Entered Parliament as a Nationalist, but later gave up politics for a well-paid and influential post in the

Ministry of Finance. Since then he has given no trouble. Appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise in June 1934.

Proved to be a very efficient director. In November 1936, after Hikmat Sulaiman had had Rustam Haidar removed, Ibrahim Kamal was appointed principal private secretary to King Ghazi. He was not happy in this post for long and in July 1937 reverted to the Customs Department as Director-General. In August 1937 he joined Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet as Minister of Finance.

Concluded convention for the south of Iraq with the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Resigned with whole Cabinet in December 1938 after the military coup made against them by Nuri-al-Said.

Tried by court-martial in February 1940 for being an accessory to the murder of Rustam Haidar and acquitted.

Appointed Minister of Finance and Acting Minister of Justice in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfa'i in June 1941, after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. A realist with strong views, he became dissatisfied with the Government's weakness and vacillation in dealing with the removal of pro-Nazi elements in the army and Administration and resigned from the Cabinet in September 1941.

Made a Senator in January 1943.

In the Senate he has worked industriously on committees, and has been an outspoken critic of Nuri Said's Administration. His hopes of becoming Prime Minister have not, however, been realised, mainly because he is not able to attract colleagues to work with him. Headed the Iraqi delegation to the International Monetary Conference at Bretton Woods in July 1944. Suffered during summer 1945 from high blood pressure.

During the summer of 1946 was again absent in the Levant.

Speaks good English.

53. Ismail Namiq, K.B.E.

Sunni, originally from Mosul. Born 1892, son of an officer in the Turkish army. Educated at Military College, and gazetted an officer in the Ottoman army in Istanbul in 1912. Joined Amir Faisal in 1917 and commanded the Hashimi Cavalry. After becoming an officer in the Iraqi army in 1921 he attended various courses, including one of six months at Tidworth, where he did well. Became Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College in 1931 and Commander of the Iraqi air force in 1933. Commanded the Cavalry Brigade 1936 and the Third Division 1937. Was appointed Director-General of Administration in the Ministry of Defence in 1941, becoming a lieutenant-general the same year. Became Acting Chief of the General Staff in November 1941 and as such accompanied the Regent to England in October 1943. On the 21st December, 1944, he joined the Cabinet of Hamdi-al-Pachachi as Minister of Defence. Became a Senator in May 1945. He is generally considered to be pro-British. He is a man of sound sense. He has not, until 1944, mixed in politics, and disapproved of Bekr Sidqi's coup d'Etat. His venality has been the subject of comment, but he is quiet and temperate. Speaks good English. He is at present in retirement, but may well return to the Cabinet later. The Regent likes and trusts him.

Created K.B.E. for war services, 1946.

54. Ibrahim Saleh el Kabir, O.B.E.

Born Bagdad 1885.

Jew. Married to Renee Sha'ul Elias. His son Jamil, born 1926, is now in England (Nottingham University). Has a daughter, Aida, born 1936. Has three brothers, viz.: Salman el Kabir, lawyer, Bagdad; Hesqail el Kabir, merchant, London; Yusuf el Kabir, lawyer, Bagdad.

Educated at the Alliance School, Bagdad; he entered business in the office of the merchant Hesqail Toweg, but continued his studies by attending occasional lectures at other institutions. Some time before the occupation of Bagdad in 1917 he went to Persia, having by then been admitted as a partner to Hesqail Toweg. He remained in Persia for some time, but after the fall of Bagdad he returned and found an appointment in the Ministry of Finance, Accounts Department. He remained in this Department and by gradual promotion became Accountant-General. Later he was transferred to the Directorate-General of Railways in the same capacity. He held this appointment for some years, but has now returned to his former post.

Ibrahim el Kabir has never been a politician: he is a typical civil servant. Absolutely trustworthy but extremely guarded in his speech. He, however, is known to have a very bitter tongue on occasion. He is not very popular, on account of a rather sneering expression and manner, possibly due to somewhat weak eyesight. A sound, reliable public servant, but too timid ever to make a mark for himself. In 1946 he gave evidence before the Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry on Palestine.

Awarded the O.B.E. for war services, 1946.

Speaks good English.

55. Jafar Hamandi

Born 1894. At the time of the outbreak of war in 1914 he was a school-teacher in Bagdad. After the war he graduated at the Bagdad Law School and was appointed to a junior judgeship in Kadhimain. Later he was given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice. In 1930 he was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior and became kaimakam of Najaf, then after serving in several other districts he was made Mutessarif of Kut in 1936 and was later transferred to the same post in Hilla. He was appointed Minister for Education in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned in August 1937, and in September he was appointed Director-General of tribal affairs in the Ministry of the Interior.

Appointed Mutessarif of Kut September 1938, and transferred to Muntafiq February 1939, to Kerbala in September 1939.

Appointed Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfa'i in June 1941 after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed Mutessarif of Bagdad in December 1941.

Resigned in October 1942. In early 1943 he received a substantial grant of Government land in the Hilla liwa. Saleh Jafar as Minister of Finance helped him to obtain this. In October 1943 was elected Shia Deputy for Hilla. Visited Palestine in early 1945.

56. Jalal Baban

Kurd of the Baban family. Born 1892.

In the early days of British occupation he was actively associated with extreme Nationalists and was deported to Henjam in 1920. Released in 1921. Appointed kaimakam in 1923 and continued to serve in the civil administration, holding the posts of mutessarif in Nasiriyah, Kerbala and Arbil until November 1932, when he became Minister of Economics and Communications in Naji Shaukat's Cabinet. Became Minister for Defence under Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with the latter in October 1933. Appointed Minister for Education in February 1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in August 1934, and was appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Finance in December 1934. Transferred to be Director-General of the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935. Appointed Director-General of Finance in December 1936.

In August 1937 he joined Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet as Minister of Economics and Communications. Made a Senator. Resigned from Cabinet in May 1938 on account of insinuations made by his colleagues (not without reason) that he had made a corrupt agreement with a Government road contractor. Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in September 1939; resigned with whole Cabinet in February 1940.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet of Jamil Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

In the sessions of 1941 and 1942 he was active in the Senate as a critic of Government measures.

Appointed Minister of Finance in June 1943, but resigned in October of the same year.

57. Jamal Baban

A Kurdish lawyer. Born 1890. Served for some time as a judge in the Northern Liwas. Became Deputy for Arbil in the general election of 1928. Appointed Minister for Justice in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet March 1930. Resigned with Nuri Pasha in October 1932. Reappointed Minister for Justice in Jamil-Madfa'i's Cabinet in November 1933. Retained his portfolio when Jamil-al-Madfa'i reformed his Cabinet in February 1934 and remained at the Ministry of Justice in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet formed in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935, and in October joined the party organised by Jamil-al-Madfa'i to oppose Yasin Pasha. Owed his continued presence in successive Cabinets perhaps more to the tradition that each Cabinet must have one Kurd than to his personal abilities.

Returned for Arbil in the elections of June 1939. After practising as an advocate, returned to public life again by his appointment as Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in October 1941.

Resigned in October 1942 and began practising again as an advocate.

58. Jamil-al-Rawi

A Bagdadi; born 1892, officer in the Turkish army. Served in the Shereefian forces during the Arab revolt. Chief aide-de-camp to King Ali in Jedda, and came to Iraq with His Majesty after Ibn Saud's conquest of the Hejaz. Elected Deputy for Dulaim in the general election of 1928, became vice-president of the Taqaddum party and Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies. Minister for Communications and Works in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet formed in March 1930. Became Minister for Defence in January 1931, but lost his portfolio when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Mutessarif of Kirkuk July 1932. Transferred to Kut in October 1935. His services were dispensed with by the Hashimi Cabinet in March 1936. In December 1936 he was in Jerusalem and in touch with the Grand Mufti and the Arab movement in Palestine. Appointed Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in Jedda September 1939.

Appointed consul-general at Jerusalem in July 1941. Withdrawn in the autumn of 1941 and was appointed Iraqi Minister at Jeddah in December 1942.

Returned to Bagdad in 1945. Appointed Director-General of Public Works 1946. Speaks some English.

59. Jamil-al-Madfa'i

Of Mosul, born about 1886. Led the party which in June 1920 came from Dair and called upon the tribes to rise against the British in the name of the Shereef. Entered Tall Afar after the murder of Captain Stuart, which he had instigated. Styled

himself leader of the Northern Mesopotamian army. On the approach of British troops from Mosul returned to Dair. Returned to Iraq 1923. Soon after, appointed mutessarif and saw service in a number of different liwas. Appointed Minister for the Interior under Nuri Pasha in March 1931. Became President of the Chamber in December 1930, following Jafar Pasha's resignation. Resigned October 1931, at the same time resigning from Nuri Pasha's party as a protest against the high-handed actions of Muzahim Beg Al Pachachi, then Minister for the Interior. Composed his quarrel with Nuri Pasha in November and was re-elected President of the Chamber on the 30th November. Again elected President in November 1932 and March 1933. Became Prime Minister in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but resumed office with a reformed Cabinet about ten days later. Resigned again in August 1934, but accepted portfolio of Defence in Cabinet which was then formed by Ali Jaudat. Became Prime Minister in March 1935, but was forced to resign by Yasin Pasha's agitation in the Euphrates after being in office for only twelve days. In October 1935 revived the party of National Unity as an opposition to Yasin Pasha's Cabinet, but received little support. Declined an invitation to join the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1936. In the winter of 1936-37 he went to the Yemen to obtain the adherence of the Imam to the Pact of Arab Brotherhood, signed by Saudi Arabia and Iraq in April 1936, and in August 1937, after the resignation of Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet, he became Prime Minister.

He lacks administrative ability, but is a figure in the political world. Is generally popular because he expresses his opinion in an honest, downright manner.

Throughout 1938 he held his Cabinet together and carried on the government of the country in difficult circumstances with success. Forced to resign on the 25th December, 1938, by a military demonstration organised by Husain Fauzi, the Chief of the General Staff, and Taha-al-Hashimi in favour of Nuri-al-Said. Continues to enjoy considerable political influence.

When Rashid Ali seized power by a coup d'Etat at the beginning of April 1941, Jamil Madfai fled to Basra, where he joined the Regent. Both narrowly escaped capture by the Iraqi rebel troops and took refuge on a British warship. Thence they were flown to Palestine, where Jamil Madfai remained during Rashid Ali's rebellion of May. He returned to Iraq with the Regent on the collapse of the rebellion, and after considerable hesitation was persuaded to form a Cabinet. Faced with the difficult task of restoring public confidence and security, he showed that he had lost his former resolution and energy. An ageing man, susceptible to the intervention of others, he inclined towards a policy of appeasement and refrained from drastic action against the pro-Nazi elements. Within these limits, however, he co-operated loyally with His Majesty's Government, and during the four months of his premiership conditions in Iraq were largely restored to normal. Feeling unable, however, to carry out the policy of strong action which was pressed on him from many sides, Jamil Madfai, together with the whole Cabinet, resigned in October 1941.

Since then he has been active in the Senate. In March-April 1943 he visited Syria, Transjordan and Egypt at the request of Nuri Said to canvass support for the idea of an Arab congress to plan the closer union of all Arab States. He met with little success but was pleased to have had an opportunity to maintain his part as a veteran of the Pan-Arab movement.

Elected President of the Senate in December 1943, in which position he used his influence against Nuri Pasha's Government. Superseded as president in December 1944 and resigned from Senate in February 1945.

60. Jamil-al-Wadi

Sunni of Bagdad. Brother of Hamid-al-Wadi, aide-de-camp to the Amir Abdullah, and Shakir-al-Wadi, formerly aide-de-camp to the late King Feisal (q.v.).

Appointed a judge in 1923 and became director of the Land Registry Department (Tapu) in 1931.

Appointed Minister for Justice November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of State Domains Lands (in the Ministry of Finance) October 1933. Returned to the Ministry of Justice in June 1934 as member of the Court of Cassation, and a month later was appointed Chief Public Prosecutor. Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1935.

Appointed principal private secretary in the Palace in July 1937, but lost this post when Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet fell, and was passed into obscurity as an inspector in the Ministry of Justice.

Appointed Director-General of Tapu in January 1938, and of Land Settlement in August 1939 when the latter Department was amalgamated with Tapu.

Land Settlement was taken away from him in the autumn of 1941. Dishonest and corrupt.

61. Jebran Malkon

Was at one time associated with Rafael Butti in the publishing of *Al Bilad*. In 1940 he refused German Legation offers made by Dr. Grobba to publish anti-Jewish articles. Malkon is now proprietor of *Al Akhbar*, although he does not write the articles as he himself does not write good Arabic. Malkon comes from a large and wealthy family in Mardin. He and his sister were the only two who escaped a family massacre in 1917 when the remainder of the family was wiped out by the Turks and the Germans. Malkon and his sister found refuge in Deir-az-Zor. After the British occupation he was appointed a director of customs and excise.

He is a man of a mild and affable disposition but he has more courage than his meek appearance suggests and has always resisted pressure to publish articles unfriendly to Britain. He has, in fact, resolutely kept clear of all political controversy, a very creditable achievement for any editor in Bagdad. *Al Akhbar* is now generally accepted as the leading vernacular newspaper and has the largest circulation. Malkon is scoffed at by his fellow-editors but has no real enemies. He visited Britain in 1945 with a delegation of Iraqi journalists and came back full of wonder and admiration for all he had seen. He has a large happy family.

He speaks a little English.

62. Kamil al Chadirchi

A Moslem (Sunni) born in Bagdad in 1901. His brother is Raul al Chadirchi who was Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in London. Kamil was educated locally and graduated at the Bagdad Law College. He obtained a minor post in the Ministry of Finance but soon gave up this job for journalism and political agitation. In 1930 he was editor of *Al Ikha al Watani* (National Brotherhood) which paper was suppressed for its attacks on the Government of Nuri Said. In May 1934 he was convicted for publishing false news in *Sawt al Ahali*, and in September of the same year he was arrested for publishing pamphlets against King Ghazi, but was released for lack of evidence. He was at that time well known for his Left-wing views. The coup d'Etat of Hikmat Sulaiman in 1936 gave him his first Cabinet post as Minister of Economics and Communications in October of that year—a post which he resigned in June 1937 because of a difference of opinion on the Cabinet's policy regarding the Euphrates. He left the country for a few months, returning after the Belk Sidqi incident, and from that time he has been an active leftist politician. He formed the Democratic Party, described as "left of centre," which includes among its members Mohammed Hadid,

Majid Mustafa and Hikmat Sulaiman (q.v.). Given the right conditions his party might expect strong support from the middle classes, particularly the younger professional men.

Kamil al Chadirchi was asked to enter Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in 1943 but refused to do so on the ground that he could only take office if he could head a Government formed of his own party. In the autumn of 1946 he fell foul of the Government. He was arrested, tried and imprisoned for attacking the Government in his newspaper *Sawt al Ahali*. His sentence was subsequently quashed and a re-trial ordered (October).

The trial made a considerable stir which his party exploited, but the affair showed that he is no leader. He has progressive ideas but is unable to co-ordinate them or to form any stable or consistent policy. Chadirchi is a rich landlord, cultivated, and a pleasant dinner-party companion. He is no Communist and has had little personal contact with the working-classes whose cause he champions in the clubs and drawing-rooms of Bagdad. His English is weak but his Turkish is good. He is friendly to us and has just sent his son to study at an English university.

63. Khalid Sulaiman

Brother of Hikmat Sulaiman (q.v.). Born 1877. Returned in 1926 from Constantinople, where he had spent most of his life in commerce. Was Minister for Education under Taufiq Suwaidi in April 1929. In the reshuffle of portfolios which followed Abdul Muhsin Beg's suicide in November 1929, Khalid Beg was made Minister for Irrigation and Agriculture under Naji Pasha Suwaida. A pleasant, honest and likeable man, but has no influence in politics. Appointed Director-General, Public Works Department, January 1932. Transferred to be Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in September 1934. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1935.

Retired in March 1939 and now lives on his pension.

64. Khalid Zahawi

Sunni. Born 1889. Entered Military College at Constantinople in 1903. Served in the Turkish army until 1924. Joined Iraq army and was appointed aide-de-camp to the late King Feisal I. Promoted to colonel in 1931 and appointed Commandant of the Military College. Went to the Staff College, Camberley, in 1934 and on his return was made a brigadier and appointed Director of Military Operations. Became O.C., R.I.A.F., in 1936. Appointed Director of Army Administration in 1937. Placed on pension in February 1939. Appointed Mutessarif of Kut in October 1939. After the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 became Mutessarif of Bagdad, but was relieved of his appointment in June.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Kabul in November 1942.

65. Khalil Ismail

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1903. Graduate of Law College, Bagdad. Held various positions under the Ministry of the Interior 1925-32. Appointed Secretary to the Cabinet 1932. Director-General of Ministry of Interior 1935. Director-General of Education 1936. Pleasant, reasonable, speaks English well.

Appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1937, but in October he was sent to be Mutessarif of Amarah.

Director-General of Ministry of the Interior September 1938.

Appointed Director-General of Awqaf in 1940. Appointed Director-General of Census in October 1941.

Director-General of Finance, August 1943.

Appointed Director-General of Revenues in December 1942.

66. Khushaba, Malik

Assyrian chieftain of the Lower Tiari tribe, aged about 55. Presbyterian, and generally in disagreement with Mar Shimun. Well educated by American missionaries at Urumia. A striking personality with a romantic record as fighter and leader. Supported the Iraqi Government in their efforts to settle the Assyrians satisfactorily in Iraq and thereby incurred the bitter enmity of Mar Shimun. Many of his followers were, however, quite innocently massacred in August 1933 in spite of their friendly attitude towards the Iraqi Government. He desires to leave Iraq, but does not wish to be resettled in the same place as Mar Shimun.

Since hope of moving all the Assyrians from Iraq has been abandoned, Malik Khushaba has settled down to a quiet life in his village. Now resides in Mosul.

67. Mahmud Abdul Karim

Aged about 32. Reuters correspondent in Iraq. Worked as a secretary in the Royal Bilat from 1932-38. Started a daily newspaper called *Al Diyar* in 1945 but it was not a success and folded up in July 1946. Karim is very friendly to us. He went to London with the Iraqi press delegation in 1945 and remained in England for some time working in Reuters head office. He returned to England in January 1946 as press attaché to the Iraqi Delegation to U.N.O. He was a follower of Ibrahim Kemal (q.v.) but has taken no active part in politics. He was well-liked by Hamdi Pachachi but is disliked by Nuri Pasha and has fallen foul of Arshad. He is a good writer but is inclined to be careless in checking his facts. While in England he fell in love with a London solicitor's daughter whom he married in the summer of 1946. He speaks fluent English.

68. Mahmud Subhi Daftari

Sunni of Bagdad. Lawyer. Born 1890. Went with his father to Constantinople during the occupation and returned in 1919. Appointed Amin-al-Asimah (Mayor of Bagdad) April 1930, but was dismissed in September 1931. Appointed principal of the Law School November 1931, but resigned immediately after his appointment. Became Director-General of Tapu December 1932 and Amin-al-Asimah October 1933. Transferred to the Ministry of the Interior as Director-General of Municipalities in November 1936. He soon quarrelled with Arshad-al-Umari, the Amin-al-Asimah, and resigned. He was made a Senator in October 1937.

Pleasant, well intentioned and noticeably more moderate in politics than in his earlier days.

Became Minister of Justice in Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1938, but devoted more attention to his entertaining than to his official duties. Resigned February 1940 with whole Cabinet.

Made a Senator in 1940.

Made Minister for Foreign Affairs in Nuri Said's Cabinet in December 1943, a post which he obviously enjoyed enormously. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in June 1944.

69. Mahrut-bin-Hadhdhal, Shaikh

Chief of the Amarat, Anaiza (Arab) tribe of Iraq. He succeeded his father in 1927. Born about 1896. Intensely proud, but wiser than he appears to be. He has endeavoured to maintain good relations with the Iraqi Government, though the Nationalist element in Bagdad regard him with some suspicion on account of his father's close friendship with the British. His tribal area is from the Euphrates southwards to the Nejd border.

He obtained a good contract for the supply of labour on the Haifa-Bagdad road in 1940. During Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 he lost control of his tribe, parties of which attacked and looted some of the road camps.

His estate al Razza, near Kerbala, has been expropriated for the Abu Dibbis reservoir and Mahrut has experienced great difficulty in obtaining compensation from the Government.

70. Mahmud, Shaikh

Of the family of Barzinja Sayyidis. He has inherited from his father and grandfather great tribal and religious influence throughout Southern Kurdistan. He was made Hukumdar of Suleimani in 1918, shortly after the British occupation. In June 1919 he revolted against British authority, was wounded and deported to Henjam Island in the Persian Gulf. He was reinstated as Hukumdar of Suleimani in 1922, after the Turks had forced the British political officers there to withdraw. In 1923 armed action had to be taken against him to check his endeavours to establish his influence in the Kirkuk and Arbil Provinces. Suleimani was reoccupied in 1924, but Shaikh Mahmud was not brought to terms until 1927. These were that he was to abstain from politics and live outside Iraq in one of his Persian villages close to the border. He chose Piran and stayed there quietly until 1930, when an outbreak of Kurdish Nationalist feeling in Suleimani again tempted him into the political arena. Air and ground forces had again to be sent against him, and on the 31st May he surrendered at Panjwin. He was granted an allowance and sent to live at Hilla. From there he was later removed to Ramadi, and in the summer of 1933 he was permitted to take a house in Bagdad. He receives an allowance of 900 rupees a month from the Iraqi Government. He has three sons, Rauf, Baba Ali and Latif. Rauf is quiet and industrious and is a student in the Law College. Elected Deputy for Sulaimani in December 1938 and again in June 1939. Baba Ali, after completing his secondary schooling at Victoria College in Alexandria, was sent to Columbia University, New York, to study political economy. On his return in 1938 he was given employment in the railways. Latif is the pet of his father, and will follow closely in his footsteps, if he has the chance to do so.

His properties in Sulaimani were confiscated in 1931, but restored by special Act of Parliament in December 1938.

Towards the end of May 1941, during Rashid Ali's rebellion, Shaikh Mahmud escaped from Bagdad, and in company with Abbas-i-Salim, brother of Babekr Agha (q.v.) he raised a tribal force to attack Sulaimani with the object of ejecting Rashid Ali's officials. Before their plans could materialise, however, Rashid Ali's rebellion collapsed and most of the chieftains returned home. Shaikh Mahmud himself endeavoured to exploit the occasion to obtain concessions to the Kurds, but he was persuaded in the end to disperse his followers and to settle down in Darikella, one of his villages in Barzin. His youngest and favourite son, Latif, is restless and unreliable, and a source of anxiety to the Mutesarrif of Sulaimania.

71. Majid Mustafa

A Kurd of Sulaimani, born about 1894. During the war of 1914-18 he was an officer in the Turkish army, and for some time after the Armistice of Mudros held pro-Turkish views. He was an active supporter of Shaikh Mahmud 1924-26. When Shaikh Mahmud submitted to the Government Majid was made a Mudir in the Kut liwa. His administrative ability was soon apparent. In 1928 he became Qaimaqam of Nasiriyah, and in 1935 he was promoted to be Mutesarrif. Two years later he was posted to Amara where he remained until 1941.

His attitude in the Rashid Ali disturbances of 1941 was equivocal, but he seems on the whole to have favoured Rashid Ali's cause rather than that of the Regent. Rashid Ali did not, however, trust him and brought him in to the capital so that he could be watched. After the Regent's return to Bagdad at

the beginning of June 1941 Majid took leave in Turkey.

He returned in September and was then suspended for four years on account of his compliance with the orders of the Rashid Ali régime.

Nevertheless, in December 1943 he joined Nuri Pasha's Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio, with the special task of finding some means to stop the fighting with Mulla Mustafa in the Barzan area and of redressing Kurdish grievances. The Regent disliked his appointment and only reluctantly agreed to it.

Majid succeeded in bringing about a peaceful settlement with Mulla Mustafa in January 1944 and remained in the Cabinet, without Portfolio, but charged specially with advising the Government on Kurdish affairs.

Resigned with the whole of Nuri Said's Cabinet in June 1944.

Has gone into business but has not abandoned politics. Made a vigorous and impressive speech on Kurdish needs in the Chamber in January 1945. By the Kurds he is not trusted as they consider he is only interested in the fruits of power. Has been careful to advertise on the surface his dissociation from events in Barzan.

72. Mar Shimun

Eshai, Mar Shimun, Patriarch of the Assyrians (Catholics of the Church in the East).

Born about 1909. Succeeded to the patriarchate in 1920 when a child. Educated in England at a seminary in Canterbury. Since coming of age and assuming the authority of his position, Mar Shimun has actively fostered discontent among the Assyrians. Whatever his position as the head of a spiritual community, his temporal authority is not acknowledged by a large number of Assyrians, estimated at a maximum at 12,000. His aim has been to establish the whole community in a compact enclave under his own spiritual and temporal authority. He was the inspirer of the mutiny of the levies in 1932 and of the exodus to Syria in 1933. Deported by the Iraqi Government in the summer of 1933, he was given an asylum in Cyprus, where his father David and his aunt Surma joined him. In October 1933 he went to Geneva to protest to the League of Nations against the massacre of Assyrians which followed the Assyrian attack on the Iraqi army at Dairabun (Faishkhabur) in August 1933, and in November went to England to obtain support from friends and sympathisers there. On his deportation King Feisal granted him and his family a provisional allowance of £780 a year, subject to his correct behaviour. This allowance was stopped by King Ghazi in the summer of 1934 on account of the propaganda which Mar Shimun persistently carried on against Iraq.

While paying lip-service to the League of Nations and always ready to petition that body on behalf of the Assyrians, he has proved disloyal to its decisions whenever they have conflicted with his personal ambition. By preferring temporal power to spiritual leadership, he has been the means of inflicting much needless suffering on a deserving people. During the year 1934 he was mostly in England, paying several visits to Geneva when Assyrian affairs were under discussion. He remained in Europe throughout 1935 and 1936, spending much time in London.

In 1939 he was granted British naturalisation and went to live in Cyprus.

Since 1940 he has been living in the United States.

73. Maulud Mukhlis

Sunni. Born about 1875. A fine soldier, he behaved with great gallantry with the Sharifian army and was badly wounded. His exploits do not lose in the telling. Served in Syria and was sent in 1920 to Dair, where the agreement between the British Government of Occupation and the Arab Govern-

ment was reached under his auspices in April. A hot Nationalist, he continued to spread anti-British propaganda among the tribes until he was recalled by King Feisal in June. Remained in Syria after the fall of the Arab Government and returned to Bagdad in July 1921. He lost no time in joining the extreme Nationalist group. There was no post to offer him in the Iraqi army, but he was given some land near Tikrit and settled down to cultivate it, with occasional visits to Bagdad and Mosul to take part in Nationalist activities. In May 1923 he was appointed Mutesarrif of Karbala, to deal with the Ulema. He is no administrator, but he kept things quiet at the time of the exodus of the *mujtahids*. An impulsive man, who allows his pan-Arab sentiment to rule his actions. He was bitterly hostile to the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1937 after Bakr Sidqi's *coup d'Etat* and openly condemned the murder of Jafar Pasha. In February 1937 an attempt was made to assassinate him and three of Bakr Sidqi's aides-de-camp were suspected. Maulud then went to live in Syria, but returned soon after Bakr Sidqi's murder in August 1937. Has been a Senator since 1925.

He was elected president of the Chamber in December 1937.

Attended the Arab Parliamentary Conference on Palestine arranged by Alubba Pasha in Cairo in the summer of 1938.

Re-elected president of the Chamber November 1938 and again in June and November 1939. Was not re-elected in November 1941.

In recent years his drunkenness has increased and discredited him.

74. Muaffaq-al-Alousi

Born about 1894. Belongs to a learned family of Bagdad. He is a graduate of the Sorbonne whence he returned to Bagdad in 1926. Was appointed a professor in the law school and afterwards in 1928 Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Two years later he quarrelled with the Minister, Abdullah Damluji, and withdrew to Beirut. In 1931 he accompanied Nuri Pasha to Mecca to negotiate the Iraq-Nejd "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement. In the autumn of 1932 he went again to Mecca, this time to take up a post as judicial adviser to King Abdul Azziz-al-Saud. He remained in Arabia for about a year and then returned to Bagdad. In May 1934 he was appointed first secretary in the Iraqi Legation in Tehran. Transferred to be consul at Beirut in May 1935. Appointed consul-general at Bombay December 1936. Dismissed from the Foreign Service in November 1937.

Remained in Syria until January 1939 when he returned to Iraq. Returned to the Foreign Service in February 1939 and posted to Paris as chargé d'affaires. Transferred to be consul-general at Damascus June 1939.

Transferred to Istanbul as consul-general in July 1941. Recalled in November. A heavy drinker, with unsavoury habits, he is not a good consular officer and is suspected of pro-Nazi sympathies.

He was dismissed in April 1943 for insubordination and in the early summer was seeking official employment in Saudi Arabia. In 1944 he was living in Turkey on an allowance supplied to him by Ibn Saud.

75. Mudhdhajar Ahmed, O.B.E.

Born Hilla, 1899. Sunni Muslim. Married. His wife (who appears in the wives of Ibrahim Kemal and Tahsin Askari, to which family, and to that of Nuri al Said, he is related through his mother.

Educated in Bagdad he served in the Turkish army as an officer. He was among the first direct officer-appointments to the police after the formation of the National Government having been Gazetted Assistant Commandant on 10th December, 1921. He received his initial training under various

British officers and by the mid-1920s had established a good reputation in the Diwanayah Liwa. He was promoted commandant in 1932 and was one of a group of officers sent for training in the Birmingham City Police School. After completing this course he returned to Bagdad and was appointed Principal of the Inspectors' Training School, which post he held for some years. Thereafter he became Director, Passport, Residence and Nationality Department, Director, C.I.D., and held other posts on the headquarters staff. After the 1941 rebellion, working under the orders of Saiyid Ahmed Al Rawi, as Director, C.I.D., he was most energetic in clearing up the chaos remaining after the collapse of the Rashid Ali régime. He hunted out and deported foreign Arab "Nazis," and was equally active in regard to Iraqis of the same type. In September 1941 he was appointed Director-General of Civil Defence which post he retained until appointed Mutasarrif, Basrah, on 12th August, 1944. Here he distinguished himself by his cordial co-operation with the British forces, but he was equally popular with all shades of Iraqi opinion and classes. Since then he has served for a short while as Mutasarrif, Mosul Liwa, and in October 1946 became Mutasarrif, Bagdad Liwa.

Mudhaffar Ahmed has matured slowly. In his younger days he did not show outstanding promise, although he always was looked upon as being steady and reliable. Always keen on sport, he was a keen "soccer," polo and tennis player and did much to foster keenness for the first and third (polo had always been played) in the police, and later in the Royal Olympic Club, Bagdad. He has developed into a sound steady public servant and in the normal course of events, being still under fifty, should go far in the service.

Awarded the O.B.E. for war services, 1946.

An attractive personality. He speaks excellent English and some French.

76. *Muhammad Ali Mahmud*

Sunni. Born 1895. A lawyer who has served in many posts under the Ministry of Justice, including that of Director-General of the Ministry, Director-General of Tapu and judge of the Court of Appeal. Elected to the Chamber as Deputy for Bagdad in 1935 and for Arbil in 1936. Has twice been elected Vice-President of the Chamber and held the post of chairman of the Finance Committee in 1937. Appointed Minister of Finance in Hikmat Sulaiman's reformed Cabinet in June 1937. He resigned in August 1937 with the whole Cabinet.

Elected Deputy for Arbil December 1937 but lost his seat in June 1939.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. On the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion at the end of May 1941, he fled to Persia and was handed over by the Persian Government to the British military authorities in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwaz and subsequently sent to Southern Rhodesia to be interned. Sent back for trial in March 1944.

77. *Muhammad Amin Zaki*

A Kurd of Sulaimani. Born 1880. Well educated and speaks French, German and English. Formerly staff officer in Turkish army. Was made Minister for Communications and Works in November 1926, and subsequently held the portfolios of Education and Defence. Exerted little influence in the Cabinets in which he has held office. His policy is to try to please the Kurds by supporting Kurdish Nationalists without compromising his position with the Arabs. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930. Again Minister for Economics and Communications July 1931. Resigned October 1932. Appointed Director-General of Economics and Communications March 1933, but became unemployed when this post was abolished in September 1934.

Became Minister for Economics and Communications in March 1935 in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet. Resigned when the Cabinet fell in October 1936.

Elected Deputy for Sulaimani in December 1937 and again in June 1939. Became Minister for Economics in March 1940 in Rashid Ali's third Cabinet.

Resigned in July 1940 on account of severe illness. Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in October 1941. Resigned in February 1942 on account of ill health. Made a Senator December 1943.

78. *Muhammad Hassan Kubba*

Shiah of Bagdad. Born 1891. Belongs to the old family of Kubba. In 1920 was associated with the Nationalist activities of Ja'far Chalabi Abu Timman. In 1923 he entered the service of the Ministry of Justice. Served as a judge in many parts of the country and also held posts in the Ministry. In December 1943 he joined the Cabinet as Minister for Social Affairs under Nuri Said. Retained this position in the Cabinet of Hamdi al Pachachi which followed Nuri's resignation in June 1944, but became President of the Chamber of Deputies on the resignation of Muhammad Ridha-al-Shabibi in December 1944.

Joined the Al Umari Cabinet in June 1946 as Minister of Justice. The Prime Minister's interference with the Courts however soon caused him uneasiness and he wanted to resign in August, only remaining in office at the Regent's request.

79. *Muhammad Hussein el Hadid*

Born Mosul 1906. Sunni Muslim. Merchant. Muhammad el Hadid was educated at Mosul Mutawassit School until 1924, when he went to Beirut. He returned from Beirut in 1928 and almost immediately went to England to continue his education at the London School of Economics. After returning to Iraq in 1931 he was appointed to a post in the Ministry of Finance which he held until 1937, when he was elected as a Deputy for Mosul. He then went into business with Kamil el Khedairi, Muhammad Ja'afar Abul Tummen and others and formed the "El Skerikat el Ziyut Wal Nabitiyah" and engaged in a considerable export trade. He is still (1946) a partner in that company. His father, Haji Hussein, is reputed to be one of the wealthiest men in Mosul, while Muhammad el Hadid himself has married the daughter of the man who, by common talk, is probably the richest in the Liwa, if not in the whole of Iraq.

Through his friendship with Kamil el Chadarebi, and possibly through contacts while in England, he became interested at an early date in the "Progressive" Movement and was one of the signatories to the application for the founding of the Hizb el Watani el Demokrati, of which he is the vice-president.

He has made many heated speeches attacking "colonisation" and professing to support "Progress," all with a strong anti-British bias, but it is stated that he has always opposed violence and was against the general strike of July 1946. He has many British friends, to whom his frankness appeals. His son is being educated at Victoria College.

Is generally looked upon as being a pleasant, shrewd man. In September 1946 he wrote an article on Iraq in the *New Statesman and Nation* which attacked the Umari régime, as a result of which the paper was excluded from Iraq.

80. *Muhammad Husain Kashif-al-Ghata (Saiyid)*

Shiah Alim of Najaf. One of the few Arab Divines of importance.

Attended the Moslem Conference at Jerusalem in 1931 as Iraqi delegate. Visited Persia on a prolonged tour in the summer of 1933, and returned to Iraq in

February 1934. In the spring of 1935 he took a prominent part in the tribal insurrections on the Euphrates, and gave his full support to the tribes which took up arms against Yasin Pasha's Government. He hoped to persuade them to make a united front with the Ulama in an attempt to force on the Government a series of sectarian demands intended to secure for the Shiah community a greater share in the government of the country. He was only partially successful and, after the defeat of the tribes by the army, he wisely withdrew to silence in the shrines of Najaf.

Declared a jihad for Palestine in the summer of 1938.

In 1939 it was suspected that he had accepted money from the German Legation to foster anti-British feeling.

Issued a fatwa against the British during Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941. His nephew, Abamad Kashif-al-Ghata, actively supported Rashid Ali and was interned in August 1941 at Fao, but was released in August 1944.

81. *Muhammad Ridha-al-Shabibi*

Shiah of Bagdad, born about 1880. Belongs to a well-known family. Member of Constituent Assembly and Minister for Education in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Again given the portfolio of Education in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha in March 1935. His reactionary views soon brought him into conflict with his colleagues and with the chief permanent officials of his Ministry, and he resigned in September 1935. He became President of the Senate, February 1937, and was reappointed Minister for Education in Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in August 1937. He is president of the Bagdad branch of the Pen Club and has a considerable reputation as a man of letters. Resigned with Jamil-al-Madfa'i in December 1938.

Appointed Minister of Education in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfa'i in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed to the Board of Education created in April 1943.

Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1943 and again in December 1944, but resigned almost immediately.

A genial old bigot determined to have nothing to do with anything modern. Speaks no English.

82. *Muhammad Salih-al-Qazzaz*

Bagdad mechanic. Born about 1898. At one time came into prominence as a labour leader and agitator. A professional demagogue, he used to thrust himself in the van of any bazaar troubles, and was especially conspicuous in encouraging discontent among the labour employed by the foreign companies operating in Iraq. Played a leading part in organising the boycott of the Bagdad Electric Light Company in the autumn and winter of 1933.

During the premiership of Yasin-al-Hashimi he was not allowed to agitate, but when Hikmat Sulaiman came into office in October 1936 Muhammad Salih became the treasurer of the Popular Reform League which was organised by Kamil Chadirji with a left-wing programme. His activities became so tiresome that in February 1937 he was sent to live in Ramadi, where he remained until December 1937, when he was released. Little has since been heard of him.

83. *Muhammad-al-Sadr, Saiyid*

Born about 1885. An influential Shiah divine of Kadhimain. Was a violent Nationalist in the early days of the British occupation, and played a prominent part in the insurrection of 1920. He fled to Syria when the insurrection was put down, but returned with the Amir Feisal in June 1921. Took an active part in the anti-mandate controversy of 1922, but after the proclamation of the Constitution

in 1924 greatly modified his views. Appointed a Senator in 1925, and elected President of the Senate in 1929. He has subsequently been re-elected to this position at each new session, until February 1937, when Ridha-al-Shabibi was elected instead. He was re-elected President of the Senate in December 1937 and again in December 1938, June 1939 and November 1939.

Re-elected President of the Senate in November 1941 and November 1942. A dignified and picturesque personality with an acute and sometimes embarrassing idea of his own importance. Ceased to be President of the Senate in December 1943 on the election of Jamil-al-Madfa'i.

An overpowering figure familiarly known as "God" from his resemblance to Byzantine representations of a bearded deity.

84. *Muhammad Salim el Radhi*

Born Bagdad 1890. Muslim. Public servant and landowner.

Educated in Bagdad primary and secondary schools, he graduated from the American University, Beirut, and later went to the United States, where he studied at Texas and California Universities, from which he took doctorates in Agriculture and Science. He returned to Iraq in 1926 and joined the Department of Agriculture, in which he has continued until he became the Director-General, which post he has held for several years.

A quiet, capable man, with many friends in all communities. He has shown no pronounced political tendencies or attachments and this, perhaps, explains his undisturbed service as Director-General of a Department. However, owing to the fact that he is connected to the wealthy Shabandar family—Ibrahim al Shabandar being his cousin—and that he himself is a considerable landowner, it is unlikely that he holds any "advanced" views, in spite of his associations in the United States.

85. *Mulla Mustafa*

Born about 1898. Brother of Ahmad of Barzan (q.v.). Was the fighting leader of the Barzanis in the troubles of 1931-32. He surrendered with Shaikh Ahmad and was banished to Sulaimani. There he lived for ten years in poverty on a small allowance from the Government. In the autumn of 1943 he bolted back to Barzan and a few months later became involved in skirmishes with the police. The fighting gradually developed, and Mulla Mustafa successfully resisted the considerable forces of police and Iraqi troops sent against him.

In the beginning he was concerned only with his own position, but later on he began to put forward political demands and to pose as a champion of Kurdish nationalism. He won a good deal of Kurdish sympathy and support. In January 1944 a settlement was arranged whereby he was promised a pardon after paying a formal visit to Bagdad to make submission to the Regent. Thereafter he returned to Barzan, but he remains restless and untamed, and the Government have not yet been able to re-establish control over the Barzani tribal area. Was formally pardoned in April 1945 by the Barzan Amnesty Law, and the Government embarked on a programme of improving security and of developing agriculture in his area. However, he became impatient in the summer and took up arms against the Government again in August 1945.

He was eventually defeated, more by the agility of the Minister of the Interior in distributing gold than that of the army in occupying his country. He fled with his brother to Persia, whence photographs of him have since found their way back to Iraq showing him as General Mulla Mustafa in a uniform strangely reminiscent of that worn by Generalissimo Stalin.

Recently his fortunes seem to have declined and many of his followers have returned to Iraq.

86. Musa Shabandar

Bagdadi Sunni, born 1890. Elder son of Mahmud Shabandar, a wealthy land and property owner of Bagdad.

Went to Berlin soon after the armistice, and lived in Europe, mostly in Zurich and Berlin, until the autumn of 1932, when he returned to Bagdad.

In January 1933 he was appointed secretary of the permanent Iraqi delegation at the League of Nations.

Speaks English, French and German. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation in Berlin in October 1935.

Early in 1937 he was accused of giving certificates of export to Iraq for munitions destined for Spain and recalled to Bagdad, where he was placed under arrest. In December proceedings against him were dropped and it seems doubtful whether there was ever any real evidence against him. Elected Deputy for Amarah, December 1937.

Lost his seat in June 1939. Reappointed to the Diplomatic Service in June 1939 and sent as chargé d'affaires to Berlin. Returned to Bagdad October 1939, and was appointed Assistant Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. His polished and friendly manner hid a close and sinister co-operation with Rashid Ali in his pro-Nazi intrigues. On the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941, he fled to Persia and was handed over to the British military authorities in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwaz and thence sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment. Sent back to stand his trial with internees in March 1944. Sentence was finally passed on him, in August 1944, of five years hard labour and sequestration of all his property. Now an invalid.

87. Muzahim al-Amin Pachachi

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1888, a lawyer. Elected Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924, and sat in the first Chamber in 1925. Minister of Communications and Works in the Hashimi Cabinet, August 1924. In 1927, while in London, he made a close study of British politics. Recalled to Bagdad in February 1928 and joined the active Nationalists. His ideas seemed to be tinged with communism. Was prominent in anti-Zionist manifestations in summer of 1929. Became Minister of Economics and Communications in January 1931, and, shortly after, Minister of the Interior, in which post he unexpectedly gave satisfaction to his British advisers. Resigned in October 1931 on account of a difference with his colleagues regarding his dismissal of the Amin-al-Asimah. Towards the end of May 1932 he was charged with complicity in the circulation of scurrilous anonymous letters, making allegations against the personal honour of the King. Resigned his seat in the Chamber and was committed for trial with four others by Bagdad magistrate's court. Acquitted in October 1932. In October 1934 he was appointed Minister at Rome and permanent delegate at Geneva. In November 1935 he was relieved of his duties at Geneva. Appointed Minister at Paris in July 1939.

Remained in France as Minister to the Vichy Government after the collapse of France in 1940. Recalled in November 1941, when Iraq severed relations with the Vichy Government, but did not return to Iraq. In 1943 he appeared to be living in Rome. Later he went to Geneva and sought but was refused facilities to return to Iraq.

Eventually returned in November 1945.

88. Mustafa al-Umari

Sunni of the Umari family of Mosul. Born 1893. Graduated in Law School in Bagdad just before the war. Served as an officer in the Turkish forces fighting in Mesopotamia during the war and was made a prisoner just before the fall of Bagdad.

Returned to Iraq after the armistice and entered Government service. Since then he has served in the Waqf Department and in the Ministries of Finance and Interior. His posts included the following: kaimakam in several districts, Accountant General, Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior and mutessarif in a number of liwas. In 1936 he was appointed Mutessarif of the Muntafiq liwa and in June 1937 he joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet as Minister of the Interior. He retained this portfolio in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in August 1937.

During the first half of 1938 he acquired a reputation for taking large bribes, and, though no allegations were proved, the Prime Minister thought it well to transfer him to another Ministry. He accordingly went to Justice in October 1938. In December 1938 he resigned with the whole of Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet after the military demonstration organised by Husain Fauzi and Taha-al-Hashimi in favour of Nuri-al-Said. He is a Senator.

Appointed Minister of Interior in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941. Since then he has been a prominent speaker in the debates of the Senate, and has been a constant critic of Nuri Said's Administration. Became Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet of Hamdi-al-Pachachi formed in June 1944.

He has the reputation of being corrupt, but he is certainly an able administrator and has as comprehensive a knowledge of the north as anyone. He put this to good use during the Barzani troubles of 1945, when his well-directed bribery made possible the victory of the Iraqi army.

89. Dr. Nadim bin Shakir al Pachachi

Born Bagdad 1914. Muslim, Sunni; nephew of Hamdi al Pachachi, late Prime Minister, and of Muzahim al Pachachi, late Iraqi Minister in Paris (q.v.).

Educated at Bagdad and London School of Economics. Returned to Bagdad in 1938 on completing his studies and was appointed to the Ministry of Economics, of which he is now Director-General. He has a civil service outlook and has never figured in politics.

Went with the Iraqi delegation to the General Assembly of U.N.O. in London, where he took the opportunity of searching for British experts to advise his Ministry in certain matters (e.g., co-operative farming) in which he is anxious to see reform and progress—less perhaps from a disinterested love of the working classes than because he believes that to raise their standard of living is the best defence against discontent and communism.

Speaks excellent English.

90. Dr. Naji al-Asil

Bagdadi, born 1895. First became prominent in 1922 as semi-official Hashimite representative in London. Continued to represent Hashimite interests in London until final conquest of the Hejaz by Ibn Saud. Dr. Naji then became destitute in England, and was deported to Iraq in October 1925. In Iraq he was soon employed under the Ministry of Defence in the Iraqi Military Medical Service. Appointed Iraqi Consul-General and Chargé d'Affaires in Jeddah in August 1931. Returned to Bagdad in June 1932 to be present during the visit of the Amir Feisal, son of King Abdul Aziz-al-Saud. Appointed consul, Mohammerah, October 1932. Acting Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, April 1933. Appointed counsellor in the Legation at Tehran, April 1935.

In June 1936, while on leave in Bagdad, he was appointed Master of Ceremonies at the palace, and accepted the portfolio of Foreign Affairs when Hikmat Sulaiman formed his Cabinet in October 1936. Resigned with Hikmat Sulaiman in August

1937, and was not included in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai.

Appointed Director-General of Antiquities in 1944.

A pleasant man of considerable intelligence who speaks excellent English. He is violently anti-Zionist.

91. Naji Shaukat

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1891. Studied in Constantinople and became a reserve officer. Joined the Sharif and was at Aqabah with Colonel Lawrence, for whom he has a great admiration. Returned to Bagdad in 1919. Early in 1921 he was given an appointment under the Mutessarif of Bagdad, and subsequently became mutessarif. He showed considerable administrative ability and maintained cordial relations with his British advisers. He was appointed Mutessarif of Kut in October 1922, of Hillah in 1923, and of Bagdad in 1924. Minister for Interior, June 1928, Minister for Justice, September 1929, and reverted to Interior in the changes which followed Abdul Mushin's suicide. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in September 1930. Recalled to Bagdad in October 1931 to take up portfolio of Interior. Became Prime Minister in November 1932. Received the Order of Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy in January 1933. Resigned premiership March 1933. Minister for the Interior in November 1933, resigned February 1934. Again appointed Minister at Angora April 1934. He accompanied Taufiq Rustu Aras, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, on his official visit to Bagdad in the summer of 1937, and was then offered a Cabinet post in Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. He declined because of his objection to Bakr Sidqi's influence.

Became Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1938, but resigned in April 1939. Deputy for Bagdad in the elections of June 1939.

Became Minister for Justice in Rashid Ali's Cabinet in March 1940.

After the collapse of France, he became a strong advocate of reinsurance with the Axis. With Rashid Ali's approval he went to Istanbul in September 1940 to establish contact with the German Ambassador, Herr von Papen. It was perhaps more than a coincidence that just before his return to Iraq, towards the end of October 1940, the local Arabic press published the official Axis declaration of sympathy with Arab aspirations, and that just after his return the resumption of direct telegraphic communication between Iraq and Germany and Italy was announced. He resigned in January 1941, but was appointed Minister of Defence in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. During Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 he went to Turkey to try and enlist Turkish support for Rashid Ali's cause. After the collapse of the rebellion he remained in Turkey. He was tried in absentia by court martial and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment.

In 1942 he found his way to Europe and moved between Berlin and Rome, receiving a Minister's salary from the Reich Government. In 1943 it seemed that he had taken up his residence in Rome, where he was in touch with the ex-Mufti of Palestine. In the summer of 1945 he was arrested in Italy, sent back to Iraq and imprisoned.

92. Nadhif Shawi

Born Bagdad about 1890. Educated in Military College, Constantinople, and the Turkish Staff College. Served in Turkish army until the end of the war 1914-18. He joined King Feisal's army in Syria and fought at Maisalun, where Feisal was defeated by the French. He then returned to Bagdad and for some years was employed as a teacher in the secondary schools. During this period he graduated at the Bagdad Law College. He later returned to the army and was given rank as a senior

captain. In 1935 he attended army manoeuvres in England. On his return he was made Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College. After two years in this post he was promoted brigadier and appointed Assistant Chief of General Staff. He was placed on pension in 1939 and became Minister of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941 after the flight of Rashid Ali to Persia. He made a pleasant if colourless Minister and resigned with the whole Cabinet in early October 1941.

93. Najib al-Rawi

Born about 1896. Sunni of Bagdad. Brother of Ahmad-al-Rawi. Married to a sister of Mme. Hikmat Sulaiman. Has for many years practised successfully as a lawyer and in 1942 was elected president of the Law Society. In 1940 he was suspected of being in too close intimacy with the ex-Mufti of Palestine (then a fugitive in Iraq) and with the Italian Minister. He was careful, however, to avoid becoming involved in Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat* in 1941.

Sleek and *mondain*, he is a prominent figure in upper class social life in Bagdad. Elected a Deputy in October 1943. He represented Iraq at the Arab Lawyers' Conference at Damascus in August 1944.

He has performed useful services for us, but it is difficult to say how trustworthy he is. He and his wife speak good English. She is a sister of Mme. Hikmat Sulaiman (q.v.).

Minister of Education in Suwaidi Cabinet of 1946.

94. Nasrat al-Farisi

Lawyer of Bagdad, born about 1890. In the early days of the Iraqi Government he held somewhat extreme Nationalist views, which he voiced as a Deputy in the Chamber. Was later given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice, where he served diligently for a number of years.

Minister for Finance, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Beg Shaukat in March 1933. Appointed Minister for Finance in Jamil Beg Al Madfai's Cabinet in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934. Appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in April 1935. Appointed Iraqi delegate at Geneva in June 1937.

Steady and intelligent, but inclined to be obstructive.

Was relieved of this appointment in the summer of 1938 when it was decided to withdraw the Iraqi delegation from Geneva. He then returned to the Bar.

Appointed Minister of Economics in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in April 1943, but did not proceed.

In June 1943 he became Foreign Minister. Resigned in October 1943, as a protest against the Regent's interference in the choice of Government candidates for election to Parliament.

Went to San Francisco in 1945 as a member of the Iraqi delegation. Speaks excellent English, but still takes lessons to keep himself up to date.

95. Nishat al-Sanawi

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1893. Studied in the School of Law, Constantinople. He was in Bagdad before the occupation, went to Mosul with the Turks, and was employed in various capacities there. Returned after the armistice and took service under the British Administration. Was appointed Director of the Law School when it was reopened in 1919; criminal magistrate, February 1922; judge in the Court of Appeal, March 1923. Amin-al-Asimah, Bagdad, 1925-30. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior in April 1930, and became Principal of the Law School, February 1931. Reappointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior, November 1931. Appointed Administrative

Inspector, November 1933. Became Director-General of Municipalities in June 1935. Appointed Chief Finance Inspector, May 1936. Placed on pension about end of 1938.

96. Nureddin Mahmoud

Born 1889. A Kurd. Commissioned in the Turkish army in 1917. Intelligent, resourceful and ambitious. Director of Military Operations. Graduate of Camberley and Quetta. Good man both in administration and in the field. One of the few Iraq army officers with modern military knowledge. Has done several courses in England. Command over men is good, and influence on the army high—as witness his behaviour on the flight of Rashid Ali when he took over command of the army and initiated the Anglo-Iraqi armistice. Does not dabble unduly in politics but sympathises with the Allied cause and was heartily against—and worked against—Rashid Ali. His only strong feeling is apparently for the Kurds, and as long as there is friendship between the Kurds and the British his support can be taken for granted.

Attractive personality. Has been military attaché in London. Was Officer Commanding 2nd Division at Kirkuk and was transferred to Bagdad as Assistant C.G.S. He visited the battle-fields of the Western Desert on the invitation of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, in May 1943.

Was promoted Amir Liwa in November 1944 and later became Officer Commanding, 2nd Division, in the reorganised Iraq army.

97. Nuri al Qadhi

Born 1889, joined Iraq Government service in 1921 and has held the following appointments: Vice-President Bagdad Courts 1925, Vice-President Mosul Courts 1937, Director-General of Waqfa 1931, Head of Legal Drafting Department, Ministry of Justice, 1936, Secretary-General to the Council of Ministers 1941. Of the old school, he has excellent manners and considerable charm, but he has hitherto played no part in politics and little is known of his character and abilities.

Minister of Education in the al Umari Cabinet of June 1946.

98. Nuri-al-Said, G.C.V.O., C.M.G., D.S.O.

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1888, son of an accountant of Mosul descent. Educated in Constantinople, speaks Turkish, German, French and English. Served in Balkan War. He was one of the founders of the Ahd in 1913 and came from Constantinople to Iraq in order to start branches there. He was in Basra at the time of the occupation as a patient in the American hospital; joined the Arab army in the Hejaz in June 1916, and commanded the troops till the arrival of Jafar Pasha (his brother-in-law); served as C.G.S. till the fall of Damascus. A good strategist very receptive of ideas, clever, hard-working, rash and hot-headed under fire. A modernist with an exceptionally alert intelligence. Was awarded the D.S.O. 1917 and the C.M.G. 1919, and accompanied Feisal in London, Paris and Syria in 1919 and 1920. He always wished for a reasonable rapprochement between the French and the Arabs, and dissuaded King Feisal from offering resistance to the French on the ground that he could not hope for support from the British. When the break came in July 1920 he went with Feisal to England. Returned to Bagdad in February 1921 and took charge of the Ministry of Defence during the absence of Jafar Pasha at the Cairo Conference. On his return he became C.G.S. and Director-General of Police, and held these appointments till October 1922. Acting Minister of Defence from November 1922 to November 1923. Held the same portfolio in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet. Minister of Defence again in November 1926, and retained that portfolio with

only short intervals out of office until he became Prime Minister in March 1930. Negotiated and signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of June 1930. Visited Jedda in 1931 to negotiate a "Bon-Voisinage" Treaty with Nejd and the Hejaz. Resigned with the whole Cabinet the 19th October, 1931, but reaccepted office on the same day in a reformed Cabinet. Visited Angora with King Feisal July 1931, and again in December-January 1931-32. During latter visit he signed with Turkish Government an Extradition Treaty, a Treaty of Commerce and a Residence Convention. Resigned premiership in October 1932. Appointed Minister at Rome, February 1933, but did not proceed. Became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Cabinet of Rashid Ali Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with Rashid Ali in October 1933 and accepted portfolio of Foreign Affairs and Defence under Jamil-al-Madfa'i in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1934 under Ali Jaudat's premiership. Resigned with Ali Jaudat in February 1935, but retained the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the succeeding Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfa'i, and returned again to the Ministry in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha in March 1935.

In October, after Bakr Sidqi's successful military revolt, Nuri Pasha, fearing for his life, fled to Egypt with his family, where he carried on a restless agitation from Cairo to secure his return to Iraq. He came back in October 1937 after the murder of Bakr Sidqi and the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. He was offered the post of Iraqi Minister in London, but did not accept it. In early December he went to Syria with the intention of working privately for a solution of the problem of the future of the Jews and Arabs in Palestine.

But for two short visits to Bagdad, Nuri-al-Said spent the whole of the year 1938 outside Iraq, occupied principally in desultory conversations about Palestine with politicians in Syria, Egypt and London. On each of his short visits to Bagdad his presence gave rise to rumours concerning his political intentions, but these died away as soon as he left.

In December 1938 he came back to stay, and a few days later a military demonstration in his favour organised by Taha-al-Hashimi and Husain Fauzi overthrew Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet and brought Nuri-al-Said into office as Prime Minister. He represented Iraq at the opening of the London conversations about Palestine in January 1939.

Resigned the premiership in February 1940, but at the Regent's request reformed his Cabinet and continued in office until the end of March when, with his own collaboration, a new Cabinet was formed by Rashid Ali.

Remained in office as Minister for Foreign Affairs until the end of January 1941, when he and several of his colleagues resigned because of Rashid Ali's increasing inclination towards the Axis. In April, shortly before Taha-al-Hashimi's Cabinet was overthrown by Rashid Ali and the army, Nuri Said wisely withdrew to Transjordan, where he remained until he was able to come back with the Regent at the beginning of June. Before the end of the month he was appointed Iraqi Minister in Cairo, but was recalled to form a Cabinet on the resignation of Jamil Madfa'i at the beginning of October 1941. From that time onwards he collaborated closely with His Majesty's Ambassador in eradicating pro-Nazi propaganda in Iraq and it was due to his initiative that Iraq declared war on the Axis Powers in January 1943.

In the summer of 1943 Nuri Pasha visited Egypt to discuss Arab unity with the Egyptian Prime Minister Nahas Pasha. He also went to Syria and Palestine for talks with Arabs there. He remained Prime Minister throughout 1943, but there were many changes in his Cabinet, and he formed his ninth Government on the 25th December, 1943.

Resigned in June 1944 with his whole Cabinet after an unedifying brawl in the Chamber between some of his supporters and the Opposition, which convinced him that he did not enjoy the Regent's confidence and support. In any case he was tired and needed a rest. Accompanied the Regent on his travels in America and Europe during the summer of 1945.

In July 1945 he was elected President of the Senate.

In April 1946 he negotiated a treaty between Iraq and Turkey covering economic and commercial matters but the Tawfiq Suwaidi Cabinet which had come into power during the negotiations wished to recall him on the ground that he had gone too far. When he returned he contrived, with his usual ability to have all his actions sanctioned retrospectively, and the treaty was accepted.

During the summer he went to London with the Regent and then returned to Syria and Turkey in the hope of arranging an understanding, and perhaps a treaty, between the two countries.

He refused to represent Iraq at the Palestine conference partly through jealousy of Azzam and partly because, having been one of the negotiators who obtained the 1939 White Paper, he feels it beneath his dignity to attend a conference whose *point de départ* is its abrogation.

Nuri Pasha is still amazingly youthful and vigorous, both in mind and body, and is likely to remain for some years one of the few Arab statesmen with an international outlook and an international reputation.

99. Rafail Petrus Butti

Born Mosul 1901. Christian. Journalist and editor. Educated at the Syrian Orthodox School, Mosul, and at a secondary school in Bagdad, he graduated from the Law College after extra-mural studies in 1929. He entered Government service as a clerk in the Ministry of Interior on the recommendation of Razzuq Ghannam, for whose paper *El Iraq* he contributed articles. He himself also published a weekly magazine *El Huriyah* which was violently anti-British but which also criticised the Administration for subservience to the British Advisory and Inspectorate staffs. There is no doubt that he received encouragement and support for this as part of the general propaganda campaign for the termination of the Mandate. He over-stepped the mark in 1927 when, after a particularly venomous attack on the British Inspector-General of Police, British policy and the Government, he was dismissed. Within a few weeks, however, he was given a better job in the Ministry of Interior as Translator. Here he was comparatively safe. He remained so employed until he graduated from the Law College when he resigned and in partnership with Jebrun Melkun published *El Bilad*. Until the conclusion of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty he backed his patron, Nuri el Said; then he switched over to Nuri Pasha's chief opponent, Yasin Pasha el Hashimi and the Hizb el Ikha el Watani and became a constant and bitter critic of Nuri and his pro-British policy. This was his first change of raiment: there were others, viz., 1921-23, Nuri el Said. 1923-29, mainly Nuri el Said, but occasionally el Hashimi. 1930-35, Yasin el Hashimi and Rashid Ali. 1936-37, Bekr Sidki. 1937, he toadied to Jamil Madfa'i after the murder of Bekr Sidki, but el Madfa'i would have nothing to do with him and, when his paper became abusive, suppressed it for a year. 1938-42, Rashid Ali. 1942-43, Interned. 1943-45, Rashid Ali when he dared. 1946, anti-British.

He has been a Deputy on two occasions, first in 1935 for Mosul and secondly in 1939 for Basra. He was rabidly anti-British both in Parliament and in his paper but his seat in Parliament protected him until July 1942 when in a clear up of probable Fifth Columnists he was interned. Within a short time he

whined, said he repented his folly and asked for release. In spite of every opposition he was released in July 1943, but on conditions. These he respected, more or less, and in January was permitted to restart publication of *El Bilad*. Censorship prevented a good deal, but the cloven-hoof showed occasionally and called forth reprimands. As soon as the war ended and the internment camp was cleared, he came forth with all his old-time venom. Recently, for reasons at present unknown, he suddenly removed himself to Egypt whence he wrote saying that he intended to take up permanent residence in that country. His wife sold up the house and furniture and has joined him. He still owns *El Bilad* although he has for the moment leased it at a monthly rental of ID. 25 or ID. 30.

Butti is probably the most capable of the Iraqi journalists and is curiously fearless in his comments. Since he first came to notice he has been bitterly anti-British and anti any Government or Politician whom he considers to be in any way favourable to Britain or British policy. It has been suggested that this is a phobia the result of extreme disappointment at not obtaining preferment as a Christian on the occupation by British forces. This has been observed, although in a lesser degree, in other Christians—particularly of Mosul—of about his age.

The real reason for his presence in Egypt is as yet unknown, but it has been suggested that it is not unconnected with Iraqi interests in the Arab League.

It is probable that he could be induced to support any policy for a consideration.

100. Rashid Ali-al-Gilani

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1892. A distant relation of the Naqib. In Turkish times was a clerk in the Waqf Department. Fled to Mosul with the Turks on the capture of Bagdad, and after the fall of Mosul practised as a lawyer. In May 1921 he was appointed a judge in the Court of Appeal. His work as a judge won him the good opinion of his advisers. Was appointed Minister of Justice in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Resigned over the signing of the Turkish Petroleum Company's Concession in March 1925, which, at Yasin Pasha's instigation, he strongly opposed. Became Minister of Interior in the second Saduniyah Cabinet in June 1925, but resigned almost immediately on being elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. From November 1926 to January 1928 was Minister of the Interior. Re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies in the general election of 1930, but resigned his seat in March 1931, in company with Yasin-al-Hashimi, Naji-al-Suwaidi and Ali Jaudat, as a protest against the conduct of Nuri Pasha's Government. Became a prominent leader of the Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani (the party of National Brotherhood). He encouraged the general strike in July 1931, hoping thereby to embarrass Nuri Pasha's Cabinet. Appointed chief private secretary to the King in July 1932. Became Prime Minister in March 1933. Resigned October 1933. Appointed Senator in summer of 1934. Helped to organise the disturbances on the Euphrates which forced Ali Jaudat to resign in March 1935 and, as Minister for the Interior, joined the Cabinet then formed by Yasin-al-Hashimi.

After Bakr Sidqi's military revolt against the Hashimite Cabinet in October 1936, Rashid Ali fled to Constantinople. He came back in October 1937.

During 1938 he made several speeches in the Senate attacking the policy of Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet.

Deported to Anah December 1938. Returned a few days later when Nuri-al-Said succeeded Jamil-al-Madfa'i as Prime Minister. Appointed chief private secretary to the Palace in January 1939, and remained in this post after King Ghazi's death in April 1939. Became Prime Minister in March 1940.

Throughout 1940 he moved steadily towards a break with His Majesty's Government and a closer

understanding with the Axis. He refused to break off diplomatic relations with Italy when Italy entered the war, but remained in the closest personal contact with the Italian Legation. He also gave full support to the Mufti's intrigues with the Axis Governments and sponsored the overtures which Naji Shawkat made to the German Minister at Angora in October 1940. In Iraq he gave free rein to the Palestinian agitators and to the pro-Nazi elements of the Press, even allowing it to be stated officially that the policy of his Government was one of strict neutrality in the war in spite of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance. Pressure from the embassy forced his resignation at the end of January 1941, but he returned to office by means of a military *coup d'Etat* on the 1st April. He then set aside the Regent and installed Sharif Sharaf in his place. At this juncture, as part of their war plan, His Majesty's Government began to move troops into Iraq, but Rashid Ali, backed by the army, refused to agree to the presence of more than one brigade.

At the beginning of May the Iraqi army attempted to surround the British air base at Habbaniyah and hostilities broke out. Throughout the month Rashid Ali and his colleagues endeavoured to unite the country in a campaign against us, but, though the townspeople were with him, he received little support from the big tribes and fled to Persia after a comparatively small British column had defeated the far larger Iraqi forces opposed to them. From Persia he contrived to make his way to Turkey, and in December, having broken his parole, he escaped to Germany and joined the Mufti in Berlin, where he became a feature of the Berlin Arabic broadcast. Tried in *absentia* by court martial and sentenced to death in January 1942.

Throughout the years 1942-44 he continued to conduct an active campaign against Great Britain from Berlin and Rome and was recognised by the Axis as the legitimate Prime Minister of Iraq. It is now known that the struggle for predominance between him and the Mufti led to a split in the ranks of the Arab traitors. When in London the Regent reiterated his determination that when caught he would be executed.

When the Germans realised that the end was near they offered to fly him to Egypt. He said he preferred Saudi Arabia but the Germans said they could not fly him so far. He therefore was taken through the German lines in a car and went to the Tyrol, thence through Austria to Prague where two Syrian friends gave him a passport. Apparently with the unwitting assistance of American, British and French military transport he finally arrived at Marseilles and thence sailed to Beirut. On the morning of the 24th September, 1945, he arrived in Riyadh in disguise. When he declared himself Ibn Saud gave him asylum. This at once precipitated a crisis in Saudi-Iraqi relations and there were many acrimonious and futile interchanges between Ibn Saud and the Regent. The Prime Minister, Hamdi Pachachi, insisted on regarding it as a personal matter and not a political one involving the two countries. The Regent was finally persuaded to accept this view and seems now overtly reconciled to Rashid Ali's continued presence in Riyadh. Covertly, however, there is no doubt that he harbours this additional grudge against Ibn Saud.

101. Rashid-al-Khojah

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1884. Staff officer in Turkish army. Came to Damascus after the armistice. Prominent member of the Ahd-al-Iraqi. He returned to Bagdad in November 1920 and was appointed mutessarif in January 1921. He is weak and much under the thumb of the extreme National group. In February 1922 he was appointed mutessarif of Mosul, where he was completely under the influence of Mustafa Sabunji. As his presence in a frontier division was considered inexpedient by the Iraqi Government, he was removed and reappointed

mutessarif of Bagdad. Appointed Iraqi Consul-General at Cairo October 1928, and Director-General of Education January 1930. Consul-General, Beirut, August 1931. Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General at Jedda, August 1933, but did not take up post. Appointed Minister for Defence under Naji Shawkat, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Shawkat's Cabinet in March 1933. Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies November 1933 after resignation of Jamil-al-Madfa'i. Reappointed Minister of Defence in February 1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in August 1934. Re-elected President of the Chamber in December 1934. Again appointed Minister for Defence in Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in March 1935, but resigned with the whole Cabinet after being only twelve days in office. Elected to the Chamber in August 1935 and joined the Opposition led by Jamil-al-Madfa'i. Appointed principal private secretary in the Palace in September 1937.

Appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet in January 1939.

Placed on pension in the autumn of 1941.

102. Rauf-al-Bahrani

A Shiah of Bagdad, born about 1897. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School and was appointed to a clerical post in the Ministry of Finance, where he rose to be Accountant-General (not altogether by merit). Appointed Minister for Finance in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in March 1935.

Resigned October 1936.

Appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise, January 1938. Became Minister of Finance in February 1940 and of Social Affairs in March.

Resigned with Rashid Ali and his Cabinet in January 1941 and joined Rashid Ali's rebel Government in April 1941. Fled to Tehran when British troops approached Bagdad towards the end of May 1941 and was arrested by the British forces which occupied Persia in August. After a period of detention at Ahwaz he was sent to Southern Rhodesia in December 1941 to be interned. Sent back for trial in March 1944 and in August 1944 condemned to three years' hard labour and sequestration of all his property.

103. Rauf-al-Chadirchi

Sunni of Bagdad. He was Mayor of Bagdad at the time of the cutting of New Street and earned a great deal of personal unpopularity thereby. Left for Berlin shortly before the occupation, and subsequently went to Switzerland, returning to Bagdad in the summer of 1920, up to which time permission to return had been refused him. Speaks French, English and German well. He set up practice as a barrister and consorted much with British officials. He took no part in the Nationalist agitation; nevertheless, when his father was deported to Constantinople in August, he was asked to return with him. He came back in 1921 and resumed his legal work without taking any part in politics. He has most of the business of foreign firms in his hands owing to his knowledge of English. He was in England on a visit during the summer of 1923, returning home in September. A retiring man of modernist opinions. Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly in March 1924. He was strongly opposed to the passage of the treaty without amendments and voted against it. Chosen director of the Law School August 1924. Minister of Finance, Second Saduniyah Cabinet, and afterwards became Minister of Justice in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet in November 1926. Iraqi Minister to Angora autumn 1929. Resigned post as Minister at Angora in December 1930, and returned to Bagdad as legal adviser to the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Appointed Iraqi Minister in London in December 1936, and proceeded to his post early in 1937.

Resigned March 1940 and remained in England, where he has a well-paid post with the Iraq Petroleum Company.

A cultured, likeable and intelligent man.

104. Rauf-al-Kubaisi

Sunni; of Kubaisah origin. Born 1885. He was commandant of gendarmerie in Aleppo under Jafar Pasha in 1919 and did useful work in keeping order before the advent of the French in July 1920. Refused office under the French and returned to Bagdad in February 1921. He was appointed Kaimakam of Suq in November 1921, but was removed in June. He then for a time joined the extreme Nationalist group in Bagdad. Appointed Director-General of Prisons in 1924 and subsequently played no part in politics. Appointed Mutessarif of Basra January 1930. Dismissed for incompetence, April 1931. Appointed Director-General of Auqaf in summer of 1933, and Director-General of Census in November 1937.

Mutessarif of Bagdad November 1938, and Director-General of Auqaf April 1939. Resigned June 1940.

Reappointed Director-General of Auqaf in November 1941 by Nuri Said.

105. Razzuq Ghannam

Doyen of Bagdad journalists. Owner of *Al Iraq*. A Christian. Pro-British; backer of Nuri Said. He is a Deputy for Bagdad. At one time he employed Rafi al Butti, but soon fired him when he realised his true feelings. Pan-Arabist. According to a speech he made while a Deputy, he had no time for those who supported the merchants and landowners at the expense of the people. "Parliaments were not collected for the protection of the profiteers and opportunists." Invited to visit Britain as one of the delegation of Iraq journalists, autumn 1945, but refused on the grounds of ill-health. He holds rather woolly views on political theory, but is sincere and means well. Speaks good English. Recently his newspaper has been losing ground. It comes out only two or three times a week and circulation is said to be only about 300. He apparently does not depend on his journalism for a living as he has a large house and his daughters, who are progressive and modern, take a prominent part in the social life of Bagdad.

106. Sa'ad Salih, C.B.E.

Shia. Born about 1898. Of a poor family from Najaf. Kurdish grandfather. He was one of the young Shias chosen by King Faisal I to study at the Law College (where he graduated in 1927) prior to receiving an administrative appointment. Served as Deputy in the early thirties and was posted to Diwaniya as administrative inspector in 1936. Appointed Mutassarif of Kut 1940 and thereafter of Basra, Hillah, Dulaim and Amara. During the 1941 rebellion kept his Mutassarifiyah (Kut) free from trouble. Bitter enemy of Saleh Jabr, who displaced him from Amara (Sa'ad Salih had annoyed him whilst at Hillah). Deputy for Diwaniya since 1944. An efficient administrator, he is less biased than many Shias, and his name is comparatively free of any hint of corruption. An able writer and impressive speaker. In December 1945 he led the attack in the Majlis on the Pachachi Cabinet which finally brought about its fall. Minister of the Interior in the succeeding (Suweidi) Cabinet. Created C.B.E., for war services, in 1946.

107. Sabih Najib

Born 1892. Gazetted to the Turkish army in 1912. Joined Iraqi army 1921, and reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel 1929. Passed a staff course in England, and for some time was Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College in Bagdad. Speaks English and French and some German. Appointed Director-

General of Police in March 1931. Represented Iraq on the Syrio-Iraq Frontier Delimitation Commission in 1933. Appointed counsellor, Berlin, June 1935. Transferred to Geneva as Iraqi delegate to the League of Nations in November 1935.

He was appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in December 1937, with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary.

Made Minister for Defence in October 1938. Resigned with the whole Jamil-al-Madfa'i Cabinet the 25th December, 1938.

Tried by court-martial in February 1940 for being an accessory to the murder of Rustam Haidar, Minister of Finance. Acquitted on this charge and sentenced to one year's imprisonment for having used insulting language when speaking of the Government at a semi-public gathering. Was pardoned by the Regent after serving only a few weeks of his sentence.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in December 1941.

Relieved of his appointment in February 1943 and now seems to be living on his pension in Turkey. Was retired from the service in August 1944.

108. Sadiq-al-Bassam

Shiah of Bagdad. Born 1895. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School, and for several years practised as a lawyer. Deputy for Kut 1930-34. In the Chamber he gave steady support to Yasin Pasha, and was a member of the Ikha-al-Watani party. In June 1935, as a reward for his political services, he was appointed Director-General of Government Lands and Properties in the Ministry of Finance, and became Minister of Education in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in September 1935. Resigned in October 1936.

Elected Deputy for Kut December 1937 and for Bagdad in June 1939. Became Minister of Economics in September 1939. Joined the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in March 1940 as Minister of Education.

Resigned with the whole Cabinet in January 1941. Throughout the disturbances of 1941 he remained inactive and was made Minister of Justice in Nuri Said's Cabinet in October 1941.

Resigned February 1942.

Appointed an unofficial member of the Board of Education in April 1943.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in December 1943. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Said's Cabinet in June 1944.

109. Said Haqqi

Born 1883. A Kurd from Sulaimaniyah and a former Turkish army officer, commissioned from the Constantinople Military School in 1903. He joined the Iraqi army on its formation and became at one time Director of Administration in the Ministry of Defence. He reached the rank of colonel, resigning from the army as a result of a disagreement with Taha Pasha al Hashimi, then Chief of General Staff. He has subsequently held posts as Director-General Jails, Director of Civil Aviation and finally Keeper of the Privy Purse at the Palace. He leads a quiet life and politically and socially is almost unknown. Appears friendly disposed to the British, but speaks no English.

Became Minister of Defence in the al Umari Cabinet of June 1946 while retaining his post as Keeper of the Privy Purse.

110. Salih Saib, al Farig

Has served as chief of the Iraqi army General Staff since 1944. He began his military career in 1916, when he was commissioned an infantry officer. He became instructor in the army's small arms school in 1921 and later pursued staff college work in both England and Iraq. Following a period of inactive service during which he served as assistant

director-general of the Iraqi State Railways, he was recalled to active service, became a Zaim in 1940 and al Liwa three years later. In August 1944 he was appointed commanding officer of the First Division of the Iraqi army. His promotion to the rank of al Fariq took place in November 1945.

A stupid man and basically anti-British. He is nevertheless popular in the army, but not with the Regent, who would like to see him go, if only because he was a member of Bekr Sidqi's staff. He attended the Victory celebrations in London in 1946 and came back slightly more reconciled to the British, though full of complaints about his accommodation. So long as he is Chief of Staff, he will be a potential danger to Britain and to the ruling House. Speaks good English.

111. *Salman-al-Barrak*

Shiah and a tribal notable of Hillah, Minister of Irrigation and Agriculture 1928-29. Has been in the Chamber of Deputies for many years and has frequently held position of Vice-President.

Appointed Minister of Economics in November 1942.

Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1943, but returned to the Cabinet as Minister of Economics at the end of the same month. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

112. *Salman-al-Shaikh Daud*

Sunni. Born Bagdad about 1900. Son of Sheikh Ahmad-al-Sheikh Daud (q.v.).

A lawyer with a large practice and a forceful personality. Given to women and drink, but a staunch supporter of democracy. He was the first person of note in Iraq who openly and independently attacked the Axis in speeches and press articles.

Elected a Deputy in October 1943 and was prominent in debates as a critic of Nuri Pasha's Government. Arab News Agency representative, for which he is very well paid. Visited Britain as a member of the Iraqi journalists' delegation, autumn 1945.

Wealthy, generous and good company, but a light-weight politically. Speaks French, but almost no English.

113. *Salih Jabr, K.B.E.*

Shiah lawyer of Najaf, born about 1890. Employed for some time as a judge. Elected Deputy February 1930 and resigned from the bench. Acquired notoriety in the Chamber as a persistent asker of questions and ready speaker. Appointed Minister for Education under Jamil Madfai November 1933. Resigned February 1934. Elected Deputy for Muntafiq December 1934. Appointed Mutassarif of Karbala in April 1935, where he proved successful. In October 1936 he accepted the portfolio of Justice in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet. Resigned in June over the Euphrates disturbances and went away for several months. He returned when Jamil-al-Madfai formed a Cabinet and was appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise.

Became Minister for Education in Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1938. Elected for Diwanayah June 1939. Minister for Social Affairs in February 1940. Resigned in March 1940.

Appointed Mutassarif of Basra in June 1940. Supported the Regent when His Royal Highness fled to Basra in April 1941 to escape from Rashid Ali and the "Golden Square." For this he was arrested and narrowly escaped a heavy sentence. He was in the end released on condition that he left the country. He withdrew to Tehran and returned in June 1941 after the fall of Rashid Ali. Appointed Minister of Interior and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Nuri Said in October 1941.

Appointed Minister of Finance in October 1942 with the special task of finding solutions for the country's economic difficulties.

Did not come up to expectations and in June 1943 he was returned to the Interior. Resigned from the Cabinet in October 1943.

Joined the Cabinet of Hamdi-al-Pachachi as Minister of Finance in June 1944. Took on portfolio of Defence in August 1944 when Tahsin Ali refused to dismiss senile officers as part of the scheme for reorganising the army, but in the reshuffled Cabinet he took up Supplies, only to hand them over in December 1944, and return to Finance. During the absence of Hamdi Pachachi, the Premier, he acted for him. When the Pachachi Cabinet fell it was expected that Saleh Jabr, who was one of the Ministers who accompanied the Regent to the Amman Conference, might become the first Shia Prime Minister. He was not chosen, however. He spent much of the summer of 1946 in England, where he had gone for treatment for an arm which had been broken in a motor accident on his return from Amman.

He is undoubtedly the leading Shia statesman and has shown himself to be a good friend of Britain, though a hard bargainer for the interests of his country. Unfortunately, Shia opinion is by no means all behind him, particularly the tribes from the Middle Euphrates. This is largely due to his wife, who is a strong-minded tribal woman of Hillah who causes her husband and others much trouble by interfering in politics.

Created K.B.E., for war services, in 1946.

114. *Sami Fettah*

Has been in command of the Royal Iraqi Air Force since June 1941. He is a graduate of the Higher Teachers' Training College (1922) and served several years as an instructor in Iraq schools. Turning to a military career in 1925, he attended the Military College at Bagdad and later studied at Sandhurst in England. Shortly after his appointment as a second lieutenant in the Iraqi army in 1928 he became air-minded, joining the Iraqi air force and later training with R.A.F. units in England. In 1932 he flew an Iraqi air force plane from England to Iraq. He joined the Iraq Staff School and graduated from it in 1937.

He has shown himself determined to clean up the R.I.A.F. and to prevent its dabbling in politics, and in this he has had considerable success. During the summer of 1946 he was in London where he attended the Victory celebrations and also visited a number of aircraft factories.

115. *Sami Shaukat*

Born Bagdad 1893. Sunni. Brother of Naj Shaukat. Graduated at Military College of Medicine, Constantinople, 1916. Joined the Arab army in Syria in 1919. Appointed to Iraqi Health Service 1921 and subsequently served for several years as Director-General of Education. Became Director-General of Public Health in 1936. An ardent Arab Nationalist.

Appointed Director-General of Education in March 1939. He did much to increase military education in the secondary schools. Became the first Minister for Social Affairs in September 1939 and Minister for Education in February 1940. Resigned in March with whole Cabinet and was reappointed Director-General of Education in April 1940.

Retained his position throughout the disturbances of 1941 and survived subsequent changes. Is believed by many to have had pro-German leanings, but he himself stoutly denied these allegations. However this may be, he has done little himself to eradicate pro-Nazi sentiment from the Iraqi education system.

Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs and Health in January 1943.

Resigned and started the newspaper *Baath al*

Qawmi ("National Resurrection") in the autumn of 1945. It was extremely nationalistic, anti-Communist and anti-British. In tone it somewhat resembled *Dio Stürmer*. Fortunately it kept falling foul of the Government and was suspended for a year in the summer of 1946. Since then little or nothing has been heard from Shaukat and his followers.

Speaks Arabic and Turkish but no English. A buffoon, but potentially dangerous through his influence on young fanatics.

116. *Selim Terzi, O.B.E.*

Born Bagdad 1899. Jew. Educated at the Alliance School, Bagdad, he entered the Posts and Telegraphs Department and has remained there until he became acting Director-General. Presumably his religion has prevented his permanent promotion, as twice or thrice completely unfitted incumbents have held the post, e.g., an eye specialist, London-trained, and an unwanted official from the Royal Bilt.

Like most Jews in Iraq he has never been involved in any form of politics, nor has he expressed any strong political convictions. Is a quiet, decent and capable man and co-operated wholeheartedly with the British forces (for which he was made an O.B.E. in 1946). It was the Government policy that this should be, but he added the personal touch which made the co-operation successful.

He and his wife speak good English.

117. *Shakir-al-Na'ama*

Editor and owner of *Al Thaghr*, a Basra paper. A quiet intelligent man with no liking for the Iraqi methods of administering the supply situation and its attendant corruption. He was, in 1943, involved in a little trouble with the Mutassarif of the Basra Liwa for publishing articles in his paper criticising the local supply distribution methods. He was told to cease such publications but he asked for such instructions in writing—presumably he would have taken the matter further. The instructions in writing were not forthcoming, but from that time he has been the subject of persecution by the Mutassarif. A good friend of Britain. Visited Britain as a member of the Iraqi journalists' delegation, autumn 1945, and wrote several glowing articles for his newspaper, *Al Thaghr*, the only regular daily newspaper in the south, has always been pro-British. He speaks good English.

118. *Shakir-al-Wadi, M.V.O.*

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1894. Brother of Jamil-al-Wadi (q.v.). Served as an officer in the Turkish army from 1915 to the armistice. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Captain 1928. In 1929 he was attached for training to various units in England, and in 1930 he was promoted major and made aide-de-camp to King Feisal. He was on King Feisal's staff during His Majesty's State visit to England in 1933. Promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1935 and attended the Staff College course. Returned to Iraq 1936 and was appointed G.S.O. 1 in the Kirkuk Division, of which Bakr Sidqi was the G.O.C. He was right-hand man to Bakr in the military revolt of October 1936. He is intelligent, capable and ambitious. After Bakr Sidqi's murder in August 1937 he was appointed military attaché in London, but a few weeks later he was dismissed and placed on the retired list.

Banished from Bagdad in December 1938 for intrigues against Jamil-al-Madfai's Government, but permitted to return in January 1939 after Nuri-al-Said had formed a Government. Appointed to the Iraqi diplomatic service in June 1939 as second secretary to the Iraqi Legation, Tehran.

At first he seems to have done well and kept in close touch with His Majesty's Legation. Later on, however, he seems to have yielded to the blandishments and bribes of the German Legation and, as

chargé d'affaires during April and May 1941, he dutifully carried out instructions sent to him by Rashid Ali's Government. Daud Haidari, who was appointed minister at Tehran in June 1941, was asked to keep a close watch on Shakir.

Appointed consul at Jerusalem in November 1941. Transferred to London in October 1944 as first secretary in order to take charge of the Iraqi Legation during Daud-al-Haidari's absence in Iraq.

Return to Bagdad in October 1946 to become Master of Ceremonies at the Palace.

119. *Dr. Shawkat al Zahawi*

A Kurd, born in 1898, son of a Turkish army officer by the name of Colonel Abdul Hakim al Zahawi. Educated in Bagdad and Istanbul. In the latter place joined the Military Medical College, and graduated about 1919. He returned to Iraq, and in 1922 joined the Iraqi Health Service. For some time worked as assistant to Dr. Mills; specialises in pathology, has produced several articles on that branch of medicine, and also lectures in the Medical College. He is a cousin of Khalid al Zahawi, Iraqi Minister to Afghanistan, and is related also to the late Jamil Sidqi al Zahawi, famous Iraqi poet. He is married to a daughter of the late Mohammed Fadhil Pasha al Daghistani, and through this marriage therefore has connexions with Hikmet Sulaiman and Najib al Rawi.

Appointed Minister of Social Affairs in April 1946 but resigned with the rest of Tawfiq Suweidi's Cabinet a month later.

120. *Sufuq-al-Ajl*

Of the Shammar Jarba tribe. Born about 1910. Educated Beirut University. Once spoke English well, but is forgetting it. Eldest son of Sheikh Ajil-al-Yawar, who became paramount sheikh of the Shammar in Iraq in the early nineteen twenties and died in November 1940. Ajil acquired much money from his relations with the B.O.D. Company and from supplying labour to the railways when the line was extended from Bagdad to Mosul. Sufuq inherited this wealth.

Sufuq's younger brother, Ahmed (born about 1923), is said to have the stronger character and may become influential when he grows a little older.

During the autumn of 1941 some of Sufuq's cousins, led by Mishan-al-Faisal, showed dissatisfaction with Sufuq's leadership, but the quarrel was patched up and the family now accept Sufuq's leadership.

In 1942 he obtained a number of contracts from the British military authorities which increased undesirably Shammar influence. Steps were therefore taken to curtail the number of contracts assigned to him and to check Shammar arrogance. By the middle of 1943 the situation had improved and Sufuq and his subordinate tribal leaders had become more amenable.

In early 1944 he had a serious quarrel with his younger brother Ahmed about the division of their inheritance from their father Ajil. A settlement was made in May, but its terms were so ambiguous that it is not likely to endure for long. An attempt was made to murder him in June 1944 by putting locust bait in his food. His brother Ahmed was suspected of being the author of the plot and while Sufuq was convalescing in Palestine he increased his prestige with the tribe by issuing free the Shaikh's reserves of corn, ghee and sugar to grateful tribesmen. Ahmed has lost no opportunity to undermine Sheikh Sufuq's influence. Flashy, engaging and plausible, he has made himself acceptable to authority, more especially the Regent. Sufuq, who is flabby, selfish and incapable, has with his persecution complex proved a sore trial to the Mosul authorities, who have attempted to sort out his quarrel with Ahmed over the inheritance. Sufuq was detained in August 1945 with the rest of the Shammar Shaikhs in Mosul.

for failing to assist the Government effectively to control his tribesmen near the Syrian frontier.

Of the younger brothers, Mish'al, though only 19, is steadier than either Sufuq or Ahmed.

Sufuq was again arrested in August 1946 for aggression against the Alu Muteiwi.

121. Tahsin al Askari

Sunni. Born 1892. Fought with the Arab forces under the Amir Faisal 1916-18 and later appointed Governor of Aleppo. Returned to Iraq at the end of 1920 and was appointed to the police with the rank of commandant. Became Kaimakam of Samawa in 1927 and Mutassarif of Kirkuk in 1930; a year later he was transferred to Mosul, where he remained until 1935 when he became Director-General of Irrigation. When his brother Jafar al-Askari was murdered by officers of Bakr Sidqi's staff at the time of the latter's coup d'Etat in October 1936 he left the country on three months' leave with Jafar's widow and later resumed his post at Irrigation. In May 1940 he was appointed counsellor in the Iraqi Legation in Cairo and became minister in October 1941. In October 1942 he was recalled by his brother-in-law Nuri Said to become Minister of the Interior.

He is devoted to the Pan-Arab cause but at the same time well disposed towards Great Britain and the Anglo-Iraqi Alliance.

Transferred to the Ministry of Communications and Works in June 1943, and acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in November 1943. He resigned with the whole Cabinet in December 1943, and was appointed minister at Cairo.

His wife is a sister of those of Ibrahim Kemal K. Mudhahafar Ahmed (q.v.). His son, Keusan, rose to the rank of lieutenant in the Royal Navy—a unique achievement for an Arab.

122. Taha-al-Hashimi

Brother of the late Yasin-el-Hashimi. Born 1888. Served in Turkish army and was employed in Arabia and the Yemen during the war. Was given a post on the Turkish General Staff in Constantinople in 1920, but returned to Bagdad in 1922 to join the Iraqi army, and was at once appointed Officer Commanding Troops in Mosul. Appointed Chief of the General Staff and came to Bagdad in 1923. Was attached to Sir Percy Cox in May 1924 for the boundary negotiations with the Turkish Government which followed the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. The post of Chief of the General Staff was abolished shortly after his return in August 1924, and for a while he acted as tutor to the (then) Crown Prince Ghazi. Appointed Chief of the Census Department in 1926 and Director of Education in 1928. In 1930 he returned as Chief of the General Staff to the Ministry of Defence, and was promoted *faris* (general). In 1931 he visited the Imam Yahya of the Yemen and concluded a treaty of friendship between the Yemen and Iraq.

In September 1935 he was appointed Acting Director-General of Education in addition to his other duties.

He was in Angora in October 1936 when Hikmat Sulaiman and Bakr Sidqi forced Yasin-al-Hashimi to resign and wisely did not return to Iraq. He came back in September 1937 and was offered the post of Director-General of Works. He refused this offer on the ground that it was beneath his dignity to accept any position lower than that of Chief of the General Staff.

Elected Deputy for Bagdad in December 1937. Opposed Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in the Chamber. Worked actively on the committee of the Palestine Defence League in 1938. On the 25th December, 1938, in collaboration with General Husain Fauzi, he organised a military demonstration against Jamil-al-Madfai's Government, and became Minister for Defence in the Cabinet which Nuri-al-Said formed

when Jamil-al-Madfai resigned. Became a Deputy for Bagdad in the elections of June 1939. Retained the portfolio of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in February 1940.

Resigned in January 1941 with most of the members of Rashid Ali's Cabinet and on the 1st February succeeded the latter as Prime Minister. On assuming office he feebly attempted to break the power of the military clique which during 1940 he and Rashid Ali had allowed to dominate not only the army but the Cabinet. They defied him and overthrew him and his Cabinet after it had enjoyed office for only two months. Taha Pasha thereupon went to Turkey, where he remained throughout Rashid Ali's rebel régime. When the Regent had been restored Taha Pasha wished to return to Iraq, but Nuri Said (the Prime Minister) did not want him and it was arranged that a transit visa through Syria should be refused.

He was still in Turkey in May 1944.

123. Tahsin Ali

A Sunni Moslem born in Bagdad in 1890. Educated in Bagdad and Istanbul. Participated in the Balkan War, fought against the British at Basra, and after the fall of Bagdad joined King Hussain of the Hejaz. Fought under Faisal and was a brigade commander in the Arab army at Aleppo. Was awarded the M.C. Returned to Bagdad with Faisal and became Secretary to the Defence Ministry. Commandant of Police in Mosul in 1922, he was removed because of his connexions with the Sabunchi faction and transferred to the Dulaim area in 1925. Between 1927 and 1938 held a number of administrative posts, including those of Mutassarif of Mosul and Basra. Director-General of the P.W.D. in 1938. Was largely connected with the activities of the local Palestine Defence Committee while in Basra. Became Mutassarif of Mosul again in April 1939, but was removed by Rashid Ali after his coup d'Etat in May. Was restored when the Madfai Cabinet was formed in June.

Not particularly clever, and apt to be pig-headed. In Mosul he was too much under local influence and showed a strong prejudice against the Yazidis. He was slow to take action against Nazi sympathisers and favoured a policy of "appeasement." Appointed Minister of Education in the Cabinet formed by Nuri Said in October 1941.

Transferred to the Palace as Rais of the Royal Diwan in June 1943. Became Minister of Defence in the Cabinet of Hamdi-al-Pachachi in June 1944, where he proved obstructive to the reorganisation of the army. Transferred to Works and Communications in August 1944 and finally dropped from the Cabinet altogether at the end of that month.

124. Tahsin Qadri, K.C.V.O.

Sunni of Damascus. Born 1893. Was with Feisal in Damascus and accompanied him to Europe in July 1920. Came with him to Bagdad in June 1921, and was appointed an A.D.C. to the King in August. Married the daughter and heiress of Abdul Wahhab Pasha Qartas of Basra. Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the Palace March 1932. Accompanied King Feisal on his State visit to England in 1938 and received the K.C.V.O.

In June 1936 he was compelled to resign from the Palace on account of the scandal of the marriage of Princess Azzah. He was later appointed counsellor to the Iraqi Legation in Tehran and took up his post in November 1936. Appointed consul-general at Bombay in December 1937. Speaks English and French. Pleasant and clever.

Appointed Director of Ceremonies in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in February 1939. Became consul-general in Beirut in July 1939.

In May 1941, like all Iraqi consuls, he seems to have carried out his orders from Rashid Ali without protest and his behaviour was strongly criticised by the British authorities.

In September 1943 he was appointed chargé d'affaires at Damascus, when the Iraqi Government recognised the new Syrian Government. On the 27th January, 1944, he was accredited as first Iraqi Minister to Syria and the Lebanon to reside at Beirut, where he has been active in Arab Unity affairs, at the same time maintaining close touch with His Majesty's Minister. Recalled early in 1945 and appointed Acting Director-General for Foreign Affairs in the absence of Fadhil-el-Jamali at San Francisco. Appointed minister in Tehran, June 1945, but in September was still in the Lebanon.

In 1946 appointed Iraqi Minister to Paris.

125. Talib Mushtaq

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1900. Father was minor official. Took part in the anti-mandate agitation of 1922 and in the spring of 1923 was one of those responsible for anti-British posters issued over the signature of the Supreme Committee of Iraq Secret Societies. Appointed Inspector of Schools in 1924 and held a variety of appointments under the Ministry of Education until November 1931, when he was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Angora. Appointed Director of the Consular Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in November 1935. Appointed consul-general at Beirut in August 1937.

Withdrawn and dismissed from the service in February 1938. He remained for a time in Syria, but returned to Bagdad when Nuri-al-Said formed a Cabinet in December 1938. Appointed Accountant-General in January 1939 and Director-General of Propaganda, Publicity and Broadcasting in May 1939. Became consul-general in Jerusalem May 1940.

During May 1941 he carried on an anti-British propaganda campaign and zealously supported Rashid Ali's rebel Government. He was recalled in June and subsequently interned.

He was appointed manager of the Bagdad branch of the Arab Bank in 1945, in which capacity he sought, vainly, for embassy co-operation.

126. Taufiq-al-Suwaidi

Born 1889. Studied law in Bagdad and Constantinople and international law in Paris. In 1913 became first interpreter to the Ministry of Education, Constantinople. Represented Iraq at the Arab Conference held in Paris in July 1918. After the armistice went to Syria and was appointed judge in Damascus. Returned to Bagdad in October 1921 and in November was appointed Assistant Government Counsellor and Director of the Law School. Minister for Education January 1928. Prime Minister 1929. President of the Chamber 1929. Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1931. Joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in July 1934 as Minister for Foreign Affairs, but resigned with the whole Cabinet in August. Held Cabinet office for twelve days as Minister for Justice in Jamil-al-Madfai's short-lived Cabinet in March 1935 and in October was appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts. He became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1937, and headed the Iraqi delegation to the League of Nations in September. There he handled the Assyrian and Palestinian questions with tact and moderation.

Again represented Iraq at the League of Nations in the autumn of 1938, and afterwards visited London as the guest of His Majesty's Government. There he had conversations with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and with the Secretary of State for the Colonies about Palestine.

Resigned with the whole of Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet on the 25th December, 1938, as the result of a military demonstration made against them. Represented Iraq at the London conversations on Palestine in 1939 after Nuri-al-Said had returned to Iraq.

Joined Taha-al-Hashimi's Cabinet in February 1941 as Minister for Foreign Affairs and did what he could to break up the military clique which during 1940 had established a stranglehold over the Government. Was forced out of office by Rashid Ali's coup d'Etat of April 1941. Tried to join the Regent at Basra, but failed. He took no part in the events of May and would have been asked to join Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in October 1941 if the fact that his brother Naji had been summoned to stand his trial for treason had not made it difficult to include him.

He is aggrieved that he has not been appointed to the Senate and blames Nuri Said for his exclusion. He is not well disposed towards the Regent. Nevertheless, an attempt was made to get him into the Cabinet in 1942, but was unsuccessful owing to the exaggerated conditions he sought to make.

In the summer of 1943 he reached an understanding with Ibrahim Kemal to co-operate in political matters. But by the end of the year he was reconciled to Nuri and joined the latter's 9th Cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister in December 1943. He was violently attacked both in Parliament and outside, and the legality of his office was called in question. Resigned in March 1944, when a High Court was appointed to consider the constitutional validity of the appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister. Went to San Francisco Conference. On his return appointed Chairman of the Economic Committee of the Arab League.

Became Prime Minister in February 1946. Resigned May 1946.

Is intelligent and very good company but sly as his nickname ("the red fox") shows.

127. Taufiq Wahbi Maroof, C.B.E.

Kurd, born Sulaimania 1887. Educated Sulaimania and Turkey. Graduated from Turkish Military College in 1904, and thereafter served in many military stations in European Turkey. During the war 1914-18, he held a regimental command, and later a staff appointment with the 13th Corps, commanded by General Ali Ihsan Pasha.

After the war he returned to Iraq, and entered the Iraqi army. He was appointed Military Adviser and Staff Officer to Shaikh Mahmud in Sulaimania in 1923, but left him when his attitude became pro-Turkish and his conduct impossible. He returned to Bagdad and re-entered the army, and with the rank of colonel became Commandant of the Military College, Bagdad. In 1929 he was sent on a course to the United Kingdom.

In April 1930 he was appointed as Mutassarif of Sulaimania, but lasted only until July, when as the result of election troubles he was removed.

For several years he remained unemployed, but ultimately obtained appointment to the post of Director-General of Surveys. After the conclusion of the operations against Rashid Ali, Taufiq Wahbi resigned from Government service, took pension and made a comfortable fortune as a contractor for the British forces.

In June 1944 he was appointed Minister of Economics in Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet, in which capacity he has toured the north to investigate possible relief and developments. It was largely owing to his initiative that the Director of the Sudan Forestry Service was engaged to prepare a comprehensive survey of the economic possibilities of forestry in Kurdistan. To the young Kurdish nationalists and hot-heads he pleads moderation and gradualism, but his influence on them is not effective.

Taufiq Wahbi is keenly interested in Kurdish culture, and has devoted much time to modernising the Kurdish language. He has given valuable help to the Information Department of the embassy in the production of propaganda in Kurdish.

A charming and cultivated man who speaks good English, Persian and Turkish. Created C.B.E. for war services, in 1946.

128. Thabit Abdul Nur

Born 1890. Son of Aziz Abdul Nur, a prominent Jacobite Christian of Mosul. He was christened Nikole. Was an officer in the Turkish army, embezzled money and fled to Syria to join Shereefian cause. At this time he changed his name to Thabit, became a Moslem and performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. Came to Bagdad in November 1921 and became prominent in extreme Nationalist politics. Elected Deputy for Mosul in general election of 1930, and appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1931. The post was abolished in March 1933. Tried in 1932 for misappropriating the funds of the Agricultural Exhibition (April 1932), but acquitted.

Appointed counsellor in the Iraqi Legation in London December 1933. This post was abolished and he was appointed Iraqi Oil Representative in London in July 1934. Appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935. His post was abolished in November 1936, and he remained without employment until December 1937, when he was appointed to the Iraqi Diplomatic Service.

Early in 1938 he was appointed Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires at Jeddah. There he put forward a number of fantastic proposals to the Saudi Arabian Government for which he had been given no authority by the Iraqi Government. The Saudi Government soon detected the folly of his schemes and gave up taking him seriously. In December 1938 and January 1939 he was in Sanaa visiting the King of the Yemen.

He was on leave in Germany on the outbreak of war in September 1939 and chose to remain there rather than return to Iraq. It is believed that he helped in the preparation of Arabic broadcasts from Berlin.

He is now living in retirement at Lausanne and has shown no sign of wishing to return to Iraq.

129. Umar Nazmi

Kurd. Born Kifri 1893. Graduated at the Bagdad Law College 1913. Appointed Judge, Khaniqin 1913; Baqubah 1914; on the outbreak of the war joined the Reserve Officers' School and was named Public Prosecutor to the Military Court, Bagdad. Appointed Judge, Civil Courts, Kirkuk 1921; Arbil 1923; Kirkuk 1924; Vice-President, Civil Courts, Mosul 1924; Hillah 1925; President, Civil Courts, Diala; Mutesarrif of Kirkuk Liwa 1927; Mutesarrif of Kut and Basra Liwas; Administrative Inspector 1931; Mutesarrif of Mosul Liwa 1934.

Held other Government posts up to August 1937, when he was made to be Director-General of Revenues. Became a Minister of Economics and Communications in December 1938 in the Cabinet of Nuri-al-Said.

Made a Senator April 1939. Minister of Interior in September 1939 and Acting Minister of Justice in February 1940. Joined Rashid Ali's Cabinet in March 1940 as Minister of Communications and Works.

Resigned in January 1941 with most of his colleagues as protest against Rashid Ali's pro-Axis policy.

Since November 1941 he has been an active member of committees in the Senate.

Appointed Minister of the Interior in Nuri Said's Cabinet in December 1943. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Said's Cabinet in June 1944.

Minister of Justice in the Suweidi Cabinet of 1946. An amiable, unimpressive man.

130. Yahya Qassim

Age 30. Advocate; ex-Iraq State Railway employee. Is the editor and proprietor of *Al Sha'ab* newspaper. He is a Muslawi and is married to the daughter of Hamdi Effendi, the brother of the ex-chief of the general staff, Amin Zaki Suleiman. He is a prominent leader of a growing Socialist move-

ment. Secretary of "Biyout-al-Umma" (House of the Nation) Society. He was interested in the publishing of a secret Radical paper called *Al Sharara*, which ceased publication some time ago.

As a result of his political activities—including the distribution of pamphlets, for which he was arrested and released on bail—the Iraq State Railways Board dispensed with his services. Owing to his discharge from the railway directorate, which, while being an Iraqi Department, has a British director, he was somewhat embittered against the British. He is an active member of a group of advocates known to have advised the Railway Union to strike. He was for a time a member of Kamil Chadirchi's Democratic Party, but resigned following personal differences. He visited Britain with a party of journalists in autumn of 1945, and stayed on in Britain for several months. He was greatly impressed by what he saw, and had the courage to say so when he returned to Iraq. He has become more balanced and mature in the past year. He is personally very friendly with us and has not published any anti-British articles or comments for some time. He is outstanding among the young Socialists. His English is rapidly improving.

131. Yunis Bahri

Born about 1904. Of the Jubur tribe of Mosul. From his early days he has been well known for his unprincipled character and immoral private life. From 1923 to 1926 he held minor clerical posts in Government offices. In June 1926 he went on a journey round the world and was repatriated destitute from Paris after having served a term of imprisonment for a misdemeanour. Between 1929 and 1933 he travelled in Arab countries, including Tripoli, Tunis and the Hadhramaut, and also Java, India, Afghanistan and Iran. On his return to Iraq he took up journalism and gave his support to extreme nationalism. He also published a newspaper called *Al Uqab*. He was subsidised in 1935-36 to publish articles favouring the Italian conquest of Abyssinia and in 1936 he sold himself to the German Legation. In April 1939 he went to Berlin and soon afterwards became the announcer of the Berlin Arabic broadcast.

In this position he has been very successful, and his broadcasts were a powerful instrument of German propaganda.

In the spring of 1942 he "went off the air" and it is rumoured that he was put into an internment camp in Germany.

Broadcast from Berlin in connexion with the Lebanese crisis of November 1943.

In the autumn of 1946 he was living in Paris, under the name of B. Jabourij, and was in correspondence with former friends in Bagdad.

132. Yusif bin Saiyid Absullah el Gailani

Born Bagdad 1907. Muslim. Sunni. Educated Bagdad and at Balliol College, Oxford. After taking his degree he returned to Bagdad in 1934 and was appointed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Is now, October 1946, Director of the Political Section.

A quiet, well conducted gentleman. Has always been friendly. Has never been reported as being in any way concerned with politics.

Married to Masoodah, daughter of the late Asim al Gailani, who speaks some English and good French and appears, modestly, in mixed society.

133. Yusuf Ghanimah

An intelligent and hardworking Chaldean Catholic of Bagdad; born about 1890. Diminutive and unimpressive, he mixes freely with Moslems and was made Minister for Finance in January 1928, after having shown industry and ability as *rappporteur* of the Finance Committee of the Chamber. Has sat in Parliament for Bagdad since the first election.

Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, and then began to take part in the activities of the two Opposition parties, the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party) and the Hizb-al-Ikhs-al-Watani (the Party of National Brotherhood). Appointed Director-General of Revenues in the Ministry of Finance, December 1932, and Director-General of the Ministry in 1933. Became Minister for Finance in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935. Appointed Director-General of Finance in June 1935.

Appointed general manager of the Agricultural-Industrial Bank in December 1936.

Was made Director-General of Antiquities in November 1941. In July 1944 appointed Director-General of Supplies and President of Post War Planning Committee, and he became Minister of Supplies in November 1944, since when the country has settled down to accepting supply controls and

rationing has become more effective in reaching the consumer at the end of the supply line.

Speaks good French and fair English.

134. Yusuf Iz-al-Din

Sunni. Son of Ibrahim Pasha, a Kurd of Sulaimani. Born Bagdad 1891. Married to the daughter of Ali Agha of Sulaimani. Owns property in Bagdad, Amara and Sulaimani. Educated locally and entered the civil service in 1918. Graduated at the Law School in 1927. Became a finance inspector in 1928 and was promoted Assistant Director-General of Finance in 1930. Became Director-General of Land Settlement June 1934. Accountant-General June 1935. Appointed Minister of Education in Hikmat Sulaimani's Cabinet in October 1936. He resigned in July 1937 because of his dissatisfaction with the Cabinet's policy on the Euphrates and with Bakr Sidqi's influence over the Prime Minister.

Obituary since last report

Salahuddin Sabbagh (hanged).

Jafar Abu Timman.

Amin al Umari.

E 12399/226/93

No. 15

POLICY STATEMENT BY NURI PASHA

Sir H. Stonehewer-Bird to Mr. Attlee. (Received 24th December)

(No. 482)

Bagdad,

10th December, 1946

Sir,

Since the events recorded in my despatch No. 462 of 26th November there have been no political developments worthy of record, with the exception of the dropping by Nuri's Government of all the cases brought against newspaper editors by the Umari Administration. Various members of the Cabinet have made statements to newspapers; but for the most part they are the kind of pre-election platitude that was to be expected. Nuri Pasha, however, in a press conference on 4th December outlined a programme of considerable interest.

2. As regards internal policy, Nuri Pasha said that co-operation must be the keynote. Party government as it was known in some countries was not possible here, but co-operation as required and permitted by the actual conditions of the country was his policy. The Government's aim must be to improve social conditions, education and the economic state of the country, and to fulfil the already existing plans for reconstruction and development.

3. As regards external policy, the safety and interest of the country must come first. Iraq would align itself where its national interests were likely to be best served. A practical rather than an ideological and

imaginary attitude was essential. Neutrality was both impossible and unnatural. The war proved the truth of this: Russia had a non-aggression pact with Germany, nevertheless she was invaded. America, which had depended on isolationism and the Munroe Doctrine, was nevertheless drawn into the war. Therefore Iraq must ally herself with the Power or group of Powers that would most conduce to her safety. As for her general security, she would co-operate with other peace-loving nations with the object of establishing world peace.

4. The Pasha's views on internal politics are a restatement of the sensible, practical view which he has always held, namely, that it is desirable to establish and to promote democracy in Iraq, but that it must be Iraq's kind of democracy: an organic growth, rather than a mere imitation of democratic régimes made by and for other peoples. It must not, however, be supposed that all his countrymen take such a sensible view.

5. His remarks regarding neutrality are similarly a reflection of the view he has consistently held, that Iraq's interests lie with those of Great Britain. It is interesting and encouraging that he should have made so forthright a declaration of them

on the eve of an election. He gave a similar reply to a *questionnaire* he received from an Egyptian magazine which had been sent to eminent men throughout the Middle East asking for their views on neutrality. Here, too, I should be happier if Nuri's views obtained universal support.

6. When calling on the Regent on the 7th, I took the opportunity of saying how sensible and courageous I thought it was of Nuri Pasha to have made this declaration, because it showed what a practical, far-sighted statesman Nuri is. His Royal

Highness was clearly gratified at my remark. He said that Nuri would certainly be criticised by some people for having spoken as he did; but it was undoubtedly true that the responsible leaders of policy and opinion in this country were in agreement with him. I think His Royal Highness is a little optimistic in a country where the rule still is each man for himself.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to the British Middle East Office, Cairo.

I am, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER BIRD

POLICY STATEMENT BY NURI PASHA

My dear Sir,
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th inst. in relation to the above subject. I am sorry to hear that you are unable to visit Egypt at the present time. I am, however, glad to hear that you are still in good health and hope that you will be able to visit Egypt at an early date. I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Yours faithfully,
Nuri Pasha

My dear Sir,
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th inst. in relation to the above subject. I am sorry to hear that you are unable to visit Egypt at the present time. I am, however, glad to hear that you are still in good health and hope that you will be able to visit Egypt at an early date. I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Yours faithfully,
Nuri Pasha

CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE

[E 9670/9632/31]

No. 16

Mr. Bevin to Lord Inverchapel (Washington).

(No. 3366.)

Foreign Office, 4th October, 1946.

My Lord,

IN the course of my talk with Mr. Byrnes on the 25th September I mentioned to him the problem of immigration into Palestine and the difficulties we were having with the Jews.

2. He expressed surprise when I told him of Dr. Weizmann's contention that between 1 and 1½ million Jews should be admitted to Palestine in the next ten or fifteen years. He pointed out the impossibility of such a proposal and suggested that, failing agreement with Arabs and Jews, Great Britain should announce that the whole Jewish and Palestine problem would be referred to United Nations Organisation for settlement. I again pointed out to him the strategic difficulties for the United States and Great Britain in that event, especially as the future of Cyrenaica was not clear. If the United Kingdom held the trusteeship over Cyrenaica, enabling her to look after the trade routes, the situation would be entirely different both as regards air and sea.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Bagdad, Jedda, Beirut and Amman, and to the British Middle East Office.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

[E 9435/4/G]

No. 17

Mr. Bevin to Mr. Bowker (Cairo).

(No. 701.)

Foreign Office, 4th October, 1946.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT herewith for your information a record of a conversation which I had on the 18th September with Musa Bey Alami, a prominent Palestinian Arab, on the subject of Palestine.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives in Bagdad, Jedda, Amman, Beirut and Washington, and to the British Middle East Office.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

Enclosure in No. 17

Memorandum on Conversation between the Secretary of State and
Musa Bey Alami.

MUSA BEY ALAMI, a Palestinian Arab, called to-day and had a long discussion with me regarding Palestine. He informed me that the situation was very acute. His talk with me had to be regarded as private because, in the event of the Palestinian Arabs joining the conference, he may be one of their representatives. He is obviously in close touch with the Arab position. He has been a servant of the Palestine Government. I found him very frank and honest and extremely helpful. He reviewed the situation historically and elaborated very fully the situation created between Jews and Arabs by the Balfour Declaration; how it had disrupted the customs between the two populations who hitherto had lived happily together in Palestine for many centuries and had thus introduced an entirely new situation. But he frankly said that it was no use raking up history.

2. Musa Bey Alami impressed upon me the importance of taking every possible step to avoid a failure of the present conference. The Arabs, he thought, would go a long way to meet Great Britain in the difficulties created by the

Balfour Declaration and subsequently by the New York agitation. He asked me to remember how difficult it would be for Great Britain if she had suddenly to add to her present population 600,000 people of a completely alien race with different ideas who would not be absorbed into the local population but would remain a completely isolated community. This had been done in Palestine and the Arabs were willing to try to see whether a Palestinian State could be devised which could absorb these two peoples and, irrespective of their religion, get them to live together in peace and harmony. In other countries Jews, Moslems and Christians had learnt to live together. The Arab populations had grown more tolerant after achieving independence. If outside influences were withdrawn, Musa Bey Alami believed the same thing could happen in Palestine. I put to him the question as to how he would begin. He said the first thing that must be disposed of was immigration. He emphasised the fact that every Arab believed, in fact knew, that this movement into Palestine was a spearhead. Whether there was partition or not, the Jews would not remain within the borders of Palestine. They would be dreaming as of old for a much wider territory and in fact it would be the beginning of the destruction of the Arab peoples; but in the end the Arabs would secure assistance from one or other of the Great Powers and the situation would end in war. Therefore the Arabs were determined to get this matter settled now. He said all this most objectively and seriously.

3. The Arabs would be willing to co-operate. Musa Bey thought he could commit the Arabs to the view that they would withdraw their opposition to the Balfour Declaration provided the Powers gave a newly-created independent Palestine State powers over immigration and supported them in maintaining their independence. Such a State would consist of the existing population of Palestine together with the Jews who had already been admitted. What Musa Bey very strongly emphasised was that the political parties should not be based on the alignment of Jews against Arabs, but should be organised according to different political opinions irrespective of religion. Some Arabs might be Social Democrats, some Communists and some Conservatives; the same with the Jews. He asked me seriously why the British Labour Party who were trying to put an end to the communal troubles in India should establish a worse one in Palestine. The Arabs believed that the British Labour Party would look upon this problem as democrats and not with the narrower conceptions of the Jewish Agency.

4. I then asked Musa Bey—supposing the Palestinian State was created on a democratic basis, what would happen to the Jewish portion that had been developed and where the Jews mainly lived? He said that he personally had no objection to communes. But, in partitioning, you left Jews under Arabs or Arabs under Jews. A series of communes might give both communities the protection they needed without splitting the country. I asked him further, supposing this was done, would the Arabs make a grand gesture to the European problem by agreeing to admit however many thousand Jews might be suggested? Musa Bey said that he had no authority to say anything. What the Arabs wanted was finality. If they were asked to admit a certain number and there was a natural development in the growth of the population such as took place in other States, he personally thought the generosity of the Arabs might be appealed to. But he said that our plan put forward 100,000 immigrants with the Jews having control over immigration. The Arabs knew what that meant and he thought the conference would break up if it was pressed.

5. I then asked Musa Bey what the chances were of the Jews and Arabs meeting to try to get agreement. I recognised that the beginning of such a conference would be very difficult, but if we had patience we might discuss all these problems. His reply was that such a meeting might take place and agreement might be reached subject to certain conditions. There would have to be some arrangement over immigration. A Constitution and democratic plan for the future would have to be devised. The relationship with Great Britain as regards defence would have to be worked out. We would have to find the best method for letting the Jewish community express themselves and for a communal Government of Jews and Arabs to be provided for.

6. I thanked Musa Bey very much for his talk with me and undertook to meet him again. I asked him to keep in touch with me.

E. B.

18th September, 1946.

E 11651/14/31

No. 18

JEWISH AFFAIRS IN THE UNITED STATES

Lord Inverchapel to Mr. Bevin. (Received 29th November)

(No. 2775)

Washington,

22nd November, 1946

Sir,
With reference to my despatch No. 344 of 25th February, 1946, I have the honour to enclose a further memorandum on the state of Jewish affairs in the United States, compiled by Mr. Bromley, first secretary at this embassy.

I am sending a copy of this despatch and of the memorandum to the United Kingdom delegation, New York, the High Commissioner, Jerusalem, the British Middle East Office, Cairo, and to His Majesty's Missions at Cairo, Jedda, Bagdad, Beirut, Amman, Angora, Moscow, Warsaw, Berlin, Bucharest and Rome.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

JOHN BALFOUR.

Enclosure in No. 18

Introduction

The events of the last nine months have borne out the contention in paragraph 30 of the earlier memorandum of 25th February, 1946, on this subject that both Jews and Arabs regard the present time as climacteric. The publication of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry's report in April raised hopes among the Jews, which were shattered by the recommendation of the Expert's Committee in July and by the insistence of His Majesty's Government on using the latter as a basis for the present discussions in London. All of this contributed to a barrage of the wildest accusations against His Majesty's Government, and severe pressure on the Administration as the most hopeful means of making His Majesty's Government change their views.

2. The fury of the Zionists and their sympathisers was fanned by the delaying tactics which they ascribed to Britain. They were the more irritated because their success in forcing their views upon the President did not, as they had hoped, result in a change of His Majesty's Government's attitude.

3. Events in the outside world, and tendencies in the United States, have con-

tributed to the maintenance of Zionist excitement. It has become clear in recent months that the end of the war in Europe did not mean the end of Jewish sufferings. From Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Roumania come stories of pogroms and persecution. A tide of refugees has been on the move westwards, bringing accounts of cruelty and repression. Displaced persons' camps in the United States and British Zones of Germany and Austria have been filled with Jewish refugees, whose plight has received much publicity. Many of these refugees may have had only the idea of escaping somewhere where they would be safe. But while more responsible Jewish leaders press for United Nations action on human rights, Zionist organisers, some of them in the guise of U.N.R.R.A. and American Joint Distribution Committee officials, have directed the thoughts of these refugees towards Palestine, and have undertaken the organisation of illegal immigration through a number of channels. So a vicious circle is set up. The more refugees arrive in the west, the greater the activity of Zionists in organising illegal immigration; the greater the number of illegal immigrants making their way to the coast of Palestine, the greater the need for His Majesty's Government to take measures to prevent such an influx from destroying the chance of an agreed solution to the problem. The stricter these measures, the larger the number of Jewish refugees piling up in camps in Europe. Meanwhile there is evidence that the Soviet authorities are making their own typical contribution to the problem by pushing Jews directly from the Soviet Union into Roumania. Some of their number set sail for Palestine with the connivance of Soviet and Roumanian officials, in spite of protests by British representatives. This policy has a short-term and a long-term aspect. Short-term to increase the difficulties of His Majesty's Government in dealing with illegal immigrants; long-term to create trouble in Palestine by the infiltration of trained N.K.V.D. agents.

4. Although these developments receive considerable publicity in the United States on their own merits, it is also in the interest

of those organising the traffic that maximum publicity should serve as a weapon by which His Majesty's Government might be forced to "open the gates of Palestine." Hence, too, the full-page advertisements in some papers soliciting funds for the repatriation of Jews from Europe to Palestine. Such work has a high cost in bribery to Polish, Czechoslovak or Italian officials and to owners of Greek or Central American registered ships.

5. In the United States Zionists appeared to have a strong position, for they had convinced the Administration that opposition to their wishes might lose a serious number of badly-needed votes in the November elections. But it is probable that the shrewder leaders may realise that time is not on their side. The stridency of their protests has tended to defeat its own object. The President is undoubtedly weary of it, and his cruise in August was partly determined by his wish to escape their importunities. They have seen, too, the poor reception accorded to President Truman's proposal to ask Congressional approval for the admittance of more displaced persons. Moreover, their leaders must realise that anti-Semitism is a force to be reckoned with in the United States, and that if their publicity campaign is too long or too stridently continued it will provoke a reaction hostile to American Jewry itself. Even in New York their sympathetic stoppages of work are causing annoyance. Elsewhere in the country there is much indifference and even hostility. So they fight the two enemies, Britain and time, and they fear they may lose to both. Genuine desperation caused by this time factor and the condition of their co-religionists in Europe, combine with tactical considerations, to raise their anxiety to fever pitch.

The Jews in the United States—Zionists

6. In spite of the importance of these issues in the eyes of the Zionists, their ranks are divided. It is true that there was unanimity so long as it was a question of opposing British proposals, or any other proposals from outside sources, which seemed insufficient. In the Anglo-American Committee's report, for example, the Zionists welcomed the recommendation for the admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine and the repudiation of the Immigration and Land Transfer clauses of the 1939 White Paper. But they attacked the conception that Palestine should be neither an Arab nor a Jewish State, the continuance of the mandate pending a trusteeship

agreement, the use for Arab benefit of money derived from the taxation of Jews and the "generous display of threats" in recommendation No. 10. This unanimity was strengthened by subsequent developments such as the British demand for prior liquidation of private armies, the break-up of illegal organisations on 29th June, and the "Morrison-Grady" proposals.

7. A rift, however, appeared when it came to positive proposals on the Jewish side in the shape of the suggestion of the executive of the Jewish Agency for "a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine." This rift was a result of the emotional state into which the Zionists had worked themselves. It, moreover, reflected an aspect of general United States opinion in international affairs, in that those who had had little experience of international politics tended towards an ill-informed extremism, while those who had been closely connected with negotiations in many countries in past years realised more clearly the complexity of the problem and the limits of what was practicable. The chief proponents of the more extreme and moderate views are respectively Rabbi Silver and Rabbi Wise, the co-chairmen of the American Zionist Emergency Council, which is the chief political instrument of Zionism in the United States. Rabbi Silver, an accomplished and somewhat unscrupulous orator, demands, in public at least, the whole of Palestine, while Rabbi Wise supports the more moderate view.

8. The controversy between them about the future of Palestine became apparent from Rabbi Wise's refusal to accept nomination on Silver's Zionist Organisation of America list for the World Zionist Congress, and from Silver's resignation from the executive of the Jewish Agency. It was also significant that in a joint welcome which the two rabbis extended to the President's renewed call on 4th October for the admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine, no reference was made to the endorsement which he was understood to have given to the proposals of the executive of the Jewish Agency for the partition of Palestine. The controversy was, however, kept within bounds until the end of October, when the Zionist Organisation of America met under Silver's chairmanship at Atlantic City. Even here, although the convention's main resolution roundly condemned partition, the door was left open for eventual Zionist participation in the London talks. With his eye on the probable policy of the United States Administration, Silver himself was at pains to direct

his own criticism, not so much against the idea of partition, as against the tactics of the Jewish Agency Executive in sponsoring such a solution. On the issue of partition, in effect, the convention really reserved its position. That the rift is causing considerable anxiety among Jewish leaders is evident from an F.B.I. report that one of the reasons for the present visit to the United States of Dr. Moshe Sneh of the Jewish Agency was the desire to effect a reconciliation between Mr. Ben Gurion and Dr. Silver. This reconciliation is now reported to have been achieved.

9. The latent controversy between the Zionist leaders lent much interest to the elections at the beginning of July last for the World Zionist Congress to be held in Basle in December. With the great reduction in the number of Jews in Europe owing to Nazi massacres, the Palestine and United States delegations will decide the day so far as partition in Palestine is concerned. The United States delegation, with about 120 votes, will be the largest in the congress. Instead of the expected 600,000, only some 200,000 of the 1 million shekel holders voted.⁽¹⁾ Of these voters 63,000 supported Silver's Zionist Organisation of America (Centre), which emerged as the largest party with forty delegates. Poale Zion (Labour) and Hadassah (Women's Welfare—slightly Left of Centre) followed with about 46,000 votes each (twenty-nine and twenty-eight delegates respectively). Then came Mizrahi (Right) with 28,000 votes (fifteen delegates) and the Revisionists (Right) with 8,000 votes (five delegates). The small vote must have been a disappointment to the Zionist Organisation of America, who had carried out an intense campaign (and are said to have been unscrupulous in their use of pressure). They were also unsuccessful in attempts to form a common front with Hadassah, who wished, in view of their somewhat different status, to retain their liberty of action at Basle.

10. On the question of partition there is in theory likely to be a majority against it if Silver persists in his opposition. The Zionist Organisation of America would then be largely against partition, as will Mizrahi and the Revisionists. The majority of Poale Zion and of Hadassah will support it. Unless the pressure for an early settlement from the Palestine and European Jews is sufficiently great and the older leaders (in particular Dr. Weizmann) can offer in the early future at Basle concrete hopes of a settlement along the lines of the Jewish Agency's proposals for

partition, the United States vote may well support a demand for the whole of Palestine and elect new Congress officers with the same view. This would greatly complicate His Majesty's Government's task and, one must suppose, increase the chances that the problem will have to be referred to the United Nations.

11. As regards the United States elections, both Rabbi Wise (Democrat) and, to a less extent, Rabbi Silver (Republican) seem to have realised the importance of keeping Palestine out of domestic politics in order that the strength of a bipartisan United States policy on this issue should not be impaired. Hence the rather tepid welcome accorded to President Truman's statement of 4th October and to Dewey's counterbid for the Jewish vote. This has not prevented a certain amount of black-mail by extreme Zionist bodies. Thus electors were urged to vote Republican by the United Zionists-Revisionists, formed in April from the new Zionist organisation the Jewish State Party, and dissident groups of the Zionists-Revisionists.

12. Bodies such as those just mentioned were strongly opposed to the grant of the United States loan to Britain. The Political Action Committee for Palestine in particular ran large newspaper advertisements headed "Kill that Loan." Fortunately prominent Jews such as Rabbi Wise and Mr. Sol Bloom took a wider view. Ex-Senator Gillette and his American League for a Free Palestine is still very active with advertisements, the emphasis now being thrown on the Hebrew, as opposed to the Jewish, people in order to strengthen the conception of race. They also attribute to Britain the ultimate responsibility for both the Kielce massacre and the King David Hotel outrage. The man who really suffered in all this was Rabbi Wise, whose prestige has temporarily sunk very low since he had the temerity at the time of the loan debate to urge that Jewish voters, as Americans, should first consider American interests.

Non-Zionist Bodies

13. The election figures already quoted reveal the fact that the amount of noise made by Zionists far exceeds their real strength in the United States. Although only 200,000 shekel holders voted, it may be argued that most of the million Jews who bought shekels are Zionists. This leaves over 4 million American Jews who were not sufficiently interested, whatever their views, even to buy shekels. The

⁽¹⁾ N.B.—In order to take part in a World Zionist Congress election, a prospective voter must buy a shekel.

Zionist Organisation of America claims that 80 per cent. of United States Jewry is in favour of a Jewish State in Palestine and it is true that there is a widespread sentimental interest in that scheme. A Jewish businessman in Chicago, however, estimated that 2 million Jews were Zionists, 2 million uninterested and a half to 1 million anti-Zionist. Even if it be assumed that a fair proportion of American Jews would look with favour on the idea of the establishment of a Jewish State, their motives are certainly mixed and there must remain a large number who do not approve of Zionist tactics. Rather naturally, with a few exceptions, non-Zionists American Jews are not vocal and do nothing to counteract the clamour of the Zionists.

14. The only anti-Zionist body of importance, Mr. Lessing Rosenwald's American Council for Judaism, has contributed a modest flow of propaganda. It only once achieved headline publicity when it sent to Mr. Acheson for transmission to His Majesty's Government an appeal that its views should be considered at the beginning of the London talks. Its appeal was based on the last words of the Balfour Declaration which state that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice... the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." The Council is a reputable body and respected by the United States authorities, but the tide has been against it. Also worthy of mention is Dr. Steinberg's Freeland League, which urges that Palestine can only touch the fringe of the problem and that there must be large scale Jewish colonisation in other territories, such as British and French Guiana, which may be offered by freedom-loving countries.

15. Amongst those with mixed motives may be mentioned Mr. Ben Freedman's American League for Peace with Justice in Palestine, which has been active with anti-Zionist advertisements in the newspapers. Its motive force is a fear that Zionist clamour may increase anti-Semitism. There is some justification for this fear, since, as one or two columnists have pointed out, the Zionists are the only hyphenated group, with the possible exception of the Polish-Americans, still able to exercise an influence on United States foreign policy, perhaps to the detriment of United States interests as a whole. Mr. Freedman is at pains to prove that Zionist claims have very little historical or ethical justification. Although he frequently seeks the assistance of British officials in the preparation of his material, he is a somewhat wild and hysterical character—

witness his latest project of proving that nearly all Eastern European Jews are descendents of people conquered and converted by the Khazaks, a tribe which lived between the Crimea and the Caucasus and itself embraced Judaism after the conversion of its king by a Spanish envoy in 780 A.D. Even assuming the truth of this demolition of the historical Zionist claim, it does not contribute to the solution of this 20th century problem.

16. The United Palestine appeal has been active throughout the period in its aim to collect 100 million dollars for Palestine. A large proportion of this sum has been earmarked for financing the transport and settlement of the 100,000 immigrants mentioned in the Anglo-American Committee's recommendations. It was reckoned by the Jewish Agency that this operation would cost from 100 to 120 million dollars, of which 65 to 70 million would come from the United States, leaving 30 to 35 million to be provided from other sources. The remainder of U.S. funds are devoted to the assistance of Jewish displaced persons in Europe and for various other purposes, some charitable and some, one suspects, unavowable. On the cultural side, the Albert Einstein Foundation is opening a university next October, the nucleus of which will be Middlesex University at Waltham, Massachusetts. It is to be named Brandeis University, after the late Justice Brandeis, and in the words of the Foundation's president, Mr. Lazarus "is intended as a Jewish contribution to the promotion of higher learning in the United States for the advancement of culture and the promotion of goodwill and righteous living among men."

The Zionists and the Administration

17. The attitude of the Administration has proved the biggest disappointment throughout this period. Fear of losing the Jewish vote in New York and elsewhere has been evident at every turn and the Zionist organisations have not been slow to exploit their power to exercise pressure in an election year. The President, having once called for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine, was not allowed to forget his pronouncement and pressure upon him concentrated on this point to the exclusion of all else. Mr. Truman himself aggravated the demand when, in reiterating his appeal in June, he accompanied it with the statement that many difficulties would have to be overcome by United States help, thus giving the impression that His Majesty's Government were stalling without good reason. Zionist pressure was very heavy

and the more effective since Washington is so close to New York. Election-minded Congressmen and Senators joined in turning on the heat with the United States members of the Anglo-American Committee and the press, much of which in the east is Jewish-owned or dependent on Jewish advertisements. Although not publicly admitted, the President's advisers were all thinking that Democratic electoral prospects were obviously less good than for fourteen years past. Each cause for discontent—rising prices or meat shortages, for example—made it the more necessary to capture every possible vote. Thus, when the President rejected the "Morrison-Grady Plan," and again when he made his statement on 4th October, it was frankly admitted to this embassy by United States officials that he had been prompted by domestic politics, rather than innate conviction. The embassy was indeed told that the President would have accepted the "Morrison-Grady" proposals if he had not been warned by his party bosses (with an eye on Senator Taft and other Republican leaders) that all his support in the country on Palestine would evaporate if he did not reject them. Rabbi Silver claimed to have "saved the day" by organising deputations to see Mr. Truman, who was so irritated and exhausted by it all that he went off on a cruise, mainly to escape from the storm. Irritated he may have been, but the main Zionist objective was achieved in that he was caused to believe, possibly mistakenly, that on his firmness depended a great proportion of the New York vote, together with that in other important centres such as Pennsylvania (Czech and Yugoslav Jews) and Illinois (Polish Jews).

18. Some few officials may not have been displeased that Britain could be held responsible for the failure of the President's efforts and so serve as a lightning conductor for Jewish wrath. Rabbi Silver probably had this in mind when, at the Zionist Organisation of America's Convention in October, he decried attacks on a foreign Government (His Majesty's Government) and said that they should rather be directed towards the United States Administration. The State Department, rightly considered to be more sympathetic to the British view, was frequently attacked for its alleged sabotage of the President's policy by the wilder men, such as Silver, Bartley Crum and ex-Senator Gillette's American League for a Free Palestine. No denials had any effect and finally Mr. Byrnes was constrained to write to Rabbi Wise to assure

him of the solidarity between the State Department and the President.

19. With the approach of the elections, the tempo increased and the last weeks saw the strange spectacle of the Zionists, on the one hand, trying to keep Palestine out of party politics, and the Administration, on the other, making three pronouncements within a month reiterating its stand, the timing of which was interpreted by the majority of the press as an election move. It was in vain that some voices in the Administration and many in the State Department urged that Palestine should be treated with an eye to United States interests in the Middle East as a whole.

The Zionists and Britain

20. The campaign against Britain reached a peak in July and August, since when it has considerably decreased. It took the usual form of demonstrations, picketing of consulates, a flood of abusive letters, advertisements in the press, attacks on the United States loan and occasional, but fortunately unfulfilled, bomb threats.

21. The dominant theme—the refusal of His Majesty's Government to admit immediately to Palestine 100,000 Jews—was torn from its context by those to whom many of the other recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee were unpalatable. Other contributory grievances were the Secretary of State's remark about New York and the Jews, Cyprus and the immigrant ships, the general measures against terrorism at the end of June, General Barker, and the alleged brutality and "Gestapo" methods of British troops. In the newspapers appeals were made by various organisations, such as the American League for a Free Palestine and the United Zionists-Revisionists, for funds to assist in the transport of refugees to Palestine and in one or two cases to help "the heroic Jewish resistance." These appeals formed the subject of official British representations to the State Department on the grounds that the organisations concerned could hardly claim tax exemption as charitable bodies and that violence was being urged against the Administration of a friendly Power. The Zionists got wind of this action and raised protests against it. The State Department is nevertheless urging upon the other departments concerned that there is some justice in His Majesty's Government's contention, and after long delays a reply was promised—significantly enough—after the elections.

22. All this ferment, which is now dying down after the initial excitement and

frustration following upon the publication of the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee, bears witness to great and sometimes wilful ignorance both of the past and of the present in Palestine. Free parallels are drawn between Palestine and the United States in 1776 or Ireland. It is always assumed, even by Zionist "ambassadors" such as Miss Fanny Holzmänn, who should know better, that Britain has only to say "Do this" to the Arabs and they will do it. It is also assumed that violence was started by the British in a vacuum and the terrorists are cast in the rôle of the resistance movements in Europe during the war. Quotation of article 2 of the mandate frequently stops short at "secure the establishment of a Jewish National Home." Most of the letters received vaguely charge His Majesty's Government with "broken promises" and "Hitler-like methods." Some few, indeed, argue cogently and with sincerity, but the majority incline to the side of one gentleman, who ended his epistle: "The murderers shall be stripped naked; they shall bear (*sic*) their naked buttocks." The feeling behind this is usually genuine, though in the main sentimental, and in spite of tilts at the Arabs and the Mufti, whose escape many believe His Majesty's Government to have connived at, the general opinion of these correspondents is that Britain alone is the culprit and that her withdrawal would usher in the millenium.

23. Every attempt is made to combat this point of view and enlighten the ignorant by the issue of guidance notes, by correspondence and by talks. But the real trouble is a deep-rooted belief in British wickedness based on the old cries of imperialism, strategic interests and oil. The minds of most of those who are vocal on this subject are, in fact, closed to arguments.

United States Opinion

24. Washington suffers from its proximity to the east coast and this is particularly true where Palestine is concerned. The majority of United States Jews and their supporters are on the east coast, and if an observer were to judge by that alone it would rightly be said that the country is behind the Zionists. This is, in fact, not the case. Throughout the country as a whole the main feeling towards this issue is one of indifference. Far from there being sympathy with the Jews, anti-Semitism is so strong as to cause anxiety to responsible Jewish leaders and to obtain frequent mention in the Liberal press. It

was one of the first things to be noticed by a party of boys from Stowe School who came to the United States during the summer, and its incidence was analysed in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the last report. A main reason for it is a widespread objection to the clamour of the Jews, who alone of the hyphenated groups are felt still to be unassimilated—to be Jews first and Americans second. In addition, shortages and black-market activities are laid to their door, since Jews are numerous in the distributive trades. This anti-Semitic feeling is particularly strong in the Middle West, and it is growing even in New York. It was noticeable in the reports received from consulates on the reception of the Anglo-American Committee's report that there was widespread indifference throughout the Middle Western and Southern States. Strong support came only from the east and the extreme west, where Jewish communities are also strong, particularly round Los Angeles. It must, on the other hand, be remembered that there is considerable, though often ill-informed, sympathy for the Jews amongst idealists such as school-teachers, professors and social workers, who are responsible for much that is best in American life. These are liberal in their views and commonly champion the underdog, particularly when the use of force is in question. To them are allied those into whom a sense of guilt has been instilled by the anti-Semitism of their neighbours.

25. In the press and on the wireless, commentators, naturally dealt at some length with the problem because it represented a major cause of disagreement between the British and United States Governments. The extreme Left and many of the Liberal elements condemned British policy on every possible occasion, although the Jews may perhaps have found a somewhat unwelcome ally in the *Daily Worker*, where the "party line" was Big Three control. It will be interesting to see how this newspaper will treat recent evidence of Soviet sympathy with the Arabs. A certain body of less extreme opinion favoured submission of the problem to the United Nations, which is a frequent theme in letters and would not be unwelcome to many distracted State Department officials. As time wore on the more responsible commentators became less hostile and showed a disposition to consider Palestine in its Middle East setting rather than in isolation. This was a result of the uncompromising line taken by the Soviet Union in world affairs which led to a realisation that

British concern about her position in Palestine was not after all so unworthy. From there some took the further step of pointing out that United States interests in the Middle East were also important and that a more sympathetic study of, and indeed help in, British difficulties was essential, since both countries wanted the same kind of world, and that not one of the Soviet variety.

26. Others who would not go quite so far felt some sense of guilt at the spectacle of United States ready to lecture Britain on her responsibilities without lifting a finger to help. Among them were to be found many supporters of the President's proposal to ask Congress for legislation to permit the freer entry of displaced persons into the United States. This move was opposed by members of the House and Senate Immigration Committees and is perhaps unwelcome to a majority of Americans. It is, however, supported by a number of prominent people as a contribution which the United States ought to make to the solution of the displaced persons problem and it was endorsed by both parties in the New York electoral campaign. If the United Nations Assembly were to recommend international action on this question, the opposition to it in the United States may be overcome, even though the anti-Semites will not fail to note the large proportion of Jews among the displaced persons.

27. Palestine was less of an electoral issue than had been expected. Outside New York practically no mention was made of it. In New York both parties urged that immigrants should be allowed to go to Palestine. Dr. Perlzweig's fear that the Republicans would be moved by Rabbi Silver (a Republican) to outbid the President and the Democrats by demanding all Palestine as a Jewish State, proved unfounded. The President's hurried pronouncement of 4th October prevented Mr. Dewey from doing more than urging that instead of 100,000 Jews, several hundred thousand should be granted admission.

28. It is noticeable that many labour organisations are represented amongst those who protest against British policy. This is due to the fact that many unions in New York, such as the Garment Workers, are predominantly Jewish. Such protests are sometimes endorsed by the A.F. of L. or the C.I.O. but this is mainly for the record. Even though the A.F. of L., at its October convention in Chicago and the C.I.O. at its November convention in Atlantic City passed resolutions urging the President to press for the transfer of

100,000 Jews to Palestine, the top leaders of the former and to a less extent those of the latter do not really sympathise with Zionist aspirations, nor are many of the members of these organisations particularly well disposed towards the Jews.

29. United States opinion with regard to Zionism is therefore largely indifferent and often anti-Semitic. But in its attitude towards the British aspect of the problem it is to some extent coloured by the general feeling prevailing about Britain at any given time.

Arab Office

30. The Arab Office in Washington has of late made some progress. Its task remains hard, since no newspapers will be so bold as to print its advertisements and it has to fight the strong American feeling against "feudal overlords" and the prevalence of dirt, disease and ignorance in Middle Eastern countries. In particular, a most unfavourable comparison is always drawn between the progressive Jews in Palestine and the backward Arabs and, on the political side, the pro-Axis activities of the Mufti and the Arabs are contrasted with Jewish exploits for the Allies. In wireless forums and in letters to the press members of the office do their best to defend the historical claim of the Arabs to the land and point out that a Jewish State would remove from them most of the industrial centres on which they must rely in order to raise the standard of living. But they still concentrate too much on political questions, echoing the proposals of the Arab League representatives and adopting a *non-possumus* attitude to both British and Jewish proposals. A few writers like Kermit Roosevelt and Vincent Sheehan have taken up the cudgels on their behalf and both *Life* and *Time* have given their point of view. Yet the audience they reach is very limited and they can but remain on the defensive in the heart of the enemy's country.

31. In May the Arab Office came under fire from Congressman Celler (Democrat, New York) for opposing the President's wish about the 100,000 Jews. It was also attacked by Congressman Sabath (Democrat, Illinois) who, in his "extension of remarks" in the Congressional Record of 12th August, charged the Arab Office with being financed by foreign agents (including the British Embassy) for subversive purposes and with being connected with people who had been members of the German-American Bund. This challenge was taken up by Mr. Bed Freedman, of the American League for Peace with Justice in Palestine,

who offered a \$10,000 reward if any proof of such financial dealings could be produced. The offer met with no response.

Conclusion

32. Very many protagonists of the Zionist cause have threatened us with a grave deterioration of Anglo-American relations if the President's wishes about Palestine continue to be ignored. It is true that his feelings on the subject are genuine and that Palestine is the only serious source of Anglo-American political friction at the present time. But it is impossible to avoid the conclusion from a study of United States opinion as a whole that the official attitude was due, not to any widespread American feeling on the subject, but to the anxiety of a weak President about approaching elections. The Zionists and their supporters are very well organised and very vocal, but their numbers are small in relation to the total population. Though there is sympathy for them in the Liberal professions owing to the humanitarian aspect of their cause, the mass of the American people is indifferent. It does not wish to be involved in this problem.

33. Amongst those Liberal-minded elements to the right of Wallace who take an interest in international affairs there were many who until recent months attacked both the Soviet Union and Britain as disturbers of the peace in their rivalries. Most of these have now been caught up in the rising tide of Russophobia and support Anglo-American co-operation in the areas most gravely threatened, even though these are geographically remote from the United States. Lippmann may at times suggest that it is hard for America to underwrite a policy which she has had little chance of forming, but others recognise that Britain has to bear the main burden and must make the decisions. Palestine they feel should not be allowed to obscure the real community of interests between the two countries in the Middle East and they are the more concerned that domestic considerations should be allowed to sway the Administration's policy towards this problem and so damage the real interests of the United States.

34. Taken in isolation, therefore, Palestine cannot be said to constitute a really grave threat to Anglo-American relations. But it is a factor which must be remembered when considering the still important residuum of anti-British feeling. Here the extreme Right and the extreme Left—pro-Russians and America firsters—can join hands with a miscellaneous collection of old opponents, such as the Irish Americans. India is now a broken reed. Palestine can take its place. Whilst these people are therefore inspired by hostility to Britain rather than sympathy for Zionism, it is not safe to say that British policy towards Palestine can be based on the general assumption that United States opinion can be ignored. A policy that can be shown to override the expressed wish of the President of the United States can and will be used, whenever the general climate is unfavourable to us, for the purpose of demonstrating that the British, while running to the United States for help in every emergency, are still practising their old selfish, imperialistic, reactionary tricks and should be firmly told where to get off.

35. Lastly, brief mention should be made of the probable effect of the Republican victory in the elections on United States policy as regards Palestine, should no solution be reached in the near future. Little hope can be entertained that the Republicans will be more tender than the Democrats. Their victory in New York, for example, must have been made possible by the transfer to them of a certain proportion of the Jewish vote, though the desire for new men in power may have contributed to the result as much as Palestine. They will strive to keep that vote against the presidential election in 1948, and no present responsibilities need deter them from promising the Zionists the moon. They can also embarrass Mr. Truman, as President Wilson was embarrassed by the Republicans over Ireland in 1919. The Administration, on the other hand, must be concerned to win the Jewish note back and will feel the less able to follow any policy disapproved. Both parties may over-estimate the importance of Palestine to the Jewish electorate, but in present circumstances they will not feel able to take a chance on it.

CHAPTER IV.—PERSIA

(A) Miscellaneous

[E 10272/5/34]

No. 19

Mr. Le Rougetel to Mr. Berin. (Received 16th October)

(No. 415)

Sir,

Tehran, 8th October, 1946

I HAVE the honour to report that the Tudeh Party recently decided to celebrate the anniversary of the foundation of the party. For this purpose they found it convenient to revive the ancient Zoroastrian feast of Mehragan, which occurs in the Persian calendar on a day close to that on which the party was formed five years ago. There are many myths and legends about the feast of Mehragan but the oldest seem to associate it with the completion of the divine creation of the world and the inspiration of mankind with the spirit of God. The party organisers have, however, been at pains to make it clear that they attach no religious significance to the festival but wish it to be observed solely as a national political anniversary.

2. The celebrations began on 2nd October with a luncheon party to foreign journalists, followed the next day by an evening reception attended by the Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet, senior officers of the services and the principal officials of the various ministries. On Friday, 4th October, there was a mass meeting of the party and of workers' unions in the main square of the capital, which was well organised and orderly. A special 10-page edition of *Rahbar*, official press organ of the party, was published to commemorate the anniversary and the editor claims that 120,000 copies were sold. All members were urged to subscribe one day's pay to party funds.

3. The occasion is appropriate for a brief review of the present position of the Tudeh Party. During the early months of the current year, after the formation of the Government of Qavam al Sultaneh, the strength and influence of the party developed rapidly, but during the last three months it has encountered set-backs in spite of the inclusion of three Tudeh leaders in the Cabinet at the beginning of August.

4. In the province of Khuzistan (which includes the A.I.O.C.'s oilfields and installations at Abadan) most of the party's agitators have for the time being been banished or shut up and martial law has imposed severe restrictions on party activities of all kinds; in Shiraz and Isfahan also, martial law has been declared with discouraging consequences for the party's organisations. In Kerman the Tudeh has been curbed and though still active in Meshed it is faced there with persistent opposition from the Persian Democrat Party. In Gilan and Mazandaran the "oppression" exercised by Government officials is the subject of constant complaint in the Tudeh press.

5. On the other side of the account must be entered the sustained vigour of the party headquarters in Tehran, the vitality of its chief organs of publicity, the Tehran newspapers *Rahbar* and *Zafar* and its eight provincial journals, the efforts of the Minister of Education (Dr. Kishawarz), through his numerous nominees, to teach the Marxist gospel in the schools throughout the country. Many party men have also been appointed to work in the Ministries of Health and Commerce and Industry. The Tudeh Party is well organised, resourceful and full of fight and determination and may well succeed in overcoming the official opposition which at present bars the way to further expansion.

I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India, His Majesty's Ambassador at Baghdad and the British Middle East Office, Cairo.

I have, &c.

J. H. LE ROUGETEL.

*Persia (Charges against British Officials)**Extract from Hansard, 16th October, 1946*

Mr. Bevin: I wish, with the permission of the House, to make the following statement regarding recent events in Persia affecting relations between His Majesty's Government and the Persian Government.

In connexion with the recent arrest by the Persian authorities of tribal leaders in South Persia and the disturbances which have occurred in that area, the Persian Government, in the light of certain information which they had obtained, came to the conclusion that His Majesty's Consul-General at Ahwaz, Mr. Trott, had been implicated in a plan for a tribal rising. His Majesty's Government, after a full investigation of the matter, have assured the Persian Government that there is no justification whatever for the charges against Mr. Trott. The Persian Government have accepted His Majesty's Government's assurances with goodwill and the case, therefore, may be regarded as closed.

In this connexion, and in answer to allegations which have been made in public statements and in certain organs of the Persian press, His Majesty's Government wish to make it clear that British diplomatic and consular officers in Persia have categorical instructions not to interfere in the internal affairs of that country. His Majesty's Government have satisfied themselves that no British official in Persia has contravened or is contravening these instructions in any way, and that no British official has given subversive elements any reason to suppose that they could hope for British support. They have no hesitation in stating that all allegations and insinuations which have been made about the complicity of British officials in subversive activities against the Persian Government are entirely without foundation.

His Majesty's Government hope to see a steady and constant improvement in their relations with the Persian Government. They reiterate their desire to see Persia strong, prosperous and independent, and free from foreign interference in her internal affairs.

His Majesty's Government have noted the way in which both the Soviet press and Soviet broadcasts to Persia have given considerable prominence to the baseless allegations made against British officials in Persia. His Majesty's Government are taking steps to ensure that the true facts of the situation are brought to the knowledge of the Persian people.

Mr. Thomas Reid: Is my right hon. friend quite certain that other Governments are not interfering in the internal affairs of Persia?

Mr. Le Rougetel to Mr. Bevin. (Received 31st October)

(No. 433)

Sir,

Tehran, 20th October, 1946

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on outstanding events in Persia during the past quarter, for which I am indebted to Mr. Watkinson and Captain Holt, Diplomatic and Oriental Counsellors at this embassy.

Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Moscow and Bagdad, Air Headquarters, Iraq, British Middle East Office, Political Intelligence Centre Middle East, Government of India and all consulates in Persia.

I have, &c.

J. H. LE ROUGETEL.

Enclosure in No. 21

Report on Events in Persia during the Three Months ended 30th September, 1946

DEVELOPMENTS during the period under review have confirmed the determination of the Government of the U.S.S.R. to expand its influence and

that of the Communist Party throughout Persia. The principal developments were the formation of a new Cabinet to include members of the Tudeh Party and various political manoeuvres in preparation for the general elections; inconclusive negotiations with the newly-constituted authorities of Azerbaijan; disorders in the concessionary areas of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and unrest amongst the Arabs of Khuzistan; a tribal revolt in the south; spasmodic affrays and negotiations with rebellious Kurds; the precautionary visit of British warships to the Shatt-el-Arab and the concentration of British troops at Basra; violent Persian reactions to these measures; and a continuous press campaign against His Majesty's Government, British officials and British interests in general in Persia, culminating in a request for the withdrawal of His Majesty's Consul-General at Ahwaz.

The most immediate objective of the U.S.S.R. is to bring about the election of a Majlis which will be disposed to co-operate in every way with the Soviet Union and in particular to ratify the Perso-Russian oil concession in North Persia as agreed by the Prime Minister Qavam-es-Saltaneh, when he visited Moscow in the spring. Early in July the Prime Minister launched a new political party, to be known as the Democrat Party of Persia, with a programme to cover all fields of internal reforms and a foreign policy which was to have good relations with all friendly Powers; provided that the sovereignty and independence of Persia are respected and that there is no interference with the internal affairs of the country in the name of friendship or on the pretext of protecting Persian independence. This party has not attracted very general support amongst prominent Persians, though lip-service has been paid to it by Government officials, and by various influential tribal chieftains. The leading members of the party, in particular Muzaffar Firuz, whom the Prime Minister permits to pose as its chief protagonist, do not inspire confidence. The reply of the Tudeh Party to this was to form a United Front by fusion with a former group known as the Iran Party.

At the beginning of August, Qavam formed a coalition Government, in which leading members of the Tudeh Party were given the portfolios of Education, Health and Commerce, while a new Ministry of Labour and Propaganda was established under the unpopular Muzaffar Firuz, who had formerly been Political Under-Secretary of State and assistant to the Prime Minister. An official statement of the aims of the new Government placed a ban on contact by Persians with foreign embassies or consulates, who were asked to co-operate. No official communication was made to any foreign mission on the subject of the ban and therefore no cognizance has been taken of it by this embassy, but instructions were given to consuls in the provinces to exercise increased discretion in their contacts with Persians. The boycott has been observed by the Persians in some towns and not in others.

Before and since the reorganisation of the Cabinet, the Prime Minister has carried out a series of arrests of extremists, both Right-wing and Left-wing, and of personal enemies accused of plotting against his Government. These included the Minister for Commerce, who was said to have arranged, without the knowledge of Qavam, for the Shah's sister to visit Moscow. Further arrests followed the discovery of the intended revolt of the Bakhtiari and Kashgai tribes. The persons arrested included Bakhtiari Khans and the General Officer Commanding in Khuzistan, whose treatment by the civil authorities led to the resignation of the Minister for War and of the Chief of General Staff, subsequently withdrawn after a public apology had been made by the Prime Minister.

In July, after a short strike at the Agha Jari oilfield and a partial strike at Abadan, called by local Tudeh leaders, a general strike was declared on the 14th throughout the A.I.O.C. area, the ostensible reason for which was a demand for Friday pay. Trouble was also stirred up by the Communists amongst the Indian artisans in Abadan. In spite of the declaration of martial law by the Governor-General of Khuzistan, under instructions from Tehran, the strike went on for three days, during which serious clashes occurred in Abadan between the members of the local Tudeh Party and Arabs. There were casualties on both sides, but especially among the Arabs, and two Arab contractors were deliberately murdered and dismembered. Little damage was caused to company property or installations, but a state of extreme alarm was caused. It was evident that the whole outbreak was of a political nature and not a genuine labour dispute. Moreover, all the points at issue between the management of the A.I.O.C. and the workers were under discussion in Tehran before a Government Commission set up under the new labour law which expressly prohibits strikes without prior reference to the commission. Production of oil was brought temporarily to a standstill.

As a result of these events, H.M.S. *Norfolk* and H.M.S. *Wild Goose* were ordered to lie off Abadan in the Shatt-el-Arab after previous notification to the Persian Government who immediately protested, stating that if the arrival of these vessels was connected with the strike it would be considered an unfriendly act. A violent press campaign was also launched against His Majesty's Government.

In view of the likelihood of further trouble in the oilfields and refinery, it was subsequently decided to send an Indian Brigade Group to Basra. This was announced by the Government of India in a broadcast from New Delhi on the 3rd August, which stated that the force was for the protection of Indian, British and Arab lives in South Persia, should circumstances require. The announcement called forth an immediate protest from the Persian Government and another outburst in the press. The return of the troops to India was demanded, since adequate security measures had already been taken by the Persian authorities, and in any case the strike was considered to be an internal affair not calling for armed foreign intervention. The Persian Government were informed that there was no truth in the report that orders had been given for these troops to enter Persia and soothing assurances were given to the Prime Minister to the effect that the firm action taken by the Persian provincial authorities during the recent disturbances was greatly appreciated and that His Majesty's Government had every confidence in the intention of the Persian Government to prevent further disorder. The Governor-General of Khuzistan, armed with special powers by the Government, had, in fact, acted to the best of his ability in a most satisfactory manner in the teeth of strong opposition from those under the influence of the Tudeh Party. In fact, the arrival of British reinforcements probably strengthened the Prime Minister's hand in dealing with the agitators, besides having a beneficial effect on the morale of the staff of the oil company.

A Government commission was sent to Abadan to investigate the causes of the riots. It was composed of persons of strong pro-Tudeh sympathies who devoted themselves to manufacturing evidence to prove that the A.I.O.C. and British agents were responsible for the disorders and for the organising of Arab resistance to the Central Government and hostility to the Tudeh Party. As none of the persons arrested had been punished and some of them had been released by the end of August, a protest was made to the Prime Minister and he was asked that the venomous press campaign against the company and the British, which had continued unabated since the time of the strike in most of the Tehran and provincial papers, should be stopped. It has increased in violence since then, *pari passu* with Moscow radio and the Soviet press.

The labour law referred to above provided for the organisation of trade unions and for commissions to decide on minimum wages, labour disputes, workers' welfare funds and other social benefits. The Labour Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy in Cairo has paid two visits to Persia during the past three months and has assisted, along with representatives of the A.I.O.C., at meetings of the commission to fix wages and allowances and later in the deliberation of the Supreme Labour Council, which first met during September. Mr. Audsley has also helped the Ministry of Labour in drafting trade union regulations. It has been announced that three French experts are to be employed by the Ministry to work out schemes for workers' welfare funds. All this is looked upon with some misgiving by the Minister for Finance, since increases of wages on a large scale cannot but lead to inflation and increased cost of living, and the necessary currency is not available. Moreover, the Treasury has had to ask for an advance of £1 million from royalties payable by the A.I.O.C. to finance purchase by the Government of this year's grain crops, and other means are being devised to try to force the Imperial Bank of Iran, and other banks who are much less affected to deposit without interest with the Banki Melli a percentage of their public current deposits and to take up Government securities in order to finance public works.

Efforts have continued throughout the period under review to clear up outstanding differences with the Azerbaijan Administration. These are in the main, the control and organisation of the armed forces to be maintained in the province and the evacuation by the Azerbaijanis of the town and district of Zendjan. A delegation has been in Tehran for some time, but their efforts have been abortive. For practical purposes Azerbaijan is independent of the Central Government. Tehran newspapers are not allowed to circulate in Tabriz and strict control is exercised over the movements of all travellers to and from the province. The Tabriz Administration has its own internal difficulties with the Kurdish Committee in Mahabad. The Kurds do not acknowledge the jurisdiction of Tabriz and there has been friction between the two as to who should control Rezaieh.

The Kurdish nationalist movement and the unsettled state of affairs in Kurdish Azerbaijan have made it necessary for the Persian Government to keep a division of troops in the Senneh-Saqiz area for defensive purposes. The extent of concessions made to Azerbaijan has led to imitative demands from other parts of Persia. Requests for provincial autonomy have been put forward in Khuzistan, Fars, Isfahan and Kurdistan. In Khuzistan the movement was aggravated after the strike at Abadan in which, as already described, Arabs were the victims of Tudeh savagery. It subsequently found expression in appeals against Persian tyranny to the Iraqi Government and to the Arab League.

Early in August a mutual defence pact was signed between the Bakhtiari and Kashgai Khans aimed against the Tudeh Party, though professing loyalty to the Government in Tehran. It became known during the middle of the month that they were plotting to seize Isfahan and Shiraz to destroy the Tudeh organisation in both centres and thus to forestall the possibility of a general election which would in all probability put that party in power. At the beginning of September the two joint Governors of Bakhtiari were summoned to Tehran and His Majesty's Consul at Isfahan reported that this certainly meant that the tribal plans were known, that the seizure of Isfahan was unlikely to succeed as the Bakhtiari, who had asked for British assistance, were almost without arms and that it was doubtful whether the revolt would take place. One of the Khans answered the summons and divulged the whole plot to Muzaffar Firuz, who then told a press conference that Abul Qasim Khan Bakhtiari had all the time been acting as a stool-pigeon for the Government and listening in to the conspiracy. However this may be, Firuz fled to Isfahan and arrested the other Governor of Bakhtiari and various members of his family. Martial law was declared in Isfahan and there has been no more trouble there. Firuz extracted "confessions" from certain of the persons arrested, which were alleged to implicate certain British officials.

On the 31st August, martial law was proclaimed in Shiraz. Khosro Khan Kashgai was called to Tehran by Firuz and was informed of the allegations of Abul Qasim Khan. After the arrest of the Bakhtiari leaders, he was again summoned to Isfahan, but his brother went instead and the Minister for Labour threatened to send a force of Caucasians against the Kashgai. The tribes of Fars, however, proceeded with their plans and on the 20th September it was reported that the Kashgai under Naser Khan were waiting to take Shiraz. They had also formed an alliance with the tribes of the Persian Gulf who were prepared to occupy Bushire. The Governor-General of Kerman, who is a former Deputy for Shiraz, and the Governor-General of Fars were instructed to negotiate with Naser Khan, who demanded the release of the Bakhtiari leaders, removal of Government officials from the province of Fars, dismissal of the Tudeh Ministers from the Central Government and the arrest of the Tudeh Party leaders in Fars. Further demands were telegraphed to Tehran, which aimed at local autonomy on the lines of Azerbaijan. The Persian Government seemed disposed to concede some of the demands and the punitive expedition, which had left Isfahan, was held at Abadeh. The Minister for War in the meantime asked the military attaché of this embassy what policy His Majesty's Government wished the Persian Government to take with regard to the tribes, but was told that his question had been referred to His Majesty's Government. By the end of the month negotiations had broken down. The Government delegation had returned to Tehran and the tribes were advancing towards Shiraz, which was surrounded by the rebels. Some days before Bushire had been cut off from the hinterland and severe fighting had taken place at Kazerun, the key-point on the Shiraz-Bushire road. Bushire surrendered to the rebels under Fathollah Haiyat Daoudi on 29th September, after a defence brought to an end by lack of water. The Persian Air Force took part in the proceedings, but the Persian navy unfortunately arrived too late.

At the end of the month it was reported from Kermanshah that a sympathetic revolt with similar aims was on the point of breaking out in West Persia.

The principal aims of His Majesty's Government during this time have been to endeavour to neutralise Communist activities and to prevent political sabotage in the oilfield areas. Strong pressure has been maintained on the Prime Minister to suppress subversive activities in the oilfields and to ensure that legitimate labour disputes are settled in the proper legal manner. The Prime Minister has responded satisfactorily. Various appeals have also been made to him to control the Tudeh press, but this has proved beyond his power, though he has issued instructions to check abuse of foreign Powers in public speeches.

Our publicity has aimed at influencing Persian public opinion in such a way that the full support of the Prime Minister could not be given to the Tudeh Party before the elections and that the advantage of genuine democratic and free institutions might be preferred to the methods and principles of communism.

While it has been made clear to the Persian Government that responsibility for security and for the protection of foreigners and their property and for removing agitators lies with them, it has also been pointed out to the A.I.O.C. that their labour policy requires overhauling.

In addition to the assistance of Mr. Audsley in advising the Persian Government, this embassy and the oil company on trade union and labour matters, the British Middle East Office in Cairo has arranged for visits during the past three months by Mr. Crawford, agricultural expert, Mr. Pridie, Health Counsellor, and Mr. Sinclair, Telecommunications Attaché, who have given valuable advice to the competent departments of the Persian Government. Contracts have also been given to the British firm, Sir Alexander Gibb and Partner, for important irrigation schemes, and a provisional arrangement has been made under which the British Overseas Airways Corporation are authorised to operate services to Tehran. Hurricane fighter planes supplied to the Persian Air Force arrived together with technical experts for their erection and maintenance. Persian Army and Air Force personnel took part in the Victory Parade in London.

Relations with countries other than Great Britain and U.S.S.R. have been of comparatively small importance. Endeavours were made to pick a quarrel with the Iraqi Government for alleged sympathy with Arab aspirations in South-West Persia. Both the U.S.S.R. and the United States were thanked for their assistance in obtaining a seat for Persia at the Paris Conference. The Prime Minister has expressed a hope that His Majesty's Government will sponsor the application of Persia to become a full member of the Peace Conference for determining conditions of peace with Germany and Japan.

The situation is thus most disturbed and the wisdom of having adequate forces at hand to protect our interests in South Persia if required has been amply proved, but whether the Prime Minister will succeed in maintaining his policy of "balance" is still an open question.

[E 10895/149/34]

No. 22

Mr. Le Rougetel to Mr. Bevin. (Received 6th November)(No. 441)
Sir,

Tehran, 28th October, 1946

I HAVE the honour to report that on 23rd October and the two following days the political party formed by the Persian Prime Minister, Qavam al Sultaneh (called the Democrat Party of Persia), celebrated the completion of the first hundred days of its existence.

2. The arrangements made were a palpable copy of the programme which the Tudeh Party organised only a short time ago to mark the fifth anniversary of its foundation, and were no doubt intended to be a counter-demonstration of party strength.

3. The first day was devoted to gatherings of members at the party clubs. On the second day a special birthday number of the party's new daily newspaper, *The Democrat of Iran*, was published, an official luncheon was given to the press and foreign correspondents, and in the evening there was a public garden party and fun fair which proved most popular and successful. On the third day there were parades of various branches of the party organisation, including the Women's League, the Youth League and the National Guard, which shows signs of becoming a para-military organisation.

4. In a message to the party, Qavam al Sultaneh expressed the hope that it would obtain an absolute majority at the polls. He invited all those in favour of orderly progress and the independence of the country to join it.

5. At the luncheon party to the press, Prince Muzaffar Firuz, the deputy leader of the party, speaking of the aims of the Democrat Party, said that they were determined to resist foreign interference in Persia's internal affairs, and would seek to maintain and strengthen good relations with Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the United States. He recalled the Soviet Government's generosity to Persia in 1920, and said that he was confident that their policy towards Persia was still inspired by the same splendid spirit. In regard to internal affairs, he

expressed the hope that, with the support of the electorate, the party would win the general election and thereby be able to carry out its reform programme and help all the people of Persia to enjoy a higher standard of living.

6. The Tudeh Party's newspapers gave little or no publicity to these celebrations, but their anxiety lest the Democrat Party should take the wind out of their sails was shown in a number of appeals to the Tudeh to stand firmly united against all attempts to split their ranks. These newspapers also evinced an increasing antipathy to the Democrat Party, and charged its members with having committed many acts of hooliganism against adherents of the Tudeh Party.

7. The general effect of this latest effort of the Democrat Party seems to have been to put new heart into those who were beginning to fear that the Tudeh Party, as the one organised political party in the country, would soon gain complete control over the Government, and to rally to the support of the Prime Minister most of those who equally dislike both the Russian affiliations of the Tudeh Party and the outmoded ideas and corrupt practices of the old oligarchy.

I am sending copies of this despatch to the British Middle East Office, Cairo, to the Government of India, New Delhi, and to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

I have, &c.

J. H. LE ROUGETEL.

E 12287/12287/34

No. 23

REPORT ON HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS IN TEHRAN

Mr. Le Rougetel to Mr. Bevin. (Received 19th December)

(No. 499)

Sir,

Tehran, 11th December, 1946

With reference to Sir Reader Bullard's despatch No. 220 of 28th June, 1945, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on the heads of foreign diplomatic missions at this post.

I have, &c.

J. H. LE ROUGETEL.

Enclosure in No. 23

(Paragraphs marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports)

Afghanistan

Ambassador: (5th January, 1944.)

M. Hosseini has now left to become Minister for Finance at Kabul. He went out of his way to be helpful during the difficult months immediately preceding his departure. His successor has not yet been appointed.

Belgium

Minister: Count Antoine de Laubespain. (12th January, 1946.)

Formerly counsellor of the Belgian Embassy in London, he is well informed about and well disposed towards England. Intelligent and agreeable, but he has poor health and rather a pale personality. Both he and his French wife are most friendly.

Brazil

Minister: Abelardo Bretanha do Prado. (29th December, 1945.)

Came here from Rio de Janeiro and has just been appointed to Vienna. He makes no pretence of having anything to do here and time hangs heavily on his hands. He and his attractive wife are popular in Tehran society and often received by the Shah and Princess Ashraf.

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Chile

Minister: Manuel Garretón. (20th June, 1946.)

A political appointee who is reputed to have sympathy with the Extreme Left. He lives at Angora and during the few weeks he was in Persia he contrived to keep his political views under stern control, although at that time the star of the Tudeh was in the ascendant. I did not see much of him, but he made an agreeable impression.

China

Ambassador: Ye Tung Cheng. (24th September, 1946.)

Another political appointment. Has been away in Cairo since presenting his letters. He seems both intelligent and friendly.

Czechoslovakia

Minister: Miroslav Kudrat. (17th July, 1946.)

Has a considerable experience of commercial diplomacy and spent most of the last war in London. He and his wife are as pro-British as they can contrive to be without falling foul of other friends of the Soviet. They have obviously no hankering after a Communist revival.

Denmark

Chargé d'Affaires: M. A. E. C. Fensmark. (10th April, 1939.)

*Formerly the Danish Minister in Stockholm was accredited to Tehran also, but M. Fensmark is Chargé d'Affaires *en pied*. Born about 1890. Formerly in Angora, and before that was attached to the Danish Court. Speaks excellent English (has an English wife). Energetic, able, helpful and straightforward. Very strongly pro-Ally and detests the Germans and their policy towards his country. It was due, at least in part, to him that about one in five of the men in the Danish community volunteered to serve in the Allied forces. For several months he ignored telegrams from his Government instructing him to work with the German Legation here, but finally obeyed instructions to inform the

F 2

German Legation that he regarded his legation as neutral. (Written in 1941.)

*He maintained close relations with the Allied Legations, and after the signature of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty, when it was certain that Persia was finally in the Allied orbit, he adhered officially to the Free Danish movement and brought his whole community with him. (Written in 1942.)

Those to whom M. Fensmark pours out his troubles often find him lacking in a sense of proportion. His community is now split into two factions—for and against the legation, and although the dissidents are not an admirable band, it is probable that if M. Fensmark had been more sensible and less authoritarian he might have held the community together. (Written in 1945.)

Absent.

Egypt

Ambassador: Mahmoud Sabit Pasha. (4th April, 1945.)

Born about 1890. Finished his education at Cambridge, of which he has the happiest memories, and was employed in the newly-established Egyptian Legation in London for some years. His last post was that of Head of the Protocol in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Cairo. He and his wife and his daughter of 20 have become immediately popular. Mme. Sabit is related to the Queen of Egypt. Her daughter has become very friendly with the Queen of Persia, who will be all the better for the companionship of a sensible, good-humoured compatriot with a *savoir-faire* beyond her years.

Sabit Pasha is not a great mind, but he is very friendly and makes a pleasing impression of frankness and honesty. (Written in 1945.)

Absent.

France

Ambassador: M. Pierre Lafond. (29th March, 1944.)

*M. Lafond was born probably about 1895. He fought in the 1914-18 war and then entered the diplomatic service. He returned to the army in 1939, but after the defeat of France he obtained an appointment in Tunisia. His open antagonism to Vichy caused him to be arrested by the Germans and sent back to France, whence he escaped back to Tunis after the occupation of North Africa by the Allies.

From all British sources we have good reports of M. Lafond. He is rather effusive in language, but not the less sincere for that. He is an interesting and cultivated man, and a pleasant addition to the diplomatic corps. He speaks English quite well. His large family is still in Tunis. (Written in 1944.)

Greece

Chargé d'Affaires: Georges Coustas. (13th September, 1943.)

Rather a lightweight, but friendly. His wife, who comes from Istanbul, is musical and intelligent. They are well received in Tehran society.

Holy See

Apostolic Delegate: Vacant.

Mgr. Pappalardo, who is in charge, is not a very striking personality, but human and agreeable.

Iraq

Chargé d'Affaires: Ismail Hakki el Agha. (16th October, 1945.)

At one time a Turkish cavalry officer and reputed to have been a fine horseman, he is not active politically and spends most of his time keeping out of trouble, not without success.

Italy

Minister: Mario Porta. (1st August, 1946.)

A career diplomat who has been living in retirement during the latter part of the war. His last post was San Domingo and before that he was for some years counsellor at Bagdad, but he does not appear to like Persia. He is a good linguist and has an English wife of somewhat formidable aspect.

Lebanon

Chargé d'Affaires: Salim Haidar. (26th May, 1946.)

A young politician without diplomatic experience, but not without ideas. His wife is good-looking, but has little to say for herself.

Netherlands

Chargé d'Affaires: W. P. Montijn. (28th July, 1946.)

Before coming to Persia he served in Australia and before that in the United States. He speaks English well and is most friendly in a rather ponderous way. His wife, who is attractive and a good deal younger than he, was brought up in America. She is bilingual.

Norway

Minister: M. Rolf Otto Andvord. (20th April, 1942.) Resides in Moscow.

*Born 1890. He was for seven years a member of the Norwegian delegation to the League of Nations. He is a friendly, sociable colleague, gets on well with Persians and has done excellent work among them in the Allied cause. His visits to Tehran are short as most of his time is spent in Moscow. (Written in 1944.)

Poland

Chargé d'Affaires: Eugeniusz Jan Milnikiel. (3rd September, 1945.)

Quiet, thoughtful and, I think, sincere, but at present fully employed trying to maintain a precarious equilibrium on the Anglo-Soviet tight-rope.

Soviet Union

Ambassador: Ivan Vassilievitch Sadtschikov. (26th March, 1946.)

An amiable exponent of an unamiable policy. A youngish man, physically unimpressive, whose only experience of foreign countries hitherto has been at his previous post in Belgrade. He has admitted to feeling lost in Persia and is, I suspect, in the hands of advisers who are more unscrupulous than wise. He is said to be purist in the matter of ideology and to have been charged by some of his compatriots with ignoring practical issues. His health has been bad, but is said to be improving. He has learnt a little French since he arrived in Persia and cultivates a cordial manner. Mme. Sadtschikov seems to be a negative quantity.

Sweden

Minister: Harald Pousette. (6th December, 1945.)

During the war he has served both in England and in Germany. Competent and sociable, but rather smooth. Has an agreeable wife and they both speak good English.

Switzerland

Chargé d'Affaires: Charles-Edouard de Baviat. (21st May, 1945.)

Formerly in Rome. A pleasant lightweight colleague. He is much preoccupied with his wife's bad health. Speaks good English.

Syria

Minister: Assad Haroun. (19th March, 1946.)

Agreeable and humorous and probably more shrewd than profound. He is well-informed and disposed to be friendly.

Turkey

Ambassador: Kemal Köprülü. (24th May, 1945.)

Friendly, well-informed and full of good sense. He is one of the outstanding members of the Diplomatic Corps, of which he became dean a few weeks ago. Formerly in Kabul.

United States

Ambassador: George Venable Allen. (11th May, 1946.)

Born in 1903, he was in the State Department for some years before being appointed here, but had previously served abroad in the Far East and in Canada. Single-minded, lucid and sincere, but in no sense a bore. It would be difficult to imagine a better choice for this post. He and his pleasant wife are on excellent terms with the Shah and Princess Ashraf. Sometimes a trifle precipitate.

Yugoslavia

Minister: Asim Alihodzie. (10th September, 1945.)

Another performer on the Anglo-Soviet tight-rope and not a very graceful one. His cordiality, though spasmodic, is generally disconcerting.

(B) Tehran Intelligence Summaries

[E 9813/315/34]

No. 24

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 37, Secret, for the Period 16th September to 22nd September, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 389 of 25th September; Received 2nd October.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

NO further progress has been made in the conversations between the Central Government and the Azerbaijan Delegation, and it appears that an impasse has been reached. The Minister for War has stated that, on the one hand, the delegation has been presenting impossible demands for armaments and money to the Central Government, and, on the other, is seeking to impose its will on that Government so as to achieve the production of an agreement which will be sufficiently vague to satisfy the Prime Minister that he can carry out the elections and yet, thereafter, leave Azerbaijan free to pursue its object of complete autonomy and of the further dissemination of Communist influence throughout the country. Their efforts are being resisted.

2. Closely connected to these discussions are those of Zenjan. During the week the press has been publishing reports to the effect that the Central Government gendarmerie had moved up to Zenjan from Qazvin and that an agreement had been reached which comprised the following terms:—

- That the Government accepted responsibility for disarming the tribes of the Northern Khamseh (Zenjan) area, especially the Zulfaghari.
- That Tabriz recognised the right of the Central Government to control Zenjan and would, accordingly, evacuate their forces from the area.
- That the gendarmerie of Zenjan would consist of two companies from the Central Government and two companies of locally recruited "Fidais," while command would be exercised by officers selected by Tehran.

However, Sunday's papers announce that the force has not yet left Qazvin and that new difficulties have arisen in the discussions. This is confirmed by the Minister for War, who states that a delegate visited Zenjan from Tabriz with specific instructions that the talks there must be kept going until a settlement is arrived at in Tehran.

3. Consequent on the allegations made by Muzaffar Firuz of the complicity of British officials and, in particular, of the Consul-General at Ahwaz in the Bakhtiari plot of revolt, His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador visited the Prime Minister and later Firuz to protest against the attitude of the Persian Government and to request to see the proofs supporting the accusation. The Prime Minister was seriously embarrassed; but Firuz maintained his original assertion, even though the only documentary evidence he could produce was a letter of introduction from the Governor of Burujird introducing Mr. Trott to Abul Qasim and a second from the editor of a provincial newspaper warning Abul Qasim of his impending arrival. He stated that a great mass of evidence

would come up at the trial, but could not be produced before it. It appears that the Bakhtiari leaders may have tried to minimise their guilt by laying the blame on Mr. Trott, and that Firuz expects the ambassador to fall in with this solution and, making Mr. Trott the scapegoat, to remove him from the country.

4. Firuz, meanwhile, is further embarrassed by the necessity for the production of evidence for the army. The Minister for War states that he has asked Firuz for it so that the military authorities may proceed with the enquiry into Colonel Hejazi's behaviour. Firuz has so far managed to evade producing it. The Minister for War said that he was sure that, as soon as he did, Hejazi would be cleared and he himself would be able "to attack" and demand an enquiry into Firuz's actions.

5. Firuz, stung by the Prime Minister's allusions to lack of respect to army officers (published as an appendix to last week's Intelligence Summary), published a reply to the effect that, contrary to the belief entertained in certain quarters, the Prime Minister was not making an indirect reference to the arrest of Colonel Hejazi.

Internal Security.

Fars.

6. The rumours of the intention of the Qashgai to go ahead with their plan of revolt irrespective of the fate of the Bakhtiari (see last week's Intelligence Summary, paragraph 7) have been proved correct by the events of the week. Reza Hikmat (Governor-General of Kerman) arrived in Shiraz early in the week on an official mission to the tribe from the Central Government and immediately visited Naser Khan. Khusro Khan said that he had brought assurances from the Prime Minister that he would do whatever they wanted, and added that Hikmat was a genuine supporter of the tribe. Hikmat later visited Naser again accompanied by the Governor-General. Meanwhile, reports became current of Qashgai tribesmen assembling in the hills and raiding on the Bushire-Shiraz road. A deputation later went out from the town to visit Naser Khan and assure him of their collaboration provided he promised immunity in return. After this events moved swiftly. Naser Khan is reported to have presented the following demands with an ultimatum expiring on the 21st to the Government:—

- (a) Release of the arrested Bakhtiari leaders.
- (b) Removal of Government officials from Fars.
- (c) Dismissal of Tudeh Party Ministers from the Cabinet.
- (d) Arrest of Tudeh Party leaders in Fars.

Action followed quickly on these steps and by Saturday army reports indicated that all small gendarmerie posts south of Shiraz had been disarmed and that the garrisons at Kazerun, Ardekan, Khormuj and Bushire were surrounded by tribesmen. The General Staff say that they are sending a relief column from Tehran on the 22nd morning. (For further details see "Army" paragraphs.) All traffic on the Shiraz-Bushire road has ceased and telegraphic communications with Bushire and the rest of the country have been cut. One interesting point about the above is that the surrounding of Bushire implies that the tribes of the littoral have risen in support of the Qashgai.

7. A summary of the events leading up to the present situation provided by His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, is attached at Appendix "A."

8. It is stated that the Governor-General of Fars and Reza Hikmat are due to arrive in Tehran on the 23rd.

9. The Minister for War appears perplexed about the method of handling the situation. On the one side he sees in the Qashgai a weapon to use in the defeat of the Tudeh, and, therefore, desires to placate them; on the other, he fears the possibility that the Russians may have a hand in the affair, that this is the second stage of the dismemberment of Persia, and that, in consequence, it is necessary to crush it mercilessly and speedily.

Khorassan.

10. Ten to twelve thousand people are reported to have emigrated from Qainat, which is in the grip of famine, to Khorassan, and, although wheat has been promised from Khorassan, nothing has been sent as yet. In addition, it is reported, sheep, cattle and other animals, including plough ones, have been moved up to Khorassan, where they are being bought by the Russians for export. In consequence it is feared that there may be a shortage of stock for breeding purposes and that the sowing of next year's crop will be seriously affected by the shortage of plough animals.

11. His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General in his report for August refers to the continuance of Russian activity in the area. After the ban on visits by Persians to foreign representatives, visitors to their consulate, although decreasing considerably in number, did not cease. Moreover, contacts are maintained through other means, such as the Cultural Society (VOKS), the Trade Agency Intourist, and the air service and hospital. Branches of cultural societies were opened during the month at Meshed and Sabzawar and meetings are regularly and well attended by both official and non-official Persians. In contrast to this, although English language classes have been well attended, the consulate-general has received only three visitors from the date of the ban and former friends seem to be living in an atmosphere of fear.

Khuzistan.

12. From the monthly report of His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General it appears that during August the activities of the Soviet Consul in Ahwaz and his associates had been little diminished. He is reported to have gone to Abadan on the 11th and visited an official of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and again to Khorramshahr on the 11th; furthermore his associates have more than once been over to Basra on various pretexts. Beyond this he has made no secret of his interest in the Arabs and has certainly made attempts to get into contact with Sheikh Chassib Khaz'al and other Arab personalities on the Persian side of the Shatt-el-Arab. On the 31st August the Governor-General arrested a suspected agent in an Ahwaz suburb near the military barracks in consequence of the considerable visiting that had been going on between that area and the Soviet Consulate.

Persian Army.

13. The General Staff find themselves considerably embarrassed at the constant demands on their reserves. With many units already out from the capital in Khuzistan, Kurdistan, Qazvin, Gilan and Gurgan, they are now called upon to meet the emergency in Fars. The divisions of the capital appear to be strengthened by the induction of a very large percentage of recruits, who now have three to four months' training; nor are these up to the usual standard in that the necessity of reconstituting the lost 3rd (Azerbaijan) Division and of providing units to form a basis for the new 11th (Gilan) and 12th (Gurgan) Divisions has meant the calling up of conscripts down to the age of 17 years, whereas the usual age is 21.

14. However, the General Staff were able to send a battalion to Isfahan last week and this week-end are preparing a regiment numbering (according to the Chief of the General Staff) about 2,000.

15. In spite of this he appears reasonably cheerful about the future and says that, giving the requisite international background situation, he can, when called upon to do so, reoccupy Azerbaijan and bring it under control with the use of only two regiments.

16. Sarlashgar Zahedi, Inspector to the 6th and 9th Divisions in the Ministry of War, has been sent down to Fars and assumes control of the operations of those divisions. This, so the Minister of War states, is normal practice.

17. Sarhang Ghulam Reza Saqafi arrived in Khuzistan and assumed command of the division on the 18th September.

18. The units of the 1st (Tehran) Division completed their training at Lashgarak Camp on the 18th, with final manoeuvres before the Shah. The camp is now closed down for the winter.

19. The divisional commander of the 10th (Khuzistan) Division has written to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company asking for barracks to be built for permanent garrisons of 300 men at Masjid-i-Sulaiman and Agha Jari and for 120 men at Haft Kel. The company have agreed to do it.

20. The combatant units available in the south to meet the threat of the Qashgai and littoral tribes consist of three infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment and four batteries of artillery. The 10th (Hamleh) Cavalry Regiment from Tehran, which was down in Fars earlier in the year, has been disbanded for lack of horses. If faced with a general rising throughout Fars these forces, scattered as they are over widely-scattered lines of communication from Abadeh in the north-west to Darab in the south-east and Bushire in the south, would probably be tied to the ground and incapable of taking effective offensive action against the tribes. Instead, they would be hard put to it to maintain their garrisons, many of which are only of a company strength: these, if invested for

any considerable period of time, would probably have to surrender for lack of supplies. The garrison at Bushire, for example, reported on the 21st that it had supplies sufficient for twenty days. The garrisons actually surrounded at the date of writing are as below:—

- (a) At Bushire: One battalion less one company.
- (b) At Kazerun: Brigade headquarters, one battalion and two companies.
- (c) At Khormuj: One company.
- (d) At Ardekan: One company.

The garrison of one company of Borazjan is reported to have withdrawn to Kazerun.

21. The Chief of the General Staff has stated that the army finds itself with insufficient funds in hand from the budget allotment of the current year to meet *in toto* the requested prepayment for the arms ordered from Great Britain (see Intelligence Summary No. 28 dated 21st July, paragraph 13). In consequence he has requested that they be permitted to make an immediate payment of 50 per cent. of the sum involved and a payment of the balance after the opening of the next financial year (*i.e.*, after the 22nd March, 1947). His request has been referred to the War Office.

Appointments.

Civil.

22. Mohammed Qawam to be Director-General of the Prime Minister's office. Ghulam Ali Khwajeh-nuri (Nisam-us-Sultan) to be Director of the Inspection Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Hussain Ashtiani to be Director-General of the Ministry of Finance.

Ali Askar Shahabi to be Director of Education in Khuzistan.

Mustashar-ud-Dowleh Sadiq and Alayar Saleh have resigned from the Board of Directors of the Industrial Bank. Ashtari, Musavizadeh, Dr. Mohsin Nasr, and Hassan Khwajeh-nuri have been appointed. Ezaz Nikpay, Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Prime Minister, has been granted ministerial rank.

Rahnema, recently Persian Minister in Paris, to be Persian Minister to Syria.

Rahnema's post in Paris has been taken over, it is understood, by Anushirwan Sepahbudi, who is at present representing Persia at the Peace Conference.

Military.

Sarlashgar Ghulam Mahmud Baharmast to be Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

General.

23. The Prime Minister has issued a circular to governors-general and governors ordering them to prevent unfriendly references to foreign Powers in political speeches.

Appendix "A."

THE first step towards obtaining autonomy for Fars was made by local Democrat Party, which telegraphed to the Prime Minister last spring asking that Fars should be given the same measure of autonomy as Azerbaijan. The Prime Minister did not reply. The Democrat Party in question has no connexion with the other parties in Persia calling themselves Democrats. It was originally formed at the instigation of Wassmuss during the 1914-18 war in order to further German designs in Persia and was pro-German and anti-British. The party was revived in 1944 as a local Conservative party that had discarded its former anti-British orientation.

2. The next step was taken by tribes of the littoral of the Persian Gulf, who made a pact to settle their disputes amicably in assembly by majority vote and to work together for the good of the country.

3. Signatories of this pact wished to extend its scope to cover leading tribal and political groups in Fars and so first invited the Qashgai, which is the largest tribal confederation in Fars, to subscribe to it.

4. The Qashgai, who, when this approach was made to them, considered the Prime Minister's new party as the best defence against growing encroachment of Tudeh Party, had just announced their adherence to the Prime Minister's

party, and so the attempt to include them in the pact made on the littoral was unsuccessful.

5. When, however, the names of the Central Committee of the Prime Minister's party were announced and it was seen that Tudeh supporters were amongst them the Qashgai changed their mind about the effectiveness of the Prime Minister's party for resisting the Tudeh Party and decided to adhere to the pact of the littoral.

6. Within a very short time the Mamassani-Doshmanziari tribes had joined and a working arrangement had been made with the Khamseh tribes. Their present action has been precipitated by the recent reshuffle of the Cabinet to include three members of the Tudeh Party and by steps immediately taken by the new Ministers to remove serving department officials in Fars and to replace them by members of the Tudeh Party.

7. Although led by the Qashgai, the movement for autonomy embraces all tribal elements in Fars, that is Turks (Qashgai), Lurs (Mamassani-Doshmanziari) and Arabs (Khamseh). It has also the support of the local Democrat Party and of an overwhelming majority of the townspeople of Shiraz and the people of the province. Local Tudeh Party, although lavishly supplied from outside with funds and newsprint, has a derisory provincial membership.

[E 10039/315/34]

No. 25

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 38, Secret, for the Period 23rd September to 29th September, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 405 of 2nd October; Received 8th October.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THERE have been no events of importance in the capital. A cloak of silence covers the deadlock in the Azerbaijan talks, while all attention is directed towards the progress of events in Fars.

Internal Security.

Fars.

2. Events in Fars during the past week fall into two categories, that of military operations and that of political negotiations.

3. In the first category detailed news is not available in that communications are bad. However the main fact emerges that the garrisons of the 6th Division have so far stood their ground and that the relief column despatched from Tehran has been halted at Abadeh pending the outcome of political negotiations. Although skirmishing is reported from Ardekan, fighting has so far been confined to Kazerun and Bushire. At the former town the tribes are reported to have launched two attacks which the military have repulsed without difficulty. At Bushire the tribes, apparently under the leadership of Hayat Daud, have invested the town at the north end of the peninsular and confined the Government forces to their barracks at the south end; inconclusive skirmishing is in progress. The Divisional Headquarters have been maintaining contact with their isolated forces by aerial reconnaissance. Shiraz remains unmolested by tribal forces. His Majesty's Consul reports the surrender of Government forces in Bushire on the evening of the 28th. No reason for this is yet known, but the cause was probably shortage of water. Aerial machine-gunning and bombing of the tribes has been started on a light scale. The house of the British consulate doctor has been looted. British subjects are being concentrated in the Residency, Cables and Wireless offices and consulate, all of which are clearly visible from the air and remote from military targets.

4. In the political sphere, Reza Hikmat and the Governor-General of Fars arrived in Tehran at the beginning of the week. Negotiations were subsequently initiated by radio talks between the Prime Minister and Naser Khan. These produced no result and a commission was despatched from the capital to continue negotiations. This consisted of Ezaz Nikpay, Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Prime Minister, Reza Hikmat, General Saffari, Chief of Police, and Javad Bushiri, ex-Majlis Deputy.

5. Prior to the arrival of this commission Naser Khan had despatched a sweeping nine-point demand to the Government demanding such steps as the

dissolution of the Cabinet. After meetings with Naser, the Government Commission has telegraphed to Tehran a modified demand comprising the following five points:—

- (a) The institution of general and area councils in Fars.
- (b) The addition of two Ministers without portfolio to the existing Cabinet.
- (c) The withdrawal and replacement of the present military commander in Fars.
- (d) The control of the gendarmerie to come under Mohammed Hussein Khan Qashgai.
- (e) The appointment of Government officials only with the prior approval of the people of the province.

The most noteworthy point of these latest demands is the complete abandonment of reference to the removal of the Tudeh from the Government and from Fars.

6. In a fulsome and wordy telegram Qawam-us-Saltaneh has replied accepting demands (a), (c) and, "providing it does not upset the carrying out of Government plans," (e). Demands (b) and (d) he has rejected. The telegram is concluded with a warning that, if the Qashgai continue to agitate, measures will be taken to disperse the tribal forces.

7. Communications continue to be in the hands of the Qashgai and Anglo-Iranian Oil Company tankers have been stopped *en route* to Shiraz coming both from the direction of Bushire and that of Isfahan. On the intervention of the British Consul some of the latter have been allowed through.

Isfahan.

8. The British Consul reports that martial law, which was imposed at the time of the arrests of the Bakhtiari leaders, is working well and is welcomed by all except the Tudeh and the Russians. The town is quiet except for sporadic attempts on the part of the former to undermine the military control. The majority of the Bakhtiari tribes have now moved to their winter quarters in the south.

9. The counsellor of the Russian Embassy arrived in the town on the 15th September, and one of his chief objects appeared to be to ascertain if the imposition of martial law was genuine or a put up job by the Government.

Khuzistan.

10. During the week the military garrisons, except that of Masjid-i-Sulaiman, which were guarding the various oil-field areas, were withdrawn to their respective centres. The Chief of the General Staff said that this was a move of reorganisation, and that the alarm of the oil company at the way in which their employees were thus left unprotected was unjustified in that the military had been replaced by gendarmerie. So far there is no indication that the Fars revolt will spread to Khuzistan; on the contrary, there is the superficial reassurance of the declaration of the tribes round Behbahan that they are loyal to the Central Government.

11. In the Arab areas the Governor-General is growing agitated at the increasing restlessness of the Arab tribes and considers that he will have to arrest various sheikhs if he is to prevent a flare-up between their followers and the Tudeh. However, he hesitates to do so for he fears the loss consequent on such an action of supporters in his efforts to keep the Tudeh in hand. He is using Sheikh Chassib as an agent to persuade various sheikhs of the Abadan and Khorramshahr areas to come to Ahwaz. His suasions are backed by threat of arrest at the hands of the military if they do not do so. As he has already arrested Sheikh Sayid Baqir Nazzari, although he released him three days later against a promise that he would not return to Khorramshahr, the Arabs have little grounds for confidence. In fact they regard Chassib as a traitor and two sheikhs have stated to the British Consul-General in Basra that they have no confidence in the Central Government and intend to resist. They said that they passed this information on in case the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company installations should become involved.

12. The other threat to security, the Tudeh Party, continues to present a tranquil surface and to hold small meetings in secret. A few days ago they sent a telegram to their headquarters in Tehran saying that they could endure the "oppression" of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company officials no longer and asking for instructions: to this they received a reply that they should do nothing for the present. Meanwhile, the fourth anniversary celebrations of the party are due

to commence on the 1st October and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company are apprehensive of developments.

13. The triple threat to the security of British lives and property represented by the circumstances recounted above has been brought to the attention of the Chief of the General Staff. He has replied that there was no undue cause for concern and that, so far as the Tudeh were concerned, there would be no relaxation of military law during the period of their celebrations. He further said he would send a signal to the Divisional Commander to order him to consult with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company manager in Ahwaz to ensure that the interests of the company were fully protected.

Kermanshah.

14. Abbas Qubadian, Amir-i-Makhsus, has expressed the hope of starting action similar to that of the Qashgai and said that, when he formed a union of tribes of this area in May last, he had been in touch with the Qashgai and Bakhtiari. He went on to say that he did not want to do anything subversive, but he felt that the Prime Minister was selling the country to the Russians and that the tribesmen, who were very restless, would have to take matters into their own hands.

15. The Tudeh Press has continued to attack the oil company and also has published an article attacking the British Ambassador for his alleged connexion with the Isfahan events.

Khorassan.

16. The sugar factory at Meshed was burnt down on the night of the 23rd September. This event, occurring just when the beet crop was ready, will not only cause a loss of about 6,000 tons of sugar to the Government, but will also cause serious loss to cultivators and create considerable unemployment.

Azerbaijan.

17. The unsettled conditions prevailing in the province have necessitated the despatch of bodies of "Fidais" to Shahpur and Khoi against the Kurds, to Ardebil and Astara against irregular forces operating there, and to Zenjan and Miandub to counter possible encroachment by Government forces. In consequence of all these demands Tabriz is entirely divested of its forces of Fidais.

18. It appears that Qazi Mohammed's Kurds have broken their uneasy alliance with the Azerbaijan Democrats. Uniformed bands have occupied Rezaieh, have surrounded a village eight miles to the north, and have control of the road running from that town to Shahpur.

19. There is increasing impatience at the failure of the Azerbaijan delegation to achieve results in its talks with the Central Government, and Pishevari has attacked "reactionary" elements in the Government for deliberately delaying negotiations.

20. Owing to its acute financial embarrassment the Provincial Government is making heavy and immediate demands in respect of earlier "under-assessment" for taxes. Failure to meet these demands is resulting in imprisonment and sequestration of property.

21. Another step of some severity is the publication of an order to landlords and peasants to hand grain in amounts, and at prices, fixed by the Government. Failure to do so is punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment with hard labour.

Kerman.

22. The Divisional Commander has gone to Sirjan to initiate operations against the tribes of that area, notably the Buchakchis, who have been growing increasingly restless. Military reinforcements have also been sent down and the press reports an engagement in the area.

23. The Divisional Commander further contemplates disarmament operations against Baluchi tribesmen which he hopes to start on the 23rd October. He asserts that the scheme as a whole is one of settlement and improvement of the conditions of the Baluchi Sirdars in order to bring them more under control and to prevent them being infected with communism. He has one million rials to further the schemes for improvements but expects difficulties as he has approached the British Consul at Kerman to get the co-operation of the Indian authorities to prevent the flight of tribesmen across the frontier.

Appointments.

Military.

24. Sarlashgar Pourzand has been appointed a Special Inspector in the Ministry for War.

Sartip She'ri has not been appointed commander of the 3rd Division as reported in Intelligence Summary No. 36, paragraph 18.

Sarhang Mir Hussain Hashemi to be commander of the 3rd Division.

Civil.

M. Nayer Nuri to be Director-General of the Department of Press and Propaganda.

Dr. Azmudoh to be Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.

M. Nasir Ali Hejazi to be Farmandar of Demavand.

M. Mohammed Taqi Rafi'i (Nizam-ud-Douleh) to be Farmandar of Rezaieh.

M. Kerim Mobassir Roshan to be Farmandar of Kashan.

M. Ihtesham-ud-Douleh Qaragozlu to be Director of the Personnel Department in the Ministry of Labour.

Dr. Shahpur Bakhtiari to be Technical Adviser to the Ministry of Labour.

Russian Interests.

25. M. Sichov, Chief of the Middle East Section of the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, arrived at Tehran on the 25th September.

Military.

26. A communiqué issued by the Chief of the General Staff reports an unprecedentedly high number of candidates for the Officers' School.

Commercial.

27. The press reports that the Government has given permission for the export to Russia during the current year (i.e., up to the 22nd March, 1947), of 2,650 head of cattle, 175,000 sheep and 300 camels.

Tailpiece.

28. Owing to its failure to pay its telephone bill, the Tehran Municipality has had all its telephones disconnected.

[E 10273/315/34]

No. 26

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 39, Secret, for the Period 30th September to 6th October, 1946. (Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 418 of 9th October; Received 16th October)

Persian Affairs

Political

EVIDENCE has become available of a desire in military circles, presumably supported by Right-wing elements, to overthrow the present Government by a *coup d'état*. The first approach was made on 21st September by the Minister for War through the assistant military attaché to the ambassador for advice as to how he was to handle the Qashgai situation so as to gain the maximum advantage for His Majesty's Government and for the Persian Government. This matter was referred to London. On 3rd October the Minister for War returned to the charge expressing extreme regret at the failure by the embassy to supply him with a "plan." From this he went on to suggest a complete change of Government either by engineering a *coup d'état* through the Palace or by forcing Qawam-us-Saltaneh to reconstitute his Government. In both cases, he went on to say, the influence of the British Ambassador would be necessary to persuade either the Shah or Qawam to take the requisite steps, and the parties concerned would need assurance of future British and American support in consequent difficulties with Russia. It appears that military circles are really deeply interested in such a project, but that the approach is complicated by rivalry and distrust between the Minister for War and the Chief of the General Staff. This latter supposition is confirmed by a query made in the last approach as to which of the two His Majesty's Government would support. At the same time

the Prime Minister appears to be considering some change in his policy. He has told the United States Ambassador of his intention to initiate a radical change of policy which would be less conciliatory to the Azerbaijani and other Left-wing elements, but only provided he was assured in advance of adequate financial and economic support from the United States. He also said that he had now decided to attend the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations. In this connexion another rumour is also current that he intends to bring up once more Persia's case before the Security Council.

2. In a meeting with the British Ambassador on 2nd October the question of the accusations launched against Mr. Trott was discussed (see Intelligence Summary No. 37, paragraph 3). The Prime Minister expressed readiness to examine the case in the light of Mr. Trott's report and in view of His Majesty's Government's assurance of the non-complicity of Mr. Trott. He also appeared extremely interested in His Majesty's Government's suggestion of an official disclaimer to make it clear that the Qashgai and other rebels could hope for no assistance from the British.

3. His Imperial Majesty the Shah signed on 5th October the royal proclamation to authorise the holding of the next parliamentary elections. According to a Court official, hitherto found reliable, the Persian Prime Minister told the Shah that the Russian Ambassador had informed him that his Government could not accept any more lame excuses for delay and that, in consequence, he was powerless to refuse the Russian Ambassador's demand, and that, if the Shah were to refuse to sign the proclamation, the Soviet Ambassador would know that it was the Shah and not the Persian Government who was obstructing them. How the Persian Government can hold elections with the country in its present state it is difficult to see. The provinces of Azerbaijan and Khamseh are under complete Democrat control. Gilan, Mazandaran and Gorgan are virtually run by the Tudeh. Kurdistan is under Kurdish control. Fars is a battlefield and Kerman-shah likely to become one.

4. Reports, which are not confirmed from official sources, are current to the effect that Russia has asked Persia to repudiate the Sa'adabad Pact and that M. Sichov has already negotiated successfully a preliminary oil prospecting and boring concession which is not dependent on ratification by the Majlis. Another rumour is current to the effect that M. Sadchikof, unwilling to risk the danger of returning to Moscow from his mission in Persia empty handed, negotiated on the eve of his departure an agreement for a monopoly of air services in the north.

5. The arrested Bakhtiari leaders, with the exception of Johanshah Khan (see paragraph 5 of Intelligence Summary No. 36), have been released from imprisonment and have moved to their houses in Tehran where they remain under surveillance. Abul Qasim arrived in the capital on Saturday night, but the purpose of his visit is not yet known.

Internal Security

Fars

6. Military operations in Fars have moved to a climax during the week and the tribes have gained undisputed control of a large part of southern Fars. The garrison at Khormuj was reported on 2nd October to have surrendered, and on the 5th came confirmation of the collapse of Kazerun after twelve days fighting. The garrison appears to have acquitted itself well up to the end for they were heavily outnumbered, a gathering estimated at 5,000 tribesmen having been resisted by a force of 600-700 military. The Chief of the General Staff states that the force only surrendered after their ammunition had been exhausted, and this is confirmed by the consul at Shiraz, who states that 2,000 rifles and three machine-guns were captured, but (for the tribesmen) disappointingly little ammunition. He also reports that the garrison hoisted a white flag in token of surrender and then machine-gunned the tribesmen as they closed in, in retaliation for which they were massacred. At Bushire, the surrender of which was reported last week, a similar slaughter of the defenders appears to have taken place. At the end of the siege two consulate houses standing near the gendarmerie barracks were bombed by low-flying Persian army planes. No facts are available about the surrender of Khormuj. Shiraz became the target of a tribal attack on the morning of 3rd October, but, though fighting continued until the evening of the next day, the actions appear to have been of a desultory nature. On that evening, the relief column, having fought its way through tribal opposition across the Merv Dasht plain, reached the town. The British Consul reports that the army appear to have no intention of defending the town, but are

concentrating in the barracks, which lie outside the town, where they have laid in considerable stocks of supplies and are digging wells. Casualties on both sides in these various engagements appear to have been comparatively slight. At Jahrum, the remaining headquarters of Fars troops, there have so far been no engagements. The troops in the area have been concentrated against an expected attack, and the consul reports that Khosro Qashgai has sent 600 riflemen in that direction to start operations.

7. British families are standing by to leave Bushire and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company have been asked to provide a plane for those in Shiraz to enable them to reach Bushire.

8. A statement of forces in Fars as at 5th October, which has been supplied by the Chief of the General Staff, is attached as an appendix to this summary.

9. Meanwhile, as regards political negotiations, General Zahedi told the consul at Shiraz that the Qashgai were not pleased at the reply of the Prime Minister to their demands, and that he was hoping to induce Qawam-us-Saltaneh to give some sort of a post to Naser Khan. Negotiations are reported to have broken down owing to the absence of guarantees and as a result of Naser's fears that General Zahedi is trying to eliminate him and take over leadership of the movement himself. That he has grounds for such a fear is shown by Zahedi's statement to the consul that if he were to stay two months in Fars he could create a *bloc* to include Kurdistan and Isfahan to which the Government could refuse nothing.

Khuzistan

10. The Governor-General is reported to be nervous of the Fars revolt spreading from the Arab tribes of that area up the coast to those of this province. The Chief of the General Staff has stated that he is moving the infantry battalion at present in Khorramshahr to Hindijan to guard against such an eventuality. The companies moved from Gach Saran and Agha Jari (see last week's Intelligence Summary, paragraph 11), have returned.

Azerbaijan

11. The British Consul-General reports that the Kurds have now evacuated Rezaieh, which they had taken last week. Qazi Mohammed is said to have reached an agreement with the Provincial Government to divide the revenues of Khoi, Shahpur, Mianduab and Rezaieh and Kurds are reported to be installed already in government offices in accordance with this agreement. Moreover, the Kurds are enlisting soldiers at a monthly rate of 80 to 120 Tomans, a sum considerably in excess of that paid by the Provincial Government, in consequence of which "Fidais" are deserting to them with their rifles. In this area, too, the writ of the local government does not appear to run. "General" Daneshian, who has been in touch with the Soviet Consul at Rezaieh, appears to be the sole authority and recently refused passage to the United States Vice-Consul, even though he had a pass issued by the Provincial Government. Finally, to complete a scene of confusion, there are rumours of Shahsavan risings starting again in eastern Azerbaijan; and the Minister for War has said that the recently-established military garrison at Resht are providing the tribe with arms and ammunition.

Khorassan

12. The fire at the Meshed sugar factory, which was reported last week, does not now appear to have been as serious as was at first thought. The Government inspector has reported that he can repair the damage within six weeks and thereby save the sugar-beet crop, which has been especially good this year and should yield 12,000 to 14,000 tons, *i.e.*, about twice the normal output. Meanwhile the Russians, taking advantage of the situation, are selling their loaf sugar in the bazaar at 77 rials per kilog.

Savah

13. Mohammed Ali Samsam, the chief of the Baghaadi Shahsavan, who are another branch of the Azerbaijan tribe of that name, is the latest tribal representative to display a restless anxiety about the situation. His anxiety, however, is lest the Azerbaijan Democrats should infiltrate further south-east and overrun his territory, but this anxiety is extended to resentment against a Government which permits such a state of affairs. The threat to territory in which this tribe moves has been increased by the arrival of "Democrat" forces in the Takistan area consequent on the withdrawal of picquets from the Zenjan "frontier." Samsam is an excitable character who talks a lot but does little: nevertheless he has been in contact with the Qashgai, with Abbas Qubadian as

representing the Kermanshah tribes, and with the Zulfiqaris and Azerbaijan Shahsavan. In consequence a further deterioration in the present situation might drive him into taking action. His main preoccupation at present is to obtain arms for such an eventuality, and he has approached, as yet without success, the Chief of the General Staff to obtain a supply.

Russian Interests

14. The Russian Ambassador, M. Sadtchikof, left for Moscow by plane on leave on 1st October. It is generally understood that he will not be returning. The final close of the Russian Consulate at Zabul (see Intelligence Summary No. 30, paragraph 9) has been achieved with the departure of its secretary to Meshed. The reading room still functions under a Persian.

15. On 30th September the Soviet Ambassador presented decorations awarded to Persians for services rendered during the war. The recipients numbered in all thirty-five, including the following army officers:—

- (1) Sarlashgar Ruhullah Kaikavussi: Order of the Red Banner.
- (2) Sarlashgar Ismail Shafai: Order of the Red Banner.
- (3) Sarlashgar Safar Ali Ansari: Order of the Red Banner of Labour.
- (4) Sarhang Ibrahim Vali: Order of the Red Star.
- (5) Sartip Sayyid Mahmud Mir-Jalalli: Order of the Red Star.
- (6) Sarhang Aziz Ishtudakh: Order of the Red Star.
- (7) Sarhang Mahmud Imami: Order of the Red Star.
- (8) Sargurd Naser Alavi: Order of Honour.

No. (1) was Director of Arsenal and was responsible for the manufacture of the rifles and machine pistols made under contract for the Russians.

No. (2) is Persian Military Attaché in Moscow.

No. (3) held an important post on the Iranian State Railway during the Aid to Russia period.

Lebanese Interests

16. Reference Intelligence Summary No. 21, paragraph 16, M. Salim Bey Heydar, has presented his letters of credence as minister and not as *chargé d'affaires*.

Appointments

"A"—Military

17. Sarhang Gilanshah to be Head of the 2nd Bureau, General Staff.

"B"—Civil

Dr. Mohsin Qarib to be Director-General of Personnel in the Ministry of Finance.

Dr. Kaviani to be Director-General of Inspection in the Ministry of Finance.

Pasyar-dovum Abdullah Mujab to be Chief of Police, Ahwaz.

Kazim Naraqi to be Director of the Cipher and Confidential Department of the Ministry of Labour and Propaganda.

Abul Hasan Sadiqi, Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Roads, to be Director-General of the State Railways *vice* Engineer Musaddiq transferred to the Ministry of Roads and Communications, and retains his present post.

Appendix

Order of Battle—6th (Fars) Division and Adjacent Garrisons as at 5th October, 1946

(A) 6th Division

(1) Main Garrison—Shiraz—

- 1 Infantry regiment (15th) plus 1 company and 2 M.M.G. sections.
- 1 Cavalry regiment (6th) less 2 troops.
- 1 Mortar company.
- 1 35-mm. anti-tank gun company.
- 1 76-mm. gun battery.
- 1 75-mm. gun battery.
- 2 Medium tanks.

(2) *Relief Column from Central Garrison—**Shiraz—*

- 3 Infantry battalions.
- 1 Mortar company.
- 3 Light tanks.
- 3 Medium tanks.
- 1 Armoured car.
- 1 105-mm. gun battery.

Pul-i-Khan—

- 1 Infantry company.
- 1 M.M.G. platoon.
- 1 Cavalry troop.
- 1 Armoured car (also one gendarmerie regiment).

Ardekan—

- 1 Infantry company.
- 1 M.M.G. platoon.
- 1 Light tank.
- 1 Radio detachment.

Jahrum—

- 1 Infantry regiment (17th) less 1 company, rifle and M.M.G. platoon.
- 1 Cavalry battalion less 2 troops.
- 1 Artillery battery.
- 1 Radio detachment.

Lar—

- 1 Infantry battalion.

(B) *9th Division**Abadeh—*

- 1 Infantry company (25th Regiment).
- 3 Cavalry troops (2 ex Deh Bid).
- 1 Medium tank.
- 1 Light tank.
- 1 Radio detachment.

Shahreza—

- 2 Infantry platoons.
- 2 Cavalry squadrons.
- 2 Cavalry M.M.G. troops.

Aminabad—

- 1 Cavalry squadron plus 1 M.M.G. troop.
- 1 Infantry platoon.

Isfahan—

- 1 Rifle company and 1 M.M.G. company (24th Regiment).
- 2 Infantry battalions (25th Regiment).
- 1 Cavalry squadron and 1 M.M.G. troop.
- 1 Mortar platoon.
- 1 75-mm. battery.

(C) *Surrendered Forces of 6th Division**Kazerun—*

- 1 Infantry battalion less 1 company.
- 1 Cavalry M.M.G. troop.
- 1 76-mm. battery.
- 1 Light tank.

Bushire—

- 2 Infantry companies.
- 3 M.M.G. sections.

Khormuj—

- 1 Infantry company.
- 1 M.M.G. section.

[E 10491/315/34]

No. 27

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 40, Secret, for the Period 7th October to 13th October, 1946. (Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 426 of 16th October; Received 23rd October)

*Persian Affairs**Political*

THE Minister of War's *coup d'état* has turned out to be a very small mouse and there has been no need to discourage further the gallant old man by conveying to him the message received from the Foreign Office in answer to his request for guidance made to His Majesty's Embassy through the assistant military attaché on 21st September. When seen by the British Military Attaché on 12th October, he seemed to be musing on the mutability of the minds of Princes and the waywardness of tribal chieftains but derived some solace from the British Military Attaché's assurance that not only he but the British and Germans in two world wars had come to the conclusion that money spent on the Qashgai was not a sound investment.

2. Under instructions from His Majesty's Ambassador the British Military Attaché tackled the Chief of the General Staff, without disclosing the source of the information, on the statements attributed to him in paragraph 1 of last Intelligence Summary concerning the connection of the assistant military attaché with the Minister of War in a plot to overthrow the present régime. The Chief of the General Staff denied that he had ever said such a thing, assured the British Military Attaché that his assistant's behaviour had been most correct, that his two visits had been made solely to ask for official information about the events in Fars and that the political implications of the revolt had not been discussed.

3. In paragraph 3 of last Intelligence Summary the opinion was expressed that the Persian Government would find it almost impossible to hold elections with the country in its present state. It was meant to imply, of course, that free elections could not be held. That Qawam-us-Saltaneh intends to go ahead with the elections there is no doubt. He will keep behind the bars all the prominent Rightist politicians now under arrest and continue to suppress the newspapers which supported them. This will stifle effectually any opposition from that quarter. It appears, however, on good authority, that he intends to go further than that and in order to prevent possible disorders arising out of rivalry between the Tudeh Party and his own Iran Democrat Party he has proposed a fusion of those two under the banner of "a common front against reaction." His henchman, Muzaffar Firuz, has stated that Government will be content with 60 per cent. of the seats in the new Majlis. Qawam fails to realise that many of the members of his party are also members of the Tudeh and it will not be difficult to foresee where their allegiance will lie after they have secured election, whether on the Tudeh or Democrat ticket. He also fails to realise that, in the last Majlis, a disciplined Tudeh minority of eight successfully imposed their will on a disunited majority of 128 and that, with increased representation in the next Majlis and a working understanding with the Iran Democrats, the Government of Persia will be under effective Communist control. The Royal Proclamation announcing the forthcoming elections has cast the deepest gloom over the whole country, and it now seems evident to all patriotic Persians that Qawam-us-Saltaneh has definitely sold his country to the Russians. The inactivity of His Majesty's Government in the face of all this is to them incomprehensible. Non-intervention they could understand and appreciate provided it was practised by the Russians as well, but to stand aside and leave your adversary a free hand can only mean to them one of three things: (a) that His Majesty's Government is no longer interested in the fate of Persia or in the preservation of its integrity; (b) that His Majesty's Government is so afraid of Russia that it dare not oppose her in Persia; (c) that His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government have come to a deal about Persia. The more intelligent admit that a policy of non-intervention was both correct and fruitful in so far that it enabled His Majesty's Government to show up at U.N.O. with a clear conscience Russia's nefarious acts in North Persia, and in so far that, with strong American support, they succeeded in securing the evacuation of Persia by Russian troops. But, they argue, after Qawam's act of treachery in withdrawing Persia's case from U.N.O., and the beginning of his downhill career of subservience to Russia, his

agreement to Russian demands and his failure to prevent Russian interference in Persian affairs, to continue a policy of non-intervention was a cardinal error of policy on the part of His Majesty's Government. This is the widely-held opinion from the Shah downwards. That it has lost the British most of their friends and much of their influence and prestige is obvious, and the Persian, by now thoroughly alarmed at the rapid trend of events and the almost certain future fate of his country, is trying to make British flesh creep by predicting that the continuance of this policy of *laissez faire* will lose the British their oil in Khuzistan and their position in the Persian Gulf.

4. The Prime Minister has given up the idea of attending the United Nations Assembly. The retention of office is the thought uppermost in Qawam's mind and he has doubtless realised that to absent himself from Persia in the present disturbed state of the country and with the elections imminent would be unwise. His brave words to the American Ambassador about taking a tougher line with the Azerbaijanis or about taking offensive action to recover the province of Khamseh (Zenjan) have turned out to be moonshine.

Internal Security

Azerbaijan

5. The Azerbaijan delegation which left Tabriz on 21st August is still in Tehran and no agreement has yet been reached with the Central Government. Its main objects are to secure the appointment of local officials to the army and gendarmerie (the "Fidais" who are now reported to number 30,000) the recognition of their locally-promoted "general" (deserters from the Persian army) to press for general elections in Persia so as to consolidate their position as a Government representing the will of the people, and to secure the return of 15 million tomans owed by the National Bank. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz states:—

"The delegation left Tabriz in no spirit of conciliation, nor were they imbued with any will to negotiate. Their object was to table demands which the Central Government must accept. Their continued stay in the capital and the absence of any hard news have given rise to the fear that the Prime Minister is hoodwinking them. Certainly the Democrats have enough to embarrass them. Their financial position is desperate. Kurdish activities in Urumieh district are keeping them on tenterhooks, while forces of irregulars, equipped, say the Democrats, by the Persian authorities in Resht, have been in conflict with the Fidais in Ardebil. The provincial government scheme, for the collection of grain for storage for winter needs, is meeting with resistance from landowners and farmers alike, and tax defalcations keep the Government tills empty. The Russians are buying up cattle, sheep, and wheat, cheerfully ignoring the official price control; the scarcity of bread is becoming more acute, and the party has to contend with a populace of which 90 per cent. are either hostile or completely apathetic. Trade is stagnant, as people who have any money either hide it, or transfer it to Tehran for security."

6. Two leaders of the Allahlu section of the Shahsavans, Abdul Hussain Mansuri and Hassain Agha Vatandust are at present in Tehran and it is understood that the object of their visit is to endeavour to get arms from the Chief of the General Staff to enable them to prosecute their struggle against the Democrats. This struggle has been renewed and carried on for the past two months to the west of Ardobil. The Allahlu claim remarkable success for themselves, and say that they have accumulated about 1,200 rifles as a result of raids on "Fidai" garrisons. They say that they need another 600 rifles to make up a fighting force sufficiently strong to capture Ardobil itself. This they want to do before the winter sets in so that they can establish a continuous line through Eastern Azerbaijan running down through the territory of other branches of the Shahsavans and of the Zulfaqaris to the Zonjan and Qazvin area. Approaches have been made before this both to the Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of War. The result has been the establishment of a contact with the military garrison at Rosht. Money, which is of little use, has been supplied by the army, but as yet no arms.

Fars

7. No serious fighting is reported from Fars since the events mentioned in paragraph 6 of last Intelligence Summary. A skirmish occurred near Jahrum and some banditry is reported on the Shiraz-Isfahan road on 10th October, for which Nasir Khan disclaims any responsibility. Some fighting is reported from

Niriz, where a column coming from Sirjan successfully occupied both that place and Fasa. Though Fathullah Hayat Daudi, the conqueror of Bushiro, arrived in Shiraz to encourage the Qashgai to further efforts, Nasir Khan did not attack Shiraz, which was virtually an open town, as the Persian army were busy defending themselves and not Shiraz in their barracks about a mile distant. Some say that the Qashgai had suffered severely from the aerial bombing and machine-gunning by the Persian Air Force, and were inclined to take a profit, others say that Nasir's armies were melting away at the approach of autumn fearing the danger to their flocks in any further delay in the downward migration to their winter quarters. Whatever the reason was, General Zahodi arrived in Tehran on 8th October with Nasir Khen's proposed terms. The exact nature of these is not yet known but the Minister of War gave the British Military Attaché the following brief outline:—

- (i) The Persian army to remain in Fars at their pre-revolt strength and locations, but to refrain from any punitive or offensive action.
- (ii) A general amnesty.
- (iii) Nasir Khan to hand back all heavy weapons and equipment taken from the Persian army immediately and the small arms within six months (many of those fell into the hands of the Boir Ahmedi, who joined in the fray in the hopes of looting both sides indiscriminately).
- (iv) The gendarmerie to remain in Fars at a strength of one regiment and to work under the general guidance of Nasir Khan. It is noteworthy that no mention of the Persian Gulf littoral is made but it is believed that Nasir Khan considers that area to be within his "sphere of influence."

8. The Tudeh Party's printing press has been removed to the Russian Consulate, whence its manifestos now issue. A prominent Tudeh member, Mutaqqi, is reported to be in hiding there.

9. The British women and children in Shiraz were due to leave for Bushire by road on 11th October as the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company did not judge it safe to send an aeroplane to Shiraz.

Khorasan

10. According to His Majesty's Consul-General in Meshed the Russian Frontier Commission at Sarakhs is spending large sums on Tudeh and Soviet propaganda among Persian frontier officials and Baluch tribal leaders.

Khuzistan

11. Though the Hayat Daudis appear to be in control of the Persian Gulf coast as far north as Bandar Dilam, there have, as yet, been no dangerous repercussions of the Fars revolt in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concessional area. Malik Mansur Basht Bavi disarmed some gendarmes at Gach Saran on the excuse that if he did not do so they would be in danger of being disarmed by the Boir Ahmedi.

12. The two infantry companies reported in last Intelligence Summary as having been sent to Gach Saran have again been withdrawn.

Persian Army

13. Both the Minister for War and the Chief of the General Staff have informed the British Military Attaché that, unless the Prime Minister can produce evidence against Colonel Hejazi (see paragraph 1 of Intelligence Summary No. 36, and paragraph 4 of Intelligence Summary No. 37) they intend to set him at liberty.

14. The unfortunate General Arfa, the late Chief of the General Staff, remains in military custody and there seems to be no immediate prospect of his trial being commenced. It is interesting to note that both the Shah and General Razmara, the present Chief of the General Staff, admitted to the British Military Attaché to having supplied the Zulfiqaris and Shahsavans with Government rifles and ammunition to aid them in their partisan activities against the Democrats of Azerbaijan—the very indictment which formed one of the charges against General Arfa.

15. The Persian army is, as always, short of money but flush with officers, and the General Staff have had under consideration for some time a scheme for sending senior officers abroad to study various aspects of military training on the

condition that they should continue to draw their Persian rates of pay only and receive no foreign travelling allowances. It is believed that the high cost of living in Persia and not professional keenness was the cause of the rush of officers to volunteer. General Johanbani is to head a mission to study military schools in Russia, France and Belgium. The Ministry of War have made parallel approaches to the British Military Attaché and through their air attaché in London for Brigadier Atapur, ex-Persian Military Attaché in London, to proceed to the United Kingdom to study organisation and training. Permission has been asked, it is believed, for other parties of officers to visit the United States and France.

Persian Navy

16. The Ministry of War have decided, in view of the present insurrections in South Persia, to commission at least one of the three small gunboats *Simurgh*, *Shahbaz* and *Shahrukh*. Though they were handed back by the Royal Navy five months ago, the Ministry of War have only now brought to the notice of the British Military Attaché the fact that the guns and machine-guns originally mounted in those ships have been replaced, while they were in use by the Royal Navy, by others of a different pattern and calibre. For those they hold no ammunition and have asked for assistance in obtaining a supply from British naval sources.

Appointments

17. "A" Civil

- (i) Ahmad Zand to be Persian Consul at Istanbul.
- (ii) Haidor Ali Ahmadi to be Persian Vice-Consul at Smyrna.
- (iii) Asadullah Arai, Shams-ul-Mulk, Shahab-ud-Dowleh, K.C.V.O. (F.O. 209; M.A. 31) to be Governor-General of Kermanshah.
- (iv) Engineer Parviz Bahman to be acting Director of the Iranian State Railways.
- (v) Taqi Nabawi, Muazzed-ud-Dowleh, to be Persian Minister at Prague.
- (vi) Abdullah Ashrafi to be Governor of Qasr-i-Shirin.
- (vii) Abdul Hussain Sultani to be Governor of Abadeh.
- (viii) Asghar Navami to be Governor of Lahijan.
- (ix) Nusratullah Akbar to be Governor of Naushahr.
- (x) Imad Mumtaz to be Director of the Tribal Affairs Department of the Ministry of Interior.

"B" Military

- (i) Brigadier Fazlullah Humayuni, General Officer Commanding Kurdistan Division, to be an A.D.C. to His Imperial Majesty The Shah.
- (ii) Colonel Kamran to be Military Public Prosecutor of the Tehran area vice Colonel Nakhai transferred to the Ministry of War.

British Interests

18. Sir Frederick Leggett, Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Labour, has arrived in Tehran to study the situation arising out of the discussions on the new Labour Law now proceeding between the Persian Government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

19. Sir Jeremy Raisman, formerly Finance Member of the Government of India, has arrived in Tehran on a short visit as an adviser to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in their discussions with the Persian Government regarding article X of their charter.

20. His Majesty's Ambassador has now handed to the Prime Minister a draft of the statement which His Majesty's Government propose to make denying the complicity of Mr. Trott or of any other consular officer in the recent tribal disturbances in South Persia. The statement makes it clear that, in the light of this categorical denial, the Persian Government withdraws its request for Mr. Trott's recall (see paragraph 2 of last Intelligence Summary).

Russian Interests

21. *Corrigendum to paragraph 14 of last Intelligence Summary.*—M. Sadchikof, the Russian Ambassador, has not yet left Tehran.

22. M. Sichof (see paragraph 25 of Intelligence Summary No. 38) left Tehran on 7th October.

23. The air agreement, reported in paragraph 4 of last Intelligence Summary, has not yet been signed, the Persian Cabinet having rejected it at their meeting of 2nd October. The Russians had been pressing not only for the exclusive right to operate air lines in North Persia, but also for the exclusive use of the aerodromes at Pahlevi and Tabriz. This information, confirmed to the British Military Attaché by the Minister for War, came from the American Ambassador whose indignant protests to the Persian Government were not wholly disinterested since Pan-American Airways are now planning to initiate a service to India via Ankara, Tabriz and Tehran.

24. In an interview with the British Military Attaché on 12th October the Minister of War professed ignorance of any oil prospecting licence given to the Russians (see paragraph 4 of last Intelligence Summary) and said that no such question had been discussed in the Cabinet. Regarding the annulment of the Saadabad Pact (see also paragraph 4 of last Intelligence Summary) he said that this had not come up as yet at a Cabinet meeting, but that he knew that great pressure was being put upon the Prime Minister by the Russian Ambassador to this end. The British Military Attaché, anxious to secure confirmation or denial of a report from C/X sources to the effect that Russia had proposed a military alliance, asked the Minister for War whether Persia would be prepared to annul the Saadabad Pact and thus lose the potential armed support of her three allies, Afghanistan, Iraq and Turkey, without gaining some other guarantee of assistance in the event of aggression. The Minister of War, obviously uneasy at this innocent query, replied that the matter had not yet been discussed in the Cabinet, but that the Chief of the General Staff had heard from his relative and crony, Muzaffar Firuz, that the Russians had proposed such an alliance to the Prime Minister.

25. Another instance of Russian "non-intervention" in Persia's affairs has been provided by the Minister of War, who stated that the Chief of the General Staff had been summoned by the Prime Minister on 10th October to a conference with the Russian Ambassador and the Russian Military Attaché. For over half an hour the latter attempted to get the Prime Minister to agree to recognise the "generals" of the Azerbaijan People's Army. This the Chief of the General Staff refused to do saying that, as they were deserters from the Persian army he had not the legal power to condone their offence or recognise their present local rank. The Prime Minister did not appear too pleased with this attitude.

[E 10736/315/34]

No. 28

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 41, Secret, for the Period 14th October to 20th October, 1946.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 436 of 23rd October; Received 3rd November)

NOTE.—The 1944 edition of the F.O. "Personalities in Persia" having been superseded by a new (1946) edition, references to personalities in this and succeeding summaries are to the latter publication.

Persian Affairs

Political

Qawam-us-Saltaneh tendered the resignation of his Cabinet to H.I.M. The Shah on 17th October and was asked to form a new one. This he did on 19th October. It comprises the following:—

- Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Interior: Ahmed Qawam, Qawam-us-Saltaneh (F.O. 138; M.A. 295) (a).
 Minister of War: Sipahbud Ahmad Agha Amir Ahmedi (F.O. 7; M.A. 21) (a).
 Minister of Industry and Mines: Hamid Sayyah (F.O. 155; M.A. 258) (b).
 Minister of Finance: Abdul Husein Hazhir (F.O. 54; M.A. 104) (a).
 Minister of Health: Dr. Manuchihr Iqbal (F.O. 67) (aa).
 Minister of Agriculture: Shams-ud-din Amir Alai (a).
 Minister of Posts, Telephones and Telegraphs: Ezaz Nikpay (F.O. 117; M.A. 199) (c).
 Minister of Roads and Communications: Abulhasan Sadiqi (c) (d).
 Minister of Education: Ali Shayegan (c) (d).

Minister of Justice: Akbar Musawizadeh (c) (d).
Minister of Labour and Propaganda: Muhammad Qali Farmanfaryan (F.O. 49; M.A. 95) (c).

NOTE.—(a) = held same post in previous Cabinet.
(aa) = held another portfolio in previous Cabinet.
(b) = has held Cabinet rank but was not in previous Cabinet.
(c) = a new-comer to Cabinet rank.
(d) = see appendix to this summary for brief personality note.

2. The head of the Prime Minister's Secretariat informed His Majesty's Ambassador that Qawam-us-Saltaneh had taken this step following a refusal of the three Tudeh Cabinet Ministers to attend a Cabinet meeting on 16th October as a protest against the appointment of new Governors-General to Kermanshah, Isfahan and Tehran where, respectively, the "reactionary" Shahab-ud-Dowleh replaces the pro-Tudeh Salih, the "capitalist" Amini succeeds the pro-Tudeh Arasteh and Musawizadeh, a member of Qawam's Iran Democrat Party, takes the place of Abbas Iskandari, brother of the ex-Minister of Commerce and, like him, a staunch Tudeh supporter. In point of fact, other sharp differences had arisen during the past week between Qawam and his three Tudeh Ministers. One was the Fars affair, in which they had demanded vigorous offensive action with all the military forces available to crush the revolt and Qawam had preferred, wisely, to attempt a settlement by negotiation. Another cause of friction was the failure to effect the fusion of the Tudeh, Iran and Iran Democrat Parties (see paragraph 3 of last Intelligence Summary) as the Tudeh refused to concede to the Prime Minister a majority of more than one in the new Majlis. Though these actions by the Tudeh Ministers precipitated the crisis, it is pretty certain that there were other reasons also which compelled Qawam to change his Cabinet, by dropping the three Tudeh members and the odious Muzaffar Firuz and by constituting one less unpopular to the country at large. Rumours of a possible *coup d'Etat* by the army, a threat of collective action to close the bazaar by the mercantile community and a threat of action by the clergy to impose a ban on the forthcoming elections were, to Qawam, alarming proofs of the unpopularity of his Cabinet and their policy. Russian reactions, as was to be expected, were rapid. The Soviet Ambassador called upon the Prime Minister on 17th October and is reported to have used violent and threatening language. He warned the Prime Minister that he knew very well that he had been working in collusion with the British for the past three or four months and that his "reactionary" Minister for War had not undertaken even a token offensive against the rebels of Fars and warned him that the Soviet Government would not take this affront lying down. It would be a mistake to expect from these Cabinet changes a swing over to the right on the part of Qawam. In the first place, he has committed himself too deeply with the Russians to make a *volte-face* and to begin to pursue a policy directly detrimental to their interests. Secondly, like all Persians, he is mercurial in temperament and even now is probably aghast at his own temerity of four days ago. Thirdly, in dealing with Qawam, it must be constantly borne in mind that retention of office is the ruling motive behind all his actions. Hence, the recent Cabinet changes may well be due, not to any desire to pursue a more impartial policy, but to declare an electoral war upon the Tudeh and fight them with his own Democrat Party of Iran and secure for himself in the next Majlis a more substantial majority than the nominal majority of one which was what the Tudeh proposed in return for the offer of fusion.

3. According to the Persian press the *agrément* of the Soviet Government has been asked for the appointment of Muzaffar Firuz as Persian Ambassador to Moscow to succeed Hamid Sayyah. While it is natural that this cowardly and traitorous rogue should seek to save his skin in flight now that his plans have miscarried, he would seem to be a gift of dubious value to the Soviet Government. The political beliefs of an ambassador are of minor importance compared to the degree of confidence on the part of his own Government which he enjoys and, while a Muzaffar Firuz in high office in Persia was, to the Soviet Government, an asset, it is hard to see of what use he could be to them in Moscow as a discredited fugitive.

4. In reply to a parliamentary question, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made a long statement in the House of Commons on the subject of the Persian Government's accusations against Mr. Trott, His Majesty's Government's Consul-General at Ahwaz. The statement and a commentary on it broadcast by the B.B.C. have had an excellent effect.

Internal Security

Azerbaijan

5. His Majesty's Consul-General, Tabriz, reports that, as far as the Kurds of Rezaieh district are concerned, Qazi Muhammad would appear to have lost whatever influence he had. They are not interested in his agreements with the Azerbaijan Democrats and the local chiefs, including Amar Khan Shakkak, have been making terms on their own, securing, it is said, sums as large as 250,000 rials per month each in return for an assurance that they will allow the Democrat Government to function in the district.

Mamassani and Kuhgilu

6. The trouble referred to in paragraph 11 of last Intelligence Summary has not yet been cleared up. The Chief of the General Staff after discussing it with the British military attaché telegraphed to the G.O.C., Khuzistan, to consult with the Governor-General before taking offensive action against Malik Mansur Basht Bavi. This has now been done but, while the Governor-General and His Majesty's Consul-General would prefer to try and induce the Mamassani to withdraw from the Gach Saran area by peaceful negotiations, the G.O.C. backed up, it seems, by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, is inclined to punitive action, a course which might well cause a general flare up in the area, where Husein Quli Rustam is prepared to come to the aid of his nephew, Malik Mansur, with 700 men.

Khuzistan

7. Colonel Leali, Chief of Police of Abadan, was arrested on 12th October on the grounds that his neglect of duty had facilitated the disturbances of 14th/15th July. Major Daulatshahi, Deputy Chief of Police, was also arrested on 14th October on charges of brigandage. Local consular officials and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company are anxious lest these arrests lead to further deterioration in the morale of the police, who may be loth to take any action in the event of further disturbances. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, in particular, are apprehensive about the findings of the military tribunal now investigating and claim that they know that the findings will attempt to prove them guilty of having fomented the disturbances.

Fars

8. The party of British women and children referred to in paragraph 9 of last Intelligence Summary has been safely evacuated from Shiraz to Bushire by road.

9. Security on the Shiraz-Isfahan road is improving but General Zahedi informed His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, that he intends to place mobile patrols on it and organise traffic into convoys for some time to come. It is believed that, following upon the agreement recently reached between Nasir Khan Qashgai and the Central Government, the Qashgai have withdrawn some distance from the town of Shiraz.

10. The terms of the agreement, negotiated by General Zahedi, between the Central Government and Nasir Qashgai are an almost perfect example of the "official" style in Persian. "Woolly" almost to the point of being meaningless, they consist of vague assurances and promises easy to evade. They consist of the following eleven clauses:—

- (i) The Prime Minister has always and will always act in conformity with the constitutional laws of Persia.
- (ii) The Provincial Council of Fars will be convened.
- (iii) After the election of the 15th Majlis a Bill will be introduced to provide for increased Majlis representation for Fars.
- (iv) Steps are to be taken to extend the Iranian State Railway into Fars.
- (v) Steps are to be taken to asphalt the main roads of Fars.
- (vi) Budgetary credits will be provided for improvements in public health and education in Fars.
- (vii) Conversations will be undertaken in Tehran to improve the economic condition of Fars.
- (viii) After the election of the 15th Majlis laws relating to Fars will be re-examined.
- (ix) Steps will be taken to increase the number of the local inhabitants of Fars in the local administration.

- (x) A general amnesty for all who participated in the recent disturbances has been proclaimed.
- (xi) The National Movement of Fars will continue under the guidance of the Prime Minister on the understanding that it does not endanger the integrity and sovereignty of Persia.

While the Persian Government can congratulate itself that the above were a cheap price to pay for the cessation of hostilities, Nasir Khan is probably well satisfied with his side of the bargain. He rose in revolt and frightened the Central Government to the extent that it refused to risk the outcome of a major clash between its forces and his own. He has secured paramount influence in Fars for his tribe and increased employment for his supporters. He knows that the Persian Government has no more intention of implementing its promises than he has to abide by his own and this will leave him the more free to commence hostilities again in order to wring further concessions from the Central Government when his tribesmen come up to the plateau in the next spring.

Persian Army

11. As the Soviet Government have not, as yet, given permission for General Jehanbani's mission to proceed to Russia (see paragraph 15 of last Intelligence Summary) it will go to France and Belgium first and take in Russia on the return journey.

12. According to a press announcement, General Shafai, Persian military attaché in Moscow, is to leave Tehran shortly to return to his post. General Shafai, who has been in Tehran for the past eight months (except for his visit to Russia as a member of the suite of Her Highness Princess Ashraf), appears to be in no hurry to resume his appointment.

13. The Chief of the General Staff informed the British military attaché that on 6th October the Russian military attaché and two of his assistants had visited him and proposed a gift of military equipment. Tanks and guns were the main items discussed but the Chief of the General Staff was assured that the Persian army could have almost any kind of equipment or weapon of which it stood in need. Mindful of the classical tag, the Chief of the General Staff was at pains to enquire if there were any conditions attached to these gifts. He was told that the Russians would naturally insist on a number of specialist officer and n.c.o. instructors accompanying the weapons so as to ensure that the Persian army derived the maximum benefit from them. To this the Chief of the General Staff was unable to agree and made a counter-proposal to the effect that a delegation of Persian army technicians should visit the U.S.S.R., select what weapons they needed and arrange for their removal to Persia. To this the Russian military attaché, in his turn, could not agree and, at present, there the matter rests. It is interesting that the Russians should have, with such naiveté, served up *réchauffé* Marshal Stalin's proposal made to His Imperial Majesty The Shah at the Tehran Conference of November 1943.

The Court

14. His Imperial Majesty The Shah received his air pilot's certificate at a ceremony staged by the Persian air force on 17th October. A description of the parade will be found in the current issue of the Intelligence Summary compiled by the air attaché to His Majesty's Embassy.

Appointments

15. "A" Civil

- (i) (Police) Colonel Baqir Shahrastani to be Director-General of Prisons.
- (ii) Dr. Abdul Husein Aliabadi to be Director-General in the Ministry of Justice.
- (iii) Hadi Arbabi to be Governor of Saveh.
- (iv) Engineer Habib Nafisi, Director-General in the Ministry of Labour and Propaganda, to be Under-Secretary of State in that Ministry.
- (v) Mahmud Mahmud to be Governor of Tehran.
- (vi) Abul Qasim Amini, a son of Mohsin Amini, Amin-ud-Dowleh, and, hence, a brother of Dr. Ali Amini (F.O. 6), to be Governor-General of Isfahan vice Nadir Arasteh. Abul Qasim was a Deputy for Resht in the 14th Majlis.

"B" Military

Sartip Muhammad Ali Alawi Muqaddam to be G.O.C. 3rd (Azerbaijan) Division. (This appointment does not imply that agreement has been reached between the Central Government and the Azerbaijan Government over the vexed question of the future organisation of the Azerbaijan People's Army. The appointment is a "cover" one to regularise the presence in Tabriz of General Muqaddam and a small staff who will continue to play for time by continuing the discussions broken off in Tehran.)

British Interests

16. Lord Kennet, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Imperial Bank of Iran, has arrived in Tehran. Conversations with the Persian Government regarding their demand for deposits (see paragraph 16 of Intelligence Summary No. 31) continue. It is thought that the Persian Government, represented by Hazhir, the Minister of Finance, would be satisfied with the Imperial Bank of Iran's offer to deposit 15% of their assets with the Banque-i-Milli free of interest and to take up Persian Government securities up to another 15% of their assets. A. H. Ibtehaj, the governor of the Banque-i-Milli, a rabid Nationalist, is not inclined to accept this offer and wishes to see the Imperial Bank of Iran reduced to the position of a junior partner in Persian banking business.

17. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company have not yet come to an agreement with the Persian Government regarding the interpretation of article X of their Charter. The Persian Government are still complaining of their inability to find the rials in exchange for sterling required to meet the company's monthly expenditure, which is in the neighbourhood of £1 million. They also demand that the royalties shall be paid to them in dollars or other currencies required and state that their sterling holdings are already more than they require.

Appendix

Personality Notes on:—

(i) Abulhasan Sadiqi.

A Deputy for Tabriz in the 14th Majlis. Landowner. Born about 1900; his father was for many years a Deputy for Tabriz. Abulhasan has long service in the National Bank, mostly in Tehran. He contributed 150,000 rials to Tudeh for their support, but is not in sympathy with them. Well educated, with a good knowledge of economic affairs. At one time was under German influence. On the Russian list of candidates for election to the Majlis in 1943.

(ii) Akbar Musawizadeh.

Was suspected of pro-Axis activities in World War II and was interned by the British and released in July 1945. President of Provincial High Court of Ustans 1 and 2 in May 1942. Member of delegation under Muzaffar Firuz which went to Tabriz in 1946 to announce agreement between Central Government and Democrats. Member of Qawam-us-Saltaneh's Democrat Party of Iran 1946. Member of Elections Supervisory Council 1946. Appointed Governor-General of Tehran vice Abbas Iskandari in October 1946 but did not take up the appointment owing to his inclusion in the Cabinet of October 1946. Was not a prominent fifth columnist and is said, by the Minister of War, to bear the British no ill-will for having been interned.

(iii) Dr. Seyyid Ali Shayegan.

Born in Shiraz in 1904, a son of the late Haji Seyyid Hashim. Educated at the Tehran Law and Political School and in Paris (Doctor of Law). Professor of Civil Law 1940. Dean of Faculty of Law. Under-Secretary of State in Ministry of Education May 1946. Has helped the British Council with advice on law books.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 42, Secret, for the Period 21st October to 27th October, 1946. (Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 447 of 29th October; Received 6th November)

Persian Affairs

Political

AS was to be expected, the greatest activity is being shown in the organisation of the Prime Minister's Iran Democrat Party both in Tehran and in the provinces. In Tehran a private army organised by the party paraded the streets and held reviews on 24th, 25th and 26th October. They numbered about 600 infantry and 500 cavalry, and wore a special uniform consisting of a brown blouse of the American army pattern, grey trousers or breeches, canvas leggings and a grey peaked hat of the Persian army field service type. The cavalry were mounted on village ponies and organised into squadrons of bays, greys, &c. All ponies carried feedbags and picketting gear. The men were not armed. Considering that the same riff-raff from the town and surrounding countryside as had hitherto formed the Tudeh supporters had been lured into the Democrat ranks by the promise of two meals a day and a few shillings, they were astonishingly orderly and well behaved. On 25th October a flight of six Persian air force machines flew over Tehran and dropped leaflets, one of which read:—

"Long live the sole refuge of patriots, of industrial and agricultural workers of Iran, the national, freedom-loving Democrat Party of Iran."

While the Prime Minister has declared an electoral war upon the Tudeh he is careful to avoid giving more offence to their masters than he has given already by dropping the three Tudeh members and Muzaffar Firuz from his Cabinet. Both Muzaffar Firuz and his successor to office, his uncle, Muhammad Wali Farmanfarmayan, have stressed the fact that there is no change in Qawam's policy, which still stands for good relations with the U.S.S.R. In addition, Muzaffar Firuz, at a meeting of the Iran Democrat Party on 21st October, spoke favourably of the proposed Soviet-Persian oil concession and forecast that it would bring notable benefits to Persia.

2. No date has as yet been fixed for polling at the next elections. It is known that the Tudeh are agitating for an early date in November and are still working for the formation of a Democratic Front with the Iran Democrat Party. In this they are not likely to succeed. The religious leaders and the mercantile community are working for a postponement, and the former have distributed a notice, under the signature of about twenty-five of the leading "mujtahids" of Tehran and the provinces, to the effect that, with the country in its present state of unrest, diminished sovereignty and lack of political freedom, it is contrary to the interests of Persia and of Islam that elections should be held. The notice calls upon all to abstain from any electoral activities.

3. Seyyid Muhammad Tadayyun (F.O. 172; M.A. 288) has been liberated. The exact reason for his arrest some months ago was not made known. It may have been in connexion with the cases pending against him and Ali Soheily for having influenced unfairly and having derived pecuniary advantages from the last elections, or it may have been Qawam-us-Saltaneh's purpose to keep out of circulation for a while a dangerous demagogue who was known to be bitterly hostile to his policy. Sheikh Ali Dashti (F.O. 33; M.A. 75) has also been liberated. No evidence of any subversive activities on his part has been found, and his arrest, it was believed, was contrived by Muzaffar Firuz out of personal spite. There is a rumour to the effect that Seyyid Zia-ud-din is also to be set free as Qawam-us-Saltaneh, while wishing to convey the impression that the forthcoming elections are free, feels confident that his plans are sufficiently matured to secure the re-election everywhere of his supporters in his Iran Democrat Party even if such a formidable rival as Seyyid Zia were at large.

Internal Security

Fars

4. According to His Majesty's Consul in Shiraz, the Qashgai are continuing to disperse, and Nasir Khan has moved his headquarters to Sultanabad some 8 miles east of Shiraz. Now that hostilities have ceased and the demands of the insurgents have been granted—at least on paper—the Fars National Movement appears to have lost its momentum. General Zahedi, for one, would like to keep the movement in being either as a potential threat to the Central Government

should it once more succumb to Tudeh pressure, or to further his own personal ambition, but the reaction or relaxation of effort is natural, and tribesmen, all the world over, are notoriously difficult to maintain in a state of coalescence. Muhammad Husein Qashgai arrived in Tehran on 26th October and has begun to discuss with the Persian Prime Minister and the Minister of War the implementation of the eleven points of the agreement recently concluded between Nasir Khan and the Persian Government.

5. Some resentment is being felt by the Qashgai Khans at the appointment of General Sheibani as Military Governor of Fasa, Jahrum, &c. This officer has a well deserved reputation among the tribes of Fars for severity, and there is even talk of a resumption of hostilities in that area to procure his removal.

6. Some punitive operations are in progress—reported in the press but not confirmed by His Majesty's Consul—in the Beyza Plain about 35 miles north of Shiraz against the Beir Ahmedi tribe, who, it will be remembered, joined the Qashgai uninvited and unwanted in the hopes of looting both sides. These operations will meet with Qashgai approval and will not be held to be contrary to the terms of the amnesty proclaimed.

7. Sixteen officers and about 500 other ranks from the Persian army garrison at Kazerun which surrendered have been allowed to return to Shiraz.

Kuhgilu and Mamassani

8. His Majesty's Consul-General at Ahwaz reports that the Governor-General has received a respectful and submissive message from Malik Mansur Basht Bavi to the effect that he will come to Ahwaz shortly. Husein Quli Rustam, his uncle, has left Gach Saran area and his band are reported to be on their way back to Mamassani country.

Azerbaijan

9. According to His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz, the Azerbaijan delegates who have returned from the abortive negotiations in Tehran are reported as saying that they have no confidence either in the Central Government or in the Iran Democrat Party, and that Azerbaijan must prepare for action. They seem to expect that the Persian Government may send troops into Azerbaijan either to regain control of the province or to influence the forthcoming elections to the disadvantage of the Left. Unless advised to the contrary by the Russians, they appear to favour armed resistance to any such move and the military training of the "Fidais" has been intensified and their monthly pay raised from 300 to 900 rials. His Majesty's Consul-General learns from a reliable source that approximately 200 sub-machine guns have been recently acquired by the Provincial Government from Russia.

Kermanshah

10. The new Governor-General, Shahab-ud-Dowleh, according to His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah, enjoys considerable prestige on account of his age, his birth and his previous experience in these parts. He has already undone much of the harm done by his predecessor, Sallahi, who, weak himself, took the line of least resistance with the Tudeh Party. General Saffari, the Chief Prefect of Police, has just returned from a special mission to the "Tribal Union of the West" undertaken on the instructions of the Prime Minister. He met nearly all the local Kurdish chiefs and, having secured the Prime Minister's agreement to their demands, obtained from them an assurance of their loyalty to the Central Government. No official statement of these demands has been made, but it is understood that they were as follows:—

- (i) The establishment of Provincial Councils.
- (ii) Improvement of conditions in Kermanshah.
- (iii) The election to the next Majlis as representatives of Kermanshah of local men and not of outsiders.
- (iv) The number of Deputies from Kermanshah to be increased.
- (v) The cessation of Tudeh activities.
- (vi) The selection by the tribes of their own representatives to control their affairs.

The Persian Army

11. On 26th October, the 27th birthday of His Imperial Majesty the Shah, there was a military review in which the entire Central Garrison marched past. It was staged in the Central Square of the town and not, as in Reza Shah's day, at the Jelalieh race course. The order of the march past was as follows: The

Shah's Household troops, Officers' Training College, a contingent of police, the 1st Division, the 2nd Division, the Cavalry Division, the gendarmerie, the Transport Service, the Mechanised Artillery (medium and A.A.). Armoured fighting vehicles observed consisted of twenty-three light tanks, twenty-one medium tanks and three armoured cars. According to the Chief of the General Staff, 20,000 men were on parade. The column, with long intervals between units and frequently delayed by having its route blocked by the enthusiastic crowds, took about two-and-a-half hours to pass the saluting base. About twenty aeroplanes flew over and dropped small paper flags. The objects of the parade were to impress the Tudeh Party, to show off Persia's armed might as capable of maintaining order in the capital and elsewhere, and to demonstrate the solidarity of the army behind the Shah. These objects, it may be said, were achieved. Not a single squeak was heard from the Tudeh, the various units were vociferously applauded, and the Shah received an ovation such as had not been seen since his succession to the throne.

Appointments

12. "A" Civil

- (i) The Soviet Government have given their *agrément* to the appointment of Muzaffar Firuz as Persian Ambassador in Moscow (see paragraph 3 of last Intelligence Summary).
- (ii) Ahmad Aramish to be Under-Secretary in the Prime Minister's Secretariat. (He was previously Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Commerce and officiated as Minister of Commerce from the date of the arrest of Sipihir to the formation of Qawam's "coalition" Cabinet on 1st August).
- (iii) Dr. Husain Pirniya to be Private Secretary to the Prime Minister.
- (iv) Seif Qazi, son of the late Seif-ul-Quzzat, to be Governor of Mahabad.
- (v) Dr. Abbas Nafisi has been reappointed Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Health. (He had resigned on the appointment of Dr. Yazdi as Minister.)
- (vi) Jawad Qadimi to be Governor of Isfahan and Deputy Governor-General of the Xth Ustan.

"B" Military

- (i) Colonel Panahian to be Second-in-Command to Sartip Alawi, the newly-appointed G.O.C. 3rd (Azerbaijan) Division. This officer holds the "local" rank of general in the Azerbaijan People's Army and the Ministry of War, while not recognising that rank, appear to hold a more favourable opinion of him than of the others for the reason that, unlike the others, he was not a deserter but had resigned from the Persian army before joining the Azerbaijan army.
- (ii) Colonel Hejazi, as was predicted in paragraph 13 of Intelligence Summary No. 40, has been set at liberty and appointed chief of the 3rd Bureau of the Persian General Staff.

[E 11092/315/34]

No. 30

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 43, Secret, for the Period 28th October to 3rd November, 1946. (Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 459 of 5th November; Received 12th November)

Persian Affairs

Political

THERE has been no event of major political importance during the past week. The Persian Prime Minister broadcast a long speech on 27th October. The chief points were that elections must be held and intrigues to stop them defeated. Good relations with Russia must be strengthened, but it was to be hoped that the Soviet Government would put a stop to unfriendly broadcasts from Moscow. Mutual good will and friendship inspired Anglo-Iranian relations and it was important that all necessary steps should be taken to maintain law and order in the area of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's operations. At the same time it was to be hoped that in the interests of strengthening good relations between the two countries all British officials in Persia would carefully abstain from any interference in Persia's internal affairs. With the United

States the happiest relations had been established and America's economic help was hoped for. All countries should understand, however, that the basis of good relations with Persia was scrupulous abstention from interference in Persia's internal affairs. Let no one try to bully Persia. Extensive internal reforms were intended including the elimination of political teaching from the schools and the expansion of educational facilities throughout the country, the continued application of a programme for the distribution of State lands to the peasantry while preserving the proper rights of private property together with energetic measures to improve the standard of living of the agricultural population and the proper regulation of relations between workmen and employers. The Prime Minister concluded with a repudiation of the Tudeh Party's claim to be the only freedom-loving party in the country.

2. The Persian press, quoting a semi-official source, stated on 3rd November that the elections would begin after the tenth day of Moharram (Ashura) which falls on 5th December, 1946.

3. The Persian press announced on 3rd November that the Soviet-Persian agreement signed on 4th April, 1946, between Qawam-us-Saltaneh and M. Sadtkhikof, the Soviet Ambassador, having expired on 24th October, 1946, had been renewed for a further period of three months. (For the terms of this agreement see paragraph 1 of Intelligence Summary No. 13 current.) The announcement was based, it was said, on semi-official sources. On 4th November a Government communiqué published by the Ministry of Labour and Propaganda stated that the news was untrue.

Finance

4. The Persian Government has applied for a loan of 250 million dollars from the International Bank.

Azerbaijan.

Internal Security

5. In paragraph 9 of last Intelligence Summary it was stated that the Azerbaijan People's Army and the "Fidais" were being brought to a higher pitch of preparedness and His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz now reports that about 2,000 conscripts of the Azerbaijan People's Army left Tabriz in the direction of Zenjan on 28th October and that southward movement from Tabriz continues. Two field guns accompanied the column. A local source, described by His Majesty's Consul-General as "moderately reliable," reports the receipt of several field guns from the Russians. This latter piece of information will require confirmation as it is possible that the source mistook for Russian field guns the mountain guns captured from the Persian army garrisons in Azerbaijan who surrendered in the winter of 1945-46. The Persian army's losses during that period were estimated at eight x 75-mm. Bofors mountain guns.

Kurdistan.

6. Some minor clashes have occurred in Kurdistan between the Kurds and the Persian military forces. The Minister for War is much perturbed at the request made to the Persian Prime Minister by the Azerbaijan Democrats for the evacuation of Sardasht by the Government forces and the handing over of that town to them. In an interview with the Minister of War on 2nd November the British Military Attaché found him in much the same state as Iago found his general, "horribly stuffed with epithets of war." He had, he said, explained to the Prime Minister the folly and danger of granting such a request. The evacuation of Sardasht would render untenable the garrisons of Baneh and Saqqiz and, ultimately, Senneh, and would thus expose the whole Hamadan district to Democrat infiltration. It would cut off the Afshar and Zulfiqari partisans from support. It would bring the Democrats and their Russian advisers to within striking distance of the Iraqi border and the Kirkuk oil fields. Apart from these tactical considerations there were other equally weighty political reasons, added the Minister of War, for refusing the request for, if granted, it would breed a spirit of defeatism and mistrust of the politicians in the Persian army. The Minister of War is by no means sure that he has prevailed upon the Prime Minister to refuse this request.

Bakhtiari.

7. There is no news from this area save that the Qashgai in Fars are reported to be very angry with Abul Qasim Bakhtiari for having made treacherous and premature disclosure of the plot hatched between them. Abul Qasim, for his

part, is probably feeling very smug for, in the words of His Majesty's Consul-General, Ahwaz, "his surprising antics have resulted in (i) the removal of his co-Governor, Johanshah Khan, (ii) Murteza Quli Khan and many members of this rival family being arrested, (iii) the complete control of Bakhtiari passing into Abul Qasim's hands, (iv) his former friend, Hormuz Ahmedi being recalled from his governorate at Burujird to Tehran and being imprisoned, (v) his obtaining 1,000 rifles and much ammunition from the Persian Government, (vi) his inducing the Persian Government to request the recall of His Majesty's Consul-General at Ahwaz."

Fars

8. General Zahedi has informed His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz that the Shiraz-Bushire road is still in the hands of the tribesmen but that traffic is running and complete security prevails. General Zahedi is being pressed by the Central Government to send garrisons to reoccupy Kazerun and Bushire but he is opposed to this as feeling against the army is still running high amongst the tribes and he fears a recrudescence of the recent trouble.

Kuhgilu and Mamassani (see paragraph 8 of last Intelligence Summary).

9. His Majesty's Consul-General Ahwaz reports that Malik Mansur Basht Bavi has handed back all the rifles he seized except a few which were taken by Husein Quli Rustam and which are expected back soon. Malik Mansur has visited the Governor-General at Ahwaz and was in a submissive mood. The Governor-General favours a plan of giving him some responsibility for maintaining law and order at Gach Saran while the G.O.C. is understood to be averse to this and would prefer to instal a military garrison there of about 300 strong.

Khuzistan

10. Sheikh Abdullah, who has been residing in Koweit since he fled from Persia after instigating the disturbances of Khorramshahr early in 1946, has requested the permission of the British political authorities in Koweit to return to Persia. He claims that his elder brother Sheikh Chassib has informed him by letter that, from the Persian Government's point of view, there is no objection to his return. Steps have been taken by His Majesty's Embassy to ascertain the truth of his statement.

11. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company report increasing lawlessness in the refinery area of Abadan. The incidents include armed robbery, a knife attack on a British employee and shooting in the refinery itself. In these acts the Tudeh are not, so far, considered to be directly implicated. Recent arrests of police officials and the lack of an efficient military governor are thought to have caused a lowering of police morale and, hence, an increase in hooliganism.

Bushire

12. According to a consular report dated 26th October, the Hayat Daudi tribesmen are still in complete control of Bushire town. The other ranks of the captured garrison were allowed to disperse but the officers are still in confinement though being treated well. Khosro Qashgai and General Zahedi are expected to arrive in Bushire shortly when it will become known whether the "Tribal Union of the Coast" was included in the recent agreement concluded between Nasir Khan Qashgai and the Central Government.

Persian Army

13. General Ridley, chief of the American Military Mission to the Persian army, has resigned and has been succeeded by Brigadier-General Grow. The continuous ill-health of Mrs. Ridley ever since her arrival in Persia a year ago led General Ridley to take this step. While it cannot be said that he accomplished much, his departure is regretted by all. He was courteous, hard working and loyal to his conception of his duty to the Persian army.

14. General Hasan Arfa (see paragraph 14 of Intelligence Summary No. 40), has been freed from arrest and permitted to live at his country house in residence forcée. The disappearance from the Cabinet of Muzaffar Firuz and the three Tudeh ministers made it possible for the Minister of War, backed up by the new Minister of Justice, to persuade the Prime Minister to permit this on condition that the military court to try General Arfa should be convened as soon as possible. The Minister of War is confident of securing an acquittal.

15. Sartip Darakshani, the former G.O.C. Tabriz, who was arrested in December 1945 on his arrival in Tehran for having shamefully surrendered to the Azerbaijan Democrats (see paragraph 2 of Intelligence Summary No. 48 and paragraph 8 of Intelligence Summary No. 49 both of 1945) has now been released. He has never been brought to trial. This is not surprising. Firstly, in Persia, though arrests are common, trials are rare. Secondly, he would appear to have had an excellent defence in view of the instructions he received at the time from the then Prime Minister.

16. In connexion with the birthday celebrations of His Imperial Majesty The Shah a parade of the II (Tehran) Division was held on 28th October. A massed P.T. display was followed by bayonet fighting to music in the old style and a very creditable exhibition of field firing for rifle squads. New colours were presented to the 27th Infantry Regiment. The parade concluded with a march past of the division.

Persian Gendarmerie

17. The contracts of General Schwarzkopf and the other American advisers have been renewed for a further period of two years.

Appointments

18. "A" Civil

- (i) Dr. Reza Kavyani to be Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Education *vice* Khalil Maliki resigned. Many other changes in the senior posts of this Ministry have been announced in the Persian press and it is understood that a general purge of these Tudeh elements introduced by Dr. Kishawarz and Khalil Maliki is being carried out.
- (ii) Engineer Khosro Hidayet to be Director-General of the Iranian State Railway.
- (iii) Said Samii to be Governor-General of the II Ustan (Mazandoran) *vice* Saifullah Nawab.

"B" Military

- (i) Colonel Jehanshahi to be Military Governor of Shiraz.

Personalities

19. A personality note on "General" Daneshian of the Azerbaijan people's army, compiled by His Majesty's Consul-General, Tabriz, is included as an appendix to this summary.

Russian Interests

20. According to the Persian press, out of 150,000 Armenians in Persia, 60,000 have elected to emigrate to Soviet Armenia and 12,000 of these have already left.

Tailpiece

Regarding the Armenian emigration to Russia, referred to in paragraph 20 above, an amusing story is going round Tehran. Two letters, written by recent emigrants to their relations in Persia were intercepted and read by the Persian postal authorities. The first letter read: "Here everything is lovely. Food, clothing and work are abundant. Soviet Armenia is a veritable paradise. We are very happy. The only person who was not so happy was Uncle Joseph. Uncle Joseph died last week."

The writer of the second letter, after similar eulogies, advised his relatives to defer their departure from Persia till "the marriage ceremonies of Petros are concluded." Subsequent enquiries from the family in Persia elicited the information that Petros was a baby of one year old.

Appendix

Personality Note on General Ghulam Yahya Daneshian

GENERAL DANESHIAN speaks Russian well, having been educated in that country, and it is said that he served with the Russian army in the Caucasus for a short time.

In 1937 he came to Azerbaijan and settled in Sarab, a village about half way between Tabriz and Ardebil. Some time later he was arrested by the Persian authorities on the charge of being a Soviet agent, and was imprisoned in Tehran. On the Russian occupation of Azerbaijan he obtained his release and went to live in Tabriz.

On the formation of the Tudeh Party Daneshian lost no time in joining it, and he was given the task of organising a branch at Sarab, and later another at Mianeh. At the latter village he came into active conflict with the Kherieh Party, which was strongly opposed to the Tudeh, and in the course of a skirmish Daneshian was wounded. This provoked the wrath of the Russian Commander of troops in Azerbaijan, General Glinski, who, as a reprisal, cast several of the leading personalities in Mianeh into prison in Tabriz.

The formation of the Azerbaijan Democrat Party brought Daneshian an appointment as commander of the Fida'is in Mianeh and Zenjan. The landlords in Mianeh district decided to leave for Tehran for security and, in their absence, Daneshian looted their properties for his personal benefit with the result that he is now one of the wealthiest men in Azerbaijan.

Pishavari promoted Daneshian to the rank of General on 5th April, 1946, his charge being the Fida'is in Sarab as well as in Mianeh and Zenjan. When the agreement was reached between Azerbaijan and the Central Government on 16th June, 1946, Daneshian was promoted to be Commander-in-chief of the Fida'is and established himself in Tabriz. He makes frequent tours of inspection of Azerbaijan in connexion with his duties and is reputed to enjoy the confidence of the Russians to the same extent as Pishavari himself. Daneshian is reputed to be possessed of exceptional courage and determination, and the Democrat Party, including Pishavari, fear and hate him.

[E 11341/315/34]

No. 31

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 44, Secret, for the Period 4th November to 10th November, 1946. (Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 465 of 13th November; Received 20th November)

*Persian Affairs**Political*

THERE is nothing of interest to report as everyone's attention is directed to the forthcoming elections. An official announcement addressed to the Ministry of the Interior by the Persian Prime Minister directs that the elections shall be concluded within a space of five days ending on 21st December.

*Internal Security**Bakhtiari*

2. It was natural that considerable resentment should be felt by those Bakhtiari Khans who became the victims of Abul Qasim's recent intrigues and, in Tehran, there is talk of a concerted move to have him replaced by Muhammad Taqi Khan, Amir Jang, son of the late Sardar Asad, a Deputy in the last Majlis. He belongs to the Ilkhani branch of the tribe and married a daughter of Sardar Muhtashim of the Haji Ilkhani branch. Murteza Quli Khan is said to be in favour of this and even the Haji Ilkhani section are reported to have given the project their blessing.

Azerbaijan (see paragraph 5 of last Intelligence Summary)

3. To the list of losses in arms sustained by the Persian Army's garrisons when they surrendered in Azerbaijan should be added the following:—

- (i) One × four gun battery of 37-mm. A/Tk. guns.
- (ii) One company of 85-mm. Brandt mortars=8 mortars.
- (iii) Three medium and three light tanks.
- (iv) The medium machine gun component of three infantry regiments=54 machine guns.
- (v) The light machine gun component of three infantry regiments=243 machine guns.

4. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reports that the Azerbaijan Government seems to be apprehensive of an attack by the Persian army on their forces at Zenjan. The Chief of the General Staff informed the British military attaché on 10th November that the Azerbaijan forces facing the Zulfiqari partisans had withdrawn from Zarrinabad (I. 39. A Y. 1532) about 65 miles south of Zenjan to Yangikand (J. 39. S K. 4642) about 48 miles further north. Other adjustments have also been made which have resulted in a shortening of their defensive line to the south and south-east of Zenjan. His Majesty's Consul-General regards the conscripts of the Azerbaijan People's Army as badly led and having no stomach for a fight and even the picked force of "Fidais" as having had in fact, very little training. He regards the recent bellicose utterances of their leaders and the recent troop movements as more bluff to intimidate the Central Government and is of the opinion that, unless extensive military aid were forthcoming from the Russians, they would be easily disposed of in battle by the Persian Army. The Chief of the General Staff further informed the British military attaché on 10th November that, according to an oral agreement reached between Qawam-us-Saltaneh and Dr. Javid, the Governor-General of Azerbaijan, during the latter's stay in Tehran, the Azerbaijan Democrat forces are to evacuate Zenjan by 16th November. The recent southward troop movements from Tabriz to Zenjan would seem to give the lie to this statement.

Kurdistan (reference paragraph 6 of last Intelligence Summary)

5. The Chief of the General Staff informed the assistant British military attaché that on 5th November the Kurds actually succeeded in capturing the heights surrounding the Persian army garrison town of Sardasht but were expelled by a successful counter attack on the following day. According to the Chief of the General Staff, the Russians during the past few days have supplied arms (chiefly grenades) and 2,000 uniforms to the Kurds.

Fars

6. His Majesty's consul at Shiraz reports that General Zahedi is trying to broaden the basis of the Fars Autonomy Movement by including the townsfolk of Shiraz and other cities and also by drawing into its orbit the Khamseh tribes. His object in this is, firstly, as stated, to widen its scope and secondly to provide a counter weight to Qashgai influence.

Khuzistan

7. Further acts of robbery are reported from Abadan by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The pressing need of despatching a military governor and a chief of police to Abadan has been brought home to the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff.

Bushire (see paragraph 12 of last Intelligence Summary)

8. According to His Majesty's consul at Bushire, Hayat Daudi has made a request through Nasir Khan Qashgai to General Zahedi to despatch an official to take over the administration of Bushire on behalf of the Persian Government. The same source reports that all the tribesmen have now evacuated Bushire town except fifty who are remaining temporarily to carry out police duties.

Persian Army

9. The presentation by His Imperial Majesty, The Shah, of colours to the 27th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd (Tehran) Division was mentioned in paragraph 16 of last Intelligence Summary. This regiment and the 26th, part of the

1st (Tehran) Division, were originally raised as training regiments at the suggestion of the American military mission. They were included as such in the order of battle dated 31st December, 1945. The scheme did not meet with the approval of the General Staff who preferred to adhere to their old practice of training recruits within their own active battalions and the two regiments referred to have since been raised to the status of active regiments.

10. The Chief of the General Staff informed the British assistant military attaché on 6th November that he was negotiating the purchase of some military equipment from the Russians. The question of a Russian military mission accompanying the equipment had not been raised again. The items under discussion were:—

- (i) 200 × 50-mm. mortars.
- (ii) 100 motor-cycle combinations.
- (iii) 30 armoured cars.
- (iv) 10 tanks.
- (v) Ammunition for the Persian Army pattern of sub-machine gun. This weapon has a calibre of 7·62-mm., whereas the small arms ammunition manufactured in the Persian Army arsenal for their B.R.N.O. rifles and machine guns is of 7·92-mm.

Payment for the above would be made out of the Persian Government's blocked gold balances in Moscow (obtained by the sale of rials to the Russians during the war).

Appointments

A.—Civil

- 11.—(i) Jawad Bushihri, Amir Humayun, has been confirmed in his appointment as Governor-General of Fars.
- (ii) Mohsin Tartibi to be Governor of Shahsowar.
- (iii) Musa Sang to be Governor of Mahallat.
- (iv) Mustafa Quli Kheradi to be Governor of Qazvin.
- (v) Itisam Qadimi to be Governor of Isafahan and assistant to the Governor-General of the 10th Ustan.

B.—Military

General Muhammad Husein Firuz, Minister of Roads and Communications in the last Cabinet, has reverted to military duty and has been appointed Inspector of the Eastern Forces (Khorasan and Kerman Divisions).

Obituary

12. On 4th November at Kadhimain, Iraq, aged 83, His Reverence Haj Ayatullah Seyyid Abul Hasan Isfahani, the leading Shia Mujtahid of Persia. A memorial service, attended by His Imperial Majesty The Shah, was held in Tehran and two days' mourning were observed. Two names are mentioned as possible successors, Haj Agha Husein Burujirdi Tabatabai and Haj Agha Husein Qumi.

British Interests

13. Reference paragraph 16 of Intelligence Summary No. 41 agreement between the Imperial Bank of Iran and the Persian Government has been reached on the following lines:—

- (a) All commercial banks operating in Iran will be required to make a non-interest-bearing deposit with the Central Bank equivalent to 15 per cent. of their total demand deposits, and 6 per cent. of their fixed deposits.
- (b) The Imperial Bank of Iran undertakes to carry Government Paper up to an amount equivalent to 15 per cent. of their total deposits.
- (c) The Imperial Bank of Iran undertakes to maintain an overbought position in foreign exchange at least equivalent to the amount of the deposits which it requires from its customers in respect of documentary credits opened on their behalf.

MILITARY ATTACHE'S INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 45

For the Period 11th November to 17th November, 1946

(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 468 of 20th November; Received 27th November)

(Secret)

Persian Affairs

Political

On 12th November the Prime Minister, Qawam-us-Saltaneh, left for Resht to take a brief holiday. The Minister for War, as next senior member of the Cabinet, is acting for him during his absence. His sudden departure has given rise to a crop of rumours. These include tales to the effect that he has been dismissed, that he is having a clandestine meeting with the Russians, and that he is avoiding the onus of the responsibility for forceful action which has been taken against strikers or may be started against Azerbaijan. There is no reliable information to confirm the accuracy of any of these tales: on the contrary, the probability of his return in normal fashion is indicated by the statement of the Chief of the General Staff to the assistant military attaché that no military action against Azerbaijan would be initiated until the Prime Minister had returned and made a decision.

2. On 12th November the Tudeh Party, after an interview with the Supreme Labour Council, declared a general strike for 24 hours of all Tehran workers including those of the State railways. This action was presumably designed to demonstrate the strength of the party in that the pretexts were somewhat artificial. These were, first, the appointment of Khusro Hidayet to be Director-General of the Railways in place of the Tudeh member Mussadiq (see Intelligence Summary No. 43 of 3rd November, 1946, paragraph 18 (ii)); secondly, the death of a Tudeh supporter at the hands of Democrat followers in a political clash in the railway stores on 10th November; and thirdly, the refusal of the Government to divulge the place of the secret burial of the victim's body. These three factors were presented as showing the oppression and cruelty to which the honest worker would now be subjected as a result of this appointment. General Ahmedi, as Acting Prime Minister, summoned Tudeh leaders and told them that he would stand no nonsense and that any attempts to promote the strike would be ruthlessly put down. Strike leaders served strike notices to employees coming to work and pickets

were established. General Ahmedi called out police and military in support. One hundred and fifty of those serving notices were arrested and pickets were broken up. As a result of these measures the strike was only 50 per cent. successful—a figure far below any previous effort of the party (when it was aided by a Tudeh-dominated Cabinet)—and the Government is congratulating itself on a victory.

3. At the same time as the strike two minor cases of sabotage occurred on the railway at Durud in the southern section and at Pul-i-Safid in the northern. The saboteurs were detected and arrested. No further incidents have occurred.

4. Sayyid Abul Qasim Kashani, who was arrested in July (see Intelligence Summary No. 28, paragraph 3), was released on 11th November.

5. Ibn Yusif, a mujtahid of Shiraz, according to the press, has telegraphed the Prime Minister to say that the elections should not be started in view of the present state of the country. Tales, as yet unconfirmed by official sources, are current in the capital to the effect that the Prime Minister has twice approached the divines Behbehani and Burujirdi, both candidates for succession to the late Sayyid Abul Hassan Isfahani, at Qum to request their approval of the holding of the elections, only to be met with the uncompromising answer that if the preparations are continued they will issue an edict declaring them unlawful.

Internal Security

Azerbaijan

6. Reference paragraph 4 of last week's Intelligence Summary. The evacuation of Zenjan by the Azerbaijan Democrat Forces has been officially announced in the press. The Minister for War told the military attaché on 14th November that the "Kizilbash," numbering about 1,500, had evacuated the town but that the Azerbaijan Democrats say that the "Fidais" will stay until the Persian Government on their part disarm and remove the Zulfaqari and Afshar partisans. He added that he had summoned the leaders of these tribes to Tehran but that he had no intention of either disarming or removing their followers. (Note.—The name "Kizilbash,"

i.e., "redhead," was the name which was given to Azerbaijani soldiers of the Persian army in Qajar times and which has now been resurrected. The "Fidais," i.e., "devotees," are "party" men, whereas the "Kizilbash" is the general soldier.)

7. In the meanwhile the press announces that Government gendarmerie forces have reached Zenjan, having been preceded by their commander, Sargurd Farrukhzad, who went ahead to prepare for their arrival. In modification of this report the Chief of the General Staff told the assistant military attaché on the 16th that one company had arrived and that a second would follow. (Note.—These are presumably the two companies mentioned as having moved to Qazvin in paragraph 10 of Intelligence Summary No. 35 dated 8th September, 1946.) He went on to say that the intention was to move up the Brigade Group, at present at Qazvin, to Zenjan at a later date but that a decision as to whether a definite military advance against Azerbaijan should be undertaken was being held over pending the return of the Prime Minister from Resht.

8. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reports that the Azerbaijan Democrats have demanded ten men with previous military service and 6,000 rials from each village. This step may be the result of their apprehensions of an attack by the Persian army.

9. The Governor-General returned to Tabriz from Tehran on 6th November with the text of a new agreement proposed by the Prime Minister, which the Azerbaijan Democrats had been given ten days to accept. One point of this was the withdrawal of their forces from Zenjan. His Majesty's Consul-General reports that the chief of police, the chairman of the Trades Union Council and General Daneshian were at first opposed to accepting it but that the Russian Consul-General, acting on instructions from Moscow, told them to get into line with the rest of the Provincial Council: in consequence the agreement was accepted.

Kurdistan.

10. Qazi Mohammed has protested to the Central Government about the clashes between Government Forces and Kurdish Democrats which took place at Sardasht (see paragraph 5 of last week's Intelligence Summary and paragraph 6 of Intelligence Summary No. 43). In consequence a tripartite commission consisting of Sartip Humayuni, commander of the 4th (Kurdistan) Division, Sartip Alavi-Muqaddam, commander of the as yet non-existent

Azerbaijan Division, and Sadr Qazi, representing the Kurdish Democrats, has assembled at Saqqiz to examine the situation.

Fars

11. It is reported in the press that a column from the Jahrum Brigade of the 6th Division has been sent out to Lar and that operations are proceeding against the tribes in that area and at Jahrum which have resulted in their retreat into the hills. Operations are under the control of Sartip Shaibani, military governor of the area (see Intelligence Summary No. 42, paragraph 5). According to press reports Khusro Qashgai, after conversations with Sarlashgar Zahedi, has returned some of the automatic weapons captured from the army at Bushire and Kazerun. It is also reported that Nasir Khan and Khusro, after visiting Shiraz, are now at Kazerun.

12. Reference paragraph 6 of Intelligence Summary No. 42 dated 27th October, 1946. Press reports state that the operations in the Beyza plain have resulted in the dispersal of the Boir Ahmedi towards Chehar Dangeh and Iqlid (the latter 32 miles south of Abadeh). The report adds that the garrison at Abadeh has been reinforced. The operations are being conducted by the 9th (Isfahan) Division. Further reports speak of a column from Shiraz under the command of Sarhang Ashdani being engaged in a fight lasting 48 hours at Kuchik Zar on 13th November and that the Abadeh column has had a clash with 600 Boir Ahmedi at Ab Barik (about 50 miles south of Abadeh). These reports are as yet unconfirmed by official sources.

Khuzistan

13. Reference paragraph 7 of last week's Intelligence Summary. Police Colonel Azadrad, at present Chief of Police at Hamadan, has been selected as Chief of Police at Abadan and Sarhang Sayyid Naimatullah Sarimi as Military Governor. A personality note on the latter is attached as an appendix.

14. Sarhang Abdul Hussain Hejazi (Commander of the 10th Division until his arrest by Muzaffar Firuz and now officer in charge of the 3rd Bureau of the General Staff) is visiting Khuzistan. The Chief of the General Staff says that he has sent him there on leave. The Governor-General has expressed his desire to His Majesty's Consul-General that Hejazi should be re-appointed as divisional commander and Hejazi obviously also wishes it. This was represented to the Chief of the General

Staff as coming from the Governor-General. He replied that such frequent changes of commanders (only two months have elapsed since Sarhang Sagafi took over after Hejazi's arrest) are bad for the army. As the Minister for War opposed the same suggestion some weeks ago Hejazi's re-appointment is not likely.

Kerman

15. Consequent on the operations with the Qashgai in Fars a column was sent from the Kerman Division to provide support from the east. The commander of the Zahidan Brigade told the assistant military attaché that the majority of the troops for this column were provided from that formation. His Majesty's Consul at Kerman provides the following report on the column: "On 4th October the General Officer Commanding despatched to Sirjan about 500 officers and other ranks fully equipped, together with two field guns, in ten commandeered trucks. The troops were from Zahidan. They proceeded from Sirjan via Niriz to Shiraz as reinforcements to assist in putting down the Qashgai revolt. On 6th October the General Officer Commanding left for Sirjan with fresh troops for the troubled areas. In the neighbourhood of Jahrum he had an engagement with the Boir Ahmedis, who were obliged to retire to one of their forts, which was effectively bombed by units of the Iranian Air Force, and later certain tribal leaders are reported to have appeared before the General Officer Commanding and sought a truce. The General Officer Commanding returned by air to Kerman on 24th October."

Gilan

16. The press reports the imposition of martial law at Bandar Pahlevi after incidents had been caused by rowdy elements in the town.

Persian Army

17. The Chief of the General Staff told the assistant military attaché that the present strength of the Qazvin Brigade of the 3rd Division, which is scheduled to move to Zenjan later (see paragraph 7 above), is three infantry battalions, an artillery battery, tanks and motorised infantry elements. This force is slightly larger than the present order of battle estimate.

18. Reference Intelligence Summary No. 41 of 20th October, 1946, paragraph 11. Sarlashgar Jehanbani's mission, which includes himself, Sarhang

Hassan Razmara and Setvan Satvati, left by air for Paris on 11th November. Sarhang Razmara is to leave the mission in February to go to Larkhill, while the other two return to Persia via the U.S.S.R.

Civil Administration

19. The press reports that the "Bakhsh" (Deputy - Governorate) of Demavand has been raised to a "Shahristan" (Governorate). It has so far been a Bakhsh of the Tehran Shahristan. This new Shahristan is to include the two Bakhshs of Garmsar and Aiwan-i-Kaif (formerly part of the Tehran Shahristan) and that of Firuzkuh (previously part of the Shahi Shahristan).

Czechoslovak Interests

20. The press reports an agreement between the Czechoslovak and Persian Governments restoring the following treaties until their final expiry:—

- (a) The Trade, Tariff and Navigation Agreement of 30th October, 1929.
- (b) The Treaty of Friendship dated 19th October, 1930.
- (c) The Residence Agreement dated 29th October, 1930.

It is not clear if the period, subsequent to the occupation of Czechoslovakia during which the treaties were in abeyance, is to be counted as part of the original period of validity or not.

The Court

21. On the occasion of the Id-i-Qadir (13th November) the Shah held the usual Royal Salaam at the Gulistan Palace.

22. The Shah, piloting his own plane and accompanied by various officials, visited Meshed unannounced on 8th November, returning to Tehran via Kerman.

Appointments

23. A.—Civil

- (i) Dr. Friedlieb, former director of the Industrial and Mineral Bank of Iran, left by air for London on 10th November. Dr. Ali Amini, secretary-general of the Supreme Economic Council, has been nominated as his successor.
- (ii) Mehdi Haidari to be assistant of the Social Insurance Department of the Ministry of Labour and Propaganda.
- (iii) Ahmed Dayani to be director of Primary Education in the Ministry of Education.

- (iv) Masud Faroughi to be director of the Registration Department of the Industrial and Mineral Bank.
- (v) Moez-ud-Din Ghafari to be director of the Drama Section of the Press and Propaganda Department.
- (vi) Naser Malayeri to be special secretary to the Minister of Justice.
- (vii) Qazim Naraghi to be director of the Registration Department of the Ministry of Labour and Propaganda.
- (viii) Ja'far Jabbari to be director of the Accounts Department of the Ministry of Finance.
- (ix) Sharif Shabdiz to be director of the Accounts Department of the Ministry of Justice.
- (x) Abbas Farivar to be special representative of the Government Press and Propaganda Department and of the Pars News Agency in Moscow and to work under the direct instructions of Muzaffar Firuz.
- (xi) Dr. Feraidun Zafar Ardalan to be chief of the Propaganda Department of the Ministry of Justice and liaison officer between this Ministry and that of Labour and Propaganda.
- (xii) Muzaffar Firuz left Tehran by air on Thursday, 14th November, to assume his appointment as ambassador to Moscow (see Summary No. 41 of 20th October, paragraph 3).

B.—Military

- (i) Sartip Ali Akbar She'ri to be Commander 8th (Khorassan) Division *vice* Sarhang Bayendor and relinquishes the appointment of Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Bayendor has been relieved on

grounds of inefficiency. The Minister for War says that he is a good staff officer but a poor commander.

- (ii) Sarlashgar Ismail Shafai (M.A. 261; F.O. 158) to be Deputy Chief of the General Staff *vice* Sartip She'ri. The Minister for War was not consulted about this appointment but knows that the Russians suggested it.

P.S.—The Prime Minister is due to arrive back in Tehran on the afternoon of 19th.

Appendix

Sarhang Sayyid Naimatullah Sarimi

Aged about 40. Speaks French.

During the time of Reza Shah commanded the Isfahan Cavalry Regiment for six years.

December 1941: Commanding the 11th (Khusrovi) Camel Regiment.

May 1943: Commanding the Fowzieh Cavalry Regiment.

December 1943: Commanding the Fateh Cavalry Regiment.

May 1945: Commanding the 11th (Saqqiz) Brigade. He later fell sick and, relinquishing the appointment, returned to Tehran.

For some period he was chief auditor to the Ministry for War, during which time he is said to have amassed a fortune. Just before his appointment to the Saqqiz Brigade he is said to have been offered a very good appointment in Azerbaijan which he refused. He is variously reported to be clever, energetic and dishonest.

E 11778/315/34

No. 33

MILITARY ATTACHE'S INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 46

For the Period 18th November to 24th November, 1946

(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 480 of 27th November; Received 3rd December)

(Secret)

Persian Affairs

Political

The outstanding event of the past week has been the occupation of Zenjan, the chief town of Khamseh, by the Persian Government forces. For several months the Persian Prime Minister has con-

sistently refused to agree to the Minister for War's repeated requests for permission to undertake military operations in order to reassert the Persian Government's authority in this province which, forming no part of Azerbaijan, was nevertheless taken over by the Azerbaijan rebels. What induced the Prime Minister to change his

mind can be told in the words of his own communiqué issued on 23rd November:—

"From the very first moment that I accepted the responsibilities of the Government I have always been trying to settle the existing troubles, and especially the situation of Azerbaijan, with complete good understanding. During the negotiations with the Azerbaijan delegates it was arranged that the Khamseh province should be completely evacuated by the Azerbaijan Democrats, and that they should withdraw their 'Fidais' and armed forces from there.

"Although the evacuation was to be completed six months ago, yet every time under new pretexts it was postponed. At last according to the discussions which were carried out in Tehran, it was agreed that the Zenjan zone be evacuated on 14th November and thus this question should be settled once and for all.

"According to same agreement a mission including well-informed and trusted officers left for Zenjan to meet this end. Unfortunately despite all negotiations and promises, on 18th November Colonel Bu. Esshaghi, head of the expeditionary mission to Zenjan, was shot at by one of the officers of Azerbaijan. On the same day, a number of the 'Fidais' suddenly attacked the Police Department, and insulted and even detained the mission's officers.

"There were also reports from other parts of Zenjan, and especially from Karsaf, which indicated that the Democrats 'Fidais' had even raped the women of the villages or married them by force.

"Therefore, in order to prevent such happenings, a military column was instructed last night (22nd November) to leave for Zenjan under the command of Colonel Hashemi to ensure the maintenance of order and security and establishing of military government throughout Zenjan."

According to the Minister for War, the column consists of four battalions of infantry, a battery of artillery, six tanks and a mortar detachment. It left Qazvin at midnight on 22nd-23rd November partly in M.T. by the main Qazvin-Tabriz road and partly by rail. No opposition was shown by the "Fidais" road posts, who were taken completely by surprise. Zenjan was occupied on the morning of 23rd November and part of the force has moved on to Sarcham about 20 miles short of Mianeh, on the provincial boundary between Azerbaijan and Khamseh. The "Fidais" are reported to have either withdrawn or gone into hiding. In the press numerous reports have appeared which tell

of the revenge being taken by the villagers against them for their numerous acts of oppression while in occupation of the province. The Persian Army appears to have met with a warm reception, being hailed as deliverers.

2. The Prime Minister has issued the following directive to provincial officials concerning the forthcoming elections:—

Clause 1.—In order to carry out the instructions of the Ministry of the Interior and in accordance with clause 14 of the Elections Act, twenty-four persons representing the six different classes of the people, and twelve persons who are impartial, unbiassed and trusted by the people must be selected and presented in each constituency within five days according to clauses 16 and 21 of the Elections Act.

Clause 2.—After the publication of the elections notice and the appointment of an interval between this date, the distribution of ballots and the polling, the details must be reported to Tehran by telegram.

Clause 3.—Refers to the period of the whole procedure, which must not exceed five days; this period is also in conformity with clause 28 of the Elections Act.

Clause 4.—Recommends the increase in number of supervisory bureaux, which will facilitate the completion of the work in five days.

Clause 5.—Speaks of maintenance of order throughout the period of polling, so that it may enable the people to cast their votes freely without any apprehension or prejudice. For this purpose the Government intends to send armed forces from Tehran to all constituencies through the whole country without any exception; and as soon as these forces arrive in their destinations the elections will start.

Clause 6.—Refers to the forgeries that may occur in the voting ballots, and for that purpose the Ministry of the Interior intends to send special officials to all the constituencies to supervise the course of the elections in co-operation with the security forces sent from Tehran. These officials will daily send their reports to Tehran.

At the end of the statement the Prime Minister expresses hope that all the electors will take into account the signifi-

cance of the elections, and will act in such a way as not to transgress the principles of order so that all may enjoy the freedom which is granted them by law.

Regarding the Persian Government's intentions to send armed forces to the various constituencies according to the Minister for War, the Azerbaijan Administration has already telegraphed to the Prime Minister to say that in no circumstances will it permit the entry of Persian Government forces into Azerbaijan.

Internal Security

Khuzistan

3. The new Military Governor and Chief of Police for Abadan have not yet arrived but are believed to be on their way. A marked improvement in the situation has been caused by the arrest, trial and conviction of about 120 notorious bad characters. Further arrests are being made.

Fars

4. The Governor-General has told His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz that a commission is leaving shortly to reinstate the Governor and Director of Customs at Bushire and to reopen the branches of the National Bank at Kazerun and Bushire. Gendarmerie posts on the Shiraz-Bushire road are to be re-established with local recruitment. Each gendarme will receive pay at rials 1,000 per mensem, uniform and ammunition, but is to provide his own rifle. The same source adds that this arrangement is to be extended gradually to cover the whole of Fars. So far the tribes have not returned any of the 3,000 rifles taken from the garrisons which surrendered.

5. The Governor-General is discussing with the Prime Minister the list of the candidates to be elected to the next Majlis. It is unlikely that any one not sponsored by the Qashgai will be elected and they have not so far produced their list of nominees.

Zahidan and Zabul

6. Though the Russian Consulate at Zabul has been closed officially, the so-called Russian Secretary has twice attempted to give official parties at the former consulate. The local governor has so far prevented this and has pointed out that he is, in fact, merely a caretaker. Russian propaganda still reaches the Zabulis through their reading room.

7. The Governor-General of Mekran, on the occasion of a recent visit to Zahidan, informed His Majesty's Consul that the

Shah had proclaimed a general amnesty for Baluch tribes in respect of the recent disorders.

8. The Governor-General also tried to persuade all possible local candidates for election to the next Majlis to stand down in favour of Arbab Mehdi, a member of the Iran Democrat Party.

Appointments

"A" Civil

9.—(i) Manuchihr Nikpay, a brother of Ezaz Nikpay (F.O. 117) has been appointed Director-General of Customs *vice* Dr. Ahmad Zilli. He was formerly director-general of the Government Tobacco Monopoly, but has been unemployed for some months.

(ii) Haj Ayatullah Husein Qumi is reported in the press to have been elected as successor to the late Seyyid Abul Hasan Isfahani.

(iii) Nasr Hejazi to be Governor of the newly formed "Shahristan" of Damavand and Firuzkuh.

(iv) Dr. Musharraf Nafisi (F.O. 109, M.A. 190) has been appointed Persian representative to the International Bank in place of Dr. Taqi Nasr.

"B" Military

Sartip Zarrabi, Commander of the Cavalry Division, has been appointed A.D.C. to H.I.M. The Shah.

Diplomatic

10.—(i) His Excellency Mahmud Jam, Persian Ambassador at Cairo, has arrived in Tehran. His normal tour of duty has expired but no reason for his return to Persia has been given. It is possible that with no Egyptian Ambassador in Tehran and the Shah's matrimonial affairs being still unsettled, no successor to Jam may be appointed for the present.

(ii) Hamid Sayyah (F.O. 155, M.A. 258) Minister of Industry and Mines, has gone to Moscow on an unofficial visit. He was Persian Ambassador there before his inclusion in the present Cabinet.

The Court

11. *Corrigendum.* — Reference paragraph 22 of last Intelligence Summary. H.I.M. The Shah returned from Meshed direct to Tehran. He flew to Kerman and back on 15th November.

British Interests

12. The contract for the Tehran water supply has been awarded to Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners.

E 12021/315/34

No. 34

MILITARY ATTACHE'S INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 47

For the Period 25th November to 1st December, 1946

(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 487 of 4th December; Received 11th December)

(Secret)

Persian Affairs

Political

After the reoccupation of Zenjan and the province of Khamseh as far as the boundary between it and Azerbaijan, no further advance has taken place (see paragraph 5 below). On 24th November the Soviet Ambassador enquired both from His Imperial Majesty the Shah and the Persian Prime Minister whether it was the Persian Government's intention to send its troops into Azerbaijan. The Shah replied that the General Staff had no plan for such an operation and that a decision on this point could only be taken in the light of future events. When putting the same question to the Prime Minister the Soviet Ambassador added that the occupation of Zenjan and his recent proclamation regarding the supervision of the elections suggested that Government forces would soon enter Azerbaijan. The Prime Minister, apparently with more courage and greater regard for truth than the Shah, replied that both these decisions were attributable solely to the Government's exercise of its normal functions, that troops had gone to Zenjan because the "Fidais" had attacked the gendarmerie and that other forces would be sent to Azerbaijan to ensure orderly elections. On 28th November the Soviet Ambassador again called upon the Prime Minister and informed him that his Government would view with disfavour the advance of Persian Government troops into Azerbaijan as it would lead inevitably to disturbances in that province. A Cabinet meeting was called for that evening, but it is not known for certain what decisions were reached. Qawam-us-Saltaneh may be considering an appeal to the Security Council against what appears to be a definite instance of Russian interference. He may proceed with his plan to send troops into Azerbaijan in accordance with the terms of his own proclamation and to make his appeal to U.N.O. only in the event of their being opposed. Again, he may prefer to wait and let the Russians make their own deductions of no troops, no elec-

tions: no elections, no Majlis: no Majlis, no oil concession.

2. The Prime Minister has sent a telegram to Dr. Javid, the Governor-General of Azerbaijan, complaining, firstly, that the Azerbaijan army is constructing a defensive position on the Qafan Kuh (the prominent feature overlooking the gorge of the Qizil Uzun River about 10 miles south of Mianeh); secondly, that the delay in holding the elections which would follow the opposition to the entry of the Government's forces is against the interests of the country; and, thirdly, that if elections are held elsewhere disregard by the Azerbaijan Administration of the laws of the country can only lead to the non-recognition by the Majlis of any Azerbaijan's Deputies elected by its present Administration.

3. A Government commission, composed of the Ministers of Justice, Finance and Public Health, has visited Zenjan to hear complaints from the inhabitants of injustice done to them by the Azerbaijan Democrats during the period of their occupation, to arrange for the re-establishment of certain Government departments and to provide for future supplies of controlled commodities such as tea, sugar and cloth.

Internal Security

Azerbaijan

4. The Tabriz press and radio have protested loudly against what they are pleased to call Qawam-us-Saltaneh's treachery in sending troops to Zenjan. Their tone continues to be bellicose and they avow that Azerbaijan will never submit to a similar dishonour. Nearly all of the available troops and "Fidais" have been sent from Tabriz to Mianeh and Ardebil in readiness to repel attacks by the Persian army and the Shahsevan tribal partisans of government respectively. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reports that two Russians arrived there by Intourist plane from Tehran on 25th November, and summoned Pishevari to the Russian Consulate, where it is reported, but not confirmed that they advised him not to resist the entry of Persian Government troops into Azerbaijan.

Khamseh (Zenjan)

5. The Chief of the General Staff informed the British Military Attaché on 28th November that the military situation on the North-West "Front" was as follows (described from west to east):—

Sardasht (J-38 V, G 90), the evacuation of which by Persian Government troops was demanded by the Azerbaijan Democrats and refused by the Persian Government, has been reinforced and, for the moment, there is no fighting in progress in the neighbourhood. Thence, through Saqqiz (J-38 W, H 61) to Tikab (J-38 X, J 43) the Persian army is in sufficient strength and no fighting is taking place. From Tikab to the main Zenjan-Tabriz road is occupied by the Afshar partisans of Government. The Zulfiqari partisans have moved up from Anguran (J-38 X, J 9355) to Yangijeh (J-39 S, K 7878). The main body of the Persian army brigade group, which advanced from Qazvin, is still at Zenjan and has now been reinforced by a regiment of cavalry from Qazvin. The advanced guard of this force is at Tazekand (J-38 R, B 1810) on the provincial boundary between Khamseh and Azerbaijan. About a week ago a party of Shahsevan tribal partisans of Government, moving south from Ardebil, captured Hirau (J-39 M, E 6773), and a further party is occupying the track from Zenjan to that place. Attempts are being made to organise a tribal sector on the remaining position of the front, i.e., from Hirau to the Caspian coast at or near Karganrud. The Chief of the General Staff thinks that an efficient link up of this extensive and heterogeneous front is an essential preliminary to any further advance into Azerbaijan.

Khuzistan

6. Another case of burglary and assault has taken place in the residential area of Abadan, when a British employee of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was severely wounded by a mixed gang of Arab and Persian thieves.

7. A branch of the Iran Democrat Party has been opened in Khorramshahr, but Tudeh opposition has so far prevented any large adherence to the party. The Russian Consul at Ahwaz has been active in opposing recruitment to the Iran Democrat Party.

Appointments*"A"—Civil*

8.—(i) Mudabbir Nuri, Mudabbir-us-Saltaneh, to be Governor of Yezd. (He is

well disposed to the British and has been known to this embassy for many years. Part of his career was spent in Fars.)

(ii) Ali Maulawizadeh to be Governor of Hamadan. (He was previously Governor of Malayir and, before that, Mayor of Arak. The Governorate of Hamadan has been vacant since the departure, in July 1946, of Ahmad Salehi).

(iii) Haidar Ali Ahmadi to be Persian Consul at Smyrna.

"B"—Military

(i) Sartip Zarrabi, Commander of the Tehran Cavalry Division, to be Commander of the Qazvin garrison.

Liberations

9. The following have been set free:—

(i) Abu Talib Shirvani, the editor of *Mihan*.

(ii) Hermuz Ahmadi Bakhtiari, recently Governor of Burujird.

(iii) Engineer Tabatabai, a brother of Seyyid Zia-ud-din.

(iv) Habibullah and Qudratullah Rashidian, wealthy merchants, supporters of Seyyid Zia-ud-din and thought to be implicated in the recent revolt in Fars.

American Interests

10. The Tudeh organ *Rahbar* in the course of the past week has come out with three violent attacks against American "dollar diplomacy" and "imperialism," in which latter respect America is stated to have donned the mantle previously worn by Britain, now, on account of her economic plight, reduced to a position of minor importance. America's desire for oil concessions in Baluchistan (hardly alluded to since the concession hunters left Persia early in 1944), the presence of American advisers in the gendarmerie and army, the virtual control of Iranian Airways by T.W.A., the rumour of a loan by America to Persia are all adduced as proofs of a growing American stranglehold on Persia. The remarks of the American Ambassador, in reply to a question by a newspaper correspondent, to the effect that the Persian Government's recent decision to send its troops into all constituencies to ensure the freedom of the elections seemed to him a normal and sensible procedure, has been hailed as further proof of American support for "reactionary" elements. The source from which these articles were inspired, if indeed it was ever in doubt, is made abundantly clear by a last accusation to the effect that America is seeking to establish in Persia air bases from which to launch attacks on Russia.

Turkish Interests

11. Lieutenant-Colonel Jelal Orgo has arrived as military attaché. The appointment has been vacant for more than a year. This is Lieutenant-Colonel Jelal Orgo's second tour of duty as he was Military Attaché, Tehran, with the rank of captain, from 1933 to 1936. He informed the

British Military Attaché that he was Turkish Military Attaché in France (Vichy) between 1941 and 1944. During his first tour of duty in Tehran, which coincided with a previous tour of duty of the British Military Attaché, Captain Jelal was a very helpful colleague.

E 12298/315/34

No. 35

MILITARY ATTACHE'S INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 48

For the Period 2nd December to 8th December, 1946

(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 498 of 11th December; Received 20th December)

(Secret)

Persian Affairs*Political*

It will present a clearer picture if, before continuing the narrative of events from paragraph 1 of last Intelligence Summary, the correspondence between the Persian Prime Minister and the Governor-General of Azerbaijan, summarised in paragraph 2 of last Intelligence Summary, is brought up to date. The reply to the Prime Minister's letter to Dr. Jawid came not from him, but from the President of the Azerbaijan Provincial Council. It was to the effect that the despatch of Government troops into Azerbaijan was unnecessary and improper, unnecessary in that Persian Government inspectors would be sufficient to ensure the free conduct of the elections, unnecessary also in that the "Fidais," recognised by the agreement of last June, were a sufficient force, and improper in that the despatch of troops was in violation of the said agreement. The Prime Minister's reply to Dr. Jawid was forceful and to the point. He said that the Provincial Council had no jurisdiction over these affairs and that Dr. Jawid, as Governor-General, had exceeded his powers in referring the matter to them. The Persian Government's action in no way contravened any agreement reached between it and the Azerbaijan Administration. Azerbaijan could not have laws differing from those in force in the rest of Persia. The present forces in Azerbaijan did not enjoy the confidence of the populace. If the Azerbaijan Administration accepted the entry of Government troops with goodwill, there need be no anxiety. If they opposed it, then the blame for any subsequent happenings must lie at their door.

2. The language used by the Soviet Ambassador to the Prime Minister in his interview of 28th November was described in paragraph 1 of last Intelligence Summary. A second interview took place on 3rd December, when the ambassador, on instructions from his Government, informed him that, if Persian Government troops were sent into Azerbaijan, disorders would inevitably ensue with consequent danger to the security of the Russian frontier. Parallel action was taken in Moscow, where Muzaffar Firuz was warned of the serious consequences of the action which the Persian Government proposed to take. The Persian Prime Minister thereupon instructed the Persian delegate at U.N.O. to inform the Secretary-General of the Security Council of the Soviet Government's action and to add that, nevertheless, the Persian Government intends to send its troops into Azerbaijan. On 4th December the Soviet Ambassador saw the Prime Minister again and repeated his message of 3rd December, adding that the Persian Government's proposed action "would create a situation on the Russian frontier which the Soviet Government could not ignore." He finished by saying that, if the Prime Minister persisted in his plans, the Soviet Government would be obliged to revise their opinion of him personally. According to Mr. Nikpay, the Prime Minister's chief assistant, who was sent to the British Ambassador to give him the above report, the Prime Minister replied that Azerbaijan was either a part of Persia or it was not. If it was, then the Persian Government's proposed action was of no concern to the Soviet Government. If it was not, then the sooner the fact was made known to the world the better. As regards himself, he had no desire to remain in office a day longer than the interests of

his country required. The substance of the above conversation has also been conveyed by the Persian Government to the Persian Ambassador in Washington.

3. According to the Persian press, four Cabinet Ministers who are seeking election to the 15th Majlis will resign, as the Constitutional Law forbids a Government executive to stand as a candidate for election. The four concerned are Maulawizadeh, Minister of Justice; Farmanfarmayan, Minister of Labour and Propaganda; Nikpay, Minister of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones; Sadiqi, Minister of Roads and Communications.

The Elections

4. There is no reliable news about the elections, but it is known that the Council of Ministers is divided on the issue. The Prime Minister wishes to take a profit from the sudden wave of popularity which has swept over the country on account of his decision to reoccupy Zenjan, his firm hand with the Tudeh and the reports of his stand against the Russians over Azerbaijan. The organisation of his Iran Democrat Party is well advanced and he is confident of the election of his supporters in most of the country. To proceed with the elections throughout Persia, however, without having first secured the entry of Persian Government troops into Azerbaijan would damage his prestige as having gone back on his avowed intentions and would, of course, result in the election of a solid *bloc* of twenty-two (twenty-one Azerbaijan seats plus one for the Northern Armenians) Russian nominees. To carry on with the elections in all areas excluding Azerbaijan would be a dangerous course and might so enrage the Azerbaijan Administration as to induce them to take the plunge by seceding from Persia and "voting unanimously" for inclusion in the U.S.S.R.

According to a statement made by the Prime Minister to the Reuter's correspondent in Tehran, the elections have been started in Azerbaijan by the Administration of that province. The Prime Minister added that, under the circumstances, they would have no validity.

Internal Security

Azerbaijan

5. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reports great efforts on the part of the Azerbaijan Administration to whip up enthusiasm for the struggle against the troops of the Central Government and to raise additional forces to oppose their

entry. One such organisation of older men on a volunteer basis has been begun under the name of "Babak" (presumably so-called either after the Persian hero Ardeshir Babak or with the meaning of "fathers' force," Babak being diminutive of Bab=a father). The same source reports that reinforcements, consisting of entirely untrained factory hands, are being hurriedly armed and drafted into the ranks of the Azerbaijan People's Army, the "Fidais" and the Babak force.

6. On 8th December the Chief of the General Staff gave the British Military Attaché the latest information concerning the situation which was recorded in paragraph 5 of last Intelligence Summary. It is as follows:—

Sardast.—No change.

Sursat (J-38 W, J 14)

A battalion moving northwards from Tikab (J-38 X, J 43) had a clash with a force of Democrats and drove them out with only slight losses on both sides. This battalion is to move on to the important centre and track junction of Shahin Dezh—formerly Sain Qaleh—(J-38 W, H 96).

Tazekand (J-38 R, B 1810)

The force has now been reinforced by two infantry battalions to a total of six, plus one battalion of gendarmes. The main body has moved to this place from Zenjan and is holding a line running, roughly, from the Qizil Uzun river at Rajin (J-38 R, E 1) to Aq Kand (J-39 M, E 23). Two battalions have been left as a reserve in Zenjan. On 4th December a force of about 200 irregular cavalry of the Afshar partisans of Government attacked a Democrat outpost in Rajin and drove them thence. The Democrats sustained casualties amounting to 12 killed, including a renegade officer of the Persian army by the name of Lieutenant Gulmuhammedi. The partisans had 4 killed. According to the Chief of the General Staff 45 kilog. of explosive were found in the village after its capture. Other booty included three machine guns, part of those lost in Azerbaijan when the Persian army garrisons surrendered. The cartridges for these, according to the same source, were of two sorts, viz., German, made of steel instead of brass and Czechoslovakian with a red base and a dum-dum type of bullet. The force, of about one battalion in strength, which moved on 6th December from Tazekand to Aq Kand met with no opposition.

Qamar

Qamar (not Cemau as reported in Tabriz telegram No. 1945 to Foreign Office, No. 541 to Bagdad, No. 474 to B.M.E.O. and No. 656 to India), about 30 miles east of Mianeh has been the scene of a clash between the Azerbaijan "Fidais" and a party of Shahsevan tribal partisans of Government who were moving up from Zenjan to Hirau (as stated in paragraph 5 of last Intelligence Summary).

Remainder of front, no change except that a force of Government supporters from the Talish area is being organised to fill the gap between Hirau and the Caspian coast at Karganrud.

The United States Air Attaché and Assistant Military Attaché made two flights on 2nd and 5th December as far as Mianeh keeping along the line of the main road. They saw the Azerbaijan forces concentrated—in a strength unstated—in the forward areas of the Qafan Kuh gorge. Many of the troops seen round bridges and manning trenches on the outward flight were not visible when they returned. The air attaché claims to have seen an unspecified number of 37 mm. anti-tank guns. Twenty troop-carrying lorries were observed in the barracks at Mianeh. (Note by British military attaché: presumably the police or gendarmerie barracks are meant as there are no Persian army barracks at Mianeh.)

Gilan

7. His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Resht reports that the situation in the former Tudeh stronghold at Pahlevi has much improved after the arrival of a detachment of troops and the appointment of a Colonel Pahlevannejad as military governor with wide powers. Several notorious Tudeh members, including the mayor and the harbourmaster, have been dismissed. A detachment of Persian troops has been stationed at the aerodrome, up till now in undisputed possession of the Russians, in order to prevent a possible repetition of an incident of a few days ago when a Persian military aircraft was refused permission to land. His Imperial Majesty the Shah, who visited Pahlevi in his own aircraft on 29th November, for the first time in five years, was accorded an emotional welcome by the populace.

Mazanderan

8. The Chief of the General Staff, on 8th December, gave the British Military Attaché some information additional to

that appearing in the Persian press on the subject of the recent attacks on Persian army detachments by workmen from the cotton mills at Shahi and from the coal mines at Zirab (on the Iranian State Railway about 20 miles south of Shahi). At both these places the small Persian army detachments on 3rd December were suddenly attacked, surrounded and disarmed. A battalion from Tehran and another from Gorgan were sent to the two places with commendable promptitude and succeeded in arresting the authors of the disturbances and in recovering the arms. Martial law has been proclaimed in the whole area and four of the ringleaders were publicly hanged in Shahi on 8th December. According to the Chief of the General Staff the assailants were Azerbaijani Turks without Persian nationality papers. These elements have now been removed from the mills and coal mines. Some hand grenades of Russian army pattern, according to the same source, were found in the possession of the insurgents.

Isfahan

9. His Majesty's Consul at Isfahan reports that the G.O.C., 9th (Isfahan) Division, has been instructed to provide reinforcements for the Khamseh front amounting to 1,000 men. He also reports that on instructions from Tehran, the G.O.C. has asked Abul Qasim Khan to provide a tribal force of Bakhtiari irregular cavalry and that Abul Qasim has agreed to provide 250.

Appointments

10. "A" Civil—

- (i) Asadullah Muwassaqi to be Governor of Babol.
- (ii) Ahmad Musanninzadeh to be Governor of Bam.
- (iii) Dr. Marzuban to be Governor of Sonnandaj.

"B" Military—

- (i) Colonel Vaharram to be Chief of Staff of 3rd (Azerbaijan) Division. (He was commander of 7th Tabriz Brigade in 1944, Governor of Khoi in 1944 and Chief of Staff of 3rd (Azerbaijan) Division from December 1944 to the date of its surrender).
- (ii) Colonel Ahmad Vessuq (late G.O.C. 8th (Khorasan) Division) to be Director of Military Operations. This is a new and temporary

appointment designed to lighten the work of the 3rd Bureau (Operations and Training) of the General Staff during the present hostilities in North-West Persia.

American Interests

11. The attacks on American policy in Persia continue in the newspapers *Rahbar* and *Zafar* (see paragraph 10 of last Intelligence Summary). In an article which appeared on 3rd December *Rahbar* struck a new note by accusing the Americans of landing troops in Persia. It went on to suggest that, as the Persian army and gendarmerie were under American control, the advance of Persian Government forces into Azerbaijan would, in reality, amount to an American threat to Soviet territory. The obvious deduction from the article was that such a situation would arise which was covered by article 6 of the 1921 Perso-Russian Treaty. The article reads as follows:—

"VI. If a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or if such Power should desire to use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia, or if a foreign Power

should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those of its allies, and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such menace after having been once called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defence. Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as the danger has been removed."

The Press

12. An announcement in the *Journal de Tehran* reports the suspension of the papers *Rahbar*, the Tudeh organ, and *Zafar*, the Workers' Union organ, by the Military Governor of Tehran. They have reappeared under the names of *Bashar* and *Shahbaz* respectively.

Liberation

13. Ahmed Ali Sepehr, Muwarrikh-ud-Dowleh, who was banished to Kashan in July (see Intelligence Summary No. 26, paragraph 16 (ii)), has returned to Tehran and has had an interview with the Prime Minister.

E 12483/315/34

No. 36

MILITARY ATTACHÉ'S INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 49

For the Period 9th December to 15th December, 1946

(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 506 of 17th December; Received 30th December)

(Secret)

Persian Affairs

Political

The outstanding event of the week has been the advance of the Persian Government forces into Azerbaijan and the resulting collapse of the Azerbaijan Democrat and the Kurdish Independence movements. The advance was in no way provoked by either side, but was ordered by the Persian Prime Minister in accordance with his previously announced intention of sending his troops into all parts of the country to ensure the freedom of the elections. The rapidity of the rebels' collapse, the sudden cessation of Russian aid to the movement and the absence, so far, of any sign of Russian reactions to the reoccupation of Azerbaijan have come

as a surprise to many, though His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz has for some months been of the opinion that the Azerbaijan Administrations bellicose utterances were largely bluff and that their "Fidais" and people's army were but a cardboard façade erected to hide the nakedness of the land and the intense unpopularity of their régime. The British Military Attaché, at the invitation of the Chief of the General Staff, visited the Zenjan front on 11th December and saw some of the fighting which preceded the capture of the Qafan Kuh gorge, which guards the approach from the south to Mianeh. His impressions of the Persian army at work and of the general condition of the countryside will be submitted in a separate report. The situation, based on the latest information given by the Chief

of the General Staff to the British Military Attaché, is described in paragraph 3.

2. There is general rejoicing at the successful conclusion of the long struggle of a whole year with the Azerbaijan Government, the connected collapse of the Kurdish Independence Movement and the discomfiture of the Tudeh reported from various parts of the country. So far the Government's forces have behaved in an exemplary manner and, far from indulging in recrimination or revenge, have actually intervened with force to save the Democrats and Fidais from the fury of the mob.

Internal Security

3. *The North-West Front* described, as far as possible, from west to east:—

Sardasht.—The Kurdish forces facing the Persian army have fled and the Kurdish Independence Movement is said to have collapsed. A column is advancing on Mahabad (the Kurdish headquarters) by the direct road from Sardasht. Mulla Mustafa Barzani and his followers and the deserter officers of the Iraqi army are there and have sent a letter to General Humayuni, the G.O.C., Kurdistan, now on his way thither, to say they await his orders as to their future. The Chief of the General Staff has instructed General Humayuni to disarm them as the first step.

Bukan.—A Persian army column, advancing from Saqqiz, has reached this place and will go on to Mahabad.

Miandoab.—After some fighting in and around Shahin Dezh, in which an Armenian battalion of the rebel forces put up strong resistance, General Humayuni has reached Miandoab, where he received the surrender of Qazi Muhammad, Haji Baba Sheikh and some other Kurdish chiefs. He left Miandoab for Mahabad on 15th December.

Maragheh.—This important town has been reoccupied by detachments moving southwards from Tabriz and northwards from Miandoab.

Tabriz.—The Government forces entered Tabriz on 13th December and were given an enthusiastic reception. The town was quiet except in one area, where 200 rebels had barricaded themselves in two houses and were resisting. They were composed of Persian army deserter officers and some of the more desperate "Fidais." Mopping up ceased at dawn on 15th December when they surrendered. Most of the leaders of the Azerbaijan movement have fled, including Pishevari and Ghulam Yahya. Kabiri has been arrested. Biryā eluded

capture by taking refuge in the Soviet hospital. Dr. Jawid, the Governor-General, and Shabistari, the president of the Provincial Council, remained at their posts. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reports that a steady stream of lorries (120 according to the Chief of the General Staff), carrying Muhajirs (Caucasian immigrants), their arms and belongings, has been seen leaving Tabriz by the Julfa road. A column of one battalion strength left Tabriz on 15th December for Julfa to occupy the frontier post. Another column, of approximately a brigade, is leaving Tabriz on 17th December for Rezaieh.

Sarab.—This place was occupied on 15th December by a column from Mianeh. The same column is expected to reach Ardebil on 16th December.

Astara.—This place was occupied on 14th December, the strong Democrat garrison fleeing across the bridge into Russian territory.

Mazanderan

4. Reference paragraph 8 of last Intelligence Summary, a search of the houses of some suspects in Shahi has unearthed 250 rifles, some dynamite and five hand grenades. In Chalus, a former Tudeh stronghold, arms and a transmitting set have been discovered.

Appointments

A.—Civil

5.—(i) Ali Ashgar Itisam to be Governor of Kashan.

B.—Military

(i) Sarhang Hashemi, formerly G.O.C., 5th (Khorramabad) Division, and now saying that they await his orders for their commanding the column which has entered Tabriz, has been promoted brigadier-General (sartip) in recognition of his services in the field.

(ii) Sarlashgar Muhammad Husein Firuz has been appointed Chief Inspector of Ordnance Stores.

American Interests

6. Moscow radio, quoting the Persian newspaper *Zafar* (organ of the Workers' Union and now suppressed) announced that the American Government had given forty four-engined bombers to the Persian air force. The State Department subsequently issued an official denial of this.

Afghan Interests

7. Tehran radio announced on 12th December that the Persian Government had given their *agrément* to the appoint-

ment of Muhammad Rahimullah Khan, at present Minister of Mines, as Afghan Ambassador to Persia.

Iraqi Interests

8. According to Seyyid Ahmad Ibn Taher, a Kurd who recently crossed the frontier into Iraq and surrendered to the Iraqi authorities, Mulla Mustafa Barzani and the Iraqi army deserter officers are now serving with the Persian army. The

Iraqi Government, in consequence, has instructed its chargé d'affaires in Tehran to urge the Persian Government to arrest these persons and hand them over to the Iraqi Government. According to the Persian Chief of the General Staff the above statement is untrue and Mulla Mustafa and the Iraqi deserters are in Mahabad, whence they have sent a letter to the G.O.C., Kurdistan, now on his way thither, offering their submission and future.

CHAPTER V.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON

(A) Miscellaneous

[E 9184/6696/89]

No. 37

(1)

Sir A. Kirkbride to Mr. Bevin. (Received 16th September)

(No. 52. Secret)

(Telegraphic)

Amman, 13th September, 1946

KING Abdullah and the Prime Minister of Transjordan informed me that they have been approached recently by emissaries from Damascus with request that they should ascertain from their British friends in Transjordan whether British troops would intervene in the event of a popular movement in Syria directed against the present system of administration. I advised them to inform the enquirers that British officials in Transjordan were not concerned with affairs in Syria, where His Majesty's Government was represented by a Minister.

My information from other [omitted: ? source]s confirms that the enquiry originated from Syria and was not made by those mentioned on their own account.

[E 9268/981/89]

(2)

Sir A. Kirkbride to Mr. Bevin. (Received 18th September)

(No. 54. Secret)

(Telegraphic)

Amman, 16th September, 1946

A MAN giving the name of Albert Deeb and describing himself as a former employee of the British Security Mission in Beirut and now acting as secretary to Akram Keilani, called at the legation to-day and asked to see His Majesty's Minister. He was received by the first secretary and asked for the assistance of the legation as he was in difficulty owing to the absence from Amman of King Abdullah.

He stated that five days ago the Syrian authorities had started large-scale military operations involving 5,000 soldiers and gendarmes to disarm Suleiman El Moshet in Alaouite. The attack had met with some initial success. The Government had also arrested the two sons of Ibrahim El Kanj of the same area. Six soldiers were alleged to have been killed and Suleiman El Moshet to have retreated into the hills. He had immediately sent down two emissaries, who were also Deputies, named Hawash and Munir El Abbas, who made contact with Keilani asking assistance of Monarchist movement to open another front in the south-east, which was to some extent neutral zone of the forces. He said that Keilani and Shekib Wahab, a Druse who holds a military command in Jebel Druse, together with other unspecified military leaders, were anxious to have an immediate meeting with King Abdullah as there was a prospect of a rising in Damascus and of tribes [corrupt group] Deir Ez Zor. Shekib Wahab apparently undertakes at the right moment to occupy Deraa and country south of Damascus. No action, however, could be taken in the absence of the King. After Deeb had been informed that this was not a matter in which His Majesty's Legation could possibly have any part, and that in any event discussion on such matter could only be made with the British representative in Syria, he announced that matter was so urgent that he was proposing to take special aeroplane to leave immediately and to consult King Abdullah in Mosul. I have no information as yet as to whether this has in fact been done.

This legation has no previous knowledge of this person and no means of checking accuracy of his statement.

[E 9641/981/89]

(3)

Sir A. Kirkbride to Mr. Bevin. (Received 27th September)

(No. 59)

(Telegraphic)

Amman, 21st September, 1946

REFERENCE to my telegram No. 54 of 16th September, 1946.

Since his return [omitted: ? from] Iraq, King Abdullah has failed to react to urgings of Syrian Monarchists to take action.

[E 9776/981/89]

(4)

Sir A. Kirkbride to Mr. Bevin. (Received 30th September)

(No. 63)

(Telegraphic)

Amman, 26th September, 1946

REFERENCE my telegram No. 59 of 21st September, 1946.

Hassan El Hakim visited Transjordan on 23rd instant and saw both King Abdullah and the Prime Minister. He took the line that any question of violence in Syria was premature until result of the forthcoming elections for the Syrian Parliament was known. He expressed the belief that there was good chance of Monarchists achieving their aims by constitutional methods. This attitude on the part of one of the leading Monarchists has done much to offset the effect of more inflammatory messages which have reached Transjordan from Syria of late.

[E 11131/2/89]

No. 38

Mr. Eyres to Mr. Attlee. (Received 13th November)

(No. 10)

Sir,

Damascus, 29th October, 1946

I HAVE the honour to enclose a copy of a despatch from the Acting British Consul-General, Damascus, in which Mr. Weld-Forester, on the eve of relinquishing his post, gives his views on developments in Syria during the past eighteen months.

2. I am in general agreement with the contents of this despatch, but there are two factors which may considerably affect the political stability of the country during the coming months. There are indications that some members of the present Government may decide that their personal interest requires that they should resign in order to give their whole time to preparing for the elections due to be held in the summer of 1947, and to avoid, during the pre-election period, the personal criticism and mud-slinging of the Opposition. If such resignations take place, it may be difficult for the President to form another stable Government. Further, Jamil Mardam Bey is due to return in a few days from Cairo, where for the past eighteen months he has been Syrian Minister; his reappearance in Damascus may well affect the stability of the present Government and of the parliamentary majority on which Saadullah Bey has been able to rely during the past year.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch with enclosure to Cairo, Bagdad, Jeddah, Amman and the High Commissioner for Palestine.

I have, &c.

H. M. EYRES.

Enclosure in No. 38

Mr. Weld-Forester to Mr. Eyres

(No. 8)

Sir,

Damascus, 25th October, 1946

ON the eve of my departure from Damascus it seems useful to report to what extent Syria has proved a viable State since Mr. Shone wrote his despatch No. 63 of 19th April, 1945.

2. Perhaps the most surprising and encouraging factor is the political stability shown in the past thirteen months. In paragraph 10 of his despatch under reference, Mr. Shone said the present régime could probably run along with Governments succeeding each other at short intervals. While the National Bloc has many critics and is widely regarded as corrupt and inefficient, there is little indication that opposition elements are uniting. In fact, Saadullah Bey's administration can be said to have continued without any major political crisis and with only one minor reshuffle of ministerial posts ever since the immediate stresses and strains caused by the events of June 1945 had been ironed out and the resultant dislocation of government had been dealt with and the machinery realigned to cope with the new situation.

3. The security during this period has been quite as good if not better than at any previous time in the last ten years. There have been two or three minor quarrels among tribal elements, but these, whether they have involved clashes over-stepping the boundaries of neighbouring countries or whether they have occurred in purely Syrian territory, have been composed with a minimum of disturbance to the country. There has been one case of tribal elements holding up the Nairn trans-desert bus service and three cases of minor banditry where individual touring cars have been held up. There have also been, during the period under consideration, three murderous attacks on individuals in Damascus which have had an internal political reason. The culprits have been arrested and sentences pronounced, and each case has had no far-reaching repercussions. These relatively minor incidents are, in my opinion, no more than had to be expected. On the credit side of security one must record that the disease in the body politic which the Alawite problem and the quasi-divine position *vis-à-vis* his followers of Suleiman Murshed had so long occasioned has recently been cured, at any rate for the moment, by a very successful, well-planned and well-executed operation last month when a small force of gendarmerie subdued Suleiman and his partisans after all peaceful methods of reaching a solution to the problem had failed. The Druses, while no more content than these spoilt children have been at any time in the past, have not fomented any disturbance and it is not considered that they are likely to take the initiative in making serious trouble for the Syrian Government, although should any trouble break out they would doubtless, as is their habit, in due course side with whichever party looked like winning.

4. The partisans of Greater Syria and of a Syrian monarchy according to a number of sources have lost ground considerably in the last two months, and the party appears to have split into three and to have quarrelled over the disposal of funds.

5. Communism also, according to reliable sources of information, has made no headway and has probably lost ground recently. The Communist leader, Khaled Dagdash, is not the type of man who is likely to be able to propagate the gospel of communism with success. He is from all appearances far too busy going to diplomatic and political receptions and attending funerals and weddings to have very much time left for organising his party, and he lacks the capacity to sway the poorer classes by demagogic oratory.

6. Nepotism and favouritism are, of course, still in evidence, but there are certain signs which would appear to indicate that some of the younger generation and a few even of the older realise how harmful these practices are and are trying to stamp them out. The Administration certainly creaks. Nearly all Government officials lack experience and are overworked. Nevertheless, the machine has run without any serious breakdown over the last twelve months.

7. The most unsatisfactory feature in the situation remains the economic and financial position, but I do not propose to attempt to examine this question here or to attempt to prophesy as it is a matter on which you will doubtless receive detailed and expert information from the Commercial Secretariat.

8. His Excellency the President of the Republic was good enough to invite me and my family on the 20th of this month to lunch with him and Madame Quwatli at Hebdani, when nobody else except her brother was present. In the course of a short talk with his Excellency on political topics, I said I thought that Shukri Bey and the Syrian Government had many reasons to congratulate themselves on the course of events during the past twelve months. The President, in reply, expressed the opinion that the country was more stable now than Iraq or the Lebanon or Saudi Arabia or even Egypt, and had fewer and less grave problems to face than any of them. In view of the fact that the President, as you know, constantly affects to be uneasy about the Greater Syrian movement, I think that his opinion, as recorded above, is specially enlightening

and possibly shows that even he himself does not think that there is any immediate threat to his régime from this movement. I suggest he may be using it as a sort of bogey to drive on his team and to augment loyalty.

9. I conclude, therefore, that Syria has proved a more viable State than could have been expected eighteen months ago, and that there is no reason to think that the present régime and Administration will not be able to carry on without any major shock or disturbance until, at any rate, the parliamentary elections in July next year, always provided that no pressure of external events whips up a violent political storm throughout the Near East.

I have, &c.

W. B. C. WELD-FORESTER.

E 11336/3673/89

No. 39

Mr. Eyres to Mr. Attlee. (Received 20th November)

VISIT OF MAJOR-GENERAL SIR EDWARD SPEARS

(No. 205)

Sir, *Beirut, 12th November, 1946*

With reference to my despatch No. 8 of 27th October from Damascus, I have the honour to inform you that Major-General Sir Edward Spears arrived in Beirut from Damascus on 22nd October. He was met at the frontier by a military escort, and during the whole of his visit, which lasted until 5th November, when he left by air for Bagdad, he was provided with a private car and jeep escort by the Lebanese Government. For the first three and the last four days of his visit he stayed with the President of the Republic as his personal guest; during the intervening week he stayed at the house of Mme. Linda Sursock.

2. General Spears's visit was completely filled with a series of official and private entertainments in his honour. Members of the legation staff, but on most occasions no other foreigners, were invited to the official functions and, as it was clear that refusal would have been not only discourteous to the Lebanese Government, but would have had a harmful effect on British prestige (which, for good or for ill, is closely associated in this country with General Spears), I authorised them to accept on the condition mentioned in paragraph 3 of my despatch under reference. Before long, however, the natural volubility of the Lebanese got the better of them. At the lunch given by the President of the Republic on the 23rd, and the dinner with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 24th, no more than brief expressions of mutual greetings were exchanged. At the dinner given by the newly-elected President of the Lebanese Chamber on 27th October, however, both host and guest

made speeches, the general's being published in the press (copy enclosed).⁽¹⁾ At the lunch given at Tripoli on 28th October by Abdul Hamid Koraméh, a former Prime Minister, at the dinner given the same night by the present Prime Minister, and at the lunch given at Sidon on 29th October by Adel Osseiran, a prominent Shia Deputy, speeches were either not made or not published. On 30th October, however, the general's speech at a luncheon given in his honour by the Acting Mohafez of Beirut appeared in the press and on the following day he gave a press conference. Fortunately, General Spears made it clear to the legation as soon as he arrived that he had no wish to embarrass us and he did his best in his public pronouncements to avoid all delicate subjects. In this he largely succeeded, and although it is impossible for a man with General Spears's record in the Lebanon to return without treading on some people's toes, I do not think that British prestige has suffered from his visit.

4. As regards internal affairs, there is no doubt that his two stays with the President did much to strengthen the latter's position in the eyes of the general public, and was correspondingly resented by the more intelligent and "reformist" elements as contributing to the self-satisfied inertia which is one of the President's most exasperating characteristics. As regards external affairs, the only incident of note was when the Transjordan Minister took exception to a contention of the general's that King Hussein had agreed to the Balfour Declaration.

5. The reception given to General Spears's return by the press was naturally mixed. The Nationalist papers welcomed

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

him as an honorary citizen of the country and as the champion of Lebanese independence though, as in Syria, his alleged statement that the Mufti should be treated as a war criminal somewhat tempered their enthusiasm and caused bitter and violent comments in some papers. The pro-Russian press, without exception, attacked the general, mainly on the ground that his visit was connected with the Greater Syria plan, which was denounced as a British imperialistic project designed to check Soviet expansion in this direction. This belief was not dispelled by the general's denial in his speech on 27th October. The pro-French papers, as might be expected, seized the occasion to give vent to their

pent-up feelings of malice against the general, and I enclose the text⁽¹⁾ of a typical article which appeared in *L'Orient* on 3rd November.

6. General Spears is due to return to Beirut on 12th November and will spend one day here before continuing his journey to Transjordan.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch with enclosures and of that under reference to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and Cairo and to His Majesty's Ministers at Amman and Jedda.

I have, &c.

(For Chargé d'Affaires),
G. P. YOUNG.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

E 11271/2/89

No. 40

LEGISLATIVE DECREE No. 50

(1)

Mr. Eyres to Mr. Attlee. (Received 18th November)

(No. 12)

Sir, *Damascus, 11th November, 1946*

I have the honour to report that before the Syrian Chamber of Deputies ended their Sixth Session last June, authority was given by the Chamber to the Government to issue legislative decrees setting out the establishments and organisation of the various Ministries and Government Departments. Under the Constitution, such authorisation confers upon the President of the Republic and the members of the Council of Ministers the right to issue decrees which, when published in the *Syrian Official Journal*, have the force of law. A number of establishment decrees were prepared during the summer and were published in the *Syrian Official Journal* of 17th October, the date on which the Chamber of Deputies held the first sitting of their Seventh Session. During the sitting the Government was violently attacked by a number of Deputies for including among these decrees some which were contrary either to the Constitution or to existing legislation, the critics maintaining that these decrees, in so far as they were contrary to existing legislation, were not covered by the authority given by the Chamber since only the Chamber of Deputies could alter existing laws or articles of the Constitution. The sitting was adjourned without a division being taken.

2. A few days afterwards a manifesto was published in several of the Damascus newspapers, signed by a number of Deputies, many Syrian notables, doctors, lawyers and various political organisations, protesting that the establishment decrees were not legal for the reasons set out in the preceding paragraph and demanding their withdrawal. In particular, Legislative Decree No. 50 for the organisation and establishment of the Ministry of the Interior came in for severe criticism. Anti-Government papers have published articles to the same effect during the past week and a number of Opposition Deputies and even some of the National Bloc are known to be trying to stimulate the Chamber of Deputies to reject the legislative decrees when Parliament next meets.

3. The decree dealing with the establishment for the Ministry of Interior authorises the Minister to exercise, *inter alia*, the following powers:—

- To license the formation of parties, societies, organisations and clubs; to control and supervise their activities and to authorise the holding of public meetings.
- To dissolve and prohibit parties, organisations, &c., should he find that they act against the basic principles of the Constitution and the republican form of Government, or have a connexion with a foreign Power or organisation, or accept foreign financial assistance without

the approval of the Syrian Government, or threaten public security; to impose forced residence for a period not exceeding one year on founders and members of any such offending organisation.

- (c) To license the issue of newspapers, magazines, &c., the opening of public reading rooms, cinemas and theatres and Syrian and foreign news agencies; the number of political newspapers to be licensed in any one town not to exceed one newspaper for every 50,000 inhabitants.
- (d) To suspend administratively newspapers, magazines, &c., for the following reasons: publication of matter against the head of the State; interference with the Syrian armed forces; publishing material showing lack of respect for the organisation of the State, the prestige of Government officials, foreign Powers and their heads of State and their representatives in Syria, and anything which would be harmful to good relations between Syria and a foreign Power.
- (e) To withdraw licences granted to newspapers, magazines, &c., and to close printing presses, libraries, &c., on grounds similar to those stated in (d) above.
- (f) To expel foreign correspondents of newspapers and news agencies suspected of improper conduct or of working for the interests of foreign Powers and organisations outside Syrian territory; to ban foreign printed material from entering the country in the event of such material affecting the country's sovereignty, independence or Constitution.

4. It will be seen that there is some substance in the allegations that this decree contains articles which severely limit the freedom of the individual as set out in the Constitution and at the same time place an almost dictatorial power in the hands of the Minister of the Interior. The Government continue to maintain that these establishment decrees have the force of law, but it is certain that the matter will be raised at the next sitting of Parliament and that there will be considerable opposition to this view. Meanwhile the Government are acting on the assumption that the decrees are in force.

I have, &c.

H. M. EYRES.

(2)

Mr. Eyres to Mr. Attlee. (Received 27th November)

(No. 18)

Sir, *Damascus, 20th November, 1946*

With reference to my despatch No. 12 of 11th November, I have the honour to report that Soltan Pasha el Atrash took the opportunity presented by the strong opposition to Legislative Decree No. 50, giving wide powers to the Ministry of the Interior, to voice his dissatisfaction with the present Government. Soltan Pasha, the hero of the 1925 Druze revolt, issued a manifesto on 6th November, which was reproduced in whole or in part during the following week by a number of newspapers, recalling the Syrians' fight for liberty against the foreign oppressor and violently attacking the members of the present Government for failing to give the freedom which the Syrians have worked and fought for. He blamed the Government for allowing the cost of living to increase and accused them of corruption and nepotism; he declared that Legislative Decree No. 50 gave the Minister of the Interior dictatorial powers; he called for support for those who wished to defend the Constitution and the freedom of the individual, and warned the Government of the consequences which would result from exercising dictatorial powers contrary to the will of the people.

2. The Government, and the Damascenes in general, have a considerable respect for Soltan Atrash and his Druze and, although they are still elated with the recent success of Government forces against Suleiman Murshed, there are few who would be prepared to tackle the Druze in the Jebel.

3. The Syrian President therefore thought it prudent to send Khaled el Azm, Minister of National Economy and Minister of Justice, on 15th November to see Soltan Pasha in his village at Qureiya. It is reliably reported that he offered Soltan Pasha the leadership of the Syrian delegation to the Arab League Conference (and £Syr.25,000 expenses), and a Druze representative in the next Government in return for the pasha's support of the Government. According to Soltan Pasha's son these offers were refused and the pasha insisted on the dismissal of the present Government and the formation of a coalition Government before he would withdraw his opposition.

4. It is not without interest that the Emir Hassan Atrash Mohafez of Jebel

Druze and nephew of Soltan Pasha, in conversation with a member of my staff, admitted that he had been opposed to the issue of Soltan Pasha's manifesto. It seems unlikely, therefore, that Soltan Pasha intended to take any serious action against the Government, though, for once, opposition to Legislative Decree No. 50 gave the Druze a common ground with

other enemies opposed to the national bloc; the suspension of Legislative Decree No. 50 appears to have cut away this common ground and the Opposition may now once more resolve itself into its component parts.

I have, &c.

H. M. EYRES.

E 12195/2103/88

No. 41

TURKISH DELEGATION'S VISIT TO AMMAN

Mr. Young to Mr. Attlee. (Received 17th December)

(No. 220)

Sir,

Beirut, 10th December, 1946

I have the honour to report that the Secretary-General of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, M. Feridon Erkin, accompanied by M. Nemaan, passed through Beirut on 3rd December on their way to Amman, whence they returned to Beirut on 5th December. It had previously been announced in the press that the object of the delegation's visit was to discuss the settlement of the question of Lebanese nationals overseas who, according to the Lausanne Treaty, were still considered Turkish subjects; commercial matters; and a new agreement to take the place of agreements on legal matters between the Mandatory Power and Turkey. Talks took place on 7th December, and on the next day the following communiqué was issued:—

"The Ministry for Foreign Affairs last night officially announced that the talks between the Lebanese Government and the Turkish delegation which has been in Beirut since Thursday have resulted in an agreement on the following:—

(1) A two-year opportunity will be given Lebanese subjects overseas, who are still considered Turkish nationals, having failed to register within a stipulated period, in accordance with the terms of the Lausanne Treaty, to choose between Turkish or Lebanese nationality.

(2) Negotiations to start within two months for the settlement of Turkish property in Lebanon and Lebanese property in Turkey on equal terms.

Before the delegation left for Angora yesterday the President conferred on

M. Feridon Erkin the medal of Grand Chevalier of the Order of the Cedar."

2. The aspect of the delegation which naturally excited the most comment in the Lebanon was their visit to Amman. The press reports M. Erkin as having said that he had invited King Abdullah to visit Turkey, and that it was expected that the King would leave for Angora in January 1947. This coming as it did at the height of the Greater Syria controversy in the press naturally gave rise to all sorts of speculation. The pro-French and pro-Russian press pointed out that the Turks had not sent a delegation to the Lebanon when Lebanese independence was achieved, and there appeared to be no reason whatever for a delegation to Transjordan at the present stage; such an action could, in fact, only be interpreted as an attempt to effect a Moslem encirclement of the Christian Lebanon on Hashemite lines (compare paragraph 7 of my despatch No. 151). It has also been suggested that the object of the delegation was to arrange for a visit of the Turkish President to the Lebanon in return for the visit of the Lebanese President to Turkey.

3. In conversation with M. Erkin, I could only elicit that nothing had been decided beyond the agreement specified in the communiqué, and that nothing had been signed here; signature was to take place subsequently in Angora.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Angora, Bagdad and Cairo, His Majesty's Ministers at Amman and Jedda, and the High Commissioner for Palestine at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

G. P. YOUNG.

CAPTURE AND TRIAL OF SULEIMAN MURSHID

Mr. Eyres to Mr. Bevin. (Received 31st December)

(No. 26)

Damascus,

19th December, 1946

Sir,
In recent Weekly Political Summaries mention has been made of operations by the Syrian armed forces in the Alouite mountains resulting in the arrest of Suleiman Murshid and his subsequent trial. I have the honour to report that on 16th December he and two of his followers were hanged in public in Damascus in accordance with the sentence of the Judicial Council, confirmed by the Syrian President (the first capital punishment inflicted in the Levant States since the elections of 1943). The following is a short summary of the events leading up to his capture and of the evidence given at the trial.

2. As a result of serious incidents in the Alouite territory early in 1945, which were fully reported at the time, warrants for the arrest of some 1,200 partisans were issued by the Syrian Government. At first repeated but unsuccessful efforts were made to execute the warrants, but early this year the Mohafez of Lattakia was instructed to "arrange" the whole question. After some months of negotiations between the Mohafez and Suleiman Murshid an agreement was signed by which amnesties were granted all round and Suleiman Murshid for his part undertook to re-establish the villagers dispossessed by him and to return all lands acquired since 1939. Towards the end of August an attempt was made by the Syrian authorities to carry out the terms of this agreement; the dispossessed peasants, accompanied by a small unit of the gendarmerie, tried to reoccupy their land but were intimidated and forced to withdraw by Suleiman Murshid and his partisans. In September a plan was made for a force of some 400 gendarmes with armoured cars and Bren guns to advance on Suleiman Murshid's village and to reinstate the dispossessed peasants. An emissary was sent to Murshid to explain the Government's intentions and to assure him that no harm would be done to him or his people if the operation was unopposed; Murshid promised that there would be no opposition. On 13th September two of the gendarmerie groups converging on Murshid's village were fired upon and returned the fire. The following day, after some fighting, the gendarmes pushed on to Murshid's village, where they found him

alone with the dead body of his wife, whom he admitted having shot on the grounds that she had been responsible for the attack on the gendarmes. His followers had fled.

3. A special Judicial Council was sent to Lattakia for the trial of Suleiman Murshid and his followers, which opened on 23rd November. Suleiman Murshid was indicted on a charge of conspiring with a foreign Power against the safety of the State, disobeying the State in his actions and in his writings, killing gendarmes, killing his wife, creating a Government of his own in agreement with a foreign Power and committing highway robbery, looting and plundering. Murshid was defended by two Lebanese lawyers. The following are the main items of interest in the evidence as reported in the Syrian press:—

- (a) Many of Murshid's leading followers admitted taking part in the fighting which ended in Murshid's arrest and of having received arms from the French. Some confirmed that Murshid had had close relations with the French and testified that he had issued rifles to them before the gendarmerie advanced.
- (b) Murshid's eldest son admitted having accompanied the French troops to Murshid's village in 1945, stating that the French had summoned him to Beirut to inform him that the Mohafez had asked them (the French) to restore order.
- (c) Murshid himself maintained that he had remained loyal to the National bloc until 1938, although he had begun to arm his followers some three years earlier in order to defend his people against their enemies, who were being incited by Ihsan Jabri, brother of the present Syrian Prime Minister. Under French pressure he had in 1938 signed a petition asking for autonomy for the Alouite Mohafazat, but he had had in mind only financial and administrative autonomy. The French had offered to supply him with 3,000 rifles from one of their destroyers, but he had refused the offer and reported it to a British officer. He admitted having formed an army of 150 volunteers, wearing the emblem of

the sun on their clothing, to collect his dues from the people. He stated that Colonel George Tomb, a Syrian Commandant of Gendarmerie, at present in Beirut, had, in the past, encouraged him to oppose the authority of the Mohafez. He said he had met the British Political Officer, Squadron-Leader Belgrave, at his office in Lattakia, together with certain Alouite leaders, during the troubles of May 1945, when it was decided to urge the Alouite soldiers in the French Troupes Spéciales to join the Syrian Government, but he denied having secretly supported the French by telling these soldiers to come to his village instead of joining the Syrian army. (Squadron-Leader Belgrave, who is at present manager of the Shell Company in Beirut, says that such a meeting took place, at the request of the French, as the Alouite Troupes Spéciales were on the point of mutiny. Those who were unwilling to join the Syrian forces were encouraged to return to their villages in the Alouite mountains after surrendering their arms.) Some forty-five witnesses gave evidence against Murshid, but only three witnesses were allowed to testify on his behalf, though he desired to call others, including Squadron-Leader Belgrave.

4. The sentences of hanging, imprisonment and deportation eventually passed by the Judicial Council on Murshid, his three sons and some fifty followers were in accordance with article 62 of the Syrian

Penal Code, which provides for the death penalty for whoever is president or a director of a society of armed outlaws who seize the property of the State, loot and plunder from the State or from the public or resist the armed forces of the State in the execution of their duty; members of such a society may be sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour.

5. A remarkable aspect of the trial is that little evidence implicating the French and none implicating King Abdullah was given, for Captain Boussiquet, the French Political Officer in Lattakia at the time, and Lieutenant Bergé, for instance, were constant visitors to Murshid from 1941 to 1945 and, more recently, Murshid and other Alouite chiefs have been in contact with King Abdullah.

6. The liquidation of Murshid and his followers by a small force of gendarmes has undoubtedly resulted in an increase in the prestige of the Government, and has come as a shock to various undisciplined elements in the country such as the Druze and the big tribal leaders. But the Syrian Government are still far from solving the problem of the Alouites, for, although their leaders will for some time to come avoid armed opposition to the Syrian authorities, the Alouites remain deeply distrustful of the intentions of the Sunni Moslems and may be expected to look towards any foreign Power which they feel will give them backing against the central Government.

I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Jerusalem, Bagdad, Amman and Jedda.

I have, &c.

H. M. EYRES.

(B) Weekly Political Summaries

[E 9950/213/89]

No. 43

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 231, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, for the Week ending 17th September, 1946. (Received 5th October)

General.

ON the 15th September His Majesty's Minister arrived in Damascus by air from the United Kingdom. He had an interview the same day with the Syrian President, and on the following day with the Lebanese President, to tell them that he had been appointed to another post and would shortly be leaving the Levant States.

There has been surprisingly little interest shown or comment in the press about Palestine since the reports of the opening speeches of the conference in London by Mr. Attlee and Fares Bey Khoury. Such comment as has appeared has been on the whole reasonable in tone, along the lines that Great Britain and the Arabs are jointly seeking a solution; a few extremist papers in both countries have made the usual appeal to direct action and the shedding of blood on behalf

of fellow Arabs. The visit of King Farouk to Mersin has given the pro-French and pro-Russian newspapers in the Lebanon another opportunity of inveighing against the formation of an "Eastern bloc." In the Lebanon a number of newspapers have discussed the possibility of recognition of the Arab League by His Majesty's Government; on the whole, Nationalist newspapers take a favourable view, but the pro-French papers are hostile on the grounds that it will be a step towards the loss of Lebanese political identity.

Economic.

A Lebanese-Syrian Common Interests Conference was held in Sofar on the 13th September. The Syrians were represented by Saadullah Jabri and the Ministers for National Economy, Finance and Public Works; the Prime Minister and the Ministers for National Economy and Finance represented the Lebanon. It is learned that the meeting was stormy, though agreement was reached eventually on the following points:—

- (a) The Syrian Mira agreed to deliver to the Lebanese 100,000 tons of cereal (90 per cent. wheat and 10 per cent. barley), against payment of £13 million Lebanese to be remitted in two instalments.
- (b) The taxes on fuel in both countries to be the same.
- (c) A Syro-Lebanese Committee to be appointed to examine and report upon the issue of import and export licences.
- (d) An alteration in the present arrangement by which a Lebanese is always the senior Director of Customs and Excise in the Common Interests; A Syrian customs representative will in future hold equal rank. (The Syrian Government propose appointing Hassan Jabbara to this post.)

Syrian Mira purchases up to the 27th August amounted to 191,000 tons of grain, of which 3,000 tons is white barley, 17,000 black barley; Mira has ceased to purchase black barley but is still in the market for white barley and for wheat.

Syria.

The past week has seen what appears to be the final liquidation of Suleiman Murshed by Syrian Government security forces. When the present Mohafez of Lattakia was appointed some three months ago he was given instructions to renew the attempts made by the previous Mohafez to arrange a settlement of the various questions concerning Suleiman Murshed. A settlement was agreed and a written agreement signed covering the return of lands seized by Suleiman Murshed during the past four years and other matters. Subsequently, when the gendarmerie endeavoured to evict Murshed's followers in accordance with the agreement, they were fired upon and forced to withdraw. Murshed then retired to his village. A force, variously reported as from 2,000-3,000 gendarmes, with a proportion of the Syrian army as reserves, was sent against him. A small column of 200 men were ambushed and the gendarmerie lieutenant in command and an n.c.o. were killed, but the attack was pressed home. Some twelve of the followers of Murshed were killed and thirty-four wounded. When Murshed's stronghold was entered, it was found to be empty except for Suleiman Murshed himself and the corpse of his wife, Um Fatah, whom Murshed stated he had shot as she had been the cause of all the trouble and had consistently urged him to resist the Government; subsequently, Fatah and two other of his sons surrendered. Murshed is now under arrest and will be brought to trial for taking action against the security of the State and murdering Um Fatah. Meanwhile the Syrian Government have given orders that the population of the Jebel Alawite and particularly the Sunni section, who were victims of Murshed's misrule, should be assisted in every way possible to re-establish themselves by grants of money, assistance in rebuilding their houses, the loan of agricultural instruments and supplies of seeds. The apparently complete success attending the Syrian security forces in this expedition will undoubtedly bring considerable prestige to the Government and may well cause Monarchist supporters in the country to watch their step, particularly as there seems little doubt that Monarchist supporters had during the past few months been in close touch with Murshed and other Alawite leaders.

The Syrian Prime Minister stated in a press conference that the Chamber of Deputies will meet on the date laid down in the Constitution (22nd October) and that the session will not be postponed.

M. Saugon, the French Consul in Damascus, went to Aleppo on the 12th September in order to reopen the French Consulate, which has been in the charge of M. Gens since the departure of M. Fauquenot. The Syrian authorities in Aleppo had given him to understand that they did not wish him to have any contact with the people and he has therefore abstained from making visits. On

the 12th September, however, he received notification that now the French Consulate had been formally opened and that official relations between the Syrians and French existed, there would be no further restriction upon his movements. His Majesty's Consul in Aleppo, however, reports that the Syrian authorities are still stopping most people who enter and leave the French Consulate, asking them to state the reasons for their visit.

Three further batches of Armenians have left Aleppo *en route* to Soviet Armenia as follows: the 10th September, approximately 600 persons; the 11th September, approximately 600 persons; the 15th September, approximately 950 persons. The emigrants left in ordinary goods wagons. M. Klinov, the Russian diplomatic official in charge of the emigration arrangements has left Aleppo so that it appears probable that no further emigrants from Aleppo will be taken this year. Approximately 7,500 have left during the summer, leaving rather more than 70,000 Armenians still in North Syria. The Soviet Armenian authorities have continued to postpone the departure of out-and-out Communists in favour of newly-joined members of the Communist Party so that the strength of Communist elements may be retained.

According to the press, the Syrian Government have decided to establish a consulate in Adana instead of at Istanbul as originally intended. The press also reports that the resignation of Dr. Nazim Qudsi from his post as Syrian Minister at Washington has been accepted by the Council of Ministers, in order to enable him to resume his duties as parliamentary Deputy.

The Lebanon.

The sitting of the Lebanese Chamber, which should have taken place on the 11th September, did not do so owing to lack of a quorum. The Munla Cabinet continues to hold together though signs are increasing that it is nearing the end of its days. The President appears to be considering asking Riad Solh to form a new Cabinet and it is believed that Henri Pharaoh and Habib Abi Shahla would be ready to support him.

The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs asked His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires if His Majesty's Government would support the Lebanese request for continued membership of the Economic Social Council of the United Nations Organisation; he added that the Syrian Government had promised their support. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires informed M. Tacla, on instructions, that His Majesty's Government could not commit themselves in advance to the support of a particular candidate for election, but would give the Lebanese candidature their sympathetic consideration. M. Tacla then said that the Egyptian Government had also put forward a demand for the same seat; this, he considered, unreasonable, as other Arab States had promised to support the Lebanon and Egypt already had three seats on various councils. Later in the week the Director-General of the Lebanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs informed Mr. Young that the Egyptians had refused to agree to withdraw their candidate and were determined to have a seat on the Economic Council on the ground that one of the major problems would be settlement of the Egyptian international financial position.

There has been considerable Communist activity in the Lebanon during the past week. Violently anti-British pamphlets have been distributed on the theme of British colonisation of the Middle East and the formation of an eastern bloc against Russia. Several meetings have been held in the neighbourhood of Shtaura and Zahle in the Bekaa and it is reported that it is proposed to organise a Communist meeting in the Lebanon to which Communists from neighbouring Arab States will be invited. Khalid Bagdash has carried out a recruiting campaign in the area of Bait-ed-Din, where the President is spending part of his time. *Saut esh Shaab* remains suspended.

There has been an unusually hot spell and forest fires have caused considerable damage in North Lebanon. The spell ended with a cloud-burst in the North Bekaa, in which nine people were drowned and large numbers of cattle and sheep destroyed.

The Polish Minister in the Lebanon, at a party given to the press at the Polish Students' Centre, stated that there were in all about 5,000 Poles in the Lebanon who received from the Polish Government a monthly allowance of £102 Lebanese; thus they were spending more than £500,000 in the country. As for repatriation, the Polish Minister stated that Poles in the Lebanon would begin to leave the country by the 1st November and that the withdrawal would be complete by the end of March 1947.

[E 10169/213/89]

No. 44

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 232, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, for the Week ending 24th September, 1946. (Received 12th October)

General

THERE has again been surprisingly little comment in the press and discussions in political circles on the Palestine Conference. Such comment as has appeared has on the whole been hopeful of an agreed solution.

His Majesty's Minister visited Damascus from 18th-20th September to pay farewell visits. A dinner was given at the Presidency, to which were invited members of the Cabinet, the president of the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies, the staff of the British Legation and Consulate, and a number of British subjects resident in Damascus. On the following day, 19th September, Mr. Shone and a few members of his staff dined with Jamil Bey Mardam at his farm in the Ghouta. The Minister and Mrs. Shone gave a cocktail party in the grounds of the legation that evening to which some 470 guests were invited, and the Prime Minister gave a dinner party later in the evening to which all members of foreign missions and consulates, as well as a number of Syrian notables, were invited. The Mohafez of Damascus at this dinner presented His Majesty's Minister with a document conferring upon him the status of honorary citizen of Damascus. On 21st September the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs gave a luncheon party in Beirut at which were present members of the Lebanese Cabinet and the staff of His Majesty's Legation. On 22nd the Lebanese President entertained His Majesty's Minister and members of the Legation staff to lunch at his summer palace in Beit-ed-Din, and the same evening His Majesty's Minister gave a cocktail party in the grounds of his house at Aley, to which some 600 guests were invited.

The press of both countries has been unanimous in expressing regret at his departure, but there has been noticeable an underlying anxiety at the absence of news about his successor; a change in policy is suspected in some quarters, and in others the delay in nomination is considered to be curious if not perhaps marking the displeasure of His Majesty's Government with the Governments of the Levant States.

Economic

The telephone service hitherto operated by the army authorities has been handed over to the Lebanese Department of Posts and Telegraphs.

The Syrian Prime Minister has stated at a press conference that the draft budget is almost completed and provides for expenditure of rather more than £9 million Syrian.

Syria

The following decisions were taken at the recent Arab Cultural Conference held in Damascus:—

- (1) To foster cultural co-operation between Arab countries.
- (2) To establish contact with the Cultural Committee of the United Nations Organisation in Paris.
- (3) To educate Arab public opinion in the utility of publicity and broadcasting services.
- (4) To establish a periodical in connexion with the Arab League.
- (5) To request the Egyptian Government to increase the power of their official broadcasting station since this station is considered the only truly independent Arab one.
- (6) To recommend the adoption of uniform weights and measures throughout the Arab world.

The British Council delegate in Damascus visited the Syrian President at the latter's request and gave him a brief report of the council's activities during the past twelve months, a matter in which Shukri Bey Quwatli has shown considerable interest. The President showed particular interest in the question of the provision of textbooks, and gave Mr. Savage the impression that it is probable that the Syrian Ministry of Education will come into line with other Arab States next year and itself place orders for books. He expressed satisfaction with the Council's work, especially for the plan for helping teachers of English: he referred to the importance of the council's library, and asked Mr. Savage to keep him informed of the council's future activities.

The Syrian Prime Minister, in conversation with His Majesty's Consul, Damascus, said that he had asked the French Minister whether it was true that the French Military Attaché to the Lebanon, Colonel Terrier, was to be accredited to the French Legation in Damascus, since Colonel Terrier was high on the Syrian list of French undesirables, and would in no circumstances be acceptable; he went on to say that for the time being he felt unable to agree to his Government accepting the French Military Attaché.

Mr. Gordon Fox, who is employed by the Syrian Government as a civil technical expert to the Ministry of Defence, has been sent to Egypt to purchase from the Disposals Mission material for the Syrian security forces, particularly armoured cars in good condition.

Lebanon

21st September was observed as a national holiday to celebrate the third anniversary of the President's election. There were no official ceremonies, and the President spent the day at Beit-ed-Din.

A law has been promulgated to the effect that Lebanese courts are competent to hear cases against the French State, thus rescinding a decree made by the French High Commissioner in 1937 making it illegal for such cases to be brought before the Lebanese courts.

It is reported in the Lebanese press that the United States authorities, at the request of the Lebanese Government, have consented to look after Lebanese interests in the French-controlled African territories.

A one-day strike of newspapers occurred on 18th September as a protest against the suspension of newspapers by administrative decree; at the present moment six Beirut newspapers are suspended, including *Saut-esh-Shaab* and the French language newspaper, *L'Orient*.

The vessel *Russia* has arrived in Beirut to take away a further batch of Armenian immigrants, of which there are some 2,500 awaiting transport.

Emil Eddé arrived in Beirut on 20th September by air from France. He was received at the aerodrome by about 150 persons, but the Lebanese Sûreté, by taking the names of all present and obstructing cars wishing to leave the airport, prevented a cortège being formed, thus spoiling Eddé's intended triumphal entry into Beirut. His party, the Lebanese National Bloc, applied for permission to hold a meeting on 23rd September, but were refused: pamphlets were distributed in protest.

[E 10223/213/89]

No. 45

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 233, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, for the Week ending 1st October, 1946. (Received 15th October)

General

ON 26th September Mr. Shone left Beirut airport in a special R.A.F. aircraft for Egypt en route to the United Kingdom on relinquishing the post of minister to Syria and the Lebanon. A large number of Lebanese and members of the British community attended at the airport to say goodbye. Mr. Eyres arrived in Beirut on 30th September as British Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*, and called on the Lebanese President and Minister for Foreign Affairs on the following day.

On 30th September the British liquidation staff left the Lebanon, in accordance with the programme of evacuation. At the moment there are, therefore, no British troops in the Levant States except for the military attaché and his staff.

Economic

Negotiations continued with Syrian and Lebanese representatives concerning the division of the O.C.P. profits. In conversation with Mr. Young the Syrian Prime Minister, in expressing his agreement to the settlement of the British claim on O.C.P. profits, made no reference to any attached conditions, but at a meeting held on 30th September the Syrian representative refused to approve the British

claim unless the British guaranteed to waive all claims against Mira, including the commander-in-chief's claim. Meanwhile, no payments are being made from either the O.C.P. or the Mira accounts to the Syrian or Lebanese Governments.

The Syrian Minister of Finance has stated that negotiations with the Bretton Woods Financial Organisation are proceeding satisfactorily, and that Syria's contribution to the fund will be 6½ million dollars, of which 10 per cent. is to be paid in gold and 10 per cent. in dollars.

Three representatives of the United States Civil Aeronautics Association were passengers in the Pan-American Air Lines Constellation which landed in Damascus on the 21st September, with the purpose of ascertaining whether the Mezze airfield provided the necessary facilities for the projected Pan-American air service.

With reference to Weekly Political Summary No. 231, "Economic," paragraph 1 (d), the Syrian and Lebanese Governments have reached an agreement in principle that the Customs Directorate of the Intérêts Communs shall have a Syrian Director for the year 1949; previously this post has always been held by a Lebanese.

Syria

During the past week the Damascus press has been largely engaged in a campaign for and against the present Government, accordingly to taste; honours are approximately easy.

The Syrian Government on the 30th September published a communiqué in the press denying the news broadcast from Radio Moscow, quoting the *Pravda* correspondent in Tehran, to the effect that the British Government had asked the Syrian Government to conclude a tripartite treaty with Turkey for joint defence.

The Damascus press has carried various reports of the proposed agreement between Iraq and Transjordan, which has caused considerable discussion in political circles. On the whole, comment has not been unfavourable, though one Damascus newspaper considers that the union of the two armies is the most dangerous factor since the Arab Legion is really a British force. The Prime Minister asked the oriental secretary whether, if the agreement came into force, the British army would have the same rights in Iraq as it at present enjoys in Transjordan. The oriental secretary assured Saadullah Jabri that the question of British troops in Transjordan and Iraq depended solely upon the agreements at any time in force between His Majesty's Government and the respective Governments of Transjordan and Iraq.

With reference to Weekly Political Summary No. 231, "Syria," paragraph 1, the gendarmerie officer in command of recent operations against Suleiman Murshid informed His Majesty's Consul in Damascus that the total number of Government forces employed was 375 gendarmes, accompanied by twelve armoured cars and thirty-two Bren guns, with a reserve of one squadron of mounted Tcherkess numbering 150.

The Syrian Government have republished in the press article 5 of a law dated 29th May, 1945, stating that any Syrian in the employment of a foreign authority, either in Syria or abroad, who failed to comply with the demand of the Syrian Government to leave such employment within a specified period of time, would be punished by being deprived of his citizenship and by the confiscation of his property and possessions. According to officials of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, their aim in enforcing this article is to compel certain Syrians employed both in Syria and in the Lebanon by the French and "Slav" Legations to give up their jobs.

Lebanon

The Lebanese Cabinet have announced during the week very considerable reductions and reorganisation in the Ministry of National Economy, and particularly in the Directorate of Supplies. It is proposed that the total number of employees to be retained will not exceed 125, instead of the 800 employed three months ago.

All suspended newspapers, including the *Saut esh Shaab*, have been allowed to reappear during the week.

The Transjordan Minister to the Lebanon, Mohammed Ali el Ajlouni, presented his letters of credence on the 1st October.

The *Russia* left Beirut on the 27th September carrying 6,000 Armenian immigrants. Before embarking each individual had to hand back his identity papers and ration card.

His Royal Highness the Emir Tallal of Transjordan passed through Syria on the morning of 24th September, and has since been staying at an hotel in Beirut as the guest of the Lebanese Government; he has been visited by the Prime Minister and other members of the Government, Deputies and other leading personalities, as well as by various monarchist enthusiasts from Syria, including Hassan el Hakim.

[E 10682/213/89]

No. 46

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 234, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, for the Week ending 8th October, 1946. (Received 30th October)

General

THE adjournment of the Palestine Conference, the apparent breakdown in the Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations, President Truman's reiteration of his proposal for the immediate immigration of 100,000 Jews into Palestine, followed by Governor Dewey's raising of the bid to hundreds of thousands of Jews, the visit of the King of Iraq and the Iraqi Minister of Defence to the Lebanon and the continued presence of the Emir Tallal in Beirut have all given an opportunity to the Levant States' politicians to give full rein to their imagination. While there have been many attacks on Great Britain, in general the press and public opinion have taken a not too pessimistic view of the Palestine Conference and the Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations.

Economic

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires has had further discussions with the Syrian Minister of Finance concerning the British claim to share in the O.C.P. profits. The Syrians have now agreed to meet the full British claim of £640,000 in the O.C.P. profits, provided it is understood that no claim will be made for the military component of M.I.R.A.; the British military authorities, however, have not agreed to waive their right to claim.

Major Holt has returned from the United Kingdom and presented Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners' preliminary report on the economic development of the country to the Syrian Government.

Syria

Mr. Eyres, British Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*, visited Damascus on 3rd October and called on the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and the President of the Syrian Republic. He returned to Beirut that night, but on the following day took up his residence in Damascus. The Syrian press, in welcoming Mr. Eyres, has shown great satisfaction that he is to reside in Damascus, "thereby starting a new and welcome precedent, as his predecessors and the majority of foreign diplomats have hitherto resided in Beirut, thereby seeming to consider the Lebanese capital as of major importance."

A Presidential Decree has been published directing that all Armenians who have left for Soviet Armenia shall lose their Syrian nationality as from the date of their departure from Syria.

The Syrian Prime Minister, at a press conference, stated that his Government had not requested the Arab League to take up the question of Alexandretta in its next session. An official of the Lebanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs, however, informed the legation that this question was in fact on the agenda, though he did not expect that any action would be taken on it.

Muhsen Bey Barazi, the head of the President's office, left by air on 1st October to spend a month in the United Kingdom as the guest of the British Council.

The President of the Syrian Republic has conferred upon the Armenian Orthodox Bishop of Aleppo the Syrian Order of Merit of the first class. His Eminence telegraphed to the President his deep appreciation for the honour conferred upon him and expressed the gratitude of all Armenians for the treatment they have received at the hands of the Syrian authorities.

No definite arrangements have yet been made for transporting Syrian pilgrims by sea to Jedda, though it is understood that the principal Sea Transport Officer in Alexandria has been directed to make one ship available for Syrian pilgrims. Meanwhile, a Syrian transport company continues to negotiate for a ship offered by the Russians; this offer has not yet been accepted and the

Pilgrimage Commission have published regulations for the pilgrimage by the overland route; negotiations are also in progress with Pan-American Airways for the chartering of aircraft.

Mr. Fox, adviser to the Syrian Ministry of Defence, has returned from Egypt, where he has placed orders for various items of military equipment, including twenty armoured cars fitted with 2-pounder guns.

The *Ikhwan al Muslimeen* have sent a written protest to the legation against the publication in *Britannia and Eve* of an illustrated article by Matania of Mohammed, which shows the Prophet regarding Adam and Eve, the latter being assumed to represent Mohammed's wife and therefore being improperly dressed. Letters have also been written to the President of the republic, the Prime Minister, &c., and a Damascus notable has challenged Matania to a duel and applied for a visa to England for this purpose.

Lebanon

King Feisal II of Iraq arrived in the *Providence* in Beirut harbour on the evening of 4th October and left the ship early in the morning of the 5th. He was visited by the Lebanese President, returned the call later in the morning, and was entertained at lunch by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, when heads of missions were asked to meet him. He then went to Beit ed-Dine and left by road on the 6th for Rayak, where he took a train to Bagdad.

Despite the agreement between Riad Solh and Henri Pharaon, referred to in Weekly Political Summary No. 225, Lebanon, that they would not interfere in each other's election campaigns, there is no doubt that the latter is working against the candidates of Riad Solh in south Lebanon. Henri Pharaon, however, is not interfering in the campaign for the Speakership of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, in which Sabri Hamadi is opposed by Habib Abi Chahla, who is receiving support from Riad Solh.

The text has been published in the press of a new law concerning "private schools" in the Lebanon, which are defined as being any educational institutes founded or administered by private individuals, societies or missions.

Amongst the decisions taken during the week by the Council of Ministers, the following are of interest:—

- (a) The provision of £15,000 for the fund for the prevention of land sales to Jews in Palestine.
- (b) The sending of a delegation to the forthcoming Telecommunications Conference in the United States.
- (c) The sending of a delegation to the Civil Aviation Conference to be held in Paris on 28th October.
- (d) Approval of Sir George Young's plan for the compilation and publication of a volume setting out Lebanese law.
- (e) The suppression of the Council of State, the special High Court with competence to hear cases against the State.

The town of Tripoli was closed on 4th October in protest against a bomb outrage, for which certain members of Abdul Hamid Karamé's party are alleged to have been responsible. The feud between Karamé's faction and the Mukaddem's has recently shown signs of activity as a result of the Mohafez of Tripoli and the commander of the gendarmerie forces in north Lebanon supporting the Mukaddem faction in an effort to ensure that Karamé will be defeated at the next elections.

The "Pères Blancs" have applied to the Lebanese Government for permission to transfer their training college for priests (Greek Catholic) from Jerusalem to Rayak. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, a Greek Catholic, is doing his best to arrange that permission should be granted, but the President is unwilling to approve as he is afraid the school would be a centre for French propaganda.

[E 10893/213/89]

No. 47

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 235, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, for the fortnight ending 22nd October, 1946. (Received 6th November)

General

PRESIDENT Truman's declaration in favour of the immediate entry of 100,000 Jews into Palestine has continued to receive most hostile criticism in

the press of both countries and amongst all sections of the population. The adjournment of the Arab Conference on Palestine until December has, on the whole, been well received except by the more violently pro-Russian and pro-French newspapers; the postponement has been generally taken to mean that there is still hope of a settlement which will end Jewish immigration; no one is prepared to admit that any settlement which allows the continuation of Jewish immigration could be accepted by the Arabs States.

Sir Edward Spears arrived in Damascus by air on Wednesday, 16th October, he was met by a representative from the presidency and from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It was announced in the press that he was visiting the Middle East as the guest of the Arab League, but both the Lebanese President and the Syrian Prime Minister asked this legation what was the real purpose of his visit. They were informed that he was no longer employed in any capacity by His Majesty's Government and that his visit had been arranged by the Arab League.

The Syrian and Lebanese Presidents, together with members of their Cabinets, met at Zebdani on the 14th October to discuss various matters connected with the two countries, particularly the reorganisation of the Common Interests. It does not appear that much progress was made in working out a joint economic policy, though the Ministers of National Economy and Finance met in Damascus two days later to continue discussions about the reorganisation of the administration of the Common Interests.

The Governments of Syria and the Lebanon have both expressed their willingness to receive a goodwill mission from India.

Economic

Up to 7th October the Syrian M.I.R.A. had purchased 203,000 tons of wheat, 21,000 tons of black barley and 20,000 tons of white barley.

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires has had further discussions with the Syrian Prime Minister and Minister of Finance on the subject of the British claim to O.C.P. profits, but both Ministers maintain that there should be a final settlement which should include an undertaking that no claim will be made for the military component of M.I.R.A., and that neither the Syrian Government nor Parliament could authorise a settlement of the British claim against O.C.P. on any other terms.

Syria

The Syrian Parliament met for the first sitting of the Seventh Ordinary Session on the 22nd October, when Fares el Khoury, in his absence, was re-elected as Speaker. Seventy Deputies were present, including Adnam Atassi, ex-Syrian Minister to Paris, Jamil Mardam Bey and Nazzam Qudsi, ex-Ministers to Egypt and the United States respectively were absent.

Sir Edward Spears, who stayed at the Orient Palace Hotel, was entertained to lunch by the Syrian President and to dinner twice by Saadullah Bey Jabri. Various other receptions were held in his honour, and he paid a flying visit to Aleppo on 19th October, where he stayed for twenty-four hours. In his speeches and in interviews with the press he made it clear that he was visiting the Middle East in a purely private capacity as the guest of the Arab League. Throughout his stay he was warmly welcomed by the Syrians.

There has recently been some criticism in Damascus of Abdel Rahman Azzam Pasha for making declarations concerning Palestine and other Arab countries, on the grounds that the post of Secretary-General of the Arab League is administrative rather than political, and that Azzam Pasha, therefore, has no right to speak on political matters as though he is giving the views of the Arab League.

Two by-elections have occurred during the past week. In Homs, Mukharram Atassi was the only candidate for the vacancy occasioned by the recent death of his brother Hilmi, but in Aleppo the National Bloc candidate, Gabriel Ghazal, was defeated by twenty-six votes out of 700 by an Opposition candidate, Dikran Jiragian, sponsored by Rushdi Hekhia's Party.

The Syrian Prime Minister informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that the French Minister had sent a note to the Syrian Government protesting against a leakage of information about the proposed reopening of French schools. Saadullah Bey was extremely incensed at the tone of the note, he had informed the French Counsellor that he could not accept such a note and that he required an apology; if no apology were forthcoming, he would consider himself free to

take any action in the matter. The present situation with regard to French schools is that the Syrian Minister of Education has been instructed to consider seven French schools as "licensed," three in Damascus, three in Aleppo and one in Homs; these schools, therefore, had to obtain only a permit to reopen and to undertake to follow the Syrian Education Law of March 1944. Other French schools will have to obtain a licence to open. This is a slight advance on the previous attitude of the Syrian Government, who have consistently maintained that no French schools "existed" and all must therefore apply for a "licence" to open.

The Damascus press reports that the French Minister has submitted to the Syrian Government a list of French property in Syria; the list includes most of the houses occupied up to 1945 by French officials, a number of barracks and the aerodromes at Mezzé, Aleppo, Homs and Hama.

A decree has been issued by the Ministry of the Interior limiting the number of papers in Syrian towns to one for 50,000 inhabitants. If put into effect, this will result in the number of papers in Damascus and Aleppo being cut to six and seven respectively; papers which are suppressed under this decree are to receive L.S.10,000 pounds compensation.

At the eleventh hour the Syrian Pilgrimage Committee were enabled to charter a British ship, which left Beirut for Jedda on the first of two voyages on 17th October. The president of the committee has expressed his thanks to this legation and to His Majesty's Consul, Damascus, for this assistance. Two convoys of cars have left overland via Transjordan for Jedda.

Acting on instructions from the Foreign Office, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires warned the Syrian Prime Minister of the embarrassing effects on relations between the Syrian Government and His Majesty's Government if the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem were to take up his residence in Syria in order to conduct political activities from there. At the same time he reminded the Prime Minister of assurances given at the time when Izzat Darawazeh, Akram Zuweir and other renegades found asylum in Syria that these persons should not be allowed to indulge in political activities. Saadullah Jabri said that while the Syrian Government would take what measures they could to prevent it, the arrival of the Mufti in the Levant States would be a minor incident compared with the situation in Iraq and Transjordan if the results of the Palestine Conference were unfavourable to the Arabs. He added that the Palestinians in Syria were "unimportant" and were keeping very quiet.

His Majesty's Vice-Consul, Deir-ez-Zor, reports that public security of both the Euphrates and Jezireh Mohafazats appears to be excellent, though arms are finding their way in small lots of ten or fifteen from Persia into the tribal areas. It is rumoured that these arms are going to Kurds and that they originate from Russian sources; there is, however, no indication that this movement is, in fact, abnormal, since the crops this year have been good, the price paid for grain high, and as a result there is plenty of money available. The Assyrians in the Khabour settlement have no particular grumbles.

Mr. Shadforth also reports that there does not appear to be much Communist activity in the Euphrates, and that the Communist editor of *Saut el Frat*, a weekly paper issued in Deir-ez-Zor, has few adherents.

The Mohafez of the Jezireh has complained that a number of Syrian subjects enlisted in Syria into the Iraq levies are being demobilised in Iraq and returning to Syria without proper travel documents, and, in some cases, without certificates of discharge. He has reported the matter to the Syrian Government, and proposes to refuse admission to any further ex-levies who are found without adequate travel documents.

Constantine Zuraik, counsellor at the Syrian Legation in Washington, has been appointed as minister there in succession to Nazim Qudsi.

Lebanon

Emile Eddé held a reception on 12th October to which representatives of the press were invited. He made a statement setting out the policy of his party which contained nothing new, and attacked the existing Government and its supporters for having collaborated with the French.

The Lebanese President, in conversation with a member of the legation staff, has expressed his uneasiness at the activities of a journalist named Emile Khoury, correspondent in Switzerland of *El Akram*, who is at present visiting the Lebanon and who the President said was in close touch with Emil Eddé and also with various Communist organisations.

It is reported that the Lebanese Federation of Labour Syndicates has held a meeting, at which Mustapha Ariss gave a detailed statement of the discussions and decisions of a conference of the Executive Committee of the International Federation of Unions held recently in Moscow. *Inter alia*, he said that the International Federation wished all labour federations to press their Government to urge that the International Federation of Unions should be represented on the United Nations Security Council—if necessary, they should demonstrate in support of this demand. All workmen, particularly those engaged in transport, should strike if and when goods are exported to or imported from Spain, and should demonstrate against the Franco régime on receipt of instructions from the International Federation. Offices should be opened for organising improvements in the economic conditions of workmen in the colonies, semi-colonies or countries that are not fully developed economically, this, Mustapha Ariss pointed out, included Syria and the Lebanon.

The committee of the "Moslem-Christian Conference" held a reception on 14th October at the Normandy Hotel in Beirut, to which a number of journalists were invited. Speeches violently criticising the British and American attitude towards Palestine were made and a number of resolutions were passed, including the holding of a Moslem-Christian conference to which representatives of all Arab States will be invited.

The following appointments have been made to diplomatic and consular posts:—

- (1) Izzat Zein, consul at Lagos for Nigeria and the Gold Coast.
- (2) Fadlo Haurani, honorary consul at Manchester.
- (3) Gibran Thweni, minister to the Argentine.
- (4) Kazim el Solh, minister to Iraq.
- (5) Joseph Abu Khater, minister to Mexico.

The Emir Tallal of Transjordan left Beirut by road for Amman on the 13th October and spent a short time resting at the Orient Palace Hotel in Damascus.

Habib Abi Chahla was elected Speaker of the Lebanese Chamber on 22nd October in succession to Sabri Hamadi, whom he defeated by twenty-nine votes to twenty-two. Habib Abi Chahla owes his success to the support of Riad Solh and the neutrality of Henri Pharaon. The defeat of Sabri Hamadi is likely to cause discontent amongst the Shia community in the Bekaa.

The week closed with a Syrian Government decree limiting the number of newspapers to be published in the various towns. Early reaction seemed to be one of violent criticism on the part of most papers. Further comment is awaited.

[E 11249/213/89]

No. 48

Extract from *Weekly Political Summary* No. 236, *Secret, Syria and Lebanon*, for the week ending 29th October, 1946. (Received 18th November)

General

NOTHING to report.

Economic

Nothing to report.

Syria

The second sitting of the seventh session of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies took place on 24th October, at which the various House Committees were elected; Naim Antaki, ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs and of Finance, was elected president of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The Government came in for violent criticism from several Deputies for issuing legislative decrees dealing with the establishments of various Government departments, parts of which, according to the critics, conflict with existing laws or are contrary to articles of the Constitution. Later in the week a manifesto was issued in a number of papers which set out the same point of view, and was signed by a large number of Deputies, Syrian notables, doctors, lawyers and a number of associations.

Considerable interest was aroused in political circles and in the press by the reported statement of the Turkish Foreign Minister that he believed it was

possible to settle the Hatay question in a manner which would safeguard the interests of both Syria and Turkey. The Syrian press pointed out that no settlement which would not ensure the return of the Hatay to Syria would safeguard Syrian interests.

Legislative decree No. 51 of 19th October, setting up the new establishment of the Ministry of Justice, contains two articles which deal with the arrangements for the disposal of cases pending before the Mixed Courts. What amounts to the official abolition of the Mixed Courts was carried out without any intimation being given to His Majesty's Legation, in spite of earlier assurances by the Syrian Prime Minister that he would introduce no legislation regarding Mixed Courts until an exchange of notes on the subject, then in process of negotiation, had been effected.

His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo reports that Communists in the area have held a number of meetings during the past few weeks, at which the usual anti-British speeches have been made and King Abdullah has come in for violent abuse.

Al Manar, the organ of the Ikhwan al Muslimeen, reports that the French Minister in Damascus has taken his table lamp to Beirut for repair, where it was repaired at a Jewish shop. The paper comments: "The Minister did not wish to repair it in Damascus. Let all hear of this."

Lebanon

During the past week General Spears has been entertained to a succession of official and semi-official banquets and receptions, at a number of which he has made speeches. Details will be reported separately.

The election of Habib Abi Chahla to the presidency of the Chamber has resulted in a number of protests from the Shia community in the Bekaa, who maintain that their community is being deprived of its rights by the election of a non-Shia. Ahmed al Hussein, Minister of Justice, a Shia, has received a number of communications from co-religionists asking him to resign his post in protest.

M. Joseph Harfoush has been appointed Lebanese Chargé d'Affaires in Brussels.

[E 11325/213/89]

No. 49

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 237, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, for the week ending 5th November, 1946. (Received 20th November)

General

On 2nd November strikes took place in all Syrian and Lebanese towns between 9 and 10 a.m.; orderly processions visited various Government offices and protests were made against the Balfour Declaration and subsequent British and American policy with regard to Palestine. A number of telegrams were received by His Majesty's Legation from townships and political organisations throughout the Levant States. No incidents were reported.

Economic

A Vickers Viking aircraft visited Mozzé Airport on 31st October carrying a deputy chairman of Vickers-Armstrong Limited, and a number of leading Egyptian personalities. A number of Syrians interested in aviation inspected the machine and were taken for demonstration flights.

Syria

The establishment decrees published by the Syrian Government (see Weekly Political Summary No. 236, Syria) have continued to receive considerable criticism in the press and from widely differing elements of the Opposition.

On the occasion of the "Id el Adha" the Syrian President received at the presidency members of the diplomatic and consular corps, and a number of Syrian notables. With the exception of the Prime Minister, who was ill in bed, and the Emir Adel Arslan, who had arrived from England the previous day, no other members of the Cabinet were in Damascus for the feast.

Public opinion has remained interested in the alleged statement of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning the Hatay (see Weekly Political Summary No. 236, Syria), and the following statement has appeared in a Damascus newspaper purporting to be the reply made by the Syrian Minister in Ankara:

"Syria is waiting for Turkey to take the first step and she will treat her neighbours with perfect friendship. We should particularly agree with Turkey since we have a common frontier of hundreds of kilom. Agreement with Turkey has been delayed for two reasons; firstly the Alexandretta question and secondly the question of properties. I shall be glad to see closer relations between Syria and Turkey and to see these problems solved by good-will on both sides."

The Syrian Government have issued a circular letter to all legations in Damascus to the effect that the Mohafazats of Latakia, Jezireh and the Euphrates are closed areas "to all foreigners." Permission must be obtained from the Syrian authorities before any foreigner may enter, and any foreigner found in these provinces without the requisite permission will be "subject to the penalties prescribed by the appropriate laws." An official of the Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs has told a member of the legation staff that the purpose of this ruling is to prevent entry of French and Russians into these Mohafazats where the Syrian Government fear they might engage in subversive activity.

Just before the circular note referred to in the above paragraph, Mr. Denet, one of the attachés at the American Legation in Beirut, completed a tour in the Jezireh in order to ascertain the present feeling amongst the Kurds. He told His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo that he had interviewed many Kurdish leaders, including Dr. Nafiz; he described the situation in the zone adjoining the Turkish frontier as outwardly quiet, but he expressed the view that Kurdish nationalist feeling had appreciably strengthened during the past three months, partly as a result of the encouragement received by the Kurds from Soviet Russia. He stated that broadcasts in Kurdish from a station presumably situated in Russia were violently anti-Turkish in character and promised Russian military support to the Kurds when the time was ripe for them to fight the Turks. Supplies of arms and ammunition were still trickling into northern Syria and probably into the north of Iraq, though the arms had to be paid for. The Kurdish representatives whom he had seen made it clear to him that the Kurds were determined to win their complete freedom, and that if Britain and the United States refused to help them they would have recourse to the U.S.S.R., which had promised them assistance.

The following appointments have been published in the official *Syrian Gazette*:-

Farid Zein Eddin, Director-General of the Foreign Office.

Assad Kurani, Director-General of the Ministry of Justice.

Leon Murad, Director-General of the Ministry of National Economy.

Assad Mahfal has been transferred from the Syrian Legation in Cairo to represent Syria in the cultural and other committees of the Arab League.

Joseph Haddad, Chargé d'Affaires in Cairo, has been transferred to the Foreign Office.

It is reported that Affif Solh has been nominated as Syrian Minister to Iraq, and Faiz Khouri as permanent Syrian representative to the United Nations Organisation.

Lebanon

In a sitting of the Lebanese Parliament on 31st October Sabri Hamadi, the ex-speaker, tabled a resolution to abolish all constitutional and other legal provisions for the distribution of electoral and administrative seats among the religious communities in the Lebanon. Sabri Hamadi attempted to have a division taken without delay, but a number of Deputies pointed out that the result of such a law would be so far-reaching that it ought to be considered most carefully. The matter has been referred to the appropriate committee of the House for consideration.

The Lebanese Government, having informed the French that they would take over the custody of enemy property at the end of October, the Chamber passed a law on 31st October giving effect to this decision. The position with regard to Italian assets has become involved as a result of the French decision to hand over the custody of them to the Italian Government before the expiry of the Lebanese ultimatum. The Italian Government, who were doubtless unaware of the local situation, instructed a member of their consular mission in Palestine to go to the French Legation in Beirut to receive custody of the Italian property in the Levant States. Decrees were issued by the French Sequestrator-General lifting Italian property from ban and transferring his powers to an Italian representative who was given a cheque for £. Leb. 800,000, which he cashed

at the Banque de Syrie and deposited with the Swiss Chargé d'Affaires as representing Italian interests. As soon as the Lebanese Government learnt of this, they attempted to recover the money, but the Swiss Chargé d'Affaires refused pending further instructions from Rome, though he has agreed that it shall remain in the Lebanon.

There have again been rumours of a possible change in the Cabinet. Riad es Solh is becoming increasingly restive over not being asked to form a new Government, and it is reported that he has, in fact, issued an ultimatum to the President that unless he is asked to form the next Cabinet soon, he will attempt to overthrow the present Government.

The final draft of the 1947 Lebanese Budget shows expenditure amounting to £. Leb. 54,190,000, the major items are—

	£. Leb.
Ministry of Interior	10,500,000
Ministry of Public Works	11,500,000
Ministry of Education	4,500,000
Ministry of Defence	10,000,000

The draft budget for expenditure exceeds the draft budget for income by only £. Leb. 150,000.

The Horse-tail Standard ("bunczuk") was presented on 1st November to the Lebanese President in the name of the Polish Military Units stationed in the Middle East by their commander, General Jozef Wiatr.

[E 11591/213/89]

No. 50

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 238, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, for the Week ending 12th November, 1946. (Received 28th November)

General

Nothing to report.

Economic

The most recent figures for the collection of cereals in Syria show that there may be an exportable surplus of approximately 25,000 tons, after allowing for the needs of the Lebanon and a reserve to guard against the possibility of a late crop in 1947.

Syria

All Government offices were closed from 4th till 8th November, inclusive, on the occasion of the "Id el Adha"; no newspapers were published. The holiday, however, was spent by many Deputies and politicians in feverish activity in preparation for the second sitting of the Chamber of Deputies on 12th November, at which it was clear that an attack would be launched against the Establishment Decrees issued by the Government (see Weekly Political Summary No. 437, Syria). Jamil Bey Mardam returned from Cairo on 9th November. When interviewed by a member of the legation staff on the 11th, he said that he had intended to keep out of local politics for the next few months in order to prepare a new political programme more suited to the needs of the country than that of the present Government, but a number of Deputies and notables, including the Deputy-Speaker of the Chamber and Naim Antaki, had expressed to him their uneasiness at the political situation occasioned by the publication of the Establishment Decrees. He had agreed to meet them and discuss the matter further. In answer to a question as to whether he would enter the Government if asked to do so, he replied that he would not enter the Government, but would be prepared to form a Government provided he was given a free hand in the choice of Ministers; he would not commit himself to being in favour of a coalition Government, but it is known that he was in touch with members of the Opposition, including Rushdi Kekhia, Nazim Qudzi and Adnan Atassi when he was in the Levant States during the summer. He added that before he had returned from Egypt both King Farouk and King Abdul Aziz had asked him to work in co-operation with the Syrian President and that he had promised to do so.

Between the end of the "Id" and the sitting of the Chamber on the 12th, a violent campaign was launched in the press against the Government for publishing the Establishment Decrees particularly Decree No. 50 (Minister of

the Interior), which gives the Minister very considerable powers over the formation and activities of parties and organisations, to imprison or exile their members, and to suspend and abolish newspapers. It has been variously described in the press as dictatorial, savage, oppressive, the negation of freedom, &c., &c. On 11th November Sultan Pasha Atrash issued a manifesto in a number of newspapers attacking Decree No. 50 and saying that as in the past Syrians had fought for their liberty against the foreigner, the time had now come when they should fight for their liberty against their Government. Secondary school students came out on strike on 11th November, ostensibly against the new regulations of the Ministry of Education, but there is little doubt that they were incited by elements opposed to Decree No. 50, including Communists, who, as has been previously reported, have a considerable hold amongst teachers and pupils in Damascus.

At the sitting of the Chamber on 12th November, the Prime Minister made a speech, stating that the Establishment Decrees had been prepared in good faith to set up a new organisation for the new State, and, while he himself did not believe that they contained matter contrary to the Constitution or to existing legislation, he was prepared to leave the matter in the hands of the Deputies to decide. After some violent speeches by Opposition members it was decided to hold a sitting of the Chamber on 14th November to debate the legality or otherwise of the Establishment Decrees.

One further example of the determination of the Syrian Government to attempt to limit foreign interference has occurred during the past week (*cf.* Weekly Political Summary No. 327, Syria). A circular letter has been sent from the Prime Minister's office to all Government Departments drawing their attention to an article in the Establishment Decree concerning the office of the Prime Minister and informing Government officials that they must not visit foreign legations or consulates or have any contact with members of the Diplomatic and Consular Corps without obtaining permission from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The new Iranian Minister, M. Rahnama, presented his credentials to the President of the Syrian Republic on 12th November.

Nabih el Azmeh (Syrian Personality No. 35) has been appointed Mohafez of Damascus city in succession to Mazhar Bey Bekri, who will be leaving to take up his post as Syrian Minister at Rio de Janeiro at the end of November.

A decree was issued on 17th October closing the Syrian Consulate-General in Istanbul and opening a consulate in Adana.

Lebanon

During the past week Sami Solh (Lebanese Personality No. 78), an ex-Prime Minister, has been attempting to obtain signatures of Lebanese Deputies to a petition withdrawing confidence from the Munla Cabinet. He has not succeeded in obtaining more than six or seven names. If the signatures of more than half (26) of the Deputies are obtained, under the Constitution, the President has to call on the Prime Minister to resign. There are as yet no indications that the Lebanese President is prepared to ask Riad Solh to form a new Government for, although on the one hand he is afraid of Riad Solh's opposition, on the other hand the President's entourage and Sabri Hamadi, ex-Speaker and Ahmed Assad, Minister of Defence, are entirely opposed to another Riad Solh Government. In this connexion it is of interest that the President has, at least on the surface, resumed friendly relations with Abdul Hamid Karamé and has recently lunched at the latter's house.

The Lebanese Chamber held a sitting on 12th November at which *inter alia* economic matters were discussed. Abdullah Yafi complained of the incompetence and inaction of the Government with regard to the high cost of living, to which the Prime Minister answered that the Government could do nothing without the co-operation of the general public which they were not at present receiving. It was agreed that a special sitting to discuss the economic policy of the Government should be held on 19th November.

It has been announced that the following will represent the Lebanon at the forthcoming meeting of the Arab League:—

Philippe Takla, Foreign Minister.

Fouad Ammoun, Director-General of the Foreign Ministry.

Sami el-Khoury, Minister to Egypt.

Halim Abu-Izzeddin, Counsellor to the Cairo Legation.

Hamid Frangieh has been elected chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Chamber of Deputies.

The following appointments have been announced:—

Jibran Tuani, Lebanese Minister Plenipotentiary at Buenos Aires.
Joseph Abu-Khater, Minister Plenipotentiary in Mexico.
Kazem el Solh, Minister Plenipotentiary at Bagdad.

The Ministry of Finance has announced that all Italian, German, Bulgarian, Hungarian and Japanese property of any description and situated on Lebanese territory has been placed in the custody of the Minister of Finance. Any person possessing such property is required to make a formal declaration thereof to the Minister of Finance, in his capacity as Custodian of Enemy Property.

E 11783/213/89

No. 51

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 239, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, for the week ending 19th November, 1946. (Received 3rd December)

General

The Syrian and Lebanese Governments were informed during the week of His Majesty's Government's decision to appoint a Minister to the Lebanon and another to Syria. The *agrément* of the Lebanese Government was asked for and received for Mr. Houstoun-Boswall. Both Governments expressed great satisfaction at the decision to appoint separate Ministers.

The efforts made by the French Ministers in Beirut and Damascus to settle outstanding questions with the local Governments have during the past few weeks come to an almost complete standstill. Although in Damascus some progress has been made with regard to the opening of French schools the Prime Minister has refused once more to allow to reopen the three schools—two in Damascus and one in Aleppo—which he maintains were used with the consent of the school authorities as strongpoints from which to attack the Syrian population during the events of May 1945. In Beirut the action of the French Government in handing over the proceeds of Italian sequestered property to the Swiss Minister a few days before the Lebanese Government decided to take over the administration of enemy property has not improved relations between Comte Armand du Chayla and the Lebanese, which have now degenerated to an almost Syrian level. It is reported also that French negotiations concerning property in the Lebanon claimed by the French have reached an impasse; in this connexion it is probable that the Lebanese are being pressed by the Syrians to keep in line with the Syrian claim that property claimed as French was, in most cases at least, paid for from Common Interests funds and should therefore become the property of the local Governments. In any case, the hope

that Comte du Chayla's arrival in Beirut would herald the beginning of a new era of friendly diplomatic relations between the French and the Lebanese Governments has proved illusory, and he will be leaving on 23rd November for Paris for consultations: according to a member of his staff, he will discuss *inter alia* the question of an establishment treaty with the Lebanon and the French attitude towards the abolition of the Mixed Courts.

Syria has been elected a member of the Security Council and the Lebanon has been re-elected to a seat on U.N.E.S.C.O.

Economic

The Indian Trade Commissioner from Egypt visited Syria during the past week and has been negotiating with the Syrian Government for the purchase of wheat delivered on board at Tripoli. No decision has yet been reached but it appears likely that he will obtain between 20,000 and 25,000 tons.

Syria

The secondary school students' strike in Damascus (see Weekly Political Summary No. 238, Syria, led to clashes with the police and gendarmerie on 13th and 14th November. On 13th November students attempting to enter the Ministry of Education were dispersed by the police and a number of them arrested. Incensed by these arrests, the demonstrators attacked the police with stones and sticks and eventually the police were ordered to fire over the heads of the demonstrators. There was a number of casualties on both sides; twenty-two police injured and four students wounded by firearms, one of whom died the following morning. The next day the students again demonstrated and one of them made a speech demanding (a) the suspension of Legislative Decree No. 50, (b)

electoral reform giving one-stage elections, (c) freedom of the press and the suppression of newspapers under foreign influence, and (d) the punishment of those who fired on the demonstrators the previous day. The offices of two Damascus newspapers, *El Qabas* and *El Barada*, were entered and partially wrecked by the students on the grounds that these papers had published articles that morning condemning the action of the students. Just before sunset the students, who had by this time been joined by a number of hooligans, tried to present their demands to Parliament, which was in session. Gendarmerie reinforcements were called in and automatic guns, Bren gun carriers and armoured cars placed at strategic points around the Parliament; the demonstrators retreated, but in doing so pulled a gendarme from his motor cycle and firing again broke out. The demonstrators were dispersed about an hour after sunset. The following further casualties occurred: 20 gendarmes, 30 police, 13 demonstrators injured, 6 of the latter by firearms.

Meanwhile, political opposition to Legislative Decree No. 50 had been gaining momentum, and, at the sitting of Parliament on the afternoon of 14th November, a draft Bill suspending Legislative Decree No. 50 was presented by the Minister of the Interior and passed unanimously. Later the same evening a communiqué was issued by the Ministry of Education explaining the Ministry's new educational programme but suspending its operation until next academic year. Damascus began to return to normal on 15th and students reassembled without incident in their schools on the 18th.

The opposition to the Government based on the publication of the Establishment Decrees has in no way abated despite the Government's withdrawal of Decree No. 50. The Prime Minister, who was due to leave on 16th November for Egypt to attend the Arab League Conference, postponed his departure until the 18th, and Jamil Mardam and Naim Antaki, who, with Lutfi Haffar, were to have accompanied the Prime Minister, both remained in Damascus. At a sitting of the Chamber on 19th November the Constitutional Committee presented an unanimous report on Decree No. 50, stating that in their opinion the Government's action in publishing it was unconstitutional in that a number of articles were contrary to the Constitution. Opposition Deputies called on the Government to resign, but the meeting was adjourned on the pretext that the report

should be published and circulated to members according to the rules of the Chamber. The next sitting has been fixed for 23rd November. Whether or not Saadullah Jabri resigns, it is clear that his Government has received a severe setback as a result of the publication and subsequent withdrawal of Decree No. 50. It is known that Jamil Mardam has been in touch with a number of Deputies with a view to forming an alternative Government if the Syrian President should ask him to do so.

Sultan Pasha Atrash was visited on 16th November by Khaled el Azm on behalf of the Syrian President in connexion with the manifesto reported in Weekly Political Summary No. 238, Syria. It is reported from a number of sources that he was asked to head the Syrian Delegation to the Arab League with £.Syr. 25,000 in his pocket for expenses and promised that a Druze would be given a seat in the next Cabinet if he withdrew his opposition (see Weekly Political Summary No. 238, Syria). He is said to have refused both these offers and to have maintained that he would continue to oppose the present Government and would be satisfied only by the formation of a coalition Government and the removal from office of all the present members of the Cabinet.

With the exception of the Frères Mariste Boys School, all the Catholic schools in Aleppo which were previously "protected" by the French authorities have received authority to resume their activities and are now open. The Mission Laïque has also been given permission to reopen and teachers are being recruited.

The Syrian authorities have taken delivery from the French of 200 light machine guns and a million rounds of ammunition; the weapons were transported in secret from Beirut in trucks. According to the Syrian Minister of Defence, the materials were in first class condition, the prices lower than from British sources, and the French were ready to supply further quantities if required.

Lebanon

At a meeting of the Lebanese Chamber on 13th November the Foreign Minister, Philippe Takla, read a statement on foreign policy. Apart from the usual comments about the sovereignty and the independence of the Lebanon and the country's solidarity with other Arab States, he referred to the question of Greater Syria, stating that collaboration with other Arab

nations must be based on loyalty and mutual respect; having entered the Arab League as an independent and sovereign country with its boundaries guaranteed, there was no reason for the Lebanon to discuss the Greater Syria project—"We do not want a Greater Syria by any means." It is probable that Philippe Takla's statement was made in answer to comments made by Samir Pasha Rifai the week before to a meeting of journalists in Beirut, when he stated that trans-Jordan would welcome the idea of a Greater Syria. The following are other main points from Philippe Takla's speech: (a) the Mixed Courts would be abolished in the near future; (b) America had invited the Lebanon to discuss the question of an establishment treaty and the increase of commercial relations; (c) the Lebanese Government would shortly buy the Nakoura-Tripoli railway for 5 million Lebanese pounds, payable in seven annual instalments without interest, the line having cost the British £5 million; (d) in reply to a question asking for information about the result of the Palestine Conference in London, he said that he could give no further information until the return of the Lebanese delegation. He added that as far as the Lebanon was concerned there had been no common defence or military discussions; (e) he did not reply to a question whether any Arab State had suggested a Greater Syria at the expense

of the Lebanon, but he stressed the excellence of the relations which existed between Syria and the Lebanon.

The Lebanese Council of Ministers has approved the extension of the Rent Law for a further year with an additional 5 per cent. on residential flats and 10 per cent. on other buildings houses remaining vacant for two months are subject to requisition.

M. Alessandrini, a representative of the Italian Government, has arrived in Beirut and made contact with the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. He has stated to journalists that the first purpose of his visit is to open diplomatic relations with the Lebanese Government, after which he will discuss the question of Italian property in the Lebanon.

The Tashnag Party held a reception in Beirut to celebrate its 56th anniversary. The President of the Chamber and another senior official representing the Government attended, also the ex-Prime Minister Riad Solh, Sami Solh and Abdullah Yafi and a number of Deputies and representatives of other political parties. This is the first time that the Tashnag Party has been so honoured.

Mr. Alfred Tabet, First President of the Court of Appeal, who has recently been on a visit to England as the guest of the British Council, has been elected Vice-President of the International Judicatory League.

E 12038/213/89

No. 52

EXTRACT FROM WEEKLY POLITICAL SUMMARY No. 240

For the Week ending 26th November, 1946

(Received 11th December)

(Secret)

General

Greater Syria polemics have occupied the attention of both Governments during the past week. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs was somewhat sharply questioned in the Lebanese Chamber on 14th November as to why he had seen fit to express opposition to the Greater Syria project when Syria, the country most directly concerned, was silent, and as a result of the visit of members of the Syrian Cabinet to congratulate the Lebanese Government on the anniversary of Independence Day, 22nd November, agreement was reached that the matter should be discussed in the Syrian Parliament. The

Syrian President called a number of meetings of various political factions, including Druzes, Alouites and the tribes, and at the sitting of the Syrian Chamber on 23rd November the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Khaled el Azm, was formally asked to state the Government's policy on Greater Syria. Some dozen extremely violent speeches were made to the effect that Syria was unable to accept any form of union with a country which was still under foreign influence; dissatisfaction was expressed with the Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty, described as an instrument of colonisation which concealed Zionist influence behind it; once, however, Transjordan had freed herself from the

coloniser she might be considered worthy of being annexed to Syria. Approval was expressed for the republican form of government which existed in Syria, and it was pointed out that the Transjordan Constitution was undemocratic because the right of legislation lay with the King and not with the Chamber. In summing up, Khaled el Azm declared that the statements and action of responsible people in Transjordan were contrary to the general principles of international law and to the charter of the Arab League which required that every Arab State should respect the form of government existing in other member States, and should not interfere in their internal affairs. Syria was an independent sovereign State and could not accept union with a less free country; Syria had chosen a republican form of government and did not wish to change the system. The Chamber unanimously approved the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the views expressed by previous speakers.

In Syria the Government press has, in general approved of the attitude taken up by the Government, though the anti-Government and non-Monarchist newspapers have made no comment. In the Lebanon more interest has been shown in the press than amongst the public.

Economic

It has been reported in the press and confirmed from Government sources that a provisional agreement has been reached between a Syrian company to be known as the National Syrian Aviation Company and Pan-American Airways by which the latter will supply two Dakota aircraft and the necessary equipment and crews to operate internal air services in Syria with a view to extending them in the near future to neighbouring countries. The capital of the Syrian Aviation Company will amount to 3 million Syrian pounds in addition to a reserve fund for the purchase of aircraft. A number of leading Damascus merchants are financially interested, but according to the Syrian Minister of Finance, Pan-American Airways have not been able to obtain the 10 per cent. share in the capital of the new company for which they had previously asked.

Pan-American Airways of Damascus have withdrawn their American staff, with the exception of their Middle East manager, and have dismissed their local staff, informing them that their services will not be required for at least another six months.

Syria

The focusing of political attention on Greater Syria (see Section 1 above) has enabled the Syrian President and Saadullah Bey's Government to rally to their support a number of Deputies and sections of the public who during the past month have been critical of their actions in publishing the Establishment Decrees. This manoeuvre has undoubtedly given the Government a breathing space, but the opposition to Saadullah Bey's policy remains. Jamil Bey Mardam has not yet shown his hand, and it is doubtful whether the Government will survive into the New Year, as the support of Opposition elements for the Greater Syria debate was almost certainly purchased by Shukri Quwatli's promise to change the Government shortly.

His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo reports that Communists continue to be active in the Aleppo area and a number of meetings have been held during the past fortnight. A speaker at one of these meetings is reported to have said that the Moslem Communists were not satisfied with the Christian branches of the party because the latter are weaker than they might be; it was known that religious leaders had strongly attacked Christians who became Communists, but everyone knew that religious leaders were capitalists, particularly Christian religious leaders; the only friend of religion was France, and now that that country had become a Communist nation religious leaders had to look for a new friend to protect them against the so-called Communist danger. The new friend was England.

It is learned that Sultan Pasha Atrash is planning to issue a new manifesto attacking the present régime in Syria and showing his sympathy with the Greater Syria project.

Lebanon

On 22nd November Independence Day was celebrated in the Lebanon by a march-past of representative units of the Lebanese armed forces, a reception given by the President and members of the Government at the Grand Sérail, and a reception and dance at the Presidency in the evening. There was little applause for the President on his arrival at the parade. Riad Solh, on the other hand, got a great ovation.

The Lebanese Government have signed a Consular Agreement with the French, as a result of which the Lebanese will have consular representatives at Dakar and Marseilles and the French will have vice-consuls at Tripoli and Sidon.

The formation of the electoral lists for the general election next year has already begun. The lists are still extremely fluid and it is not yet clear what position will be taken by Camille Chamoun, who may continue to support the Constitutional Party or join the Phalangists and the section of the Druze headed by Kamal Jumblat. In the north Lebanon Abdul Hamid Karamé appears to be losing ground against the Mukaddom family, who have joined forces with Hamid Frangish and Mohammed Abboud. The Phalange Party had a successful reception last week and have set up an impressive headquarters in the old naval base in Beirut; they have recently converted their weekly newspaper into a daily paper. The Attorney-General has informed a member of the legation staff that the elections will take place on 29th June and 6th July, 1947.

In a debate in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on 26th November, during a discussion on Greater Syria, one of the Deputies, George Akl, insisted that the present agitation confirmed the necessity of establishing diplomatic representation between the Lebanon and Syria; had these relations been established, such remarks as had been made by Transjordan notables would have been impossible. He and other speakers took the line that so long as foreign troops remained in Arab countries agitation of this kind would continue. At the conclusion of the debate a resolution was passed calling upon the Government to express to the Government of Transjordan the opinion of the Lebanese people that the Lebanon is completely independent and is against any change which would affect the *status quo* of the Lebanon.

E 12267/213/89

No. 53

EXTRACT FROM WEEKLY POLITICAL SUMMARY No. 241

For the Week ending 3rd December, 1946

(Received 19th December)

(Secret)

General

Greater Syria has again been the topic of the week. The Lebanese Press Bureau on 2nd December issued a communiqué to the effect that at a session of the Arab League Council "the curtain has been drawn on the Greater Syria scheme because the Transjordan Foreign Minister has signed the motion adopted by all foreign Ministers of Arab States rejecting the so-called project of Greater Syria." The Syrian Acting Prime Minister in a statement to the press contradicted the allegation made by the Transjordan Prime Minister that the State of Transjordan had been born as a result of the Arab revolt, and that the Syrian Republic had been established by the French as a result of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. He asserted, on the contrary, that Transjordan's present status was the outcome of the declaration made by Sir Herbert Samuel, in which he proclaimed British control over the province which had been severed from Syria by French aggression in 1920. He also denied that the evacuation of Syria by the French had been the result of action taken by any foreign Power.

While the desire for a "Greater Syria" of some kind is widespread in Syria, recent

statements attributed to King Abdullah and to various leading personalities of Transjordan appear to have considerably reduced the possibility of King Abdullah ever ascending the throne of Syria; and, at least for the time being, the Syrian President has strengthened his position and that of the republican régime. The Lebanese have taken the opportunity to express again their distaste for union with any Moslem State.

Units of the American Mediterranean Fleet arrived in Beirut on 1st December and are due to leave on 4th December. They include the aircraft carrier *Randolph* and a light cruiser. A series of visits and receptions by and for the Lebanese Government have taken place, and many of the officers and ratings visited Damascus after special arrangements had been made with the Syrian Government for them to do so wearing uniform.

Economic

Ikhwan el Muslimeen have formed a Workmen's Committee, the aims of which are summed up as follows:—

- (1) To create co-operative industrial companies in which members will participate and share the profits.

- (2) To assist small craftsmen by advancing loans or opening shops for them.
- (3) To assist poor workmen by giving them medical help and endeavouring to find them employment.
- (4) To teach illiterate workmen to read and write and to give them free education.

El Manar, the newspaper of the Moslem Brethren, urges workers to abandon foreign doctrines, to rally to the Moslem Brotherhood, and to follow the teachings of Mohammed rather than those of Stalin, Lenin and Molotov.

The provisional agreement concerning the formation of the National Syrian Aviation Company (see Combined Weekly Political Summary No. 240, Economic) has now been signed.

Syria

In a debate in the Syrian Chamber on 28th November, arising out of the delaying of internal press telegrams by the Government, the Minister of the Interior asked for a vote of confidence in the Government: this was given by 56 to 9, some fifteen Deputies walking out of the Chamber before the division was taken. The sitting of 16th December has been earmarked for a debate on a draft Bill, presented by one of the Opposition Deputies, proposing a change in the electoral laws, the most important modification being one-degree elections instead of the present system.

On 30th November a Government Bill was passed after a sharp debate, prolonging until the end of December the restrictions on the transport and milling of cereals which, under the M.I.R.A. Law, were due to end on the 30th November. The Government stated that the measure was temporary and that the whole question would be considered and debated during the present month.

His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo reports that the feeling between supporters of the National Bloc and the Opposition is running high and that attacks are being made in the Opposition press against bloc leaders for inefficiency and nepotism and the desire to remain in power at any cost to the country, and in the bloc press against the Opposition leaders on the grounds that they are devoid of constructive ideas and have been responsible for stirring up the recent troubles in Damascus and other parts of Syria.

The trial of Suleiman Murshed started in Lattakia on 23rd November. Full reports are not yet available, but much evidence has been given alleging that

Suleiman Murshed received assistance in money and arms from the French and was on more than one occasion instructed by them to attack Government forces.

The British Vice-Consulate at Deir-ez-Zor was closed on 24th November.

Lebanon

At a sitting of the Lebanese Chamber on 3rd December M. Henri Pharaon initiated a debate on the economic situation, in which he called upon the Government to make every effort to reduce the cost of living. He referred particularly to the high price of bread and declared that Syria should ensure that the Lebanon received wheat at a lower price. He also spoke of the necessity for distributing hard currency so that goods most needed to lower the cost of living could be imported. Abdullah Yafi pointed out that in the past the Lebanon had never really been self-supporting and had relied on income received from troops of occupation and on "services rendered"; there were no more troops and no more services to be rendered; even the tourist trade was being forced out of existence by the high cost of living; properly directed efforts must be made by the Government to ensure that the country should be self-supporting. He then went on to attack the Government for interference in industry and commerce, which had resulted in high prices, and pressed for the publication of a list showing the distribution of hard currency. The debate was adjourned until 5th December.

The Queen of Transjordan arrived in Beirut on 3rd December with her daughter who is to receive medical treatment at the American University Hospital.

Feridun Erkin, Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, passed through Beirut on his way to Amman and is due to return on 5th December. He is reported in the press to have stated that he will discuss the retention of Lebanese nationality by Lebanese immigrants in Turkey; Lebanese assets in Turkey and the development of trade and economic relations.

The Lebanese Council of Ministers have published a decree authorising the unrestricted circulation and milling of cereals from 1st December.

Annis Saleh and Subhi el Mahmassani have been appointed members of the Arab League Committee of International Legislation. Mohammed Sabra has been appointed Consul-General at Dakar.

A municipal decree has been issued banning the use of motor horns in Beirut and authorising the police to fine careless "street walkers"!

EXTRACT FROM WEEKLY POLITICAL SUMMARY No. 242

For the Week ending 10th December, 1946

(Received 30th December)

(Secret)

General

The Syrian Government and the press of both countries have not yet allowed the recent outbreak of Greater Syria polemics to die down. The monarchist press continues to refrain from comment and monarchist sympathisers have expressed their anxiety at the events of the last month which they feel have seriously set back their chances. During the week the Head of the Syrian President's Office sent for the Oriental Secretary to ask him unofficially what was His Majesty's Government's present attitude towards Greater Syria. The Oriental Secretary stated that the policy of His Majesty's Government on this question had not altered and that there was no intention of intervening for or against any particular solution advocated or opposed by the peoples directly concerned. In answer to a question whether this might be taken as an official statement of policy, the Oriental Secretary replied affirmatively.

On 11th December the Lebanese Government published a somewhat inaccurate communiqué regarding the decision of His Majesty's Government on the subject of communications with the Arab League; it clearly expressed the view, however, that the Secretary-General of the League, when making a communication regarding a decision of the League, was entitled to do so only on behalf of those of the member States which had approved the decision.

Economic

A Czechoslovakian Commercial Mission has, during the past week, been visiting Damascus and Beirut.

It is learned that Brigadier Frere, representing the Anglo-Syrian Purchasing Agency, has signed an agreement with Jean Sehnaoui regarding the formation of a company to carry on business in the Levant States with 40 per cent. British financial interest; it will have a nominal capital of £Syr.60,000 and the financial backing of Sehnaoui Fils up to a maximum of £Syr.400,000.

Syria

On 4th December one of the Syrian Cabinet informed a member of the lega-

tion staff that at the suggestion of the President the Government had resigned. Attempts to form a new Government have not yet proved successful, and Saadullah Jabri's Cabinet continues in office under the acting presidency of Khaled el Azm, Saadullah Bey remaining in Cairo on the grounds of ill-health. There is little doubt that Shukri Quwatli asked Jamil Mardam to form a Cabinet, and that the latter only agreed to do so on condition that he had a free hand in the choice of Ministers. Shukri Bey did not agree to this, and after considering the possibility of a neutral Cabinet headed by the Emir Adel Arslan or Mustafa Barmada, he asked Fares Bey Khoury to form a Government, but the latter refused on the grounds of age and ill-health.

The following sentences have been announced by the Judicial Council as a result of the trial of Suleiman Murshid (see Weekly Political Summary No. 241, Syria). Suleiman Murshid and two others, death by hanging; Fateh Murshid (the eldest son of Suleiman) and three others, 15 years' hard labour; the two younger sons of Suleiman and 17 others, 10 years' hard labour. A number of sentences of deportation were announced and some 30 persons acquitted. The sentences were passed in accordance with an article in the Penal Code and not in accordance with the law for the protection of independence. The article in question specifies that those who are head of a society consisting of armed outlaws who seize the property of the State, the money or possessions of the public, or resist the armed forces of the State, shall be sentenced to death, but members of such a society may be condemned to temporary imprisonment with hard labour. The sentences will have to be confirmed by the President of the Republic before they are executed.

Lebanon

Following sharp criticism of the Government's economic policy at the sittings of the Chamber on 5th and 6th December, Saadi Munla announced his intention of resigning, and stated that he had instructed Philippe Tacla, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to return from Egypt. The latter arrived in Beirut on 9th December, but as

a result of the death of the Emir Shakib Arslan, the official letter of resignation was not handed to the President until late on the following day.

At the sittings on 5th and 6th December of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, the debate on the economic situation initiated on 3rd December was continued. The Government was severely criticised for their inadequate customs policy and their inability to secure markets in Arab countries for Lebanese produce, their failure to deal with the high cost of living and unemployment, and their lack of plans for agriculture, industry and commerce. The Prime Minister, in reply, attempted to throw responsibility for the present unsatisfactory economic situation on previous Governments, and stated that the present Government had been successful in securing the services of two foreign experts, one for economic affairs and one for tourism, the 1947 budget duties on essential commodities, including building materials, had been reduced or eliminated, and agreements with the British authorities for the purchase of the H.B.T. Railway and the Trans-Arabian Oil Company had been signed and would shortly be submitted to the Chamber. The Minister for Agriculture said that additional supplies of fertilisers and tractors had been imported and agricultural produce had been exported to France, Egypt and Palestine. These Government statements, however, were not well received, and a vote of no confidence was only avoided by the President of the Chamber adjourning the session. No new Government has been announced though the names of Riad Solh and Abdullah Yafi are freely mentioned as probable successors to Saadi Munla.

M. Feridan Erkin returned to Beirut on 5th December (see Weekly Political Sum-

mary No. 241, Lebanon), and a communiqué was published on 8th December to the effect that agreement had been reached—

- (1) to give ex-Ottoman subjects who had failed to register under the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne a period of two years to opt for Lebanese nationality;
- (2) to start negotiations within two months for the settlement of Turkish property in the Lebanon and Lebanese property in Turkey.

M. Alessandrini (see Weekly Political Summary No. 239, Lebanon), informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Beirut that the Lebanese Government stated that they would be prepared to resume diplomatic relations with Italy, provided the latter agreed—

- (a) to the abolition of the Mixed Courts, and
- (b) to the unconditional restoration of the £Leb.800,000, which sum was transferred by the French Sequester-General to an Italian representative just before the Sequestre was taken over by the Lebanese (see Weekly Political Summary No. 237, Lebanon).

Farajallah Hallou, the Lebanese Communist, and Khaled Bagdash, the Syrian Communist leader, together with a number of other party members, appeared before a Lebanese court on 4th December on the charges of publishing seditious pamphlets. Bagdash, whose defence had contended that the court had no jurisdiction, stated that he was prepared to appear before any Arab court, with the exception of a Trans-jordan court. Judgment was postponed till 27th December.

CHAPTER VI.—GENERAL

[E 10878/2209/65]

No. 55

BRITISH ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Memorandum by the Middle East Secretariat

AS a result of the conference with British representatives in the Middle East held by the Foreign Secretary in September 1945, it was decided that His Majesty's Government should embark on a positive policy of assisting Middle East countries to promote their economic development and raise their standards of living.

Present policy

2. Three lines of action have so far been taken to implement this policy:—

(a) *Establishment of the Scientific and Technical Department of the British Middle East Office in Cairo*

A small staff of highly qualified British experts is now being built up within the British Middle East Office. This at present consists of experts on Health (Dr. E. Pridie, C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E.), Labour (Mr. Audsley), Agriculture (Sir Herbert Stewart), Statistics (Dr. J. Murray) and Telecommunications (Major Gray Sinclair). The appointment of advisers on Forestry and Animal Husbandry has also been agreed and these posts will shortly be filled. In addition a senior ex-official of the Sudan Government, Mr. W. F. Crawford, O.B.E., has been appointed to the office to co-ordinate the work of the experts and to act as adviser on the development of Rural Education. Arrangements are also in hand for the organisation of an entomological section to be attached to the office, which will advise and assist Middle East Governments in the carrying out of the anti-locust and insect pest work as a continuation and extension of the work of the war-time Middle East Anti-Locust Unit.

The advisers on Health, Labour and Telecommunications were appointed to the office in the spring of this year and have already done much useful work, which may be summarised as follows:—

(i) *Health*.—In Egypt Dr. Pridie (who has been Health counsellor to the embassy since June 1945) has built up very close personal contacts with the Egyptian health authorities, and through these contacts has been able to offer advice on major measures of health policy, such as the organisation of rural health services and the reform of Egyptian nursing services. He has also been able to arrange for frequent short visits to Egypt by eminent British medical specialists and professors, and to promote similar visits of Egyptian medical professors to England. There has, as a result, been a further demand for British professors and assistant professors to take appointments in Egypt. Arrangements for exchanging medical research workers between this country and Egypt are now being negotiated under his auspices. Since the spring, Dr. Pridie has visited Iraq, Persia and Ethiopia and the Levant States, and as a result of these visits has put forward recommendations regarding the lines on which national health policies could best be developed in each of the countries concerned and the ways in which His Majesty's Government could assist such development.

(ii) *Labour*.—In Egypt, Mr. Audsley (who has been in addition Labour counsellor to the embassy at Cairo since June 1945) has, like Dr. Pridie, built up close personal contacts with the Egyptian authorities concerned with labour problems. He is using his influence to persuade the Egyptians to turn to this country in seeking the model of their future labour policy and legislation. He has from time to time been consulted by the Egyptian authorities during specific labour disputes. He was instrumental in arranging a visit of Egyptian trade union officials to this country. He has also succeeded in stimulating the Egyptian authorities to consider reforming the Egyptian Civil Service, using the British Civil Service as their model. Mr. Audsley has also visited the Sudan, the Levant States, Iraq and Persia, where he has given valuable advice to British employers—e.g., the Sudan Government Railways, the Iraqi Petroleum Company and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company—on the improvement of industrial relations (he was instrumental in promoting the appointment of Sir F. Leggett as labour adviser to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) and on the organisation of trade

unions among their native employees. Mr. Audsley has also given assistance to the Governments of the Levant States, Iraq and Persia on the formulation of labour legislation and the provision of social services. His advice has been welcomed by these Governments with gratitude. The success which he has achieved in Persia has now been consolidated by appointing a labour attaché to the embassy at Tehran. Mr. Audsley will shortly be returning to Bagdad by invitation of the Iraqi Government and will submit comprehensive recommendations to them and us. The possibility of arranging for an expert from the Ministry of National Insurance to visit the Middle East is also under consideration. It is considered that the work accomplished and to be accomplished in this particular sphere is one of the most effective ways of resisting communistic penetration.

(iii) *Telecommunications*.—Major Sinclair was appointed in April. He has recently concluded a tour of the area and his reports are being considered.

(iv) *Statistics*.—The head of the Statistical Department of the Iraqi Ministry of Economic Affairs is now studying statistical methods in this country. At the Iraqi Government's request Dr. J. Murray, the statistician appointed to B.M.E.O., will return with him to Iraq and spend two months assisting him in the organisation of his Department. When he takes up his post in Cairo it is intended that Dr. Murray should, amongst his other duties, collect vital statistics in the area to serve as the basis for the work of the other members of the B.M.E.O. development section.

(b) *Appointment of British Experts to Posts offered by the Middle East Governments*

Every effort has been made since the Middle East Secretariat was set up in the Foreign Office in January 1946 to stimulate the Middle East Governments to call on the services of British experts and to speed up the recruitment of such experts. Since that date some sixty appointments have been notified, of which nearly half have been filled. These include appointments to the Haigh Irrigation Commission, which has been set up by the Government of Iraq to plan the irrigation development of that country for the next ten years, to the Royal Medical College in Bagdad, which is mainly staffed by British professors, and to the medical schools of Cairo and Alexandria Universities. It is now hoped to speed up recruitment for Egypt, where the deficiency is most serious, by arranging for the British Council to subsidise posts for which the salaries offered by the Egyptian Government are found to be inadequate. The shortage of manpower in this country will not, however, permit recruitment for service in the Middle East on a wholly satisfactory basis. Schemes of secondment are being carried out whenever circumstances permit.

(c) *Dissemination of Scientific and Technical Information in the Middle East*

A major aim of the policy described in paragraph 1 above is to promote the dissemination of scientific and technical information in the Middle East, and in particular to encourage consideration of the regional aspects of the scientific problems which the area presents. An important beginning has been made in this direction with the publication by His Majesty's Stationery Office of the Keen, Worthington and Allen Reports on Middle East Agriculture, Science and Rural Education respectively. In these reports the basic physical and economic problems of the region as a whole are for the first time analysed from the point of view of the possibilities of modern scientific development. These reports provide a basis for regional long-term economic planning, and the B.M.E.O. is arranging for them to be widely disseminated in the Middle East.

Future Policy

3. In addition to pushing forward on the lines already indicated, it is hoped that, as soon as the political situation in the Middle East calms down, B.M.E.O. will be able to assist in organising regional conferences on scientific and economic matters. It is, however, important to notice that the work of the experts attached to B.M.E.O. has, in fact, gone ahead in spite of an unfavourable political atmosphere. Both Mr. Audsley and Dr. Pridie have made great progress in Egypt and the Tudeh Party had no hesitation in consulting Mr. Audsley when in Persia.

Foreign Office, 23rd October, 1946.

[E 9960/2508/93]

No. 56

Mr. Bevin to Mr. Eyres (Beirut), No. 387; Sir A. Kirkbride (Amman), No. 55; and His Majesty's Representatives at Cairo and Bagdad

(Confidential)

Sir,

Foreign Office, 24th October, 1946

YOU will have seen from my despatch No. 220 of 5th October to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda, a copy of which has been sent to you, that Ibn Saud's anxiety regarding the reports of a projected "union" between Iraq and Transjordan has been heightened by stories which have reached him that certain British officials had been encouraging the "Greater Syria" movement or the movement in favour of a Syrian monarchy. Similar allegations against British officials have been received from time to time from the Syrian President and from other Arab sources.

2. I do not believe that there is any foundation for these allegations. At the same time, I think it important that all British officials in the Middle East should take particular care to avoid giving any grounds for the impression that His Majesty's Government are supporting or encouraging King Abdullah's aspirations to the Syrian Throne, or that His Majesty's Government's attitude towards the future form of Government in Syria or her future relations with Transjordan and Iraq could be other than one of complete impartiality. They should be warned that, when these questions are raised with them by interested parties, or even in ordinary conversation, the correct line for them to take is that such matters concern primarily the inhabitants of Syria and of the neighbouring Arab States, and that it is the definite policy of His Majesty's Government not in any way to intervene either for or against a particular solution which may be advocated or opposed by those more directly concerned.

3. I shall be glad if you will instruct accordingly all British officials under your authority, and if you will also take such steps as you may consider practicable to explain His Majesty's Government's attitude of disinterested neutrality to any British subjects who, while not employed in any official capacity, may, nevertheless, be regarded locally, for some reason such as their former official employment, as being possibly connected with the implementation of British policy.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

E 344/87/G

No. 57

MEMORANDUM ON MIDDLE EAST OIL

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to draw attention to four features of the Middle East oil industry so that their political aspect may be considered. The four features are:—

- (A) The growing importance of the Middle East to world oil economy.
- (B) The spectacular rise in crude oil production in the Middle East anticipated over the years 1945-50-55.
- (C) The extent of British interest in Middle East oil (on a shareholding basis), and the magnitude of our investment therein.
- (D) The dependence of the British Commonwealth on Middle East oil in peace conditions and in war.

2. To illustrate 1 (A) above, diagrams A and B are attached:—


(a) Diagram A forecasts two significant trends:—

- (i) Middle East area is expected to provide a greater proportion of the total world increase of production than any other oil-bearing region.
- (ii) United States production is likely to fall steadily, failing discovery of major new oil fields.

On the basis of (ii) above, the United States, whose production at present somewhat exceeds consumption, will shortly become importers of oil on a growing scale,


FIG. A

ESTIMATED TOTAL WORLD OUTPUT OF CRUDE OIL SHOWING
ESTIMATED CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL PRODUCING
REGIONS, 1945-50-55



36%

APPROXIMATE DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD OIL RESOURCES



NOTE.

Estimates of the amount of oil reserves are inherently subject to a wide margin of error. Calculations of proved reserves (heading (a)) approximate to 8000 million tons or more; estimates made of total oil resources including as yet untested or speculative possibilities run to figures of the order of 50-65,000 million tons.

E 344/87/G

No. 57

MEMORANDUM ON MIDDLE EAST C

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to draw attention to four features of the Middle East oil industry so that their political aspect may be considered. The four features are:—


- (A) The growing importance of the Middle East to world oil economy.
- (B) The spectacular rise in crude oil production in the Middle East anticipated over the years 1945-50-55.
- (C) The extent of British interest in Middle East oil (on a shareholding basis), and the magnitude of our investment therein.
- (D) The dependence of the British Commonwealth on Middle East oil in peace conditions and in war.

2. To illustrate 1 and B are attached (a) Diagram A f trends:—

- (i) Middle I provide the total duction bearing
- (ii) United likely to discover fields.

On the basis of (States, whose prodn what exceeds cons become importers of

ESTIMATED CONTRIBUTION OF MIDDLE EAST OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES TO ESTIMATED TOTAL MIDDLE EAST OUTPUT, 1945-50-55




50 80
100 164
200 226

Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
12th December, 1946.

FIG. D

ESTIMATED ROYALTY RECEIPTS BY MIDDLE EAST OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES 1945-50-55




5.5 80
 6.0 164
 6.0 226

Middle East Secretariat,
 Foreign Office,
 12th December, 1948.

FIG. E


ESTIMATED TOTAL MIDDLE EAST OUTPUT OF OIL 1945-50-55, SHOWING CONTROLLING INTERESTS.



1945 1950 1955

Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
12th December, 1948.

ESTIMATED BRITISH COMMONWEALTH REQUIREMENTS OF CRUDE OIL, 1945-50-55



0.5 80
2.0 164
3.0 226

*Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
12th December, 1946.*

drawing their supplies in the main from the Caribbean (see paragraph 5 (ii)).

- (b) Diagram B shows the long-term importance of the Middle East as a reservoir of oil in relation to world reserves. Oil reserves cannot be estimated without a wide margin of error. Nevertheless, it is evident that a high proportion of the known, and of the speculative future, oil reserves of the world occur in the Middle East.

3. The rate at which crude oil production is likely to develop in the Middle East area (see 1 (B) above) is illustrated by Diagram C. The significant points are:—

- (a) Total production may be quadrupled in period 1945–50–55.
(b) The centre of gravity shifts from Persia to the Arab lands by 1950.
(c) Kuwait emerges by 1950 as a producer comparable to Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

An incidental effect of this increased production will be the swollen royalties received by Middle East Governments, see diagram D.

4. The extent of British interest in Middle East oil production on a shareholding basis (see 1 (C) above) is shown in diagram E. The dominant British rôle and the increasing United States share are plainly shown.

No estimate of the total value of the British share in the Middle East oil industry can be expressed in terms of pounds sterling without considerable difficult research. The value to this country of the sales of oil products, of tanker earnings and of the industrial orders, &c., represent an immense sum. The following facts may give a clue to its extent:—

- (i) At current oil prices the approximate sales returns on the products from the British-controlled share of Middle East crude oil would be:—

Year	Millions of tons of crude oil	Sales return on products sold £.s.d. in millions of pounds sterling
1945	20.5	80
1950	42.0	164
1955	58.0	226

- (ii) Replacement value (at 1946 prices) of the major British fixed assets of Middle East oil industry:—

	£ million
Iran-Abadan refinery ...	120–150
Palestine-Haifa refinery	25

Trunk pipe-lines, actual and projected, from Iraq oil-fields to the Levant coast represent also a sum in excess of £20 million.

5. Tentative estimates of British Commonwealth (exclusive of Canada and India) requirements 1945–50–55 in peace are shown at diagram F. In relation to these figures the following points must be considered:—

- (1) The output of oil from British Empire sources (excluding Canada) is now about 3 million tons. It is unlikely to rise to more than 5 million tons a year in the future.
(2) The Middle East is at present supplying about 25 million tons or about 60 per cent. of the oil required for British use.
(3) British requirements in peace conditions will probably be some 18 million tons larger in 1955 than now. Only two producing areas are capable of developing exports on this scale—the Caribbean area (comprising Venezuela and other Latin American countries) and the Middle East. But the United States is likely to absorb most of the increase in Caribbean production, so that the expansion in British needs will tend to be drawn in the main from the Middle East. The proportion of British oil supplies derived from Middle East sources may, therefore, rise to about 70 per cent. in 1955. The importance of the accessible and prolific Middle East oilfields would be accentuated in war.

Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
12th December, 1946.

MOVEMENT FOR A GREATER SYRIA

E 12185/8478/65

Mr. Eyres to Mr. Attlee.

(No. 25)

Damascus.

9th December, 1946

Sir,

I have the honour to report that during November the Levant States have been suffering from a recurrence of the Greater Syria fever to which both countries, and particularly Syria, have been subject from time to time in the past. This most recent attack was occasioned by a statement to the press in Beirut on 6th November by Samir Pasha Rifai, chairman of the Transjordan Delegation to the London Palestine Conference. He was reported to have said that it was unnatural for a country, which before 1919 had always been one, to be split up into small States; that although everyone agreed that union should be the ultimate goal, there was some difference of opinion as to the form of Government for Greater Syria, some desiring a republic with Damascus as its capital, others a monarchy with King Abdullah as its ruler—this matter must, of course, be left to the people themselves to decide. In answer to a question whether the Lebanon would be included in Greater Syria, Samir Pasha replied that the Lebanon was excluded from the plan, but should the Lebanon in the future ask for inclusion in Greater Syria, everyone would be delighted.

2. Considerable prominence was given in the Lebanese press to Samir Pasha's statements, and in a sitting of the Lebanese Chamber on 13th November, Philippe Tacla, the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a speech outlining the Government's foreign policy, said that the Lebanon had joined the Arab League, the constitution of which was based on mutual collaboration and respect for the boundaries of member States; he went on to state categorically that the Lebanon did not want a Greater Syria of any kind.

3. Philippe Tacla's statement in the Lebanese Chamber was commented upon a few days later by Ahmed Shuraki Pasha, Transjordan Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, according to the Lebanese press, took the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to task for interfering in matters which did not concern him, and pointed out that

(1)

(Received 16th December)

in any case the Lebanon had, in 1919, absorbed four Qazas which belonged to Syria. This statement gave rise to much criticism in the Lebanese press, and at a later sitting of the Lebanese Chamber, on 19th November, Philippe Tacla was asked why he was making statements about Greater Syria when the Government of Syria had not itself done so.

4. This led to discussions between representatives of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, as a result of which a debate on the subject was staged in the Syrian Chamber on 23rd November. Before the debate, the Syrian President is reported to have had a series of meetings with Deputies, at which he is alleged to have urged them to condemn strongly this Greater Syria plan, and to have made sarcastic allusions to King Abdullah's subordination to a foreign Power. In consequence, a series of violent speeches were made by Deputies of the various political parties, including a Druze, an Alouite and a tribal Deputy, in which Transjordan was described as being still under the heel of the colonisers and therefore unfit even to be annexed to Syria. The acting Prime Minister, summing up, said that the actions of responsible people in Transjordan were contrary to the principles of international law and to the Charter of the League, which required that every State should respect the form of rule existing in other member States and should not interfere in their internal affairs; they also violated the spirit of co-operation and friendship on which the Charter of the League was based; Syria, now an independent sovereign State, could not accept union with a less free country; she had chosen a republican form of Government and wished to adhere to this system. The Chamber unanimously approved the views expressed by the speakers and by the Government.

5. During the last week of November reports reached the Syrian and Lebanese press that the Greater Syria question had been raised at the Arab League, and in all except those newspapers of known Monarchist tendencies extravagant editorials

appeared condemning the plan except in so far as Transjordan might join Syria if and when she became free from foreign domination. After various contradictory reports of discussions at the Arab League meeting, rumours that King Abdullah had expressed his intention of ascending the throne of Damascus, that Transjordan troops had entered Syria, and that Ibn Saud had sent an ultimatum to King Abdullah, the press of 1st December carried a communiqué, released by the Lebanese press bureau, to the effect that at session of the Arab League Council "the curtain has been drawn on the Greater Syria scheme because the Transjordan Foreign Minister has signed the motion adopted by all Foreign Ministers of Arab States rejecting the so-called project of Greater Syria."

6. This particular outbreak of Greater Syria polemics has come at a fortunate time for the Syrian President and Saadullah Jabri's Government. In my despatch No. 12 of 11th November, I gave some account of the position arising from the publication of the Establishment Decrees, and in particular Decree No. 50 for the Ministry of the Interior, which resulted in the disturbances in Damascus on 13th-14th November and the later withdrawal of the offending articles of Decree No. 50. By the debate on Greater Syria on 23rd November, referred to in paragraph 4 above, Shukri Quwatli was able to show the world that he enjoys the confidence of Parliament and to divert, for the time being, adverse criticism from the Government. It is, however, certain that to obtain Opposition support for the debate Shukri Quwatli has had to promise that Saadullah Jabri's Government will be replaced by another, and probably one which will include members of the Opposition.

7. While the desire for a Greater Syria and for a king is endemic amongst a large part of the population of Syria, there is little doubt that the statements attributed to King Abdullah, the Transjordan Foreign Minister and Samir Pasha Rifai have greatly reduced the possibility of King Abdullah ever ascending the throne of Syria, and, at least for the time being, Shukri Quwatli has strengthened his position and the position of the republican régime in Syria. The Lebanese have been able to express their distaste for joining up with any Moslem State, and the Arab

League has been able to make King Abdullah and his Ministers look slightly ridiculous. It is worthy of remark that comment in the French-inspired Lebanese press has tended to concentrate on the danger of getting involved in a British-controlled bloc designed to act as an "iron curtain" against Russia in the Middle East.

8. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Beirut has seen this despatch and agrees with that part of it which deals with events in the Lebanon. I am sending copies to His Majesty's representatives at Bagdad, Cairo, Jedda, Jerusalem and Amman.

I have, &c.

H. M. EYRES

P.S.—Since the above despatch was drafted Muhsin Bey Barazi, head of the President's Office, sent for the oriental secretary to discuss the various Greater Syria statements and counter-statements reported above.

During the conversation Muhsin Bey referred to an article in a Damascus newspaper about a statement alleged to have been made by Mr. Churchill early in 1945, after his meeting in Cairo with the Syrian President, to the effect that Great Britain would welcome any union between Arab countries which was brought about by the free will of the peoples concerned. Muhsin Bey went on to ask what was the policy of His Majesty's Government at the moment, since any partition of Palestine would obviously raise the question in an urgent form.

Mr. Dundas replied that the Palestine problem was still under discussion and he was therefore unable to comment on the possibility of partition. With regard, however, to the recent publicity for a Greater Syria, the policy of His Majesty's Government had not altered, and there was no intention to intervene for or against a particular solution advocated by the peoples directly concerned. Muhsin Bey asked if he might take this statement as an official declaration of policy, to which, in the light of your despatch No. 387 of 24th October, Mr. Dundas replied affirmatively. Muhsin Bey appeared relieved, but expressed the view that His Majesty's Government's interests lay in a continuation of the *status quo* in Syria, and that His Majesty's Government should say so to all concerned.

Sir A. Kirkbride to Mr. Bevin. (Received 18th December)

(No. 78. Confidential)

Sir, Amman, 2nd December, 1946

I have the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with your despatch No. 55 of 24th October, 1946, on the subject of Transjordan and the "Greater Syria" movement.

2. A statement made earlier in November 1946 by the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Chamber of Deputies at Beirut, to the effect that the Lebanese Government did not want and would not accept a Greater Syria, started a new series of pronouncements on this subject.

3. On 18th November, 1946, several of the elected members of the Legislative Council of Transjordan expressed disappointment at the statement made in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies and asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs to enlighten the Council as to the views of the Transjordan Government on the subject.

The Minister gave a lengthy reply, making the following points:—

- (a) The Kingdom of Transjordan would not abandon its efforts to secure the reunion of Syria.
- (b) If such a reunion took place, the inclusion or otherwise of the Lebanon was a matter for the Lebanese people to decide for themselves.
- (c) The statement of the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs constituted interference in a matter which was the concern of the Syrian provinces (*i.e.*, Syria and Transjordan) only; passing reference being made to the fact that the present-day Lebanon included some districts which had been detached from Syria without the latter's consent.
- (d) The allegation that the "Greater Syria" scheme concealed a plan to permit the expansion of Zionism was fantastic, the greater the unity in Syria the greater would be the resistance to Zionism in the Arab world.
- (e) The presence of British troops in Transjordan under the terms of the treaty of alliance did not affect the validity of Transjordan's independence or Transjordan's ability to unite or federate with other countries.

(f) The reunion of Syria would be in the best interests of the inhabitants of the territory and would, therefore, continue to be the policy of the people and Government of Transjordan.

4. I was informed by the Prime Minister of Transjordan on 24th November, 1946, that the Syrian Prime Minister, Saadullah el Jabri, had asked the Council of the Arab League to take note of the efforts of the Transjordan Government to bring about a change of régime in Syria; to this request the Transjordan Minister for Foreign Affairs had replied that the question was not a dispute for examination by the council because the Transjordan Government, which was entitled to wish for the reunion of Syria, had always maintained that the change would be effected, when it came, by the desire of the inhabitants of that territory.

5. In the meanwhile, there came the debate in the Syrian Parliament on the subject of Greater Syria, when opposition to the scheme was voiced by the Acting Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and by a number of Deputies.

This debate also was referred to in the Legislative Council at Amman, and the Prime Minister of Transjordan replied in the absence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 26th November, 1946.

He referred the councillors to the earlier statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and added:—

- (a) Transjordan had done nothing contrary to the Covenant of the Arab League or to accepted international procedure between friendly Governments.
- (b) Syria only achieved independence through the assistance of another European Power, and unless Syria was reunited there is no guarantee that those who were evacuated from the country would not return.
- (c) The reunion of Syria, which was partitioned for imperial purposes, was a matter which would be decided by the people and not by those who oppose that measure out of considerations of private interest.

6. The controversy was enlivened by a report from Beirut, which attributed a

statement to King Abdullah, said to have been made in a private conversation, to the effect that he had received formal promises of the throne of "Greater Syria" to include Syria, the Lebanon, Transjordan and parts of Palestine. This report was repeated by Reuter's from London and was given considerable publicity in the Egyptian press.

King Abdullah has alleged on various occasions in the past that in 1921, when His Majesty's Government first recognised his position in Transjordan, he was by implication promised the throne of Syria providing he abandoned his intention at that time of raising a rebellion in that territory against the French authorities.

There was, of course, no foundation for this claim, but the King used it from time to time as a means of strengthening his case for the grant of independence to Transjordan. It can serve a similar purpose in connexion with his Syrian aspirations.

The report from Beirut has probably arisen from its repetition and not from any assertion that a new promise had been given.

7. On 30th November, 1946, the Prime Minister informed me that, after some rather acrimonious exchanges in the Council of the Arab League during which the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs had

supported the Transjordan delegate, it had been decided not to proceed with the complaint of the Syrian Prime Minister and to recommend that no further statements should be made on the subject of Greater Syria before the legislatures of the Arab States.

8. While these exchanges attracted more attention and appeared, superficially, to indicate a greater degree of feeling on the subject at issue, they were, in fact, less dangerous than the talk which was current during September last of a revolt in Syria designed to terminate the republican régime in the country. My telegrams Nos. 52, 54, 59 and 63 refer.

It may well be the case that the present ventilation of the question will put a term to the suspicion that has been evident in some quarters that His Majesty's Government, or, at least, some of the servants of His Majesty's Government, have been working in favour of a Kingdom of Greater Syria.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to the High Commissioner for Palestine and to His Majesty's representatives at Bagdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus and Jeddah.

I have, &c.

A. S. KIRKBRIDE.